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What was the role of Honduran elites in the coup dtat of 2009?

Raquel Orejas Tagarro Survey of Modern Latin American Politics Fall semester 2009 Words: 3857

I. Introduction While I was a volunteer in Central America the coup in Honduras broke out. The instability of the whole region was palpable. Latin America has always been known to be prone to this type of political action, even though today most of the countries are developed democracies. Cursio Malaparte, the author of The Technique of the Coup (1937) argued that the coup is nothing more than "the resource of the power class when it is in danger of losing power." Usually coup dtats are negatively seen by the majority of the population. However, in Honduras that was not the case. The population was divided; half in favor, half against the coup. The international community condemned the coup and stressed dialogue between the main parties. Therefore a deeper study of the Honduras case will release some valuable insights. This paper will answer the question, how were the Honduran elites involved in the coup dtat of June 2009? For that purpose I will provide an overview of the quality of democracy in the country. Then I will explain the evolution of the coup while explaining details of the different actions and actors involved. The final part will concentrate specifically on each of the various elite groups and how they were involved.

II. Honduras: political, economic and social facts Honduras is a Central American country, bordered to the west by Guatemala, to the south by El Salvador, Nicaragua, and the Pacific Ocean, and to the north by the Carribean. Its estimated population is 7 million. Honduras has one of the lowest rates of income per capita in Latin America and the Caribbean. Due to rapid population growth, GDP growth has been insufficient to exert a significant improvement on living standards of the population 1 . Moreover, in June 2005 Honduras was among the 18 poorest countries of the world, whose debt was relieved by the Group of G8. 2 With 64% of the population below the poverty line, Honduras also has the second highest poverty rate in Latin America, after Haiti. 3
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UNDP, Honduras Human Development Report 2009, http://hdrstats.undp.org/es/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_HND.html 2 Stanford Graduate School of Business, The G8 Debt Relief Plan May Not Help, http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/news/research/econ_henry_g8debtrelief.shtml 3 Anonymous, CENTRAL AMERICA: Honduran coup drives instability Oxford Analytica Daily Brief Service. Aug 13, 2009:1

The Honduran economy is more than 55% based on the service industry. The major industries of the country are sugar, coffee, textiles, clothing and wood products. The remittances sent from the US are counted for more than 20% of the GDP in 2008. 4 Several factors of its political history need to be explained. During the twentieth century, the growing importance of the banana plantations put the country under the domination of American fruit companies such as United Fruit Company, Standard and Cuyamel. Shortly afterwards, Honduras became a "banana republic". However, the American multinationals contributed little to the overall development of the country. In 1933, Tiburcio Caras Andino, supported by the United Fruit Company, came to power and pursued an aggressive dictatorship until 1948. Juan Manuel Glvez succeeded him and began the modernization of the country, to include introducing it in the Organization of American States (OAS). 5 In 1954, a democratic regime was established and the liberal Ramn Villeda Morales became president of the Republic. He made the country join the Central American Common Market (CACM), implemented an agrarian reform, and pursued different education programs. In 1963, during the nervousness caused by the rise of communism in Cuba, Colonel Osvaldo Lpez Arellano took power via a coup. Due to the removal from power of Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua in 1979, the general instability in El Salvador, and the pressure from the U.S. under President Jimmy Carter, the Honduran military accelerated the process to return to democracy. In April 1980 people voted for a Constitutional Assembly and general elections were held in November 1981. A new constitution was approved in 1982. The election of the Liberal Party candidate Roberto Suazo Cordova in 1981 marked the return of civilian rule. In 1985, Jose Simon Azcona Hoyo became president. He was followed by Rafael Leonardo Callejas, in 1989, whose administration was filled with strikes while he was trying to handle a disastrous economic situation. In 1993, Carlos Roberto Reina won the presidential election. Reina entered the path of economic reforms and austerity measures. His government abolished
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EIU, Country Finance: Honduras, http://www.eiu.com.proxy1.library.jhu.edu/report_dl.asp?issue_id=824107867&mode=pdf 5 Organization of American States (OAS) is the oldest regional organization in the world, dating 1889. The Organizations four main pillarsdemocracy, human rights, security, and developmentsupport each other and are intertwined through political dialogue, inclusiveness, cooperation, and legal and follow up instruments that provide the OAS with the tools to maximize its work in the Hemisphere.

