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RUKMANI
Nirodha and Vyutthana are two key words in the Yogasutras (YS.) of
Patan~jali. They are like opposite poles and in I.31 and I.4,2 Patan~jali
brings out this distinction clearly. While in the stage of nirodha the seer
abides in itself, in the vyutthana stage, even though purus. a or citisakti
is the same without change, it does not seem to be so, as it has the
same form as the modification of the mind.3 We could translate nirodha
as ‘total restraint’ and vyutthana as ‘emergent activity’ due to klesa
or afflictions. They refer to the states of samadhi (both sam . prajn~ata
and asam . prajn~
ata) and non-sam
adhi respectively. As long as kle a
s
4
(afflictions) or karmasaya (deposit of karma) holds sway kaivalya or
liberation cannot come into existence.5 The aim of the YS. is to free
purus. a from its association with the mind (gun. as) and attain its true
nature. The system thus appears very clear theoretically, but when one
reads the YS. one is faced with many difficulties.
Yoga is defined as the ‘restraint of the modifications of the mind’.6
Yoga is also used for both types of samadhi. 7 Samadhi is also the
8
last means to yoga. Thus samadhi stands for two kinds of samadhi
and also denotes both the means and the end. In addition having two
stages of samadhi (sam. prajn~ata
and asam . prajn~ata)
and relegating
. prajn~ata
to a state of vyutthana . prajn~ata
sam 9 in comparison with asam
further complicates matters. There have been attempts to get over some
of these problems. Thus some commentators have tried to explain these
difficulties but not always in the same way. The various interpretations
only reinforced the belief that yoga was a practical path which, if
done systematically, would lead to kaivalya at the end. It was difficult
unambiguously to lay down the different stages without getting into
some semantic and etymological problems. In experience the transition
from vyutthana to nirodha was perhaps smooth. But the same, when
spelt out in ordinary language, (even when it is the devavan . ı Sanskrit)
gives rise to many problems. Some of them are
and nirodha;
1) what are the exact definitions of vyutthana
Journal of Indian Philosophy 25: 613–628, 1997.
c 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
to asam . prajn~ata,
we are left further confused.15 Patan ~jali himself calls
sam . praj ~
n
ata vyutth
ana in relation to asam . prajn ~
ata in YS.III.9.16 Thus if
the definition in YS.I.2 took care of the defect of non-inclusion, it now
suffers under the defect of over-pervasion (ativyaptidos . a). By already
mentioning that samadhi (nirodha) is a state of all stages of the mind
(ks. ipta, etc.) it becomes difficult to resolve the tension between nirodha
and vyutthana. This led Misra to interpret yoga as the nirodha which
is the cause for the destruction of the afflictions.17 And Bhiks. u gets
over the problem by connecting the second sutra to the third sutra and
reading them together. Thus according to Bhiks. u that is nirodha which
is the cause for purus. a abiding in itself.18 But can one jump from one
sutra (I.2) to another (I.3) without compromising ekavakyat a (syntactic
unity)? Bhiks. u stretches the rule of ekavakyat a in this case and so his
interpretation is suspect. But if that is overlooked the interpretation can
be accepted. Bhoja does not address himself to the problem at all. The
Vivaran. akara (VK.) is not concerned with the implication of nirodha
but argues from the result saying that ks. ipta, mud . ha and viks. ipta cannot
be called samadhi because in those states the object is not revealed
as it is. Using the analogy of ‘walking’ and ‘stopping’ he argues that
as the end of ‘making known the object as it is’19 is obtained only
in ekagrat the others are not samadhi.
a, Now all these commentators
have argued backwards from the result of samadhi and are begging the
question. This became necessary since the sutra-s (I.1, I.2) themselves
do not convey the meaning clearly. Misra and the VK. at least stay
within the bhas . ya text to draw out the meaning, whereas Bhiks. u goes
beyond the relevant sutra and bhas. ya to connect the sense.
