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US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLlEGE
VOWME LXX MaV 1990 NO 5
Professional Bullelln 100-90-5
CONTENTS
2 Command
by General John W Foss, US Army
9 Perspectives on Command
10 Higher Command in War
by Field Marshal Sir William Slim
22 Corps Command in World War II
by Major General V\oade H. Haislip
33 Leadership at Higher Echelons
by General J Lawton Collins
46 Patton's Staff and the Battle of the Bulge
by Ueutenant Colonel Paul G. Munch, US Army
55 The Diplomat Warrior
by Ueutenant Colonel (P) Rudolph C. Barnes Jr., US Army Reserve
64 J. F. C. Fuller and B. H. Liddell Hart:
AComparison
by Brian Holden Reid
74 Toward aProfessional Military Ethic
by Ueutenant Colonel (P) Mason E. Smith, US Army
83 Insights
by Captain Stephen C. Danckert, US Army
84 Summaries the best from other journals
86 Letters
89 From My BooksheH
by Major General Michael F Spigelmire, US Army
90 Book Reviews contemporary reading for the professional
From the Editor
Duril)g the centennial year of the birth of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, it is appropri
ate for military officers of all ranks to reflect on the requirements of command. For mem
bers of the Armed Forces and others interested in the profession of arms, the very name
Eisenhower, or Ike. is synonymous with high-level command in coalition warfare. Ike's
success during World War II is a case study in the personal aspects of commandership.
Remembering Ike and anticipating the awesome challenges facing future military leaders,
the editorial staffselected command as the theme for this issue ofMilitary Review. A tribute
to Ike will be presented in our October 1990 issue.
In today's fast-paced, high-tech Army, there is an inadvertent tendency on the part of
some officers to dilute the importance of command by lumping the term together with the
processes of command such as control, communications, intelligence, and so forth,
Obvious examples are the well-used acronyms C' (command and control) and C31 (com
mand, control, communications and i n t e l l i g e n c e ~ Although most officers know that there
are distinct differences between the above terms and command, there is always the danger
that the study of, and preparation for, command will get short shrift in the development of
our future military leaders. Of course, this eventuality must never be allowed to happen.
At every opportunity, General John W. Foss, commanding general, US Army Training
and Doctrine Command, makes a point ofhighlighting the differences between command
and its processes. His views, based on years of experience and a great deal of thought,
reinforce the doctrinal definitions and concepts contained in US Army Field Manual 22
103, Leadership and Camm<lnd at Senior Levels. We present General Foss' point of view in
our lead article, titled simply "Command."
Although doctrine, theory and peacetime experiences are important to the develop
ment of future commanders, an exposure to the knowledge gained by successful comman
ders in. past wars is an essential part of the education process. To make this knowledge
available to our readers, the editorial staff located tape recordings of presentations to past
CGSC classes by rhree outstanding senior commanders of World War 11-Field Marshal
Sir William Slim, Major General Wade H. Haislip and General J. Lawton Collins-and
edited their remarks for presentation in this special issue. Although all three of these "mas
ters of the art of command" spoke at Leavenworth four decades ago, their comments are
just as relevant today as they were back then. As a matter of fact, some of their techniques
and procedures are included in current Army doctrine.
Slim's presentation, titled "Higher Command in War," highlighted his adventures as
the commanding general of Fourteenth Army in India and Burma. Basically, he addressed
three issues: the commander's personality; his headquarters and staff; and the ways and
means of exercising command. Major General Wade H. Haislip commanded the XVCorps
in Europe during World War II. His presentation gave the CGSC Class of 1950-1951 a
vicarious experience in the challenges of corps command in combat. Haislip's talk gave
meaning tb suchtenns as "risk, uncertainty and tension." This issue'sfinal perspective on
command is a presentation by General J. Lawton Collins. Collins commanded the 25th
Infantry Division in the Pacific and VII Corps in Europe during World War II and served as
the chief of staff of the Army from 1949-1953. His Leavenworth speech highlighted the
qualities, attributes and techniques required for "leadership at higher echelons." His views
on the senior commander's need to be attuned to public opinion are especially relevant to
the Army of the 1990s.
We hope you find these old and new views on command to be of interest in your profes
sional development. Let us hear from you.
PWC
General John W. Foss, US Army
T
HEEVOLUTION ofwarfare, enhanced by
dramaric advances in technology, has led
to high demands on mobility, agility and rapid
decision making. Technology has prompted
not only great demands, but also a myriad of
devices to assist the commander. How we com
mand will be the key to our future success. Dur
ing the coming decade, the Army must stress
and reinforce some aspects of command that
have always been important, but which now
have become even more essential.
We can choose one of two paths-a strong
command path or a strong control path. Tech
nology and electronic devices will push us
toward control. Such a path is dangerous. Only
the command path provides for initiative, the
acceptance of risk and the rapid seizure of
opportunities on the battlefield. The control
path appears safer but leads to caution, a more
deliberate manner, and an emphasis on proc
ess as opposed to outcome. We must realize,
though, that the future battlefield will be less
forgiving of slow decisions than ever before. It
will not be a place for cautious, bureaucratic
centralizers glued to computer monitors waiting
for that one additional piece of information
which will allow a "sure" decision to be made.
This article argues for a strongcommand phi
losophy for the US Army and asserts that we
must begin to embed that philosophy through
out the force now. This strong command philos
ophy empowers commanders with maximum
authority to accomplish their tasks, to develop a
strong chain of command and to practice com
mand on a daily basis in peacetime training just
as we will have to exercise it in war.
Philosophy. A strong command philoso
phy is essential to how our Army functions in
peace and in war. We have had many fine com
manders, present and past, who have practiced
a strong command phHosophy! whether it be:
When in charge, take charge!
General Maxwell R. Thurman
or
Never teU people how to do things. TeU them
what to do and they wiU surprise you with their
ingenuity. General George S. ParronJr.
As an institution, though, we are not consis
tent in our application of command and com
mand authority. We often send our subordi
nates conflicting signals-in how we act, what
we say, or even what we call things. When we
say "C
4
," we tend to place all parts of com
mand, control, communications and comput
ers on an equal basis. However, we all know that
control, communications and computers are
subordinate to, and support, command.
What does a strong command philosophy
entail? It is a total approach to empower com
manders with the authority to deal with tasks as
assigned in combat or peacetime. We have
often referred to this as "mission tactics" or
"mission orders" or freedom of action for the
commander to execute his mission in the way
he sees fit, rather than being told how to do it.
To deal with such a concept, we must first place
our approach to command in perspective; then
discuss the role of control, with communica
tion and computers clearly defined as what they
are-components of the control appararus that
supports command.
Command. A strong command philosophy
is built around three precepts: vision, free
dom ofaction and responsibility. A commander
must design a simple command system that will
survive the dynamics of combat and is based
upon a strong command philosophy rooted in
our first precept-mission tactics. Who is better
able than the commander on the ground, for
ward at the decisive point, to recognize and
seize the opportunity? The commander must be
MILITARY REVIEW. May 1990
3
COMMAND
Commander's Intent
(Vision)
A
r---------, r---------,
Priority of
Mission Tactics
Main Effort
(Freedom 01 Action)
(Responsibility)
Figure
empowered to exploit these opportunities and
avoid the vulnerabilities of dynamic combat.
Only the practice of mission tactics will enable
the decisive commander to exercise initiative
and in recognizing opportunity, rapidly accom
plish the mission.
The commander must, however, act within
the parameters of the overall mission. An under
standing ofthe intent of the higher commander
is a prerequisite to mission tactics. Our next pre
cept-"commander's intent"-provides vision
and enables subordinate commanders to clearly
understand what the larger force must accom
plish in order to gain victory. The commander's
intent is designed not to restrain, but to unleash
a subordinate by giving him greater freedom of
action to accomplish the mission. Subordinate
commanders view their mission within the con
text of the higher commander's intent. Should
battlefield opportunities arise, the commander
can immediately capitalize on them, rather
than wait on instructions from higher head
quarters.
But the display of initiative and the exercise
of freedom of action within the Commander's
intent also bring attendant responsibilities.
These are governed by our third precept-the
designationofthe maineffort. The commander
who has been assigned the main effort knows
he h:).S greater freedom of action and lesser
responsibilities to the rest of the force. Com
mahders who have been assigned missions
other than the main effort know they have
responsibilities to support the main effort (for
example, protect the flank, provide supporting
fires, and the like) and not divert resources from
the main effort. In the chaos of combat, an
understanding of the main effort provides a
common basis for action.
Thus, a strong command philosophy is really
a stool. Mission tactics (freedom of
action), reinforced by knowledge of the com
mander's intent (vision) and focllsed on a main
effort (responsibility) constitute the basis of a
strong command philosophy. This synergism
results in effective command and a philosophy
relevant to any battlefield, in any theater of
operations, in any type of conflict.
Control The proper understanding of con
trol is embodied in the axiom, "The more con
trol imposed, the less command applied." Con
trol, by definition, restricts command. This is
not to say, however, that control is bad. No one
has "total" freedom of action all the time. Some
control is necessary to focus the effort. In some
complicated actions, a great deal of control is
required to ensure synchronization. Therefore,
the rule is to apply only those control measures
essential to the operation.
The most common form of control is the
mission itself. Not only does the mission struc
ture commonality of actions, it focuses the en
tire unit on the main task at the critical time.
Another control that is automatically ap
plied is the common doctrine adopted by the
US Anny and instilled in commanders during
their formative years in units and in military
schools. Higher commanders expect their subordi
nates to understand, apply and act within the.tenets
ofArmy doctrine.
Most controls, however, are not automatic.
For example, the operations order (OPORD) is
tailored to the mission as are the graphics on
the operations overlay. Although optional and
situationally dependent, these are, neverthe
less, controls and must be reviewed by the com
mander prior to implementation.
staff officers sometimes sprinkle control mea
sures into an OPORD without full cognizance
May 1990 MILITARY REVIEW 4
CONTROL
Mission
(Task)
""
r------.., ...----...,
/ ~
Sigma Control Common
Star Measures Doctrine
Figure 2
of the impediments placed upon subordinate
commanders. The basic rule governing option
al control measures is the test of "purpose."
Each control measure should have a specific
purpose that contributes to mission accom
plishment. If a control measure fails the pur
pose test, do not apply it-it unnecessarily
restricts freedom of action. OccasionaUy, the
purpose test will necessitate very restrictive
controls. For example, certain night operations
or attacks on fortified positions, by their very
complicated nature, require a high degree of
synchronization among several units and sup
porting fires. Thus, selective and restrictive
control win be required. Once these specific
missions are completed and the need for re
strictive control abates, the commander should
then relax controls and revert back to the mini
mum control necessary.
Some controls ate system oriented. As with
operational controls, the commander should
specifically review these control systems-such
as the Army Tactical Command and Control
System (Sigma Star)-to determine their appli
cability to the mission. This is especially impor
tant because without specific direction from
the commander, the system tends to run toward
the goal of efficiency rather than effectiveness.
But, as we all know, the mission demands
effectiveness.
In summary, control is inversely proportional
to command. A good commander is like a good
horseman; he maintains a strong grip and, at
the same tibe, keeps a loose rein. He allmvs
COMMAND
freedom of action, but is prepared to take con
trol quickly when required. Ultimately, "what,"
not "how," is most important.
Communications. Communications pro
vide the link between command and control
that enables commanders to lead from the front
and directly influence the action. A robust
communications capability facilitates c o m ~
mand by allowing the commander to tighten
or loosen control rapidly through some mode
of communication other than face-to-face. A
strong, flexible communications system allows
the staff and subordinate commanders to pass
information. O:Jmmunications systems are tools
that facilitate the command and control im
posed by the commander, enabling him to issue
timely orders directly to subordinates. But even
with very sophisticated ccmmunications capa
bilities, the commander must strive to person
ally issue orders to subordinates face-to-face
whenever he can or, failing that, by voice radio.
The tone, rate and pitch of a commander's
voice will tell mote than any graphic or written
message could ever convey.
Computers. These remarkable and ubiq,
uitous devices are an aid to help provide infor
mation to the staff and commander. This infor
mation must then be assessed for its operational
relevance by the staff and passed to the com
mander. The commander must resist the temp
tation to tie himself to the computer. Although
the flow of information is fascinating, most data
is input by the staffand is intended for the staff.
The commander cannot treat the computer
~
-c-o-m-m-a-n-d--'j ,. ,......---....,
\1,---c-o-m-m-u-n-jC-a-ti-o-n-s----,
\, Computers ]
Figure 3
MILITARY REVIEW. May 1990 5
information as totally correct because a com
puter can be given poor, partial or outdated
information on which to compute. The com
puter also passes on all the trivial data impor
tant to only a few individuals, none of whom is
a commander. After all, a computer does not
Ifwe learned nothing else from the
recent operations in Grenada andPanama,
we have learned that soldiers fight
exacdyas they are trained in peacetime.
We must command in peacetime as we
commandin war. We mustplace the same
responsibilities upon subordinates in peace
time that we expect ofthem in combat.
question the input. Output must be asses.,ed.
Excessive reHance on computers, or a series of
computers, can be embarrassing when the com
puter llCf"dShes,"
Properly used in their intended role, comput
ers provide invaluable assistance; therefore, our
development of them must continue. They can
"mechanically" pass information, orders, data
and graphics in almost realtime. But the com
puter is not, nor can it be, a substitute for com
manders talking to commanders.
The Commander. Having commanded at
every level in our Army, I have leamed-usually
the hard way-some points along the way that I
have developed into my command philosophy.
Perhaps the most important thing to know
about command is that it is personal. One can
not successfully command through the staff.
Nothing communicates commander-to-com
mander as well as face-to-face. Parton observed
that the senior should go forward to visit the
junior, rather than the j ~ n i o r back to See him.
The obvious exception is when it is necessary to
collect several commanders at one location.
Notice that Patton said "go forward." He did
not say "call," or ('communicate" or "write.'!
The value of face-to-face command cannot be
stressed enough, especially during critical mo
ments of the battle. What the commander says,
and how he says it, is the basis for the unit's
actions, In peacetime, when routine activities
tend to be turned over to the staff, a commander
must constantly speak of the important issues,
because staffs tend to treat everything as equal
in importance.
Command is more than responsibility; it is
also authority and authority must be actively
exercised. Thurman's often-stated maxim,
"When in charge, take charge," contains a lot
of wisdom-be in charge and practice the au
thority given to you. Commanders must make
decisions. Regardless of the difficulty at hand, a
decision must be made in a timely and resolute
manner.
Many years ago, I Icamed to command only
one echelon down. This not only contributes to
the entire chain of command having maximum
freedom of action, it also reinforces the span of
control theory. Commanding two levels down
violates a fundamental principle of war-unity
of command. Commanding one level down
maximizes the information flow and increases
the opportunity for face-to-face or voice-to
voice command. The commander must keep
abreast of what is going on two or more levels
down. By contrast, commanding too far down
gives one a stereoscopic view, and this tunnel
vision inhibits the ability to "see" the overall
battle. The absolute worst effect of such a com
mand style is that the chain of command goes
into "neutral" and steps out of its responsibi
lities when a senior commander usurps its author
ity. That commander then misses the most viral
input he needs-a subordinate commander's
assessment of his unit's overall capability.
Next, good commanders anticipate. Not
only do they anticipate the enemy, they antici
pate their subordinates' needs and provide help
and support to facilitate overall mL-;sion accom
plishment. In this regard, the staff plays a key
role. They must be forwatd-looking, helping
the commander anticipate.
Successful commanders also have a vision of
& May 1990 MILITARY REVIEW
Patton observedthat the senior shouldgo forward to visit thejunior, rather th
thejunior back to see him. The obvious exception is when it is necessary to coj
several commanders at one location. Notice that Patton said flgo forward/' He dJ
say caD, 11 or or {{write." The value offacMolace command ca
be stressed enough, especially during critical moments ofthe battle.
the task. They "see" the task in its proper per'
spective; they understand the "what" and
"how" of the mission; and they understand the
conditions necessary for success. Further, they
can articulate those points to others. Good
commanders are able to visualize not only the
capabilities, but the intended actions of subor'
dinate units in the accomplishment of the
larger mission. It is especially importam that
the commander, not the operations officer (531
03/J3), personally articulate the commander's
intent portion of the order. If others do this for
the commander, the unintentional, yet inevita
ble, filters are applied and the result becomes
not "what the commander intends," but "what
the staff officers thought he intended."
Before I condude, let me offer a few words on
peacetime command. If we learned nothing
else from the recent operations in Grenada and
Panama, we have learned that soldiers fight
exactly as they are trained in peacetime. We
must command in peacetime as we command
in war. We must place the same responsibilities
upon subordinates in peacetime that we expect
of them in combat. We must foster the same
relationships in peacetime as in war. As com
manders, we must demonstrate daily that we
will say what to do, not how to do it; a
we will not skip echelons in directing a1
seeing tasks, but consistantly adhere
chain of command. We must empha:
important things and avoid the trivial. I
mander finds himself or his unit doin
thing for peacetime only, he should c
how this will affect his mi
the answer is: there is no
to the task, then he should not do it. I
simple. But if he has no option, then 1
convert the execution of the task into
else of the chain ofcommand so as to g2
imum benefit from the task.
Just as command personifies the com
so must the chain of command repres
personifY the command system. A stror
of command is essential to a successful
implies trust and confidence between f
of command and develops junior Ie,
placing the appropriate authority, respo
and decision making at each level. Al
responsibility and decision making 1
practiced. Senior commanders must re
that we do not live in a penect world; tl
underwrite subordinates' honest mis
part of the developmental process. Tha
MILITARY REVIEW. May 1990
produces risk-raking, iniriarive-grabbing and
war-winning commanders.
Commanders train, teach, coach and de
velop their subordinate leaders and units to a
high standard. One way senior commanders
develop subordinate commanders is by watch
ing. The process of watching them leads to
training, teaching and coaching in such a man
ner that both the subordinate commander and
his unit can overcome weaknesses and improve
perfonnance. While commanders must avoid dic
tating "how," they must never be afraid to tell a
subordinate what to do or even when to do it.
Good commanders must be willing to take
some risks. In combat, commanders operate
within the higher commander's intent, tem
pered by doctrine and procedures. In peace
time, commanders must understand and oper
ate within the same guidelines. The "garrison"
exercise of command entails risk just as it does
in wartime. The combat requirements of ini
tiative and risk taking are just as applicable in
peacetime as they are in war. The commander
who makes no mistakes and rakes no risks prob
ably does not accomplish very much-nor does
he have soldiers with great confidence in the
unit or its leaders. The commander who cen
tralizes everything in an attempt to be strong
everywhere is, in fact, strong nowhere. But
worst of all, his chain of command and his
junior leaders will never develop responsibility
and initiative.
There is a saying in our Army, "Command
is command." Translated, that means com
mand of any unit-combat, combat support or
combat service support, in the Continental
United States or forward deployed, tactical or
nontactical-is srill command, which beats not
being a commander. Equally important in that
statement is that command-in the field, at one
of the combat training centers
j
in peacetime,
during a contingency operation or in war-must
be practiced as it will be executed in war.
We have talked about command, control,
communications and computers. I have a s ~
serted that we must have simple, robust com
mand systems built upon a strong command
philosophy. Commanders must be provided the
maximum freedom to command and have im
posed on them only those control measures nec
essary to synchronize mission accomplishment.
A strong command philosophy recognizes the
many tools available to the commander, but
emphasizes that tools are no substitute for exer
cising the personal element of command.
In the next war, the price of failure will be
very high and the margin for error grows
smaller. We must get the maximum effect from
our leaders and our units. At a time when tech
nology and electronic devices appear to ofter an
easy path to overcome the complexities of mod
em battle, the Army must empower command
ers, embrace the mission tactics and use tech
nology to assist-not take over-the art of com
mand. Most important, we must be an Army
that practices strong command on a day-to-day
basis in peacetime, so our units are always ready
for the demands of combat. The capabilities we
now possess in our officer and noncommis
sioned officer corps say that now is the time to
empower leaders to get the most out of this
great Army. "1>
General]olm W. fuss ~ commanding general, US Anny Training and Doctrine
Command, furt Monroe, \irginia. He IOOS commissioned from <he US Militm'y Acad
emy; receiwd a master, degree from Shippensburg University of PennsyllUnia, and ~ a
graduate of<he AllJ1Y War College. He has helda rnriety ofcommand and staffpositions
in Europe, South Korea and Vietnam. He "'" the chief, Joint US Military Advisory
Group, Philippines; commanding general, Se"",th AllJ1Y Training Command, West
Germany; commanding general, Infantry Center and commandant, InjUntry School,
furt Benning, Georgia; and commanding general, 82dAirborne Division and command
injrgeneral, XVIII Airborne Corps, Fart Bragg, North Cawona; and <!epmy chiefofstaff
oj <he Army for operations and plans.
./
May 1990' MILITARY REVIEW 8
PERSPECTIVES ON
It has been said that the art ofcommandis timeless; many ofthe
skills and traits ofsuccessful command have a unique durability.
This is very evident in the articles that foHow as three of World
War II's ablest commanders reviewin their own words the
pIes and methods that served them in command.
Even though Field Marshal Sir Wi11iam Slim, General J.
Collins and Major General Wade Haislip are deceased, their
remarks, presented four decades ago, offer enduring truths that
apply to many of the challenges of present..cfay and future
command.
Higher
I/I"Iftf4 ... ..Jftn"" ......... ....;1'1
,",un."..I...a
til
WJIl:I.D
."ar
Field Marshal Sir William Slim (1891-1970)
Reproduced by permission of the Controller of HMSO
Field Marshal Sir Wil1iam Slim m arId War I and
in the Indian army during the interwar period. As com
mander ofthe 1st Burma Corps (I 942-1945) and supreme
AUied commander of ground forces in Southeast Asia
(1945-1946), he was the driving force behind the successful
campaign to drive the Japanese out ofIndia and the defeat
ofthe]apanese armies in Burma. Afterthe war, he servedas
commandant ofthe Imperial Defense College, chiefofthe
Imperial Staff, British army, and governor general ofAus
tralia. The following remarks, delivered to the students and
faculty of the US Anny Command and General Staff Col
lege on 8 April 1952, provide his unique and invaluable
insights on the art of command at the senior levels. His
remarks have been edited for publication.
Al LTHOUGH I selected the subject of this talk,
..tS.Command in War," I do address you with a certain amount
of diffidence. Command is an intensely pen;onal affair; anyone
who has exercised it and then goes on to talk about it (which may
not be very wise) is bound to base all that he says on his own
personal experience. Any man's personal experience, however
wide it may have been, is limited. Another thing that makes talks
on command from us old generals sometimes rather a bore is that
we are frightfully inclined to sprinkle our talk with a very large
number of capital "1"5, and the capital "I" is not really a very
elegant letter. I'll try not to, but I probably shall.
The sort of command that I am talking about, mainly, is higher
command-that is, the command of an anny or of an anny group.
Most of the things I shall say hold good, I think, for command at
any level. If, when I have finished, any ofyou cate to get up andsay,
"Well, we know a better way to do it," I will not contradict you at
May 1990 MILITARY REVIEW 10
PERSPECTIVES
all -as long as you say, "1 know a better way for me to do it, but not
necessarily for you," because I do emphasize throughout that com
mand is a personal thing.
I have been very lucky in my military career-very much more
lucky than I deserve. I have commanded everything from a section
of six men as a lance corpcral to an army group of a million and a
quarter, and the conclusion I have come to, after 40 years of doing
that, is that command, on whatever level you exercise it, is very
much the same thing. It is based on the same qualities.
o,mmand is that mixtute of example, persuasion and compul
sion by which you get men to do what you want them to do, even if
they do not want to do it themselves. If you ask me really to define
it, I should say command is the projection of personality -and like
all true art, and command is an art, it is exercised by each man in
his own way. But, you cannot be a commander without having
certain qualities. In command itself, I think there are three ele
ments. I am talking now, remember, of the command of a big
organization. There is, first of all, the commander himself; then
there are his headquarters and his staff; and third, there is the way
he keeps contact with the people he commands. I will talk about
each of these.
The Commander
If you ever have to organize a command or a campaign, believe
me, the first thing to do is to select your commander and select
him early because he should be the mainspring of the whole enter
prise. I said just now that command was the projection of person
ality. So it is a question of what sort of personality a commander
should have. He ought to have a whole lot of qualities, but there
are certain ones that are basic and without which, he will never be
a commander at all.
Will Power. The first of these is will power, or determination if
you like to call it that. Not only does the commander have to
decide what is going to be done-that is perhaps one of the easier
things-but he has got to see that it is done. I don't think you
really need me to tell you that, because most of you have had
experience of command on some level.
You do not need me to tell you, either, of the amount of opposi
tion you will meet. There will be opposition first of all from the
enemy. Well, that is fair enough; that is the attitude you expect of
the enemy. I can remember in World War I, when I was a very
young officer, some fellow at the back started sending up forms and
one ofthe things you had to fill in was the attitude of the enemy. A
certain youhg officer filled in "hostile!" He got it back with a very
rude note from the staff saying, "Amplify your answer." So he sent
it back. "Definitely hostile!" So you will meet opposition from the
You very often hear
people say, "So and so is a
lucky commander!' Well,
you can be lucky once; you
can be lucky twice; but I
don't think you will be
lucky three times. Ifa chap
is lucky three times, there is
something more to it .
The commander who
always guesses right doesn't
reallyguess, it is a product
of, training, knowledge,

MILITARY REVIEW' May 1990 11
I hadasort ofmottn,
"No details, no paper andno
regrets!' No details-don't
go about settingmachine
guns on different sides of
bushes. That is done a
damn sight better by a
platoon commander. Then,
no paper. You cannot
entirely do without paper,
but you can get rid ofquite
a lot ofit. Do not have
people coming to you with
huge 6les, teYing you an
about it. Make the man
explain it; and ifhe cannot
explain it, get somebody
who can.
enemy, but there are other forms of opposition. Strangely enough,
there will be your own statl Sometimes I used to get cross with my
staff, which was one of the finest Anglo-American staffs you could
have had, and I used to say, "You fellows do nothing but tell me
that anything I want to do is logistically impossible." You will get
most of the opposition to the things you want to do from the
administrative Ot what you call the logistics staff-and that is very
understandable because the one thing that an administrative staff
officer wants to avoid is letting down his commander. So he is
always a little bit on the cautious side. There is always a tendency
on the part of your administrative staffs to say, "Look here, you're
taking too great a risk." Sometimes you may be, but you must be
the judge of that.
Then there are your subordinate commanders who probably
want to do the thing a little bit differently or have other ideas, and
sometimes you will find your superiors have very strong ideas of
their own. You have to deal with that sort of opposition. When you
get rather high up, there are doubting and interfering politicians.
You have rodeal with them. They aren't so hard rodeal with when
you get down to it; they are not half as tough as they look some
times. Then, of course, there are your allies.
Now, it is an extraordinary thing that you should meet with so
much opposition from allies. Allies, altogether, are really very
extraordinary people. It is astonishing how obstinate they are, how
parochially minded, how ridiculously sensitive to prestige and how
wrapped up in obsolete political ideas. It is equally astonishing
how they fail to see how broad-minded you are, how clear your
picture is, how up-to-date you are and how cooperative and big
hearted you are. It is extraordinary. But let me tell you, when you
feel like that about allies-and you have even worse allies than the
British, believe me-when you feel like that, just remind yourself
of two things. First, that you are an ally too, and all allies look just
the same. If you walk to the other side of the table, you will look
just like that to the fellow sitting opposite. Then the next thing ro
remember is that there is only one thing worse than having allies
that is not having allies. You will get opposition from all those
sources. You simply have got to drive through what you want
against every kind of opposition, including the opposition of
nature. The opposition of nature canbe, of course, the worst ofthe
lot. The British army fights all its battles uphill and usually on the
junction of four map sheets.
To be a little more serious, this determination, this will power,
which is the first essential of the commander, is really based on
courage. Not so much physical courage; you will have that
because, thank God, courage is bred in us. You will have physical
courage, but what else you commanders will have to have is rarer-
May 1990 MILITARY REVIEW 12
that is moml courage. Mora! courage simply means that you do
what you think is right \vithour bothering too much about the
effect on yourself. That is the courage that you will have to have,
Yenl must be as big as your job an.d you must not be too afraid of
losing it. It docs not what your job is, whether supreme
commanc!cf or lance coqxxal, you HUlst not be too afraid of losing
it--somc peclplc are. So the one quality no leader can do without
is determination, bilsed on moral courage.
Judgment. The prime task of the commander is to make
sions. \X/hat you have to do is to weigh all the various factors,
recognizing that in war half of your infom13tion may be wrong,
that a lot of it is missing completely, and that there arc all sorts of
elemems OV{:f which you havt7 no control, such as the \veatherand,
to a certain extent, the action of the enemy. Yf.lll have to weigh all
these things. and corne to a dedsiclJ). as to what you want to do, You
must have that judgment. Another kind (l that you
need is rhe judgrncnt of men. You must be able to select your
5ub()rdinarcs. I have known at least one man who had every
attribute of the great cOrTnnander and would have t"Ccn of
cornmanders that we produced. but who lacked the
fKM'cr properly to sdcct his subordinates. He was too hJY'al to them
and dung to them when he should have gotten rid of
them. Choose your subordinates and then, decentralize to them.
Do not try to do ev(:rything yourself because you will kill yourself,
uni<-" you make somebody so angry by interfering with his job that
he shoots you, The motto for a commander who is going to survive
the strain of cornmand I(n any length of time, is "Don't keep
and bark yourself:" Deal, also, with the things that matter and have
rhe jndgment to detennine which they ate.
When I commanded, I had a SOrt of mottO, "No derails, no
paper and no rel,'fets," J-.b go about setting
machineguns on different sides of That is done a damn
sight better by a platoon commander. No details,
Then, no p"pet, You cannot entirely do without vaper, but you
can get tid of quite a lot of it. Do not have people wming to you
MILITARY REVIEW May 1990
It is astonishing how
obstinate [allies] are, /WW
parochially minded, how
ridiculously sensitive to
prestige IIlJd how ..Tapped
up in obsolete political
ideas. It is equally
astonishing how thl."}' fail to
see how broad-minded you
are, how dear your picture
is , . , and how cooperative
and big-hearted you are .
Just remind yourselfoftwo
things, First, that you are an
aUy too , , , Ifyou walk to
the other side ofthe table,
you .viIllookjust like that
to the fellow sitting
opposite. Then the ne,,-c
thing to remember is that
there is only one thing
than having aUies
that not having aU1es,
13
There is an obvious
contJict between flexibility
ofmind and strength ofwill.
You have to be very careful
to see that your strength of
will does not becomejust
obstinacy and that your
flexibility ofminddoes not
become mere vacillation . ..
You have somehow, in yOUl"
selves, in your own
characters, to strike [a1
balance.
with huge files, telling you all about it. Make the man explain it;
and if he cannot explain it, get somebody who can.
When I say "no tegrets," that is important. You do the best you
can. You may have gotten it wrong; you may have lost a battle. You
may even have lost a good many of your men's lives which hurts
more, but do not have regrets. Do not sit in the comer and say,
"Oh, ifI had only gone to the left instead of the right," or, "If I had
only fought in front of the river instead of behind it." You have
done the best you could- it hasn't come off. All right! What's the
next problem? Get on to that. Do not sit in the comer weeping
about what you might have done. No details, no paper, no regrets.
If you go on that motto and if you combine it, as I did, with
going to bed at 10 0' clock every night, getting up at 6 0'dock, and
crucifying anybody who woke you up between those hours unless it
was for a major disaster, you will probably survive five years of
higher command in war as 1did.
Now in some commanders, the ability to judge correctly seems
instinctive. You very often hear people say, "So and so is a lucky
commander." Well, you can be lucky once; you canbe lucky twice;
but I don't think you will be lucky three times. If a chap is lucky
three times, there is something more to it. I think I can illustrate
that to you. I was once having my porrrait painted by a very well
known artist. I was not paying for it-the government was doing
that. I watched him doing it. Be took his little toothpaste tubes
and squeezed out blobs of the ptimary colors all down the side of
his pallet. Then he took a brush, dabbed at the colors he fancied
and mixed them all together. Then he put his stroke straight on
the canvas to give the color ofmy nose or whatever it was. It struck
me as the most extraordinary thing; because if I had been doing
that, I should have wanted to try the tone on something first to see
if I had it right. I asked him how he did it. He said, quite frankly, he
did not know, but he supposed it was pracrice. Well, of course, it
was a good deal more than practice. It was a mixture of training,
observarion, knowledge and "feel" for his task-and that is what
people call luck with a commander. The commander who always
guesses right doesn't really guess, it is a product of all those
things-training, knowledge, observation and character. There is
only one more point I would like to make about judgment. The
stronger a commander's will power, the more dangerous or even
fatal it may become if his judgment is bad. Therefore, when you
select your commanders and when you train yourselves as com
manders, keep the balance between strength ofwill and judgment.
Flexibility of Mind. Modem war, tactics and techniques
change rapidly. Indeed, the whole background against which you
fight fl war may change very rapidly. The invention of a new
weapon, a political change, a break in the weather and the whole
May 1990' MILITARY REVIEW
14
thing may change very rapidly. Unless you can adapt yourself to
that-unless your mind is sufficiently flexible-you will not be a
good commander. What you have to cultivate is imagination, but a
controlled imagination, and a flexibility of mind. There is an
obvious conflict between flexibility of mind and strength of will.
You have to be vety careful to see that your strength ofwill does not
become just obstinacy and that your flexibility of mind does not
become mere vacillation. We have, all of us, known the chap who
went about thumping himself on the chest and saying, "I am a
strong man." He has a weakness somewhere and, of course, if he
never changes his mind, he will be wrong more often than he is
right. Then you get the other fellow who has such a flexible mind
that he always agrees with the last chap who talked to him, and
he's terrible. You have somehow, in yourselves, in your own charac
ters, to strike the balance between flexibility of mind and strength
of will. When you have done that, you will be well on the road to
being a commander in quire a big way. But nobody can help you
very much, you have to do it yourself.
Knowledge. Another quality you must possess is knowledge.
Now, when you command a small unit, if you are a platoon com
mander, you should be able to do everything that you ask any man
in that platoon to do rather better than he can himself. When you
get higher up and you command divisions, corps and armies, you
cannot, of course, be expected to perform all the operations that
everybody under your command performs or to have their tech
nical skill. You can't take a wireless set to pieces and put it together
again like a trained mechanic should be able ro do. You can't take
out a fellow's appendix as well as a doctor would, though God
knows, sometimes I felt I could do better than some of them. But
you have to know the capabilities of the machines that they han
dle; you have to knowthe sort of conditions under which thc'Y have
to work; and you have to know how long it takes them to do certain
things. You must have that kind of knowledge.
Another kind of knowledge you should attain is the knowledge
of your enemy. We, the British, at any rate, are not very good at
that. We didn't study our enemy enough. When you are a com
mander, one of the people you want to study very closely is your
opposite number-the fellow you are fighting-because bartle is
largely a struggle between the wills of the commanders.