compulsory military service and restructured the armed forces. Through these changes, Reina was in charge of decreasing the military power in the country. Reina was succeeded by a liberal, Carlos Roberto Flores. While he was in office Hurricane Mitch occurred. It was the worst natural disaster in Honduran history. It resulted in more than 10,000 deaths and material losses of over three billion dollars. After that Ernesto Ricardo Maduro Joest, a former president of the Central Bank of Honduras during the regime of Callejas Romero, became president. He is known for pursuing neoliberal economic policies. In the 21st century the first president was Ricardo Maduro of the National Party of Honduras. During his electoral campaign Maduro promised great advances in the economy. Although as president he had some success during 2004 and 2005, he fell short of his promises. In 2006, power was transferred to the liberal Manuel Zelaya Rosales, who won the 2005 elections with 49.9% of the vote. Economic concerns have always been a major issue in Honduras, from its beginning as a banana republic until today. Zelaya surprised the Honduran population, first by making a deal with Hugo Chvez and Petrocaribe to receive oil, and second, by entering the regional leftist alliance ALBA in 2006. 6 The relations with the U.S. at the beginning of ALBA's mandate were nice and smooth. However, before joining Honduras and Petrocaribe, Zelaya began to make very grave statements of the U.S. government. He criticized the US immigration policy, its drug laws, and its free market practices. This was an astounding transformation of the Honduran diplomatic direction. During the Cold War Honduras served as the base for U.S. aircraft sorties designed to control the revolutionary left in Central America; now Zelaya adopted ALBA political language as his own. 7

III. Measuring quality of democracy in Honduras How to evaluate if a democracy is appropriate and legitimate for the citizens is not an easy task. A great deal of literature devoted to this issue can be found. A one
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ALBA. Alianza Bolivariana para los pueblos de nuestra Amrica. A regional alliance created by Hugo Chvez in 2001 as a vehicle for broader regional economic integration and an alternative to the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas. However, it is essentially a club for the region's leftist leaders. Members: Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Dominica, Honduras, Ecuador, San Vicente & Granadinas, Antigua & Barbuda. 7 Centro de Estudios Internacionales de Barcelona (CIDOB), Biografa de Manuel Zelaya, http://www.cidob.org/es/documentacio/biografias_lideres_politicos/america_central_y_caribe/hondur as/manuel_zelaya_rosales

size fits all model can not be established as countries, democracies, and citizens differ enormously. For that reason I will review three sources to measure quality of democracy in Honduras: First, the Latinobarmetro Survey. Second, the democracy ranking of the Quality of Democracy. Leonardo Morlino. 8 Latinobarmetro is an annual public opinion survey that involves some 19,000 interviews in 18 Latin American countries, representing more than 400 million inhabitants. The main conclusions of the Latinobarmetro Survey (2008) about Honduras are pretty gloomy. More than 80% of the population believes that the country is ruled by a powerful elite that only cares about their own benefit. Additionally, the trust in congress, government, and the president is between 20% and 30%. However, the most astonishing figure is that 63% of those polled would not mind an authoritarian government if they could resolve the economic problems of the country. 9 The second source to evaluate Honduras democracy is the ranking of the Quality of Democracy (2008 2009), which is calculated by two scholars from the Vienna University of Technology and the University of Klagenfurt. It is an annual ranking of all country based democracies in the world by focusing on the quality of democracy from an international perspective. The variables taken into account are: the political system, the level of socioeconomic gender equality, the economic system, the knowledge based information society, the level of education and research, health status, the health system and environmental sustainability. The ranking focuses on average values of the two two year periods, from 2002 2003 and 2005 2006. Honduras was ranked 61st out of a total of 103 countries. Only four countries of the Latin America region were below Honduras: Venezuela, Guatemala, Paraguay and Nicaragua. 10 Finally, the last resource is the eight dimensions framework proposed by Larry Diamond and Leonardy Morlino. The authors explain that a good democracy has at Third, the eight dimension model of Larry Diamond and

