Hazard and Operability Study HAZOP

HAZOP

Author: rpd POZSGAI PROCOPLAN Ltd.

To determine the safety requirements

10. Management Of functional safety and functional safety Assessment and auditing 2. Allocation of safety functions to protection layers 3. Safety requirements specification for SIS 4. Design and engineering of SIS 5. Installation, commissioning and validation 6. Operation and maintenance 7. SIS modification 8. Decommission

To determine: the hazards and hazardous events of the process and associated equipment the sequence of events leading to the hazardous event (scenario) The process risks associated with the hazardous event, the requirements for risk reduction the safety functions required to achieve the necessary risk reduction Allocation of safety functions to protection layers and for each safety instrumented function The associated safety integrity level (SIL) To specify the requirements for each SIF called SRS in order to achieve the required functional safety

1. Hazard and risk assessment

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Hazard and Operability Study - HAZOP

9. Verification

Design and development of other means of risk reduction

11. Safety life-cycle structure and planning

Definitions
Hazard: potential source of harm Harm: physical injury or damage to the health of people, either directly or indirectly, as a result of damage to property or to the environment Risk: combination of the frequency of occurrence of harm and the severity of that harm Tolerable risk: risk which is accepted in a given context based on the current values of society Safety: freedom from unacceptable risk Safe state: state of the process when safety is achieved Safety integrity: average probability of a safety instrumented system satisfactorily performing the required safety instrumented functions under all the stated conditions within a stated period of time safety integrity level (SIL): discrete level (one out of four) for specifying the safety integrity requirements of the safety instrumented functions to be allocated to the safety instrumented systems.

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Risk
Safety integrity of protection layers shall meet the required risk reduction!
Concequency of hazardous event Severity EUC risk Frequency Frequency of hazardous event
Non SIS risk reduction (BPCS)

Risk = Severity x Frequency

SIS Safety Instrumented System

Other safety system Required risk reduction

Tolerable risk

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Reduce risks to acceptable levels

Hazard Class
Major

Unacceptably high risks!

Medium

Minor LOW MEDIUM HIGH

Acceptably low risks! Frequency of occurrence

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Reduce the frequency of occurrence

Prevention

Hazard Class
Major PL3

PL1

Medium PL4 PL2

Minor LOW MEDIUM HIGH

Frequency of occurrence

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Reduce the severity of consequence

Hazard Class
Major ML1 ML2 Medium ML3 ML4 Minor LOW MEDIUM HIGH Mitigation

Frequency of occurrence

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Tolerable risk
Risk cannot be justified except in extraordinary circumstances

Intolerable region The ALARP or tolerability region

(Risk is undertaken only if a benefit is desired)

ALARP:

Tolerable only if further risk reduction is impracticable or if its cost is grossly disproportionate to the improvement gained

(As Low As Reasonably Practicable)

Broadly acceptable region

(No need for detailed working to demonstrate ALARP)

It is necessary to maintain assurance that risk remains at this level

Negligible risk
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Layers of protection
COMMUNITY EMERGENCY REPSONSE PLANT EMERGENCY REPSONSE PHYSICAL PROTECTION (DIKES) PHYSICAL PROTECTION (RELIEF DEVICES) AUTOMATIC ACTION SIS OR ESD
CRITICAL ALARMS, OPERATOR SUPERVISION, AND MANUAL INTERVENTION BASIC CONTROLS, PROCESS ALARMS, AND OPERATOR SUPERVISION

PROCESS DESIGN

LAH 1

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Preventive and mitigation Protection Layers

MECHANICAL PROTECTION SIS (ESD) ALARM + OPERATOR SUPERVISION BPCS (DCS) CONTROL PROCESS DESIGN
I

COUNTRY EMERGENCY RESPONSE COMMUNITY EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANT EMERGENCY RESPONSE PHISICAL PROTECTION HAZARDOUS EVENT ACCIDENT