I found it very difficult to get very much information about the
Japanese. We were not very clever at it at the start of the war with
Japan. I remember, on one occasion, I really thought I knew my
opposite number pretty well. I used to keep his photo on my desk.
If! couldn't do anything else, I used to look at him and say, "Well, I
may not be much of a general, but I am better looking than you." I
thought I knew that fellow very well. I planned the whole cam-
MILITARY REVIEW May 1990 15
It i ~ not usually
dif6.cult for a commander
to know what he wants to
do; major tactics will be the
basis ofthat knowledge.
The thing that is difficult to
know is ifhe can do it with
the resources he has .. .
Unless the commander
has a wide knowledge of
general administration and
logistics, he will find himself
much too much in the
hands ofhis logistic experts
who will be admirable chaps
but who, as I said, will be
on the cautious side.
paign on what I reckoned he would do as a reaction. It did not go
right at all; everything went the other way. It was only after I had
been fooling around at this game for some time that I discovered
that they had told him he could go home, and had ptoduced
another commander who had different ideas. The whole tempo of
the thing was quite different hecause they had changed the com
mander. One of the things you must have knowledge of is your
enemy and especially the commander.
Now, it is not usually difficult for a commander to know what he
IVants to do; major tactics will be the basis of that knowledge. The
thing that is difficult to know is if he can do it with the resources he
has. But what I do stress and what I think we sometimes (we, the
British, I won't say y o ~ d o , although I think you do) miss is a general
knowledge of administration, The answer to that is the logistic
answer, almost always. Unless the commander has a wide knowl
edge of general administration and logistics, he will find himself
much too much in the hands of his logistic experts who will be
admirable chaps but who, as I said, will be on the cautious side.
I once had an argument with Field Marshal (Sir Bernard L.)
Montgomety-I didn't have many because I neatly always agree
with him on military matters-about what the qualifications of a
great commander ate. We each tried not to give our own qualifica
tions-but I said (which rather surptised him) that I thought the
real test of a great commander in the field was to be a judge of
administrative risk. A judge ofadministrative risk-nowyou think
that over.
Integrity. If you have those qualities that I mentioned-will
power, judgment, flexibility of mind and knowledge-you will be a
commander. You will be a good commander, you may even be a
great commandet, but you won't necessarily have the confidence
of your men, especially when things are not going your way. And
the confidence of your men is essential. In order to get that, all
those qualities must be based on a simple honesty, on integrity. You
have to have this massive and simple honesty. All the really great
commanders who have held their men have had it because the
only foundations under man which will stand under great stress are
the moral ones.
You're all right as long as you're winning. I'm a hell of a general
when I'm winning, anybody is. But it is when you are not win
ning-and I have not always been winning, if yOu had been a
Britishgeneral at the statt ofa war you'd knowthat - it is then that
the real test of leadership is made. It's a funny thing, but when you
are in command and things have gone wrong, there always Comes a
pause when your men stop and-they look at you. They don't say
anything-they just look at you. It is rather an awful moment for
the commander because then he knows that their courage is
1& May 1990 MILITARY REVIEW
ebbing, their will is fading, and he has got to pull up out of himself
the courage and the will power that will stiffen them again and
make them go on. That happens to every commander sometime or
other. He will never get over that moment unless he has the confi
dence of his men.
I can remember myself, I am not telling you this as an example
of leadership, but I remember once I stepped out of a tank. I was
using a tank because it was the only means of communication I
had left. I saw waiting for me two of my subordinate commanders
with a couple ofstaffofficers and one or two other fellows, standing
in a melancholy group. The situation was just about as bad as it
could be. Adivision was cut off; we had no means of getting it out;
and I didn't think we could last very long or it didn't look like we
could. As I stepped out, those chaps just looked at me and I did not
know what to say. So, I put the best mce I could on it. I tried to look
cheerful, and said, "Well, gentlemen, it might be worse." And one
of those unspeakable fellows said, "How?" The only thing I could
thinkofsaying was, "Well, it might be raining," and in two hours it
was.
Now, I don't hold that up to you as an example of leadership or
how to deal with it, but it was a situation that I shall never forget.
You, too, will all sometime have to face it and what you have got to
do is build yourself up for it, because it will come. The way you will
survive it is by having the confidence of your men, which you will
get by honesty in dealing and with integrity. Now, to get on to the
headquarters, which is the second element in command.
The Headquarters
A headquarters is important as far as the commander himself is
concerned, in its effect on him and in its effect on the people who
are commanded. I believe that a commander has a right to demand
In the Burma
Campaign, very often
owing to shortage ofair
transport, a lot ofmy
troops, my forward for
mations, had to be on half
rations. Whenever they
went on halfrations,
I used to put my own head
quarters on halfrations.
It was a bit theatrical,
I admit, but it didremind
the young staffofficers with
healthy appetites what it
is like to be hungry, andit
perhaps put a little more
ginger in getting
the supplies forward.
MILITARY REVIEW' May 1990 17
An Cw;amoir
When you are a
commander, one ofthe
people you want to study
very closely is your
opposite number-the
feHow you are 6ghting
because battle is largely a
struggle between the wiIl5
ofthe commanders . ..
I planned the whole cam
paign on what I reckoned
he would do as areaction.
It did not go right at all;
everything went the other
way . .. [later] I discovered
that they had told him he
could go home, and hadpro
duced another commander
who had different ideas.
18
from his headquarters two things-the first is information, and the
second is suggestions. The information has to cover a ttemen
dously wide field: his own troops, the enemy, photography, every
thing. On it, he must form his judgments. Then, I think it is the
duty of his headquartets to put up to him suggestions for alternative
courses of action, from which he selects one, or perhaps he thinks
of one for himself. That is what the headquarters should do for the
commander. For the troops, the first essential is that the headquar
rers should translate to them quickly and accurately the will of the
commander. I suppose I have published dozens of operations
instructions and orders, and I have never written one myself
because I have always had excellent staff officers who could do it.
But, there is one part of an ordet that I have always made a point of
writing myself. That is the object. I do recommend it to you, gen
tlemen, that when long orders are being written for complicated
operations, you take up your pen yourself and write the object in
your own words so that object goes down to everybody.
You must insist that your headquarters regards itself as the ser
vant of the fighting troops. In practice that means that staff mem
bers won't collect to themselves an undue proportion of the
amenities, but they will confine themselves or you will confine
them to having the necessary degree of comfort for them to per
fonn their duties efficiently. In the Bum1a Campaign, very often
owing to shortage of air transport, a lot of my troops, my forward
fonnations, had to be on half rations. Whenever they went on half
rations, I used to put my own headquarters on half f'dtions. It was a
bit theatrical, I admit, but it did remind the young staff officers
with healthy appetites what it is like to be hungry, and it perhaps
put a little more ginger in getting the supplies forward.
You have to see that your headquarters is the servant of the
fighting troops. It has to be a friendly headquarters- I don't mean
friendly amongst yourselves, it must be that-but it must be
friendly to the people who come to it from outside. If an officer
comes to headquarters to find out something, do not keep him
hanging about; have somebody ready to take him to the chap who
can give him an answer. Do not forget that your headquarters, any
headquarters, is always under inspection. Always, it is being
inspected by the people who come up from below. Do not bother
too much about the people who eome down from above. but the
headquarters must be efficient and look efficient.
Organization of Headquarters. We organize our headquar
ters now on the chiefof staffsystem; so do you. Personally, I am not
very fond of it-I like the old-fashioned British system before we
began to copy the Geffi1ans, of the commander dealing directly
with his principal staffofficers. I know all the arguments in favor of
the others and they are very good ones, but I nm on the old system.
May 1990' MILITARY REVIEW
PERSPECTIVES
Don't let that worry you, I am not pteaching hetesy, I am not
asking you to change anything. When you get to a height in com
mand, it teally will not mattet what the theotetical otganization of
your headquatters is. By changing the emphasis a little bit, you will
have it running the way you want it. Whatevet you do, see that in
your headquarters thete isn't too much (Etich) Ludendotff and too
little (paul von) Hindenburg.
Choices ofStaffs. Thete ate certain key staff officers to whose
selection you ought to pay a great deal of attention. First of all, of
course, there is your chief general staff officer, ot your chief ofstaff.
There is next, and in many ways more important, your chief
administrative officer. Then there are two other fellows I would
draw your attention to-one is your chiefintelligenceofficer. Now,
when you select your chief intelligence officer, do not select him
because he is a fellow who can put on false whiskers and go down to
the bazaar and pass himself off as Chinese or something. He can
not do it anyway, but you do not want that sort of fellow. What you
want first and foremost is a good organizer. A man who can
organize the collection and interptetation of intelligence-not
necessarily collect it himself. You Want an officer who will repre
sent to you the mind ohhe enemy commander. They are very hard
to find, these chaps, very hard to find. They are very rarely regular
officers-they are usually university dons or something like that.
Get a fellow with the extraordinary flair of being able to put him
self in the mind of the enemy commander-get him and put him
in your pocket, because he's very useful.
Then, you want some good planners. They also come from what
we might sometimes think strange places. Of two of the best plan
ners I ever had, one was a fellow of All Souls College at Oxford, a
son of the Archbishop of Canterbury; and the other one was an
American National Guard officer whose profession was selling
refrigerators. They were both of them absolutely first class, and you
must have high-class planners.
Traveling Circuses. Do not go in for traveling circuses. We
developed a very bad habit in the British anny. When an officer
was promoted, he took all his staff from the lower fonnation. That
meant that you pushed out a lot of really very good fellows to make
roomfor the circus, broke up the staffof the lower fonnation and it
was not good for the commander himself.
Size ofHeadquarters. All British and all American headquar
ters are too big and should be cut down. As far as I know, there are
only three ways of cutting down headquarters. One is by a flat,
overall cut-you reduce your staff by say, 10 percent. I do that
about once a year to the War Office, and the excruciating noise of
the corks coming out of the bottles is heartbreaking! Another way
of doing it is by elimination of complete sections. That is possible
Ionce had an argu
ment with Field Marshal
(Sir BernardL) Mont
gomery ..
quaIiJications ofa great
commanderare. We each
tried not to give our
quaIiJications-but I said
(which rather surprised
him) that I thought the real
test ofa great commander
in the field to be ajudge
ofadministrative risk.
MILITARY REVIEW. May 1990
19
Ifa man loses a battle,
orgets a setback, go and see
him and find out why. Ifhe
did it because he was
careless, ifhe did it because
he was stupid or, above all,
ifhe did it because he got
cold feet, sack him. Tell him
why you sacked him.
But ifhe did it because he was a
little bit overeager, because
he tookjust a little bit too
much risk or because he
was a little bit too
pugnacious, give him
another chance. Lots of
fellows benefit a great deal
by a little setback once.
20
because you do find, especially in wartime, that around your head
quarters all sorts of fancy sections grow up that you can really very
well do without or you can push farther back.
Lastly, a way, which I recommend to your attention, is to cut out
one complete tier of the staff hierarchy. That is, roughly speaking
you get rid of say, all the captains, and send them back to their
regiments where they are very badly wanted, or you get rid of all
the majors and you let the captains do their own job and the
majors' jobs. In a big headquarters what you will find is that in
effect this merely means that there is one note less on the file, and
that's no harm. Unless you constantly keep your eye on the size of
your headquarters, it will grow out of all knowledge and usefulness.
Contact Between Commander and His Command
Now, the third and last element is the contact between the
commander and his command. You cannot, when you get a big
formation, know more than a very small fraction of your men. But
every man in your command-and I don't care how big it is
ought to know you, at least by sight. As you walk onto any parade
or pass any men in your army, they ought to be able to say, "There's
the 'Old Man,' I wonder what he's up to now." You have to be
known to them. Y()u have to show yourself to your troops.
Publicity. Then, there comes this business of publicity. I've
hardly known a general in the British artily and strangely enough
in the American either. who has not said that he disliked publicity.
I have never yet seen a general in either army who did not rush to
the newspaper to see what it said about him. Publicity is with us
and it is here to stay. It is necessary, and a good general uses it for
his own purposes.
I have only one bit of advice about publicity to give you and that
is, if you take over an artily or large fortllation, do not start outside
publicity until you are really well known to your own men. I sug
gest that you don't start it until you have won a battle or two, and
then you won't have to bother because it will be done for you. Get
yourself known to your own men before you start trying to get
yourself known to people outside. The best way of getting yourself
known to your own men is going about amongst them and actually
talking to them. If you want to talk to men, it does not marter
whether they are private soldiers or staff officers, ifyou want to talk
to them as a soldier, and not as a politician, there are only two
things necessary. The first is to have something to say that is worth
saying, to know what you want to say. The second, and terribly
important thing, is to believe it yourself. Do not tell men some
thing that you don't believe yourself, because they will spot it, and
if they do not spot it at the time, they will find out. Then you're
finished.
May 1990. MILITARY REVIEW
PERSPECTIVES
Scapegoats. Do not go chasing scapegoats; ifsome fellow undet
your command has made a blob, has lost a battle or done some
thing that is wrong, do not rush off straight away and "sack" him.
Some people think that's big stuff in the way of command. My
advice to you is if a man loses a battle, or gets a setback, go and see
him and find out why. If he did it because he was careless, ifhe did
it because he was stupid or, above all, if he did it because he got
cold feet, sack him. Tell him why you sacked him. But if he did it
because he was a little bit overeager, because he took just a little bit
too much risk or because he was a little bit too pugnacious, give
him another chance. Lots of fellows benefit a great deal by a little
setback once-but the thing to do is to find out why -don't be in
too big a hurry to sack people.
If you have to sack anybody, which is the most unpleasant thing
in the world because the chaps you have to sack are usually rather
nice people, do it yourself. Send for him or go to see him and do it
straight to his face and tell him why you have done it. Then push
him straight out, put him in an airplane and send him out of your
anny area. Do not leave it to other people to do and do not do it by
letter. Similarly, if a rebuke has to be given to a subordinate com
mander, even a small one, sign it yourself. There is nothing more
annoying if you are a major general, than to get a raspberry signed,
"Doolittle, CAPTAIN."
Finally, when you become great generals, as some of you will,
and you have all these publicity merchants rushing about, watch it
that they do not make a monkey of you. Watch it, that they do not
make you begin to act as they think you ought to act. If you start
putting your cap on at a particular slant in front of the mirror
before you go out to face the flash bulbs, just watch it, because
there has been more than one good chap who has been a little bit
ruined by trying to act up to what the publicity boys thought he
ought to be. It may even affect your judgment.
Now, all I tell you is this-that command is a completely per
sonal thing. That you must have certain essential qualities: will
power, judgment, flexibility of mind, knowledge and integrity. Do
not confuse those with the frills that commanders always culti
Yate - they cultivate them because they want to get known to their
troops. Ifyou wear a couple of pearl-handled revolvers, you will not
be a Patton; if you put two badges on a beret, you will not be a
Monty. Look for the essentials that are in those commanders and
copy those. You all have the makings of commanders in you. You
wouldn't be here in this han if you didn't. Some of you have
already been commanders. You can develop your power of com
mand. The last thing I say to you is this-Command is you. As
you develop, be yourselves, because no imitation was ever a
masterpiece. "1..
You want an officer
who will represent to you
the mind ofthe enemy
commander. They are very
hard to find, these chaps,
very hard to find. They are
very rarely regular oflicers
they are usually
university dons or
somethinglike that . .. get
him and put himin your
pocket, because h e ~ very
useful.
MILITARY REVIEW May 1990 21
Corps
COInID.and

I.n
World War II
Major General Wade H. Haislip (1889.197
Major General Wade H. Haislip graduated fro
Academy, fought in France during World War I a
War Department General Staffjust prior to assurnitig,t .
of XV Corps in World War II. This narrative, a rewrlt
presentation to the US Anny Command and General Staff CO _,
lege Class of1950-1951, gives some insight into what it was like
to be a corps commander in combat. The XV Corps arrived in
Europe on 11 July 1944, became operational on 31 July and
fought across France andinto the heartofGerrnany as part ofthe
Third, First and Seventh US armies.
T
HE CORPS commander is the farthest corps headquarters, on the other hand, goes
commander to the rear who direcrs fire into action and stays there until the war is over. If
on the enemy; he is the man who conducts the properly organized and managed, there is no rea
battle. He gives purpose and direction to the son why a corps should not be able to sustain ir
combat operations of his divisions. To appreci self indefinitely. Its headquarters is large enough
ate his task, one must understand the corps' for continuous operations without exhausting irs
place in the organization ofArmy ground forces, soldiers.
irs characteristics and irs relationship to an A division has units trained together as com
army and a division. bat teams, but a corps has nothing except a
The army is the great administrative and sup headquarters, an artillery headquarters and
ply echelon. It influences the fight by assigning some signal units. A division is complete for
missions, means and frontages to its corps. By combat; a corps has only that which is given to
varying anyone or all three of these factors, it it by the army commander. As a division ma
can have a direct impact on what a corps can tures in irs training and develops greater cohe
do. An army can stop a corps in its tracks by sion, its commander can adopt complex stand
giving it a front wider than it can manage or by ing operating procedures (SOPs). A corps, on
taking away irs divisions. Conversely, by giving the other hand, takes on new strength just prior
a corps greater combat power and reducing its to irs involvement in a fight. Usually, there is
frontage, an army can enhance the corps' abil insufficient time for a corps to indoctrinate its
iry to accomplish its mission. divisions, artached artillery battalions and engi
In theory, a division in combat expecrs to be neer unirs in elaborate and intricate tactical
relieved periodically to refit, rest, receive re procedures. Consequently, a corps must use
placements and prepare for the next fight. A simple SOPs.
May 1990 MILITARY REVIEW 22
A division has no self-contained units. To
split up a division, you must make numerous
attachments to its major subordinate units be
cause a regiment has neither fire nor service
Sl.\pport adequate to fight. On the other hand, a
corps has nothing but self-contained units. It
can take on divisions and artillery units or drop
them without any trouble, without any break
ing up of attachments. Although the division is
a supply unit and the corps is not, except for its
own corps units, the latter must monitor clivi,
sian supply to ensure soldiers and units get what
they need.
Finally, a division retains its organization
throughout its life, while a corps is a continually
changing force. In nine months of combat, my
corps changed from one to six divisions and
from 12 to 27 battalions of artillery. At one
time or another, there were 27 different divi
sions fighting under XV Corps.
The Mayenne River and Le Mans
To illustrate how one corps fought in World
War II and to highlight some of the challenges
facing its commander and staff, I will summarize
XV Corps' fight across France and Germany,
pausing to look at a few operations in depth.
When the First US Army broke through the
Gennan defenses at the base of the Cherbourg
peninsula, the Third US Anny attacked through
the hole. The VIII Corps came out first, turned
west and drove towards Brest. My corps came
through second and pushed south toward the
Mayenne River. Our first battle action was the
forcing of a well-defended river line.
My mission was "to capture Laval and May
enne and secure a crossing of the Mayenne
River" (see map). To accomplish this task, I had
the 79th and 90th Infantry divisions, the 5th
Armored Division and the I06th Cavalry Group.
I advanced with the 90th Infantty Division on
the left and the 79th Infantry Division on the
right. The 5th Annored Division was eche
loned to the right rear of the corps to protect
the right and rear flanks and to execute an en
velopment, if the tactical situation permitted.
MILITARY REVIEW. May 1990
PERSPECTIVES
By 6 August 1944, encountering only light en
emy resistance, my units had secured the towns
and crossed the river. US forces now had my
A division in combat expects
00 be relieved periodicaHy 00 refit, rest, re
ceive replacements and prepare for the
next light. A corps headquarters, on the
otherhand, goes moo action and stays
there until the war is over . .. There is
no reason whya corps shouldnot be able
00 sustain itselfindefinitely.
corps facing east and the VIII Corps facing west.
My corps' next mission, assigned on 7 Au
gust 1944, was to capture Le Mans, 50 miles to
the east of the Mayenne River. This mission
required us to traverse ideal defensive terrain,
force a crossing over the Sarthe River and seize a
strongly defended city of 75,000 people. More
over, during the drive, we were vulnerable on
our left and right flanks. We were told there
were numerous German forces in the vicinity of
Le Mans, but no one knew how many. We knew
there were Gennans on the east side of the
Sarthe River because they were shooting at us.
Also, intelligence sources showed that there
were about 30,000 Gennans south of the Loire
River. The greatest threat, however, was in
the north from German forces withdrawing
southward and eastward from the vicinity of
Mortain.
Additionally, we were told that there were
800 tanks in our front. Now, in my opinion,
that is a hell of a thing to tell a corps when you
order it into battle. Believing that this figure
was excessive, I told my G2 (intelligence) to
pass the word to the divisions that there were 80
ranks to our front. Later, I revised this number
downward to about eight tanks. After the first
few weeks of fighting, we had destroyed 120
ranks so maybe there were 800 tanks after all.
It is appropriate to digress for a moment to
23
explain how we got our intelligence. It was a
rather remarkable thing. The Air Corps had a
system for debriefing fighter pilots when they
returned from their missions. As you can imag
i

In battle, you must .
know where you are
going, what you are
going for andhow to
handle the situation
when it develops.
Combat is a day-w-day
affair. We were very
lucky and extremely
fortunate to have done
it successfully.
-
ine, this procedure produced an enormous con
glomeration of infonnation. These bits of infor
mation found their way to my corps, arriving
about 3 or 4 o'clock in the morning, inside the
covers of an book. My G2 nearly
went crazy trying to identify information rele
vant to us at the time.
My major concerns during the planning
phase for the attack on Le Mans were speed of
movement and a desire not to be tied up
nitely at the objective. To ensure rapid seizure
of the objective with the minimum loss of
mentum, my staff and I decided on a
pronged attack. The 90th Infantry Division was
assigned the northern half of the city, the 79th
Infantry Division was given the southern half
and the 5th Armored Division was ordered to
encircle the town from the southeast. Going
against doctrine, I used my annor inthe city to
crack it like a nut. You were not supposed to use
24
armor in this manner, but I did it I and it was
successful. You \Ue what you have to get the job
done. I positioned the l06th Cavalry Group to
cover the roads leading into Le Mans from the
north and northeast. After fierce street
ing, the city fell on the evening of 8 August.
Moving Northward to
After seizing Le Mans, the corps received
three new attachments: the 2d French Armor
ed Division, the 35th Infantry Division and the
80th Infantry Division. The French division
was en route to Le Mans from the vicinity of St.
James to the south. The 35th Infantry Division
was concentrated near Mortain, and the 80th
Infantry Division was moving to Le Mans from
St. Hilaire via lavaL It had just landed on the
Continent and had no combat experience.
On 9 August, I was ordered to change the
corps' direction ofattack from aneasterly
tation to a northerly direction to capture
9On. The staff quickly developed a plan to ad
vance east of the Sarthe River, using that
de to protect our west flank, with the two
armored divisions abreast, the 2d French
cd Division on the left and the 5th Armored
Division on the right. The 90th Infantry
sion was given the mission to follow the French
on the left, and the 79th Infantry Division was
tasked to foHow the 5th Armored Division on
the right. The 106th Cavalry Group was
signed to cover the corps' eastern flank.. The
recently arrived BOth Infantry Division was
directed to secure the bridgehead at Le Mans
and protect our left and rear flanks.
To move into this attack posture, I had to
position the French Armored Division to the
corps'left front as quickly as possible. There
were two routes to move the division to its line
of departure. First, it could pass south and east
aroundLe Mans and the 5th Armored Divi
sion, a time-<:onsuming operation. Second, it
could proceed by the most direct route across
the rear of the three other divisions, a risky
movement. In the interest oftime, the latter op-
tion was selected. It required careful planning.
May 1990 MILITARY REVIEW
To move into this attack posture, I had to position the French Armored Division
to the corps' left front as quickly as possible. There were two routes to move the division
to its line ofdeparture. First, it couldpass south and east around I.e Mans and the 5th
ArmoredDivision, a time-consuming operation. Second, it couldproceed by the most
direct route across the rear ofthe three other divisions, a risky movement. In the
interest oftime, thelatter option was selected. It required careful planning.
This plan required the French unit to cross
the Sarthe River north of Le Mans, The opera
tion had to be executed rapidly because the
river offered a perfect delaying obstacle to my
corps if the Germans were behind us. To com
pound the problem, the French had left their
treadway bridges back on the beach, 140 miles
away. Fortunately, we had some corps bridges.
I had the 5th Armored Division attack to
seize crossing sites along the entire corps front.
My corps engineers built two bridges over the
5arthe north of Le Mans. With my fingers
crossed and my deputy chief of staff running
traffic, we moved the French division across the
river during the night of 9-10 August and into
its attack positions on the left of the corps. The
operation worked like a charm.
While the French were moving up on the
evening of 9 August, the 5th Annored Division
was driving enemy forces from crossing sites
along the Orne River. They turned over sites
in the French division's zone to them by 1200,
10 August. With my forces now consolidated,
we attacked northward toward Alen90n.
My attack formation had the two armored
divisions abreast, followed by the two infantry
divisions. Each infantry division moved with
one motorized regimental combat team (RC1)
follOWing the armor. This fonnation raises a
contentious issue. It deals with the attachment
ofRCTs to annor units. Being a good infantry
man, I refused to use this procedure. I have seen
too many infantry units chewed up by the ar
mor. There is always a tendency among com
manders to use forces that do not belong to
them before they use their own resources. I
25 MILITARY REVIEW May 1990
, (ieLF
OF
sr.
@ ST. to
t:I'.i!:..- "'''',;-lit ll>t( 'J{ 'i:Ji'ir'"! .
.r0JtP,fJ" ,

'f!"''''A'':C!['H'''1Ij1lT
!l-<I" tn. .. ,4lb ",I,IQ.
know corps commanders who Hlways attached
an infantry RCT to armor. If you do that and
the RC':T gets used up, your infantry division
becomes combat-ineffective.
During the attack northward, the corps en
countered sharp tank action, strong artillery
fires, congested roads and overall strong Ger
man resistance. The going was slow. The major
obstacle facing us was the Perseigne Forest
which stood across the route of advance in both
annoreddivisionzones. The forest was about 12
miles wide and 10 miles deep. Reportedly, it
contained enemy supply installations and the
bulk of two first,class Gennan divisions, about
30,000 troops. I wanted to burn the forest with
napalm, but amlY denied my request based on
intelligence reports that the Germans had al
ready evacuated the area. I now faced a major
decision. If I tried to move the corps in between
the forest and the Sarthe River, a smaller enemy
force could have delayed our advance. If I had
tried to pass the corps around the forest to take
Alen4;on, it would have been an extremely awk
ward affair. l.-onsidering my options, I took a
risk and directed that the forest be bypassed to
maintain the momentum of our attack. I split
the corps and sent half on one side and half on
the other side of the forest. By doing this, I had
my forward divisions separated by a 12-mile
wide obstacle. I ordered the 79th Infantry Divi
sion, trailing the 5th Annored Division on the
right, to be prepared to deploy and attack the
forest on any sign of the enemy.
As they say, "Nothing succeeds like success."
There was no threat from the Perseigne Forest
and no Gennans in We took the
town easily. However, my two annored divisions
lost 60 tanks getting from the Orne River up to
May 1990. MILITARY REVIEW 26
I ADVANCE OF THE XY CORPS
I
1
I
J
"" II OF TIfE THIRD l:N1TED STATES ARMY
NORJ\1ANDY TO THE SEINE RIVER
I AUGUST TO AUGUST,
SCAlf l TO ;00.000
"" " l;; $ I'J ,.., .0 "' ....
____ __. ....
Elsewhere in the COIps area of opera
tions, the 80th Infantry Division, protecting
our left and rear flanks, forced the withdrawal
of German covering forces threatening the Le
Mans bridgehead. The I06th Cavalry Group on
our right flank turned back a German threat
from the direction of Orleans.
seizing Argentan
After we took the anny com
mander ordered the corps to seize Argentan on
the Orne River to the north. Notwithstanding
my complaint that the corps was stretched
pretty thin with an open flank, the order stood,
and we prepared for the advance. I turned the
90th Infantry Division west, tied its right on the
Ecouves Forest and placed it in a defensive
tion to block the major road network leading
into Vemeuil and Paris to the east. This road
center had to be blocked prior to the passing of
my corps. I intended to send my two armored
divisions around the east side of the forest. As
usual, the armor reacted too quickly. Without
orders, the commander of the 2d French Annor
ed Division moved some units into the 5th
Armored Division's sector where the twoforces
became entangled, causing considerable confu
sion.Moreover, the French sent a combat com
mand into the forest from the north where it
MILITARY REVIEW. May 1990
PERSPECTIVES
encountered strong resistance from enemy tanks,
tank destroyers and artillery belonging to a pan
zer division. The French forces killed about 800
enemy soldiers, captured 1,000 prisoners and
destroyed 34 tanks. After this engagement, we
continued On to Argentan and seized it. We
were then ordered to halt.
Earlier, the Third Anny commander had
ordered XV Corps to push toward Falaise and
link up with the British forces there. Before this
mission could be executed, he directed half of
the corps' divisions to march on Dreux to the
east, a mission previously assigned to XX Corps.
The latter corps had been ordered to change
direction and move to Chartres.
The above situation brings me to another
teaching point concerning the characteristics
of the pursuit. At Argentan 1 never knew from
one day to the next what my mission was going
to be. Anny did not know either. In fact, 1 was
always apologizing to my division commanders
for making them respond on 1or 2 hours' notice
and for never giving them time to perfonn re
connaissance. Here at Leavenworth, you study
Throughout the war, my corps'
frontages were always roo wide to handle
effectively. To compensate for this recU1'"
ring problem, 1always selected the part
ofthe zone in which I desired to attack and
used mycavalry to observe the .rest.
I was able to do this because I always had
the initiative, and whereverI went, the
Gennans bad to come to me.
that when you want to pursue, you seek out sen
sitive areas in the rear and try to grasp and hold
them; so you can comer the enemy to deal him
a knockout blow. In battle, you must do this
before you start. You must know where you are
going, what you are going for and how to handle
the situation when it develops. Combat is a day
to-dayaffair. We were very lucky and extremely
fortunate to have done it successfully.
27
Each infantry division moved
with one motorized regimental combat
team (RCI) following the armor. This
formation raises a contentious issue.
It deals with the attachment ofRCTs to
armor units . .. I have seen too many
infantry units chewed up by the armor.
There is always a tendency among
commanders to use forces that do not
belong to them before they
use their own resources.
At Argentan the corps was ordered to turn
east once again to seize Dreux and move to the
Seine River. To do this, I was ordered to split my
corps in two. With the 2d French AmlOred
Division and 90th Infantry Division left back to
block routes through Argentan, the 5th Armor
ed Division and the 79th Infantry Division
were ordered to march on Dreux and Nogent
Le-Roi, respectively, to seize toad net\\'orks
there, cross the Eure River and continue to the
Seine River. To make the task more complex, I
was directed to retain control of my entire
corps. This meant that I would be commanding
a corps split in two parts, with units separated
by over 50 miles. After my protest to the army
commander, he sent out his chief of staff who
took p'drt of my sraff and established a provi
sional corps consisting of the 90th Infantry
Division, 2d French Armored Division, four
battalions of corps artillery and other support
units. On 18 August 1944, this provisional corps
passed to the command of V Corps.
Continuing the mission, the 5th Armored
Division and 79th Infantry Division advanced
in sector toward DreUJ<, meeting only minor
resistance. By dark on 16 August, both divisions
hadseized rheir objectives. They then crossed
the Eure River and proceeded to the Seine. By
the evening of 20 August, the 79th Infantry
Division had crossed the Seine in the vicinity
of Mantes Gassicourt, and the 5th Am10red
Division had positioned itself between the
Seine and Eure rivers, east of Louviers, to pre
vent river traffic and enemy crossings of the
Seine. At 0600, 24 August 1944, XV Corps
passed to command of the First US Army.
On 27 August, XV Corps attacked across the
Seine River with the 30th Infantry Division in
the right zone, the 79th Infantry Division in
the left zone and a combat command of the 2d
Am10red Division protecting the north flank.
By dark the corps had advanced about 3 kilo
meters against strong enemy resistance. When
the attack resumed on 28 August, 35 battalions
of artillery delivered 53,000 rounds on enemy
positions. Over 2,000 enemy soldiers were
kllled by artlllery, and another 1,000 were so
shaken that they surrendered to 79th Infantry
Division units as they passed through the area.
By 1200, 29 August, both infantry divisions
were on the corps' objectives, dearing the way
for the general advance ofUS and Britishforces
east of the Seine River. On 28 August, the 5th
Affi10red Division passed to command of V
Corps, and the 106th Cavalry Group passed to
Third US Affi1Y. On 29 August, the XV Corps'
remaining three divisions passed to XIX Corps.
With the corps zetoed out, the headquarters
and corps troops passed to Third US Army and
moved to the vicinity of Rozay-en-Brie to await
the assignment of divisions.
From the Seine to the Danube
When we resumed our push eastward, we
crossed the Marne River and moved up to the
Meuse River with an infantry division and
an armored division abreast. After breaking
through the Vosges Mountains and seizing Strass
bourg, my forces were again widely separated. I
had an aIll10red division and an infantry divi
sion in and around Strassbourg. Thirty-five
miles away, across the Vosges Mountains, I had
an infantry division, part of a second infantry
division and part of an aIll10red division. The
forces there were tlghting off a vicious counter
attack. When the Battle of the Bulge occurred,
my corps was attacked on a 20-mile front with
May 1990. MILITARY REVIEW
28
Third.Army
firing near Budeshein;Ger ..
1Q M<':fcIJ 1945.
When the attack resumed on 28 August, 35 battalions ofartiIlery
delivered53,000 rounds on enemy positions. Over2,000 enemy soldiers were killed
by artillery, and another 1,000 were so shaken that they surrendered to 79th Infantry
Division units as they passed through the area.
My corps artillery replaced the XII Corps artillery by shifting 10 battalions
northward during a single night. Because XII Corps artillery's techniques
were radicaHy different from my corps' procedures
t
it continued to direct its fires into
its corps zone, and we directed our tires into our zone to fool the Gennans into
thinking that the corps artilleries had not been moved.
two infantry divisions defending in the left half
of the zone. The right half of the corps' zone in
the Vosges Mountains was covered only by a
cavalry group.
I mention this fact to show that throughout
the war, my corps' frontages were always too
wide to handle effectively, To compensate for
this recurring problem, I always selected the
part of the zone in which I desired to attack and
used my cavalry to observe the rest. I was able to
do this because I always had the initiative, and
wherever I went, the Gennans had to come to
me. Moreover, I kept an annored division in
reserve to react to contingencies.
Next, without any prior notice, I received
orders to take over the XII O:Jrps' sector on my
left and to release the units in that corps for use
in the north. To accomplish this task, I was
given one additional infantry division. At the
time, XII Corps occupied a 40-mile front with
three infantry divisions, one armored division,
a cavalry group and an armored division in re
serve. Within four days, I released these forces,
plus 17 battalions of corps artillery, and re
placed them with my three infantry divisions,
armored division and cavalry group, Concur
rently, I shifted my right flank 11 miles to the
left.
