Professional Documents
Culture Documents
AND
ENGINES)
Aircraft Division
February 1947
1 J
AND
ENGINES)
Aircraft Division
Dates
Of
Survey:
6 October - 11
November 1945
Date of Publication:
February 1947
^)f
ao-54-
U. 8.
SUPERiraENDENT OF DGCUMENrt
APR
1947
This report was written primarily for the use of the United States StraBombing Survey in the preparation of further reports of a more comprehensive nature. Any conclusions or opinions expressed in this report must be considered as limited to the specific material covered and as subject to further interpretation in the light of further studies conducted by the Survey.
tegic
II
FOREWORD
The Uaitcd States Strategic Bombing Survey
was established by the Secretary of
late
was drawn
War
was
to conefl'ects
Army to the extent of 60 percent, and Navy to the extent of 40 perceut. Both Army and the Navy gave the Survey all posmen,
supplies, trans-
in
potentialities
and mformation.
in
Nagoya,
the
ment of the JJnited States armed forces, and for detemiinuig future economic policies with respect A summary report and to the national defense. some 200 supporting reports contaming the fuidings of the Survey in Germany have been
published.
On
i
15
that the
effects
August 1945, President Truman requested Survey conduct a similar study of the of all types of air attack in the war against
submitting reports
in
Japan,
duplicate
to
the
Secretary of
War and
Navy.
Japanese
and the Asiatic maiidand. It was possible to reconstruct much of wartime Japanese military planning and execution, engagement by engagement, and campaign by campaign, and to secure reasonably accurate statistics on Japan's economy and war-production, ])lant by plant, and mdustry by mdustry. In addition, studies were conducted on Japan's over-all strategic plans and the background of her entry into the war, the internal discussions and negotiations
islands of the Pacific,
leading to her acceptance of unconditional surrender, the course of health and morale
among
the
Japa-
C.
Alexander,
The Survey
Jr.,
interrogated
Frank A. McNamee,
Fred
Searls, Jr.,
and translated many documents which not only have been usefid to the Survey, but
also, will furnish
Group,
The Survey's complement provided for 300 civilians, 350 officers, and 500 enlisted men. The
Ill
TABLE OF CONTENTS
rage
Army and Navy Dkpot Hisport (Corporation Report No. XIX) Thk Depots and Thkir Importance in thio Aircraft Industry
Dispersal The Air Attacks Production Statistics Evaluation of Pre- Attack Intelligence Appendices:
1
1 1
2 2 5
Army Arsenal and Navy Depots Frame and Engine Production by Army and Navy Depots First Naval Air Depot (Depot Report No. XIX-1) Eleventh Naval Air Depot (Depot Report No. XIX-2) Twenty-First Naval Air Depot (Depot Report No. XIX-3)_. KozA Naval Depot (Depot Report No. XIX-4) Tachikawa .\rmy Air ."Arsenal (.\rniy Arsenal Report No. XIX-5)
A. GeoKra])liical Locations of
B.
Air
Face Page 6
7 14
23 42 46
IV
instance,
the
engine section
of
the
Army
.\ir
siiul
Navy
air
depots were
to tliosi'
t)f
haiuUcd
repair,
modification and distril)iition of aircraft. However, one Japanese Army arsenal and four
and
aircraft
accounted for 3.8 percent of all Japanese production and 4.4 percent of all combat jnoduction over the years 1!)4I through
was transferi-ed from Tachikawa to Kanazawa, starting in August 1944 before any air The Twenty-fii-st Naval attacks in the vicinity. Ail- Depot dispersed in the Omura area begiiining in October 1944, following an attack by Chinabased B-29s. And although the Eleventh Naval
Arsenal
Air
Depot
commence
1945.
Army
Japan
Jamiary 1945, elaborate plans for such a move had been made a year earlier. Except for the transfer of the engine ])roduction
dispersal until
dej)ots
produced
in
functions of the
Army
percent of
airplane engines
made
kawa
were
to
in
as the original
The
to the
(lei)ots
plants.
over the
Kyushu
The Army Air Arsenal at Tachikawa, and later Kanazawa, jjroduced both airframes and engines, as did the Eleventh Naval Air Depot at Hiro and the Twenty-tirst Naval Air Depot at Omura. The First Naval Air Depot at Kasumigaura produced aircraft and the rocket-propell(>d suicide l)omb, Baka; and, the Koza Naval Depot near Atsugi produced aircraft only. In addition to these primary military producers, the First Naval Air Technical Depot at Yokosuka
partly at
,
he
It plant in Japan to be attacked. was struck on 7 July 1944 during the second B-29 No damage attack on the Japanese homeland.
on
to
damage
dispersal operations
which, coupled with an efTort to produce newer types of aircraft, crippled aircraft production by
this
conducted
In
November
<S,57()
Army
a total of
were civilians,
bined civilian
employees of which (50 percent and the Navy depots had a comof 88,554.
and engine production ceased entirely after the October attack. Koza was attacked by carrier-based aircraft on 10 and 18 July and 13 August 1945, but danuige
employment
Detailed reports on the operations of the individual depots have been prepared from information
sources
obtained from Japanese Army and Na\'y (USSBS, Aircraft Division Reports No.
5).
XlX-1 through
DISPERSAL
Dispersal
pattern
of
was slight. Aircraft production at the First Naval Air Depot had ceased by the time it was The Elevfirst attacked on 16 February 1945. enth Naval Air Depot suft'ered three attacks on 19 March, 5 May, and 2 July 1945, which destroyed most of the arsenal and many machines. Production, however, for the most part had been
dispersed
or so
moved underground
that
production
prior
to
the
the
depots
it
followed
the
usual
earlier
attacks,
losses
might be
except
that
came somewhat
attributed as
much
For
themselves.
1
The Army Air Arsenal was hit on 4 April, 10 June, and 2 August 1945, but most of the arsenal had been dispersed prior to the air attacks.
Production then also suffered more from dispersal than from direct attacks.
to 3 of the mili
PRODUCTION STATISTICS
From January 1941 through August 1945 the Army and Navy Depots produced a total of 2,706
and 5,821 engines, accounting for 3.8 percent of total Japanese airframe production and
aircraft
5 percent of total engine production.
Eleventh and In the number of engines produced from 194 through 1945, the Eleventh Naval Air Depot le with a total of 2,320 engines, followed by th Twenty-first Naval Air Depot with 2,132 and th Army Air Arsenal with 1,369. The trend of total engine production by Arm; and Navy air depots rose gradually from 20 pe month in January 1941 to the peak of 301 in Ma Thereafter, with minor resurgences, th 1944.
trend
declined
2).
Army
was low at the start of the war, totaling 9 in December 1941, but rose during 1942 and 1943, reaching a peak of 138 in December 1943 (Figure 1). The December
Airframe production
at
sharply
to
51
in
the depots
August
194
(Figure
The peak
1943 production constituted 6 percent of the production of the entire mdustry for that month. Thereaft(>r until the end of the war, the trend wa,<l()wnwaril.
last half of
Ha 4
The trend of production was downward throughout 1944 as a result of changes of aircraft types in production at the Eleventh Naval Air Depot (USSBS Aircraft Division Report No. XIX-2) and the Twenty-first Naval Air Depot (USSBS SlowAircraft Division Report No. XIX-3). down caused by type change-over and loan of employees to Mitsubishi by the Army Air Arsenal
contributed to the decline. Combined with an air attack on the Twentyfirst Naval Air Depot and a poor production
record at the Eleventh Naval Air Depot, these factors caused a 2-year low point in production in
(Homare) engines produced by the Elevent Naval Air Depot, the transfer of engine productio of the Army Air Arsenal from Tachikawa t Kanazawa and the cessation of production at th Twenty-first Naval Air Depot following a; attacks and dispersal. Production was on the increase in Noverabc and Decemher 1944, but again fell oft' and ws generally low in 1945 due to air attacks on th Eleventh Naval Air Depot and the change-ovf
to production of the
Ha
45 engine at the
An
Air Arsenal.
EVALUATION OF PRE-ATTACK
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence figures on production at the!depots and the types of aircraft produced wci
October 1944, with a total production of only 23 Production gained thereafter until Febaircraft. ruary 1945, when the effects of air attacks and dispersal resulted in a downward trend which was liaited in June with further recovery in July. Only 2 aircraft, however, were produced during
to be a producer.
Intelligence only slightly overemphasized tli importance of the depots as aircraft producers
i
closing
month
of tlie war.
On
from
1941
Novcmbci 1944 by estimating their contributio at 4 percent of total combat aircraft productidi
Actually, during 1944 the depots accounted U
3.4 percent of the total
through 1945, the Army Air Ai-seual was the most important military producer, with a production of The Twenty-first Naval Air Depot 1 ,005 aircraft. was the most important Nav-y producer (9f)(i aircraft), followed i)y the Eleventh Naval Air Depot
(532),
(75)
combat production,
Im
Koza
(128),
Army
Ai^-
Arsenal
froi
(Appendix B).
Tachikawa
to
Kanazawa.
71884547-
APPENDIX B
Airframe and engine production.
Depots,
irncBArr fRODCcxioN
FIRST
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Pagf
in
8
9
9
.
9
10
11
Employment Graph
B. Dispersal
Map
12
13
ITS
INTRODUCTION
Naval Air Depot (Dai-ichi Kaigun was primarily (Migagod in repair of airframes, aireraft engines, oidnance, and auto-
and
for
The
First
Kokiisho)
motive
('(luipnicnl,
l)iit
also |)ro(luee(l
llie
Type
O:-!