LAH 1

PREVENTION
INIT. EVENT 1

MITIGATION ML1 ML2

PROTECTION LAYERS PL 1A PL 2B PL 3A PL 1B PL 1C PL 2C PL 3C PL 3D PL 1D

CONSEQUENCE 1

INIT. EVENT 2

HAZARDOUS EVENT

CONSEQUENCE 2 CONSEQUENCE 3

INITEVENT 3

CONSEQUENCE 4

SCENARIO = FROM INIT EVENT ..TO CONSEQUENCY

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TYPE OF RISK

CENSEQUENCY FOR PERSON

ENVIROMENT ACCIDENT
CONSEQUENCE FOR POPULATION

CAUSE SYSTEM INCIDENT (FAILURE) HAZARD

CONSEQUENCY FOR ECONOMY CONSEQUENCY FOR ENVIROMENT

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HAZARD
HAZARD: ENERGY OF POSITION

GRAVITY

ACCIDENT

RISK REDUCTION

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PR EV EN TI O N
CONSEQUENCE

INCIDENT

PROTECTION

PROCES HAZARD ANALYSIS

HOW IDENTIFY THE HAZARDS? USEFUL ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES:
Checklist Analysis What If Analysis What if Analysis+ Checklist Analysis Hazard and Operability Analysis: HAZOP Failure Mode and Effects Analysis: FMEA Event Tree Analysis: ETA Fault-Tree Analysis: FTA

OTHER PROCEDURES:

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FLOWSHEET OF HAZOP
HAZOP
1. Partition if process 2. Intentions of design Determine deviations (parameter + guideword) 4. Determine causes + frequency 5. Determine consequences + severity 6. Identify protections, safeguards 7. Recommendations, actions

8. Documentations

NO

Finish?
RISK ASSESMENT

Applied software: DYADEM PHA-Pro7

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Aims of HAZOP
Hazard & Risk Analysis: identification of the hazards and hazardous events (emergency situations) inherent in the process and its associated equipment as well as of the sequence of events leading to an emergency, the process risks related to emergencies, the requirements of risk reduction and the safety functions necessary for achieving the required level of risk reduction. Objective of the HAZOP: The hazard & operability (HAZOP) analysis is the structured and systematic investigation of some planned or existing technological process or operation with the purpose of identifying and evaluating all problems which may pose risks in respect of the personnel, the environment or equipment or may hinder the efficient operation of the process system. The HAZOP study is aimed at the discovery of potential deviations from the intention of the design as well as the investigation of the possible causes of these and the assessment of the consequences. Applied standard: IEC 61882: Hazard and operability studies (HAZOP studies)
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HAZOP glossary
HAZOP worksheet entries: Node / subnode: A node is a specific location in the process in which (the deviations of) the design/process intent are evaluated. (e.g. separators, heat exchangers, scrubbers, pumps, compressors, and interconnecting pipes with equipment.) Design Intent: The design intent is a description of how the process is expected to behave at the node; this is qualitatively described as an activity (e.g., feed, reaction, sedimentation) and/or quantitatively in the process parameters, like temperature, flow rate, pressure etc. Deviation: A deviation is a way in which the process conditions may depart from their design/process intent. Parameter: The relevant parameter for the condition(s) of the process (e.g. pressure, temperature, composition). Guideword: A short word to create the imagination of a deviation of the design/process intent. The most commonly used set of guidewords is: no, more, less, as well as, part of, other than, and reverse.

Deviation = Parameter + Guideword

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HAZOP glossary
HAZOP worksheet entries: Cause: The reason(s) why the deviation could occur Consequence: The results of the deviation, in case it occurs. Consequences may both comprise process hazards and operability problems, like plant shut-down or reduced quality of the product. Several consequences may follow from one cause and, in turn, one consequence can have several causes Safeguard: Facilities that help to reduce the occurrence frequency of the deviation or to mitigate its consequences.