Before we move on there is one more question which needs attention.
By defining yoga as samadhi (I.1 bhas. ya) and then as restraint (I.2),
the relationship between samadhi and yoga is left hanging loose. Later
in the Sadhanapada, samadhi is listed under the means to yoga.20 So
now we get a situation where samadhi is both the means and the end
(yoga); this necessitates a different way of viewing samadhi.
Bhoja just summarises the relevant sutras and refrains from getting
into any of the intricacies. While Misra and Bhiks. u accept the necessity
of both yoga-s as two steps leading to the final goal,21 the VK. strikes
a discordant note by denying that there is a relationship of cause and
effect between sam . prajn~ata
and asam . prajn~ata
and adding further that
asam . prajn~ata
is independent of sam . prajn~ata.
22 As he cannot maintain
this position in the later sutras 23 he contradicts himself and so is not
of great help. As sam . prajn~ata
is known as sab ıja24 and asam . prajn~ata
this stage that there is clarity of vision (vaisaradya); ignoring all that
went before we are told that r. tam . bhar
a arises in this stage. We already
know that .rtam . bhar a arises in all the above stages; so this only adds
to the confusion.
We must also be aware of a new word introduced in sutra I.41,36 i.e.
samapatti. Misra glosses over the word as a synonym of sam . prajn~ata.
But Bhiks. u and the VK. understand it as a special, technical word in
Yoga, emphasizing more the result of sam . prajn~ata
than the process.
The VK. makes an imaginary opponent (purvapaks . in) raise the question
and implies that samapatti denotes the accomplishment of the effect.37
Bhiks. u makes it very clear that samapatti means prajn~a and that it is the
result of sam . prajn~
ata. 39 If the intention of Patan ~jali was to distinguish
samapatti as the result from samadhi as the process, one would have
expected him to use it only in YS.I.47, which defines the last stage and
result of sam . prajn~ata.
But immediately after introducing the word in
I.41 Patan~jali goes on to call even the first stage of sam . prajn~ata
(i.e.
savitarka) as samapatti. 40 Bhiks. u is not happy with this situation and
tries to give his own interpretation which leaves us further confused.41
He seems to suggest that sam . a,
. yama (dharan dhyana and samadhi )
as means, concerns itself with the objective aspect of samadhi, but
samapatti has direct perception of the object or it is a state of oneness
with the object. Thus the end is distinguished from the process of
sam. yama in which samadhi stands for the means. But this is not at
all plausible, for YS.III.342 also defines samadhi as oneness with the
object of support. Then what is the difference between samadhi and
samapatti ?
So even introducing the concept of samapatti does not get us any
further and the tension between nirvicara samapatti
as nirodha and the
other stages as vyutthana is still very much there. Can we say that the
superior position accorded to the last stage is because of the subtlety
of the objective support and not due to the nature of prajn~a that comes
into being? Prajn~a has only one meaning and it cannot change its sense
with every samadhi state. It is perhaps this dilemma that forces Bhiks. u
to give two different meanings for r. tam . bhara prajn~a- 1) prajn~a is
common to all the states43 and denotes the class prajn~a even when it
arises in the lower states like savitarka, nirvitarka, etc. 2) only prajn~a
that arises in the last stage can be called r. tam . bhara. This is no help
whatsoever.
There is some more information on prajn~a when we look at the
second chapter on means to yoga. In the Sadhanap prajn~a takes
ada
on the role of means which is not mentioned in the Samadhip
ada. In
YS.I.2 we were introduced to the word prasankhy _ 44 which is the
ana
same as sattvapurus. anyat ati
akhy and dharmameghadhyana and denotes
prajn~a.
