Nationalities Papers Vol. 38, No.

5, September 2010, 723 739

DEBATE Stalins populism and the accidental creation of Russian national identity
David Brandenberger
University of Richmond History, Richmond, VA, USA (Received 8 October 2009; nal version received 16 December 2009) This article argues that the formation of a mass sense of Russian national identity was a recent, contingent event that rst began to take shape under Stalin. Surveying the new literature on Russian nationalism, it contends that elite expressions of Russianness and bureaucratic proclamations of ofcial nationality or russication should not be conated with the advent of a truly mass sense of grassroots identity. Borrowing from an array of theorists, it argues that such a sense of identity only becomes possible after the establishment of necessary social institutions universal schooling, a modern army, etc. Inasmuch as these institutions come into being only after the formation of the Soviet Union, this article focuses on how a mass sense of Russian national identity began to form under a rapid and unpredictable series of ideological shifts that occurred during the Stalinist 1930s and 1940s. This articles major contribution is its description of this development as not only contingent, but accidental. Drawing a clear line between russocentric propaganda and full-blown Russian nationalism, it argues that the ideological initiatives that precipitated mass identity formation in the USSR were populist rather than nationalist. In this sense, Stalinism has much more in common with Peronism than it does with truly national regimes. Keywords: Russia; USSR; Stalin; populism; nationalism

Ronald Grigor Sunys book The Revenge of the Past is known for the elegant argument that Soviet attempts to domesticate the forces of nationalism after 1917 actually led to the consolidation of dozens of new nations and the collapse of the USSR. Within each of these new national traditions, it is often possible to identify members of the creative and political elite responsible for aspects of this nation-building (e.g. Allworth). The Russians are no exception in this regard, as recent books by Yitzhak Brudny and Nikolai Mitrokhin make abundantly clear.1 While Brudny and Mitrokhin are correct to trace the emergence of Russian-looking institutions and incipient nationalist organizations to the decades following the death of Stalin, neither spends much time on the preceding era, which presumably set the stage for the emergence of increasingly full-edged nationalism. This article investigates the dynamics between 1917 and 1953 that ultimately gave rise to a social milieu capable of producing articulate Russian nationalists. It dovetails with Sunys analysis of the nonRussian nationalities to argue that the formation of modern Russian national identity should be considered in large part the product of a historical accident. While this would

Email: dbranden@richmond.edu

ISSN 0090-5992 print/ISSN 1465-3923 online # 2010 Association for the Study of Nationalities DOI: 10.1080/00905992.2010.498464 http://www.informaworld.com

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not be a controversial claim to make in regard to the modern Azeri or Turkmen nations, this article contends that the emergence of modern Russian national identity in its present form was by no means inevitable and was just as much a result of historical contingency and the Soviet experience as the other republican cultures of the USSR. Discussions of Russian national identity tend to locate its origins in the nineteenth century. Historically, some commentators have focused on ideology and russication2 work that has been recently complemented by new research on imperial nationality policy in central institutions,3 the western borderlands and Poland,4 Ukraine,5 Siberia,6 and the Volga and North Caucasus regions.7 Others have examined the role of institutions such as the Russian Orthodox Church and the military.8 Still other have offered explanations pivoting on the role of the intelligentsia and educated classes, locating reections of an emergent sense of Russian national identity in the periods debates,9 press,10 art,11 public culture and civic organizations.12 It is important to remember, however, that such articulate notions of group identity found little reection in Russian society as a whole outside of the small urban educated elite. Marginally literate if educated at all, vast stretches of the empires Russian-speaking population simply could not imagine a larger political community than that dened by their provincial economic, cultural, and kinship associations. In other words, the process Eugen Weber has described that transformed peasants into Frenchmen during the nineteenth century was just barely underway in the Russian-speaking lands of Eastern Europe at the turn of the twentieth century (Weber; also Jelavich; Boyd). What can account for this absence of an articulate sense of national identity? In part, what seems to have been lacking among most Russians under the old regime was a commonly-held awareness of a long, glorious history, replete with a pantheon of semi-mythical patriots whose heroism had advanced the national cause (Smith 213). It was such claims of primordial pedigree, according to Benedict Anderson, that mobilized the new imagined communities of Europe through print media and mass education during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Tales of ruling dynasties, epic struggles and battleeld victories dominated these new national histories, the creation and popularization of which was a central aspect of the consolidation of nations throughout Europe (Anderson 109 10, 11). In Russia, however, a lack of agreement within elites about what it meant to be Russian and disdain on the part of the tsarist regime for nationalism of any stripe (particularly via print media and public education)13 prevented the coalescing of a similarly coherent, consistent and articulate sense of national identity on the popular level.14 Instead, group identity among Russians during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was more or less coherent only on the regional level. As one scholar has put it, the average peasant at the turn of the century had little sense of Russianness. He thought of himself, not as a Russkii, but as a Viatskii or as a Tulskii that is, a native of Viatka or Tula province.15 Such understandings persisted even after peasants left their villages to join the ranks of the nascent urban working class (Johnson). Perhaps unsurprisingly, a lack of national patriotic sentiments among the population dovetailed with this underdeveloped and inconsistent sense of national identity. Provincial Russia offered little to counteract this state of affairs it was a society with few institutions, where authority was more often associated with specic personalities than with the ofces they held. For a variety of reasons, neither the public schools (to the extent to which they even existed) nor the tsarist court made any concerted effort to alter the situation.16 Even the army relied on banal and simplistic forms of sloganeering (referred to in Russian as shapkozakidatelstvo) in order to maintain morale within the ranks. Although it should be acknowledged that after the start of the First World War, the tsarist state did

