Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Briefing Series – Issue 3
CHINA POLITICAL REVIEW 2005:
PROMOTING A HARMONIOUS SOCIETY TO COPE WITH
A CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE
by Yongnian Zheng, Zhengxu Wang & Liang Fook Lye
© Copyright China Policy Institute
December 2005
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Email: CPI@nottingham.ac.uk
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The China Policy Institute was set up to analyse critical policy challenges faced by China in its
rapid development. Its goals are to help expand the knowledge and understanding of
contemporary China in Britain, to help build a more informed dialogue between China and the UK
and to contribute to government and business strategies.
Summary
1. In 2005, Hu Jintao emerged as having full control of China’s domestic and
foreign policies. Hu has quickly consolidated his power to become the
“core” of the leadership, with Premier Wen Jiabao and Vice President Zeng
Qinghong as his important lieutenants.
2. In line with Hu’s vision of a “harmonious society”, the Fifth Plenum of the
Communist Party Central Committee in November 2005 approved a series
of recommendations for the 11 th FiveYear Plan that aims to achieve
balanced and sustainable development. The Party will continue to deliver
social goods to stay relevant to the people.
3. To meet the challenges of governance, the Party embarked on a campaign
to improve the competence of its members and address the moral
problems within its ranks. In the face of the many social problems, some
circles within the Party want to revive Marxism to bring it in line with the
realities of a market economy.
4. The leadership has tightened control over societal elements that could
destabilize society, such as intellectuals. Incidents of social unrest are
being carefully handled and contained at the localities. Foreign elements
that could promote regime change in China are closely watched.
5. Despite some internal debate, Hu went ahead with the ceremony to
commemorate the 90 th anniversary of the birth of Hu Yaobang, the late
reformist leader. This left open the question of political liberalization in the
future.
6. In 2006, the leadership will continue to improve the lot of the people and
address social grievances, while cracking down on potentially destabilizing
elements. Local leaders will be urged to handle potentially explosive issues
with care, such as land evictions and peasant petitions, and avoid high
handed measures.
7. Hu is likely to promote more of his supporters into powerful positions. The
Party centre under his leadership will step up efforts to groom the 5 th
generation leadership that will succeed the current leadership in 2012.
2
China Political Review 2005:
Promoting a Harmonious Society to Cope with a Crisis of Governance
By Yongnian Zheng, Zhengxu Wang and Liang Fook Lye*
Hu Jintao FullyinCharge
1.2 Yet, beneath the veneer of stable economic growth and political
tranquility, China faces simmering social grievances arising from peasant
discontent, corruption and government abuse of power, widening income
and regional disparities, and environmental degradation. For example, in
July 2005, the Standing Committee of the Chinese People's Political
Consultative Conference (CPPCC) pointed to the widening income gap as
"the root cause of disharmony". 2 Official statistics show that the number of
incidents of popular unrest in 2004 jumped to 74,000 from 58,000 in 2003
and 10,000 in 1994. 3
1.3 Moreover, the frequent coal mining disasters across the country and the
recent contamination of the Songhua River in China’s Northeast due to an
explosion at a chemical plant are exemplary of the increasingly damaging
effects of the blind focus on economic growth. Besides raising questions
about proper governance at the local level, these mishaps underscore the
challenges faced by the central government in encouraging local leaders to
look beyond GDP growth figures.
1.5 Within the Party, Hu has made a concerted effort to enhance its governing
capacity. Early this year, a campaign was launched to “maintain the
advanced nature” of the Party (保持党的先进性). Party members, from the
* Yongnian Zheng is Professor and Head of Research at the China Policy Institute of the University of
Nottingham; Zhengxu Wang is Visiting Research Fellow at the East Asian Institute (EAI) of the
National University of Singapore; and, Liang Fook Lye is Research Officer at the East Asian Institute.
The authors are grateful to John Wong and Richard Pascoe for their valuable comments on the draft.
1
“China’s economy to grow by 9.4 points this year”, China Daily, 5 December 2005.
2
“China warns gap between rich, poor is feeding unrest”, The Washington Post, 22 September 2005.
3
“The cauldron boils; protests in China”, The Economist, 1 October 2005.