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HAZOP members
Practically in the HAZOP procedure the following members should be present as participants: HAZOP team leader (PROCOPLAN Ltd./SIL4S Ltd.) HAZOP secretary (PROCOPLAN Ltd) Operator (MOL) Maintenance experts of process unit (MOL) Functional Safety Engineer (FSE) and /or SIS expert (PROCOPLAN Ltd) Technologist (UTE) HSE

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HAZOP leader
HAZOP leader responsibilities: Defining the method and scope of the analysis Plans and scheduls the HAZOP study Ensures the data supply gets to the members Explanation of the applied guide-words and technological parameters Leads the team in the HAZOP analysis Ensure the results and recommendations are to be documented Ensures that the study is completed in the time and follows the progres of HAZOP study Ensures that the analysis thoroughly covers the process Prepares the HAZOP sheets and handles the HAZOP program Makes a report about the comments and notices Documenting the determined hazards, identified problems and recommendations Prepares the draft HAZOP report
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HAZOP guidewords
The basic HAZOP guide-words are: Guide Words
No (not, none) More (more of, higher) Less (less of, lower) As well as (more than) Part of Reverse Other than (other) Early / late Before / after Faster / slower Where else
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Meaning
None of the design intent is achieved Quantitative increase in a parameter Quantitative decrease in a parameter An additional activity occurs Only some of the design intention is achieved Logical opposite of the design intention occurs Complete substitution - another activity takes place The timing is different from the intention The step (or part of it) is effected out of sequence The step is done/not done with the right timing Applicable for flows, transfer, sources and destinations
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HAZOP parameters + guidewords

Paramter Guide Word Tbb Alacsony ramls Alacsony nyoms Vkuum Hmrsklet klnbsg Nincs szint lerlt Telik - fogy Visszalps Elmaradt elksett Kiegszts Rossz idben extra Nincs r id kihagyva Nincs kevereds Rszleges reakci Nem kvnt reakci Szint klnbsg Nincs ramls Fordtott ramls Eltr ramls Beszennyezs Ms anyag rossz sszettel Nyoms Robbans klnbsg lkshullm Kevesebb Nincs Fordtott Eltr Rszleges Ms mint ramls Nagy ramls

Nyoms Hmrsklet Szint Id/ idzts Kevereds/ vegyls Reakci Gyors reakci Lass reakci Nincs reakci megfuts Gyors kevereds Lass kevereds Tl hossz tl ksn Tl rvid tl hamar Magas szint Alacsony szint Magas Alacsony hmrsklet hmrsklet

Nagy nyoms

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HAZOP parameters + guidewords

Paramter / Guide Word Tbb Tl gyors Elmaradt leereszts/ Tl hossz szellztets Elmaradt semlegests/ kzmbsts Hinyos Hiba/ segdenergia ellts kimarads Hiba Nincs/ elmaradt Tl kicsi Tl nagy Nincs Rossz frekvencin Tl lass Nem indul nem ll le Kevesebb Nincs Indts/ lellts Leereszts szellztets Tl rvid Tl Semlegests semlegests kzmbsts kzmbsts Segdenergia ellts * DCS hiba Karbantarts Rezgs Fordtott Eltr Indts lellts elmaradt Eltr Rosszul idztve Beszennyezs Rossz anyaggal Rszleges Ms mint Rossz sorrend

* Segdenergia ellts : villamos, mszerleveg, hidraulika

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HAZOP documentation
Input documentation: Process Flow Diagram (PFD) Piping and Instrumentation Diagram (P&ID) Detailed technological description Operational manual Safety Material Data Sheets (SMDS) Risk criterias for people, public, business and environment. Tolerable risks (part of HSE policy) Logic Narrative, ESD system description Cause and Effect matrix (C&E) Output documentation: Introduction, methodology System definition and delimitation Documents (on which the analysis is based) Methodology Team members, sessions, attendance HAZOP report Recommendations
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HAZOP worksheet

ltalnos informcik Vllalat Helyszn zem Projekt Idpontok

Eljrs ismertetse

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HAZOP worksheet

Munkacsoport tagjai

Munkalsek idpontjai

Rsztvevk

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HAZOP worksheet
Alcsompontok Berendezsek P&ID rajzok Vezrsz

Csompontok Eltrsek

Paramter

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HAZOP worksheet

Okok Kockzat Szemly Krnyezet Gazdasg

Valsznsg Kvetkezmnyek Vdelmek Javaslatok Slyossg

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HAZOP report

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HAZOP nodes and subnodes

Subnode 2.6 Subnode 2.2 Subnode 2.8 Subnode 2.3 Subnode 2.4 Subnode 2.10 Subnode 2.1 Subnode 1.2 Subnode 1.1 Subnode 2.11 Subnode 2.9 Subnode 2.7