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make some attempt to develop a more concrete and coherent notion of what it meant to be Russian, too little effort was invested too late to have a tangible effect.17 As a result, negative caricatures of the German enemy did more to unite the empire than the clumsy nativist patriotic slogans that were hastily disseminated between 1914 and 1917 (Jahn). A decade later, little had changed, despite the intervening imperial collapse, revolution, civil war, and rst phases of Soviet state building. Ethnographers associated with the rst Soviet census during the mid-1920s are known to have looked in vain for evidence of an articulate sense of a Russian national community.18 Instead, when the archival record reveals moments of ethnic self-awareness among ordinary Russians, these sentiments tend to be vague and focus on negative characterizations of non-Russian ethnic groups rather than on positive descriptions of themselves.19 Of course, if there had been only a weak and inconsistently-felt sense of national iden tity under the ancien regime, the fact that little changed following the revolution should come as no surprise. National identity formation is not a spontaneous or inevitable process; whats more, the early Soviet regimes commitment to proletarian internationalism led the Bolsheviks to actively discourage the coalescing of a mass sense of Russian national identity during the rst 15 years of the Soviet experiment. As is well known, Soviet authorities were relentless in their emphasis of the primacy of class consciousness over national consciousness. Even after the inauguration of Stalins Socialism in One Country thesis in the mid-1920s, Soviet propagandists continued to view class as a more fundamental and decisive social category than other paradigms drawn along ethnic or national indexes. Indeed, nationalism was viewed as a sentiment that threatened to distract the laboring masses from more natural afliations organized along class lines. Russian nationalism in particular was seen as enough of a threat to the early Soviet republic that positive appraisals of Russianness during the 1920s were condemned as jingoism and Great Power chauvinism reminiscent of the tsarist-era (Martin, Afrmative Action Empire 156 59, 388 89; Simon 83 91; Kohn, Soviet Communism and Nationalism 65). Non-Russian nationalism was also discouraged during this time, with the persecution of bourgeois nationalists in republican areas being complemented by an ambitious korenizatsiia program designed to advance local cadres and develop non-Russian cultures within the context of Soviet socialism. It was hoped that state-sponsored upward mobility and cultural development would defuse nationalist and separatist sentiments on the periphery and foster new traditions that would be national in form, socialist in content. Much of this changed toward the end of the 1920s, when turbulence and social unrest particularly in the aftermath of the 1927 war scare led Soviet ideologists to look with increasing urgency for a way to complement the partys arcane, materialist propaganda with slogans that would be more understandable and compelling to the average Soviet citizen. Realizing that the existing line was too abstract and bloodless to effectively rally their poorly educated population,20 Stalin and his colleagues began to look for a more pragmatic alternative that would focus on the celebration of individual heroes and the rather questionably Marxist notion of Soviet patriotism. This attempt to court public opinion is at rst glance paradoxical in light of the regimes infamously reckless and cruel revolution from above during these years shock industrialization, specialist baiting [spetseedstvo], forced collectivization, dekulakization and cultural revolution. Nevertheless, these two seemingly incompatible trends functioned as carrot and stick within Soviet mobilizational efforts, attempting to drive the society forward during the late 1920s and early 1930s by hook and by crook.