Willow (KoYl) in s-mall (|uantilies from January to July 1944, and the
intermediate
trainer
suieide aireraft
Baka
11
for 4
December
])eicent
1944.
Pro<luetion
months amounted
starting
to
1.3
>
of all
all
percent of
Baka
II
])roduetion.
The
,")()
in
It
depot, set up as such in Octohei- 1941, was percent completed in that month, 60 percent June 1943, and 100 percent in August 1944.
first
dispersal,
was located in Ibaraki prefecture, west of Ivasumigaura and about 2 miles south of Tsuchiura eitv, adjacent to Ivasumigaura airfield and the In buildings of the Ivasumigaura Air Group.
addition to the necessary shops, sei'vice buildings, and storage sheds, the dei)ot jiiiivided six dormitories
The second
dispersal,
January to August
19'
ji
and
a hospital.
The
Type 97 attack
Type
bomb equipment);
repairs to engines
of
many
and
department) and another near the village of Fukuhara, lying the north of the depot (engine departmen This move was 55 percent completed, and p The decli duct ion dropped about 20 percent. in both capacity and actual repairs shown by engine department during this period was ascril:
(aircraft
t
guns and bombing ("qinpment, and fixed onlnance parts; repairs to automobiles, and production of
au.xUiarv fuel efpupinent
foi'
automobiles.
maintained
scpai'iite
drpai'tmelit
for each ty|)e of woi'k; aircraft dei)artnicnt, engine department, ordnance dej)artment, and (fioni .V[>ril 194.")) an automobile department, as well as the usual sei'vice and administrative departments.
duration of attacks being about 10 minutes each instance. These were Navy raids except May and June attacks (Twentieth Air Fore
The
of
total
employment
was 3,977,
workers; for July 1943, 5,983 (3,504 direct workers); for July 1944. 10.713
which 1,607
wcri' direct
The
ail-craft
department
was
affected
m
f
heavily, suffering
damage
to 107,640 scpiare
tlic
('.\|)|)eiidi\
I); i{cfcr-
wood
sh()|),
piojieller sliop,
Ke|)air of
wooden-nianuracturo machine sho]), ntin^, sewinj;;, and metal ])latin<; shoijs, and warehouse for finislunl products, in addition this, 32,292 square feet of the emi)loyee traininjz 1, the materials storaije huildinj; of the accounts )artment, the waste oil reprocessing plant, and assembly hall were damatjed. Casualties from se raids were 21 deaths and 2 injuries, riie air-raid precaution program of the depot vided slit trench shelters for as many as 4,700 sons, and jjlaced greatest emphasis on defense inst fire (Reference Item 2).
lair
1
war.
damage to faciiilics and i'(|iii|)niciil by had no! been nnide by the close of the This was ascril)ed to a lack of labor and
All l)ul one alliicl< occiiri'ed
liie
.'iriiT
materials.
pro-
the dis]jersids.
EVALUATION OF PRE-ATTACK
INTELLIGENCE
War Department Military Intelligence Service (G-2), recognized the depot as a repair station in operation, but never published any evidence that it w-as engaged in aircraft production.
PRODUCTION STATISTICS
'he
REFERENCE NOTES
the
depot produced,
in
1
all,
75 Willows,
The
following material
is
month being 20 (June Production of Baka 11 amounted to 600 4). lies, of which 197 were made in February 194.5, peak month. The original plan to produce Willows a month through .March 1945 was not
best production in
on
file
with recoi-ds of
Aii-
any
Bombing Survey,
War
ried
air
out {Ap])endix
accomplishments
for
in-
c'.nding iiian-lioiirs.
000
JO SllNfl
Nl
lN3WA01d3
10
11
Ocr.p.to
71S845-47
3
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
in
15 16
17
18
20
Face page 20
21
and Warehouses D. Bomb Damage, 19 March, 5 May, and 2 July 1945 E-1. Bomb Plot, 19 March 1945 E-2. Bomb Plot, 5 May 1945 E-3. Bomb Plot, 2 July 1945 F. Production Statistics
C. Dispersed Factories
22
22 22 22 22
14
ITS
IMPORTANCE
IN
INTELLIGENCE
The Klcvcnlli Naval Air Depot (Dai Juiclii Kokusiio) was one of four air depots that were i)ro(lu(iiiji' or were aljout to produce aircraft, The depot luaMufaelured both air frames ami airIn 1943 and 1944 (fiscal year, craft engines. April to March) it completed 150 and 196 aircraft respectively, or about 7.5 and 8.3 percent of the national total production of single-engine bombers
Ivaiguii
for
A branch
1945
in
was established on
April
Iwakuni, which was located to the west of it. This was intended to be used for small aircraft repau- but later was converted for the purpose of aircraft production. Figures for the original floor space of the Eleventh Naval Air Depot were lacking but ex-
pansion
since
1942
amounted
to
more
than
ground.
those years.
The
a single-engine
manufactured were the Type 97 Model 3, Kate 12, Navy attack plane; and the Suisei,
11,
Judy
12,
and
33, single-engine
Navy
dive
to
hombers.
At
the close of
war
it
was about
produce the Shiden, George 11, an experimental land-based fighter using a Homare 21, 18-cylinder
radial engine.
In
aircraft
principally
radial
engines the depot manufactured Kasei Model 15 or Ha 32, a 14-cylinder engine, used on the twin-engine bomber
11
;
September 1944) represented dispersal rather than expansion of facilities (Appendix A). The depot was under the direct jurisdiction of the Naval Air Headquarters, which planned the production schedule, supplied and made allocations for raw materials, and in general had direct After the formation of the Munisupervision. tions Ministry, production schedules and allocation of raw materials were coordinated with the over-all schedules set up by the Ministry.
Betty
Model
Ha
45,
an
EMPLOYEES
The employment for the Eleventh Naval Air Depot for 1945 was 53,200, with 31,920 classified
Maximum
production
Kasei engines was attained during 1943; 519 were completed, or 1.8 percent of the total engine
production in Japan.
for
as
direct
or
productive workers,
consti-
Homare
1
engine production
The employment
1944
was 689 or
.4
mouth
of the Hirose-
Okawa River
Originally
pairs liut
it
1939 was 14,000 with 9,400 or 67 percent in productive work. All these figures seem high for the amount of production achieved but it is believed to be due to the fact that it includes the marine engine department which was not con-
was concerned principally with redid supply aircraft and engines to the
early as 1930.
1
Air Force as
officially
It was,
however,
established
on
October
1941.
The
cerned with aircraft manufacture vmtil June 1945 when it was combined with the Eleventh Naval Personnel in 1945 included regular Air Depot. employees (77 percent), conscripted students
On
June 1945 the two departments were combuied due to the increasing importance and priority given to aircraft production. The marine engine department was to supply aircraft parts, but by the end of war it had not yet fullv converted itself.
and military (4 percent). Students were employed from June 1944 and military personnel in June 1945. The multiple-shift (3shift) schedule of work was used at the depot but the third shift had only a small percentage of student labor and no other employees. The employment schedule therefore was for all prac(19 percent)
tical
purposes on 2
shifts.
15
on eaeh
shift
was
as follows:
Shifts
wood-working mat'hinos such as lathes, cuttinc: In etc., which wore destroyed also. Mil ion, some engine parts were destroyed, causlU'liini's,
'j:
units.
No
j)lamie(l
(ig-
(h'op
in
tl'e
;ins
Kihatayama manned by a crew of three en each. At Hachiroyama there were two antircraft machine guns manned by a crew of tiiree In adtiition, there was a portahh^ smol<e ell. iccu apparatus in charge of guards, and two
mis used during
irposes.
tlie air
aircraft engines
during 1944 and 1945, 1,248 Homare 21 engines were manufactured as against 2,110 planned. Total production from 1940 to 1945 was 2,445 engines (Appendix F). Prior to 1940 the Hikari model and the Kotobuki aircraft engines were manufactured. An average of 60 engines were manufactured annually with considerable increase in 1938 and 1939 when 100 and 130 engines were completed, respectively. In 1940 the Kinsei (1,040-liorsepower, 14-cylindei' I'adial engine) went into production. Beginning with June, 115 wei'e produced during the year. Kasei engine (1,440-horsepower, 14-cylinder radial
but,
1
;i(iut
j,
works located in Tokyo, Tamashinia in ^ayama prefecture, and Hiroshima. Of these ppliers 58 percent were destroyed which is llccted in the fact that parts shortage became
VCl'C.
manufacture began in June 1941 and amounted to 64 for the year. In 1942 production was devoted exclusively to the Kasei 15, and 240 were completed. Peak production of Kasei, however, was reached in August of the following
engine)
year, only to be discontinued after October in
favor of the
Homare
21
(1,970-horsepowei',
18-
PRODUCTION STATISTICS
from 1939 to 1945 was 594 planned or ordered by the ivcrnment. From 1930 to 1945, 1,211 aircraft ic completed. Aircraft manufactured between i:i(l and 1939 were of various types, l)ut Navy tack planes were manufactured during each of
Over-all production
iliames
with
92(5
During 1944 and 1945 only Homare 21 engines were manufactured. Actual production of aircraft compared to planned indicates a lack of coordination from 1944 From 1939 to 1943 there to the end of the year. was no divergence at all with 348 aircraft planned and completed. In 1944 and 1945 (April 1944July 1945) 555 Judy were planned as against an
cylinder radial engine).
actual of 215 (Figure
1).