NODE-1
Subnode 1.5

NODE-2

PLDA
Subnode 2.12 Subnode 2.13 Subnode 1.3 Subnode 2.5 Subnode 1.4
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Subnode 1.6
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HAZOP & LOPA

HAZOP KOCKZATOK RANGSOROLSA LOPA

ELTRSEK OKOK OKOK GYAKORISGA

KEZDETI ESEMNY KEZDETI ESEMNY GYAKORISGA KVETKEZMNYEK KVETKEZMNYEK SLYOSSGA TOLERLHAT GYAKORISG BPCS (DCS) IRNYTS IPL & PFD ALARM + KEZELI BEAVATKOZS IPL & PFD

FSQA

KOCKZATI MTRIX

KVETKEZMNYEK MEGLV VDELMEK JAVASOLT VDELMEK

KVETKEZMNYEK SLYOSSGA

FSQA

SIS (ESD) AUTOM. BEAVATKOZS IPL & PFD MECHANIKAI S EGYB VDELEM IPL & PFD BIZTONSGI KVETELMNY SPECIFIKCI SRS

SIL?
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CSKKENTETT GYAKORISG
Hazard and Operability Study - HAZOP

Kockzatok rtkelse: Kockzati mtrix (plda)

Kvetkezmny Slyossg

PLDA
< 1 v C (II) C (II) C (II) N (II) U (I) A B C D E Kockzati osztly I. osztly II. osztly Magas Nagyon magas Nem elfogadhat Ms megoldst kell vlasztani Meghatrozott idn bell sszer kockzatcskkentst kell alkalmazni Nem kvnatos (mszaki s/vagy adminisztratv ALARP szablyozssal) Tovbbi sszer kockzatcskkentst kell Felttelekkel elfogadhat alkalmazni (mszaki s/vagy PLDA ALARP adminisztratv szablyozssal) Kockzat s krcskkents nem szksges Elfogadhat
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Szemly A (III) A (III) A (III) C (II) C (II) Ignyelt kockzatcskkents C (II) C (II) N (II) C (II) C (II) C (II) C (II) C (II) C (II) C (II) C (II) C (II) A (III) A (III) C (II)

Gazdasg

Krnyezet

Elhanyagolhat 0 Gyakori

Valsznsg (gyakorisg) ValszLehetValntlen sges szn > 20 v 420 v 1 4 v

Jelentktelen Jelentktelen Enyhe srls vesztesg hats Jelents Jelents Jelents srls vesztesg hats Slyos Slyos Slyos srls vesztesg (helyi) hats Hallozs, Nagyon slyos Nagyon tbb srls vesztesg slyos hats Tbb Katasztroflis Katasztrofli hallozs vesztesg s hats Kockzati szint Kockzati kategria

II. osztly III. osztly

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Kzepes Elhanyagolhat

Veszlyes esemnyek gyakorisga

Veszlyes esemnyek kiindulsi okainak gyakorisgnak meghatrozsa mszaki megfontolsokon alapul becslsekkel:
Kategria
0 1 2 3 4 Valszn (1 - 4 v) Gyakori (< 1 v) Lehetsges (4 - 20 v) Valszntlen (> 20 v) Elhanyagolhat, rendkvl valszntlen

Valsznsg

Meghatrozs
Iparban ismeretlen elforduls, a berendezs letciklusa sorn nem vrhat. Iparban mr elfordult, a MOL terletn mg nem, de a berendezs letciklusa sorn elfordulhat. MOL terletn mr elfordult, de a berendezs letciklusa sorn nhnyszor elfordulhat. MOL terletn vente tbbszr elfordult, a berendezs letciklusa sorn tbbszr elfordulhat. vente tbbszr elfordulhat az adott helyen.

PLDA

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Szemlyekre vonatkoz kvetkezmnyek

Szemlyek egszsgre s biztonsgra vonatkoz kvetkezmnyek, minsgi becslse:
Kategria
A B Slyos srls (baleset) s egszsg krosods Hallos vagy csoportos baleset Tbb embert rint hallos balest Egy embernl tbbet rint hallos baleset, katasztrfa. Egy embert rint hallos baleset vagy kettnl tbb embert rint csoportos slyos baleset. Munkakpessg hossz idszakos kiesse illetve rszleges elvesztse. Nem visszafordthat, teljes gygyuls nem lehetsges, de nem jr az let elvesztsvel. Jelents srls (baleset) s egszsg krosods Munkakpessg idszakos (3 napnl rvidebb) kiesse. Visszafordthat, teljes gygyuls lehetsges. Enyhe srls s egszsgi rtalom (elssegly) Munkakpessgre nem hat, munka kiesst nem okoz (elssegly, orvosi kezels).