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The origins of the new emphasis on accessible propaganda date to 1928, when Maksim Gorkii and others concerned with societal mobilization began to argue that everyday heroes could be used to popularize the nascent patriotic line by example. In marked contrast to the regimes focus on proletarian internationalism and anonymous social forces during the 1920s, this new stress on popular heroism led to the rise of what was essentially a new genre of agitational literature. Prominent projects like Gorkiis multivolume History of Plants and Factories and The History of the Civil War in the USSR began to assemble a new pantheon of Soviet heroes, socialist myths, and modern-day fables. This search for a usable past not only focused on shock workers in industry and agriculture, but it also lavished attention on prominent Old Bolshevik revolutionaries, industrial planners, party leaders, komsomol ofcials, comintern activists, Red Army heroes, non-Russians from the republican party organizations, and even famous members of the secret police (Brandenberger, National Bolshevism 27 42). A.S. Enukidze, G.I. Piatakov, A.I. Rykov, A.V. Kosarev, A.E. Egorov, M.N. Tukhachevskii, F. Khodzhaev and Ia. Peters quickly became household names. This stress on everyday heroism took center stage at the rst conference of the Soviet Writers Union in 193421 right after the Seventeenth Party Congress of Victors hailed the successful completion of the rst phase of industrialization and collectivization. Now, mobilizational propaganda was apparently supposed to supplant the coercion of the rst Five-Year Plan and a massive array of new literature was commissioned to develop and expand upon the new Soviet Olympus and its pantheon of contemporary heroes. Virtually silent on the issue of Russianness (with the exception of attention cast toward nineteenth century radical democrats such as A.S. Pushkin, N.G. Chernyshevskii and N.A. Dobroliubov), this propaganda promoted a line that might anachronistically be called multiculturalist, insofar as it devoted considerable effort to popularizing a diverse variety of non-Russian party members and labor heroes whose valor was distinctly national while also conforming to the reigning socialist precepts of the day.22 This contemporary focus was complemented by the creation of new historical narratives for the various Soviet nationalities as well. These popular histories publicized regional uprisings against tsarist colonialism (e.g. movements under Imam Shamil and Amangeldy Imanov) and grouped them together with better-known peasant rebellions led by Pugachev and Razin. Worker unrest in Baku and Tiis in the 1890s was likewise described as part of the same revolutionary tradition as the street ghting and barricades that paralyzed St. Petersburg and Moscow in 1905. Ultimately, Soviet mass culture, circa 1935, was characterized by a colorful and complex pageantry revolving around Soviet socialism and the Friendship of the Peoples. Accessible, heroic tales from the recent (and not so recent) past served to provide a common narrative that the entire society would be able to relate to a patriotic rallying call with greater social application than the previous decades narrow and impersonal focus on materialism and class. Central to this argument is the populist nature of this new line. Although populism is difcult to dene in the abstract23 and is often associated with agrarian politics in practice,24 it also describes top-down political campaigning designed to mobilize society on the mass level through the co-option of grassroots beliefs and values. The latter denition effectively describes Stalinist propaganda between the early-to-mid 1930s and 1953, inviting compari sons with the authoritarian populism of Argentinas Juan Peron (1943 1952), Chiles Carlos Ibanez del Campo (1927 1931), Brazils Getulio Vargas (1930 1945), Cubas Fulgencio Batista (1937 1940), Perus Juan Velasco Alvareda (1968 1975) and Paraguays Alfredo Stroessner (1954 1989) (Dix; Malloy; Sondrol; etc). In each case, a charismatic leader presided over a developing but divided society by appealing for