4
Hu’s consolidation of power is rapid by Chinese standards. His immediate predecessor, Jiang Zemin,
is widely regarded to have only consolidated his power eight years after he became General Secretary
in 1989. Before that, Zhao Ziyang (19871989) and Hu Yaobang (19821987) only managed to hold
on to the post of General Secretary for two years and five years respectively.
3
rankandfile to senior personnel, have had to participate in educational
activities to improve their quality of work and better serve the people.
Beyond this, some ideologicallyinclined senior Party members called for a
renewed effort to reexamine or to redefine Marxism, making it more
consistent with rising capitalist realities in the Chinese society.
1.6 To address social grievances, Hu has proposed a “harmonious society”,
both as a guiding principle for the government in the coming years, and as
a grand vision to boost public confidence in the regime. Following this line,
the Party approved a series of policy initiatives for the 11 th FiveYear Plan
at its Fifth Plenum in October 2005. 5 These initiatives mark a new focus on
resolving the negative consequences of the uneven developments of
recent years.
1.7 In light of the increasingly precarious social conditions, the Party has
tightened political control. Certain segments of society such as
intellectuals, lawyers, and journalists have been put on a tighter leash.
The authorities have also been careful in handling local incidents to
prevent them from escalating. With more than 100 million registered
Internet users and almost 400 million cell phone holders, China today is
becoming an increasingly open society, where bad news and adverse
publicity can travel very fast to become newspaper headlines the world
over, such as the recent shooting incident in a village in Guangdong. 6
1.9 On the external front, Hu has quickly emerged as a confident leader on the
international stage. 8 China’s rapid economic rise has enabled China’s
leaders to be proactive in world affairs. Both Hu Jintao and Primer Wen
Jiabao have made frequent visits to major powers such as the US, Britain,
Germany and France. Recently, China ordered 150 A320 airbuses and 70
Boeing passenger planes within a span of two months. In terms of Sino
US relations, the two sides are working toward a relationship whereby the
US welcomes China’s participation as a “responsible stakeholder” in the
international system and China is willing to work within the existing world
order, an implicit recognition of US supremacy. 9
5
These policy initiatives will be incorporated into the 11 th FiveYear Plan (20062010) for
consideration at the National People’s Congress in March 2006.
6
In an incident in December, foreign reports claimed that police opened fire and up to 20 villagers
were killed. See “Villagers Tell of Lethal Attack by Chinese Forces on Protesters”, New York Times,
December 11, 2005.
7
China Youth Daily, 7 December 2005.
8
Hu’s frequent diplomatic forays to Asia, Europe, Canada, Latin America, and his attendance at the
APEC Summit and UN General Assembly this year share a common message, that China is committed
to building a mutually beneficial and constructive relationship with other countries.
9
For the US view of a constructive SinoUS relationship, see “Whither China: from membership to
responsibility”, Remarks by Robert B. Zoellick, Deputy Secretary of State to the National Committee
on USChina Relations, 21 September 2005 (http://www.ncuscr.org/articlesandspeeches/Zoellick.htm
4
1.10 In order to enhance China’s relations with EU, China this year chose not to
emphasize the question of the EU’s lifting of its sixteenyear ban on the
export of weapons to China. Instead, China has focused on commercial
areas. Despite trade disputes over textile and clothing, substantial
progress has been made in relations between China and major European
powers.
1.11 In dealing with Japan, China’s most important neighbour, Hu has adopted
a practical but firm approach. Following Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s
repeated visits to the Yasukuni shrine and rising antiJapanese nationalism
at home, China has taken a more hardline attitude towards Japan.
Nevertheless, it seems that the political chill has not had an adverse
impact on their commercial relations due to the nature of economic
interdependence between the two countries.
1.10 Closer to home, Hu seems to have dampened the proindependence
movement in Taiwan. Mainland China took a tough line with the passage
of its antisecession law in March 2005. Then, it added a soft touch with
historic visits to the mainland by the then Kuomintang (KMT) Chairman
Lien Chan and People First Party Chairman James Soong. The KMT victory
in the endofyear local elections in Taiwan underscored the success of
Hu’s crossstraits policy.
