Simon Pointer Is Francis Fukuyama correct to argue that after the collapse of Soviet Communism: ...

the liberal democratic revolution and the capitalist revolution are the end stage of a clear cut pattern of historical evolution? (Held:222) . The extent and speed of the democratic transition in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989 led Francis Fukuyama to proclaim the end of history. This he represented as the end point of mankinds ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.i I will attempt in this essay to explain how Fukuyama clearly overstated the case. Fukuyamas use of the term History has been the source of much misunderstanding. To clarify before I continue, rather than referring to history by the dictionary definition, as the study of past events, Fukuyama refers to it as mankinds ideological evolution.ii In his provocative essay, Fukuyama proposed that the collapse of Communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe signalled the end of historical progress and the triumph of the liberal democratic model of government. He also made the bold claim that liberal democracies will no longer face challenges from systematic alternatives. Written with the cold war ending and the West emerging triumphant in the foreground, Fukuyama draws on unfolding events for empirical evidence. Upon print, the article was considered highly controversial, receiving criticism from both right and left wing political analysts seeking to disprove it. Nonetheless while subjecting him to considerable criticism, most of Fukuyamas critics seemed to concede that his main point the current lack of competitors against political and economic liberalism in the world ideological market place is surely hard to refute.iii

In the end of history, Fukuyama attempts to establish a conceptual framework in which to view the end of the Cold War and dramatic liberal reforms in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and China

Simon Pointer during the late 1980s. He divided this framework into four main arguments. First, he believed history should be viewed as an evolutionary process of struggle between competing ideologies. Drawing upon the perspective of nineteenth-century German philosopher Georg W. F. Hegel, Fukuyama argues that history can be understood as a sequence of stages of consciousness, that is, as a sequence of systems of political belief that embody distinctive views about that basic principles underlying social order.iv In the modern era, it is to Fukuyamas understanding that we have reached the final stage of this ideological development

Second, the end of history has been reached because ideological conflict is virtually eliminated. Liberalism is the last triumphant ideology. Fukuyama notes that at the centre of this argument lies the observation that a remarkable consensus has developed in the world concerning the legitimacy and viability of liberal democracy.v Along these lines, Fukuyama asserts that the chief rivals to liberal democracy, Fascism and Communism, have run their course and ended in disrepute. Fascism was vanquished with the defeat of the Axis powers during World War II and Communism had been disaffirmed by recent political and economic concessions in the Soviet Union and China, and the reunification of Germany. Thus, as Fukuyama asserts, in the world of ideas, Western liberal democracy has emerged as the unchallenged victor over all other competing ideologies, with only religious fundamentalism and nationalism remaining as potent, though inferior, adversaries.

Third, despite this apparent triumph of the West,vi Fukuyama notes that international conflict will by no means cease, but that future wars, uprisings, and regional disputes will pit historical factions (those who still cling to outmoded, discredited ideologies) against the post-historical embodiments of liberal democracy.vii From this perspective, Fukuyama contends that it is not necessarily important that all societies develop into healthy, prosperous liberal democracies, but that none seriously upholds the pretence that it can offer a superior, viable alternative to liberal democracy.

Simon Pointer Fourth, far from lauding this prospect of post historical liberal societies, Fukuyama laments the passing of history, which he concludes will usher in a very sad time.viii In this post-historical era, Fukuyama notes, the excitement of revolution and ideological possibility will be replaced by economic calculation, the endless solving of technical problems, environmental concerns, and the satisfaction of sophisticated consumer demands.ixFukuyama does however indicate that ideological consensus today may be neither fully universal nor automatic, but exists to a higher degree than at any other time in the past century.x Many found Fukuyamas ideas compelling and learned, particularly among those on the political right. Even if there was an intensive disagreement about the majority of its details, a broad spectrum of political opinion found the general message hard to brush aside. Nevertheless, there are serious questions to be raised about Fukuyamas argument. First of all, liberalism cannot be simply treated as a unity; it is itself ideologically contested ground. There are various different conceptions of liberalism which Fukuyama fails to systematically analyse, neither does he provide any arguments about how might one choose among them. Where Fukuyama stands on the balance between liberalism and democracy is unclear. Of course, there is no single undisputed version of democracy and even liberal democracies have branched off into a number of different institutional types. Fukuyama essentially leaves unanalysed the whole meaning of democracy and its possible variants. He fails to properly address the degree to which inequalities between groups can lead to clashes of values and ideologies, whether it is inequalities in ownership, control or life chances. The potential for struggles between different ideological accounts of the nature of the economic system and of the desirable alternative forms of economic organisation at national and international level is underestimated.