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popular unity against internal and external enemies. Remedies for poverty and poor living conditions were promised, to be realized at the expense of poorly-dened corruption and vested interests rather than through more systemic reform. Symbols and rhetoric deployed in support of this agenda focused not only on enemies of the people and the promise of a better life, but the shared history of blood and soil that harkened back to a semi-mythic golden age of unity and prosperity (Dix; Canovan 136 71). Of course, for all these leaders talk about nation, national origins and national unity, they were not genuine nationalists, inasmuch as they believed in dictatorial power from above rather than self-determination from below.25 Although sometimes referred to as an ideology, such populism is probably better thought of as a mode of mobilizational agitation a conclusion which simplies the comparison of Stalin-era populism to that advanced by a number of South American dictators during the twentieth century (Horowitz; Merkl 114 35). Indeed, the fact that populism in Argentina coexisted harmoniously with other seemingly-incompatible ideological precepts (e.g. the defense of oligarchic privilege and elite business interests) illustrates how Stalin could use populist appeals alongside a more orthodox Marxist-Leninist line based on class analysis and proletarian internationalism (Horowitz). And as was the case with Argentina under Peron, Soviet society responded well to Stalins deployment of populist sloganeering oriented around the friendship of the peoples and a shared history of heroism, valor and virtue (Brandenberger, Propaganda State in Crisis chap. 6). No sooner had this new populist propaganda begun to enjoy success in Soviet society than it was hamstrung by the Great Terror between 1936 and 1938. What had previously been support for non-Russian ethnic self-expression translated during these years into suspicion and charges of bourgeois nationalism26 at roughly the same time that Enukidze, Piatakov, Rykov, Kosarev, Egorov, Tukhachevskii and other members of the new Soviet Olympus were consumed by the on-going purges. It is also at this time, interestingly enough, that the press regular condemnation of great-power chauvinism quietly gave way to a gradual and halting rehabilitation of myths, legends and iconography drawn from the Russian national past. New names from Aleksandr Nevskii and Peter the Great to Aleksandr Suvorov and Mikhail Kutuzov joined the now-sparse ofcial pantheon of heroes, replacing famous personalities from the Soviet past who had fallen victim to the Terror. By 1938, this celebration of things Russian was even beginning to refer to the Russian people as primus inter pares the most historic, heroic and revolutionary of the peoples of the USSR (Volin, Velikii ruskii narod). This prewar shift towards the prerevolutionary Russian usable past was intensied further during the opening weeks of the German Soviet war in 1941 as Soviet ideologists struggled to mobilize their society for war by any means possible. True, party propagandists made other pragmatic concessions as well in regard to the church, non-Russian selfexpression and the new alliance with capitalist powers abroad, but all of these gestures paled in comparison to the huge amount of resources devoted to the Russian national past. Whats more, tentative efforts between 1938 and 1941 to venerate not only Russian historical gures, but the Russian people itself, also matured into a major wartime theme.27 Ultimately, this celebration of Russian war heroes of the past and present not only set up Stalins famous 1945 toast to the Russian people, but the xenophobic excesses that followed during the mid-to-late 1940s and early 1950s. The intentions behind this about-face in Soviet propaganda have been widely debated since Nicholas Timasheff termed it one aspect of the eras Great Retreat in 1947. Some have linked the phenomenon to nationalist sympathies within the party hierarchy,28 eroding prospects for world revolution,29 and the Stalinist elites revision of Marxist

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principles.30 Others associate the transformation with increasing threats from the outside world (especially Hitlers rise to power in 1933),31 the emergence of domestic etatism,32 the triumph of administrative pragmatism over revolutionary utopianism33 and the evolution of Soviet nationality policy.34 Still others tend to contextualize the changes underway as symptomatic of larger ideological dynamics,35 while yet another school of thought considers the phenomenon to be little more than a short-term exigency of war.36 Recently, Veljko Vujacic has returned Stalin to center stage in order to argue that the general secretary aspired to cultivate no less than a new Soviet-Russian identity over the course of his reign, combining his affection for the Russian working class with Marxism-Leninisms principle of proletarian class consciousness. In order to do this, Stalin apparently not only advanced a newly hybridized identity, but aggressively destroyed the remaining vestiges of Old Russia as well.37 An original interpretation, it suffers from the lack of a proverbial smoking gun in the form of archival documentation. Unable to conclusively demonstrate the existence of a consistent party line on Russian proletarian identity stretching from the 1920s through to the 1950s, Vujacic assembles a circumstantial case based on a motley assortment of public speeches, policy decisions and institutional developments. The end result is an interesting but articially linear and overdetermined argument that meshes poorly with the established contours of Stalin-era ideological and cultural politics. Even more problematically, this interpretation fails to explain major aspects of the partys rehabilitation of Russianness during the mid-1930s and 1940s, particularly the massive emphasis placed on non-proletarian elements of the Russian national past. Perhaps the only interpretation capable of accounting for all of the turnabouts in regime propaganda during the 1930s contextualizes them within a newly populist ideology that prioritized societal mobilization for industrialization and war above all else.38 Two points are worth noting in regard to this emergent sense of national Bolshevism. First, the deployment of Russian symbols and iconography was far from inevitable and should be seen as a by-product of historical contingency stemming from the failure of more thoroughly Soviet propaganda during the purges. Second, even pervasive russocentrism after 1937 should not be confused with ofcial support for Russian state- or nation-building, inasmuch as state- and nation-building required a degree of institutional, political and cultural autonomy that the Bolsheviks never had any intention of extending. Instead, Stalin-era russocentrism should be regarded as instrumental and populist in design gestures designed to mobilize rather than enfranchise. Noticeably absent, after all, was the creation of an independent institutional identity for the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) that was separate from that of the USSR as a whole. That is to say that russocentrism after 1937 did not redress a profound institutional imbalance that lay at the heart of the Soviet system. As is widely known, the RSFSR was originally incorporated into the USSR without the bureaucratic institutions established elsewhere in the Ukraine, the Transcaucasus or the other union republics. This denial of a separate party organization, central committee, academy of sciences, etc. had been a deliberate strategy to limit Russian inuence in Soviet society during the early 1920s.39 Tellingly, this imbalance was retained after 1937 despite ofcial paens to the Russian people as the rst among equals.40 This discouragement of state-building was mirrored in the partys stance on Russian nation-building. Although a vast array of heroes, legends and myths associated with the Russian national past were revived after 1937, these efforts were selective and cautious, being designed to reect upon the Soviet present rather than to encourage independent historical inquiry into the past. Tsarist centralization and empire-building were styled as