In YS.II.11 Vyasa mentions dhyana
45 called prasankhy _ as
ana
46
that through which the last stage of yoga is achieved. In YS.I.15 on
the other hand, we were told that prasankhy _ is the capacity of the
ana
mind to see subtle defects and thus help in detachment (vasıkara); 47
therefore vasıkara
(detachment) and paravas ıkara are the instruments
here. By placing prasankhy _ also under the means and by calling it
ana
in the second pada, the tension is not resolved.
dhyana
view in II.27 that makes prajn~a serve both the meanings of nirodha
(sam . prajn~ata
and asam . prajn~ata).
62
To get the picture straight – firstly we know from our earlier
understanding63 that sam . prajn~ata
was a vyutthana state in compar-
ison to the asam . praj ~
n
ata nirodha, but now within prajn~a itself there is
a division of some prajn~a-s being kaivalya (hanam) and others being
those that lead to hanam. So it must mean that some prajn~a-s are
vyutthana-s in relation to the last three which are nirodha-s or one
nirodha explained variously. Thus the tension continues. And we are
left with one more problem to resolve, i.e. which is the last stage? Is the
last .rtam. bhara prajn~a the last or the last three of the seven-fold prajn~a
or asam . prajn~ata
itself? Does this again mean that in experience these
stages are easy to identify, but when put into a text and a language,
defy comprehension and lead to problems of semantics?
We have to also address ourselves to the very many words that yoga
uses almost synonymously. Of the six systems of philosophy Yoga
is perhaps the one school which has a profusion of technical words
used interchangeably. Thus we have dharmamegha, prasankhy _
ana,
anyatakhy atih . , sattvapurus. anyat
akhyatih . , viveka, vivekakhy
atih . , praj n~a,
.rtam. bhara, pratibhaj
n~ana,
ekagracitta, sabıjah. and more being used
more or less in the same sense. While some of these words have
already been referred to in the passages above it will be useful to look
at dharmamegha as it is relevant to the vyutthana-nirodha debate.
Dharmamegha, prasankhy _
ana,
sattvapurus. anyat
akhyatih .,
vivekakhyatih . , khyatih
. , asam . prajn~
ata, nirb
ıjah
. are introduced by Vyasa
very early under the second sutra of the Samadhip itself.64 Vy
ada asa
does not think it necessary to explain these terms whatsoever at this
stage. He only says that the highest samadhi having insight into the
difference between purus. a and buddhi 65 is called dharmamegha. So we
think then that it is the same as the nirvicara samapatti
mentioned in
I.47.66 As for prasankhy _
ana, we have already seen above the confusion
of using prasankhy _
ana, as both means and end (prajn~a). 67
Dharmamegha poses some problems as to its exact connotation. Under
sutra I.2 Misra just explains Vyasa’s statement defining dharmamegha
as the highest discernment.68 Bhiks. u also has the same explanation
following Vyasa as the highest prasankhy _ 69 The VK. does not
ana.
explain the word but only mentions that dharmamegha is the name of
samadhi. 70 Bhoja does not gloss the word at this stage. The difficulty
again that defies logic is the gradation in prajn~a or anyatakhy atih . . Thus
Bhiks. u describes dharmamegha in the Yogasarasa _
ngraha as the highest
stage of insight into atman. 71 Can there be a qualitative difference in
stating this is that the yogı practises detachment even towards prajn~a or
_
prasankhy and then reaches the last mature stage of dharmamegha,
ana
i.e. a continued presence of prajn~a. YS.IV.30 continues with the same
topic of dharmamegha and mentions that all afflictions and all karma
cease in this stage. Vyasa mentions a yogı in this state as a liberated
one -jıvanmukta.82 Misra and Bhiks. u also repeat the same idea,83 each
in his own way. The VK. departs from both Misra and Bhiks. u by
stating that dharmamegha is so called because ‘it rains the supreme
form of discernment, does not make sense. He does not expand on the
jıvanmukta concept but repeats what Vyasa says.86 Bhoja expands on
dharmamegha under IV.29.87 and agrees with Vyasa regarding its being
a stage of continuous discerning insight.88 Bhoja, however, does not
use the word jıvanmukta to define such a yogı though his description of
the state as a ‘cessation of afflictions and of karma’89 is tantamount to
the same thing. It is significant though that Bhoja does not talk about
the cessation of the yogi’s karma which is neither bright nor dark but
the cessation of only the threefold karma.