I'se
years.
The production
of air
Between 1939 and 1945 the following types of rcraft were produced Type 97 Model 2 (Kate 11), iigle-cngine bomber; Reisui (Jake), a single:
igine
reconnaissance plane;
12), a single-engine
Type 97 Model
vate
lisei
Navy
attack plane;
frames during 1944 and 1945 fluctuatetl greatly and in July and October 1944 it dropped to one and zero, respectively. The drop in October was noted as being due to bombing but no bombing attacks were recorded in the United States Stra-
(Judy 11, 12, and 33), single-engine Navy bombers; and Shiden (George 11), an imoved single-engine Navy fighter (Appendix F). The Kate 11 was manufactured in 1939 with atal of 50 for the year. In 1940 and 1941 anufacture was limited to Jake of which 48 ere produced. In 1942 and 1943 production as exclusively Kate 12 aircraft of which 250 ere produced during the 2 years. In the followyear 30 additional Kate 12s were manug ctured. Production of the Judy type also gan and during 1944 and 1945 a total of 215 icluding Judy 11, 12 and 33) were produced. At the close of war, the production of the imfoved George 11 was just beginning and one was
vc
Bombing Survey Tabulating Section records. The productive capacity in November 1944 was only 30 aircraft per month while the plainied was
tegic
60 and actual 24. Hence, the ordered production was out of line with the capacity and there is
reason to believe that the orders were "hoj)ed for" figures and not the planned figures made l)y the
tlepot.
was a change
Beginning with the fiscal year April 1945, there In in type to the modified George. order to expedite this change it was planned to reduce Judy production to 20 a month. Despite this, at the end of the war the change to the fighter George had been just completed and production had not started. The production of the
fighter
rapleted.
of jig equip-
Over-all
ment.
17
Production
in
May when
Judy
])iO(hiction
May.
Considering the actual and planned engine production figures, the 2 approximate each other up to December 1944 except for August and SeptemAn increasing divergence occurs after this ber.
period in which the actual figures take a downward trend while the planned continues to rise (Figure
2)
.
or production figure
lie
There is sudden decline in January and May 1945. The severe drop in January and August was due to technical causes flaws in the engine which reciuired correcJanuaiy 1945 also was the beginning of the tion. dispersal program and contributed to the decline. The dip in production in May and again after June was due to B-29 l)ombing attacks. Pro1944,
duction in
May,
60
COMPARISON OF
MIS.
ESTIMATES AND
MIS ESTIMATES
a ACTUAL KATE
12
ACTUAL PRODUCTION
PRODUCTION
M.I.S.
JllX
Pf OIIU(TIOP
^' M/TEi
n^
1939
F
1940
1941
1942
1943
I94<
U t U
1944
ELEVENTH NAVAL
AIR DEPOT
3
FIGURE
19
APPENDIX A
PUint expansion Eleventh A^dval Air Depol. January 194'2-
February 1946
Name
LOCATION
SUPPLIES
SUPPLY
BUILDING DEPARTMENT
SHOP BOMBS AND GUNPOWDER WAREHOUSE ENGINE SHOP (PARTS) ORDNANCE WAREHOUSE (COMMUNICATION ORDNANCE) KURE SUPPLY WAREHOUSE ORDNANCE WAREHOUSE (TORPEDO HEADS^ ENGINE PARTS) ORDNANCE WAREHOUSE (ORDNANCE PIECES) BOMBS AND GUNPOWDER WAREHOUSE
SUPPLY WAREHOUSE
ORDNANCE WAREHOUSE [ORDNANCE PARTS) SUPPLY WAREHOUSE TOKUSHIMA BRANCH SHOP SUPPLY WAREHOUSE NAURO BRANCH OF OSAKA SUPPLY WAREHOUSE SUPPLY WAREHOUSE
ACCOUNTING DEPARTMENT
MATERIALS WAREHOUSE (BULBS. ELECTRIC WIRE. ETC.) RAILWAY TUNNEL USED AIRPLANE PARTS WAREHOUSE RAW MATERIAL WAREHOUSE (AIRPLANE PARTS AND LIGHT ALLOY) RAW MATERIAL WAREHOUSE (COAL, OIL, PAPER, COTTON, ETC) RAW MATERIAL WAREHOUSE
MATERIALS DEPARTMENT
FOUNDRY (ENGINE CASTING)
FORGING SHOP (ENGINE)
IN
AUTOMOBILE DEPARTMENT
ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT
ORDNANCE SHOP (GUNS AND OPTICAL EQUIPMENT) ORDNANCE AND AUTOMOBILE DEPARTMENT ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT (HEAT TREATMENT)
AIRCRAFT DEPARTMENT
AIRPLANE SHOP (PARTS)
U S
47
irw*
p.
lor
. .
APPENDIX C
Dispersed factories and warehouses
Section
Function
Airplane
stored.
(i(il)ara_
Accounting.
jiarts
and
stored. stored.
liiiht
alloys
Koyaura
Kamionsaki. Hosogoe
Kaitaichi
Do.
Parts nmnnfaeturi'.
ArmamentSupply
do.. materials
Kirigushi
Machine ^'luis, hotnbs and equipment niarnifacture. Bombs and exiilosives stored.
Do,
Casting"
optical
Akizuki
Nomi
Tokushima
Raw
work
(engine)
parts.
Repair of planes.
Takuma Do
Kaiiunji
Supply
Airplane. Sujiply Airplane.
large pl;uies.
Imabaru
Mitsugaharaa-
Nakashima
Wada
IwakunL
Do-Tojo--
._.
Supply... do do
do....
Armament Armament
[larts
Matsuyama-.. Yawatahama.-
Engine Supply
Communication i'qnii>ment stored. Supply work and armament parts. Manufacture of eneine iiarts, Sujiply work and arniament parts.
Repair of planes. Kelmet hearings. Running test of motors.
Raw
.
materials
Atn Hinoura
Engine Supply
Bombs and
.
explosives stored.
Nenoura Kamagari
Yosigasc Kurashiki
Hiraeji
Raw
materials-
Accounting..
do.:
Naruo Osaka
Do Do
Komatsushima.
jiarts.
various
doSupply
Main
Raw
arsenal--. materials-
Airplane
Supply
71884547
21
APPENDIX D
linmh ihimngv
'
I'J
tabic,
MARCH
ATTACK
Damage
caused
M up
locaI
iun
Near
83
Ti'St
foundry shop^
call
Partial
damage.
Xpar
7U
71
Test
No damage.
Partial damage of 20 iutcent. Practically no damage. Severely damaged, (10 percent. 50 machines: 33 rej>airabli-,
17
09
47
Xo. No.
112
'A
shop.
machine shop
jrre[>airable.
<H)
per-
for engines.
Boiler house
Severely dainageil.
ma-
for
Xo. 1 shop. .. Xo. 11 shop.. Xo. 103 shop Xo. 20 shop.. Xo. 50 shop. Xo. 42 shop..
Total
23
chines; 4 repairable, 4 unrepairable. Severely damaged. 40 percent. 18 machines: 12 repairable. (I unrepairable. Partial damage.
Do.
Do. Severely flamaged.
Partial
No
damage. damage.
MAY
1945
ATTACK
90
LEGEND
BUILDING
(RAIDS
LAYOUT
MARCH-1945)
OF
19
LEGEND
BUILDING
(RAIDS OF 5
LAYOUT
MAY 1945)
LEGEND
BUILDING LAYOUT
(RAIDS
OF
2 JULY 1945)
APPENDIX
AIR FRAMES
Planned and actual airframe and engine production, Eleventh Naval Air Depot, 19S045
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
in
24 28 30 32
39 40
Omura
Plant Lay-out
Map
of Plant Locations
Omura
40
41
D.
Bomb
Plot
23
ITS
INTRODUCTION
Naval Air Depot, located town of Omiira, Kyushu Island, produced hoth aiiThe plant had apfj-ames and airplane engines. piincipai buildings and a similar proximately 4.5 number of smaller shops, offices, storehouses, and In addition, there were about engine test cells. various sizes in the area (Appendix 25 hangars of A liranch of the depot was at Hiu at the A).
Tlic
al)()ut
never material-
Apart from its production functions, the depot was extensively engaged in repair of all Navy types (if aircraft and engines.
EMPLOYMENT
Elmployment at the depot rose more or
of 23,878 employees in
first
less
mouth
of the
Omura Bay
western Kyushu. Forging and casting was done at Hiu. The order establishing the di'pot was issued in March 1939. Construction began in May 1939. Prior to completion of the original plan, an expansion
and construction in was begun immediThe depot officially was opened October ately. although operations had been commenced 1941, some months earlier. Construction was com-
was ordered
in July 1941
September 1944 prior to the Student labor was used after June 1944. Fluctuations in the numbers of em])loyees beginning in October 1944 were due to the varying numbers of students used. Increased employment to 26,391 in October and 28,772 in November 1944 was due to the use of large numbers of students in cleaning up after the heavy October air attack and in assisting in the consequent dispersal o|K'rations (Figure and Table 1).
air
attack.
Taklk
1.
Total
Ill
1)1(1!/
niiiil
10'r'>
Date
The
was the
Type
observation seaplane,
Model
1 1,
Pete.
The
depot also produced two types of training fighters, Zeke and Claude, Type O and Type 90 advanced
trainers.