Kvetkezmny

Meghatrozs

D E

PLDA

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Gazdasgi vagy zleti kvetkezmny

Gazdasgi vagy zleti kvetkezmny, minsgi becslse:
Kategria
A Nem jelents vesztesg

Kvetkezmny

Meghatrozs
Hozam, energia vesztesg, kb. 25% bedolgozs cskkents egy kisebb zemnl (zleti vesztesg: 1 10 ezer EUR) Kisebb zem lellsa, 25% bedolgozs cskkents egy norml nagysg zemnl (zleti vesztesg: 10 100 ezer EUR) Vllalati imzst rombol, elltsban fellp minsgi s mennyisgi problma (zleti vesztesg: 0,1 1 milli EUR) Nagyobb zem lellsa (zleti vesztesg: 1 10 milli EUR) Orszgos zemanyag elltsban fellp botrnyos zavar (zleti vesztesg: >10 milli EUR)

Jelents vesztesg

Slyos vesztesg

D E

Nagyon slyos vesztesg Katasztroflis vesztesg

PLDA

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Krnyezeti kvetkezmny
Krnyezeti kvetkezmny, minsgi becslse:
Kategria
A B C Nagyon slyos krnyezeti krost hats, hatrrtket jelentsen meghalad kibocsts (mrgez gzmls). Kls (kertsen kvli) s jelents bels krnyezetkrosts. Jelents erforrst ignyl helyrellts. Katasztroflis kvetkezmny nagy kls krnyezeti krost hats, hatrrtket jelentsen meghalad hosszidej kibocsts (pl. HF, ammnia, knhidrogn mls vagy jelents lvzszennyezs). Nagyon jelents erforrst ignyl helyrellts. Slyos (helyi) hats Helyi (bels) krnyezeti krosods, vllalati imzst rombol. Korltozott mrgez anyag kimls. Jelents hats Jelents krnyezeti hats, hatrrtk feletti kibocsts. (ers pl. knhidrogn fklyzs). Idszakos krnyezeti hats. Nem jelents hats Helyi krnyezeti hats, kellemetlensg (zaj, szag, hulladk keletkezs). Egy napnl rvidebb fklyzs.

Kvetkezmny

Meghatrozs

Nagyon slyos hats

Katasztroflis hats

PLDA
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IPL requirements
IPL Independent Protection Layer shall be (acc. to EN 61511-3/F.9.): Specificity: An IPL is designed solely to prevent or to mitigate the consequences of one potentially hazardous event (for example, a runaway reaction, release of toxic material, a loss of containment, or a fire). Multiple causes may lead to the same hazardous event; and, therefore, multiple event scenarios may initiate action of one IPL; Independence: An IPL is independent of the other protection layers associated with the identified danger. Dependability: It can be counted on to do what it was designed to do. Both random and systematic failures modes are addressed in the design. Auditability: It is designed to facilitate regular validation of the protective functions. Proof testing and maintenance of the safety system is necessary.

3 Enough's, Big/Fast/Strong Enough 3 Ds: Detect / Decide / Deflect

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SIL, RRF
RR(F): SIL: Risk Reduction (Factor) Kockzat cskkentsi (tnyez) Safety Integrity Level Biztonsgi integritsi szint

Safety integrity level (SIL)

Hibzs tlagos valsznsge (PFDavg)

Kockzat cskkentsi tnyez (RRF)

1 2 3 4 >=10-5 - <10-4 >10000 - <= 100000 >=10-4 - <10-3 >1000 - <= 10000 >=10-3 - <10-2 >100 - <= 1000 >=10-2 - <10-1 >10 - <= 100

>=10-1 <= 100

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Safety Instrumented Functions (SIF)

SIF1 SIF1 S1 SIF2 S2 S3 SIF3 S3 S4 SIF3 Logikai Vezrl (LS) FE 2 S2 S3 Logikai Vezrl (LS) S1 FE 1 FE 2 FE 3 SIF2

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Typical SIF

102 KEM. FG FTGZ NYOMS MINIMUM VDELEM: SIF-102-02B/1..4

MPSL-087A/B/C

Pldk BMS rendszerbl:

PSL 2oo3 1oo2

MBAL-001-004 (fg 1.)