My corps artillery replaced the XII O:Jrps
artillery by shifting 10 battalions northward
during a single night, Because XII Corps artil
lery's night-firing techniques were radically dif
ferent from my corps' procedures, it continued
to direct its fires into its corps zone, and we
directed our fires into our zone to fool the Ger
mans into thinking that the corps artilleries
MILITARY REVIEW. May 1990 29
had not been moved. Although difficult to
execute, this deception worked. Its success was
a remarkable tribllte to the outstanding battle
sraffs in borh corps and ro rhe skill with which
battle-trained units can displace. This example
illustrates why it is not necessary to have a stra
tegic reserve sitring back enjoying the war. With
good soldiers, outstanding leaders and superb
staff work, you can pull a division out of the
lines and move it 100 miles within 24 hours.
We did it often!
My next point for discussion deals with an
attack on a fortified zone, the Seigfried Line.
When ordered to break through ir and drive to
the Rhine River, I had the 3d, 45th, 71st and
100th Infantry divisions in the corps. The 7Ist
was a new division; it had not yet been in
action. 1was determined not to put it in a fight
where it could get torn up and lose its confi
dence. On the way up to the line, I allowed the
7I5t to organize some small attacks to get the
fed of the usc of artillery and to get accustomed
to combat. It was also involved in the seizure of
Bitche.
To penetrate the Seigfried Line, I put the 3d
and 45th divisions on the left and the lOOth and
7lst divisions on the right. The latter division
also had the mission to protect my rear. As nor
mal, I put my cavalry in the interval between
the two groups of divisions. Unlike some com
!nanders who spread their strength neatly over
an entire front and then wonder why they never
get anywhere, I put every gun in the corps artj}...
Iery and every airplane in the tactical air force
behind the corps' main effort. I believe in pour
ing it on the objective area and not scattering
your combat power over a wide front. Addi
tionally, I received the 6th Annored Division
just as we approached the Seigfried Line and
placed it in reserve. After the infantry created a
hole in the fortified zone, I moved the armored
division up and ruptured the Gennan defensive
positions. My annored forces rhen raced to the
Rhine in some 20 hours, a distance of over 100
miles. The les.'iOn here is to never use armor to
penetrate a fortified position. It is not organized
for this task. If you commit the annor too early,
it becomes bogged down, and the infantry has
to come along and pull it out and do the job
over again.
I had another policy that I always strictly
enforced. It deals with support between divi
sions. I believe the best way one division can
support another in battle is to loosen and soften
up enemy resistance in its own zone of action
that might threaten the unit on its flank. I
never permitted one division to tum across the
front of another division. When you do this,
there is a great possibility that your forces will
become disorganized. Disentangling the troops
and getting them started again in the right
direction is a difficult, risky business, especially
if enemy forces are located nearby. If I had a
division advancing rapidly and having success,
I insisted that it plunge ahead in its own zone
and drag the other divisions with it.
Now, I want to address the Rhine River cross
ing. My staff and I started planning for the
cro&sing several weeks in advance, focusing
south of the junction of the Main and Rhine
rivers. We had the air corps take photographs
all winter, and we studied the banks of the river
under all conditions and types of weather. The
Rhine, a fonnidable obstacle, is 1,000 feet wide
and has a current of about 4 miles per hour,
about as fast as a man can walk.
By this time, we had destroyed all enemy
forces west of the Rhine, and we knew there
were no large concentrations of forces east of
the river either. We felt that if we could get a
footing over the river, we could not be turned
back. We knew, however, that the Germans
were desperate and were placing all their units
in the front lines. We expected a fierce fight at
the river line.
My intent was to cross on a broad front with
speed and momentum. To do this, we used four
crossing sites. The initial assault force crossed in
assault boats and DUKWs, 2 liz-ton amphibious
trucks. I was fortunate to have a battalion of
DUKWs to transport the artillery and heavy
equipment. Moreover, we built infanrry ferries
May 1990' MILITARY REVIEW 30
and heavy pontoon ferries. After the fire was
cleared from the crossing sites, we constructed
bridges. Because the river was high and the
stream beds were soggy and boggy, we selected
our bridge sites carefully. We built a treadway
bridge just south of Worms in 12 hours and 50
minutes, a heavy pontoon bridge 1,040 feet
long in 9 hours and 12 Ininutes and a pontoon
bridge 1,164 feet long in 17 hours and 10
minutes.
Q)mmand and control of the river crossing
was another eXCiting challenge. 1 told my staff
that I wanted the operation organized just as
carefully as the channel crossing was organized.
They did it too! My 03 (operations and plans)
established the priority of crossing, and my 04
(Logistics) granted clearances. We had a corps
control cell in the 04 office with a traffic
officer, military police (MP) officers and some
military policemen. We had two sector control
cells on each side of the river. Each pair, one on
each side of the river, controlled two bridges.
We also had two assembly areas on each side of
the river. The only traffic between them was
bridge traffic. At the ingress and egress points
to each bridge, we had an MP officer, some mili
tary policemen for traffic control and a recovery
vehicle to move stalled or inoperative vehicles.
Experience shows that if a vehicle is going to
break down, it will always do it in the middle
of the bridge. [f a driver did not know where
he was supposed to go the minute he crossed
the river, we ran him into an assembly area to
dear the road until we could get the problem
stmightened out.
The river crossing was a great success. We
attacked at 0230,26 March 1945, and 68 hours
later, or about 48 hours after the bridges were
completed, we had crossed 120,000 troops,
23,000 vehicles, including four infantry divi
sions and two annored divisions, and 84 as
signed or attached units, mostly of battalion
size. Many of them belonged to XXI Corps. I
was a proud corps commander standing there
watching the traffic move across the bridge
one after another without any hesitation, with
MILITARY REVIEW. May 1990
We attacked at 0230, 26 March
1945, and 68 hours later, or about 48
hoUts after the bridges were completed,
we hadcrossed 120,000 troops,
23,000 vehicles, including four infantry
divisions and two armored divisions,
and84 assigned or attached units,
mosdy ofbattalion size.
Ii
31
everything running perfectly. We switched traf
fic on some of the bridges occasionally and
turned it back again without any delay.
The river crossing, however, was not my only
focus at the time. I had two divisions attacking
east across the river and approaching rhe Main
Unlike some commanders who spread
their strength neady overan entire front
and then wonder why they neverget any'
where, I put everygun in the corps artillery
and every airplane in the tactical air force
behind the corps' main effort. I believe in
pouring it on the objective area and not
scattering your combat power.
River, which itself was about 350 yards wide. I
had another division attacking south to capture
Mannheim, the great industrial city of Ger
many. With all this going on, the army com
mander called me up and said, "Move the XXI
Corps across your bridges too." Slightly an
noyed at this directive, I responded, "While I'm
doing all these other things for you, I've got a
few odd minutes, is there anything else you'd
like me to do?" He came down and took ovet
my bridges.
After we took Nuremberg and started south
to the Danube, it was evident that the fight was
rapidly drawing to a close. German resistance
had been deteriorating ever since we left the
Rhine River some 250 miles back. We knew
that when we hit the Danube, it was just a mat
ter of finding soft spots and getring across. We
had run out of maps and off of maps, but at this
stage of the game we were in full pursuit. I was
not worried about being cut off or stopped. We
just kept the pressure on and gained ground.
Although this has been a fast, superficial
look at the XV Corps in World WadI, there are
a few additional points worth pondering. First,
as a corps commander, I never knew from One
hour to the next whether I was going to have
one, two, four or whatever number of divisions.
The lesson here is that a corps commander
must be flexible; he must be able to adjust him
self to any situation without worry, fuss or
bother. No matter what happens, it must be
considered entirely nonna!. Prepare yourselffor
this kind of warfare. Second, the fights that
I have described were fought with weapons and
materiel that are now outdated, some of them ob
solete. But these battles proved that the Anny's
principles are sound. We know how to fight, but
our techniques and procedures are going to
have to change as our organizations and weap
ons change. Think about these changes while
you are studying here at Leavenworth. Do not
blindly accept the tactics and techniques of
World War II. Be innovative; think critically
about future war and how to wage it. Third, XV
Corps consistently operated without friendly
units on either flank or protecting its rear. Con
sequently, we always marched closed up and
ready to fight in any direction. This tactic re
quires well-trained soldiers, competent leaders
and sound bartle drills. Fourth, tapid movement
over great distances made communications ex
tremely difficult. Radio and telephone commu
nications were consistently unsatisfactory. Often,
couriers and other messengers were the only
means of effective communications. Ordetswere
issued orally between commanders in face-to"'
face exchanges or transmirted orally by anny staff
officers to corps staff officers. Although wor
risome, this procedure allows you to better under
stand what your boss is trying to accomplish.
Fifth, aerial reconnaissance was always unsatis
factory. Neither reports of reconnaissance mis
sions flown nor photographs taken were received
at the torpscommand post in time to be ofany
use in bartle planning. They always
48hoUJ:s late. We always fought with
tactical intelligence. Finally, remember this fro
lll
an old corps commander. A corps must behan
dIed sitllplyand directly. There must be no elab
orate SOPs'll(} elaborate maneuvers. If you want
to win a fight, put your combat power in the
place you Want it to go and punch it
May 1990 MILITARY REVIEW 32
ea ersh
G
at Higher
S
General]. Lawton Collins (1896-1987)
GeneralJ. Lawton Co1llns graduated fro .,', ,,'
in the Philippines prior to World War II. After t
Harbor, he was sent to Hawaii to organize the
General CoUins led soldiers into combat in both acific and
European theaters in World War II. He took the 25th Infantry
Division into Guadalcanal in late 1942, and commanded the US
VII Corps during the Way landing at Normandy and then in
battles in France, Belgium and Germany. Afterthc war, he served
as deputy and vice chiefofstaffand, from 1949 to 1953, he was
chiefofstaffofthe Army. He delivered this speech to the students
and faculty ofthe US Army Commandand General StaffCollege
on 15 April 1949. His views on leadership ring true across the
echelons of command and are as applicable today as when he
served. His remarks have been edited for publication.
HEN I was first asked, last year, to come leader, then look into the techniques of lead
here to speak, the subject assigned to ership and then see what differences, if any,
me was "Leadership in the Higher Echelon." I there are in the qualities and the techniques of
thought about that subject f()r some time be leadership for larger units.
cause it never had occurred to me before that First of all, the qualities of a leader. I am onl y
there was any difference in leadership in the going to touch upon four of them, Probably you
smaller units from the leadership required to could line up 100r 15, but there are only t(,ur
command large units. The more I analyzed the that really amount to anyrhing, from my point
problem, the more I became convinced that of view,
was correct. [ think that just as it is true that
tactics involved in a squad or a platoon or a Human Touch
company or a battalion are identical to the tac First, I would say rhar a great leader musr
tics used in fighting in a corps or arm also have the human touch. Now, I cannot quite
true that the same qualities all qefinethat for you specifically, but I could per'
unit commanders ate essential ose who haps indicate what 1 mean by saying that this
have the responsibility of commanding larger human touch that I put such great store by
units. So, I am going to attack the ptoblem would be exemplified by men like RobertE.
pretty much in that way, first of all trying to Lee, and outside of the military field by such a
analyze what are the essential qualities of a great man as AbrahaIll Lincc,[n. That would be
MILITARY REVIEW' May 1990
33
the first then, in my judgment, of all the essen
tial qualities-that a leadet must have the
human tOLlch. Nc)\\,\ h()w do yOll get that way?
What are the things that are involved in having
a hUnl<ln touch!
Integrity. The first of these is that he must
be a man of character and integrity. There is an
One ofthe things you certainly
cannot kid{the troops] about is
honesty, character and integrit}' The
leader who does not have those qualities
loses the confidence ofhis men faster
than in any other way, because the men
knolV a phony when they see one. You
can't hide a phony.
old saying in the Army that you can't kid the
troops, and one of the things you certainly can
not kid them about is honesty, character and
integrity. The leader who does not have those
qualities loses the confidence of his men faster
than ill any other way, because the men know a
phony when they see one. You can't hide a
phony. You either have character and integrity
or you don't have it; And HS I say, men can spot
people of that ilk right off the bat.
Genuine Interest. Next, the leader must
have a genuine interest in the welfare of his
men. And again, ifhe does not have that, if he
does not look after his men first, last and all the
time
i
hewiU never have their confidence. Now,
while we are doing many things in the Army
today to improve the relationships between our
officers andmcn. to engender the confidence
that must exist there, I think what we really
ought to do is to go backto the old Army stand
[ud-where 9fficers actedas.the "fathers" of
their units. I do I1(ltl
ll
efm in a sentimental way,
but in agenuineway, with all thefinest implica
tions of the responsil>ilityofa father for his chil
dren. When! joined the Army that was the
thing that was emphasized most to me and, as a
matter of fact, it was emphasized Iuost at \V'est
Point, that my job was primarily to look after
my men. And I say we must go back to that
point of view again, where the officer is willing
to spend any amount of thne in order to look
after the interests and welf,,,e of his men. I
would like to illustrate that by a story.
I guess it was in January 1941, I was assigned
as chief of staff of VII Corps (the corps I had
the great good fortune to command in Europe)
which was just being organized at Birmingham,
Alabama. When I reported dO\vn there with
the army commander, all we had were a handful
of officers. I received word that we were going to
get our cadre in a day or two ;.;md the cadre
sisted of one noncommissioned officer and I
think it was 19 or 21 privates.Well, I got in
touch with the 01 (personnel) over in Atlanta,
Georgia, and I said, "Is this OUf whole cadre?u
He said, H()h yes, that's what you are going to
have to organize your headquarters company." I
think we were entitled to about five or seven
master sergeants and a lot of other noncommis
sioned officers, but the senior man being sent us
was a corporal. So we sat down and wrote to all
the staff officers who were being ordered to us
and suggested that they pick out, from their old
headquarters, one or two men who were suscep
tible of development into senior
sioned officers and bring them along, and we
would guarantee that they would get some pro
motion. Well, these men began to arrive at odd
times. Usually, we had no forewaming of just
when they were going to corne. And one night
at abour I I o'clock, as I was just tuming in, the
telephone rang and it was the Salvation Army
down at the railroad station. They said that
there were just about a half dozen, six or eight
men, for VII Corps that had just arrived. They
had a lot of baggage with them and did not
know what to do. Our headquarters company
was still not fully organized, and we did not
have adequate transportation or anything of
that sort So. I got the 04 (logistics) of corps
headquarterson.the phone, Colonel Eel Hall,
and I said, "We have got some men down there
May 1990 MILITARY 34
at the railroad station. I would like you to get
your car, and we will go down and meet them."
So we did. We did have an acting first sergeant
by then, and he was able to bed them down for
the night. Now, I do not say this in a boastful
way, that we two colonels went out and picked
up these soldiers. That was our duty. It never in
the slightest occurred to us that we were doing
anything particularly unusual, because that was
our business. Well, I had an interesting come
back on that incident when [ took command of
this same corps in England, before the Nor
mandy invasion. At one of the first offices that I
walked into, there was a good-looking master
sergeant. As I shook hands with him, I said,
"Sergeant, you have been around here for a
long time -I know you from before when we
were in Birmingham, don't I?" He said, "Yes,
General, you are the first man that I saw in VII
Corps. You met me at the railroad station about
midnight the night I arrived, and I have never
forgotten it."
Now, I am sure that was one reason we had
such a crack corps headquarters, and maybe I
am biased but I think, perhaps, we had the best
in Europe. But there is no question in my mind
that one of the reasons why we had it was
because of the fact that Hall and I had met
those men that night. Three of them were still
with the company and were master sergeants
then. That is the sort of thing that the officers
of the Army must do for their men, for all their
men. In the old Army, that was the routine
thing, and we must get back to that sort of
action.
Judgment. Now,rhe next thing that the
leader must be able to do is to judge men. He
must know how to choose tllen, because men
are vastly different.Youcanhatl?le one man
one way and find you musthlltldleanother one
in an utterly different f a s ~ i o n . With one man,
you have to be exttemelyfirm, and another one,
if you do that under certain circumstances, he
loses his confidence. You have to handle each a
little bit differently, and that is again dependent
upon your own knowledge ofhuman nature and
PERSPECTIVES
your ownwillingness to admit that people can
have fOibles, can have weaknesses and yet can
have very great qualities which, if properly han
dled, can leadro perfectly splendid results.
Responsibility. Now, along with this will
ingness to handle men differently, you have got
to give them responsibility if you expect them
to be able ro develop into the leaders that you
want to have under you. You have to place
responsibility on these subordinates of yours,
and then you have to be loyal to them.
I ran into an incident out in the Philippines
some years ago when I was G 3 (operations and
plans) of the Philippine Division. We were sta
tioned at Fort William McKinley. We had a
number ofvery splendid young officers who had
joined Us from the Military Academy and from
With one man you have to
be extremely finn, and another one, if
you do that under certain circumstances,
he loses his confidence. You have
to handle each a little bit differently
people can have foibles, can have weak
nesses and yet can have very great
qualities which, ifproperly lumcfled,
can lead to perfectly splendid results.
the R01C (Reserve Officers' Training Corps)
back here in the States. In one of the regiments
in the brigade, the rule was that none of these
young officers could even serve as officer of the
day, mind you, until they had served as officer of
the guard for three tours of guard duty, and dur
ing these tours of guard duty they had ro live
right at the guardhouse. Now, these were men
who had .a fair amol.lnt of training. Some of
them had even gradl.lated from the basic COllfse
at Fort Benning, Georgia, and yet that WdS the
ordenlf that particular regimental commander.
He was completely suppressing these Yol.lngsters.
In contrast ro that sort of an idea, when I first
was commissioned in 1917, I reported to duty
MILITARY REVIEW. May 1990
35
It is easy enough for anybody
having made a pIan, to follow that pIan if
everythinggoes according to schedule.
The difflculty always arises, particularly in
war, when something unexpecteddevelops,
something that you have not foreseen.
Then what do you do! It is usually better
to stick to a relatively poor plan than to
be always varying, but on the other
hand, to stick obstinately to something
that is no longer applicable to the
changed circumstances is silly.
amI ttx)k command of a company the same day.
All of my classmates were in the same boat.
There was no alternative but to take command
and to assume responsibility. And yet these
youngsters in the Philippines knew far more
than we did when we reported to duty. Well,
that is one way to suppress initiative, and I can
assure you that it is a sign of lousy leadership. If
you are going to treat your subordinates that
way, you can't possibly expect them to grow up
and to shate with you the responsibility for their
units-;
Toughness. I always was a great admirer of
Lee but, despite the fact that I come from the
South, I do not class Lee as one of the truly
"Great Captains" of warfare. That may be a
shocking thing to some of you, but the reason
that I don't is that Lee lacked one quality that is
essential to the great leader. He was not able to
enforce his will on his subordinates. Lee was
just too dam nice, and at critical times. You all
know the story of the first day of Gettysburg
when Lee ordered James Longstreet to atrack
and Longstreet just refused to do it. He did not
just come out and say that he would not obey,
but he did not obey, and Lee failed to make him
oblY_ And linked up with that same incident
was Lee's failure to make "Jeb" Stuart report to
him regularly and adequately. At the critical
time when he wanted Stuart and needed him
badly, he didn't know where he was. And so the
Battle of Gettysburg was lost. I think it was a
very fortunate thing for the nation that it was
lost, but it has always, to me, represented a
drawback in Lee's quality as a leader. With all of
his humanness-in fact he had too much, you
might say, of the human quality- he simply did
not have the tenacity, that hardhoiled trait,
which at times you must have if you are going to
make the subordinate obey. One of the toughest
things that you will have to do as a senior com
mander will be to relieve other commanders.
The time may come when you have a division
under you that is not doing the thing that it
ought to be doing, and after you have looked
the situation over carefully, yourself, you come
to the conclusion that the fault is in the division
commander. Then you have got to have the
tenacity and firmness to say, "Well, I am just
sorry, but the jig is up, and somebody else is
going to command that division." And the divi
sion commander has to be able to do the same
thing-not as a cover-up for any failures of his
own- but for the good of the whole unit. If a
regimental commander is not up to the job, if
after he has been cautioned and whatnot, he
does not perform the way the division COm
mander thin.ks he ought to perform, particu
larly in action, then the division commander
has no alternative but to relieve him. And, ifhe
does not relieve him, if the senior doesn't re
lieve the subordinate who does nat measure up,
n.0t being faithful to the men who are
under him. Because that is what it all boils
dowl:'l to. you have got to protect the lives of
the.menwho serve un.det you.
all of this< business ofthese human
be summed up in saying that
this leader must have a devotion to service
.hlthefthanto himself. The mottoof the Mili
taryA.cademy,"Duty-Honor-Country," is
still standard that we can all en
de:ly()rto !iveuR to. Not oneself.-that is not
that counts. What does countisdtlty
and filithfulness and honor toyour country and
to the menwho serve under you. So that, then!
May 1990 MILITARY REVIEW
36
would say, is the first of the qualities that a great
leader must have. He must have the human
touch based on character and his devotion to
the men under him and his devotion to his
country.
Intelligence. Now the next major quality, I
would say, that is essential is intelligence. You
must have a good head; there is just no alter
native to that. The commander must have a
keen analytical mind to solve the problems that
are constantly facing him. He must have men
tal capaciry. He must not be a narrow-minded
person with lack of scope and at the samc time,
he must have great flexibility of intellect. Sev
eral years ago, I had a discussion on this particu
lar subject with a professcr from one of the tech
nical institutes. I said I had arrived at a hap
hazard definition of my own and I wondered
what he thought of it. I said, "My concept of
intelligence was the ability to adjust oneself to
unforeseen circumstances." It is easy enough for
anybody having made a plan, to follow that
plan if everything goes according to schedule.
The difficulty always arises, particularly in war,
when something unexpected develops, some
thing that you have not foreseen. Then what do
you do? It is usually better to stick to a relatively
poor plan than to be always varying, but on the
other hand, to .stick Obstinately to something
that is no longer applicable to the changed cir
cumstances is silly. So, it had always impressed
me that the key thing was to be able to adjust
yourself to unforeseen circumstances.
Well, the psychologist told me that I was all
",rongand I won't go into the technical reasons
",hyhe gave thlit view. J still stick to it for my
BlIt, YOllmust then apply that intel
lect tothehandling of It is.pretty difficult
toputyourJinger of' what istacdessn
css
'What
lack?f
j
ud
Rl1l
et\t?But, I thinkrnClS
tof
Whave
lW..
d
krlowwl\atlalll. driv
ingat.Youlllllst this intelligen\eto suit
the Illen and the situation with which you.are
confronted. Andunless you do that, then your
is ofno value at all. And yet next to
the human touch, I say that the second quality
MILITARY REVIEW. May 1990
PERSPECTIVES
that is essential to real leadership is a fine in
telligence.
Courage, The next of the essentials, I would
say, after the human touch and intelligence, is
courage. Now, that is a rather obvious. thing,
particularly on the physical side. The leader
Lee wasjust roo dam nice,
andat critical times. You all know the
story ofthe Jirst day ofGettysburg
when Lee orrleredJames wngstreet to
attack and wngstreetjust refused to do it
.. Lee failed to make him obey. And
linked up with that same incident was
Lee's failure to make "Jeb" Stuart report
to him regularly and adequately.
who is afraid to get up front, the leader afraid to
take the same chances as his men, is never
going to get anywhere at all. The man who tries
to run any organization from a desk is going to
be acomplete failure.
In time of war, it takes some courage,though
not an awful lot, to get up and be right upfront
where you can see what is going on, and unless
you do that you are not going to command the
respect of your men and you are not going to
know enough of what is going on to be able to
make these decisions-to change plans with
circumstances.
But even more impprtant than sheer physical
courage is intellectual courage, the courage pf
your cpnvictip!1S. I frequently hearpu(in civil
life that in the Army, men are afraid to speak
their mind-that when they are told to do
solllething by a senior commander, Or asked for
anopil)i?n, that the tendency isto give "the old
man what he wants to hear." I flatly denythat.!
have seen many, many officers try it, but rhey
have never amounted to a hill of beans. and I
have never seen any of them get any\vherejn
the service. It has been my experience thauhe
men I served under wanted me to tell them
37
what I thought and that is what I always tried to
do. And as far as I can see, it has not hurt me a
bit in getting along in the Army. But it does
take intellectual courage, at times, to be able to
do that, particularly if the man you are working
In time ofwar, it takes some
courage, though not an awfullot, to get
up and be right up front where you can
see what is going on, and unless you do
that you are not going to command the
respect of your men and you are not
going to know enough ofwhat is going on
to be able to make these decisions-to
change plans with circumstances.
for is not a topnotch leader. And yet we must do
that. We must give our honest opinions.
Health. The fourth and last element that I
am going to discuss among these essential
for leadership is good health. Now, that
may surprise some ofyou. As a younger officer, I
heard many talks on leadership. But it was only
dOWn at Benning, not many years ago, I heard a
talk by General Troy Middleton, one of the
really great leaders that we had in World War I
and who came back on active duty in World
War II and did a magnificent job. He is the first
man I evet heard emphasize the necessity of
good health as an essential for a leader. But
when you stop and think about it, it is abso
lutely and utterly essential-good physical
healthand more important, again-good men
talhealth.
If are not well physically, if yoll do not
keep yourselves fit physically, it is bound to
react on what you do, on what your point of
view such things as deafness. I served
once under a very fine manwho, unfortun.ately,
i\el1:ing more and more deaf each month.
As fine. a man as he was, his deafness interfered
with his. real efficiency. And I could cite other
instances men who have stomach ulcers inev
itably, at times, feel badly and that affects how
they handle their troops, if they are in com
mand of troops. It mitigates against their effi
ciency and their ability to handle their job.
Good health is utterly essential to a leader,
and good mental health is even more important
than good physical health. The same colonel I
was talking about a while ago who refused to
give his lieutenants responsibility, had been
passed over for promotion and, unfottunately,
every time a new promotion list came out and
he wasn't on it, the poor regiment caught hell.
He was warped mentally, and it materially
affected his ability to run his regiment. For
tunately, 1 have served under great men and
only rarely have I served under men who have
had that weakness - the weakness of being
overly ambitious, of being overly sensitive of
their own prerogatives-and in each instance
that it was there, we had our difficulties.
So I would say, in summing up, that the four
qualities you must have are, first of all, the
human touch based on character and integrity
and loyalty. You must have intelligence-a flex
ible intelligence. You must have courage, phys'
ical and mental, and you must have good
health-again physical and mental.
Now, these things you are bam with. I re
member that during the war, General George
C. Marshall came up to See me when VII O:>rps
was in a place called Cameliminster,southeast
of Aachen. It so happened that I had been priv
ileged to serve under Marshall when he was
assistant commandant at Benning years ago,
and we were talking abollt different chaps who
had been down there at that time, and would
say, "How is so and so doing?" He is marvelous.
This. next man,"\Vell,he hasn't quite mea
sllred up," and soon. And finally Marshall said,
"\Veil now, what is it-you have either got to
have this business of leadership in your
or yOU haven't. Isn't that it? You have either got
this sp""k of leadership or you haven'r." I said,
"Yes, I guess that's right."
That is pretty nearly true and yet that is,ina
sense, a pessimistic outlook because we cannot
May 1990 MILITARY REVIEW
38
Senior people . .. are never gomg to get loyalty [unless they] are loyal to their
own subordinates. 1remember that General Fox Conner . .. said that the only instructions
that he really got from Pershing when they started tbe headquarters over there was
'Wen, Fox, you are going to be the plans and training officer. Don't make too many
mistakes/' Sure, there were gomg to be some mistakes made, but Pershing always backed up
his subordinates. One ofthe great things that Mr. Baker did was to back up Pershing all
the time. So loyalty, then, is something you can just learn to do by practice.
AA 4$
all be born great leaders. Fortunately, I think
there is something you can do about it. You can
improve your personality. You have to start with
what God gave you, unfortunately, but there is
something that you can do about it. In a sense,
just as important as the inherent qualities of
leadership are the techniques of leadership and
commamtCan you learn how to lead?
The Techniques
Now, what arc some of the things that We
ought t()lookoutforifwe aregoing to make
ourselves better leaders --to make full usc, we
might say, .of the. God-given talents that we
have tel start with. The hrstofthem,l would
say, is to know your business, to get tokn()W
your business. The officer ought to know better
than t h { ~ man under him how to handle allthe
weapons in his unit. Know your business and if
you can do that and are willing to work hard,
that will overcome a hell of a lot of deficiencies
in the talents that God mayor may not have
given you. That is the first t h i n g ~ g e t to know
your business.
I do not know whether they still do it, but
when I took the course atBenning, all the com
pany officers used to take machineguns horne
with them before the test came in mounting
a machinegun.The groupthat I was with got
to be experts at the business of. mounting a
machinegon.Andwhen I later had charge of
that verysaluescction as ahinstructor there,
I always prided myselfthat I could mount a
rnachinegun just as fast as Sergeant Wolf could,
whichwas something, lean assure you, because
\ve had a magnificent group of noncommis
39 MILITARY REVIEW May 1990
11 did not have time to get over
to the 9th myselfand see wlJat
was going on, I could caR Eddy on the
phone and he would tell me what the con"
dinons were. There never was any doubt
about it in my mind that they were
correct, because I knewthat he personally
had been around on the ground and had
seen what was going on.
ag r r JWIiMJMw;;;m ,i @ +M&
H& **
sioned officers there. But we instructors wanted
to know as much about it as Wolf did, and
McNemy and McGony, and if we could do
that, then we knew our business. It made a
world of difference in the instruction at the
school, because the group of instl11ctors there
was outstanding. The class knew that those fel
lows knew what they were talking about.
Well, if you do that with your organization,
whether it is a squad or company or platoon or
division or an army, you can get, from your
meh, a tremendous amount of confidence. But
i{yondo not know what you are talking about,
then I can assure youthatY(lu are going to
become one of those havetob
l1
lk
doze their way to get discipline or to get results.
So that is one of the first things one can do. Get
to know your techniques,getto know yourtao
tics, whatever the organization is.
40
Now, the next thing that you can do is to get
out and see tor yourself, firsthand, what the con
ditions are. Now this holds particularly in action.
I had 20-odd divisions pass through VII Q)rps
overseas, and all of them were crack men, with
one or two possible exceptions where we had to
make some changes. But one of the great things
I always knew about the 9th Division, which
General Manton Eddy commanded, was that if
I did not have time to get over to the 9th Divi
siem myself and see what was going on, 1could
call Eddy on the phone and he would tell me
what the conditions were. There never was any
doubt about it in my mind that they were cor
rect, because I knew that he personally had
been around on the ground and had seen what
was going on-he was not talking secondhand.
That is the only way you can know in action, for
sure, what conditions are.
If I can be personal for a moment, it was my
routine, always, to leave headquarters around
11 o'clock in the moming to visit each divi
sion daily, and as I rode along I would take a
look at the roads as I went. I was a greatbeliever
in keeping transportation moving. That is the
way you get speed. Keep your roads open, and if
you don't do that, thenyou are goingto lose
time all along the line; and 1used to try to keep
ahead of my corps engineer. I knew as much
about the conditions throughout the roads as
he did.
Well, the same thing holds true with these
division commanders. The real fellows are the
ones that get up front.l do not mean recklessly,
or with a sense of bravado at all, but where the
critical area is, there is where the commander
has to be. Your plans are going to vary. No mat
ter how perfect the concept is, c.onditionsare
going to vary and the commander has to make
spotdecisions to keep his units rolling.
I remember one night after we broke through
theGerman position, on aboutthe16th.()fJune
Ithink itwas, at the base of the Cherbourg pen
insula; going up into Eddy's area. 1 hadnotgone
by headquarters. It waslate in the day and I
found a battalion commander.. there,deadon
May1990. MILITARYREV1EW
PERSPECTIVES
his feet, not literally dead, but mentally-phys
ically. He was a fine battalion commander, but
he was just worn out and nothing was happen
ing. Nothing was moving. Well, I got Eddy on
the phone and in a few minutes he was up there
and the two of us-he did the directing, of
course-shifted the battalions, and I gave Eddy
instructions then that we were not going to stop
all night long. We had broken through these
Gemlan positions, and we were not going to
stop until we got to the sea. I did not care what
the conditions were. We simply had to keep
going that night. And the next morning a fresh
battalion with some tanks drove into the town
on the far side of the peninsula. Had we not
come up there, I am confident that it would not
have gone through that night because the
troops were too tired. And ifwe had beensoft at
the moment when we had to be hard, we would
never have made the breakthrough with the
speed that we did. But we could do that only
because we knew what the conditions were.
Well, you can only do that if you get out and
see for yourselves, so that you will know what
you are talking about. You have got to analyze
each new problem through. Make use of what
ever intelligence that you have, and it does not
take an awful lot of intelligence. We teach the
estimate of the situation in the Army. But
unfortunately, too frequently we think it applies
only to a tactical situation. But if you will ana
lyze all of your missions, either in peacetime or
wartime, you do not have to have an awful lot of
brains to figure out a common sense solution.
But, if you don't think, if you don't stop and
analyze; of course you will do dumb things; and
if something happens then, you are lost as far as
your men are concerned. You are not being
their leader.
Now, havinganalyzed the situation, the next
impprtanr toe;<plain t()yourlllen
",hat the is and
trying to d9 ",hateyeritis you are doing,Again,
if I can be persolll1l, overin. Germany when I
was a company commander, One of the things
assigned ro uS to do was to go rhrough the
woods in the Mountibal Forest in the bridge.
head area. It was midwinrer with about 2 feer of
snow on rhe ground. We had to go out each day
and check the maps, check rhe ground against
The men I served under wanted
me to tell them what I thought and that
is what I always tried to do. Andas far as I
can see, it has not hurt me a bitin getting
alongin the Army. Butit does mke
inteHectual courage, at times, to be able to
do that, particularly ifthe man you are
working for is not a topnotch leader.
the maps and decide where we were going to
put our defenses in the event the bridgehead
should ever be attacked by the Germans. It was
an arduous job. It wasn't nearly as comfortable
out there as it was back in Koblenz, where we all
had nice barracks. Early in the game, I decided
that the only way in the world that we could
make rhis thing work well and get it done
rapidly and efficiently was to tell the men what
the problemwas. Questions ofsecrecy came up.
Well, should you let the men know what it is all
about? I decided I .was going to do it. I told them
all about it and each day before we started out, I
said what the job for that day was going to be.
Well, one of the most flattering things I have
ever heard in my life was to hear one of our
sergeants, about the second or third day out, at
a break, say to some of the others, "The thing I
like. aboutthis captain of ours is that he tells us
",hat it is all about and that makes it easy." Tell
yourmenwilatit is all about. Take them into
your c<>nfidence.