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Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino, The Quality of Democracy, Journal of Democracy 15 (2004): 21 Corporacin Latinobarmetro, Informe Latinobarmetro 2008 10 David F. J. Campbell and Georg Plzlbauer February, The Democracy Ranking 2008/2009 of the Quality of Democracy method and Ranking Outcome http://www.democracyranking.org/en/ranking.htm

least universal suffrage, fair elections, more than one party and several means of information. Their framework also takes into account the level of civil and political freedom, equality, and transparency. 11 In order to establish a comprehensive analysis of the Honduras case I have included a table with the definition of each dimension as the authors explained in their work. (See table 1.) The second column is the characteristics of the democracy in Honduras that reveal if that dimension is accomplished or not. The last column is the level of satisfaction of the dimension studied. The results of the study reveal that the quality of democracy through the lenses of the Diamond and Morlino framework is insufficient. The level of corruption, the low trust in the government and its institutions, and the feeling of inequality among the citizens is astounding. However, the level of electoral participation is one of the highest in the region and the competition is fair in the party system. To sum up, Honduras democracy through the three methods of evaluation can not be catalogued as a good one. Furthermore, the country has the infrastructure to let flourish an equal and free democracy. However, the distance between the main population and the elites is too wide to let this happen. It is not easy to access the political sphere and if you make it there, you will be pressed by many additional actors that come from outside the political sphere, e.g. powerful businessmen or the church.

IV. The 2009 coup dtat On June 28, 2009, a group of soldiers surrounded presidents Manuel Zelaya Rosales house; they arrested him in pajamas and took him to the Honduran Air Force where he was sent to Costa Rica. The president of the Congress, Roberto Micheletti Bain, took office as interim president. Zelaya was sent to Costa Rica because that same Sunday, he was preparing an opinion poll asking if the people wanted a fourth ballot box in the November elections. The fourth ballot box the other three are for the President, the deputies and the

mayors was to vote for the calling of a National Constituent Assembly in 2010, whose primary aim would be to draft a new Constitution of the Republic. Honduras' constitution has not been, and cannot be, modified since its ratification in 1982. It is
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Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino, The Quality of Democracy, Journal of Democracy 15 (2004): 23

believed that the reason why Zelaya was so interested in changing the Constitution was to imitate his counterparts of Venezuela, Nicaragua and Bolivia. He wanted to be re elected when his term ends in November of this year. The coup was fueled by a growing confrontation between the three branches of government, specifically between the judicial power and the executive. The initiative of President Zelaya of promoting a consultation had a hostile response from the political class. They constantly reminded the country that in the past that proposal had implied an authoritarian coup. From that moment, any attempt by the president to consult the citizens clashed with opposition from the Legislature and the judiciary. Carlos Aguilar observes that when President Manuel Zelaya thought of doing the survey he did not handle well a few issues. First, Central American democracies do not have the same level of citizen participation compared to western ones. Second, any kind of reform that involve the elites should be slowly and firmly prepared by all the public sectors. Third, the power of the armed forces has been greater than the presidents in all countries of the region except for Costa Rica. Furthermore, the military has strong liaisons with other elites like corporate groups and the Catholic Church. As Cardinal Rodrguez said in Central America, politics smells of gunpowder and incense. 12 From another point of view, Margarita Montes, a Honduran citizen who wrote an article for the Spanish newspaper El Mundo stresses that what happened on the 28th of June was not exactly a coup. She argues that for the first time in the post Cold War era (1989 to date), an army overthrew a democratically elected constitutional president to restore the rule of law, not to break it. Moreover, the Honduran case does not comply with two fundamental characteristics of coup dtats: violation of the rule of law and military rule. The armed forces followed a court order. Its purpose was to restore the rule of law that was being consistently violated by the president. After the intervention of the armed forces, the constitution was still intact and fully respected