BSL

LOGIC SOLVER: Biztonsgi PLC

1oo2
MUV-002A/B/C (fg 1.)

102 KEMENCE FG LNGR VDELEM (ZEM KZBEN): SIF-102-03D/5..8

MBAL-005-008 (fg 2.)

BSL

1oo2

LOGIC SOLVER: Biztonsgi PLC

MUV-003A/B/C (fg 2.)

102 KEMENECE GSTERMK-ELVEZETS VDELEM: SIF-102-05A

MGSC015/15A/15B

GSC

2oo3

LOGIC SOLVER: Biztonsgi PLC

3oo3 1oo2
MUV-004A/B/C (rlng kzs) MUV-011..018 (rlng egyedi) MUV-003A/B/C (fg 2.)

1oo2

MUV-002A/B/C (fg 1.)

1oo3

8oo8

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Process Safety Time / Response Time

Folyamatbiztonsgi idnek nevezik azt az idperidust, amely alatt a technolgiai folyamat mkdhet vdelem nlkl s egy fellp mkdsi igny nem vezet veszlyes llapothoz.
PV

Folyamat vltoz

Slyos kvetkezmny bekvetkezse

BUMM

Belltott retesz hatrrtk AHH Belltott retesz eljelzs AH

Folyamat biztonsgi id (PST) Reaglsi id (RT)

RT < PST RT PST/2 Id (t)

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Standards
Felhasznlt rvnyes szabvnyok, rendelkezsek, utastsok s mszaki irodalom:
Seveso II Directive [96/082/EEC] 18/2006. (I. 26.) Korm. Rendelet: a veszlyes anyagokkal kapcsolatos slyos balesetek elleni vdekezsrl MSZ EN 61508: Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related systems, Parts 1-7. MSZ EN 61511: Functional safety: Safety Instrumented Systems for the Process Industries. Parts 1-3. EEMUA 191: Alarm systems, a guide to design, management and procurement No. 191 (Engineering Equipment and Materials Users Association) IEC 61882 Hazard and operability studies (HAZOP studies) IEC 60812 A rendszer-megbzhatsg elemzs mdszerei. A hibamd- s hatselemzs (FMEA) eljrsa IEC 61025 Hibafa-elemzs (FTA: Fault Tree Analysis) AZ EURPAI PARLAMENT S A TANCS 1999/92/EK IRNYELVE (ATEX137): A robbansveszlyes lgkr kockzatnak kitett munkavllalk biztonsgnak s egszsgvdelmnek javtsra vonatkoz minimumkvetelmnyekrl 3/2003. (III. 11.) FMM-ESzCsM egyttes rendelet: A POTENCILISAN ROBBANSVESZLYES KRNYEZETBEN LEV MUNKAHELYEK MINIMLIS MUNKAVDELMI KVETELMNYEIRL MSZ EN 1127-1: Robbankpes kzegek. Robbansmegelzs s robbansvdelem. MSZ EN 746-2:1998 Ipari htechnikai berendezsek 2. rsz:Tzel s tzelanyag ellt rendszerek biztonsgi kvetelmnyei NYOMSTART BERENDEZSEK MSZAKI-BIZTONSGI SZABLYZATA: a 63/2004. (IV. 27.) GKM rendelet s a 23/2006. (II. 3.) Kormnyrendelet vgrehajtshoz szksges rszletes mszaki kvetelmnyek Layer of Protection Analysis: Simplified Process Risk Assessment (Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) Concept Book)

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Thank You for your attention!

PROCOPLAN KFT.
2030 rd, Disdi u. 107./C Tel: +36 23 361-433 Fax: +36 23 364-124 Mail: procoplan@procoplan.hu www.procoplan.hu

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