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necessary precursors to Soviet state-building, while leaders from Ivan the Terrible to Peter the Great were used to implicitly legitimate the partys preference for charismatic one-man rule. Age-old anxieties served to inform the new concerns of the 1930s, whether through the Oprichninas just suppression of internal enemies or Aleksandr Nevskiis epic struggle with German Teutonic invaders. Prerevolutionary triumphs on the battleeld, as well as in science and the arts, served as a pedigree for Soviet-era commanders, artists and thinkers. Pushkins use of literary realism and his refusal to be restrained by convention was even held to anticipate the advent of Socialist Realism. According to the paradigm that apparently governed this revisionism, the rehabilitation of historic individuals, reputations and accomplishments was governed by their ability to illustrate, explain and justify contemporary aspects of Soviet life without allowing for the creation of an independent, free-standing alternative to the ofcial line. This quixotic relationship with the Russian national past is best understood as a function of Stalins peculiar regard for the Russian people as a whole. Although famous for his valorization of the Russian people, Stalin was not a Russian nationalist and had historically opposed all efforts to promote Russian self-rule. As Terry Martin has put it, Stalin viewed the Russian nation as a state-bearing people, the backbone of the Soviet Unions multiethnic society.41 Known for their revolutionary sweep of the hand, the Russians were drafted to serve quite literally as the rst among equals, the elder brother within the Soviet family of nations. Their culture, history and demographic strength were to reinforce the authority and legitimacy of the Soviet state. As A.N. Poskrebyshev put it in Pravda after the war, Russians in the USSR were the societys cementing force, strengthening the friendship of the peoples. Only this explanation can account for why even at the height of postwar russocentrism, the regime had little patience for anything reminiscent of Russian state- or nation-building. Ultimately, then, Stalin was an authoritarian populist rather than a nationalist and exploited russocentric imagery and rhetoric in order to mobilize Russian speakers to serve all-union interests. Geoffrey Hosking questions how effective this bid really was, noting that any positive inuence on public opinion was likely tempered by the USSRs continuing persecution of village culture and the Russian Orthodox Church during these years (Hosking, Rulers and Victims 188, 157, 180 187). Vujacic agrees, contending that the mass terror of the Stalinist period and the collectivization of the Russian peasantry opened an unbridgeable chasm between the Soviet state and the Russian nation (178). But as logical as these assumptions may seem, they are contradicted by a recent investigation of the popular reception of Stalins russocentric populism that suggests that the new line resonated quite well well enough to function as something of a modus vivendi between the Stalin-era state and Russian-speaking society.42 This is not to say, however, that Stalins populist attempt to co-opt the Russian national past without encouraging Russian nation- and state-building translated perfectly from theory into practice. Indeed, Russian speakers appear to have assimilated the general secretarys national Bolshevism in rather peculiar ways. In particular, although Russians generally grasped and internalized the most familiar, epic dimensions of the ofcial line (Pushkin, Peter and other personality cults; their status as rst among equals), they often failed to appreciate its more arcane and elusive Soviet elements (historical materialism; class consciousness; the friendship of the peoples; etc.). Letters, diaries, secret police reports and postwar interviews reveal that many Russian speakers actively distinguished between the two, thinking about their national past and its heroes and iconography separately from more conventional Soviet values (Brandenberger, National Bolshevism). One was familiar, accessible and appealing, while the other was schematic, bloodless and