During the
depot aliandoned production of its older types in favor of small-scale production of the Aichidesignetl torpedo and dive bomber, Ryusei, Model
Model
and the Kawanishi fighter, Shiden, George (Photo 1). Peak production of 73 airplanes per month at the depot was reached in December 1943, representing about 3 percent of
11,
Grace,
21,
the
total
production of
1941
II
the
industry
for
that
month.
From
iVniakaze
to
1944,
tlie
(Tempu
11),
3Hn-horse])r()(hiction
Peak
of 170 of these engines in April 1944 constituted iitire engine 4 percent of the iirodiiction of ll of this Pi-oiliictioii industry for tiie inoiiUi. engine type was abandoned in late 1944, but S-cvhiider llomare planned nioduction of the
1
'I'ahi.I'; 1.
same
<;('ii('ral
(Jiuui;i iirca.
'I'lic
air-iVaiiic assciii(lii-out,''li-
llie
oi'iginal
depot
site
in
Omiira. utilizing
slietl.s
bombed-
|)iini!iiily
in
tlic
Ivoiigawa
2).
and .Mizubakai'i disti-icls (Appendix C). desiu'n functions were dis'I'll!' managerial and pcrsc(l in tlic Ilvcda district in 2S hnildings com-
MiznbakaiM
district
(if
Sheet working was |)erforiued in seven small buildings in tli(> Suzuta <listrict, and 2 tunnels in the same area with a total space of 15,984 scjuare Production at feet wore used as machine shops. the dispersed locations began in January 1945.
prising a total area of aS.oOO s(|uare feet.
metal
dispersed shops (Photo :{). This development contained 45 builfiings with a total Hoor space of I07,5(J0 .square feet, devoted to fuselage (Photo 4), wing (Photo 5), and final assembly of Geoi'ge (Photo 6).
a
was
similai-
de\('lci|)nient
of
The center
from Omura In the Oguri
of engine^ construction
to the
was
shifted
Most of the airframe I'onstruction took place in Korigawa district of the Onuna area. Fortyone small buildings in upiici' Korigawa contained
the
9(J,720
Isahaya area (Appendix B). district of Isahaya a total of 67,500 S(|uare feet of small dispersed surface shops were devoted to engine construction, and 21,(il)() s(|uarc feet of underground machine shops also were put
into operation.
in
In the
of
Kaneyama
Omura, 80
feet
district of the
and wing assembly of Grace. A like number of buildings and floor area in middle Korigawa was usetl for metal working and machining. Final assembly of Grace was maintained at
fuselage
i)ercent
of
stpiare
of
war.
Plioto 2: As.sembly
slicd.s
Omura
27
There
was
no
airplane
production
ilurina;
avoided.
AIR ATTACKS
The
first air
combat
types, George and Grace. Production of Homare engines was planned for tiie dispersed engine plants but, due to the difficulties of obtaining parts and of operating in
Air Depot came on 7 July 1944, during the secoi B-29 attack on the Japanese homeland. Tl attack was of small scale compared to the size
dispersed locations, all production of new engines ceased after the dispersal and the entire capacity of the engini' works was devoted to repair.
tiie
The
I)rogram
predominant
of
111'
featui-e
of
the
dispersal
this
de[)ot
was
the
geographical
piD.ximily
location.
the
new
The
dispersal
Although 17 B-2! had the depot, the Sasebo dock area, and tl Tabata Iron and .Steel Works for targets, tin were no hits in the de])ot area (Appendix D). The ne.xt attack on the dejDot occurred on October 1944. A total of 71 aircraft droppi|l E.\tensi^ 1,50 tons of bom])s on the plant. damage to installations and production resultci Both the final air frame assembly buildings an the large machine shop, several tool shops,
i
28
I'li-iiiii'
shop,
(I'liolo
Miiil
s(()rii,u'('
l)iiil(lin.<;s
were
dr-
ing
in
ihi'
fill
dispersed
forced
lo
locations
to
which
Navy
of the
roycd
I
7).
Many
oilier
Uiiildinns
were
ollicials
move
sis
a 'result
Octobi'i- allack.
assembly shop and sonic of lie cnu'inc (est lis (Photos 8 and (). There were 253 eni])loyees killed and a])])i'o.\iiilely 250 injnied as a result of the attack, loduetion of enii'ines had ceased at the plant to the attack, lint conversion from the |i(ir ii:d<a/.e 11 to production oi the Homai'e eng-ine The depot produced no engines after i)^ hailed. attack and the subsequent dispersal.
'
The
of
original
Omura
occasions thereafter
bill
On
21
November
the
depot was the target for 94 aircraft cariyiMg 202.5 tons of bombs. No bombs fell in the plant area and there was no damage to plant installations. Two employees were killed outside the planl. On 19 Decembei' 1944, 32 airciaft carrying 51
tons of bombs, had the
Omnia
dejiot as a target.
.Vlso,
i
as
off
result
this 25
of
the
dispei'sal
activities
th(>re
iih(>(l,
hy
October attack,
was
airframe
hiiilhs
January 1945, 1 month, extremely low j)ro(luction during 1945 was r partly to the effort to pi-oduce newer combat )es, but also resulted from difficulties of opeiatpri-sed locations
commenced
in
immediate plant area were damaged and 2 employees were killed. Forty-five B-29s dropped 89 tons of bombs on the depot on 6 January 1945, resulting in some hits among the engine test cells and on a seaplane maintenance shop. One death resulted from llie
side of the
attack.
rii.idi 4: Irilericir of
Sl.1-47-
a.s.seinlily
shop at
IVIiziihakari
29
I'liiito 5:
depot
oil
IS
rosultiag in the
Alaroh 1945 with sonic damage hangar ai-ea of the depot. There
infhctetl
in
i\
were no casualties. Following the strike of 18 Alai'ch there were eight moi-e attacks' on the depot in IVIarcii, May, June, and July 1945. The aircraft plant was not the primary target in any of these attacks, l)ut the attacks were against airfield installations or other targets and the depot was hit only incidentally. No additional damage to productive facilities was caused, fasiialties from these later attacks totaled IS killed and a similar numher wounded. The iiistoi-y of the bombing program on this |)articular- target might well be limited to the attack of 25 ()ctoi)er 1944. This attack came at time when o|)ei-ations were being conducted in a normal fasliion. Lat(>r attacks were directed
;i
Th(> dispersal instituted as a direct result wasl important factor in reducing the production! this depot to insignifieaiiee when compared to|
earliei-
production.
PRODUCTION STATISTICS
From April 1941 through August 1945 the de produced a total of 966 aircraft. It had a tc| capacity of 1,030 and govenmient orders for 1,
Over the same period, its engine f duction totaled 2,132 compared with capacity 2,224 and orders for 2,615 engines.
aircraft.
of the operations of
lif
against
tlie
its
th(s
bulk of
where.
The
were small. Airframe production ils abandoned in October 1941 in favor of product n of engines and extensive aircraft and engine vcpn'i-
30
I'rodiicl ioii
!)42,
of aii'lVaincs
and
l)()lli
fiipacity
P.M.")
was
al
in
I
dispeise<l locations
"cpandrd
rci^iilarly
rracliini;
\\)-i'A
airplanes
pvv
newer
ly|)es
he he
lonlli in Dccciiibcr'
rsl
()
(Fiijiiro 2).
fell
Durinji: (lie
oil',
lighter, fleorge.
as did
liic
Government-plaiuied
|)r()(luc(ion fairly closely
iipacity, <lu('
prodnctii)n of
hscrvalion
I
s('a])lan(',
Pete,
)ii)e
[id
1or|)edo
dive hondxT,
during the early years, but exceeded t)oth capacity and aclii.-il [)roduction during most of 1944 and 194.'). The plans called for a larger production of the newer type eonibal
jilaiies
than could be
I'eali/.ed.
due
first
to
abandonment
heavy
air
of
one
(rainei-
Numerically, the most important type produceil was the observation seajjlane Pete, followed by
It was not war that the depot went into regular ])roduction of any of the tiewei' cond)at type |)lanes. During 194.5, the depot concentrated only on the first-line types Grace and George. The only engine pi'oduced was the Amakaze 1.
'.^).
Iroduction, the
attack in October
iiiieed
ulit
1(1
Production at dispersed sites during 104.^, but was still small only airplanes in July and one in August at the of the wai'. Till' low production during
in close
Photo
6:
final
31
Iiitcriiir vii'W
uf (iamage to No. in
final
correliition
i'lom
the
to
;i
start peuiv
of of
production
170 engines
total
November
l)ro(luetion
1941
per
as
Tlu' highe'
From mid-l 944 4). with a decision on the part of the navy to abandon production of t!ie Amakaze engine in favor of planned production of
montli in April 1944 (Figure
fell
oi^ in line
rate of 40 per month was actual during 4 months, and reached 5(1 p exceeded month during 3 of those months (Figure 5). Pv
estimated
the 1S-cylindeition
first
Homare
was
estimateti to
have ceased.
])er
The
Omura
resulted in the
greatly overestimated at 10
month
in
lii4
dispersal of activities.
After dispersal the i)ianned Homare engine production failed to materialize, as preparations for production wer(> halted by the 25 October attack and prockiction in t!ie dispersed locations
actually achieved
Intelligence had
i
production
at
tli
was too
difficult
to
maintain.
Emphasis was
placed on engine
was missed.