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Carlos Aguilar, Cmo y Por qu del Golpe de Estado en Honduras?, Center for International Policy Americas Program, August 10, 2009. http://www.pensamientocritico.info/index.php/especiales/crisis en honduras/189 como y por que del golpe de estado en honduras la sinopsis de un proceso de pacificacion y democratizacion fallido en la region.html

the succession of power established by the Constitution, thereby appointing a new president. 13 However, Zelayas actions did not justify his arrest and deportation. Coups are not a democratic way of resolving problems. That is a lesson Latin America learned the hard way. 14 The November elections are seen by many countries and Politians as illegitimate. Also, the way Zelaya wanted to reverse the coup through violence or the way he tried to bribe policeman in the borders to enter his country are no better. In this case no one is innocent, but the whole Honduran population has suffered a violation of human rights and has been dishonored by their political elites. There are numerous national and international reports from human rights organizations that discuss the repression and violations of fundamental rights and freedoms since the coup. The violations reported include: thousands of arbitrary detentions, excessive use of force, physical abuse demonstrators by police and the military, killings of protesters and political opponents, torture, sexual abuse, and intimidation of human rights defenders.

V. The implication of the elites in the 2009 Coup Before numbering all the elites involved in the coup it is important to mention which are the main institutions that Hondurans citizens trust and rely on. The church has the highest level of public confidence with 67.8%, followed closely by the media with 66.2%. The third institution is the Armed Forces with 59%, which would rank as the state institution that receives the highest level of confidence in Honduras, followed by municipalities with 54%. The central government only reaches 51% confidence, followed by the police with 50%. The National Congress, the Public Ministry and the Attorney General's Office ranked in the middle of public confidence. The Electoral Court, the Supreme Court and High Court Accounts are at the bottom of the group in terms of public confidence. In the bottom of the rank we find the political parties with 36%. 15 With this we can now an overview of the power of the main elites in Honduras.

13 14

Margarita Montes, La ruptura de un modelo, El Mundo, July 2, 2009, Opinin. Anonymous, Leaders: Why and how to reinstate Zelaya; Reversing Honduras's coup, The Economist, July 25, 2009. 15 Jos Miguel Cruz, Jos Ren Argueta, Mitchell A. Seligson, Ph.D. Cultura poltica de la democracia en Honduras: 2006, Proyecto de Opinin Publica de Amrica Latina (LAPOP) & USAID (2007)

(A.) Interests of the political parties and institutions 16 Roberto Micheletti, the losing candidate of the Liberal Party in the primary elections, had a strong antipathy to Zelaya for not giving enough support to ensure its success. In addition, Zelayas party militants saw his initiative as a threat to win the coming elections. Moreover deputies from two of the three small parties, the PINU and the Christian Democrats were on the side of the National Congress in the confrontation between the government branches. The only party who supported Zelaya was the leftist Democratic Unification Party who had little representation in parliament. Interested institutions include: The Supreme Court, whose president has a direct dependency relationship with Micheletti. The Public Ministry, where leaders were appointed by Congress after heavy negotiations between the blocs in which Micheletti played an active role. The Attorney General of the Republic, ruled by a Liberal appointed by Congress and who had heavy dependence in his party The National Commissioner for Human Rights, who was reelected by the National Congress after intense negotiations with the Liberal Party The Supreme Electoral Tribunal, highly politicized body whose president belongs to the Liberal Party and maintains direct links with the Congress president.