YS.IV.32 continues with the description of the effect of the rise of
dharmamegha.90 Having dealt with the continued presence of discern-
ment and the omniscience and jıvanmukti the text states the same
dharmamegha also frees the gun. a-s from giving rise to further
mutations.91 Having stated the effects of dharmamegha there is no
clue whatsoever to the riddle of jıvanmukti versus asam . prajn~ata
or
kaivalya. The topic of dharmamegha is dropped and after discussing
what a sequence is in IV.33 the text presents us with the definition of
kaivalya proper in IV.34.92 This brings us to asam . prajn~ata
and we are
left with the feeling of not fully knowing what dharmamegha really
stands for. So far then what is clear is that sam . prajn~ata
is a vyutthana
in comparison to asam . prajn~ata.
But in sam . prajn~ata
itself the earlier
stages of savitarka, nirvitarka, etc. are vyutthana-s in relation to the
last nirvicara. While it is not stated explicitly we also get the feeling
that prajn~a also has gradations and so the prajn~a of nirvicara, at its
height called dharmamegha, is a nirodha while all others have to be
viewed as vyutthana-s. It also appears that unlike Advaita-Vedanta and
Sankhya
_ the jıvanmukti concept in Yoga is not very well defined. It
seems just slightly lower than the final nirodha. Thus that is also a
vyutthana in comparison to the last nirb ıja.
One point which is not made clear in Yoga is the relationship of
prarabdha-karma (karma that has started yielding result) to prajn~a-
sam . sk
ara-s. If praj ~
na sam. sk
ara-s are capable of destroying all vyutth
ana-
sam . sk
ara-s and replacing them with only praj ~
n
a-sam . sk
ara-s in turn
to be overcome by asam . prajn~ata
sam . skara-s, what happens to the
prarabdha-sam
. skara-s? In dharmamegha-prajn~a the yogı is constantly
in a state of prajn~a; so only prajn~a-sam
. skara-s
are being accumulated.
Logically since all klesa-s and karma cease at this stage there should
not be the prarabdha either. But since a jıvanmukta will have to live
asam . prajn~ata
adding that asam . prajn~ata
subliminal impressions oppose
the prajn~a subliminal impressions. So we have asam
96
. prajn~ata
the real
nirodha 1) being experienced through its subliminal impressions;97 2)
as opposing the subliminal impressions of prajn~a; 3) called nirb ıja
because it is without seed. Asam . praj n~
ata cannot be directly known
as a state of knowledge like sam . prajn~ata because there is no object
to which it relates itself. In that sense it is without a seed (nirbıja).
It is because of its superior status of being without seed that Bhiks. u
raises this state above even Advaita’s jn~ana and S _
ankhya’s viveka.98
But the question which arises here, as it did in the case of prajn~a
earlier, is whether asam . prajn~ata
coming into being once will result
in kaivalya or is it something which has to perfect itself and come to
a final asam . prajn~ata
like dharmamegha in the case of sam . prajn~ata.
There is another dimension to the problem here. In sam . prajn~ata
we
were told that the last state of dharmamegha is the state of jıvanmukti
which burns away all karma except prarabdha. The difficulties with
that notion were examined there and no satisfactory explanation was
forthcoming from the texts themselves.
When we now look at asam . prajn~ata as the stage of kaivalya we
naturally assume that prarabdha is burnt away now. Vyasa does not
state it in so many words but Bhiks. u is very clear on this point. He
says that prarabdha is overcome by asam . prajn~ata
as it destroys all
. prajn~ata
99
subliminal impressions. But the way Bhiks. u describes asam
in its relation to kaivalya and prarabdha raises the question of many
asam . prajn~ata
samadhi-s along with prarabdha being destroyed only in
the last asam . prajn~ata.