INTELLI-
Production of the
rectly attributed
to
Amakaze
tlie
11
engine was fo
Estimates of pi-oductiun (jf tin reconnaissance plane i'etc wore fairly sound from liie angle of
32
Pliotci S:
Inicnor
icw
,,t
i-iigine
33
""t..^/\
Photo
9:
Horn!)
damage
34
t-
36
!? ?
Si
%9's
1
tf)
u
a c
m
>
!
?=.
< 5
1^
S5 sells ciKgi 4 X
t/) tf)
nz
"*
a.
f
<i J
5S
r
-N(o*>ior-(BmOr
[JQ.ixzzuj33SSu
^
tn
39
Si
KiQ.
>
m2
I
3j
o
I
^
>cfl
^i2q''~;?'2
5^
5 * I
s?:
^
5; tr
I-
5
Z C
<l
O2
Di
<i
13 _j Q: [
a a ct Wc o o o c a a a
'
J U>
tft
* CL
c
I
U. U1 Q.
L
c
O5
-
<
_(
Z
2
35t/il-iAu.i;
Tiof-.a>o5~^^''^fit5CTiO^'^'^''''^'^'^
?i3
41
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
in-
43 44 45 45
45
Employment,
Map
of Dispersal Locations
C. Planned, Ordered,
Face Page 44 45
42
ITS
INTRODUCTION
j
The
plan
was
to
move
facilities
and equipment
(shops, offices,
'rom
)f
May
1944
to
August
1945,
21
percent
The depot opened on Jack production. 1 April 1944 and continued in operation to the end war. It was located in Koza county jf the (Koza-gun), Kanagawa prefecture, about 4 miles
all
Some
of
to
be dispersed
The
total building
was
installations)
not available.
The
The number
throughout
tlie
of
(Appendix A, Table
ivas
1).
single
be In shoj)s underground, approximately 645,840 square feet; in tunnels, approximately 322,920 square feet; in surface locations, approximately 322,920 square feet. The goals were to maintain the same amount of equipment and facility space, and a monthly production of 120 planes. However, building space was reduced to 60 percent of the predispersal area. Plans were made also to economize on materials and labor, to expedite the dismantling of the original plant, and to minimize damage to buildings from air attack prior to dispersal. Easily destroyed material was transferred to the
dispersal
to
was
used.
dispersed plants.
dis-
Employment
statistics
'
way
to
Man^
Total
patchei(l
workers
Regular workers
hours per
number
of
over
crease in area
was
feet.
month
preceding
month
workers
present
538,200 square
Work on
dispersal
commenced
November
1944
April. .__
May
June.
luiy
._
;;;;
August
Septembor
October
124
628
788 88
100
November
December-
196
7,912 8.000
8, 8,
100 196
96
188
s.omj
3,384
103.
824
8,384
1945
lanuary...
February
March
April.....
May
June...
luly
"
August...
.3,668
126.888 143. 472 166. 636 168. 000 180. 320 183. 344 186, 368 187, 264
8,668 8,676 8,784 9.000 10. 440 10, 648 9,656 9,688
216
1,
144 108
and transportation, and the Jack, construction of and operation in dispersed sites did not come up to Construction was to have been expectations. completed by 15 June 1945, and the operation entirely transferred to the new site by 10 July, but at the end of the war, actual progress represented about 80 percent of plans (70 percent of the planned increase).
of materials, labor,
urgent,
demand
for
-892
32
A summary
will also
'
.AIJ
employment was of a single, 10-hour, day shift. Haken Koin" workers sent or borrowed from other
factories.
43
Number One
and
its facilities
plant area
were
all in
on 10 July, 18 July, and 13 August. One sheet metal shop was destroyed by machine gun fire. There was a total of 5 deaths and 10 injuries.
shops.
It
assem])led
airframes
equipment. Monthly production capacity was to Since the 1)6 GO planes (50 percent of the total). in other areas were delayed, final assembly plants this area was important from the standpoint of Temporary roads connected it with production.
the original plant. Number Two plant area was a dispersal inlo It consisted a ravine just north of Nundier One.
PRODUCTION STATISTICS
Government orders
were well
ing
ing a figure of 70 in
March
In the follow
to 30, the leve
month
this figure
was dropped
wing and fuselage assembly shops (eai)acity planned for 40 a month), a machine shop (300 machine tools in tunnels), a parts shop (welding, static, metal plates, etc, above ground), and a sheet metal shop (in tunnels). It had by the end of the war assembled 10 wings and fuselages.
of
reached by planned production, and from tliei on the two figures were identical. It was con templated that these figures would rise to SO
ii
2).
Planned
(tnd
actual producti'oti.
April
U).',^
August 1945
Year and
month
1944
Requested
Nundier Three plant area, north of Number Two, was a dispersal into woods and a ravine, and included a final assembly shop (underground, capacity planned for :iO planes a month), fuselage
and wing assembly (underground, capacity ])lanned for 40 a month), a parts shop (in tunnels), and a parts warehouse (in tunnels). By the end of the war only the major ])art of the tunnels had been completed; the remaiuder was in |)rocess of
construction.
April
May
June
Jul.v
August SeptemberOctober
NovemberDecember..
194."i
January February..
March
April..
--
-May June
Number Four
east
of
the
original
July .\ugust
Total
It comprised a final point of starting operation. assembly shop (underground, capacity planned for 30 planes a month), fuselage antl wing assembly (above ground, capacity planned for 40 a month), a jig shop, and a wooden parts shop, both above
ground.
The
all.
How much
is
persal itself
difficult
shortage of materials and parts. The most serious aspect of the dispersal was that it was not completed according to schedule, since
a
until
at various times
44
EVALUATION OF PRE-ATTACK
INTELLIGENCE
Var
(
total
number made
to
No
estimate of rate of
De|)iirtineiit
iiiul
Military
tlio
Iiiti'llia;enco
21,
itl(Mitiii('(l
(jppot as a production
REFERENCE NOTES
The
following material
is
Inr .laok,
\:\
-started in
sixtli
and supposed tliat plane ])ro(luction October 1944. This was actually
of
on
file
at the office of
niontli
i)roduction,
hut
the
three
lines
produced
duriiiti;
TOTAL
EMPLOYMENT
APRIL 1944
AUG
PLANNED, ORDERED,
1945
APRIL 1944
JULY
1945
APPEICIX
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
its
___.
47 48
49-
49 49
53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60
61 62
Airframe
Works,
Monthly Employment Engine Works D. Direct Man-Hours Worked Airframe Works Engine Works E. Direct Man-Hours Worked F. Plan for Underground Engine AVorks at Hayasbi G. Plan for Underground Aircraft Works at Shichisei H. Dispersal of Tachikawa Air Arsenal I. Air Attack Damage J. Monthly Aircraft Production K. Monthly Engine Production
63
46
ITS
INTRODUCTION
The Tacliikawa Army Air
miles east of Tol^yo
^Vj-senal,
directly
were issued.
under the Commanding General of Army from whose office all orders Funds were received from the Army.
town of Tachikawa, was the only Army arsenal engaged production of airframes and ah'craft in the During the period 1941-45 air-frame engines. production accounted for 1.4 percent and engine
on the outskirts of
production 1.2 percent of the Japanese total.
and
its
was Col. Sliujiro Tanabe. The airframe and engine works employed
11,940 workers at the war's end.
a total
The principal model produced in the airframe was the Ki-51, Type 99 single-engine Approximately 22 reconnaissance aircraft, Sonia. per month were produced for the years 1942 through 1944 by the Tachikawa Arsenal, which was the sole manufacturer of this model. Other aircraft produced by the arsenal included the Ki-30, Type 97 single-engine light bomber, Vnn, and the Ki-43, Type 1 single-engine fighter, Oscar. Only 49 of the latter model were produced although it was one of the Army's outworks
of
Prior to
war,
two
11-hour
shifts
The production Peggy, was planned to begin in the latter part of 1945, Init only one was produced before the war ended. In the engine works the principal product was the Ha-23, a nine-cylinder, air-cooled radial ?ngine of 360 horsepower for trainer aircraft. During the years 1941 through 1944 production iveraged 26 per month. Other models included the 1,050 horsepower, 14-cylinder Ha-31, an lir-cooled radial with a two-sjieed supercharger Tor powering the twin-engine Kawasaki fighter
standing single-engine fighters.
of
Ivi-67,
Nick,
DISPERSAL
of the Tachikawa Arsenal were two widely separated areas: The engine works centered around Kanazawa in Ishikawa prefecture on the west coast, more than 200 miles from Tokyo, while the air-frame works were scattered in the general pi'oximity of
Nakajima
The
facilities
dispersed
to
engaged in all modificaand major repairs for the Tokyo area. In August 1 944 the engine works was moved to he city of Kanazawa, which is on the Japan Sea ibout 100 miles due north of Nagoya (Appendix fV). Owned by the Japanese Army, the Arsenal
of the
Marianas Islands by
47
States forces
June
1944,
Army
tion of roads
a small scale.
and the distance, this transfer was on At the end of April 1945 compoto
engine
nents were in limited production at the new site. In April 1945 tlu' Army authorities decitled
construct
carried out.
Early
attacks,
urban area
program was put into effect hy which the t'acilities of the engine works were scatteretl to 35 sites in Ishikawa prefecture and raw materials to 50 additional storage sites.
an underground plant for the airframe works at nearby Shichist-i containing 13,200 Average height and width of the feet of tuimels. tunnels was 10 by 13 feet (Appendix G). In August the Shichisei plant was 80 percent completed.