Simon Pointer Furthermore Fuckuyamas own account of potential sources of ideological conflict is insufficient. He dismisses nationalism and religious movements as political ideologies unconvincingly. For example, he describes the Islamic world as a theocratic state ... a political alternative to both liberalism and communism. But the doctrine has little appeal for non-Muslims, and it is hard to believe that the movement will take on any universal significancexi If this is deemed to be correct then surely one can conclude that liberalism can be dismissed as a political ideology for the same reason that it too cannot generate universal appeal. After all it has had a limited impact on the Islamic world. Marxism is another end of history philosophy that believes the end of history will come about through the victory of democracy from below through communism. Marxists such as Alex Callincos therefore have been among Fukuyama's fiercest critics and point out that poverty and racial tension is still rife within capitalist democracy. Fukuyama argues that even though there is poverty, racism and sexism in present-day democracies, there is no sign of a major revolutionary movement developing that would actually overthrow capitalism.xii While Marxists disagree with Fukuyama's claim that capitalist democracy represents the end of history, they agree that democracy (through communism) will spell the end of history. Alex Callincos, a prominent advocate of classic Marxism, in his 1991 book The Revenge of History argues, the really existing liberal democracy that Fukuyama defends, fails on three counts. These failures can be distinguished by; the existence of a largely passive citizenry, the erosion and displacement of parliamentary institutions by unelected centres of power and substantial structural constraints on state action and on the possibility of the piecemeal reform of capitalism.xiii He then proceeds to reaffirm the classic Marxist tradition by arguing that democracy can only come from a movement by a proletarian revolution.xiv He uses the example of the rich twentieth century tradition of soviet democracy, of workers councils which develop into at least an embryo of a new form of political rule.xv

Simon Pointer From this standpoint, Callincos interprets Stalinism, which dominated the Soviet Unions history, as a counter revolutionary force which created at the close of the 1920s an anti-democratic, state capitalist regime; that is, a regime in which the state bureaucracy extracted surplus value and regulated capital accumulation.xvi It seems that Stalinism wiped out any chance of a radical workers democracy. For that reason, Callincos insists that the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, shouldnt be understood as the defeat of classic Marxism but instead a defeat of an authoritarian distortion of Marxism imposed by Stalinism. Furthermore what won in 1989 was not democracy as Fukuyama claims but capitalism. Fukuyamas claims about the the end of history are implausible. Debate continues over the very nature of liberal democracy, its distinctive principles, its diverse institutional forms and the proper grounds for its defence. It is as important now as in 1989 to recognise that ideological struggles over democratic theory and practice have not ended. Just as democratic politics thrive on robust criticism, discussion and debate, so does democratic theory. In liberal democracies, where democratic realism still provides the underpinning assumptions of elite political practices that are oriented primarily to elections and managing political conflict, the search for democratic alternatives is vital.

i ii

F. Fukuyama, The End of History? The National Interest. 16. (1989): 3. Ibid. E. Mortimer, The End of History? Marxism Today. November. (1989): 29. F. Fukuyama, A Reply to my Critics. The National Interest. 18. (1989/90): 22-23. Ibid., 22. Fukuyama (1989) 3. Ibid., 18. Ibid.

iii iv v vi vii

viii ix x xi

Ibid. Ibid., 22. Ibid., 14.

Simon Pointer

xii xiii

Ibid., 9. A. Callincos, The Revenge of History: Marxism and the East European Revolutions. (Polity Press: Cambridge,

1991) 109.
xiv xv xvi

K. Marx and F. Engels, The Communist Manifesto, A Modern Edition. (Verso: London, 1998) 48. Callincos, 110. D. Held, Models of Democracy. (Polity Press: Cambridge, 2006) 225.

Bibliography

Callincos, A. The Revenge of History: Marxism and the East European Revolutions. Polity Press: Cambridge. 1991. Fukuyama, F. The End of History? The National Interest. 16. (1989). Fukuyama, F. A Reply to my Critics. The National Interest. 18. (1989/90). Held, D. Models of Democracy. Polity Press: Cambridge. 2006. Marx, K and Engels, F. The Communist Manifesto, A Modern Edition. Verso: London. 1998. Mortimer, E. The End of History? Marxism Today. November. (1989).