One ()fthe favorite storiesrhat Ihave g\lCS
back to the time of Friedrich von Steuben, that
Prussian who came OVer here to put a little disci
plinein the Continental Anny. You relllembet,
George Washington had his troubles with that
MILITARY REVIEW' May 1990
41
It was late in the day and
I found a battalion commander there,
dead on his feet He was a One batta
lion commander, bllt he was just worn out
and nothing was happening. Nothing
was moving. Well, I got Eddy on the phone
andin a few minutes he was up there
shift[ing] the battalions . ifwe had been
soft at the moment when we had to be
hard, we wouldnever have made the
breakthough with the speed that we
did. Bllt we coulddo that only because
we knew what the conditions were.
<lany. It was a ragtag, bobtailed affair without
any discipline at all. And so he took von Steu
ben, who volunteered to come over here to help
out. Von Steuben had wrirten to an officer
friend of his in the German army, after he had
been in this country for a year or two. The letter
was quite remarkable. I am going to paraphrase
it slightly for you. He said to this chap, "The
genius that is the character or the nature of the
American p e o p l e ~ t h e genius of this people is
different from ours. In the German amlY you
tell a man to do something and he does it. In
the American Army, I must first explain the
reasonwhy, and then it is done," Now I say, that
von Steuben, writing at about 1778 or 1779,
put his finger on the ""ence of Amcrican disci
pline.lt is discipline based not on just the rough
rule but a discipline based on leadership and
understanding.
And that has been my experience through
out. my servke. If you only take your men into
y()ur c0l'lfi<lence, tell them what you are trying
to d()al1d ",hyrou are trying to do it, the Amer
icansoldier",Hlmeet you more than halfway.
And that is something yOll can learn todoby
pt<lctice and by application; You have got to be
loyal tothesesuhordinatesof yours if you e"er
expect to retain their confidence. Loyalty works
down, not up. Too many people, senior people,
in the past have not realized that. They look to
loyalty on the part of theit subordinates. They
are never going to get loyalty from their subordi
nates unless they themselves are loyal to their
own subordinates.
I remember that General Fox Conner, who
was General John Pershing's plans and training
officer at Chaumont in World War I, said the
only instructions that he really got from Per
shing when they started the headquarters over
there was "Well, Fox, you are going to be the
plans and training officer. Don't make too
many mistakes." Sure, there Jere going to
be some mistakes made, but Pershing always
hacked up his subordinates. One of the great
things that Mr. Baker did-Newton D. Baker
who was our secretary of war and one of the
greatest of our secretaries of war-was to back
up Pershing all the time. So loyalty, then, is
something you can just learn to do by practice.
In addition to being loyal, you have got to
give them something to do. You have to learn to
decentralize to your subordinates. I have no
patience with commanders who say, "We can't
get along without-we can't let this man go on
this special detail because he is essential." No
body is that essential. If you get a man so good
as all that, let him go for awhile and let his sub
ordinate take command. Give this fellow under
him a chance to exercise command. It will
develop him and it will also take some of the
load off your shoulders.
And there is another thing that you must
learn to do. You have to learn how to relax. You
have to leam how to trust these men under you
to do their share of the job. That's important. If
you want to retain your good health- physical
and mental health- you have to learn to relax
and that isn't always easy to dt'>, particularly in
combat.
Even though we did not live in the rear in
some big headquarters, I always believed in
making ourselves as comfortable as we possibly
could do, even though the men up front could
not have such advantage. Because we worked
night and day, day in and day out, without any
Ma\l1990' MILITARY REVIEW 42
The senior commander has to learn, among other techniques then,
bow to be able to express bimselfto get out and meet civilians who frequently are skep"
tical about this Anny ofours. Be able to outline to them what the Anny aspires to do,
howit is organized, howit works or creaks, and explain to them the reason why . ..
Marshall couldgo up before a congressional committee and outline to them the
most complicated sort ofa problem in a very simple way.
relief at a big headquarters, it was our endeavor
to make ourselves as comfortable as we could. It
took an awful lot of ingenuity on the part of our
engineer and our young officers at the head,
quarters, but we had hot water shower baths, so
that when we came in at the end of the day, or
the people who were on a night shift, before
they finally got to sleep in the morning, could
get a shower and relax. Most of us were out in
the field until late in the dav, so at the
tefS, we ate late. When we came in, we had a
highball before dinner, if we had any liquor.
That is the only time we eVer had it, but it isa
false idea for senior leaders not to ever do that
sort of thing.
Iris impossible to get suchfacilities. or such
Jnaterials togo aU the way around everywhere,
but itisveryessential that the senior
ders, .at the. end of the day after the job-the
primary jobs at any ratc-is done, be able to
relax, to have a good meal in relative comfort.
Then we would go back to the map room and
review the operations of the day and the in
structions that had been issued in/the field.
When we got through with that we could go to
bed, knowingthat we had done everythingthat
could be done. And unless the bombers came
around, you had a pretty good chance of getting
a night's sleep.
Now, the final technique that you have to
learn is a sense of showmanship. That is more
important than many people believe it is, par
ticularly infantrymen. I am an infantryman. I
thought the cavalry always had a verve that the
infantry lacked. We used to look down our
noses, at times,;}t the silly things that the caval,
rymendid, butwewere wrong. A sense ofshow
marishipbuilds morale, it builds prideof unit:.
George Patton was a great one fi)r that sbrt.bf
thing and that is why, despite Georgie's
sional flare,ups, the men under him were really
crazy about him. That is why they fought sowell
for him. They knew that he would look after the
welfare and the morale and the newspaper
Hcity and the Third Anny.
One of the great minor leaders of this war
MILITARY REVIEW May 1990 43
was a feUow by the name of Patty Flynn, a reg
imental commander in Eddy's division. Patty
was much too old to command a regiment, by
all the rules of the game. But he had an undying
desire to do something-to fight. He was a cav
alryman and there was nocavalry fighting over
therc, so he appealed to General Dwight Eisen
hower, whom he knew well, to be given an
intimtry regiment. So he was assigned to the
9th Division. And Eddy, recognizing this fel
low's spark, assigned him to a regiment that had
losr a fine commander and it had begun to run
downhill. TIl is regiment had taken consider
able casualties in North Africa, and it was ap
parently in bad shape and needed somebody to
give it a lift. After Patty had been there for a
shott time, the division commander noticed
that the men in the regiment were painting a
strange device on their helmets-- AAA with a
line across the "A"s painted on the side of their
helmets. It began to crop up throughout the
whole division. Eddy asked Patty, one day,
"What does this thing mean-what's going on
here!" Patty said, "Well, this is the motto of this
regiment. It means:. 'Anything, Anywhere,
Anytime' -bar nQthing." That was the motto
of the regiment from that time on, and boy.
they did anything, any place and any time, bar
nothing.
Patty had just lifted them up by their own
bootstraps. Unfortunately, he was later killed in
action, leading a platoon. He really did not
belong there, as a matter of fact. That was one
of Patty's weaknesses. He got too excited and
too interested. He got too far up in front, past
the point where the regimental commander
ought to be, and he was shot in the head by a
German and killedin action. It was the kind of
death that Patty wanted, but we all felt the terri
ble loss.
So, you can learn thesetypes of things, tech
niques that ",illmakeyou a better leader.(ietto
know your and work at it hard. Be loyill
to the men who are under you. Get up frol}tand
see for youtselfwhatis going on. Vary your
actions depending upon what the situation is,
based on your awn firsthand knowledge. De
centralize to rhese subordinates. Learn to relax.
Get to be somewhat of a showman, and you can
overcome your shortcomings in talent and
personaliry.
Large Units_ Now then, how does this apply
to large units? Or does it apply? Is there any
great difference in the application of these prin
ciples and these techniques to large units?
There is no real difference, as far as I can see.
The only rhing is that the field is larger and
in addition to the units themselves that you
command, you have a responsibility to the pub
lic at large. Public opinion begins to affect what
you can or cannot do with your unit. And you
have to consider that at the higher echelons.
The senior commander has to learn, among
ather techniques then, how to be able to ex
press himself in public. That is a very important
thing for a senior commander, to be able to get
out and meet civilians who frequently are skep
tical about this Army ofOUts. Be able to outline
to them what the Army aspires to do, how ir is
organized, how it works or creaks, and explain
to them the reason why. That is a very impor
tant attribute for a leader.
Again, Marshall had that marvelous faculty,
also Eisenhower and Bradley, and it went a tre
mendous way toward securing, for the Anny,
the needed assistance on Capitol Hill in the
business of appropriations during the war. Mar
shall could go up before a congressional com
mittee and outline to them the most compli
cated sott of a problem in a very simple \Vay.
The Congress trusted Marshall. But aside from
that he could explain to them what it was
about. They came to have such confidence in
himthat towardthe endthey didn't even WOrry
tootlll.lch about the explanation. Ithinko\le of
tributes. to. Marshall dltlle at
. timeqfthe at()mic bomb developments. After
thefirsr billiop d()llars had been spent and they
still had notcompleted the job, Marshall went
ul' beforeac0tllmittet:meetingof the Senate
Ithink. dosed session of the Senate
Appropriations Committee. He said he needed
May 1990 MILITARY REVIEW 44
anothet billion dollars, and unfortunately, this
time, he could not give them the detailed expla
nation of what it was fot. All that they asked
him was "General, ate you sure that the billion
will be enough?"
A senior commandet has to develop the art
of negotiation and compromise. He has to be
able to sit down with othet men of othet set
vices and other nationalities and be able to
negotiate with them and be able to arrive at
satisfactory compromises with them. That is an
art, I can assure you. It takes ttemendous judg
ment to know when to give in and when to
stand firm, and that is something that takes
years of experience to develop. But it can be
developed and it has to be developed as you go
along through your formative years as a leader.
The rigid man will never compromise; he lacks
that judgment, that tact, that knowledge, of
how to vary with the changing situations that I
spoke of earliet. This is exttemely important for
the higher commander because the stakes are so
much greater.
It is more important than ever that the senior
commander knows how to judge men and pick
able subordinates. Over the years, he must regis
ter, in the back of his head, the. abilities of the
men that he has been serving With, so that
when he is faced with difficult missions, he can
seek out and assign, to the particular jobs, men
in accordance with their talents. That was one
of the great faculties that Pershing and Eisen
howet had. Marshall had it as well-to be able
to select men and fit them into the proper type
of job. For a senior commander, that is ex
tremely important.
But along with all of these things that the
senior commander has, I would like to go back
to the first one of the qualities that L men
tioned, the human
tendency, as you get older,t()get:a little:bit
more self-centered, a little bit more proud of
yourself, there is a tendency in higher com
mandto get farther away from the men who do
the real fighting. And no marter how good you
may be, if you do not refresh yourself through
MILITARY REVIEW. May 1990
PERSPECTIVES
Get to know your businessatld
work at it hard. Be loyal to the men who
are under you. Get up front andsee for
yourselfwhat is going on. Vary youractions
depending upon what the situation is,
basedon yourown firsthand knowledge.
Decentralize to these subordinates.
Learn to relax. Get to be somewhat ofa
showman, and you can overcome your
shortcomings in talent andpersonality.
contact with the subordinate officers and the
men under you, you will lose this common
touch, and with it will go your leadership.
Finally, I would like to say that the Army
today offers to all of us great challenges in lead
ership. Today we hear from some sources that
we can win the next war, if we have to fight
another of the damnable things, with gadgetS.
We can win them with airplanes, with atomic
bombs, withsubmarines orwith guided missiles
or something else of the sort and that we can do
all of this without an. army. I do not believe it. It
is going to. take team work ofall of the services
to win. But the Army has a privileged position
in a sense. In the air, the airplane is the key
thing and at sea, it is a ship. But I have always
felt that what makes the Army special is that
the key thing in the Army is man himself. The
human being is the essential weapon. No mat
ter hoW good these gadgets are, they have to be
operated by man and that is the essence of our
life in the Army. Handling men, with all of
their strengths, .their foibles .and their weak
n willalwaysbe key. They are our Arm
en

esses
ti"res as tb.e Frenchman would say. It is a chal
lenging thing. To me, it is the most attractive
part of Army life, to be associated with men
you can lead and who look up to you,' if you
have these qualities of leadership. That's what
the Army is all about, and I arn very proud to be
part of it. "'i..
45
and the
BATTLE of the BULGE
Paul G. Munch, US Army
The impottrlQce of rclationshipbetween commanders i'i
immense, o{t(m primary determinant in combat. The author
here the other relationship that often spell., victory or
defeat in b...ttle..... that between a and his staff. He
a vividiHustrntiQn. of the trust and cdmpetcndc.'S that
aJIowcd Gt!()rgc 5. Patton Jr. and his ThhdArmy staff to make
their ('fidemc6nmbutions in the Battle ofthe Bulge.
May 1990" MILITARY REVIEW
HE TACTICAL skills and attributes re
quired of a commander to be successful
on the modem battlefield have been greatly
debated, but the need to maximize the poten
tial of astaff to increase the comnlanCrS chances
of success has been largely ignored, This
mains a paradox since a COIllI1mnder
1
sstaff is an
integral part of the command element and a
vital key to success on an increasingly complex
battlefield.
It is also surprising frOll1 a historical
point, since most successful commanders have
recognized the importance of their staffs. For
instance, when Field Marshal Sir Bernard L.
Montgomery was asked to list the attributes of a
successful general, the first item on his list was
i'Have a good chief of staff,1l1
Like Montgomery, George S. Patton Jr. also
recognized the importance of his staff After the
war, he suggested "no one lllan can conduct an
anny, but that the success of any anny depends
on the harmonious working of its staff and the
magnificent fighting ability of the combat of
ficers and enlisted men. Without this team
work, war cannot be successfully fought."2
If an efficient and effective staff clement is
key to a commander's success, it would be help
ful to study the workings of a successfid staff. In
this regard, few staffs can match the accom
plishments of Patton's Third AmlY staff dur
ing the Battle of the Bulge. Although over
shadowed by the flamboyance of its commander,
the Third Army staff was key in turning the tide
against the Gennan offensive,
The Third Army Staff
Prior to the Battle of the Bulge, not many
officers shared Patton's enthusiasm for his staff.
But, the staffs perfonnance during the Battle of
the Bulge would change many minds. For in
stance, OIllar N. Bradley later stated:
"Indeed, I had once agreed with the observa
tion of another senior commander who said,
'Patton can get more good work out of a medi
ocre bunch of staff officers than anyone I evcr
saw.' His principals were almost without ex-
Patton set high standards and
demanded excellence, timeliness and hard
work from the entire staff. He told them:
". .. It is inevitable for men to be
killed and wounded in battle. But there
is no reason why such losses should be in
creased because ofthe incompetence and
carelessness ofsome stupid son-of..a-bitch.
I don't tolerate such men on my Staff."
ception holdovers from the Sicilian campaign
where their perfoIlllalKe could be most charita
bly described as something less than perfect.
However, five months in Europe had seasoned
that staff and the greatly matured Patton suc
ceeded in coaxing from it the brilliant effort
that characterized Third Army's turnabout in
the Bulge.'"
If so much of the Third Anny's success de
pended on its staff as Patton and Bradley sug
gested, how did Patton effectively use his staff to
enhance his amlY's success? More important,
what can we learn from Patton's handling of his
staff?
Command and Staff Relationship
Much of the Third Army's success can be
attributed to a strong mutual trust between Pat
ton and his staff. Patton once told General
Dwight D. Eisenhower, "I don't need a brilliant
I want a loyal one.
1l4
He got what he
wanted.
Upon assuming command of the Third Army
during early 1944, Patton replaced most of the
senior staffofficers with either the veterans \vho
had served with him in Africa and Sicily or
with cavalrymen he had known before the war.
They were totally loyal and carried out his or
ders in an unobtrusive and highly effident man
ner. He, in tum, trusted, rewarded and backed
them to the hilt.
s
Their unobtrusive manner sometimes
cealed their talent. Brigadier General Hugh ].
MILITARY REVIEW. May 1990 47
Afterhe was infonned ofthe latest
intelligence, personnel, logistics andair
clata, be askedquestions oradvice ofhis
staffmembers, outlined that days actions
and left for the frontline areas. Upon his
rerum, he was briefed on the day's events
... Likewise, he required one officer from
each staRsection to go forward each
day and visit the corresponding o6.cers of
the next lower echelon.
Gaffey, the chief of staff who pulled them
together was considered a "staffofficer ofgenius
and a tank expert."6 Both Gaffey, who departed
to command the 4th Annored Division during
early December 1944, and Gaffey's successor,
Brigadier General Hobart R. Gay, "were equal
ly competent in the exercise of their intricate
craft; both were in the mind of their master:
they would be asked to do what lesser men
would think and achieve iL"7
At the staff-section level, many considered
Colonel Oscar W. Koch, the G2, the most pen
etrating mind in the US Anny's intelligence
community. Likewise, some suggested that Colo
nel Walter ]. Muller was the "ablest Cjuarter
master since Moses."8
Patton set high standards and demanded
excellence, timeliness and hard work from the
entire staff. He told them:
"I've won in battle and I'm going to win
again. I won because I had good commanders
and staff officers. I don't fight fix fun and I
won't tolerate anyone on my Staff who does
. . . It is inevitable f()f men to be killed and
wounded in battle. But there is no reason why
such losses should be increased because of the
incompetence and carelessness of some stupid
son-of-a-bitch. I don't tolerate such men on my
Staff."9
All of the staff members knC\v the high stand
ards expected of them, but they also worked
with a sense of purpose. The staff worked
around the clock to get a job done, but when
the work was done, they relaxed. There was no
compulsion to look occupied or to take part in
"busy work." If a staff officer did not perfann to
expectations, he was removed.
lo
Although he had choscn most of the senior
members of his staff and felt comfortable with
them, Patton remained distant from the main
body of the staff. He preferred to lie apart from
them with a few members of his command
groUp.ll Such an approach had double benefits.
Patton was afforded the opportunity to relax,
thoroughly think through current problems
and plan future operations. It also prevented
him from interfering with the operation of his
staff and getting involved with too many de
tails. (It is interesting to note that in earl ier staff
assignments, Patton had received several poor
efficiency reports.)
Patton's distance allowed him to maintain a
predictable and organized relationship with his
May 1990. MILITARY REVIEW 48
Patton remained distant from the main body ofthe staff. Such an
approach had double benefits. Patton was afforded the opportunity to relax, thoroughly
think through current problems and plan future operations. It also prevented him from
interfering with the operation ofhis staffandgettinginvolved with too many details.
w eM. @?W&
staff. He had a daily meeting at 0700 with the
chief of the heads of sections and General
Otto P. Weyland of XIX Tactical Air Com
mand.
12
During these informal, open-forum
meetings, as at other times, he promoted open
and frank dialogue between his staff and him
self. The resulting discussions promoted con
structive criticism and provided Patton an ex
cellent sounding board to formulate and de
develop his plans. 13
Once he had reached a decision and issued
an order at these meetings or elsewhere, he was
adamant. 14 To eliminate misunderstanding, he
normally issued orders directly to his subordi
nates but required that short, written orders
reach the subordinate prior to his carrying out
the order. He suggested that army orders not
exceed a page and a half of typewritten text and
that they could usually be done on one page
with a sketch map on the back. These orders
would tell what to do, not how to do it,15
In addition to his 0700 meeting, he also had
a more formal general staff meeting every day at
0800 and 1700. These briefings had a twofold
objective: to keep him and the staff informed of
the most current plans and operations, and to
knit all of the staff sections together. These
were short briefings, never lasting over 20
utes, After he was informed of the latest
ligence, personnel, logistics and air data, he
asked questions or advice of his staff members,
outlined that day's actions and left felr the front
line areas, Upon his return, he was briefed on
the day's events, 16
In the forward areas, Patton gained a true feel
for the situation, Likewise, he required one
officer from each staff section to go forward
each day and visit the corresponding officers of
the next lower echelon, These visits provided
better information for staff actions
moted a bond of understanding and solidarity
between all elements of the Third Army that
was unequaled elsewhere.
J7
The line and staff
knew each other well and functioned on that
basis.
18
By the fall of 1944. the ThirdArmy staff was a
smooth-running organization. The relationship
of Patton to his staff is instmctive, He
MILITARY REVIEW. May 1990 49
ened the strong mutual trust between himself
and his staff with an established command-staff
relationship and effective two-way communica
tions. To this relationship, the staff added com
petence, efficient staff procedures and an effec
tive working relationship between the various
staff levels within the Thitd Army. The staff
proved its worth duting the Battle of the Bulge.
foreshadowing the Battle
When the Germans launched their offensive
on 16 December 1944, Patton's Third Army
had been on the offensive since 8 November.
When they finally captured Metz on 13 Decem
ber, Patton would proudly state that this was the
first time Metz had been taken by assault since
the year 641. Intent on retaining the initiative,
the Third Army was now poised to break through
to the Rhine River. The ground attack was to
commence on 19 December.
The Allied command had been surprised by
the Germans' attack. Bradley initially thought
it might be a spoiling attack to force a halt on
Patton's advance into the Saar. 19 In any event,
he called Patton on the evening of 16 Decem
bet to direct the telease of Patton's 10th At
moted Division to General Courtney H. Hodges'
First Army. Patton protested. He felt it would
hutt his chances to reach the Rhine, but Brad
ley was finn. Patton ordered the 10th Armored
Division north.
While this was Patton's first official notice of
the Germans' Ardennes offensive, he had antic
ipated the attack and, on 12 December, had
even directed his staff to make"a study of what
the Third Army would do if called upon to
counterattack such a breakthtough."20
Patton's intuition about the German offen
sive in the Ardennes area was based on the solid
information being collected and analyzed by
Koch. During November, the G2 section identi
fied a numbet of Gennan units leaving West
phalia and Third Army's front. Koch believed
they were regrouping somewhere. On 23 No
vember, he wrote in his daily periodic report:
"This powerful sttiking force, with an estimated
500 tanks, is still an untouched strategic teserve
held for future employment" and concluded
they might be used for a "coordinated countet
offensive."
l1
Through early December, Koch continued
to pursue information on this poSSible threat.
On 7 December, he warned of "enemy reserves
with large Panzer concentrations west of the
Rhine in the northern portion of 12th Army
Group's zone of advance." Two days later, Koch
informally briefed Patton on the possibility of a
German attack and their capability to mount it.
On the 11th, Koch again warned, "Overall, the
initiative still rests with the Allies. But the mas
sive armored force the enemy has built up in
reserve gives him the definite capability of
launching a spoiling offensive to disrupt Allied
plans."
22
Koch's predictions ran counter to
most other higher headquarters. Others were
predicting only minor counterattacks. "Counter
offensive
u
and "counterattack" are distinctive
terms meaning different things. ULTRA (the
higher-level intelligence) intercepts were un
available to confirm either view due to the Ger
man secrecy surrounding the offensive.
2J
While visiting several division headquarters
on 12 December, Patton "decided definitely to
place the 6th Armoted and the 26th Division
in the III Corps near Saarbriicken, because, if
the enemy attacked the VIll Corps of the First
Army, as was probable, I could use the III Corps
to help by attacking straight north, west of the
Moselle River."2' That day Patton directed his
staff to make a study of what the Third Army
would do if tequested to counterattack a break
through to the north of Thitd Army.15
Four days later during his normal morning
meeting, still unaware that the Germans had
begun theit attack through the Ardennes an
hour earlier, Patton was briefed on the "trans
lated" intetcepts from the previous evening.
They indicated the German armored concen
tration around Trier was breaking up and mov
ing to an unknown destination. The Germans
had also just gone on radio silence. Patton was
convinced that the attack would be through the
May 1990 MILITARY REVIEW
50
Ardennes.
26
He asked Gay, his chief of staff, and Colonel
Maddox, his 03 (operations and plans), how
they were progressing on the study that he had
ordered on 12 December. After they updated
him, he made his instructions more specific. "I
want you, gentlemen, to start making plans for
pulling the Third Army out of its eastward
attack, change the direction 90 degrees, mov
ing to Luxembourg and attacking north."27
As a consequence of the Third Army's ag
gressive staff work, Patton was not overly sur
prised by Bradley's phone can during the eve
ning of the 16th. He was disappointed that he
could not continue his offensive toward the
Rhine, but not surprised by the German offen
sive. The continuing analysis and planning by
his staff and Patton's recognized tactical intui
tion had allowed him to anticipate the offensive
and even draw up contingency plans.
The Battle
During their normal morning briefing on the
17th, Koch reported that the Germans were
continuing their attack on VII LCorps in the
First Army's area, but they also appeared to be
moving into the area fronting on Third Army's
own XX O:>rpS.28
Patton thought it over for a moment, then
said, "One of these is a feint; one is the real
thing. If they attack us, I'm ready for them, but
I'm inclined to think the party will be up north.
VIII Corps has been sitting still-a sure invita
tion to trouble."29
The extent of the breakthrough became
clearer on the 18th, the third day of the offen
sive. It was serious. General Hasso von Man
teuffel's panzers had smashed through the 28th
Division to overrun Troy H. Middleton's VIII
Corps reserves. Further north, two regiments of
the 106th Division had already been encircled,
and the remainder of the division was desper
ately hanging on at St. Vith. The situation did
not look good.
While somewhat ad hoc, reinforcements were
on the way. The 7th Armored Division from
[patton] had a daily meeting at 0700
with the chiefofstaff, the heads ofsections
and General Otto R Weyland ofXIX Tae..
tical Air Command. During these iniol'-
mal, open..forum meetings, [he] promo-
ted constructive criticism andprovided
Patton an excellent sounding board to
fonnulate and develop his plans.
Lieutenant General William H. Simpson's Ninth
Army was being rushed south to strengthen the
northern shoulder. To the south, the timely
arrival of Patton's 10th Annored Division had
helped steady a weak right shoulder, and ele
ments of that division raced to reinforce the 9th
Armored Division at Bastogne. In addition,the
82d and WIst Airborne divisions were en route
to the area from Reims.
30
MILITARY REVIEW May 1990 51
At 1030 on the 18th, Bradley summoned
Patton, Koch, Maddox and Muller (Third
Anny 02, 03 and 04, respectively) to his head
quarters at Luxembourg. The severity of the sit
uation was greater than Patton had anticipated,
He qu ickly volunteered to halt the eastward
attack of the 4th Annored Division and con-
The GZ section identified a number of
German units leaving Westphalia and
Third Army's front. Koch believed they
were regrouping somewhere . .. Patton
directed his staffto make a study ofwhat
the Third Army would do ifrequested to
counterattack a breakthrough to the notth
ofThird Army. Four days later during his
nonnal momingmeeting . .. he made his in
more specific. "I want you, gende
men, to statt making plans for puJ1jng the
Third Army out ofits eastward attack,
change the direction 90 degrees, moving
to Luxembourgand attacking north."
centrated it near Longwy. Patron also offered to
remove the 80th Infantry Division from the
line and start for Luxembourg in the morning,
and suggested the 26th Infantry Division could
be alerted to move within 24 hours.)!
That evening at 2300, Bradley called Patton
to ask him to attend a scheduled 1100 con
ference the following morning at Eisenhower's
Verdun headquarters. Patton called a staff meet
ing for the following morning and went to
bed.
32
Patton started his staffmeeting by saying that
the Third Anny's plans had changed. The of
fensive toward the Rhine was off "We're going
to fight but in a different place. Also, we are
going to have to move very fast."J3
He then began to develop a rough concept of
operation based on the assumptions that he
could use the VIII Corps from the First Anny
(M iddleton) and the III Corps from the Third
Anny (Major General John Millikin) on any
two of three possible axes. From the left, the
axes of attack were in order of priority as fol
lows: from the general vicinity of Diekirck due
north; from the general vicinity of Adcm on
Bastogne; and from the general vicinity of Neuf
chateau against the left nose of the Gennan
salient.J
4
With that guidance to his staff, Patton de
parted f()[ the conference with Eisenhower.
After the war, Patton would suggest that consid
ering rhat between 0800 and 0915, "We had a
staff meeting, planned three possible lines of
attack, and made a simple code in which I could
telephone General (Jay which two of the three
lines we were to use, it is evident that war is not
so difficult as people think."35
At Verdun, the mood was somber. After a
briefing on the overall situation, Eisenhower
began to speak:
"George/' he said to Patton, "I \vant you to
go to Luxembourg and take charge.
ll
uYes, sir.l)
"When can you get there?"
"Nt1W," .
"You mean today!" Eisenhower asked.
III luean as s(x)n as you have finished with me
here,"
There was a pause.
"When will you be able to attack!" Eisen
hower continued.
'iThe mOD1ing of December twenty--second/'
Patton said, "with three divisiot1s.l!36
Colonel Charles R. Codman, Patton's aide,
described the reaction:
"There was a stir, a shuffling of feet, as those
present straightened up in their chairs. In some
faces, skepticism. But through the room the cur
rent of excitement leaped like a flame. To disen
gage three divisions actually in combat and
launch them over more than a hundred miles of
icy roads straight into the heart of a major
attack of unprecedented violence presented
problems which few Commanders would have
undertaken to resolve in that length of time."3?
Within the hour, the details of the counterat-
May 1990 MILITARY REVIEW 52

became clearer on the 18th, the thirdday
ofthe offensive . .. pa.nzers had smashed
through the 28th Division to ovemm
Troy H. Middleton's VIII Co.rps reserves.
Further north, two regiments ofthe 106m
Division had already been encircled, and
the remainder ofthe division was
desperately hanging on at St Vith.
Within the hour, the details ofthe counterattack were settled. Patton phoned
the code number to Gayand started toward the battle in Luxembourg. Patton was almost
continuously at the front consulting with his commanders andobserving the progress of
the battle. Despite the complexity ofthe movement and battle, bri1liant staRwork aDowed
Patton to remain at the front andcontrol the battle almost entirely by telephone.
HW4AW%@WMA
tack were settled. Patton phoned the code num The Third Anny had been a key element of the
ber to Gay and started toward the battle in Allied success.
embourg. He was confident that his staff would During the course of the battle, Patton was
take the necessary actions to start the 4th almost continuously at the front consulting
Armored Division moving to ArIon by way of with his commanders and observing the proW
Longwy, the 80th Division to Luxembourg via ress of the battle. Despite the complexity of
Thionville and place the 26th Division on alert the movement and battle, brilliant staff work
pending specific orders to move. allowed Patton to remain at the front and
Within two days, the Third Army was a full trol the battle almost entirely by telephone.
38
participant in the battle. A week later, the Ger The effort of the Third AmlY staff between
mans were stopped at their high-water mark. 18 and 23 December is impressive. Under the
MILITARY REVIEW May 1990 53
mounting pressure of the Ardennes offensive,
Patton's staff worked overtilne to assure success.
For instance:
Maddox's 03 section changed the army
from a three-corps front, nmning north to
south, to a four-corps battle line, split in two.
One ran east to west in the Ardennes; the other
ran north to south in the Saar.
Colonel "Speed" Perry, who had served as
Patton's guide into Palermo, moved hundreds of
combat and supply units in 133,178 motor vehi
cles, traversing more than 1,6 million miles,
Muller and his G4 section established an
entirety new supply system, set up scores of new
depots and dumps and shifted 62,000 tons of
supplies in just 120 hours, wotking around the
clock.
Colonel Elton H. Hammond's signalmen
constructed a vast new communications net
work, using some 20,000 miles offield wire, and
kept it going under extreme winter conditions
in the face of vicious enemy interference.
Koch's 02 section prepared and distrib
uted hundreds of thousands of new maps and
terrain analyses of the changed battle area,
drew up estimates of the enemy situation and
kept the order of battle up to the minute.
39
The performance of the Third Army staff
during the Battle of the Bulge assured success
and more than justified Patton's confidence in
them. One commentator would later suggest
Patton "demonstrated over and over his ability
to anticipate critical points and places and to
drive his staff not only to the limit but, seem
ingly, beyond the limit of human endurance. In
the final analysis, it was his direction of staff
officers which made possible coordination with
in his army and its spectacular victories."40 "1..
NOTES
1, MAJ H, A. Deweerd, Greal Soldiers of World War fI (New York: W. W
Norton & Company, 1944). 117. The list o! nine ware: Have a good chief of staff;
Go for simplicity in everything; Cut OUI all paper and tram subordinates to work
on Wtrbal instructions and orders; I0ep a firm grip on basic fundamentals - the
things thal roa"y maner; Avoid being involved in details -leave them to your
staff; Study morale-i! is a big thing in war. Without high morale you can
achieve nothing; When the issue hangs In the balanCil, express confidence in
the plans and in the operations. even It Inwardly you leel not too certain of the
outcome; Never worry; Newr bellyache,
2. GOOl'Q{l S. Pallon Jr. war As I Knew It (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Com
pany, 1947),329,-30
3. Omar N. Bradley, A Soldiers Story (New York: Henry Holl and Company,
1951),473.
4. H. Essame. PartlX1: A Study!n Command(NewYork: Charles Scribner's
5oos,1974),121
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid
8. Ibid., 122,
9. COL Robart S. Allen, Lucky Forward (New Yak: The Vanguard Press,
Inc" 1947), 19,
to. Edgar F: Puryear Jr" Nineteen Stars (Orange, VA: Green Publishers. Inc,.
1971).273.
11. Essame, 122.
12. Ibid., 124.
13. John M. vermillion, 'The Pillars ot Parametel'$ (Summer.
198?}:7.
14. Essame, 125.
150 Pallen, 357. Patton also suggested. "Never lell people how to do things.
Telilhem w17af to do and they will surprise you lheir ingenuity:"
16. Puryear, 273-74.
17. Patlon.
18.Allen,59.
19. Bradley, 445.
20. Patton, 186 and 188.
21. Ladislas Farago, Patton; Ordeal and Triumph (New)t)rk: lvanObolensky,
Inc., 1963),
22. Ibid.. 696
23. Russell F. Weigley, Eisenhower's LIeutenants (Bloomington, IN: Indiana
UniWtrsity Press, 1981), 458-63.
24, Patlon, 186.
25. Ibid.
26. Farago, 697-98.
27. Ibid., 698.
28. Ibid., 703.
29. COL Charles R. Cadman. DriYe (Boston: Little, Brown and Company,
1957),230.
30. Bradley, 446-47,
31. Patton, 189-90.
32. Ibid., 190.
33, Charles Whiting, Patton (New York: Ballantine Books, Inc., 1970),89.
34. Patton, 190.
35, Ibid.
36. Codman,231-32.
37. Ibid., 232.
38. Bradley, 473.
39. Farago, 710.
40. Famous American Military Leaders 01 World I'mr II, ''Army Times," eds.,
(New York: DlXId, Mead & Company, 1963p4.
Lieure""nt Co,mel Thul G. Munch commands the 565rh Engineer BarraIian, VII
Cml)s, West Gennany. He graduated from the Vrrgini<I Military Institute and Georgia
Tech, and received an MMAS from the US Anny Com1Mndand General SraffCoilege.