In early
construction of an
May
it
was decided
to
move
one-half
foi-
In
the meantime,
under-
the
ground engine works was undertaken in June at Hayashi, 6 miles south of Kanazawa, and was about 30 percent coni[)leted by August when the war ended. This undei'ground plant was to Approximately include 11,616 feet of tunnels. 800 machine tools eventually were to be installed in the underground plant, which was to have, in addition to a machine shop, a raw materials warehouse, components storage, transformer station, and oil storage (Appendi.x F). After the dispersal of the engine works in August 1944, the airframe works for a time occu-
twin-engine medium bomber Peggy, but at the end of the month construction of a semiuiulerground woiks at Hanno was undertaken to which it was intended to retransfer the final assembly facilities from the Takahagi site. The dispersal of the airframe works was aL within a 27-niile radius of the Tachikawa arseuai (Appendix H).
ATTACKS ON PLANTS
The Tachikawa
arsenal suffered from the
ett'ect
Tachikawa Arsenal vacated by the engine works. AVith the intensification of air attacks toward the end of 1944, plans were
pied the section in the
formulated
for
the
dispersal
of
tlie
airframe
one of which was directc' against the woi-ks as the primary target. Diaing the attack of 4 April 1945 on the Tacli
of three attacks, only
However, because of tliificulties in obtaining building materials and transportation facilities, dispersal of the works' machine shop to Tokorozawa, 12 miles northeast of Tachikawa, was not undertaken until 10 March 1945. During the same periotl the sheet metal shop facilities were moved to the Hikawa tuiuid, 27 miles west of Tachikawa. In the meantime, in early February 1945, approximately 60 warehouses had Ibeen acrjuired in the Tachikawa area, and by the first part of March
works
also.
kawa
Airi)lane Co.'s
main
Thiid\ing
it
wa
damage was
ligh
burned
all
facilities
was
felt
that an uncontrolled
among empt
On
Forci
attack
against
the arsenal,
airfiel
The
decision
to
disperse
resulted
when
the
To
and
During the was necessary temporarily to expose certain steel and light alloys to the elements in outdooi' dumps, a portion of these materials suffered considerable damage. With the transfer of the sheet metal shop facilities to Hikawa, a j)ortion of the components assembly shoj) was moved to Sawai, 25 mil(>s southwest of Tachikawa. Due to the poor eoudi10,000
transfer,
since
hangars were destroyed. Twenty-nine B-2[ attacked the target and dropped 169 tons of G bombs. Eighteen aircraft bombed visually aiv by radar devices. Damage was light. On 1 August the arsenal was hit during a urban area attack on Hachioji. Incendiarie gutted 4 of the remaining buildings, and there weij 29 casualties; 5 dead and 24 injured. These raids caused damage to only 11 of th approximately 75 buildings (Appendix I). The urban area attacks on other districts had
1
1
'
large effect.
It
such as
oil,
coal,
48
PRODUCTION STATISTICS
From
aircraft.
works
end,
Tnclii-
to
Kanazawa.
dis[)ersal
From
and
April the
1945
to to
the
1941 until
tlic
ond of
tlic
war
(lie
furthci'
Actual production was 1,004. During the period April 1941 to the end of the war engine
luction
(Figure 2 ) After March 1 945 Ha-45 was the only engine in production because of the govermnent's
attempt to standardize tyix's. The Kanazawa main works never was bombed but suffei'ed extremely from the threat of bombing. Actual ])roduction stayed fairly close to capacity until August 1944 when general confusion and lack of supplies together with attempted dispersal caused the program to fail (Appendix K).
tli(>
in
remained until Marcli 1!)42 when it rose to 30. In Septemher of 1943 it rose to 40 and remained until the end of the war (Figure 1). i|iit this level ()r(h'rs lagged below capacity until August 1942 ivhen the 2 coincided at 30 aircraft per month. From Sc])temhi'r 1942 through March 194.'5 orders 'xceeded capacity, rising to 48 aircraft per month n March but dropping sharply to 22 in April In April 1944 orders again reached capacity 1943. vhich was 40 per month and stayed at that ap)ro.\imate level until February 1945 and dropped
)ft'
EVALUATION OF PRE-ATTACK
INTELLIGENCE
The War Department Military
Intelligence
Service (G-2), estimate of total production for Sonia was 17 percent over actual (Figure 3). The
estimate,
although
it
failed
to
show
all
of the
of Sonia.
due
to the
attempt
to establish a
program
for
This was abandoned because of the inaof production engineers to cope with attend-
amounted to 913 Sonias while estimated 1,068. Intelligence did not have any estimate of production on othfer aircraft as the production was so small it was negligible. There were no estimates of engine production as the only engine produced in appreciable quanOver-all production
MIS
nt problems.
June through December 1944 arose from the loan of about 700 rorkers to Mitsubishi. In early 1945 planned nd actual production fell sharply due to the 'reparation made for the production of Ki 67, a !\vo-engine bomber, Peggy (fig. 1). Only one Peggy was made because of the conjusion arising from dispersal which in turn was laused by bombing and the threat of further
large drop in production in
ttacks.
iispersal
The
tity was the Ha-23. The horsepower and Military made no estimates on low although aware of the fact producing other models.
Service
horsepower engines,
that the arsenal was
REFERENCE NOTES
1.
Explanatory table
and evac-
uation.
2.
Damage
Aircraft
to tools
third raid.
3. 4. 5.
Production of Sonia rose briefly after and then stopped in July prior to the
war.
works
'nd of the
6.
Receipt of principal metal materiivls. Component Shops of the engine works. Explanation table for engine works
di.^persion
program.
rame works. Low production in the first half f 1943 accompanied the change over from Ha-23 Ha-31. In September 1944 capacity as well s production fell ofi' due to the dispersal of the
I
with the records of United States Strategic the Aircraft Bombing Survey, in the office of the Adjutant General, War Department, Washington, D. C.
Reference items are
filed
Division,
49
a:
TACHIKAWA
INTELLISENCE
AIRFRAME
ARMY
ESTIMATE
AIR
ARSENAL
ISOWIA)
FIGURE
52
LEGEND
AIRCRAFT ENGINE
HONSHU
ISLAND
53
APPENDIX B
Tachikfiii'ii ^\rii/ ^\ir
Arsrnal
nioiithli/ ciiiploiinn
til
Direct .
Indirect.
1941
Direct
APPENDIX C
'nrhikawa
Army Air
clitirt, ilirecl
and
indireci workers
1!)',0-
Jiily
1945
1940
iri'C'l...
direct.
1941
APPENDIX D
Tacliikuwd
Army
Air ArscKal
WJ}-J uhj
W4'>
APPENDIX
The
1.
c^eneral
Requirements:
(a)
storage, etc.
Diameter, 10 feet. Height, 7 feet. Length, 1,320 feet.
To
by an 8,800-pouncl
toolt^.
bomb.
(b)
2.
Machine shop:
Diameter, 16 feet. Height, 10 feet. Length, 9,075 feet. Interval between passage,
" 5.
Communication passages,
Diameter, 13 feet
"^'gh*' 1
fe'^^;
etc.:
feet.
(]_
Summary:
Diameter
(feet)
:]
Transformer station:
Diameter 16
Length,
feet
lO 10
IG 10
Heiglit (feet)
10 7
1,1
HeigSiefeef
(i6 feet.
Length
(feet)
9,075
66 1,320
Total, 11,616.
58
APPENDIX G
Tlio jionoral plan for undcrgi'ound
f
installation
(1.
Requirements:
(a)
(6)
Intended to withstiind direct, hits by 1,100pound bombs. Intended to accommodate 800 macliine tools.
7.
2.
Machine shop:
Span, 13
feet.
Heii^ht, 10 feet.
LengMi, 9,240
.'5.
feet.
Jig shop.
Sjmn, 13
feet.
8.
in-
spection shops,
Height, 10 feet.
shops,
oil
storage, etc.
Length, 908
4.
feet.
Repair shop:
Span, 13 feet. Height, 10 feet. Length, 363 feet.
9.
Summary:
Span
(feet)
Heiglit (feet)
10
13
5.
Transformer room:
Span, 20 feet. Height, 13 feet. Length, 66 feet.
20 20
13 10
(feet)
200
59
TOKOROZAWA
U S STRATEGIC
BOMBINC SURVEY
APPENDIX H
60
UJ
tr.
> D
in
m Z o
CD
U
(9 UJ
t5
H
P
I
APPENDIX K
Monliihj engine produclioji
HA-23
Total capacity
i
HA-31
Ordered
HA-46
Ordered
Total
Ordered
Produced
Produced
Produced
Ordered
ne
lly. Tigust
Iptember,
etober
l>vemberpccmbcr,-
5 10 10 15 15 15 20 20 20
TotaL
1942
130
huary...
Ibruary.
lareh
fril
Ine.. lly.
igust lotembcr_
Itober
livember.
iceraber..
Total.
436
340
263
luary
prch
Iril
Ibruary.
ty
ly
Igust
JDteinber. Itober....
Ivember.. Ieember_.
Total.
66
puary... Jjruary.
M
ly
Irch
y gust
ptember. tober Ivsmber..
ttber...
60 70 70 70 85 85 85 80
10
30 50
Total
695
480
416
60
80
80 100 120
'30
70 100 150
Total
Grand
totah.