(B.) The corporate groups The Honduran economy, as others in Latin America, is based on the business of a few families who control all economic sectors. It is almost impossible to walk through Honduras without seeing or touching something that does not belong to Canahuati Larach, the Flores, the Andonie Fernandez, the Ferrari, the Kafie, the Nasser, the Rosenthal and the Goldstein families. The family leaders arrived in Honduras as immigrants and now they send their youngest children to be educated in the U.S. so they can continue to operate as Honduran political elites. There are normally no confrontations between them, although they sometimes argue in politics. However,

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Leticia Salomn, Honduras. Polticos, empresarios y militares: protagonistas de un golpe anunciado, http://www.resdal.org.ar/honduras/articulo leticia salomon.pdf

when the coup happened all of these families supported it. 17 Zelaya continuously expressed his belief that these businessmen and their companies were responsible for the sluggish performance of the Honduran economy. Furthermore, the revenues of these companies finance the electoral campaigns of the main parties in Honduras. Subsequently, executives pay them back with positions in the political sphere. As an example, the vice president of the Congress is the daughter of the owner of one of the more important newspaper in Tegucigalpa, La Tribuna. On the other hand, the Honduran Council of Private Enterprise (COHEP) and the National Association of Industrialists (ANDI) were upset with the President's decision to unilaterally increase the minimum wage by 66% in December 2008, despite business's refusal to raise it. A higher minimum wage resulted in higher costs. Therefore, to be competitive they had to lay off many workers. This caused higher levels of unemployment and dissatisfaction within the business owners.

(C.) The media The same families described in section B also own the media. They have a variety of businesses, from banks and exporting companies to telephone and cable companies. This reflects one of the main problems affecting the quality of freedom of expression in Honduras. Three of the main channels of television are owned by the same person, Rafael Ferrari, from the Liberal Party, who also owns a number of radio stations.

(D.) The military The possibility of a new government not entirely aligned with U.S. interests and military corporate leadership in the CA 4 (Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador), represented a serious threat to regional control. The Honduran army's protagonist role in the political arena is nothing new in this context. When business is booming, many Latin American democracies accept electoral processes. When the interests of oligarchic sectors are in danger, it is interpreted as an
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Ibid., See also, F. Peregil, Los hilos del poder en Honduras El Pais, December 4, 2009 http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/hilos/poder/Honduras/elpepiint/20091204elpepiint_3/T es

attack on the country and on law and order, which to the ruling elite justifies the collaboration of the armed forces to keeps democracy functioning.

(E.) The church The Honduran Catholic Church, through its parent body the Episcopal Conference, gave its full support to the military coup three days after the event. The Episcopal Conference, widely covered by the press and the news agencies, was pro coup. In its statement the government is accused of "treason, abuse of authority and usurpation of power." Thus according to the Honduran Catholic Church, everything was done according to constitutional standards. Shortly after, the Honduran Cardinal Oscar Andrs Rodrguez called former President Manuel Zelaya to consider his return and thereby avoid a "blood bath" in the country.

(F.) The role of the United States of America The U.S. role in the coup has had many faces. At first, the Obama administration supported the coup. Mark Weisbrot, co director of the Center of Economic and Policy Research (CERP), states in his article that the U.S. State Department sent a letter to Republican Senator Richard Lugar saying that the only person responsible for the coup was Zelaya himself. Moreover, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton criticized Zelaya for trying to re enter Honduras. Afterwards, the U.S. moved to the side of Zelaya. Both Obama and Clinton insisted that Honduras must ignore Zelaya's disobediences and their legal processes and bring back him as president. The U.S. as a threat has stopped aid, cut visas and intimidates North American investments in the country.
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VI. Conclusion To understand the conflict in Honduras it is important to look in depth not only at the structural flaws of the country but also at the power of the different elites. The structural causes that reinforced the coup were the high level of inequality, low confidence in the political system, and a cleavage between the government branches.
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Mark Weisbrot, Obama Should Change Course and Support Democracy In Honduras McClatchy Tribune Information Services, August 13, 2009.

Moreover, having a strict constitution that does not permit amendments does not help either. We have learned that behind a coup there is not only military force, but also powerful groups that dominate the economy and the religious life of the citizens. In deed, to make a coup happen and succeed there is also a great need of support from the population.