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impersonal. One stirred up emotions of pride and belonging; the other only duty and obedience. This idiosyncratic reception of the ofcial line should really come as no surprise, inasmuch as audiences rarely accept ideological pronouncements wholesale, tending instead to simplify, essentialize, and misunderstand the content of ofcial communiques in ways that are sometimes difcult to anticipate. Such dynamics make the analysis of popular reception an essential dimension of any study of propaganda and ideology in the modern world. In this case, Russians selective consumption of national Bolshevik rhetoric and imagery during the Stalin era meant that by 1953, they were in possession of a much more coherent and articulate sense of who they were as Russians than they had enjoyed in the years before 1937. Put another way, the partys attempt to reinforce popular loyalty to the Soviet regime through the selective co-option of Russian myths, legends and iconography resulted in something Stalin never anticipated: the formation of a sense of Russian national consciousness quite independent of Soviet socialist trappings. As such, although the emergence of this sense of national identity is tied to one of the greatest propaganda campaigns of the mid-twentieth century, it should also be regarded as an unintentional and even accidental by-product of the general secretarys populist irtation with the mobilizational potential of the Russian national past.

Notes
1. Considerably less reliable are the memoirs of one of Suslovs former aides: Baigushev, Russkaia partiia. 2. Fundamental texts include Riasanovsky, Nicholas I and Ofcial Nationality; Wortman, Scen arios of Power; Thaden, Russias Western Borderlands; Thaden, ed. Russication; Lowe, Russian Nationalism. For new work on russication, see Weeks, Russication; Miller, Russikatsiia; Kappeler, Ambiguities of Russication. 3. See, for instance, Steinwedel, To Make . . .; Tolz, Russia; Tolz, Orientalism; Cadiot, Searching for Nationality; Cadiot, Russia Learns to Write. 4. See Weeks, Nation and State; Weeks, Religion and Russication; Rodkiewicz, Russian Nationality Policy; Gorizontov, Paradoksy imperskoi politiki; Staliunas, The Pole; Dolbilov, Kulturnaia idioma; Staliunas, Granitsy v pograniche; Staliunas, Did the Government . . .; Dolbilov, Russication and the Bureaucratic Mind; Dolbilov and Miller, Zapadnye okrainy; Maiorova, War as Peace. 5. See Miller, Ukrainskii vopros; Miller, Shaping Russian and Ukrainian Identities; Tolz, Russia; Mikhutina, Ukrainskii vopros; Vulpius, Nationalisierung der Religion. 6. Slezkine, Arctic Mirrors; Sunderland, Russians into Iakuts?; Bassin, Imperial Visions; Geraci, Ethnic Minorities. 7. See Geraci, Window on the East; Werth, At the Margins; Jersild and Melkadze, Dilemmas of Enlightenment; Crews, For Prophet and Tsar; Tolz, European, National, and (Anti-) Imperial. 8. Among others, see Vulpius, Nationalisierung der Religion; Sanborn, Drafting the Russian Nation; Vitarbo, Nationality Policy. 9. See Becker, Russia between East and West; Aizlewood, Revisiting Russian Identity; Knight, Ethnicity, Nationality, and the Masses; Knight, Was the Intelligentsia Part of the Nation? Maiorova, Bessmertnyi Riurik; Maiorova, Slavianskii sezd 1867 g.; Maiorova, War as Peace; Miller, Imperiia i natsiia; Poole, Religion, War, and Revolution. 10. See Renner, Russischer Nationalismus; Renner, Dening a Russian Nation; Weeks, Ofcial and Popular Nationalism. 11. See Ely, This Meager Nature; Dianina, Museum and the Nation; Dianina, Museum and Society; Jenks, Russia in a Box; Norris, War of Images. 12. See Kotsiubinskii, Russkii natsionalizm; Dianina, Museum and the Nation; Dianina, Museum and Society; Swift, Russia and the Great Exhibition; Fisher, Russia and the Crystal Palace; Bradley, Voluntary Associations; Loukianov, Rise and Fall . . ..