730 2,730
1,275
134 1,203
7 145
OF REPORTS
21
The following is a bibliography of reports resulting from the Survey's studies of the European and Pacific wars. Those reports marked with an asterisk (*) may lie p\irchased from the Superintendent of Docimients at the Government Piinting Office, Washington, D. C.
(iv
many
22 23
24 25
2(j
Metallgussgesellsehaft
Ahaniniumwerk
G m
Gm
European War
27 28
2!)
LuftschifTbau Zeppelin C! b H, Friedrichshafi on Boflensee, Germany Wieland Werke A G, LTlm, Germany Rudolph Rautenbach Leichmetallgiessereien, Soli
gen,
*2 *3
The I'nited States Strategic Bombing Surve.v: Summary Rejjort (European War) The United States Strategic Boml)ipg Survey; Overall
Germany
G, Lime
Germany
Vereinigte
The
German
War Economv
30
Deutsche Metallweike, Heddemheii German\' Duerener Nletalhverke A G, Duren Wittenau-Ber & Waren, German v
AIRCRAFT DIVISION
(
Hy
)i\isi(iii
and
Hran(^li)
*4 6
Aircraft Division Industry Report. Inspection Visits to Various Targets (Special Ki'|iort)
32
33 31
Airframes Branch
6 7 8
!l
\\'urks,
I_)essau,
35 30 37
Germany
Erla Maschincnwerke
(_i
ni
li
II,
Ilcitcrlilick,
(icr-
AT
many
G' Maschinenbau,
Gm
A
1)
H, Lei]vJg (Mockau),
Germany
Gothaei Waggonfaliiik,
G, Gotha,
Germany
10
11
Focke Widf Aircraft Plant, Bremen, Germany (Over-all Report Part A Messerschmitt A G,
|
38
30
12
13 11
Augsburg, Germaiivl Part B Uiipendiccs 1, II, III Dornier Works, Friecirichshafen & Munich, Germany Gerhard Fieseler Werke G m b H, Kassel, German,\ Wiener Xeustaedter Flugzengwerkc, Wiener Neustadt, Austria
Area Studies Division Rejrort A Detailed Study of the FIffects of Area liomlji on Hamburg A Detaik^d Study of the I'IffecIs of Area Bombi on Wujtpertal A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombi on Dusseldorf A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombi on Solingen A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bonibr on Remscheid A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombi on Darmstadt A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombi on Lubeck A Brief Study of the Effects of .\rea Bombing Beilin, Augsburg, Boclium, Leipzig, Hagen, Do muufl, Oberhausen, Schweinfurt, and Bremen
i
42 43
Bussing
wick,
NAG
Flugmotorenwerke
G m
II,
Bruns-
Germany
44 45 46
Mittel-Deutsche Motorenwerke
G m
b H, Taucha,
47
Reception Areas
in
Bavaria,
Germany
Inc,
EQUIPMENT DIVISION
Electrical
18
ly
Motorenwerke A
G (BMW)
Munich,
*48 49
Branch
Germany
Henschel Flugmotorenwerke, Kassel, Germany
Light Metal Branch
Optical and Precision Instrument Branch
German F^lectrical Equipment Industry Report Blown Boveri et Cie, Mannheim Kafertal, Germa
20
50
Optical
64
Abrasives Branch
'il
Submarine Branch
Mjiiii, (ici-iiiany
Tlie
V2
92 93
94 95 90
G,
Augs-
Germany
i3
The
Blohm and Voss Shipyards, Hamburg, Germany Deutschewerke A. G, Kiel, Germany Deutsche Schiff und Maschinenbau, Bremen, Ger-
many
id
i7
iS
Machine Tools & IMachineiy as Capital E(|uipmenl Machine Tool Industry in Germany Herman Kolb Co, Cologne, Germany ('ollet and iMigelhard, Offenbach, Germany Naxos Union, I'rankfort on Main, Germany
97 98 99 100
Friedrich
Krupp Germaniawerft,
Kiel,
Germany
Germany
Ordnance Branch
*101 102
103 104 105 106
The Defeat
2
.!
of the German Air Force V-\Veapons (Crossbow) Campaign Air Force Rate of Opeiation Weather Factors in Combat Hombanlnient Operalions in the iMiiopean Theaire Bombing Accuracy, I'SAAF Heavy and Medium
Ordnance Industry
Friedrich
Keijorl
Krujjp
Grusonwerke A. G, Magdeburg,
)a
Bombers in the KTO Description of RAF Homliing. The Impact, of the Allied Air
Logistics
I'lffort
on German
MORALE
111
107 108
DIVISION
Bombing on German Morale
Germany Bochumer Vereiu fuer Gusstahlfabrikation .\ G, Bochum, Germany Henschel & Sohn, Kassel, (!ermany Rheinmetall-Borsig, Dusseldorf, Germany Hermann Goering Werke, Braunschweig, Hallendorf, Germany Hannoverische Maschinenbau, Hanover, Germany Gusstalilfabrik Friedrich Krujip, Essen, Germany
OIL DIVISION
*109 *110
*111
Oil Division, Final Report Oil Division, Final Report, Appendix Powder, Explosives, Special Rockets and Jet Propellants. War Gases and Smoke Acid (Ministerial Report #1)
Medical Branch
The
in
Effect of
Geimany
MUNITIONS DIVISION
Heavy Industry Branch
The Coking Industry Report on Germanv
Coking Plant Report No. 1, Sections A,"B, C, & D Gutehoffnungshuette, Oberhausen, Germany Fiiedrich-Alfied Huette, Rheinhausen, Germany Neunkirchen Eisenwerke A G, Neunkirchen, Ger-
112
113 114
in
Greater Ger-
The German
78
Report
Team
Oil
Branch
many
Reichswerke Hermann Goering
G,
Hallendorf,
115
llfl
Germany
August Thyssen Huette A G, Hamborn, Germany Friedrich Krupp A G, Borbeck Plant, Essen, Gernrany
117
Ammoniak werke Mer.seburg G m b H, Leuna, Germany 2 Appendices Braunkohle Benzin A G, Zeitz and Bohlen, Germany \\'intershall A G, Leutzkendorf, Germany
Ludwigshafen-Oppau Works
of I
Farbenindustrie
Dortnmnd Hoerder Huettenverein, AG, Dorlnuuid, Germany Hoesch A G, Dortmund, Germany Bochumer Verein fuer Gusstahlfabrikation A G, Bochum, Germany
Motor Vehicles and Tanl<s Branch German Motor V'ehicles Industry Report Tank Industry Report Daiirrler Benz A G, Unterturkheim, Germany Rena\ilt Motor Vehicles Plant, Billancourt, Paris
A G,
118 119 120
121
Lud\yigshafen,
Germany
Hamburg, Germany
G, Grasbrook
Hamburg, Germany
&
Vol. II
Adam
G,
Ham-
Opel, Russelsheim,
Germany
Refinery,
HamI
Germany
Auto Union A G, Chemnitz and Zwickau, Germany Henschel & Sohn, Kassel, Germany Maybach Motor Works, Friedrichshafen, Germany Voigtlander, Masehinenfabrik A G, Ptouen, Ger-
Oil Plant
&
Vol.
Vol. II
Rubber Branch
126 127 128 129
many
Volkswagenwerke, Fallersleben, Germany Bussing NAG Brunswick, Germany Muelilenbau Industrie A G (Miag) Brunswick, Ger-
Deutsche Dunlop
Gummi
Co.,
Germany
Continental Gummiwerke, Hanover, Huels Synthetic Rubber Plant.
Ministerial Report on
many
Friedrich Krujip Grusonwerke,
Magdeburg, Germany
German Rubber
65
Propellants Branch
l3D
131
132
Elektrochemischewerke, Munich, Germany Sehoenebeck Explosive Plant, Lignose Sprengstoff Werke Bad Salzemen, Germany Plants of Dynamit A G, Vormal, Alfred Nobel & Co, Troisdorf, Clausthal, Drummel and Duneberg,
GmbH,
Daimler-Benz A G, Mannheim, Germany Synthetic Oil Plant, Meerbeck-Hamburg, German Gewerkschaft Victor, Castrop-Rauxel, Germany Klockner Humboldt Deutz, Ulm, Germany Ruhroel Hydrogenation Plant, Bottrop-Boy Ger
many
Neukirchen Eisenwerke A G, Neukirchen, German; Railway Viaduct at Altenbecken, Germany Railway Viaduct at Arnsburg, Germany Deurag-Nerag Refineries, Misburg, Germany Fire Raids on German Cities I Ct Farbenindustrie, Ludwigshafen, Germany, Vol & Vol II Roundhouse in Marshalling Yard, Ulm, Germany
I
Germany
133
Deutsche Sprengchemie
G m
b H, Kraiburg, Ger-
many
193 194
195 196 197 198 199
Economic
Effects Division
.