Harmonious Society: A Vision and A Plan
2.3 Since Hu and Wen took office, there has been a shift in official rhetoric.
Most important is the emphasis on the ordinary people and disadvantaged
groups, such as peasants and migrant workers. There is also an emphasis
on balanced and sustainable development, the socalled “scientific
development” idea. These shifts in policy focus are guided by the concept
of “harmonious society”, which Hu first enunciated in February 2005. Such
). For China’s willingness to work within the existing world order, see “Zhongguo gongchandang zai 21
shiji de zouxiang” [The way ahead for the Chinese Communist Party in the 21 st century], People’s
Daily (Foreign Edition), 11 November 2005; Also see the two articles by Zheng Bijian, and Wang Jisi
on the SinoUS relationship published in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 5 (September/October 2005),
pp. 1824 and pp. 3948.
10
According to official statistics, China’s Gini coefficient, an internationally accepted way of
measuring income inequality, is expected to reach 0.47 this year, exceeding the "alarm level" of 0.4.
On the Gini scale, zero corresponds to complete equality and one refers to perfect inequality, or one
person having all the income. See “Measures called for to narrow income gap”, China Daily, 9 July
2005.
5
a society would contain elements of democracy, rule of law, fairness and
uprightness, order, and balance between the needs of man and nature. 11
2.4 The idea of harmonious society has evolved into a set of concrete policy
initiatives outlined in the Proposal for the 11 th FiveYear Plan. This
proposal is politically significant in that, on the one hand, it marks the
maturation of the developmental thinking of the HuWen leadership. On
the other, it shows that the fourth generation leadership, with its power
consolidated, is pushing ahead with a comprehensive development plan.
2.5 This is a proposal for equitable, balanced, and sustainable development. It
stresses the “comprehensive building of a moderately welloff society” to
improve the wellbeing of ordinary people; “comprehensively
implementing scientific development” to achieve balance and
sustainability; “building a new socialist rural society” to improve farmers’
income and living standards; and to better conserve resources and protect
the environment.
Rejuvenating the Party
3.1 With the goal of building a harmonious society set, the leadership believes
that its force of Party cadres needs to be brought up to this task. In
January 2005, the Party launched a nationwide campaign to “maintain the
advanced nature” of the Party. The campaign is carried out in three half
year stages: the first (JanuaryJune 2005) involves Party and
governmental organizations at county level and above; the second (July
December 2005) involves urban grassroots organizations; and the third
(JanuaryJune 2006) goes to the rural areas.
3.2 Party members attend educational and discussion sessions within their
party cells to discuss ways of improving the Party’s quality and more
importantly, their daily work. They are also required to carry out criticism
and selfcriticism. The purpose is to improve the quality of the 69 million
Party members and eradicate malpractices that have tarnished the Party’s
reputation. Meanwhile, the Party has singled out several “exemplary”
party members as role models for other party members to emulate.
3.3 At the same time, the leadership is searching for ways to rebuild the
Party’s ideological foundation. After two decades of pragmatism and a
deliberate sidelining of ideological assertions, there appears to be a
resurgence of Marxism within some circles of the Party. 12 While China’s
economic success reflects the strengths of a marketoriented economy,
capitalism has also caused many social problems. At least to some,
Marxism, with its emphasis on distribution and equity, seems relevant
again.
3.4 In a much quoted article in July 2005, Liu Guoguang, a renowned Chinese
economist and former Deputy Director of the Chinese Academy of Social
11
“Hu Jintao qiangdiao zhashi zuohao gongzuo dali cujin shehui hexie tuanjie” [Hu Jintao stresses the
need to firmly lay the groundwork to push ahead with a socialist and harmonious society],
Xinhuawang, 19 February 2005 (http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2005
02/19/content_2595497.htm).
12
“Chinese Marxism redefined”, The Wall Street Journal, 6 December 2005. Earlier, in June 2004,
while presiding over a study session of Political Bureau members, Hu had stressed the need to embark
on a comprehensive and indepth study of the Chinese Communist Party governing theory. See “Dang
de zhizheng lilun: yige xuyao shengru yanjiu de keti [The Party’s governing theory: a topic that
requires indepth research], Renminwang, 31 August 2005.
6
Sciences (CASS), warned of the dangers of allowing western economic
studies dominate in China. He argued that any attempt to weaken
Marxism in China, including in Chinese academia, would ultimately force
the Party to “change its colour”. Meanwhile, CASS was instructed by the
Party to establish a school of Marxism, to revive the study of Marxist
ideology in China.