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13. On education, see Eklof, Russian Peasant Schools 125 26; Seregny, Teachers; Seregny, Russian Teachers. It can be argued that the autocracy actively discouraged the emergence of a single mass sense of Russian national identity out of the fear that popularizing an ethnically based form of solidarity might inadvertently undermine monarchical authority. See Rogger, Nationalism and the State; Weeks, Nation and State 4 11; Siljak, Rival Visions 27982. 14. Of course, this lack of universal public schooling did not mean that the peasantry and nascent working class were completely unaware of Russian state history. Ethnographic material collected by the Russian Geographic Society and other nineteenth-century organizations reveals that ordinary people displayed a surprising variety of opinion regarding historical events and personalities, especially the great events and great leaders that Anderson identies above. But it is precisely because of the regional variation in these accounts that such an awareness of historical events and personalities should not be mistaken for a coherent sense of national identity on the popular level during the nineteenth century. Given the wide variation in historical folklore from region to region, it would be rather hasty to assume that such notions might contribute to a single, widely held sense of national identity during the nineteenth century. Conicting impressions of heroes, imagery, and symbols, after all, divide rather than unite, denying old regime Russia the sense of a common heritage that is so critical to the possession of a mass social identity. See Buganov, Russkaia istoiriia. 15. Pipes, Russian Revolution 203. On regionalism, see Kingston-Mann, Breaking the Silence 15; Tolz, Russia 178 81; Kaiser, Geography 45. 16. On schools, see Trostianskii, Patriotizm 3-4; Dmitriev, Natsionalnaia shkola; Siljak, Rival Visions 253 54; Eklof, Peasants and Schools 123; Karlsson, History Teaching 203. On the court, see Wortman, Scenarios of Power 2: 525; also Tolz, Russia, 10004, 179. Only at the very end of the old regime were local institutions beginning to take steps to promote a broader sense of identity. See Seregny, Zemstvos, Peasants, and Citizenship. 17. See Knox, With the Russian Army 32; Dobrorolskii, Mobilizatsiia 11415; Danilov, Rossiia v mirovoi voine 112, 115 16; Golovin, Voennye usiliia Rossii 2: 12425, 121. Although some studies have regarded the war as having a galvanizing effect on identity formation, they typically conate inarticulate nativism with a more coherent and well-dened sense of Russian national identity. See Sanborn, Mobilization of 1914; Sanborn, Drafting the Russian Nation; Stockdale, United in Gratitude; Kolonitskii, Russian Idea 57 60; Wildman, End of the Russian Imperial Army, 116 17. 18. Hirsch, Soviet Union as a Work-in-Progress 259; Hirsch, Empire of Nations 8788. 19. For examples of inarticulate Russian chauvinism, see Martin, Afrmative Action Empire 94 96, 103 12, 137 39, 148 54, 158, 161; Payne, Stalins Railroad 10, 127, 13555, 235, 292; Hoffmann, Peasant Metropolis 124 25; Rozhkov, Internatsional durakov 60. 20. Evidence of this can be found in Stalins 1934 critique of Comintern propaganda as excessively schematic and arcane. According to Georgi Dimitrov, Stalin denounced the materialist approach with the comment that people do not like Marxist analysis, big phrases and generalized statements. This is one more of the inheritances from Zinovievs time. Anecdotal evidence veries Stalins appraisal for a former political ofcers commentary on the difculties of basing agitational work on unadulterated historical materialism, see Lenin Schools, 5; for Stalins commentary, see the April 7, 1934, entry in Dimitrov, Dnevnik, 101. 21. On the emergence of the hero in Socialist Realism, see Clark, Soviet Novel 34 35, 72, 119, 136 148, 8 10; Clark, Little Heroes 205 206. Although there was little room for individual actors in the classic Marxist understanding of historical materialism, Stalin identied a prominent role for decisive leaders aware of the possibilities and limitations of their historical contexts in 1931. See Beseda s nemetskim pisatelem . . ., 33; also Merzon, Kak pokazyvat 53 59; Istoriia VKP(b), 16; Gorokhov Rol lichnosti; Ilichev, O roli lichnosti 2; Iudin, Marksistskoe uchenie. M. Gorkii and A. N. Tolstoi, among others, led the new interest in heroes with the support of A. A. Zhdanov. See Pervyi vsesoiuznyi sezd 8, 17, 417 19, 4. 22. On the promotion of socialist priorities (collectivism, absence of property relations, etc.), see Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain; Hoffmann, Stalinist Values. 23. One analyst has identied seven distinct types of populism while others have contended that populism is such a context-specic mobilization strategy that it almost dees generalization. Compare Canovan, Populism with Beasley-Murray, Peronism; Dix, Populism; etc. 24. Traditionally, discussion of populism in the Russian context is almost always limited to the nineteenth century Slavophilic idealization of the village, the nativism [pochvennichestvo] of people