For instance, in the Yogas ara. Bhiks. u says that the
need to define asam . praj ~
n
ata as having only the residue of sam
. skara-s
100
is to allow for activity to take place. In fact he uses the very word
for activity. Our understanding so far is that asam
vyutthana . prajn~ata
cannot arise till dharmamegha is achieved. Once there is detachment
towards dharmamegha, asam . prajn~ata comes into being. So even in
the dharmamegha stage vyutthana has ceased, so how can it come into
being in the stage of asam . praj n~ata?
This is further aggravated when
Bhiks. u mentions that nirodha is a state having a series of subliminal
impressions alone and in that state the mind will only have sometimes
more and sometimes less of sam
. skara-s.
101 One can only surmise that
NOTES
1
tada dras. t.uh. svarupe’vasthanam.
2
vr.ttisarupyamitaratra.
3
vyutthane yah. cittavr.ttayah. tadavisis. t.avr. ttih. purus. ah. -Vyasabhas. ya under
YS.I.4.
4
i) klesamulah. karmasayo dr. s. .tadr.s. tajanmavedanıyah. . YS.II.12.
ii) sati mule tadvipako jatyayurbhogah. . YS.II.13.
5
gun. adhikarakramasamaptau kaivalyamuktam. – Vyasa’s introduction to YS.IV.34.
6
yogascittavr.ttinirodhah. . YS.I.2.
7
sarvasabdagrahan. at sam . prajn ~ato’pi yoga iti akhyayate : : : dvividhah. sa yogah.
cittavr.ttinirodha iti : : : VBh. on YS.I.2.
8
YS.II.29.
9
i) asam . prajn ~atapeks. aya sam . prajn ~ato’pyatra vyutthanam boddhyam – Varttika on
YS.I.4.
ii) nirodhasamadhimapeks. ya sam . prajn~ato’pi vyutthanameveti : : : Vaisaradı on
YS.I.3.
iii) tatha ca vyutthanam nirodhasca yogadvayasa dharan. a evatra grahyah. : : : Varttika
on YS.III.9.
10
yogah. samadhih. . sa ca sarvabhaumascittasya dharmah. – VBh. on YS.I.1.
11
ks. iptam, mud. ham, viks. iptam, ekagram, niruddhamiti cittabhumayah. .
12
tatra viks. ipte cetasi viks. epopasarjanıbhutah. samadhir na yogapaks. e vartate.
: : : pradh anamallanirbahananya yena ks. iptamud. hayorapi nis. edhah. kr.tah. . Vivaran. a
13
on YS.I.1.
14
cf. Brahmalinamuni Pata n~jalayogadarsanam (1970) p. 13.
15
asam . prajn ~atapeks. aya sam . prajn ~ato’pi vyutthanam – Varttika on YS.III.9. Also see
n. 9 above.
16
vyutthananirodhasam. skarayorabhibhavapra durbhavau nirodhaks. an. acittanvayo
nirodhaparin. amah. . YS.III.9.
17
ata eva karmarupan. i bandhanani slathayati. karma catrapurvamabhimatam, karye
karan. opacarat. slathayati svakaryad avasadayati. Vaisaradı on YS.I.1.
18
tada dras. .tuh. svarupe : : : ativyaptih. – cf. T.S. Rukmani, Yogavarttika of
Vijn~anabhiks
. u. Vol. I, p. 33.
19
samadhitve satyapi karyakaran. at paks. a ityucyate. yatha gacchatah. pratipadam
vidyamanapi sthitih. sthitikaryakaran. an na sthitirityucyate. viks. epopasarjanıbhutatvam
viks. epasthaikasamadhivyaktyabhipra yen. a sarvabhauma iti tu pradhanyam samanyena
sarvabhumis. u vr. tteh. – Vivaran. a on YS.I.1. cf. Rama Sastri, Krishnamurti Sastri (eds.)
n~jalayogasutrabh
Pata . ya-vivaran. am, p. 8.
as
20
yamaniyama’sanapran. ayamapratyaharadharan. adhyanasamadhayo’s. t.a-vang _ ani.