His jJret-WIIS assignmencs include command and staff positions in Germany, Korea and
he Continental United States,
May 1990 MILITARY REVIEW 54
i
Lieutenant Colonel (P) Rudolph C. Barnes Jr., US Army Reserve
The author sees the dramatic changes sweeping the geopolitical
scene as mandates for change in more than the force structure
and equipping ofour military. He cites the need to reorient the
military toward greater participation in the expanding political
environment of low..intensity contlict (LIC). He warns that tbe
conventional warrior wiJl be ill equipped to handle the diverse
challenges of LIe and ca1ls for the developmeot of soldiers
trained to operate in this new role as "diplomat warriors:'
D
IPLOMACY and military operations are
seldom considered together, but as in
SW.l1nents of national policy, they have always
been complementary. Diplomacy is the pre
ferred means of conducting foreign policy, but
military oper,ations are often necessary to pro
ject national power beyond the limits of diplo
macy. Carl von Clausewitz recognized this rela
tionship when he described war as an extension
of politics by other means'! While complemen
tary. military operations and diplomacy have
tmditionally been mutually exclusive, with mil
itary operations the domain of the Department
of Defense and diplomacy the province of the
Department of State.
TIle balance between military force and diplo
macy is detennined by the nature of the threat
to national security. Where the threat to n a ~
tional security is clear and direct, conventional
combat operations are appropriate to protect
US security interests, and considerations of m i l ~
itary force preempt diplomacy. Where the threat
is ambiguous and indirect, however, diplomacy
plays a dominant role, and military force must
be subordinated to political objectives. The
problem for Us policy makers is how to prepare
In Panama, US actions were linked to
political, economic and covert military ac'"
tivities controHed by the US a m b a s s a ~
dor . But when Noriega declared a state of
war between the US and&nama andthreat..
ened US lives and property the mili",
tary chain ofcommandpreemptedthe
ambassador's control ofmilitary activities.
for both kinds of threats; the fonner can be met
by conventional military forces, but the latter
requires a new type of soldier-the diplomat
warrior.
The Panama intervention illustrates the di
chotomy between military force and diplomacy.
Until General Manuel A. Noriega was per
ceived to bea clear threat to US interests in
Panama, US actions were linked to political,
economic and covert military activities con
J
trolled by the US ambassador in Panama. But
when Noriega declared a state of war between
the US and Panama and threatened US lives
and property there, he and his regime became
MILITARY REVIEW. May 1990 55
Decades ofexcessive military expenditures
and foreign-aid commitments by the Soviet
Union to maintain Eastern Bloc and other
satellite countries have left it economicaRy
debilitated. The dramatic democrati
zation ofWarsaw Pact countries in Eastem
Europe, coupled with growing [domestic]
unrest _.. has emasculated the Soviet Union
as a threat to the United States. While
specific changes in Soviet military strategy
remain unclear, one thing appears certain:
traditional Cold War strategies based on
conventional war . .. in Europe
are now obsolete.
the target ofa major conventional combat o p e r ~
ation, and the military chain of command pre
empted the ambassador's control of military
aetivitic'S. While OperationJust Cause was dear
ly a military success, publicized confrontations
between US combat troops and foreign diplo
mats connected with the Vatican, Peruvian,
Nicaraguan and Cuban embassies reflected an
apparent lack of c(x.>rdination between military
commanders and diplomats in Panama. The
achievement of US political objectives in Pan
arna will depend on close coordination between
military and diplomatic activities there.
Since World War II, there has been a trend
toward the merger of diplomacy and military
operations. Despite, or perhaps because of, tech
nologies that have produced awesome military
destmctive capabilities, weapons of mass de
stmction have not been widely used by the
United States or Soviet Union. And with few
exceptions, like the Cuban missile crisis, these
superpowers have also avoided direct military
confrontation. Avoiding the risks of mutual
assured destmction, they have focused instead
on competing for geopolitical influence in
politically unstable, but strategically important,
ateas of the Third World. The result has been
the proliferation of political warfare, euphe
mistieally known as low-intensity conflict (LIC),
a condition of violent peace, which might be
described in Clausewitzian terms as an exten
sion of war by other meansJ
Conventional military conflict between the
United States and Soviet Union has undoubt
edly been discouraged by the prospect of mutu
ally unacceptable losses, but economic and
political factors have also been important. Eco
nomic power has always been a prerequisite for
military power, and dominant nations that have
failed to adjust their military commitments to
declining economic strength have only acceler
ated their own decline. Professor Paul Kennedy
has described this phenomenon as "imperial
overstretch," and noted rhat the extensive mili
tary commitments of both the United States
and the Soviet Union make them vulnerable to
such overstretch.
3
Decades of excessive military expenditures
and foreign-aid commitments by the Soviet
Union to maintain Eastem Bloc and other sat
ellite countries have left it economically debili
tated. The new Soviet openness (glasnost') and
political restructuring (perestroyka) reflect fun
damental shifts in both Soviet domestic and
defense policies needed to strengthen its econ
omy. The dramatic democratization of Warsaw
Pact countries in Eastern Europe, coupled with
growing unrest among ethnic minorities and
demands for independence by Soviet republics,
has emasculated the Soviet Union as a threat to
the United States. While specific changes in
Soviet military strategy remain unclear, one
thing appears certain: traditional Cold War
strategies based on conventional war between
NATO and Warsaw Pact nations in Europe are
now obsolete.
Like the Soviet Union, the United States
has also experienced relative economic decline
as a result of excessive military expenditures and
foreign-aid commitments to defend the free
world. The principal beneficiaries of this largess
have been Japan and West Germany, countries
that have been able to focus their energies
and resources on economic growth, while the
May 1990' MILITARY REVIEW 56
With few exceptions, li.ke the Cuban missile crisis, these superpowers have also
avoideddirect military confrontation. Avoiding the risks ofmutual assureddestruction,
they have focused instead on competing for geopolitical influence in politically unstable,
but strategicaHyimportant, areas ofthe Third World. The result has been the proJife1'"
ation ofpolitical warfare, euphemistically known as low,intensity conflict (LIC), that
nUght be described in Clausewitzian tenns as an extension ofwar by other means.
United States carried the burden of theiT de
fense. The emergence of these new industrial
powers, coupled with the relative economic
decline of the United States and the Soviet
Union, has transformed the former East-West
bipolar geopolitical environment into a multi
polar free-far-all in which former allies and
adversaries now compete for world power and
influence. In this fluid geopolitical environ
ment, economic and political power are as im
portant as military power; and the focus of com
petition among world economic powers is likely
to be in the Third World, with its abundant
natural resources and lucrative markets.
The changing geopolitical environment and
increasing budget deficits have caused US pol
icy makers to question the spiraling costs of
sophisticated weapons systems and massive US
troop commitments overseas, as well as their
relevance to changing national security objec;
tives. With the decreasing likelihood of con
ventional war in Europe and the need to protect
national security interests in Lie situations,
weapons of mass destruction and massive troop
commitments have become all but irrelevant.
New strategies and force structures are required,
and they must include an emphasis on diplo
macy to be effective.
The importance of diplomacy in LIC can be
attributed to the requirement of public support
for mission success in that environment. With
out public support, no incumbent government
can survive for long against a determined insur
gency nor can any insurgency succeed without
a base of public support (or at least apathy), To
paraphrase Mao Tse-rung, public support pro-
MILtTARY REVIEW May 1990 51
The emphasis on political objectives
and the requirement that indigenous
forces be the primary actors in LIe call
for military leadership that contrasts
sharply with the "take charge"and ufol..
lolV me" variety ofleadership requiredin
combat . . Instead, ability, tact and per-
suasion are required to assist andmotivate
indigenous forces to achieve politicO'"
military objectives in a hostile and
ambiguous environment.
Wi_; iJ2 tiiA @$@M@
vides the friendly sea in which the insurgent
must swim to survive.
Legitimacy is a prerequisite for public sup
port, and militan' operations can compromise
legitimacy. To be effective, US military opera
tions in LIe must meet a difficult double tcst of
legitimacy; they must contribute to the political
legitimacy of supported forces and also be legiti
mate by US standards. Legitimacy in the area of
operations is essential for indigenous public sup
port, \lihile legitimacy in the United States is
necessary to sustain the congressional support
required f()r protracted military operations in a
politically controversial envirol1ment.
4
Perceptions of legitimacy arc shaped by the
electronic and printed media, and military
operations in LIe are especially vulnerable to
media exploitation. Indiscretions that would
be overlooked in conventional conflict can
threaten legitimacy and mission success in LIe
In this unforgiving environment, military oper
ations must conform to legal, moral, political
and cultural nonns to mobilize the public sup
port needed for mission success. As legal and
political advisers to their commanders, the mil
itary lawyer and the civil-military officer are
diplomat warriors who help provide the re
quired publ ic support by ensuring the legit
imacy of military operations.
5
A Webster's definition of diplomacy is skill
in handling affairs without arousing hostility, a
teml synonymous with tact. Such a concept is
out of place in conventional conflict, where
hostility is the essence of successful operations.
There the threat is clear and direct, and the
center of gravity is normally the use of over
whelming military force to destroy the enemy.
In contrast, the threat in LIe is ambiguous and
indirect, friend is seldom distinguishable from
foe; legitimacy is the center of gravity; and
the use of overwhelming force is likely to be
counterproductive to politico-military objec
tives. With US forces normally in an advisory
role, diplomacy is essential to achieve politico
military objectives through indigenous forces.
Civil Affairs (CA) personnel are the mili
tary's frontline diplomats, and their contrasting
roles in conventional combat and LIe illustrate
the differing requirements of the two environ
ments. In combat, military objectives predomi
nate, and the primary role of CA is to minimize
civilian interference with combat operations.
In LIe,. political objectives predominate, and
the primary role of CA is to mobilize the public
support essential for mission success.
6
Other
special operations forces (SOP) such as psycho-
May 1990 MILITARY REVIEW 58
logical operations (pSYOP) and Special Forces
(SF) share. leading roles with CA in LIe and,
like CA, have only supporting rotes in
tional combat. These contrasting roles help
explain the inadequacy of conventional mili
tary forces in LIC, a lesson painfully learned by
the United States in Vietnam and the Soviet
Union in Afghanistan.
The military interventions in Grenada in
1983 and more recently in Panama represent a
blend of conventional combat with LIe. Un
like Vietnam, these combat operations enjoyed
n-uhll ........ __...t' -t ....... .;.ha. 1 c.i"("lf..o.C' "' ...... ..-l
v,",,""",-" pU:l...'" .. L uU.,t..'!--,'-J.lL UI. ... .LL..... '\...lJ.1LL'\-U VLO\. ..... " U.LI.U
the area of operations due to their surgical na
ture, clear military success and quick with
drawal of combat forces once military
tives were achieved. Following combat opera
tions in Greneda, CA personnel played a key
role in achieving US political objectives there.
Until the fledgling Grenadian government could
function effectively, CA personnel worked with
the Grenadian government and the US Agency
for International Development (USAID) to
reestablish essential services, serving as an
extension of both the US military and diplo
matic corps.? The inability of the Endara gov
ernment to provide essential services in Pan
ama following the US intervention there has
provided a similar opportunity for CA person
nel to contribute to US security objectives in
that strategically important country.
The emphasis on political objectives and the
requirement that indigenous forces be the pri
mary actors in LIC call for military leadership
that contrasts sharply with the "take charge"
and "follow me" variety of leadership required
in combat. For the US adviser in LIe, aggres,
sive leadership traits considered ideal for
ventional conflict can be disastrous. Instead,
ability, tact and persuasion are required to assist
and motivate indigenous forces to achieve
military objectives in a hostile and ambiguous
environment. Mission success in LIC requires
that US military advisers be diplomat warriors
to provide "leadership from behind."8
Combining military and diplomatic skills is
tJSMflS Panamanians
for weapons, 23 DJ.ilcember1989.
Perceptions oflegitimacF are shaped
by the electronic andprintedmedia, and
military operations in LIC are especially
vulnerable to media exploitation. Indiscre
tions that would be overlookedin con"
ventional conflict can threaten legitimacy
andmission success in LIe. In this unfo!'"
giving environment, militaryoperations
must conform to legal, moral. political
and cultural norms to mobilize the public
support needed for mission success.
not a new idea; senior officers in all services
have been encouraged to seek advanced mili
tary training and civilian postgraduate work to
prepare them it)r high-level leadership posi
tions. General ('Allin L Powell, chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff; qualifies as a diplomat war
rior, having served in both diplomatic and
tary assignments with equal distinction. His
predecessor, Admiral William J. Crowe Jr., had
a similar background, confirming the value of
MILITARY REVIEW May 1990 59
diplomatic skills to high-level military lead
ership. When characterized as the classic diplo
mat warrior, Crowe once noted that his PhD.
from Princeton helped him see"... that there
are political dimensions to everything."9
It should not be surprising that Crowe was
able to see political dimensions to everything
The military interventions in Grenada
[and] Panama represent a blendofconven
tional combat with LIe. Unlike Vietnam,
these combat operations enjoyed wide
public support in the United States and
the area ofoperations due to their surgical
nature, clear military success and quick
withdrawal ofcombat forces once
military objectives were achieved.
from his lofty perspective, since even conven
tional military operations involve diplomacy at
the strategic level. What makes LIC unique is
the predominance of political objectives at the
tactical level, where the rubber meets the road.
All US military personnel working with indige
nous personnel must combine diplomacy with
military competence. Current defense doctrine
recognizes the need for language training and
cultural orientation for such assignments; but
because training in these skills is not readily
available to junior military personnel, few are
prepared for diplomat warrior roles. to
The emphasis on diplomacy should not ob
scure the fact that the diplomat warrior must
first be competent in military skills and that
the effective application of military force is
essential to mission success. Events in both
Grenada and Panama confirmed the need for
quick-reaction, conventional forces to protect
US security interests, and even in unconven
tional LlC environments, organized violence is
essential to achieve politico-military objectives.
Insurgency and counterinsurgency are the sub
stance of LlC, and both require effective mili
tary operations to complement the political,
economic and social activities required for ulri
mate victory. While military force must be con
strained ro avoid collateral damage and a loss of
legitimacy, it must also be effective to achieve
legitimacy. Hence, government military forces
that cannot protect the public from insurgent
forces jeopardize the public support necessary
for legitimacy and political control.
Both insurgent guerrillas and counterin
surgency forces must compete for legitimacy
and public support while attempting to neu
tralize their opposition. As political underdogs,
insurgent guerrillas may forego diplomacy for
sabotage and subversion to undermine public
confidence in an incumbent government. Only
the most desperate insurgents, however, c o n ~
duct terrorist activities and sacrifice legitimacy
for dramatic effect. Not all terrorists are ineffec
tive insurgents, however. Narcoterrorists, as
contemporary cousins of the Barbary pirates,
are affluent international criminals who use ter
rorism to neutralize law enforcement. In Co
lombia, Peru and Bolivia, drug lords and their
terrorist squads have challenged the ability of
government to maintain law and order.
While countemarcotics operations are nor
mally law enforcement operations for which
military forces are inappropriate, when drug
lords challenge the legitimacy of a government,
they should be treated as insurgents. In Peru, for
example, drug lords support insurgents who
provide them protection in return. In Panama
and Cuba, drug lords have been protected by
corrupt government officials. Success against
drug cartels allied with powerful pelitical forces
requires the full range of LIe military, eco
nomic and political activities. The Panama
intervention and atrest of Noriega reflecr the
US commitment to the international drug war
and its priority among LIC activities.
Like rhe insurgent, the drug lords and their
terrorist squads must have a friendly sea in
which to swim, depending on a measure of pub
lic support or apathy to survive. Too often, the
drug lords are afforded undeserved legitimacy
Ma.y 1990. MILITARY REVIEW 60
Not all SOFs under USSOCOMrequire an emphasis on diplomacy . .. The Rangers
conduct strikes and raids such as those in Grenada and Panama, both ofwhich were
consideredpeacetime contingency operations anddoctrinallyincludedin LIe... the US
Navy's SEALs and the US ArmY5 Delta forces are oriented to counterterrorism operations
requiring quick..reaction surgical strikes against spedJic targets in highly sensitive envi..
ronments. Even SF, CA andPSYOP forces have specializeddirect action missions.
lbiilJ.% we bYAH&
and safe haven in fiefdoms where drug produc
tion is the only source of income for poor peas
ants. In these areas, a combination of military,
economic and political activities will be re
quired to isolate drug lords from their base of
support, a prerequisite for their capture.
Humanitarian assistance, civic action and
disaster relief are activities that can help mobi
lize public opinion to achic\ye politko-mili tary
objectives in LIC, such as denying drug lords
safe haven. Long- and short-term projects to
improve the quality of life in underdeveloped or
devastated areas include the construction of
roads, bridges and schools, and also medical
projects. Disaster reliefcan be especially critical
when public support is at risk. USAID is nor
mally the lead agency for hwnanitarian assist
ance and civic action, but CA personnel, work
ing through their indigenous counterparts, are
especially well suited to conduct such projects
in the hostile LIC environment.
11
As a result of 1986 legislation providing
for the US Special Operations Command
(USSOCOM), there is now an environment in
which the unique politico-military skills re
quired in LIC can be deve1oped.
12
The SOFs
that are assigned to the subordinate units of
USSOCOM include the Army's SF, CA and
PSYOP forces. A primary mission of SF is to
instruct indigenous forces on the martial arts
of LIC; CA is responsible for civil-military re
lations and mobilizing public support; and
PSYOP, the military media. While military
intelligence is not one of the SOFs, it must pro
vide the intelligence so critical for special oper
ations in Ue. The primary mission of these
forces in LIC is advising and assisting indige
nous military forces in accomplishing their
politico-military objectives, requiring a blend of
unique military skills and diplomatic finesse.
Ambassador Charles A. Whitehouse, as assis
tant secretary of defense for spedal operations
and LIe, and General James J. Lindsay, the
commanding general ofUSSOCOM, have em
phasized the need for special training for the
personnel of USSOCOM and its subordinate
units to accomplish their unique politico
military missionsJ3 At the John F. Kennedy
Center for Special Warfare at Fort Bragg, North
Carolina, new courses are being offered to these
personnel that emphasize the unique leadership
skills required in UC.
14
It has even been sug
gested that a "LICschoolhouse" be established
for both military and civilian personnel at the
61 MILITARY REVIEW" May 1990
Humanitarian assistance, civic
acdon anddisaster reliefare activities that
can help mobilize public opinion to a"
chieve politico-mi1itary objectives in LIC ..
USAID normally the lead agency for
humanitarian assistance and civic action,
but CA personnel, working through their
indigenous counterparts, are especiaJJy
well suited to conduct such projects in
the hostile LIeenvironment.
6iMliWM 4kWU @
National Defense University or Foreign Service
Institute to augment military training. IS
Joint civil-military training for the diplomat
warrior is appropriate since most US activities
in Lieare joint ventures involving US military
personnel, dvilian agencies and indigenous
forces. Just as military personnel need to under
stand the essentials of diplomacy, so do their
civilian counteqxlrts need to understand unCOIl
ventional military operations and security meas
ures necessary to survive and function in the
ambiguous and hostile LIe environment.
Not all SOFs under USSOCOM require an
emphasis on diplomacy. Notably, the US Army's
Rangers epitomize combat operations that are
the antithesis of diplomacy. The Rangers con
duct strikes and raids such as those in Grenada
and Panama, both of which were considered
peacetime contingency operations and doctri
nally included in LIC. Other SOFs also have
direct action missions: the US Navy's SEAls
and the US Army's Delta forces are oriented to
counterterrorism operations requiring quick
reaction surgical strikes against specific targets
in highly sensitive environments. Even SF, CA
and PSYOP forces have specialized direct action
missions in addition to their indirect missions.
The one common denominator of the varied
military missions of SOF in LIe, both direct
and indirect, is that they must be conducted in
politically sensitive environments for which
conventional forces are not well suited. Accom
plishing politico-military objectives in such an
unforgiving environment requires that military
decision makers and those advising indigenous
forces combine the leadership traits of a profes
sional soldier with the finesse of a diplomat
the components of the diplomat warrior.
The aftermath of the Panama intervention
will likely reaffinn the importance of the diplo
mat warrior, not as a substitute for his conven
tional counterpart, but as a complementary
defense capability necessary to protect US se
curity interests in hostile environments short of
war. In such politically sensitive environments,
neither diplomacy nor conventional military
operations alone are adequate to protect US
security interests, but the diplomat warrior, rep
resenting a blend of both disciplines, can help
indigenous forces achieve politico-military ob
jectives. Whether assisting a new government
in providing essential services following
bat, providing humanitarian assistance, disaster
rehef, supporting countemarcotics operations,
counterinsurgency or even insurgency, the dip
lomat warrior is an essential defense capability
in the contemporary geopolitical environment.
Itwould be a mistake to think that the
mat warrior is limited to LIe. Visionary military
thinkers have recognized the increasing
tanee of civilians in conventional warfare, and
predicted a variety of diplomat warrior will be
May 1990 MILITARY REVIEW 62
an integral part of our Hfourth generation"
ventional forces. 16
The diplomat warrior will bring a new look
to the military. As a bastard stepchild born
of the uneasy relationship between diplomacy
and military operations, this unique soldier
must be able to bridge the formidable gap be
tween these two disciplines. To succeed, the
diplomat warrior must understand the rela
tionship of military operations to the political
objectives of contemporary warfare and be able
to provide military leadership with the fines;,
of a diplomat.
There is a need for a national political con
sensus and strategy to give direction to US
involvement in peacetime military operations,
but despite the lack of national policy, it is clear
that Congress understands the value of the dip
lomat warrior to US security objectives. It over,
came stiff Pentagon resistance to mandate the
DIPLOMAT WARRIOR
$ ;
General Colin L. Powell, chairman ofthe
Joint Chiefs ofStaff, qualifies as a diplomat
warrior, baving served in hotb diplomatic
and military assignments with equal dis
tinction. His predecessor, Admiral Wi1Jiam
J. Crowe Jr., bad a similar background _.
Men characterized as tlJe classic diplomat
warrior, Crowe once noted that Ph.D.
from Princeton llelped bim see u that
there are political dimensions to everything!'
!iii 2
creation of USSOCOM; and if recent legisla
tion is any indication of future defense
orities, Congress will continue to provide the
hmding and oversight to ensure thar the diplo
mat warrior becomes an effective extension of
both our military and diplomatic corps. "h.
NOTES
1, Patrick M. Cronin, "ClausswilZ Condensed," Military Review (August
1985):40, General Carl Von Clausewitl is Credited with recognizing war as an
extension of politics by military means
2. For a proposed doctrinal description of the Jow,.intensity conflict (UC)
environment, see For Comment Draft of Joint Chiefs of Statf Doctrine for Joinr
Operations in Conflict(hereafter referred to asJCS PUB 3-07),
12 September 1988, Washington, DC, 20301-5000, I..{}; see also LTC Rudolph
C. Barnes Jr., "The Politics Qf Low-Intensity Conflict,ft Military Review (Febru
ary 1988):2.
3. Paul Kennedy, Too Rise andFail of The Groat Powers (New' York: Random
House, 1987). af) extensive and welldocumented history <lIthe relationship
between national economic and military strength since 1500.
4. For a discussion of the interrelationship of public support and legitimacy
in lIC, see LTC Rudolph C. Barnes Jr" "Civil Affairs: A L1C Priority," Military
Review(September 1988):38
5. For a discussion of the functions oltha military lawyer and civil-military
operations in L1C, see Rudolph Barnes, "legitimacy and the lawyer in L1C:
Civil Affairs legal Support," TheArmy Lawyer, October 1988, 5.
6. Barnes, "Civil Affairs," Militery Review (september 1988).
7. Delbert L. SpUrlOCk, "Grenada Provides Classic Case," The OtIicer
(August 1984):17; RudOlph C. Barnes Jr., "Grenada Revisited: Civil Affairs
Operates in Paradise," The Officer(July 1985):14.
8. MG William H. Ailey Jr., "Challenges of a Military Adviser,ft Military
Review(November 1988):34.
9. lime interview, 26 December 1988, 72.
10. See generally, JCS PUB 3-07.
11. Rudolph C. Barnes Jr" "Civic AcUon. Humanitarian aFJd Civic Assis
tance, and Disaster Relief: Military Priorities in Low Intensity Conllicl." Special
Warfare (Fall 1989).
12. For a description of the unusual legislative history of US Special Opera
tions Command (USSOCOM) and the Assistant Se"retary of Delense tor Spe.
cial Operations and lie (ASDISOUC) by a key ollicial, we R. Lynn Rylander,
':ASO-SOllC: The Congressional Approach to SOF Reorganization," Special
Yiarfare(Spring 1989). Thelaw mandatingthecrealionolUSSOCOM and ASOI
soLIe is the Amendment to GoldwaterNichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 (Public law 433. 1 October '1986). Part B,
Special Operations Matters, 10 US Code 167, 1311, as amended from time 10
time therealler,
13. For an overvie'N of the mission of US military forces in Lie by the new
ASDISOliC, see Ambassador Charles A. Whiteho!.Jse, "Lov/lntonsiIY Conflict
andlhe Third World," RDANationat8ecurityReporl,voL 7,no. 7,JJJIy!9B9, 13:
for an overview of USSOCOM /)"j its cO'l1mal1df!r, see James J, Lindsay,
"USSOCOM: Strengthening the SO.. Capability," Special IM:Irfere (Sprir"K]
1989):5-7
14. Steven Bucci, "Fighters \Is Thinkers: The Special Operations Staff
Officers Course and the Future of SOF;"' Spe-ciai Warfare (Spring 1988}:33
15. WiIliamJ. Olson, "Organilatioilal Requirements for lIC," Military Review
(January 1988):16
16. William S. Lind. at aI., '"The Changing Face 01 War: Jf1101he Four1h Gener"
MifitaryRe'liew (October 1969)5-11
lieutenant G)kmel (P) Rudolph G Barnes Jr., US Army ResenIC, i) a1\ a1tml1c)' at
law in Prosperity, South CArolina. He receit-wa RA fnml The Citadel, an Iv1.PA, and
a J.D. fram the University of South CArolina, and is a gradU1lte of the US Army
Cornmandand General StaffO)Uege. His Reserve hat'/: included swffjudge
advocate, US Anny ]FK Special Waifare Cenrer, fx:rrt Bretgg', North Cardiwi, mmd
Sf>ecial project officer; The Judge Advocate General's School, Charlottesville,
Presently, he is the staff judge advocate, US Army Resert'e ,Special (1)cratirfns Com
marul. Fort Bragg.
MILITARY REVIEW. May 1990 63
T
HE CURRENT debate on attrition and
maneuver has contributed to the resurg
ing interest in Major General]. F. C. Fuller and
Captain Sir B. H. Liddell Hart, the two most
original and important military thinkers of the
20th century. Today, Fuller and Liddell Hart are
widely read by American officers, but this was
not the case before 1941. Moreover, with the
exception of Geneml George S. Patton Jr. and
General S. L. A. Marshall, American officers
prior to 1941 made only a marginal contribu
tion to the debate over mechanization.
Even those who did contribute, such as Pat
ton, admitted to not having read either Fullcror
Liddell Hart. In fact, when Patton met Liddell
Hart for the first time in 1944, his impression
was not overwhelmingly favorable: "He is very
well read but ... has no personal knowledge of
the facts of life so far as war is concerned- in
that he is not alone. He is a funny looking man,
tall and skinny." This seems to indicate that
Liddell Hart made as much a physical as a cere
bral impression upon him. Marshall, an enthu
siastic apostle of Fuller and Liddell Hart, wrote
a foreword to Fuller's treatise, Armoured W a r ~
fare. Although he advertised its value to Ameri
can officers, his efforts had little effect. The
Infantry Journal did not review it, and at the
Infantry School between 1932 and 1939, no
more than six officers had taken the original
British edition of the book (published under the
tide, Lectures on FSR III) out of the library.!
In a sustained comparison of Fuller and Lid
dell Hart, one test really counts with soldiers,
and rightly so: What was their military e x p e r i ~
ence and what knowledge was gained from that
experience? Fuller, a practical soldier, as his
World War I experience testified, was first and
foremost a romantic visionary; Liddell Hart was
perhaps even more so. When they are criticized
for sweeping generalizations, this should always
be borne in mind. Furthermore, Liddell Hart
was not a professional soldier. He was a jour
nalist who, by virtue of his personality and
intellect, rather than his limited military expe
rience, made himself a force to be reckoned
May 1990 MILITARY REVIEW 64
with both inside and outside the army.
Before 1914, Great Britain had not produced
any first-rank military theorists. Yet after 1918,
two military theorists emerged from the trau
matic experience of World War 1-Fuller and
Liddell Hart. Their work was a response to the
Great War and the widespread feeling, evident
among junior officers, that whatever had gone
awfully wrong ought to be rectified before the
next war.
Much more than simply representative fig
ures of a reforming impulse, they were men of
pronounced individuality. Liddell Hart initi
ated their friendship in 1920 when he began to
send Fuller copies of his early writings. Given
that Fuller was already a colonel who had
turned down a promotion to brigadier general,
the seriolCsness with which he treated this
young captain as an equal does him b>reat credit.
Fuller encouraged him but replied with an
admonition that was to mark out his own path
as much as that of Liddell Hart over the next 40
years-namely, the desire to move away from
the tactical plane that had preoccupied pre
vious Btitish military writers. After reading sev
eral of Liddell Hart's articles, Fuller observed,
"... I cannot help feeling that your views on
the principles ofwar are based more on a special
case and particularly a tactical case than on the
general conditions of war itself."
Fuller and Liddell Hart were to pioneer the
technique of studying warfare in the round as
a social phenomenon. Their correspondence
constitutes probably the greatest interchange of
ideas in the history of warfare. (What we would
not do for a similar correspondence between
Henri jomini and Carl von Clausewitz.) Their
letters are characterized not only by trenchancy,
insight and a profligacy of suggestion and spec
ulation, but also by real wit, and sometimes,
eynicism and despair. Fuller and Liddell Hart
read each other's books in draft, commented on
them and ranged widely over the prevailing mil
itary issues of the day. They occasionally col
luded in advancing the cause ofmilitary reform,
as when Fuller asked Liddell Hart to pose a
question at his RUSI (Roy"l United Services
Institute for Defence Studies) lecture on mech
anization about the need to set up a special
force to experiment in this areaJ
Their friendship was motivated by a com
monality of interest. They shared a commit-
Both concluded that to avoid the
deadlock ofmodem war, it was important
to do more than just improve infantry
techniques. Restotingmobility on t1re battle
field required not only adopting the tank
and other annored vehicles; it demanded
nothingless than a revolution in military
thinking, especially concerning the rela
tionship ofweapons on the battlefield.
ment to seeking out lithe truth" as a basis for
informed discussion. Fundamentally, Fuller and
Liddell Hart were late Victorian and Edwardian
rationalists who found much that appalled
them in the conduct of human affairs.
They wete dedicated to the belief that World
War I had been a catastrophic event in world
history and had been conducted ineptly. They
argued that the instruments which could trans
form the nature of war and avoid a repetition of
1914-1918 were at hand if only soldiers had the
wit to use them. Both believed that generalship
as an art could be restored by harnessing the
weapons developed by the mechanical, elec
trical and chemical advances of the Industrial
Revolution.
War could then be used to fulfill rational and
clear-cut objectives, and its propensity toward
sheer destruction, restricted. Greater weapon
power would reduce the need for large armies
and would increase professionalism. Therefore,
future armies would be small, with a high mea
sure of cohesiveness, elan and professional skill.
The passion and brutality of conscript armies
would be banished from the bartlefield. Gentle
manly, limited, but decisive campaigns would
MILITARY REVIEW May 1990 65
After 1918, two military theorists emerged from the traumatic experience
ofWorld War I-FuDer and Liddell Hart. Their work was a response to the Great War
and the widespread feeling, evident amongjunior oBcers, that whatever had gone
awfully wrong ought to be rectified before the next war.
be waged. Thus, by various means the utility of
war would be restored.
Both Fuller and Liddell Hart, whatever their
disenchantment with the British High C1m
mand in World War I, believed that warfare was
an inescapable element in the affairs of man
kind. They never subscribed to pacifism, but
s<)ught rather to apply the fruits of reason to
refine the barbarism of modem war. In this
effort, Liddell Hart was more radical than Ful
ler. By the late 19305, Liddell Hart came to per
sonify the informed critic's view of the disasters
of 1916-1917 for he had a passionate commit
ment to ensure that "this bath of blood," as he
called Passchendaele. would never again be
repeated.
3
What were these reformers like as men? In
stature they could not have been more dis
similar; Fuller was 5 feet 5 inches tall and Lid
dell Hart, 6 feet 5 inches. Both were bald and
had penetrating eyes, though Liddell Hart's
were more kindly. Both inspired considerable
awe and sometimes fear. Fuller was aloof, arro
gant, occasionally bombastic, but always dog-
matico Readers of The Anny in My TIme and
Memoirs of an Unconventional Soldier will know
with what ferocity his scathing wit was some
times vented upon the British anny. Even though
he had what some have called personality de
fects, Fuller's entire career was underlaid with
his strengths, tremendous courage, vision and
fundamental integrity.
Though Liddell Hart was undoubtedly more
approachable, affable and clubbable, he too
could be arrogant and offensive. Guests arriving
at his country house for the first time armed
themselves with appropriately weighty topics of
conversation, as "The Captain" was not noted
for small talk. If the guest was an expert, Liddell
Hart, ever the journalist, did not waste a second
in exploiting that expertise. As Michael How
ard wrote: "{Andl when one visited him, to be
entertained with excellent food and wine and
endless whisky- everything the heart of man
could desire except sleep-he would be lying in
wait with a deceptively small piece of paper on
which he had jotted down in his microscopic
writing a few dozen topics on which he wanted
May 1990. MILITARY REVIEW 66
inforrnation or discussion."
4
Because Fuller and Liddell Hart were such
forceful and powerful personalities, the nature
of their relationship changed drastically. By
1927, Liddell Hart had rapidly surpassed Fuller
in terms of political connections and influence.
This change in Liddell Hart's status produced
tensions, which resulted in quarrels mainly over
their political differences.
By 1930, Liddell Hart had become an estab
lishment figure. He moved easily and comfort
ably in the circles of the liberal intelligentsia.
Fuller, on the other hand, did not. His intellec
tual and social life was largely dominated by
Gennan attitudes. He was a member of that
"other" literary circle, which was right wing,
pro-German and Roman Catholic. Fuller was
not only a supporter of The Link, an organiza
tion designed to foster Anglo-German friend
ship, but addressed its meetings, including the
most virulently pro-Nazi and anti-Semitic. He
continued to do so until the declaration of war
in September 1939. Needless to say, such be
havior only confirmed the opinion of conser
vatives in the army that Fuller was a reckless
man of poor judgment.
s
Apart from his age, the pernicious result of
Fuller's unwise political activities was that his
talents were not better utilized in World War n.
It is indeed a tribute to the universal respect
that he had won by his abilities, not only that
he was not interned with other fascists in 1940,
but that demands for his recall were to be heard
as late as 1942.
Liddell Hart was also in disgrace at the out
break of World War n, but not for ideological
reasons. Unlike Fuller, he had always been a
champion of the League of Nations and collec
tive security, and was appalled by the appease
ment of Germany. Fuller's fascism exasperated
him. He pointed out that Nazism was the en
emy of free inquiry and independent judgment
in the pursuit of ttuth; Fuller would have been
the fil1lt to have been imprisoned if such a dic
tatorship had been instituted in Britain. From
1937-1942, their friendship was broken, and
MILITARY REVIEW May 1990
FULLER/LIDDELL HART
would not be restored until their fundamental
commonality of interest was renewed by their
abhorrence of Allied strategy in World War II.