3.5 But such wellintended efforts may turn out to be illconceived. Political
campaigns only generate reluctance if not resistance from Party members.
Although Marxist theory may provide some insight into prevailing
problems, it is clearly illfitted for a China that is moving rapidly toward a
free market economy and pluralist society. In governing such an economy
and society, democratic institutions and processes of representation,
interest aggregation, and decision making may be more necessary than an
ideology. Political reform is more fundamental than a return to old
fashioned party work and ideological campaigns.
Tightening Political Control
4.1 While the government is addressing the urgent issues that lead to
discontent, it is also applying tough measures to minimize social unrest.
Although the leadership realizes that political reforms are needed, it takes
the view that they should be implemented gradually to keep things in
check. Furthermore, dissenting voices must be muted to ease policy
implementation. These are the complex causes behind the tightening of
control in China.
4.2 The political environment was tightened towards the second half of 2004.
In November 2004, the Publicity Department (previously called the
Propaganda Department) banned discussions in the media on the role of
public intellectuals. 13 Some outspoken public intellectuals were even taken
into custody for questioning. Sophisticated technologies and methods are
used to restrict what citizens can and cannot view and write on the
Internet.
4.3 Some university authorities have also required research institutions and
professors to declare their foreign funding to ensure that such funding
does not come with an agenda to promote political change. The leadership
is particularly concerned about the “colour revolutions” that recently led to
the downfall of regimes in several Central Asia countries. 14 It fears that
foreign forces might promote regime change in China through intellectuals
and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). 15
4.4 In September 2005, residents of a Guangdong village launched a peaceful
protest against a local Party Secretary who had been accused of
embezzlement. When two foreign journalists tried to enter the village,
they were physically threatened and manhandled by a mob believed to
have been hired by local authorities. A Chinese legislator from a
13
“Curbs on views of academics in media; ban reflects growing anxiety at reports on ‘public
intellectuals’ speaking out”, South China Morning Post, 22 November 2004. The ban follows a series of
articles on 50 “public intellectuals” including contemporary philosophers, artists, lawyers, economists
and media analysts by the Southern People’s Weekly, a wellknown magazine.
14
“Zhizhengdang fubai shi daozhi ‘yanshe geming’ de zhongyao yuanying” [The important reason
behind ‘color revolution’ lies in existing ruling Parties which are corrupt], Renmingwang, 7 Dec 2005
http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/49150/49152/3921640.html.
15
“Beijing concerned about ‘colour revolution’”, Financial Times, 18 November, 2005. See also “CCP
studies ‘colour revolutions’”, EIU ViewsWire, 20 September 2005.
7
neighboring province who intended to provide legal advice to the villagers
was beaten up. 16 In this incident, the Central Government appeared to be
on the side of the local authorities. It probably feared that being too
lenient to the villagers could open the floodgates to more of such
protests. 17
4.6 But there are more practical reasons behind the commemoration. By
restoring Hu Yaobang’s reputation, Hu is attempting to appeal to a broader
crosssection of society which identifies with the style of government that
Hu Yaobang stood for corruptionfree, upright, and propeople. These
are the same qualities that Hu Jintao himself is championing within the
Party. Hence, besides the young Hu’s personal indebtedness to the old
Hu, 18 rehabilitating him is a part of the young Hu’s Party building effort. 19
Prognosis for 2006
5.1 In the year 2006, the leadership will strive to show itself capable of
making a more positive impact on society and will redouble its efforts to
address the social grievances of the peasants and other disadvantaged
groups, in line with the broad goals of the 11 th FiveYear Plan.
5.3 The frequent reports of rising social unrest by Western media do give the
impression that the Chinese leadership is in danger of losing control. We
take the view that all these incidents still do not constitute a real threat to
the regime. China’s successful economic reform and development, whilst
16
“Beijing should step in to stop Taishi violence”, South China Morning Post, 11 October 2005.
17
In December, a similar but more serious case of villager protest took place in Dongzhou village,
Guangdong, in which foreign reports claimed that police opened fire and up to 20 villagers were killed.
See “Villagers Tell of Lethal Attack by Chinese Forces on Protesters”, New York Times, December 11,
2005.