YS.II.29.
21
i) castvartho’ng _ adanginam
_ bhinatti. YS.I.1. Vaisaradı. Narayan. a Misra in his explana-
tion of anga _ and ang _ ı in this context says: angam _ = tr.tıyadhyayatr.tıyasutrapratipadyam
as. t.amamangam _ yogasya. ang _ ı = sam . praj ~
n
a to’sam. prajn ~atasca, ubhayorapi
yogasabdenabhidhanasya vaks. yaman. atvat. angam _ sam . prajn _ ı
~atasamadhih. , ang
asam . praj ~
n
a tasam
a dhiriti kasyacit vy
a khy
a nam. cf. N
arayan . a Mi
sra (ed.)
n~jalayogadarsanam, p. 3.
Pata
ii) yadyapi samadhisabdenaikagratatisayarupam
nirodhadvayaru payogadvayasya ngameva _ paribhas. is. yate tathapi
yogadvayamang _ anginorabhedavivaks
_ . ayaiva samadhisabdenoktamevamuttarottarasu tre’pi
bodhyam. cf. Rukmani op. cit. p. 26.
samadhirbhavati. ibid.
89
klesanamavidyadınamabhinivesantanam karman. am ca sukladibhedena trividhanam
jn~anodayatpurvapurvakaran. anivr.ttya nivr. ttirbhavati. Bhojavr.tti under YS.IV.30.
90
tatah. kr.tarthanam parin. amakramasamaptirgun. anam, YS.IV.32.
91
tasya dharmameghasyodaya tkr.tarthanam gun. anam parin. amakramah. parisamapyate
: : : VBh. under YS.IV.32.
92
purus. arthasunyanam gun. anam pratiprasvah. kaivalyam svarupapratis. t.ha va
citisaktiriti. YS.IV.34.
93
Like the presence of the body after jıvanmukti leading to the postulate in advaita
that there is still some residue of avidya left.
. skaropagam bhavati. sa nirbıjah. samadhih. . VBh. under YS.I.2.
94
i) tadavastham sam
ii) tasmanniralam . banadeva jn ~anaprasadamatrattasyotpattiryukta : : : niralam . banah.
sam . skaramatrases. asya niralam . banasya samadheh. karan. amupapadyate
: : : abh avapraptamiva vr. ttirupakaryakaran. annirbıjah. niralam . banah. : : : Vaisaradı under
YS.I.18.
iii) cf. Rukmani op. cit. Vol. I, p. 246.
. prajn~ata
due to the grace or prasada of
95
Bhiksu sometimes accommodates asam
Isvara. Varttika under YS.I.23 and YS.II.45. cf. Rukmani op. cit. Vol. I, p. 126; Vol.
II, p. 216.
~akr.tanamapi sam . skaran. am pratibandhı bhavati. VBh. under YS.I.51.
96
: : : prajn
102
: : : evam kramen . a caramasam ~ate’khilasam
. prajn . skaradaho bhavati : : : Yogasara,
p. 34.
103
cf. Rukmani op. cit. Vol. I, p. 255 and footnotes on p. 255.
: : : iti s _ rahasyam svanubhavasiddhamupadis. t.am. Yogasara, p. 91.
104
ankhyayogayo
Note: Though the Vaisaradı, Vartikka and Vivaran. a are commentaries on the VBh.
on the YS. for the sake of brevity they are indicated as ‘on’ the YS. in the notes.
Thus, for instance, note 70 says Vivaran. a on YS.I.2. instead of Vivaraņa on VBh.
on YS.I.2.
REFERENCES
Department of Religion
Concordia University
Montreal, Quebec H3G 1H8