Fuller and Liddell Hart were not partners
but collaborators who set about fulfilling their
They both analyzed the Schlieffen PIan
of1914 with some care. They agreed that
it was overambitious as a strategic envelop
ment because its main thrust lacked the
mobility to secure the pIan ~ objectives,
and the operation simply could not be
sustainedlogistically. The result was
stalemate andattrition.
ideals in ways that each thought the most suit
able. Both were light infanttymen, and the idea
of military movement was fundamental to their
outlook. Fuller wrote two books on the British
light infantry, British Light Infantry in the Eight
eenth Century and Sir John Moore s System of
Training (1925), and Liddell Hart wrote, The Fu
ture ofInfanrry (1933). They advanced the thesis
that future wars would require lighter, more flexi
ble, mobile and, above all, thinking infantry
men who could reacr and exploir fast-moving
situations, unlike the plodding, overladen and,
on the whole, immobile (in both thoughr and
deed) infantry masses of the Great War.
At different stages of their careers, both
Fuller and Liddell Hart devoted their energies
to improving the quality of conventional infan
try tactics and training before turning their
attention to the tank. Both concluded that to
avoid the deadlock ofmodemwar, it was impor
tant to do more than just improve infantry tech
niques. Restoring mobility on the battlefield
required not only adopting the tank and other
armored vehicles; it demanded nothing less
than a revolution in military thinking, espe
cially concerning the relationship of weapons
on the battlefield. They maintained that weap
ons should be fielded in order to express their
67
They were dedicated to the beliefthat World War I had been a catastrophic
event in world history and hadbeen conductedinepdy. They argued that the instruments
which could transfonn the nature ofwarandavoida repetition of1914-1918 were at hand
ifonly soldiers had the wit to use them. Both believed that generalship as an art could be
restored by harnessing the weapons developed by the mechanical, electrical
and chemical advances ofthe Industrial Revolution.
tactical functions and not just as representa
tives of anns of the service. The distinction was
subtle, but clear.
In pursuit of this objective, they undertook
the massive task of rethinking the very nature
of war and developing a logical and practicable
sequence of the principles of war as the first step
toward developing military doctrine. Until very
recently, the British army had traditionally d e ~
dined to contemplate military doctrine. Al
though the intellectual fruits of these efforts are
felt in virtually every staff college in the world,
in the 1920stheywere perhaps overripe.
FuUer's codification of the principles of war,
The Foundations of the Science of War, though a
book of great length and learning and no little
insight, was poorly received due to its con
voluted style. Liddell Hart never wrote a book
specifically on the principles of war, though a
distillation of his teachingcan be found in Strac
e/tY: The Indirect Approach, a highly individual
interpretation of their historic implementation,
rather than a cogent analysis of the principles
themselves.
This systematic attempt to first establish
principles, which by definition acknowledged
the failure of previous military theories, led to
an unfortunate direction in their thought. They
both expressed an excessive contempt for the
intellectual attainments of senior officers.
May 1990 MILITARY REVIEW 68
FULLER/LIDDELL HART
The private papers of Liddell Hart are lit
tered with reflections on their cerebral inade
quacies: on their "military trades unionisrn/'
their willful blindness to "truth," and their
criminal neglect of the need f,)r novel thinking
and drastic structural reform. Liddell Hart came
to see that military professionalism in Britain
had served to cement the existing ossified stmc
ture. He looked elsewhere for models, and
where better than the United States. In the
1920s, he focused on William T. Sherman, and
in the 1930s, on T. E. Lawrence as altemative
models of commanders. Shennan, although
scruffY, neurotic and freethinking, was a profes
sional soldier; Lawrence, a donnish, youthh,l
figure given to philosophical flights of fancy,
not unlike Liddell Hart himself, was a guerrilla
leader. Sherman and Lawrence could adapt
their military methods to the circumstances
they faced and were not blinded by dogma.
Indeed, it was adaptability that both Fuller and
Liddell Hart sought in their ideal commander
of the future.
Sherman and Lawrence were much more in
tellectual than Fuller's hero, Ulysses S. Grant.
But both Fuller and Liddell Hart would have
agreed that intellect, whether trained or un
trained, was a prerequisite for successful com
mand, and that this requirement would become
more important the more intricate and sophis
ticated modem warfare became.
Fuller's most important contribution was in
the sphere of mechanization. He played a cm
cial role in the evolution of early tank tactics;
the scheme to launch a tank attack at Cambrai
was originally his. Further, the composition of
"Plan 1919," a plan for a decisive tank attack to
win the war in 1919, and a document to which
any soldier would have been proud to have put
his name, was in many ways the apogee of
Fuller's professional military career. In addition,
he had played an important part in the paper
victories that ensured the survival of the infant
Tank Corps after World War I. It is no wonder
that Liddell Hart was so deferential when first
approaching him.
Although this article is not an exhaustive
study of Fuller's and Liddell Hart's writings
on mechanization, some comtnon themes and
major differences deserve extended treatment.
[Liddell Hart] focused on William T.
Sherman [and] IE. LallTCnce as alternative
models ofcommanders. Sherman, although
scruffy, neurotic and freethinking, was a
professional soldier; Lawrence, a donnish,
youthfu16gure given to philosophical
flights offancy . . . was a guerrilla leader.
[Both] could adapt their military methods to
the circumstances they faced and were
not blinded by dogma.
Both in their detailed technical treatises and
sweeping historical surveys, Fuller and Liddell
Hart agreed that the development of armored
forces would make strategic and operational
envelopments more decisive and efficient as a
means of waging war. They both analyzed the
Schlieffen Plan of 1914 with some care. TIley
agreed that it was overambitious as a strategic
envelopment because its main thmst lacked the
mobility to secure the plan's objectives, and the
operation simply could not be sustained logis
tically. The result was stalemate and attrition
a very inefficient means of waging war, as Fuller
and Liddell Hart never tired of pointing out.
Prior to mechanized forces, envelopment
was difficult to achieve. Because the numbers of
troops involved rendered their command, cOn
trol and supply difficult, especially in the con
fined spaces of Westem Europe, they frequently
arrived on the battlefield exhausted. Mecha
nization would provide a solution because ar
mored vehicles permitted troops to fight and
move across the battlefield. Earlier improve
ments in military transportation, such as the
railway, had only enhanced strategic mobility.
At the operational level, troops still had to dis-
MILITARY REVIEW. May 1990 69
[LiddeD Hart) claimed that the
deeper the annored forces advanced, the
greater the psychological dislocation of
the e n e m y ~ command, and the less
would be the need to engage the enemyin
a decisive battle. Whereas FuHer believed
that the introduction ofarmored forces
would render the decisive battle more
inJport1lIlt, liddeD Hart argued that it
would be relegated to a less significant
place in military priorities.
mount and then move on foot across the battle
field.
Five aspects of the operational art that Fuller
clearly described should be digested by all sol
diers preparing to wage maneuver warfare:
From the military point of view, 1 hour is
not 60 minutes, but what is accomplished in 60
minutes.
The most effective form of defense is mo
bile defense, which permits the defender to pro
tect his fighting power and installations without
surrendering the initiative.
In the offense and defense in maneuver
warfare, the main aim should be the dislocation
of the enemy's command and organization, and
not just the destruction of his fighting troops,
though this should not be neglected.
All plans should be based on the defensive
offensive, the strongest form of war. Even light
ning offensive advances should be founded on a
secure base; if they are not, movement forward
would lack backbone.
The pursuit is the most important act in bat
tle because, if correctly organized and launched,
it guarantees the annihilationofthe enemy and
the attainment of the political object of the
war.
Liddell Hart subscribed to these five points,
but he felt strongly that Fuller neglected the art
of strategy. He may have been right. Nonethe
less, he agteed that Fuller was the most original
thinker who wrote on the subject of amlored
warfare- "original" in the sense that Fuller
started from a blank piece of paper and thought
out the subject for himself. It is clear that others
(including Liddell Hart) read him and not vice
versa.
Liddell Hart, on the other hand, was the
most persuasive advocate of mechanization.
One is stnlck less by Liddell Hart's technical
grasp than by the faith he showed in the rank as
a means whereby the full strategic potential of
mobility could be realized, along with improv
ing the art of generalship.
Liddell Hart was a great believer in unlimited
objectives. He claimed that the deeper the
armored forces advanced, the greater the psy
chological dislocation of the enemy's com
mand, and the less would be the need to engage
the enemy in a decisive battle. Whereas Fuller
believed that the introduction of armored forces
would render the decisive battle more impor
tant, Liddell Hart argued that it would be rele
gated to a less significant place in military pri
orities. As he pointed out in SlTategy: The In
direct Approach, strategic maneuver would ren
der the battle, if it need be fought at all, a fore
gone conclusion. More serious is Liddell Hart's
attempt to universalize the indirect approach.
Although it is a valuable operational tool, the
indirect approach cannot be employed dogmat
ically; under certain circumstances, a direct ap
proach is just as valuable. The indirect approach
is not a cure-all, as Fuller himself pointed out.
6
The relationship between strategy, the oper
ationallevel of war and technology is truly sig
nificant in the writings of Fuller and Liddell
Hart. They both tried to foretell the future by
arguing that the strategy and tactics of future
armies should be based on weapon power. Their
development of this commonplace assertion
was anything but commonplace. What really
counted in modem war, they contended, was
not the number of men but the number and
efficiency of their weapons, whether they are
mechanized, chemical or aerial.
Land warfare would tend to follow the same
May 1990' MILITARY REVIEW 70
FULLER/LIDDELL HART
The operational techniques theypioneered were proved basically sound; and the
disappointing political fruits ofWorld War II, with Soviet domination ofEastem Europe
andcommunist penetration ofEast Asia, tended to reinforce their claims ro prescience.
general trends as naval power; that is, weapon
power would be concentrated on mobile and
capital-intensive weapons platfonns, a trend
that in land warfare has yet to work itself out.
This trend had a number of implications for the
structure of armies. First, the organization of
annies would have to be modified to ensure that
new weapons systems were used to their full
potential. Instead, new weapons have been
imposed on existing structures, rather than new
structures developed to accommodate the greater
power ofnew weapons. Likewise, geography has
exerted a much greater influence on doctrinal
change than technology. Although Fuller's and
Liddell Hart's views about the future ofthe Brit
ish army were not popular at the time, their
keen awareness of the potential of technology
has much to teach us in adapting existing admin
istrative and command structures to future tech
nological challenges.
7
However, their views are flawed in the re
spect that they believed technological change
would reduce the size of annies, as numbers
would be rendered obsolete and immobile by
machines. Ofcourse, there is some truth in this
argument. Of the 11 million men mobilized by
the US Armed Forces from 1941-1945, less
than two million were deployed in its 90 Army
divisions, and of these less than 700,000 made
up tank crews and infantry fighting on the
ground. Greater weapon power has been de
ployed by smaller numbers, yet the d e v e l o p ~
ment of this force has demanded the reintro
duction of the mass anny, which is basic to the
waging of war in the 20th century.B
By 1940-1941, the reputations of both Fuller
71 MILITARY REVIEW May 1990
and Liddell Hart were waning, Fuller had litrle
to offer on matters of defense policy, and his
views lacked authority once he had hitched
himself to the fascist wagon. As defense c o r r e s ~
pondent of The Times, Liddell Hart increas
ingly cornmented on defense policy. His views
[Liddell Hartl began to claim
that technological trends indicated the
primacy ofthe defensive in the next war,
which would be ofSornme-like battles.
As historian Brian Bond has observed, it
is difficult to see how, under the conditions
that Liddell Hart outlined, there would
be any need for the armored forces that
he simultaneously called for.
on national policy were largely extensions or
developments of the indirect approach. He
advocated a policy of "limited liability," which
argued an avoidance of (Iny commitment to
France and restricted British land forces to two
or three high-quality aonored divisions; the
bulk of the British contribution would come in
naval and aerial forces, The reasoning behind
this style of thinking, no matter how clever it
was articulated or debated, was based on emo
tion and nor clear thinking: a passion amount
ing almost to an obsession to avoid a tepetition
of the Great War,
Liddell Hart had so convinced himself of the
need to avoid future entanglements, that he
was prepared to deny the importance of his own
best writing, He began to claim that tech
nological trends indicated the primacy of the
defensive in the next war, which would be of
Somme-like batrles. As historian Brian Bond
has observed, it is difficult to see how, under the
conditions that Liddell Hart ourlined, there
would be any need for the annored forces that
he simultaneously called for, The German vic
tories of 1939-1941 revealed Liddell Hart's
thinking to be wishful and misleading.
Liddell Hart, like Fuller, lost reputation but
not honor. One of his most savage critics was
Marshall. He claimed that Liddell Hart's writ
ings, "because of the ready acceptance of their
skillti.llly put but incomplete tnlths by an admir
ing public, can be considered one of the more
baneful influences upon military thinking with
in the English-speaking democracies during our
time."9
In 1942, Fuller and Liddell Hart patched up
their differences. They were convinced that the
conduct of a second world war-especially its
escalation to a l'total" war-would be as disas
trous as the first, and would, like the first, lead
to yet another world war. So, they profited
in hvo ways, TIle operational techniques they
pioneered were proved basically sound; and the
disappointing political fruits of World War II,
with Soviet domination of Eastem Europe and
communist penetration of East Asia, tended to
reinforce their claims to prescience,
They reestablished their reputations by dove
tailing these two aspects in books about World
War 11-Fuller, in The Second W"rld War: A
Strategical and Tactical History and Liddell Hart,
in The Other Side of the HiU, The Rommel Pape".s
and finally after long delays, History of t1Je Sec
ond World War. They were remarkably suc
cessful in explaining the techniques of blitz
krieg and in condemning the Allied conduct of
the war, especially the doctrine of uncondi
tional surrender and the strategic air offensive.
Liddell Hart publicly championed the cause of
the German generals arraigned at war crimes
trials, notably Eric von Manstein. These books
also exhibit a certain intellectual perversity that
is crucial in understanding their personalities,
Fuller and Liddell Hart took intellectual delight
in championing the unpopular or minority
cause. By the early 1950s, their views had be
come the majority verdict on the war and its
outcome, thereby bolstering their claim to be
prophets without honor in their own country.
What is their place in history? Fuller's is very
secure; ironically, he was remarkably indifferent
to it. "One outstanding advantage of old age is,
May 1990 MILITARY REVIEW 72
that one does not care a damn for the future,"
he wrote in 1962. "Why should one? As it will
never be seen," Increasingly the view is that
Fuller is the greatest military thinker of the
20th century, for all his defects. In Marshall's
view, he was the "most far-sighted military
thinker of the Machine Age." Much of that
greatness reposes in Fuller's profound under
standing of the operational level of war and how
it relates both upward to grand strategy and
downward to tactics. This aspect of Fuller's
work will become more greatly appreciated as
our interest in what is now tenned "operatiomtl
art" increases. 10
Although Liddell Hart developed themes
that were implicit in Fuller's thinking in a more
radical way, his reputation will be scmtinized
more closely. In his lifetime, he strove to secure
tangible evidence of his influence and impor
tance, and be had a major say in what was writ
ten while he was still alive. This effort, which
denotes a certain lack of self-confidence wholly
foreigo to Fuller, seems to have rebounded upon
Liddell Hart. Men who seek to have history
written in their favor rarely succeed in the long
run. The signs are that books and articles on his
FULLERILIDDELL HART
They both tried to foretell the future
by arguing that the strategy and tactics of
future armies should be based on weapon
power. Their development ofthis com
monplace assertion was anything but com
monplace. What really counted in mod
em war, they contended, was not the
number ofmen but the number and
efficiency oftheir weapons.
pre- I939 career are becoming more critical, per
haps excessively critical, as a reaction to the
praise that was heaped upon him during his last
years and immediately after his sudden death in
1970.
11
Clearly, the debate on attrition and maneu
ver is a replay of the arguments of the interwar
years. But what may not be doubted is that
Fuller and Liddell Hart were men of such fas
cination, mental range, intellectual vitality and
productivity that many more books are going to
be written about them and their remarkable
friendship. "'k
NOTES
1. Brian Holden Reid, "Tensions in the Supreme Command: Anti-Ameri
canism in the British Army 1939. 45, .. in Amenean ConneotlOOs, AmerICan Iden
tity: Essays in Hooorot MarcusCunlilte, ed, Brian Holden Aeidand John Whfte,
(london: Macmillan, forthcoming); Jay Luvaas,rne Education of an Army
<london: Cassen, 19$4), 369 and 374, 082; Martin Blumoosoo, The Patton
Papers 1940-1945, VQI. 2, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974), 426. Forreferences
to Palton's meetings wilh Fuller 1917-19, see The Parton Papers 1885,1940,
vol. 1, (1970), 446, 469 and 669. Patton had read Fuller's Tanks in the Great war
(london: John Murray, 19201 see pages but by 1929 he had turned
against the tank, descfibing Fuller's and Liddell Hart's writing as "puerile," see
page 860
2, Fuller to Liddell Hart. 10 June 19.20., Liddell Hart Papers 1/30212; Harold
A, Winton, To Change an Army: General Sir John Burnett-Stuart and British
Arl7lOlJffK1 Doctrine, 1927-1938 (London; Brassey's, 19B81 74,
a R H, Liddell Hart, A History of tho WJrfd War, Cas
sell, 1934), 434,
4. Michael Howard, The Causes of wars (London; Temple Smith, 1962),
19B,
5. Michael Holroyd, Hugh Klngwll/: A Critical Biography (London:
Heinemann. 1964, 1971),26--27; RichardGriffrths, Fellow
(ooP, 19801314; Brian Holden Reid, J. F. C. Fulls/: Military Thinker(Nfm York:
Sl. Martin's Press, 1987), 19293.
6. Edward Hagerman, 71la American C/vi11Nar and the Origins of Modem
er/8Ie Ondiana Universily P18ss, 19BEl1 .'tw,
7, Barry R. Posen, The Sources of MilitlJlY Doctrine{Comeli UP, 1984), 222
"" 226.
8. John Keegan, Six Armies in Normandy (London: Jonathan Cape, 1982),
86.
9. Brian Bond, L1ddeII Hart (London: Cassell, 1977),98-99 aI1d 114---15;
S, L. A, Marshall, Blitzkrieg (New York; Morrow. 1940), 18-19.
10. Ful!er to Liddell Hart, 14 AuglJSt 1962, UddeH Hart Papers, S, L A,
Marshall, in J, F: C. Fuller, Armourod warl"are (US ed" 194-3), lx. 0
11. JohnJ. Mearsheirners n8W and highly critical study, Liddell Hart 8ndthe
weight of History, has yetto be publiShed in Britain and I have been unable to
read it before preparing thiS !$cture. The author is grateful to the trustees of the
Liddell Hart Centre for MilitaryArchives, King's ColIegEI, LondOn, for permission
10 quote from the Liddell Hart Papers.
Brian HolJen Reid Leet,.,.er in War Studies. Kings CoUege. London. England. and
reslJeni historian at the British Army StaffCoUege. Comber!ey, where he;1 relponsib!e for
the _hing of military history on the Higher Command and Staff Course and Army
StaffCourse, Afellow ofthe RO)'li Society and RO)'li Geographiml Society. he
is fimner editor of the Royal United Service Institution Journal.
MILITARY REVIEW. May 1990 73
1 ward
a
PROFESSION
L
ILITARY ElHI
Ueutenant Colonel (P) Mason Smith, US Army
Thc author that formcr Marine Lieutcnant Colonel Oli,-cr
North came Ul' sh,m ufthe desired standardofethical behaviur
whcn hc li...J in the cungres.'lwnaI hearings of thc lran/Cuntra
a{(air. shurtcomings, according to the author, wcre tile
result ufa malfurmed hierarchy ofethical valu,,,,. He gOL'" UII tu
call for a deRnid,-e set ufpmft.'$SkJnal ethical values fur the mili
tary, on .1 higherorder ufmomI values.
F
OR MORE THAN 200 yea". the US (lei"" that re'luire us to pert,'rm re"xm"hl, fm
AmI) has o1",nly ,tnJggbl to "v"lv" irs the good of ourselve, and each othec' Within
partk\llar mp!ill idelltit" All ,',hieal dik-mllla houndark'S lie uniqU(' and
generated by thi, 'tnlggl<. th" res"lt of " com ohHg<lt!ol)S for all citizens, hut in partkubr for
JX'tith,<:',tct!skm' action and vallK-'s. chc.tSen spt'ciali"cd roles in our
.. {hi$ institution, in this nuclear ,is,n spe-
confrontation has hcwl1le "cute ,ince the first d,diled role that demands a sl",cialired way of
II"wi nudear weapOlb, The twoatomie bombs thinking and unique code of ethics,
that signal",! thlH",d of Workl Wad[ have cast More' than 30 year all", one of our mo't
a ",,,lear sh"dow over the US ps,d"" dvil and prominent soldien; articulatdy characterized
military ,IIike, 'TIl;' ,l",dow do",!> thinking a, what he saw as the challenge of thi, century,
actiol1sandblsi<: .. systems. ... has precise application as
provi:de a b(H,mdaries of a soldicrls
for lx>th thinking and acting, Th"" set hound ethic.
May 1900 -MiliTARY REVIEW 74
Military Alliances, bakmces of/)ow(r, leagues of
nations, all in tW'l'1 failed, leaving the onl)' txah to he
by way of the mKible of ,""t The Wter destnlc
tiwness of war now blocks ow this alte)wui<!e. \Ve
have had our laSt chance. If we will not devise some
greater ana more equitable s)'stem, our
dun will be at ow door. The problem basically [<
theological and involves a spiritual recrudes
cence, an improvement ofhuman character. . It
mlLlt Ire of the sJ)irit if we are to save the flesh.
Gweral DOllgias )I.'bcArthur.
Speech to the Joint 1'vketin!; of C':ongress,
19 April 1951
Thtee decades following MacArthur's speech,
the National Conference of Catholic
(NCCB) took up his challenge in a controver
sial public letter." The debate that followed
dealt mostly with the larger issues of nuclear
war and peace, but within that debate lies the
foundation for the recrudescence, the rebirth, of
a soldierly ethic.
As the NCCB correctly concludes, the
shadow of nuclear weapons does touch us in the
most basic ways in which we live our lives. Polit
ical policies and military plans that place our
lives, our existence, in jeopardy are fundamen
tally and rightfully unsettling. By the same
token, statements that challenge these policies
also challenge the boundaries set by our
dierly value systems. Unfortunately, extreme
positions taken within these debates have too
often ruled discussion. As a result, our thinking
and our sense of moral obligation anchored in
these value systems become distorted. In a
word, we become so stratified by the extremes of
debate, tbat we often forget life is lived between
extremes.
From its controversial roots, MacArthur sets
the context and the bishops look for middle
ground, in a debate of particular value to our
Army and our Armed Forces in general. Both
reaffinnthe itnportance of religion as an essen...
tial support to publicorder and morality.> In
the process, each establishes a linkage between
conscience, authority and basic human values.
It is this linkage that requires us to act respon
sibly for the gocx1 of ourselves and each other.
This linkage defines our values and the ethi
cal standards that govern contemporary 501
dieting.
Ethics and Soldiering
Just thinking about values, ethics and soldier
ing is in itself a process. Richard A.
Gabriel warns in To Serve With Honor that a
confusion evolves I'tom this thought process,
which usually centers upon two issues.
The first confuses professional ethics (and val
ues) witb the ethics (and values) of the good moral
life.- Gabtiel argues that we make an error "of
the first order" when we attempt to associate
membership in a profession with heing a good
man. Simply because a man lives according to
the tenets of a profession does not guarantee his
existence as a good man. In the beginning,
human beings have no moral character. Each
person develops his or hers by the way that he or
she lives. We shape our moral character by the
goodness or badness of our acrs. By perfonning
these acts, we then become either good or bad
people.
The adopted code of a professional man, in
our case a professional soldier, helps shape rhat
soldier's moral character, but is not his total
moral character. The goodness or badness of his
professional acts may contribute to the values
found in his total moral character, but are not
his total moral character. In fact, it could
even be argued that in order ro have a morally
stmight professional soldier, we must firsr have a
momlly srraight man.
The second issue confuses an ethic of virtue
with an ethic of duty.
5
Simply because a man
possesses certain traits ofcharacter, .or virtues,
does not guarantee that he will always act eth
ically. At its extreme, to make this assumption
attempts to deny a. man freedom of choice.
Choice involvestbe intellectual "ctivity called
deliberating. The outcome of deliberating isa
practical judgmentto either perfoml or nor to
petforman act. Choice always involves values.
MILITARY REVIEW' May 1990 75
Conceivably, guidelines can be developed to
help each person make an informed and mor
ally correct choice in line with certain values,
but of that choice remains with the
It is this concept ofrightness or
wrongness in an act and man's ability to
distinguish between the way things ought
to be, as opposed to the way that they ac
tually are, thatgive ethics andthe process
ofvaluing their applicability. Man, in the
exercise ofthis freedom, can voluntarily
assume an obligation to do what is right
and avoid that which is wrong.
individuaL In each unique adventure. he or she
is free t() choose to act either ethically or
ethically,
Setting aside these two issues establishes the
uniqucIlCS.5 ofour own human acts and the near
complete mastery owr them that each of us
experiences, By doing so, we have established
the role of personal freedom in decision making
and have also shown a linkage between values
and choice, Qur personal freedom in decision
rnaking appears to be as broad as the values we
have available for choice, The question now
becomes where or to whom does a soldier look
for his particular values?
Ethics, Values and Obligation
P!riUlSophy is the antithesis ofpragmatic action,
6
Soldierly values are values that Were dis
covered by otherso!diers and handed down
through history, They refleet the traditions,
customs and usages of a particular way of life, fit
to society and tested overtime, Each generation
sifts arid sorts these valuc.', accepting thoscthat
they find genuineanddiscarding the In
order to the significance of this sift
ing and sorting process, we must look more
closely at the relationship between ethics,val
ues and m(lra! behavior, In this relationship, we
should find a philosophy to guide our actions as
soldiers,
In a study of the relationship between ethics,
values and moral behavior, we find two basic
concepts, The first deals with a fact of man's ex
perience; he can distinguish right frnnl wrong.
In addition, he has a feeling, an awareness, for
what he "ought" to dO,7 The second concept is
derived from the first-man can intuitively
assi
b
1f1 a hierarchy of value to each "ought." He
can then sort the moral oughts from all other
values.
s
It is this concept: of righ.tness or
ness in an act and man's abiiity to distinguish
between the way things ought to be, as opposed
to the way that they actually are, that give eth
ics and the process of valuing their applicability,
Man, in the exercise of this freedom, can volun
tarily assume an obligation to do what is right
and avoid that which is wTong.
Ethics and its inherent process of valuing
can subsequently be defined as the observance
of those moral obligations that man freely
through as being that which
he ought to do, Gabriel gives more specificity to
this definition, He leads us to believe that tbese
moral obligations are also linked to a person's
role in the social order. He specifically defines
military ethics as the observance of "those mor
al obligations and precepts that are appropriate
t.o a person's role within t.he military profes
>
5100.
"9
In moving towatd this definition, we have
arrived at a position that allows man, in his
moral behavior, to accept unique obligations
within his special social order, However, in
doing so, we have implied the existence of a
higher order. In other words, those values ac
cepted within a special order now "affect man
only in some particular and optional aspects of
hislife, whereas true moral values affect t.he
man,"lO When he leaves his special
speial order, rhe true good, to which he bas
become attuned either in this special socia!
order or by his very nature, does not lose its
intrinsic value as good, Therefore, man does
not lose his obligation to follow that goodwhen
May 1990 MILITARY REVIEW 76
'f.

The adopted code ofa professional mao, in our case aprofessional soldier,
helps shape that soldier's moral character, but is not his total moral character. The
goodness or badness ofhis professional acts may contribute to the values found
in his total moral character, but are not his total mora/character. In fact, it could
even be argued that in orderto have amorally straight professional soldier,
we must first have a morally straight man.
H
'4"
he leaves, or more important in the case of a and hierarchy in the development of mordl
soldier, joins his special social order, I
1
value consciousness. It is necessary in order to
It is important to understand that man may interpret and apply a standard against the US
adopt a moral code, as a result of his role in Army definition of an ethic, a definition devel
society, that must subordinate itself to a higher oped within a special social order.
ethic when these roles come into conflict.J2 It In August 1981, as part of its basic statement
is the relationship between this higher ethic of purpose, the US Annypublished certain
and the values tied to his specific role in society "fundamental principles" thQught to be "har
that guides man's moml behavior. nessed to a setofvalues and ideas ... consistent
with our nation's heritage and linked to our
The Professional Army Ethic national goals and objectives."14 .It defined
In the end, all men must be responsible to their these harnessed and linked values as the profes
Ollm ccmsciences for what they belve tetike right Soldiers. were advised that
and MOOg.] 3 . .
theDS Army holds.resolutely to four funda
The previous discussion of ethitsin general mental and enduring values: loyalty to the in
is fundamental, if we are to understand order stitution, loyalty to the unit, personal responsi-
MILITARY REVIEW. May 1990 n
'.
When he 1.'avt'S his sped.11 social
order, the tttl(> go(m, to which he
hecome attuned either in siX'dal
social ordcr (,(' bf his vcr}' nature, does
not lose its intrinsic go<m.
Tht're(ore, man dot'S not lose obligation
to (ollt)W tbat good whtW he or
more important in the cas<' 0(11 s<,l<lier,
joim his rocial
l"lility and This "f()rmalizcd St)klicr's
>,. providelsj the value base
for military th,' pn)l<:s,,,ional
It .additionally <ls!'wnes that th.is philosophy
builds, upon certain "soldierly
uanmitnwnt 1 compettnn:, c:mdor and
Tlu: interactive protluct (If thest:'
ul-s'and _ is 'prc'Sumed ref be an ethical
soldier. j(,
These trait' listed as the Atmv ethic att',
without a douht, slIlllxJrtablc qUHlities f6,luired
of a pr,,!("sional soldier. Ilowevcr, dwy fail the
-established test as or moral
values. Each qU(lht:k1i
only in silttle (",rrieHL'f ard o/,!ion,d as/Jeel of his
Ufi? i7 conventions that have
,nomlhnplk:tttions, hurAte txmnd in etiquette,
taste ;ind practicality, ()n dw oth(:r hand, a tnw
erhiGl1 or moral value should affeC!" ",ILlier as
it man, F()( example, nsoldier is expected to he
lo'fAlto hts instlrudnn, If that iOStirtltkm ceast:;
to exi,t. he is "I1'''(I'<xl as II ,oldier, Hete he can
no longer Ix: loyal to that which (:(:.ases to be.
Bur th" ill"erlte Ilf hb institution, on the other
hnfl{C wilt noraft<:et his bas!ccxbtcnce as a
hUl1'llln being, Hc qm srill bc true to himself.
Thi' {(mn of existence, which distinguishes
trmnfrOUl being, remains cot15i&t:cnt
and CHfl neither be assumedn:or discarded ,It

A cOlltemlX,tMY example elf rhis distincrion
bc t(:mn.d in <:ongressional .
""n",d by Matin" Lieurenant C<,loncl Olivet
Nnrth at til<' 1987 !r,miC:()ntra Tn
thc;-;,c hCdrings, Nt!rth
stratc:" thil1: his understanding of hJ)'alty to
instttutj,)f) to unit ha:;, becomt'
voluted, N'Jrth defined his lovalrV to unit as a
nelrly exclusi,,'c k....yalty to the L:Xcc'utivc branch,
irH\"lx'ctlvc of ;"ny
institutiunal k,valtv, But, else in error,
his (lct'initi()n hirn onlv in some
particular and option:ll aspect cl his life. },,-'1orc
imr'ortd,nt and pertin('l1t to this analysis, he
adlnits to having lied to (A:I[1,t;ressY" The issue
is rHlt to whum did he owe lovaltv or to whom
,hd he Ii<:: it is thar he lied, S:,dly, regardless of
all other irnplic.ations, he ceased to be tnIe to
himself
\Ve can appro;ICh this same point from
an()thcr perspective. Some actton:; are right or
'\vrong because someon.e \\"ho has tilt:
authority c(mdones or f()rbids thenL This
thority ::;l:cms from positive lm\/ an.,l the "state
has the right to t(:ldiid some action not
wise \vroog f('f the :sake of good order."]9
confusiun may result from a conflict
between <JCtsappa,rently authorizerl or (knied
by legitimate auth{)rlties, Some acts. h(Nt'cvcr,
by their very nature are rccogntz(;d as good and
l'cannot be made a snmdard of conduct. by any
lawnr custom,"20 These (lets, or nonnative
iKtkHI.S, srand on their own. As itl the case of
North, it is tht'Sc acts that muS-t form the basis
(e.r an Anny ethic; for we arc bound in conN
&dcI1Ct:, liS he was bound tn consdence, to
(>bSccrve these nonns.
Law and the Rule of Conscience
'flU? {mlsecHtiml(umj thmrk its own ol>e<liem
dieTS for being in a j)ositi011 to prosc<.'ute.
Al!'nsl }xU. Nuwmt'f;fg i,Xt,Jt l1i;iib< I
So t,,,, in rhis short arrid,,_ I have trkd 1'0
establish a Ilnkagt bctwetm conscience,
itI' and hasic human v"ltre", This linbg<: is fun'
to our lll1dl'rstallding of good moral
behavior, it requires that we acr
sibil' fot the gtxxl ofoursdves and each oth"r.
May 1990' MILITARY REVIl'!W
78
I have tried to show that when a man joins a
special social order, the special social order of a
soldier, he voluntarily adopts the unique
tions of his new social order. He does so while
still owing allegiance to a higher set of values.
Validation of the ethic ofhis new social order is
now determined by how closely it emulates, or
has internalized, these higher values.
A closer examination of the current US
Army ethic shows that it contains qualities that
are indisputably necessary for good soldiering.
However, even though a good soldier must have
these qualities, they may not necessarily be
moral values of a good man. If they are not
those of the good man, and if we, as a profes
sion, have not identified moral values common
to hoth good men and good soldiers, then we
must do so. This identification process should
force us to look beyond current professional
boundaries, to other forms of authority for guid
ance and validation. When we look elsewhere,
wenm the risk of encountering confkt be
tween authorities, and the question of obedi
ence could become a central issue.
Obedience of a soldier in support of a just
cause is the centerpiece ofsoldierly values. jodI,
Hitler's lieutenant, taunts us when we. begin to
consider against whose standard the just cause
is measured. Again, referring to the Iran/Con
tra affuir and testimony before its Select Com
mittee:
Nields [Counsel to o,mmittee]: I take it you
did con.siderably more which you did not teU the
committee about? [North previously acknow1
edged that he had made false and misleading
statements to congressional committees about
his involvement with the Contras.]
North: I will tell you right now, o,unsel and
all the members here gathered, that I misled the
congress. I misled ...