TABLE 1: Quality of Democracy in Honduras Definition 19 Rule of law All citizens are equal before the law; Independent judicial system Participate in: elections + civil society organizations + public policy issues Assessment of Honduras 20 Low credibility in the judicial; Income, education & urban/rural differences One of the highest election participation rates in the region; Low civil organizations participation and low identification with a party Strong two party system Liberals and Nationalists + New parties (PINU, PDCH & UD ) Low credibility in the government to solve problems; Economic issues preferred to democracy Very low High Medium Low Level

Participation

Competition

Regular, free and fair electoral competition in the political parties

Vertical Accountability

Obligation of the leaders to answer citizens requirements Government must act in

Horizontal Accountability

accordance with the law and in accordance with all other gov. institutions; A non governmental check and balance

Honduras ranks as the third most corrupt country in the world

Very low

Freedom

High level of violence and distrust Political, civil and social between citizens. Scarce freedom of press Low

Responsiveness

Government enacts the policies that the population want the most All citizens and groups have equal rights and equal legal protection, access to power and justice

Latinobarmetro data: only 28% trust that the people leading the country will do the right thing Inequality has remained constant and not diminished with democracy Very low

Equality

Low

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Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino, The Quality of Democracy, Journal of Democracy 15 (2004): 23 20 Jos Miguel Cruz, Jos Ren Argueta, Mitchell A. Seligson, Ph.D. Cultura poltica de la democracia en Honduras: 2006, Proyecto de Opinin Publica de Amrica Latina (LAPOP) & USAID (2007)

Bibliography

Aguilar,Carlos, Cmo y Por qu del Golpe de Estado en Honduras?, Center for International Policy Americas Program, August 10, 2009. http://www.pensamientocritico.info/index.php/especiales/crisis en honduras/189 como y por que del golpe de estado en honduras la sinopsis de un proceso de pacificacion y democratizacion fallido en la region.html Anonymous, CENTRAL AMERICA: Honduran coup drives instability Oxford Analytica Daily Brief Service. Aug 13, 2009: 1 Anonymous, Leaders: Why and how to reinstate Zelaya; Reversing Honduras's coup, The Economist London: Jul 25, 2009. Vol. 392, Iss. 8641; pg. 12 Centro de Estudios Internacionales de Barcelona (CIDOB)Biografa de Manuel Zelaya http://www.cidob.org/es/documentacio/biografias_lideres_politicos/america_ce ntral_y_caribe/honduras/manuel_zelaya_rosales Corporacin Latinobarmetro, Informe Latinobarmetro 2008 Cruz, Jose Miguel, Argueta, Jos Ren and Seligson ,Mitchell A.,. Cultura poltica de la democracia en honduras: 2006, Proyecto de Opinin Publica de Amrica Latina. USAID. (2007) Diamond, Larry and Morlino, Leonardo, The Quality of Democracy, Journal of Democracy 15 (2004): 21 EIU Country Finance Honduras p. 99 http://www.eiu.com.proxy1.library.jhu.edu/report_dl.asp?issue_id=824107867& mode=pdf Montes, Margarita La ruptura de un modelo, El Mundo, July 2, 2009, Opinin. Peregil, F Los hilos del poder en Honduras El Pais, December 4, 2009 http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/hilos/poder/Honduras/elpepiint/2 0091204elpepiint_3/Tes Salomon, Leticia Honduras. Polticos, empresarios y militares: protagonistas de un golpe anunciado, http://www.resdal.org.ar/honduras/articulo leticia salomon.pdf Stanford Graduate School of Business, The G8 Debt Relief Plan May Not Help, http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/news/research/econ_henry_g8debtrelief.shtml

UNDP, Honduras Human Development Report 2009, http://hdrstats.undp.org/es/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_HND.html Weisbrot, Mark Obama Should Change Course and Support Democracy In Honduras McClatchy Tribune Information Services, August 13, 2009.

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