18
The two Hus are not related. But to a large extent, the young Hu owed his earlier career to the old
Hu, when he was chosen by the old Hu to lead the Chinese Communist Youth League and later to be
the Party Secretary of Guizhou.
19
To downscale the profile of the event, in order not to raise excessively high expectations of
impending political reform, the commemoration date was shifted to a date when Hu was abroad so
that he could give the event a miss. The number of invitees to the ceremony was also reduced.
20
“Zhonggong gaoceng guanzhu qunti shijian pinfa” [The Party’s senior leaders are concerned about
the frequent occurrence of mass incidents], Xin Bao, 11 November 2005.
8
creating a lot of problems, has produced many winners, particularly the
rising middle class in the urban areas. On the whole, the majority of the
population is satisfied and still supports the government. In a recent
survey in China’s major cities by an American polling agency, the findings
show that most urban residents are generally happy with their lives. In
fact, 76% of the respondents are optimistic about their future, compared
to 46% in the US. 21
5.4 Nevertheless, the government is facing more and more demands for
political liberalization from an expanding urban and welleducated middle
class. There is also pressure for political opening from the United States,
the European Union and other countries. 22 While the Party does not
dismiss the need for political change, it wants to do so at its own pace. 23
In its first white paper on “Building Political Democracy”, released in
October 2005, China states that it will build its own “socialist democratic
political system”, but it will be done under Party leadership and in a
gradualist way.
5.5 In the arena of high politics, Hu will continue to promote his supporters
into leading positions. This process has continued unabated and looks set
to pick up pace with the 17 th Party Congress only two years away. Rumors
are rife about the impending transfer of Shanghai’s Party Secretary Chen
Liangyu, a protégé of Jiang Zemin, and his replacement by one of Hu’s
people. 24 There are also indications that the Party is stepping up efforts to
groom younger leaders at the provincial level such as Li Keqiang (Party
Secretary of Liaoning), Li Yuanchao (Party Secretary of Jiangsu), and Xi
Jinping (Party Secretary of Zhejiang) for top positions in the 5 th generation
leadership.
5.6 The dismal showing of the proindependence Democratic Progressive Party
(DPP) in Taiwan’s local elections in December 2005 is likely to compel
President Chen Shuibian to be more moderate in his crossstraits policies.
For Hong Kong, the Chinese government and Chief Executive Donald
Tsang are likely to reject demands for a timetable for universal suffrage,
but will avoid appearing highhanded in doing so. Externally, ChinaUS
relations will remain on an even keel, with occasional upsanddowns,
while China’s ties with Japan will remain tense, with no significant
breakthrough in sight.
21
The survey was conducted by the Pew Research Center, an independent opinion research
organization based in Washington D. C. See “To people in China, future looks bright”, International
Herald Tribune, 16 November 2005.
22
During George Bush’s visit to Japan in November 2005, he prodded China to grant more political
freedom to its citizens while praising the vibrant democracy in Taiwan. The new premier of Germany
also raised the issue of democratic reform when she met with Hu Jintao in November 2005.
23
Hu sent an unequivocal message to George Bush during the latter’s visit to China in November 2005
that China has no intention of giving in to US pressure on this score. See “China holds line during
Bush visit”, International Herald Tribune, 21 November 2005.
24
“Chen Liangyu anshi zhiwu jiangyou biandong [Chen Liangyu hints at portfolio changes],
Chinesenewsnet, 21 November 2005 (http://www1.chinesenewsnet.com/gb/MainNews/SinoNews/
Mainland/2005_11_20_22_20_34_215.html).
9
Appendix
Major Political Events in 2004
7 Feb Premier Wen Jiabao tells a joint gathering of Party and government
leaders celebrating the Lunar New Year that the focus this year will
be on creating a harmonious society.
3 – 12 Mar Third Session of the 10 th Chinese People’s Political Consultative
Committee convenes in Beijing.
5 – 14 Mar Third Session of the 10 th National People’s Congress convenes in
Beijing.
14 Mar The AntiSecession Law is adopted at the Third Session of the 10th
National People’s Congress. The law obliges China to take action
should Taiwan secede from the mainland.