At the meeting [at the WhiteHouse inAugust
1986 with members of the House Intelligence
Committee]?
At that meeting.
Face to face?
Face to face.
MILITARY REVIEW May 1990
MILITARY ETHIC
You made false statements to them about your
activities in support of the contras?
I did. Furthermore, 1did so with a purpose,
and I did so with a purpose of hopefully
ing the very kind of thing that we have before us
now, and avoiding a shutoff of help for the Nic
araguan resistance, and avoiding an elimina
tion of the resistance facilities in three Centtal
Ametican countries wherein we had promised
those heads of state on my specific orders, on
speei!", orders to me -1 had gone down there
and assured them of our absolute and total
discretion,zz
The principle used to arrive at a just cause is
fundamental. If means applied towatd an end
The US Anny holds resolutely to
four fundamental and enduring values:
loyalty to the institution, loyalty to the
unit, personal responsibility and selJIess
ness. This "formalized soldier's philosophy
.. . provide{s] the value base for military
service in the professional sense."It addJ.
tionaHr assumes that this philosophy builds
upon certain professional "soldierly
quaJjties":c0mmitment, competence,
candorand coWage. The interactive
product ofthese values and qualities is
presumed to be an ethical solJier.
"undermine the values we seek to pursue," then
these means simply cannOt be used.
23
A second example worth considering leads
us to this same point. As the Iran/Contra affair
began to unfold, William Casey, then director
of Central Intelligence, authorized establish
ment of an office ofpublic diplomacy (SILPD)
to be housed at the USDepartffient of State.
This office, chartered to work under the guid
ance of. a restricted. interagency group moni
tored out of the White House, apparently "cre
ated a sophisticated apparatus that miJ<.ed prop
intimidation, consciously
79
ing the Ametican people and at times tramp
ling on the right todissent."z4
The executive officer to the director of thiS
oIganization, Lieutenant Colonel Daniel ("jake")
Ii
[In the IranlContra]hearings,
North demonstrates that his unde1"
standing ofloyalty to institution atId
loyalty to unit has become convoluted.
North de6ned his loyalty to unit as a nearly
exclusive loyalty ro the executive branch,
irrespective ofany constitutionally
mandatedinstitutionalloyalty . The
issue is not to whom did he owe loyalty
or ro whom did be lie; it is that he lied.
Sadly, regardless ofall other implications,
he ceased to be true to himself.
Jacobowitz, and five other soldiers, trained in
psychological operations, staffed S/LPD. They
reportedly focused their activities upon the
conduct of a "huge [domestic] psychological
operation,"
25
Executive Order 12333 restricts the intel
ligence community including the Central In
telligence Agency (CIA) from activities "in
tended to influence United States political proc
esses, public opinion ... or media."26 It ap
pears that this office was established at State,
rather than at the CIA, largely to citcumvent
these authorities.
Returning to the principle used to arrive at a
just cause, have the means employed here also
undennined the values they sought to pursue? If
so, the result should be an "uncomfortable ten
sion" between conscience, authority and basic
hwnan values.
27
This tension, common to both
of these examples, stems from a conflict be
tween the "rude pressures of necessity on the
one hand and the seductive lure of a higher
humanitarianism on the other."Z8 The first
position embraces opportunism, which calls for
the absence of ethical constraints in favor of a
short-term gain. The latter "invites us to inflate
the worth of the ends for which we are fighting,
identifying victory with liberty, welfare, and
sometimes survival of humanity as a whole."
29
The issue raised in both the North and CIAI
State examples is the clear inability of a soldier
to absolve himself of a moral duty regardless of
position or authority. The duty invoked here
involves a requirement to make moral judg
ments for which every man is held responsi
ble.
30
This duty, properly recognized in rhe US
Law of Land Warfare, calls upon a soldier to
apply standards of judgment and allegiance to a
higher order than that of loyalty to his institu
tion, IOYdlty to his unit and so forth." Here,
"choice between one's role in the Inilitary and
other roles can be resolved only when the sol
dier can clarify his own values."3Z That clarifi
cation begins with accepting the genuine, in
trinsic worth of every other human being.
The NCCB reminds us rhat human decency
and actions that support the dignity of man
mtc_t be the common denominator, for:
"No society can live in peace with itself or
with the world without a full awareness of the
worth and dignity of every human person and of
the sacredness of all human life.""
Conclusions Leading Toward
an Improved Professional Ethic
There is good evidence to support the fact
that professional soldiers owe an allegiance to
a higher set of values than those found in the
present Army ethic.. If the bishops are correct
when they assert that the sanctity of human
life embodies these higher values, and man is
bound in conscience and in law to pursue the
sanctity of life, then we must encourage an
ethic that reflects and supports these two cor
cel'ts' have. The cUrrent
Anny ethic and the Law of Land both
contain elements that point toward these val
ues. HOWever, the bishops cllallenge 1.,IS to. raise
0trt outabsolute principles
an.d to relegate pragmatism to its proper and
significantly less prominent position, By doing
M.y1990 MILITARY REVIEW 80
so, we evoke every Inan to make moral
ment. about his specific acts-judgments that
are based upon his own clarified values.
Following this line of reasoning, it seems
appropriate to offer a proposaL Each precept of
this proposal is specifically written to
ment, not to replace, the existing Army ethic.
Each precept builds upon those eXisting, prag
matic qualities (loyalty to institution, loyalty to
unit, and so forth) necessary to good soldiering.
But more important, these additional precepts
attempt to recobfllize a soldier's allegiance to a
higher and more noble purpose preservation
of the of man.
Precept #I: Soldiers are men and
women with moral obligations shaped by
their This precept recognizes
man's first overwhelming obligation to follow
that which he inherently ancl unequivocally
knows to be right, that which he ought to do
34
Precept #2: Every soldier holds a special
position of trust and responsibility to all
men, not just to his fellow countrymen. We
have affiffi1ed, within this short article, the
principle of association applicd to the profes
sional man. That is, in order to be truly profes
sional, a soldier'sethical position must relate to
mankind as a whole, and not Just to some par
ticular subset of mankind delineated by na
tional boundaries or cultural differences. Two
corollaries to this ethical precept logically
emerge. They apply particularly to those who
exercise authority over others,35
.. Corollary #1: A leader's firsr duty, the pur
suit of peace, is to mankind; his second duty is
to thewelfare of his men; and his third dutyis to
the execution of his mission. in this hierarchy,
the latter is dependent upon the second to
accomplish the first. This. concept is fit w an
understanding of the complex nature of deter
rence. in this era, forces exist, first, to deter war
(rhe put$uit of peace); and second, if deterrence
fails, to prosecute that war to a desired outcome.
In order to a\:complish the latter, a leader's force
must fi5t be trained (his obligation to the wel
fure ofhis men) and subsequently deployed, pre-
MILITARY REVIEW. May 1990
MIUTARY ETII!C
pared to perronn its war-fighting tasks (execu
tion of mission).
'II Orrollary #2: In order to execute his duty
to mankind, a leader must strive to reduce to a
minimum the violence, destruction, suffering
and death of soldiers and civilians alike.'" The
pursuit of peace is indeed that duty which a sol
dier owes to all mankind. It. is this universal and
singular element of a soldier's ethic that gives it
selective profeSSional credibility. For it is this
bent toward peace that obligates a profeSSional
,
The issue raised in both the North and
CWState examples is the clear inability
ofa soldier to absolve himselfofa moral
duty regardless ofposition or authority .
This duty, properlyrecognizedin the US
Law of Land Warfare, calls upon a soldier
to apply standards ofjudgment and alle
giance to a higherorder than that of
loyalty to his institution, loyalty to his
unit and so forth.
to limit violence, which he must inflict, to that
which is absolutely the minimum nece&sary to
achieve peace.
Precept #3: Violating one's sense of
honor is never justified. A soldier's sense of
ethical integtity is the center of his effectiveness
as both a leader and a follower. Gabriel tells us
in simple tenns, that "some things are not
done."37 There is a point beyond which man
knows that he cannot pass. Regardless of the
consequences, his conscience dictates that he
must go no further. A soldier, no less a man, is
bound by this equation. "[It] is at the center ofa
leader's effectiveness," at any leveL38
Precept#4: A soldier must follow aUlaw
ful orders, but he must never exeeute an
ot'l1erthat is morally wrong. Little need be
said here, as this is a fundamental preceptof
the Law of Land Warfare, reaffiffi1ed at Nurem
berg and in the mOre recent My Lai incident.
39
81
Guidelines addressing questions of right and
wrong can indeed be shaped by law, culture and
tradition, but our decisions must be finnly
rooted in conscience-the first ethic.
A man only reaUy gets the best out of tile men lie
commands by something a/>proadung a complete
fusitm of his (Jam identity witll tile co7porate wllole
they jlJ'rm. Gcneml Sir John
It is clear that there is a linkage between con
science, authority and basic values. It is also
clear that each soldier, in his or her chosen re
ligious tradition, owes an allegiance to a higher
set of values than simple loyulty to institution,
loyalty to unit, persGnal responsibility and self
lessness. Each of these qualities is necessary for
good soldiering, but each affects the values of a
good man only in some peripheral and volun
tary way. The NCCB has directed our attention
to the values of a good man. It asks us to think
about our duty and the profession of soldiering
in terms of these values. It inspires us to develop
an ethic based upon mle of conscience and the
recognized worth of individual human beings.
It is true, fllsing this unique identity of man
with his soldierly corporate structure is a com
plex and awesome task. But, if we do it right, we
are assured of getting the best out of the soldiers
we command.
NOTES
1. Mol;jlObligatioll and theMili/ary: Collected Essays(Washinglon. DC: The
National Defense University Press, 1988), ix.
2. National COl'lfcrence of CalholiC Bishops, The Cha.llengeo! Peace__ Gods
Promise and Our Response (Washington, DC: United Slates Catholic Con
ference; 1983).
3,lbid.,iiand2.
4. Richard A. Gabriel, To Serve With Honor (Weslport, CT: Greenwood
Pres:>, 1982), 8.
5.lhid,
6. Ibid., 23.
7. W. T. Jones, Roi!ls and Differential Moml Assessments of Role
f'(lrfotmance," EtlIics, voL 94, 00. 4 (July 1984):609, See also. Austin J.
Fagothuy, $, J.. Right Reason: Ethics in Theory andPmctice(SI. Louis. MO:
C. V. Mosby Co., 1963), 21; and Marshal Cohan, Thomas Nagel and Thomas
Scanloo, War and Responsibilities (New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1974), S.
RJones, 610.
9. Gabrlel. 29.
10. Ibid., 54,
11.Jones,51t.
12. Ibid., 613. W T. Jones nlakes a slightly different assessment. He argues
that the mornl problem is not which rOIa makes the greater claim, but ralherthe
issue is "to decide What to do When the circumstances for which tho rore was
designoo have changoo so much thaI thQ for by the role may no
1000000r be appropriate:'
13. GabrieL 54.
14, US Department of the Army Field Manual (FM) 100-1, Too Army
(Wllshmgton, DC:US Government PrinllngOHi<:e (GPOI, 14 August 1961), 23.
15,ltiic:l.
16, Ibid.. WiRiam H, Shaw, "Nuclear Deterrence and Deonlology,"
vol, 94, no, 2(January 1884):259
l7. Albert Flor$l and Deborah G. Johnson, "'CollectiVe Responsibility and
Prolessiona! Roles," Ethics, vol. 93, no. 3 (April.19$3):542.
16,CangrossionfJlOUarterfy, voi. 45. no. 28(11 July 1967}:1527 and 1530.
19. Fagothey, 76.
20. Ibid
21. Guenler Lewy. "Superior Orders, Nuclear Warfare, and the Dictates of
Conscience,' in ed. Richard A. Wasserstrom, (Belmont. CA'
Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1970), 131.
22. CongresskJrJalOuarterly, 1527.
23. Lewy. 132,
24. Robert Parry and Peter Kornbluh, '"Iran-Contra's Untold Story," Foreign
Policy, (Fall 198B):3.
25. Ibid., 19-20
26. EKecUtiW Oroor 12333, 4 December 1981, 46 Federal Register 59941.
27. Terry Nardin, Law Morality aM rhe Relations of States {New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 19831291.
28. Ibid
29,lbid.,291-92
30, ShaW,258.
31. US Department 01 ttle Army FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfarowith
Change 1, (Washington, DC:GPO. 15 July 1976), 182.
32. Gabriel, 54. The possibifityof a disconnect between values and soldierly
roles has nol entirely escaped !renior army leadership. 1986 was designated as
the year 01 ''Army Values" - tacit recognition that these "values" coold stand
some reexamination.
33. The Chall&nge of Peace, 68.
34. FM 100 --1, 23-24: US Department of the Army FM 22 -100, Military
Leadership (lNashington, DC:GPO, January 1M3), 4-18.
35. The Challenge CJf Peace, 94: Denis Thompson, "Ascribing Responsibility
to Advisors ill Ethics, vol. 93, no. 3, (April
ThompSQn takes us into a re<.llm once removed from direct participation -the
role 01 advL<;e1 or secondary agent
36. The Challenge of Peace, 94.
37. Gabriel. 141.
38, Ibid.
39. Ibid., 41
40. GeneraiSir John Hacketl, The Profession ofArms(london: Sidgwickand
JackSon, 1983),228.
Lk.>Jllt>rUmt Cokmel (1') Mason E. Smith ischiej; Architecture and Pout;;
J6, US Spa", Command. He received a B.A. and an. M.A. frmn Creighton University
and a Master of Military Art and Science frotn the US ATtn) Omimand arul General
StaH College (USACGSC). H(, previr'US assignnlL'1Us include command of the 124th
and 54th Signal Battalions; staffofticer, SHAPE Headauar,
ters; and facuIt)' nlL'mbt>r, USACGSC, Fort I.:..eaVLlltvorth; Kansas. He also servedas a
senior service college fellow at the Atlantic CouncU of the United States.
May 1990 MILITARY REVIEW 82
What We Learned From the Hanoi Hilton:
Reflections on Leadership, Ethics and Survival
By Captain Stephen C. Danckert, US Army
I was 18 years old when I met Captain Richard
Stratton. A local, boy-made-good, the fonner Viet
nam prisoner of war (POW) had returned to his
hometown to address my US Air Force Junior
Reserve Officer's Training Corps (USAF JROTe)
graduation banquet. I had just finished Scott
Blakely's account of Stratton's captivity, Prisoner at
War,l and I was mesmerized by this war hero.
Stratton spoke for more than 90 minutes. The
audience- USAF JROTC cadets and their par
ents- barely took a breath during the entire speech.
With an almost scholarly precision, Stratton re
counted tlw tale of his capture and captivity. His
eyes were unimaginably old, but he had a quick wit
and a ready laugh. In the days before former Presi
dent Ronald Reagan made patriotism respectable
again, Stratton burned with a fierce love of his
country.
The man stands out in my memory because he
taught me something that spring night. I learned,
once and fc)rever, that certain things matter-that
justice, hope and honor exist, just as surely as the
continents ofAfrica and Australia. Mostly, I learned
that these things are more important than victory
and that even the defeated can know heroism.
Stratton is a hero. He won no victories, con
quered no nations, vanquished no armies. He is a
hero of another sort. In a world of torture and
treachery, he dung to his honor, to his very human
ity. Stratton and his fellow paws fought the enemy
every day of their captivity, fully knowing that vic..
tory was hopeless but that struggle was necessary.
There is a lesson here for all of us. We do not
speak much of ethics nowadays, certainly not with
any genuine conviction. Instead of honor, we talk
about "values" and "ideals." Or we revert to super
ficial cant, reminding ourselves of the "four Cs
courage, candor, competence and commitment."
Ethics has become another Madison Avenue slo-
CPT Danckert is currently w the 32dAir Defense
CAJmmand, Federal Republic of Germany. He l\ an honor
graJuate of Norrheas!ern University, Boston, Massachusetts.
gan, a ritual incantation offered up to some half
remembered god.
It was not so in the prisons of Vietnam. Honor
was so real one could almost reach out and touch it.
Z
Stratton and his comrades governed their lives by it.
The rows knew that the enemy could inflict
more pain than any man could endure. "Victory"
defined as giving no more inf()mmtion than name,
rank and service number-was impossible. So the
POWs fell back to the redoubt of honor. They gave
infomlation whenever they could; one pilot
idenriiled his commander as Donald Duck. And,
they made the Vietnamese sweat for every ounce of
information extracted, whether tnle or false. The
POWs broke when torture become unbearable, but
not before then - never before then.
Such stubbornness may sound foolish to a civil
ian. It may sound foolish to many in uniform today.
But it was the POWs' commitment to honor-and,
implicitly, to each other-that kept them alive. If
victory was impossible, honor was all they had left.
It was enough.
We must learn this lesson today. Too often our
ethics studies focus on bloodless ethical models,
contrasting "ideal Army values" to "individual val
ues" to "cultural values." Such rot is not what sus
tained Stratton in the prisons ofVietnam. It will not
sustaln future leaders In times of failure and distress.
Father James Schall, the noted scholar and the
ologian, said that education is not designed to pre
pare us for success. It is designed to prepare us for
failure, So too with ethics. In those moments when
all is lost, a man must tum within himself to find his
soul. His soul ought to be strong enough to with
stand that discovery.
Honor is not a formula for success. It is a formula
for survival. The most remarkable thing about Strat
ton and his fellow POWs is not that they came
through Vietnam with their sanity intact. It is that
they came through Vietnam with their humanity
intact.
Humanity-the ability to love, to laugh, to hope
and to show mercy-is the very essence, and the
only real end, of ethics. To the degree that we lose
MI L1TARY REVIEW. May 1990 83
our decency, we become selfish automatons, career,
seeking missiles oblivious to the duties, the in,
justices and the pt.."Ople in our path. When we miss
our target- "success" -we survive, if at all, as
pondent shells.
Stratton and his comrades knew this, Perhaps,
that is why they fonned a school in their prison. Like
the schoolmen of the Middle Ages, who prc,erved
humane leaming while the Datk Ages thundered
outside, the POWs kept the flame of learning, the
spark of hope, alive. Hope is a virtue too lofty for
those ambitiOUS for victory.
These, then, are the lessons of Hanoi. As yet, \ve
have not applied them, \Ve continue to teach cadets
and young officers about "values," lIsing the dis,
credited "values clarification" model. This model
has wrought only skyrocketing illegitimacy and ram,
pant corruption in other contexts, We continue to
ignore the importance of cohesion and small,unit
bonding in our personnel policies. We do not
require our officers to read the works of Virgil, and
Livy, and Dante, and all the others who have had
-something important to say alx)ut human conduct.
Most disturbingly, we have not freed ourselves of
the present age's obses,'iion with success. Even when
we discuss truthfulness and courage, we speak of
their importance to career success. We have not
learned the essential lesson of Hanoi: that honor
counts more than victory.
Seventy years before Stratton addressed my junior
ROTC squadron, G. K. Chesterton wrote on the
importance of honor as the world approached the
abyss of the great war. "If we are to win," he wrote,
;'it will be by a stubborn sanity and an ancient
instinct of honor ... which cOlmts courage so much
higher than victory that all its heroes have heen
defeated heroes, from King Arthur to Joan of Arc,
and which has defended our passes in the perilous
hour with something half uttered in the horn of
Roland and the lion of Themlopylae."3
If the echoes of Roland's hom have long since
hded away, the call to integrity has not. Stratton
and his fellow POWs heeded that call. Mav we
always strive to follow their example. '
NOTES
1. Scott Blakely, Prisoner at War (londoo: Penguin Books, 1975). Blakely's
account is 100 best Ihave read of the roN experience in Vietnam
2. James Bond Stockdale, Chronicles ofCu/lure (July
1968), to. Admiral Stockdale. lhe senior American PCNV in Vletnem, IS an
eloquen! spokeman lor ethics and humafle learning in the training of officers,
3. G_ K Chesterton, Collected Ylobrks, Vofume XXVII(San Francisco: Ignatius
Press, 1988).315,
May 1990. MILITARY REVIEW 84
Noriega Overthrow May Help
Stabilize a Turbulent Region
By Trevor Armbrister
Sea Power, January 1990
At the end of 1989, as the Cold War era seemed
to be thawing in Europe, events in Central America
were as tense as they have ever been, In Nicaragua,
the ruling powers seemed to harden their stand
against progress toward a democracy, as they ended
the cease fire with rehels in that country. In El Sal.
vador, the communist rebels lalffiched their own
"Tet-style" offensive to weaken the democratically
elected government. In Honduras and Guatemala,
political violence seemt.."C! to be. on the increase.
And, in Panama, the United States had to intervene
militarily to unseat a despotic ruler and protect the
vital Panama Canat opening the United States to
the old criticism of ((Yankee imperialism." But, the
author concludes, US intervention in Panama may
signal a turnaround for policy initiatives in Latin
America,
"Over the last three years, IMikhail] Gorbachev
has more than doubled -from $250 million to $515
million-the annual value of arms the Soviets sent
to Nicaragua'5 Sandinistas," states the author. Indeed,
the Sandlnistas maintain the largest anny in
tral America. The author points to Soviet aid
ments that include assault rifles, torpedo boats and
the possible shipment of MiG29 fighters to Cuba
all evidence of a continuing communist effort to
destabilize democracy in the region.
The author notes, "Throughout the region last
year, developments were almost exclusively grim and
the United States was perceived- by friend and foe
alike-to have been the loser of the game. Mili
tarily, the balance of power shifted to the other side."
The "Omtras" were forcc'<l to retreat into Hon
duras and received only humanitarian aid for
tence. In El Salvador, the rehels USf.'<l
missiles for .the first time against gov-
May 1990' MILITARY REVIEW 84
emment aircraft. The aircraft have been the biggest
advantage of the counterguerilla forces in their
trating war. Rebel attacks grew in intensity in
mala, while terrorist attacks, including several against
US servicemen, occurred in Honduras.
"Economically, the region was in worse shape at
the end. of 1989 than it was 10 years earlier," says the
author. "And this despite infusions of
ican aid."
<lIn elections everywhere, the people of Central
America have shown that they do not want radical
solutions to their problems/' he says. "Yet because
economic conditions have worsened, their faith in
democratic institutions has begun to wane."
The interests of the United States extend past the
security of the Panama Canal. "There are larger
issues-debt, immigration, dnlgs," he says. The
C..entral American l&.'iue has been with the Bush
administration since the beginning, starting with
what to do with the US-backed "Contl'dS" and the
Centml American peace plan. This problem was
inherited from the previous administration and has
yet to be resolved,
Forces within the government of the United
States have wrestled with the problem of Central
America for the last decade, leaving the impression
with many in the region that we lack the will to
protect our interests there, Support for the rebels in
Nicaragua waned in Congress, and the new admin,
istration seemed satisfied with conciliatory measures
toward the communist government.
As 1989 drew to a close, it appeared that commu
nist ambitions in the area were becoming more
nounced, and the United States seemed unable to
cope with the problem. And, at the time, it looked
as if the United States was completely impotent in
dealing with the situation in Panama.
But on 20 December 1989, the United States
moved to protect its interests in Panama and, in
doing so, demonstrated resolve in the region. "There
was no doubt that Washington ... sent a strong
message to friend and foe alike/' states the author.
The move by President Bush in Panama may have
marked a crucial turning point of US policy in Cen,
tral America, regaining the initiative in that region.
The author quotes the fomler chief of US South
ern Command, Geneml Fred Woerner, .who told
Congress, "It is time to take full measure ofour
ests in Latin America:'
"By its actions in Panama, the Bush administrk
tion seem!s! to signal its belief in the validity of
Woerner's advice." the author says. He thinks this
marks a new beginning in Central America-one of
commitment to the region and resistance to less
democratic forces there.-JMP
SUMMARIES
The Limits of "International Law"
By Robert H. Bark
The National Interest, Winter 1989-1990
According to Rohert H. Bork, the issue of
national law is not easily defined or understood
within our own country or among the international
community. This has resulted iri a number of
tions taken by our president being judged differently
by different groups, adding to the confusion over
legal interpretation.
"Whenever an American President uses or
dizes force against another country, the halls ofCon
gress resound and the pages of newspapers sizzle with
pronouncements by his political opponents (and his
allies) that he is (and is not) a lawbreaker," he says.
This has led some to question the validity of the
concept of international law.
In fdct, the United States appears to be a major
violator of intemationallaw if one listens to some
circles. Bork states, hm.vever, "The word 'law' is a
capacious one and before we accept a sense of guilt it
would be well to inquire further."
International law ranges from international agree
ments on fishing or treaties to the broader
sions of law that apply to the use of force. Bork
observes, "There are a great many statements of
principle that pur/xn-t to be law."
The author then examines whether any real defi
nition of intemationallaw can apply to the use of
force. Even the most "predatory" governments use
legal staffs to justify or deny the correct application
of force to accomplish national goals.
Judge Bork, now a legal scholar for a conservative
think tank, examines the illustration of the use of
international law as it applied in the case of
aragua during the 19805. The support of anncd
insurgents and the mining of national waters was
declared a violation of international law, but the
United States chose not to participate in that
pute. This is not altogether uncommon, as ('only 47
of 162 nations entitled to accept that compulsory
jurisdiction" do so.
Additionally, the court proceedings are not
out some political undertones. The invasion ofGre,
nada was condemned as a violation of international
law in the United Nations by a larger vote than the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It is clear that cer,
tain agendas and philosophies are more accepted in
the interpretation of the law.
The author, examining SOffie of the other writings
of legal scholars, wonders if all the ambiguities can
be resolved when international law is called to
examine any issues in the use of force by one
ereign nation against the other. Bork draws no con,
MILITARY REVIEW May 1990 85
about thi, but note:) thilt the ttS(' of the
hnv usually gocs agmn",t the \V('HCm (k'mocratic
cOlllrnunitits.
"11w major with iTv.em.alional btw is
that it (onvtrts what arc essentially pH,hlcm.5 iJf
intnnational momlity, as defined by a r'cmicular
rxAitical (omrnunity, into arguuH.'flt8 ,lbour law that
,-\1'(; blgd)' dE'ltwd of moraht)"" states..
The b$Ut' of intt!1'l;lticH),lllaw b <lho raist,-d t(x
poJitkai reasons in thb country, "Those \\h.o di:sap
pro',,'{' (ILl Pre:-;idcflt's acti\IIlS on the f1writs, but wh.o
fe:,lf they rna)' pf()\'e fx,pubr, can tmnsfonn the dis
pute from one alxnH subs-wnce to on.c about legal
ity, .. notes the ;:,\uthOT.
B-ork dmws- SoHIC conclusions alx)ut the ()f
intcm'.Hionallaw: "Since it do'('s not prev;w, rht' per
sistence of the idea that it can be pcmicious.
There GU\ he nu authentic nile of hnv mnong na
tiCH\;; until 11<1\ions have;1 COHll1l0n political moral
ity or ;m: under a common
May 1990' MILITARY REVIEW 86
Antimateriel Technology
Is Nonlethal
Arthur H. Westing's letter in your Fehmary 1990
issue undeservedly obscures needed discussion of
retired Colonel John B. Alexander's assertion in his
article, "Antimateriel Technology," (Military Re,
view, October 1989) that technolob'Y has made feasi
b e operational and tactical employment of non
lethal weapons, thereby limiting battle casualties of
friend and foe. In particular, Alexander mentioned
using aerosol dispersants to disable aircraft and velli,
ele engines.
Relying on two international conventions and a
provision of the US Constitution, Westing main
tains that such lifes<lving methodology would
involve breaches of treaties and war crimes. This is
not so, notwithstanding Westing's International
Peace Research Institute.
True, the Environmental Modification Conven,
tion of 1977 prohibits "military or any other ho,tile
use of environmental modification techniques hav
ing widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the
means of destmction, damage or injury to any State
Party." But, the convention is speCifically concerned
only with a "technique for changing-through
deliberate manipulation of natural processes-the
dynamics, composition or structure of the Earth,
including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere and
atmosphere, or of outer space." That is, the use of
the environment as a weapon in, but not as a
medium for, combat is prohibited. Put another way,
Alexander's aerosols disable engines, they do not
make "Swiss cheese" out of the ozone layer.
True, the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which the
United States joined in 1980 with a reservation con
cerning nonadherent states, prohibits the "use in
war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases" and
"analogous materials," as wen as bacteriological war
fdre. But, the agreement is concerned with lethal,
antipersonnel weapons-not with Alexander's non
lethal, antimareriel anns. It would be a different
matter had Alexander advocated dropping cartons
of cigarettes on enemy territory,
True, the Supremacy Clause of the US Constitu,
tion makes treaties part of the "supreme Law of the
Land." But invocation of the clause is simply irrele,
vant. The provision- in our federal system-estab
lishes the primacy of federal laws and treaties over
the legislation of the constituent parts of the United
States. In a unitary state, such as Norway, whence
Westing hails, there is no need for such a provision.
Innovation in warfare, particularly when it prom
ises to introduce a measure of humaneness into that
bloody enterprise, deserves to be explored, discussed
and, perhaps, implemented. While history teaches
us to be leery of military innovation, it does not
suggest that we should be paranoid about all ad,
vances in military technology. I am glad that horses
no longer die on battlefields, and 1 do not mind
turning off a few tank engines if it will save human
lives.
Axel Kleiboemer, Attorney-at-Law, Washington, DC
Colonel Mosby's "From
My Bookshelf"
I thought you might be interested in contrasting
the "From My Bookshelf' reading lists with one
from a fanner Civil War officer:, Colonel John Sin
gleton Mosby. It is taken {rom The Memoirs ofColo-
nel John S Mosby, edited by Charles W. Russell.
May 1990 MILITARY REVIEW
86
exploits during the Civil \X/;.\, comrih
u[(d dr<:unHtically to influellce \vhm T. Harry
\X/illialns calkd th<: advt;;nt of ll)(,Kkm
Moshy tel pass his We as an ol'r5Cure
Virginia kUtotlK')' until the Civil \\!m propcHt:d hinl
to lKtj('1fl" H(' was (xiucat(xl m the Unh't:rsitv of Vir
ginia in Ch"rlotte5vilh,' and gr;\duatcd in and
nl;lthcmatic" lacking (onl'lal iniHtary
training, he bt.:'g;m military GlfCer as an obscure
private in the state rnitiria.
A(crwding to t-,,'1osby, "/\ raid is a predator)' incur
sion. gcncfnlly against the supplic) ,lnd cornmunica
tilms of ;In encmv to by striking a
vuhwwbk point ,md ,1cMf'l)'ing his subsistence"
Mosby liv('i,l his (kfinitiot! from 15 .Iune 1862 unti19
April 186), Not ,lrnan with the [()tIline of
(!llties, he CIWfgy with depth.
Emlv in the war, 9 December 1862, M05by wrote
his "Send Hlt' hoob to fcad." wite,
Pauline, sent the fulllJwing;
Plut1lfch '5 Bmi/ILI Ln-n< Heside.; pr;K,tin: (or
tv10shy in H',lding da;;,sical Greck, Plut,lrrh, more ,I
IH(lraliH th;ll1 a hi\tofian. wflJte in:'>tTtKtivc hiogfk
phies ,tl'X1U( Gfu:k <lnd H,i HH;l1l warriors and
Ill-en" Plutarch lIsed til(' livcs uf great men to illus
tmte pt-[.",(1I1<I1 (!lanKIer and individu{ll actions;
duty ptrfonncd and f('w,m:!cd; individual insolence
punish(d; and t(:mpcr disciplined,
Thomas BabingUlll 1\:1acaulay's Histur)' of Eng,
kmd. Macaulay, the 19th historian, \vrotc
com\X'lIing namltivc and brilliantly dcpict('d
ilies, evcnts and milit;lli' actions with tel iog
detail and meaningful all\l5ions, M\lCaulay
Scfl.'lll.sly Sir Scott's UM::: of
tion lmd local color to propel incrthbtoric.al fact's
into ,icticlns. Macauky, the histod;m, bel i('wd he
not Glllfirw ro hattles, and
dipliJrnacy, but cCHltempmary life and, lih
S<'on,
Sir Wa!ttr Scott'li n(wds and poems. In
lion H. I intercsting reading, Scott's usc
wld loc:al colnr pnNided ;.UI example lor t\1tlS)y to
(,tt\ulm{; in his inH.'1\ f('!Klrts,
William Shakespean::, S lakeslX"arc's works wefe
('I)rel1illnnWnr f{)f refldcrs the ilgeof radiollod
wlcvision.
L.(Jrd Byron. Byron was the coT1telllptmuy,
hero of the 19th His {'l<)ctic charancrs
symbolized passionat( yet unrepentant individuals
rdying on self against c:-slabhshmmt.
"'Byronbm' influenced an attitude of
.... to form a of the
of th( hero W.10 stands outside tht:
tion of the ordinary criteria d good and evil."
WilHam Haditt\ Lifl' of N(I!x,feorL Hazlitt, a
LETTERS
romantic c.".-"'lyi::-L 'Nl-H"l ":"t,H"tcd life ,,,ith the Fr(;nch
Hcyolution and livl'd t(l the >('nd of iL" wrote a
popular wntcmrxmlry bing-rapl,,!" of Napoleon that
\\"<IS bv t..1"shv !tJf its narrative stvle, as much as
f;;x military exploits. '
These selected readings, along with The [---Ife of
\-1ari(Jll rCild by !'v1o!'thy as achild, significantly ltlt1U
cneed his "Perh;lps his lifelrmg fond
ness for Byron's poetry from a fcding that
there \vas a rcsnnblance between the experiences of
Byn'J11, a" rcprcscmed in his poems, ,U);,:} his O\..'{"\ ....
the \var of the many \\'ith one. Or, as writes
after h,lVing fcadT1u' Uk II[ i\1arion, '[ n:1Tlembcr
hmV' I shoutnl when I fC;ld aloud the way the
great rmnisan hid in the swarnp and (,utwitted tilt.'
British.' "
MI\J S. CarroH. USA, J I2th Intdligt'r1c('
Halt"liOll, rON U(l(.u,
Brezhnev Doctrine Alive and Well
I was disapPc1inted by se\,ef(ll articles in the
Deccrnbcf 1989 issue of Hn"jeu), most not<l
bly "A Difk'fcm: Lesson From the \XJ;u in Afghan
istan," ("Insights") by John J. \'Valsh and" Pen:StTil)'k:l
and ()rdn: Altcmati,,"(' Futures and Thdr Impact on
the Soviet Military" by Jacob W. Kipp.
c.:Cmtrary to what Kipp claims" the Leonid Brezh
nev is not only alive, it was used indircctly
in early 1989. \Vlwn Solidarity tried to form a non
communist govcmment , the Soviets issued
ments (most notably in Praula) all but ()pcnly
ing Solidarity not to ft:JrHl a nonc:omll\unist
ment, So Solidariw gavc the control of
the armed f{.Jrccs, the :>ccrt't police, trade, the
presidency, the and dt facto control
(l\'cr foreign polky. What we have in Pobnd is not
a nonolmmunist gOV(:n1l1lenr, hut a quasisocial.
dell'H)Cratic gowrnment:,
In bet, what has. happened is that the Soviets
have made dear to Eastern European nations that
any rdonns tht'Y make do nothing to loosen the
Soviet:" tctnlomic and military hamoK'rlock on
thern. "nlis is nota rcnundation of the Brclhncv
doctrim: (which was not written by Brezhne\', but by
Vladimir I. but a rewording of it. The &Nicts
simply c<umot afford not to have an eml1lfe,
intention is not to abo ish the
Illunist system. Nor is it his intention to refonn it.