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like F. M. Dostoevskii and the rural pro-peasant activism [narodnichestvo] of educated radicals. Two exception to this rule are Glazov, Stalins Legacy; Priestland, Stalinism. Nationalism by denition is inherently linked to self-determination and popular rule, see Gellner, Nations and Nationalism. This was rst noticed by Mensheviks watching the purges from Parisian exilesee Sh., Vrazheskie gnezda; 24; Sh., Razgrom natsionalnykh respublik, 16. For more modern analysis on this turnabout, see Szporluk, Nationalities 3031. Deployment of such mobilizational rhetoric against the backdrop of Stalins draconian prosecution of the war makes it clear that he was acting as an authoritarian populist rather than a nationalist. Barghoorn, Soviet Russian Nationalism 28 34, 14852, 23337, 260; Barghoorn, Four Faces 57; Barghoorn, Russian Nationalism 35; Dzyuba, Internationalism or Russication 65; Kohn, Soviet Communism 57; Kostyrchenko, V plenu, 7; Blank, Sorcerer 21125. Mehnert, Weltrevolution durch Weltgeschichte 11, 72 73. Szporluk, History and Russian Ethnocentrism 44 45; Szporluk, Communism and Nationalism, esp. 219 20; Pospelovsky, Ethnocentrism 127; Glazov, Stalins Legacy 93 99; Rees, Stalin and Russian Nationalism 77, 97, 10103. Mehnert, Weltrevolution durch Weltgeschichte 12 14; Urban, Smena tendentsii 911; Dunlop, Faces 10 12; Konstantinov, Dorevoliutsionnaia istoriia Rossii 22627; Suny, Stalin and His Stalinism 39; Brooks, Thank You, Comrade Stalin 76. Black, History and Politics 24 25; Shteppa, Soviet Historians 124, 13435; Agurskii, Ideologiia 140 42; Agursky, Prospects 90; Lewin, Making of the Soviet System 27279; Heller and Nekrich, Utopia in Power 269; Seton Watson, Russian Nationalism 2528; Besancon, Nationalism and Bolshevism 4; Simon, Nationalismus 17273; Tucker, Stalin in Power 5058, 319 28, 479 86; Kostyrchenko, V plenu 78; Suny, Stalin and His Stalinism, 39; Williams, Russia Imagined 111 26; Perrie, Nationalism and History; Vihavainen, Natsionalnaia politika. Szporluk, Nationalities 3031; Dunlop, Faces 10 12; Liber, Soviet Nationality Policy 51 52, 158 59, 178 79; Slezkine, USSR as a Communal Apartment; Bordiugov and Bukharev, Natsionalnaia istoricheskaia mysl esp. 39; Vihavainen, Nationalism and Internationalism. Martin, Modernization or Neo-Traditionalism; Martin, Afrmative Action Empire, esp. chap. 11; Kappeler, Russian Empire 378 82; Hosking, Russia 43233. See, for instance, Hoffmann, Stalinist Values; Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain, esp. 357. Tillett, Great Friendship 49 61; Lane, Rites of Rulers 181; Dunham, In Stalins Time 12, 17, 41, 66; Barber and Harrison Soviet Home Front, 69; Bonnell, Iconography 25557; Boterbloem, Life and Death 257. Vujacic, Stalinism and Russian Nationalism, esp. 15972. For a more subtle reading of Stalins relation to the Russian people, see Van Ree, Heroes and Merchants. Although Terry Martin traces this ideological turnabout to russicatory changes in Soviet nationality policy during the early 1930s, this connection is somewhat circumstantial. Aside from unresolved questions concerning causality and sequencing, these early administrative policies resemble later cultural forms of russication only supercially. Administrative russication consisted of a limited set of institutional reforms designed to rationalize and streamline Soviet governance, while cultural russication represented a more general, non-bureaucratic effort to improve mobilizational propaganda through the remodulation of ideological appeals. No documentation from the former party and state archives has ever been uncovered that explicitly links the two policy shifts together. See Martin, Russication of the USSR. The original architecture of the USSR attempted to hamstring Russians ability to advance their own sectarian interests by denying the RSFSR a republican-level communist party and state institutions. Such administrative structures, it was feared, would endow the RSFSR with too much inuence and create the potential for a standoff between the Russian republic and the all-union center. Efforts to develop a bureau for RSFSR affairs within the all-union central committee resulted in the brief creation of such a body in 19261927 and 19361937. In each case, however, the bureau lacked a clear administrative mandate and enjoyed little inuence. Efforts to expand RSFSR institutions after the war were brutally suppressed as Russian nationalism during the Leningrad Affair see Brandenberger, Stalin, the Leningrad Affair . . .

25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32.

33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38.

39.

40.

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41. Martin, Afrmative Action Empire 20, 396 97; see also Van Ree, Heroes and Merchants. For a more internationalist reading of the Russian peoples role in the Soviet experiment from Stalins former comrade-in-arms, see the second edition of Molotovs famous conversations: Chuev, Molotov 333 34. 42. Brandenberger, National Bolshevism, chaps. 6, 10, 14. This analysis of Russian speakers does not attempt to speculate on how the non-Russian peoples responded to the russocentric populism a subject worth its own separate, empirical investigation.

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