26 Apr – 3 Lien Chan embarks on an historic trip to the mainland, marking the
May first visit by a Kuomintang (KMT) Chairman since the KMT lost the
civil war and fled to Taiwan in 1949.
Lien Chan’s visit paves the way for subsequent visits by People First
Party James Soong (5 – 12 May) and New Party Chairman Yok Mu
ming (6 – 13 Jul).
30 Jun – 7 Hu Jintao visits Russia and Kazakhstan, and attends the Shanghai
Jul Cooperation Council Summit in Astana and the “Dialogue between
the Leaders of G8 and China, India, Brazil, South Africa and Mexico”
in Gleneagles, the United Kingdom.
9 – 10 Jul US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice holds talks with her
counterpart Li Zhaoxing in Beijing. This is her second visit to China
following her last introductory visit in March this year.
27 – 30 Jul Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono begins his State
Visit to China. This is a followup to Hu Jintao’s visit to Indonesia in
April this year where the two countries signed a joint declaration on
a strategic partnership.
3 Sep Hu Jintao speaks to George Bush over the telephone. Besides
discussing the damage caused by Typhoon Katrina, the two leaders
agree to delay Hu’s visit to the US which was originally scheduled in
early September.
8 – 17 Sep Hu Jintao begins his State Visits to Canada and Mexico, and attends
the summit on the 60 th Anniversary of the founding of the UN. Hu
meets with George Bush on the sidelines of the summit.
10
(中共中央关于制定国民经济和社会发展第十一个五年规划的建议) that will
chart China’s socioeconomic progress from 20062010.
12 – 17 Shenzhou VI completes its fiveday orbit around earth. This is
Oct China’s second manned space flight, following the first successful
mission in 2003.
17 Oct Junichiro Koizumi pays a visit to the controversial Yasukuni shrine.
He has visited the shrine every year since taking office in 2001.
31 Oct – 2 Hu Jintao begins his state visit to Vietnam, returning an earlier visit
Nov to China by Vietnam’s President Tran Duc Luong in July. The two
countries alternate one highlevel exchange once every six months.
8 – 19 Nov Hu Jintao embarks on State Visits to the United Kingdom, Germany,
Spain and South Korea, and attends the 13 th APEC Informal Leaders’
Meeting in Busan.
13 Nov The Songhua River in Heilongjiang Province is contaminated as a
result of a blast that occurred in a petrochemical company under the
China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) located upstream in
Jilin Province.
16 Nov China’s Ministry of Health confirms its first ever human case of bird
flu. Two other cases were from the central province of Hunan and
eastern Anhui. China has shown much greater willingness to work
with the World Health Organization to curb the disease compared to
its handling of the SARS epidemic in 2003.
19 – 21 Following trips to Japan and South Korea, George Bush arrives in
Nov China for a visit. This is Bush’s first visit in his second presidential
term. Hu Jintao accepts Bush’s invitation to visit the US as early as
possible.
29 Nov – 1 The annual Central Economic Conference convenes in Beijing to
Dec outline China’s economic work for 2006.
3 Dec Taiwan’s ruling party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), faces
its biggest political crisis since it came to power five years ago
following its poor showing in local polls. The number of mayoral and
county magistrate seats controlled by the DPP fell to 6 from 9
previously (out of a total of 23 seats). In contrast, the opposition
Kuomintang gained control of 14 seats, up from 9 previously. The
DPP’s poor showing has been attributed to its lack of achievements
and involvement in recent scandals.
4 Dec An estimated 250,000 people take to the streets in Hong Kong
demanding a timetable for universal suffrage in the election for
Hong Kong's chief executive and Legislative Council.
4 – 15 Dec Wen Jiabao visits France, the Slovak Republic, the Czech Republic,
11
Portugal and Malaysia, and attends the 9 th ASEAN+China Summit,
the 9 th ASEAN+3 Summit and the first East Asia Summit in Kuala
Lumpur.
6 Dec Three people are officially confirmed dead after local security forces
open fire on protesting villagers in Dongzhou village in Guangdong,
a short drive away from Hong Kong. The villagers were unhappy
with the lack of compensation for their land acquired to build a
power plant.
7 – 8 Dec Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo and US Deputy
Secretary of State Robert Zoellick hold the Second ChinaUS
Strategic Dialogue in Washington. The first round was held in August
this year.
12