His intention is to changt its and, at
same time, give himself all the political there
is to have in tlw Union; that is, make himself
sole dktator.
MILITARY REVIEW. May 1990 87
I believe we are witncs",;ing the return of Lcnin's
New Economic Policy (NEP) in the Soviet empire.
The NEP, started in 1921 by Lenin, was both asur
render to the peasants and a massive deceptlon cam
paign. The Soviets saw the NEP as a fundamentally
aggressive and ideological campaibTfl. designed to
quiet the people, expand tl:Xeif.,Ttl trade, divide the
West and promote world revolution. It strengthened
the economy and tricked the democracies, ulti
mately leading to our present predicament.
The Soviets have deceived the \Vest in
Afghanistan. Not only have they continued military
aid to Afghanistan, they still have some 30,000
KGB (Committee of State Security) border guard
troops in the country and the Soviet air force con
tinues to txnnb the country, flying from bases in the
Soviet Union. S/JetHulZ raids arc probably continu
ing as welL
In his Afghan article, Walsh draws too many, usu
any inaccurate, parallels with Vietnam, The Sovit:ts
were never defeated in Afghanistan. They withdrew
and then orchestrated a sham "debate" in the
run press to the United States into cutting
off military aid to the Afghan rebels. They also with
drew because the Afghan anny was by then rebuilt
and capable of fighting by itself.
\Xlalsh's Vietnam analogy is also untenable. The
US bombing of Hanoi did not coalesce the people of
North Vietnam into supporting the North Viet
namese army and Vietcong invasion of South Viet'
n3m. They "supported" the war effort because if
they did not, Hanoi \v()llid have killed them.
Walsh mentions Grenada and the allegedly
unjustified levels of force and violence used there. I
refer you to Captain Daniel P. Bolger's article,
"Operation Urgent Fury and Its Critic";" (Military
Review, July 1986).
There is a need f(x expertise in unconventional
warfare, but with 20,000 Soviet and Warsaw Pact
commandos doing terrain analysis, prac.ticing
tage and in Western Europe and
Soviet spy rings ripping off the 8th Infantry Divi,
sion's and 11 th Armored Cavalry's battle plans in
the Federal Republic of Germany, it is not wise to
neglect: the NATO mission.
Michael Daly, Wakefield, Massachusetts
BULLETINBOARDBUUETINBOJUWBUUE1INBOARDBUL
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May 1990. MILITARY REVIEW 88
Major General Michael F. Spigelmire, US Army
"I am delighted to have the opportunity to ~ e c o m m e n d books for the professional reading ofour field
grade officers. The intent of my list is to focus on those works that capture the true nature of battle, so that
Army leaders will know what to emphasize in the training of our soldiers. At the same time, I want to
ensure that the books have not been recommended several times before. These are books that are essen
tial reading, but do not always make the top of the list. "
America's First Battles: 1776-1965 edited by
Charles E. HeHer and William A. StolfI.
Because we must be prepared now to fight and win
the first battle of any conflict, this superb book can
provide great insights on how we can do just that. It
shuws the profound impact that peacetime training
has on an Am1Y's readiness to go to war.
Embattled Courage: The Experience of Battle in
the American Civil War by Gerald Linderman.
This is a brilliant study of two armies locked in
mortal combat in the most tragic of wars. Few books
bring home the harsh and brutal realities ofwarfight
ing as well as this one.
Stalingrad to Berlin: German Defeat In the East
by Earl F. Ziemke.
Except for the introduction of nuclear weapons,
the Soviet victory over Germany was the most fate
ful development of World War II. Both wrought
changes and raised problems that have constantly
preoccupied the world in the more than 40 years
since the war ended. The purpose of this volume is to
investigate one aspect of the Soviet victory - how
the war was won on the battlefield. The author
sought, in following the march of the Soviet and
German armies from Stalingrad to Berlin, to depict
the war as it was and to describe the manner in
which the Soviet Union emerged as the predom
inant military power in Europe.
Panzer Leader by Heinz Guderian.
This book gives the story of how the German
armored forces were formed from the point ofview of
the man widely accepted as the father of German
armored format ions, who led them into combat with
grear success until relieved by Adolf Hitler outside of
Moscow in 1941. In 1943, Hitler recalled Guderian
to try to rebuild his armored forces after the disasters
of 1942. The book recounts the efforts Guderian
made to that end and how these armored forces were
subsequently squandered by Hitler in the battle of
Kursk. Finally, after the failed assassination attempt
on Hitler's life on 20 July 1944, Guderian became
the chief of the German General Staff until nearly
the end of the war and oversaw much of the subse
quent German operatiOns.
The Guinness History of Land Warfare
by Kenneth Macksey.
The author concentrates on those events which
demonstrate the crucial factors and phases that con
ditioned land warfare throughout the ages.
Law, Soldiers, and Combat by Peter Karsten.
This book presents a historical analysis of the laws
of war and the application of the laws to contempo
rary war situations, including discussion ofviolations
that occurred during the Vietnam conflict. The em
phasis of the first two chapters is to explore the con
cept of individual responsibility with regard to illegal
orders-a trait that is rare in a work on this topic.
The final chapter presents a series of recommenda
tions that are practical but that also show unique
underotanding. Karsten emphasized individual respon
sibility in relation to ethical roots and practicality.
The authot analyzes violations of the laws of war
with objectivity, irrespective of political association.
On Infantry by John A. English.
English looks at the development of infantry orga
nization, weapons and how the infantryman fought
MG Spigelmire is the commandant of the us Anny Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia. He has also served as
the commanding general, 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Stewart, Georgia; Assistant Chief of Staff, 7th
Corps, Stuggart, Federal Republic of Gennany; and commaruler, 197th Infantry Brigade (Separate Mechanized), .fun
Benning, Georgia.-Ediwr
MILITARY REVIEW. May 1990 89
from 1866 to the present. His book is a most im
pressive blend of rhoughtful history and common
sense assessment. It is an absolute must for anyone
who wishes ro understand the developmenr and
applic.:'ltion of tactics in the most fundamental arm
of any army-the infantry.
The Forgotten Soldier by Guy Sajer.
Sajer presents fascinating memoirs of a very young
Fmnco-Gennan conscript who fought on the
em Front from 1942 to 1945. His book offers an inti
mate eyewitness account of the savage combat with
the Red Anny and Soviet partisans, as well as
tions in wartime Gennany and the gmdual disin
tegration of the Wehmuu:ht. A revealing disclosure of
how brutally the Gemlan anny treated its own en
listed men, this book describes the common soldier's
view of combat and other aspects of modem
fare. It vividly portrays the terrors of battle, the frus
trations and disillusionments of prolonged
service and the close bonds of comradeship that sus
tained men through otherwise unbearable
ships.
The Maneuver Warfare Handbook by William S.
Lind and Richard S, Moore,
This book provides a clear and succinct discussion
of the maneuver warfare tactics that emphasize
cious maneuver for development of combat power
and force protection, rather than reliance on
power and attrition. It is an excellent primer on
"three-element
n
or (vice "OnleIY
push") tactics that embody AirLand Battle doctrine
at the tactical level.
May 1990' MILITARY REVIEW 90
THE U ~ B O A T WAR, 1916-1945, by J. Temlaine.
841 pages. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York. 1989. $42.95.
This book concentrates on submarine, or U-boat,
warfare. The author considers submarine warfare to
be a single campaign starting in 1916 and only end
ing with the close of World War II. Submarines from
1916 to 1945 were, in fact, torpedo boats intended
to tmvel on the surface but with the unique ability to
submerge for brief periods to avoid detection. Mod
em naval and military persons accustomed to the
abilities of nuclear submarines to remain submerged
most of the time tend to overlook how this totally
altered their wartime role and means of detection.
A major theme of this book is the almost criminal
stubbomess of the allies to learn the lesson of his
tory - that merchantmen can best be protected by
strictly controlled convoys. In World Wars I and
II, in both the Royal and US navies, the overly
aggressive approach used suggested that hunter killer
techniques should be used to seek out V-boats in the
open ocean. Time and again, it was shown that a
better technique was to keep specially designed
escort vessels close by the convoys and let the sub
marines come to the bait.
U-boat sinkings almost brought Britain to its
knees and to the peace table in both world wars.
Battle reports are analyzed with chilling reality in
terms of hundreds of ships lost, thousands of lives
lost and millions of tons of shipping sent to the bot
tom. The first sea lord, Admiral John R. Jellicoe,
admitted defeat was imminent in World War I;
Winston Churchill came close to the same conclu
sion in World War II; thiS, despite the overwhelming
preponderance of excellent Allied ships. For some
time in both wars, the Allies lost sea control, which
almost spelled disaster.
U-boat watfdre typifies the overwhelming influ
ence of new technology. Termaine skillfully traces
how each measure, and resulting countenneasure,
changed the effectiveness of the U-boats in sinking
merchant ships.
Although this book presents little factual data
that was preViously unknown, it has great value to
the naval, military and political professional. It
reminds each that a guerre de course can dominate
warfare. This book demonstrates the importance of
maintaining technical innovation and ingenuity, by
those who control the military, when applying such
techniques to modem warfare.
RADM B. wetnan, USNR, Retired, Denver, Colorado
THE EDUCATING OF ARMIES. Edited by
Michael D. Stephens. 240 pages. St. Martin's Press Inc.,
New York. 1989. $49.95.
This small book is well written and well edited.
There are 11 contributors who describe, in various
detail and complexity, the education of the armies of
the United States, Britain, Sweden, Israel, the
May 1990 MILITARY REVIEW 90
Soviet Union, China, Cuba and Indonesia.
After reading the first chapter, the reader should
go to the last chapter, "Conclusions: The Educating
of Annies." This will provide an overview prior to
reading the chapters on the separate annies. The
focus of the chapters on sepaldte armies is quite dif,
ferent depending upon the amlY discussed, In some
ways this heterogeneous format is a little disconcert,
ing because it is difficult to compare, in detail, the
approach that one country's army takes with that of
another. Therefore, the reader should simply digest
the discussion of each army individually,
In one of the most important and well-written
chapters, Kenneth Lawson, assistant director of the
Department of Adult Education at the University of
Nottingham, distinguishes between training and
education in a way that is useful not only to military
educators but also to educators in general. While
acknowledging that there is considemble overlap
between the concept of training and the process of
education, he notcs that, in training, the student is
focusing on acquiring information and skills directed
toward specific performance; whereas, in education,
the student is being prepared for the broader man
date of improved intellectual prowess for leadership
and decision making.
The philosophies governing the education of the
US Anny and the British anny are similar. Leaders
in both countries recognize that they are preparing
the young soldier not only to handle rather sophisti
cated military technology but also for his eventual
return into the civilian sector. The descriptions of
education in the other annies focus less on the needs
of the individual soldier and more on the needs of
the government.
This book will hold the attention of students of
the educational process and, in particular, officers
expecting commands with and of the annies
cussed. Ifone knows how a soldier in another anny is
educated, one can begin to understand how that sol,
dier thinks. The US soldier, who receives little in
the way of political indoctrination, will gain an
understanding of why a soldier in the annies of
Cuba, Indonesia or China is so consumed by ide
ology, often to the point of placing military
erations second.
COL Clarl< Watts, VSAll, Columbia, Missouri
POWER & MADNESS: The Logic of Nuclear
Coercion by Edward Rhodes. 350 pages. O:Jlumbia Uni
versity Press, New York. 1989. $30.00.
The Revolution" that swept away so
many of the old regimes in Eastern Europe
BOOK REVIEWS
tinues to send megaton--size shock waves through the
US nuclear strategy and anus control communities.
If the Cold War is really ending, if the Warsaw Pact
is breaking up. if the Soviet Union is turning from its
dreams of world domination (all mighty big "ifs"),
what happens to cherished principles of classical
deterrence theory such as mutual assured
tion (MAD)? It is MAD, after all, that fonns the
bedrock principle lIpon which US nuclear policy is
built.
If the thesis of Edward Rhodes' timely and impor
tant new study of nuclear strategy is correct, the
stunning events of the past months in Eastern
Europe may help to expose MAD as an essentially
irrational policy that has led to a "probabilistic orga,
nizational Doomsday machine," conjuring up remi,
niscences of Dr. Stangelove,
Rhodes, assistant professor of international
rions at Rutgers University and an associate at
vard's Center for Intemational Affairs, applies a
deductive methodology to reexamine most of the
assumptions underlying classical nuclear deterrence
theory. He concludes that US nuclear deterrence
policy contains an unexamined element of irra,
tionality that eliminates the possibility of waging
limited or controllable nuclear war.
Rhodes' logical analysis of MAD theory leads him
to four conclusions that have significant
tions for military planners. He suggests that future
US defense strategy should: abandon unnecessary
strategic modernization effortsj make major cuts in
theater nuclear forces; reduce conventional forces in
Europe; and discard the use of "controlled response
rhetoric" (such as doomsday threats) in future discus
sions with the Soviet Union.
Much of what Rhodes says will not sit well with
classical deterrence theorists or with career military
officers, but the sweep and rigor of his analysis make
this a critically important book for anyone with a
serious interest in balancing power in our age of
llMADness." This book promises to be amajor intel,
lectual resource as the debate heats up in Congress
and the administration concerning how to spend
the "peace dividend" that is supposed to result from
recent events in Eastern Europe.
Despite the complexity of his topic, Rhodes has
managed to write a book that discusses serious and
arcane matters with a minimum of the jargon and
stuffiness that too often plague academic writing.
While he has not tried to emulate Tom Clancy, he
has provided an important, accessible and erni,
nently readable book.
William D. Mclean,
GMI Engineeringand Management Insdtute,
Michigan
MILITARY REVIEW. May 1990 91
AMERICA'S TENTH LEGION: X C"rps in K".
rea, 19.50 by Shelby Stanton. 342 pages. Presidio Press,
NCNato, CA 1989, $24.'15,
Shelby Stanton has written an excellent book
about a tragic episode in the history of the US Arrny
in Korea. X Corps, the "Tenth Legion," was
eral Douglas MacArthur's instnlIl1Cnt for seizing the
initiative from the North Koreans in 1950. His
pendent X Corps executed a masterful laqding at
Inch'6n, followed lip by an equally bold, but
matdy disastrous, attempt to conquer northeast
Korea"
Hurriedly assembled by MacArthur's
sial and hard-driving chief of staff, Major General
Edward (Ned) M, Almond, X Corp, planned and
launched the Inch'on invasion less than 30 days
after its fonnation. This was in spite of grave doubts
about the operation held by the Joint Chief" the US
Marine, and the US Navy, Almond, by then com
manding general of the corps, pushed and harassed
his subordinates to ever greater speed, gaining a
utation for bold and dangerous maneuvers, Almond
also gained the deep dislike of the Marines
pecially 1st Marine Division commander, Major
General Oliver P, Smith) and drove some of his own
commanders and staff to distraction. After the of
Seoul, X Corps was redirected to Wonsan and then
to the Yalu River, where it would come close to COffi
r
PASSIN
AMERICAN DEFENSE POLICY &
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY. Edited hy
Fred E. Baumanll and Kenneth M,
Jensen. 200 pages. Unlvcrsity Pre-s:iot'
Virginia, Charlottesville, VA. 1989,
$10.95 paperlhlck.
HITLER & SPAIN: The Nazi Role in
the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939 by
Robert H. Whealey. 256 pages. The
University Press of Kentucky, Lexington.
KY 1989, $24,00,
FOUR MEN WENT TO WAR by
Bruce Lewis. 209 pages. St. Martin"
Press, Inc., New York. 1989. $16,95.
w
This is a compilation .of papers written for a conference at Kenyon Col
lege in 1984 on the title theme. As the world celebrates the conclusion of
four decades of nuclear peace, the essays address such timely issues as the
compatibility of post-World War II US defense policies with the nationJs
historlcalliberal tradition and the meaning of "defense" in that context.
The volume, as a whole, implidtly,>vonders if national strategic decisions
preserved the peace or needlessly drained the treasury in pursuit of a
chimerical balance of power that was preserved in spite of choices con
cerning force structure and nuclear options. The pieces are, for the most
part, written by and for academics and may seem somewhat abstruse to
the general reader. Patrick H. Gorman, USA, Retired, Winter Springs, norMa
An important but little-known preliminary to World War II is ilIumi;
nated by thi, enjoyable and thoroughly re,earched exploration of the
Spanish Civil War of 1936-1939. The author examine, Gennan par
ticipation in the conflict in four areas: military, political, ideological and
economic. His purpose is to determine Adolf Hitler's role in Francisco
Franco's rise to power in SpaiD and to assess the benefits the Germans
accrued from their Spanish operations. Although not a comprehensive
history, the book contains enough background material with its limited
theme to satisf)' the geneml reader and makes a significant contribution
to a better understanding of a largely forgotten stmggle.-LTC David L
Watkins, USAR" Fort McCoy, Wisconsin
The title state, the main theme of thi, book The author tell, the World
War II experiences of an American waist;gunner in a 8;24, a British
paratrooper, a German tank driver and an Italian alpini officer. Although
it is enjoyable reading, the characters and stories are not linked together
in any manner. Also, Lewis did not interview the participants until 40
years after' the war, when memories have faded and details become
cloudy. Because of the abundance of biographies covering the same areas
of the war in greater detail, I do not recommend this book.-MAJBmceA.
Brant, USA, Schofield Barracks, Ha.waii
May 1990 MILITARY REVIEW
92
plete victoryl only to be shatten..d by Chinese
vention and driven back to the port of Hungnam.
The story of the despemte battles along the frozen
reservoirs and on the narrow, icy roads of northeast
Korea is a story that never gets old and should be
remembered each time commanders have the urge
to plan "dynamic" thwsts without regard to flanks
or terrain.
Stanton coveTS all aspects of this story in
ing detaiL He uses a wide array of interviews and
official records to tell the most complete story, to
date, of X Corps. Stanton provides a complete (and
not unsympathetic) portrait of the controversial
Almond who was-despite his hard exterior-
BOOK REVIEWS
bnwe, energetic and dynamic.. He also shows
mond's other side as a MacArthur;wofshiping zealot
and a confinned racist, Almond, like MacArthur,
had tremendous flaws to match his virtues. Yet, the
virtues were real and cannot be ignored.
Despite the defeats at Chosin, Almond and his
staff recovered sufficiently to plan, coordinate and
execute the extraction of the Marines from Chasin
and then, in a magnificently executed withdrawal,
the entire corps from Hungnam. The Marines have
been justly proud of their role in this operation for
years; perhaps it is time for the Army to take a share
of the credit
l
even though it was AlnlOnd and
Arrhur who placed X o,rps in the predicament in
THE PRISONERS NINETEEN
FOURTEEN TO NINETEEN
EIGHTEEN by Robert Jackson, 240
pages. Routledge Chapllian & f-lall, Inc..,
New York. 1989. $35,00,
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
SOVIET MILITARY POWER by Leo
COOpeL 2.56 pages. St. Martin's Press,
Inc., New York. 1989, $49,95.
ARMS AND JUDGMENT, Law,
Morality, and the Conduct of War in
the Twentieth Century by Sheldon
M. Cohen. 2.56 pages. WeHvicw Press,
Boulder, CO. 1989. $15.50 clothbound.
$15.95 paperback,
Relying on diaries and first-person accounts of captivity, Robert Jackson
provides readers with a fast-paced examination of the treatment of
oncrs of war (POWs) in World War 1. The "Great War" put the Hague
Rules of 1907 to a rlgorous test. Although there was a general acceptance
of standards br treatment of POWs
l
application of the rules varied
from camp to camp, The greatest portion of the book deals WIth British
POWs in Gennany and dispels any notion that prisoners suffered no
hardships in the last "gentleman's war." Military readers will gain an
appreciatIon for the importance of planning and preparation in POW
operations, However! Jackson's work is an appetizer, not an emree.-LTC
Neil M. Franklin, VSAR, Montgomery; Alabama
Leo Cooper exhibits a Soviet bias; however, if the reader is interested in
academic research of the arms race with a Soviet view, this book is a
starting point, Cooper uses politics, economics and military power to fuse
his theories on the causes and effects of the arms race. He argues that the
emphasis of the United States is to bring about a cooperative between
US political and military powers to redirect Soviet research and
ment efforts from economics into wasteful armaments. C.....coper contends
this US "imperialist" collaboration has forged the militarization of the
US economy into a tool to force the Soviets into an unnecessary eco
nomic recession and political collapse,-MAj Willis L Hintt, USA, Peter
borough, New Hampshire
This small volume integrates history, tactics, morality and international
law in an admirable. readable attempt to prove that intemationallaw,
with regard to war and its ethics
l
has not caught up with the tech;
nological changes of this century. The author also differentiates between
the nlorahty of war and moral conduct within war, irrespective of its
murality. In the process, he delineates many of the nuances that ethics
and intemationallaw must address. The book is an embryo of a master
piece, meaning that it needs to be expanded considerably if it is to have a
chance at swaying international opinion.-<::OL George M. Hall, USAR,
Retired, Arizona
MILITARY REVIEW. May 1990 93
the first place.
Dl"Spite a few minor errors unrelated to Korea, this
is an accumte and careful presentation of an irnpor,
tant historical episode. 1highly recommend it.
Richard W. Stewart,
Center for Anny Lessons Learned,
Fort uavenworth, Kansas
FINAL WARNING: Averting Disaster in the New
Age ofTerrorismby Robert Kuppem1an and Jeff Kamen.
In pages. Doubleday & Co., Inc., New York. 1989.
$18.95.
Robert Kuppennan and Jeff Kamen allege to offer
one last opportunity f()[ America's political leaders
to recognize the potential for hann Ix)sed by
tempomry terrorists and to design and implement
defensive (preventive and reactive) measures. While
pmisl''Worthy, the authors no doubt suspect the
futility of theif effort. If we have not been awakened
to the danger by now, the only thing that will
awaken us is a mass casualty event, after which there
will be accusations and a flurry of expensive
IXJsals-the fonner, to fix blame and the latter, to
show how "antiterrorist" one or another branch of
government is-rather than efforts to control
rorism per se. Regrettably, reaction has become a
hallmark of our national style in many important
areas, not the least of which is terrorism.
For the past decade, Kuppennan has been calling
for more planning, better coordination of planning
and a more "assertive" antiterrorism policy on the
part of the United States. His arguments have been
recognized as valid, then largely ignored.
man and Kamen marshal their arguments around
the logical projection of proven terrorist capabilities
and motivations and portray them against a
ground of equally established patterns of unim
pressive governmental antiterrorist actions. The
outcome is sobering. Their projected probabilities
(more disruptions and, eventually, mass casualty
incidents) are difficult tQ refute beyond closing one's
<""Yes and reciting the popular mantra, Ult can't
pen here/'
This work gives short shrift to the influence of US
domestic politics on all government policies. With
regard to terrorism, this is especially apparent con
cerning Greece, Israel and Ireland. There is a
pottionate approach to problem definition (three
pages devoted to covert operations and 25 to news
media) and a distinct bias toward labeling the Mid
dle East as rhe most probable source of future inci
dents against Americans.
While the reader may not agree with every
pretation, on the whole, Kuppennan and Kamen
identify the fdCtors we consider in developing
effective plans and policies regarding terrorism.
Commenting on our national record over the last
decade, the authors state, "Each administration has
foolishly promised counterterrorism miracles,
ing itself and the public that the terror phenomenon
is amenable to a US imposed solution." By any
dard, this is a welhurned and painfully accurate
statement.
Final W,rning is particulatiy valuable reading for
the military professional who has not stayed abreast
of the growth of terrorism and the evolution of
terrorist thinking. All is put together rather nicely
in one volume.
LTC Donald B. Vought, USA, Retired, Department of
Joint and Combined Operations, USACGSC
MOSCOW STATION by Ronald Kessler. 305 pages.
Charles Scribner's Sons, New York. 1989. $19,95.
With a backdrop of gkl5llOSt', perestroyka,
can traitors and Soviet spies, Moscow Station would
appear to be just another John LeCarre or Frederick
Forsythe noveL Unfortunately, it is not. Ronald
Kessler's latest work is a factual account of how
Soviet intelligence penetrated the US embassy in
Moscow, The results of this bold opemtion have yet
to be fully analyzed; but, on the surface, US intel
ligence efforts in the Soviet Union appear to have
been gravely crippled.
Writing in detail and with authority, Kessler has
obviously conducted extensive research into the
many facets of this classic case of espionage and
ual entrapment. Why did the elite guards of the US
Marines open sensitive and classified holding areas
to the KGB (C,ommittee of State Security)? Who
were these young men and what motivated them to
betray their country's trust? And, where were the
career diplomats and security officers who should
have checked on the guards or reported their
picious actions?
Kessler attempts to answer these and other
tions, but he often leaves the reader with far more
questions. Even the am1chair sleuth is left with nag
ging questions about Kessler's open, detailed
edge of what transpired in the embassy and how
much of this infonnation may still be classified or
damaging. An excellent example is the Marine
guard's discussion of the lax security practices of the
Moscow embassy in comparison with those of the
May 1990 MILITARY REVIEW
94
BOOK REVIEWS
US embassies in Somalia or Zimbabwe. Does such
detail and knowledge assist the reader?
But even more damning than the actual
tion efforts is the failure of US security procedures
and counterintelligence to stand up to scrutiny.
l1\fough his extensive investigations, Kessler
tively portrays US security to be a bankrupt system
of where just the approach of a
hostile intelligence agency can effectively
rilise the or procedumlly correct
vidual. According to the in--depth documentation
presented, current US counterintelligence
dures can cause even the most security conscious
individual to think twice before reporting the
tures of hostile agents,
Moscow Station opens a Pandora's box ofquestions
but provides precious few answers. In the end, the
reader is left only partially satisfied; however, this
book is worth reading.
MAJ Terry A. Griswold, USA, Department ofJoint
and Combined Operations, VSACGSC
NEW WEAPONS, OLD POLITICS, America's
Military Procurement Muddle by Thomas L.
Naugher, 251 pages. The Brookings Institution,
ington, DC. 1989. $34.95 clothbound. $14.95 paperback.
Thomas L. McNaugher demonstrates that the
numerous attempts to improve weapons acquisition
policies have, in fact, created harmful political
sures in the technical development of these weapons
systems. Although the end products are vitally
needed for the nation's defenses. US military
curcment policy is not the direct result of design but
of accident.
This is a detailed and comprehensive analysis of
US weapons procurement policy since the end of
World War II. Using case studies gleaned from
cial and unofficial sources, with discussions that
focus on all sides of the political spectrum, the
author presents this extremely complex area in a
readable format.
Some of McNaugher's conclusions do not cover
new ground; however, this fact does not detract from
their basic soundness. He amply demonstrates the
basic Ametican belief that higher technology and
ultrasophisticated weaponry are superior to
nized and 1ained forces. Continually, "wonder
weapons," that ;lre quantum leaps forward in
nology, are cor idered by US military planners as
both the standa :' I and the expected norm, regardless
of their impact ',>n overall readiness conditions
cause of higher costs and training require;
ments. In addition, the "disincentives" outlined by
the author, as found in the current procurement sys-
tem; are directly blamed for the current state of
ray and inefficiency within the defense industry.
It is McNaugher's contention, and a very difficult
one to refute, that everyone most directly affected in
the procurement
diers, policy makers, technicians and politicians
has some say over weapons acquisition; therefore,
what has occurred is an adversarial situation in
which these groups continuously fight for control
over the course of weapons systems development.
The bottom line result: since everyone has partial
control over at least part of the process and no one
has control over all of it, the resulting weapons
terns are political outcomes.
As a cure, McNaugher proposes changes that are
not especially unique or radical, although they ob
viously run opposite to the current system and are
diametrically in opposition to the defense
ment system reform movement. Among other things,
he proposes: significantly less (not increased) cen
tralization of procurement; a slowing down of the
time frame presently found in the research and
development of new weapons systems; and a far
greater use of competitive measures in the design
and development process in order to decrease and, if
possible, remove the entire procurement process
from political perusal.
Although the cost of his basic conclusion is not
cheap, McNaugher does end on a positive note
the United States will get what it pays for only after
it first expends significantly more money in
ly exploring new technologies before making commit
ments."
CPT Richard D. Koethe Ill, Tennessee ARNG,
Memphis, -Tennessee
TIME-LIFE HISTORY OF WWII_ Edited by
Books. 496 pages. Prentice Hall Press, New
York. 1989. $39.95.
Most World War nbuffs have in their library, or
are certainly familiar with, the 39-volume World
War 11 pictorial series initiated by Time-Life Books
in 1977. The series was one of the best sellers in the
extensive Time-Life library of fine books.
Now, in the 50th anniversary year of the begin
ning of World War n, the publishers have produced
a complementary, history of the "big
war." This volume is not just a condensation of the
previous 39 volumes. It has a completely original
text and hundreds of photos,maps, paintings and
other useful infonnation. It has been a while since I
poured through most of the 39 volumes, but I do
MILITARY REVIEW' May 1990 95
believe some of the photos are the same. Then
again, many are different.
As a one-volume summation of the war, this book
hits the mark. It traces events chronologically,
beginning with the immediate post,World War I
period in the first chapter. This is followed by three
chapters on World War ll. A final chapter, "Tri
umph and Aftennath," traces events around the
world that resulted from the Allied victory in World
War II, events that set the stage for the East-West
struggle that continues today.
The inside front and back C(}\''el'S have a chro
nology of key events of the war and associated events
from 11 November 1918 to 21 July 1954, when
North and South Vietnam were created. These cov
ers provide a quick, useful reference fOr the reader or
researcher in a hurry. As in the original series, the
book is interspersed with excellent color drawings of
major items of equipment used by both sides. An
easy-to-read text tells how these pieces of equipment
were used. Color maps throughout add greatly to the
book's usefulness.
Although $40 is a bit much for one book, consid
ering that each of the 39 volumes costs $15 new, a
5OC-page comprehensive pictorial volume about
World War II for less than the price of three of the
original volumes seems a bargain. The Time-Life
writers and editors are noted for their accuracy and
detail, and this book does not disappoint. It would
be a quality addition to any library. I liked this book
and recommend it.
John Reichley, Department of
Academic Operations, USACGSC
NO NAME ON THE BULLET: A Biography of
Audie Murphy by Don Graham. 342 pages. Viking Pen
qUin,lnc., New York. 1989. $18,95.
To my generation, Audie Murphy was an all,
American hero, a role model for literally thousands
of young men. He rose from grinding rural poverty
in Texas to military glory on the World War II bat
defields of Europe and, later in the 1950s and 1960s,
to worldwide fame as a movie star. He was the quin
tessential World War II military hero-a combat
infantryman and man of action whose valor earned
him the Medal of Honor, the Distinguished Service
Cross, the Silver Star, the Bronze Star, three Purple
Hearts, the coveted Combat Infantryman Badge
and a host of other medals.
Despite his heroic achievements as a soldier and
his accomplishments as an actor, Murphy is today, at
best, a footnote in our popular culture. Older Ameri
cans recall him with varying degrees of vagueness;
younger ones, barely or not at all. Don Graham's
new book is a bold attempt to explain why.
No Name on the Bullet might be more aptly tided
The Rise and Fall. of Attdie Murphy. Graham chroni
cles, in excruciating detail, Murphy's decline and
descent. As he points out, "Audie Murphy was the
real thing, not some pumped-up, aerobkized, cel
luloid palooka. And the real thing is always more
interesting, morc human. more tragic ... thanthc
made up, the phon}'. lt was that real hero, the lIlan
behind the bronze statuary, that 1had come to find."
Find him he did; Graham writes a compelling, en
grossing, eminently readable account of Murphy's
life and times. As a fellow combat infantryman and
avid fan of Murphy, I found the latter chapters of the
book especially painful. They reveal a dark side of
his personality that evokes both sympathy and
revulsion.
The author draws on a plethora of earlier books
and articles. He also sifts through an astonishing
array of other sources, public and private, to capture
the essence of Murphy. Graham synthesizes these
diverse sources into a vivid, powerful, often poign
ant story of Murphy and the major forces that
shaped his life (the Depression, World War II and
Hollywood).
This book richly deserves a wide reading audience
and, perhaps, even a movie. For Murphy, the latter
would, indeed, be poetic justice.
COLThomas B. Vaughn, USA, Retired,
McMinnviJ/e, TelUlesBee
Mili.taryReviewIncrease
Rising production costs and constrained tesources require an increase in the
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and APOIFPO address rates will be $22 for one year or $42 for two years; foreign
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May 1990 MILITARY REVIEW 96
NewHallofPame
HONOREE
This year marks the 20th anniversary of the Fort Leavenworth Hall of
Fame that was established to recognize outstanding officers who served
at Leavenworth and went on to make significant contributions to the
US Army and the natIOn. The Hall of Fame is sponsored by the
Memorial Hall Association with the generous support of the Henry
Leavenworth Chapter of the Association of the US Army, and the
local. community.
Mark W. Clark graduated from West Point in 1917, and was
commissIOned a second lieutenant of infantry. He served In France
with the 11th Infantry Regiment in 1918 and was wounded. After
recovering, he served on the general staff of First Army during the
SaintMihlel and MeuseArgonne offensives.
After several stateside assignments, he was assigned as a student
at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) from 1933 to 1935.
He graduated from the Army War College in 1937 and became a
general staff officer In 1940 as a lieutenant colonel. He planned
detailed largescale maneuvers and was promoted in 1942 to major
general.
In August 1942, he went to England to command all US forces
in the European Theater. Before the invasion of North Africa, he went
to Algiers on a secret misSion to determine French intentions. General
Dwight D. Eisenhower gave Clark and this clandestine mission sigmficant
credit for the invasion's success.
In November 1942, Clark became the youngest threestar general
In the Army, In 1943, he took command of the Fifth Army, the first
US army to be activated in the European Theater, In September, his
forces invaded Salerno, and the long Italian Campaign began, In
December 1944, he assumed command of 15th Army Group, which
comprised all Allied forces in Italy, He accepted the surrender of
230,000 Germans on 29 April 1945, the first German field command
to surrender in Europe, President Franklin 0, Roosevelt personally
presented the Distinguished Service Cross to Clark.
After the war, Clark became the commander of occupation forces
in Austria, and later served as deputy to Secretary of State James F,
Byrnes, In 1952, he became commander of Army forces in the Far
East, assuming responsibility for operations in Korea, In October 1952,
he suspended the stalemated armistice talks, telling North Koreans
that "we would not return" unlil the stalemate ended, The talks
resumed in April of the following year, and North Korea signed the
armistice on 27 July 1951
General Clark retired shortly thereafter and became president of
The Citadel in Charleston, South Carolina, He died on 17 April 1984.
I