Report
Special
papers which together Kriegseilberichte comprise the Hermann Goering Works above report Food and Agriculture J 134u Industrial Sales Output and Productivity
1
I
|
Farbenindustrie, Leverkusen,
Germany
Chemisehe- Werke, Heuls, Germany Gremberg Marshalling Yard, Gremberg, Germany Locomotive Shops and Bridges at Hamm, German
TRANSPORTATION DIVISION
*200
201
Damage Division Report (ETO) Viliacoublay Airdrome, Paris, France Railroad Rejfair Yards, Malines, Belgium Railroad Rejmir Yards, Louvain, Belgium Railroad Repair Yards, Hasselt, Belgium Railroad Repair Yards, Namur, Belgium Submarine Pens, Brest, France
Plant, Angouleme, France Plant, Bergerac, France Coking Plants, Montigny & Liege, Belgium Fort St. Blaise Verdun Group, Metz, France
The
Effects of Strategic Bombing on Germany Tran portation Rail Operations Over the Brenner Pass Effects of Bombing on Railroad Installations
Regensburg, Nurnberg and Munich Divisions. German Locomotive Industry During the War German Military Railroad TrafTic
Powder Powder
UTILITIES DIVISION
*205 206 207 208
Electric Utilities Industry Report 1 to 10 in Vol I "Utilities Division Plant Reports 11 to 20 in Vol II "Utilities Division Plant Report 21 Rheinischc-Westfalische Elektrizitaetswerk A
German
Gnome
et Rhone, Limoges, France Michelin Tire Factory, Clermont-Ferrand, France Gnome et Rhone Aero Engine Factory, Le Mans,
France
148 149 150
151
Ebelsbach,
Ger-
many
Louis iireguet Aircraft Plant, Toulouse, France S. N. C. A. S. E. Aircraft Plant, Toulouse, France A. I. A. Aircraft Plant, Toulouse, France
*1
Pacific
War
War)
V Weapons
in
London
City Area of Krefeld Public Air Raid Shelters in Germany Goldenberg Thermal Electric Power Station, Knapsack,
*2 *3
Japan's Struggle to
End
the
War
a:
Nagasaki
Tit
Germany
Brauweiler Transformer
weiler,
&
CIVILIAN STUDIES
Civilian
*f
Germany Germany
Defense Division
Protection and AUi
Field Report Covering Air Raid Subjects, Tokyo, Japan Field Report Covering Air Raid Subjects, Nagasaki, Japan Field Report Covering Air Raid Subjects, Kyoto, Japan Field Report Covering Air Raid Subjects, Kobe, Japan Field Report Covering Air Raid Subjects, Osaka, .Japan Field Report Covering Air Raid Subjects. Hiroshima, Japan Summary Report Covering Air
in
Railway and Road Bridge, Bad Munster, Germany Railway Bridge, Eller, Germany Gustloff- Werke Weirhar, Weimar, Germany Henschell & Sohn Kassel, Germany Area Survey at Pirmasens, Germany Hanomag, Hanover, Germany Werke Augsburg, Augsburg, Germany
GmbH,
Protection and
Alii
MAN
GmbH,
Germany
Heiterblick, Ger-
many A T G Maschinenba^i G
Germany Erla Maschinenwerke b H, Mockau, Germany Bayerische Motoren werke, Durrcrhof, Germany
b H, Mockau,
m G m
Mittel-Deutsche Motorenwerke
G m
No.
b H, Taucha,
*10
*11
Germany
Submarine Pens Deutsche-Werft, Hamburg, Ger-
many
172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180
181
Raid Protection Japan Allied Subjects Final Report Covering Air Raid Protection Allied Subjects in Japan
a)|
182 183
Multi-Storied Structures, Hamburg, Germany Continental Gummiworke, Hanover, Germany Kassel Marshalling Yards, Kassel, Germany Amnion iaworke, Mersetiurg, Leuna, Germany Brown Boveri et Cie, Mannheim, Kafertal, Germany Adam Opel A G, Russelsheim, Germany Daimler-Benz A G, I'nterturkheim, Germany Valentin Submarine Assembly, Farge, Germany Volkswaggon werke, Fallerslebcn, Germany Railway Viaduct at Bielefeld, Germany Ship Yards Howaldtswerke, Hamburg, Germany Blohm and Voss Shipyards, Hamburg, Germany
Medical Division
*12 *13
Bombing on Health and Medical SeiJ Japan I The Effects of Atomic Bombs on Health and MeditJ Services in Hiroshima and Nagasaki
The
Effects of
ices in
Morale Division
*14
The
Effects of Strategic
66
ECONOMIC STUDIES
Aircraft Division
*33
Nissan Automobile
Company
*34
Corporation Report No. X VIII (Nissan .Jidosha KK) (Engines) Anny Air Arsenal & Navy Air Depots Corporation Report No. XIX (Airframes and Engines)
*35
XX
Makajima
Aircraft
Company, Ltd.
(Nakajima Hikok
(Airframes
Kawanishi Aircraft
*36
in
Japan's
War Economy
Capital Goods,
Inc.
(Kawasaki
Kaisha) (Airframes
Kokuki
Kogyo
Kabtishiki
The Japanese Construction Industry Japanese Electrical Equipment The Japanese Machine Building Industry
Electric
&
Engines)
Power Division
Aichi Aircraft Company Corporation Report No. V (Aichi Kokuki KK) (Airframes & Engines)
*40
,*41
The The
Sumitomo Metal
VI
*42
Civilian
Supplies Division
of Living
and
Utili-
KK)
Company
J^pan
ISIusical
Instrument Manufacturing
War
Production Industries
Naval Ordnance Army Ordnance Naval Shipbuilding Motor Vehicle Industry Merchant Shipbuilding
Oil
X
KK)
XI
(Tachikawa Hikoki
Fuki Airplane Company Corporation Report No. (Fuki Hikoki KK)
(Airframes)
49 50
61
Chemicals Chemicals
War War
Appendix
52
Oil in Japan's
War
Appendix
XII
*53
KK)
The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japan's War Economy (Including Appendix A: U. S. Economic
.\nalysis and Comparison; Intelligence on Japan Appendix B: Gross National Product on Japan and Its Components; Appendix C: Statistical
Ishikawajima Aircraft Industries Company, Ltd. Corporation Report No. XIII (Ishikawajima Koku Kogyo Kabushiki
(Kaisha) (Engines) Nippon Airplane Company Corporation Report No. A'/T
Sources)
Transportation Division
(Nippon Hikoki
KK)
*54
XV
*55
Economy
(Summary Report)
*56
Effects of Air Attack on
XVI
XVII
*57 *58
59 60
Kawasaki- Yokohama Effects of Air Attack on Effects of Air Attack on Effects of Air Attack on Effects of Air Attack on
the City of
Nagoya
Osaka-Kobe-Kyoto
the City of Nagasaki the City of Hiroshima
67
MILITARY STUDIES
Military Analysis Division
61
87
Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (Enclosure I), Comments and Data on Effectiveness
of
Ammunition
62 63
64
6")
Air Forces Allied with the United States in the War Against Japan Japanese Air Power Japanese Air Weapons and Tactics The Effect of Air Action on Japanese Ground Army
Logistics
88
Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (Enclosure J), Comments and Data on Accuracy of
Firing
89
Reports of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (Enclosure K), Effects of Surface Bombardments on
Jaiianese
War
Potential
Kmploynient
of Forces
Pacific
Command
66
Physical
Damage
Control
(a
The
67
in the War Against Jajjan (Twentieth Air Force) World War Air Operations in China, Bvinna, India
Imrdment
n
65
(H
The
Effects of the
on
The
Air Transport
Command
in
the
War
Against
Japan
70
71
The Thirteenth Air Force in tlie War Against Japan The Seventh and Eleventh Air Forces in the War The
Against Japan Fifth Air Force
in
92 93 94
95
Report on Nine Incidents) Effects of the Atomic Bonil) on Hiroshima, Jai)aii I'^lflfects of the Atomic Bomb on Nagasaki, Japan Effects of the Four Thousand Pound Bomb on Japanese Targets (a Report on Five Incidents) Effects of Two Thousand, One Thousand, and Five Himdred Pound Bombs on JajJanese Targets (a Report on Eight Incidents) A Report on Physical Damage in .Japan (Summary
Japanese Targets
Report)
The Interrogations
II)
of
Japanese
Officials )Vols. I
and
*73 *74
*7!S
Campaigns of the Pacific War Tlic Reduction of Wake Island Tlic Allied Campaign Against Ral:>aul
G-2
97
Division
76
*77 78 79
The American Campaign Against Wotje, Maloelap, MiUe, and Jaluit (Vols. I, II and III) The Reduction of Truk The Offensive Mine Laying Campaign Against Japan Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party Foreword, Introduction, Conclusions, and General
98
99
100
101
.Japanese Military and Naval Intelligence Evaluation of Piiotographic Intelligence in the Japanese Homeland, Part I, Comprehensive Report Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa-
Summary
80
81
Report
Report
of Ships
of Sliips
82
83 84
8")
86
Kamaishi Area Bomliardment Survey Party (Enclosure B), Hamaniatsu Area Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (Enclosure C), Hitachi Area Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (Enclosure D), Hakodate Area Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (Enclosure Pj), INIuroran Area Report of Sliips Bombardment Survey Party (Enclosure F), Shimizu Area Report of Shi])s Bombardment Survey Party (Enclosures G and H), Shionomi-Saki and Nojimaclosure A).
105
*106
*107
108
nese Homeland, Part II, Airfields Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa nese Homeland, Part III, Computed Bomb Ploliinjh Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa,i nese Homeland, Part IV, Urban Area Analysis Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japanese Homeland, Part V, Caniovflage Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japanese Homeland, Part VI, Shipping Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japanese Homeland, Part VII, Electronics Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japanese Homeland, Part VIII, Beach Intelligence Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in tlie Japanese Homeland, Part IX, Artillery Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Jap* nese Homeland, Part X, Roads and Railroads
'
i \
p;
Saki Areas
valuation of Photograi)hic Intelligence in the Japanese Homeland, Part XI, Industrial Analysis
68
U. S.
I9<7