Stockholm China Forum

October 2011

Paper Series
Managing Chinas Rise: A Strategic Imperative for U.S.-Europe Cooperation in the Global Commons
by Abraham M. Denmark
Chinas remarkable rise in economic, political, and military power has the potential to significantly challenge some of the fundamental tenants of todays international order. Indeed, several analysts predict that China is beginning to use its growing influence to reshape the rules and institutions of the international system to better serve its interests.1 Given the remarkable speed and breadth of Chinas rising power, and its enigmatic approach to several key international issues, successfully managing Chinas rise will be essential to preserving the long-term health and success of the international system. In response to these challenges, the United States has pursued a strategy of engagement and hedging, which has created a relationship that includes elements of cooperation as well as competition. The United States has also engaged its allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific region, making the management of Chinas rise a fundamental element of its regional engagement. Yet the strategic nature of the United States approach stands in stark contrast to Europes relations with China. Europes approach to China has to date been dominated by economics and trade, with other issues such as human rights and the EU arms embargo only occasionally rising to the surface. Security issues, and the strategic implications of Chinas rise, have not yet become regular elements of Europes China strategy. The 2010 NATO Strategic Concept does not include a single reference to China.2 This disparity in approaches must be addressed. Given the interests and values shared by the United States and Europe, as well as the strategic challenges that Chinas rise pose to the existing liberal international order, managing Chinas rise must become a central element to U.S.-Europe strategic and political dialogue and policy coordination. This coordination must be founded upon a shared U.S.-Europe understanding of mutual interests and the potential challenges and opportunities posed by an increasingly powerful China. While several issues should be addressed in these discus2 NATO, Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 2010, http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept2010-eng.pdf.

Summary: Chinas remarkable rise in economic, political, and military power has the potential to significantly challenge some of the fundamental tenants of todays international order. The United States has pursued a strategy of engagement and hedging, which has created a relationship that includes elements of cooperation as well as competition with China. Yet security issues, and the strategic implications of Chinas rise, have not yet become regular elements of Europes China strategy. The global commons (the high seas, air, space, and cyberspace) offer an excellent opportunity for the United States and Europe to bring a strategic element to efforts to manage Chinas rise.

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1 For more on realist concerns about the affects of Chinas rise on the international system, and liberal institutionalist responses to these concerns, see G. John Ikenberry, The Rise of China and the Future of the West, Foreign Affairs, January/February 2008.

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sions, the global commons (the high seas, air, space, and cyberspace) offer an excellent opportunity for the United States and Europe to bring a strategic element to efforts to manage Chinas rise. The Global Commons and the Rise of China Dependable access to the global commons is the backbone of the international economy and political order.3 Over 90 percent of global trade, worth over $14 trillion in 2008, travels by sea.4 Similarly, reliable connectivity in the air, space, and cyberspace has enabled the emergence of global economies and global militaries both of which contribute significantly to international stability and prosperity. Clearly, maintaining this level of globalization and its resultant stability and prosperity will require the sustained openness of the global commons. The openness and stability of the global commons are protected by U.S. military dominance and sustained by U.S. political and economic leadership. A combination of geography and investment have made the United States a natural sea power, and successful exploitation of air, space, and U.S. technological prowess in cyberspace made the United States a leading power in that domain as well. The commons, in turn, enable the United States and its allies to project power globally as has been repeatedly demonstrated in the successful integration of sea, air, space, and cyber assets during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the 1994 air war over Yugoslavia, the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and the 2011 incursion into Libya. Yet this military dominance is being increasingly challenged by the rise of new military powers. As developing countries translate their newfound wealth into military power, they are taking advantage of lowering barriers to access high-end military technologies and building robust military capabilities that could undermine the openness and stability of the global commons. While these trends apply to several emerging states, and even some nonstate actors, the sheer
3 This section is derived in part from Abraham M. Denmark and James Mulvenon, eds., Contested Commons: The Future of American Power in a Multipolar World, Center for a New American Security, January 2010, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS%20Contested%20Commons_1.pdf; See also Michele Flournoy and Shawn Brimley, The Contested Commons, Proceedings, July 2009. 4 International Maritime Organization, International Shipping: Carrier of World Trade, (2005), http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D18900/IntShippingFlyerfinal.pdf.

size and volume of Chinas potential power makes Beijing the most significant new player in the global commons. Despite Chinas reliance on open and stable global commons for international commerce, Chinas approach to the seas, air, space, and cyberspace has thus far been rather enigmatic. Chinas potential challenges to the global commons are both military and political as demonstrated by the deputy chief of the General Staff of Chinas Peoples Liberation Army, General Ma Xiaotian, discussed the commons at the Shangri-La Security Dialogue in June 2010: It is worth noting that in recent years, maritime affairs and issues related to the cyberspace, outer space, climate, and environment have become increasingly prominent, forming new dimensions of security. These new security issues have come into being along with the continuous improvement in mankinds ability to develop themselves and the constant expansion of the space for human development. The solution to these problems ultimately lies in further development and cooperation. Relevant issues should neither be politicized nor used as excuses to put pressure on other countries in pursuit of ones own interest. The international community should bear in mind both the history and reality in handling those issues. While upholding every nations right to strive for sustainable development, we should also give full consideration to the actual development level of different nations and gradually establish fair and effective international norms through serious, responsible, and constructive negotiations.5 Given the ambiguity of such statements, outside analysts must focus on Chinese behavior in the global commons. China is building significant military capabilities that can be used either to support the openness and stability of the global commons, or to undermine them. While some capabilities such as advanced surface platforms can be used for either inclusionary or exclusionary missions, others (especially anti-ship ballistic missiles, anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, and advanced military cyber capabilities) would almost exclusively be applicable in what Western analysts
5 Speech by General Ma Xiaotian: New Dimensions in Security, IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, June 5, 2010, http://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-ladialogue-2010/plenary-session-speeches/second-plenary-session/ma-xiaotian/.

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describe as an anti-access, area denial (A2AD) strategy.6 While Chinas maritime A2AD capabilities are necessarily limited geographically (for now), its capabilities in space and cyberspace threaten Europe as much as the United States. For example, Chinas 2007 test of a direct-ascent ASAT weapon is responsible for creating 22 percent of all catalogued space objects in low Earth orbit, according to NASA.7 Politically, China seems to be advocating positions that would significantly undermine international agreements that support open and stable global commons. In the maritime commons, although China has acceded to the UN Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS), it continues to reinterpret precepts in UNCLOS regarding the rights of foreign military vessels to transit a countrys exclusive economic zone (EEZ). While UNCLOS explicitly stipulates that foreign militaries can transit through another countrys EEZ without notification, China argues that EEZs should be treated as territorial waters meaning that foreign powers must first gain permission from the coastal state before transiting its EEZ. The consequences of this standard if applied around the world would decimate the ability of any military to transit the world and seriously undermine the openness of the maritime commons. In space, China has advocated an international arms control treaty that would focus only on weapons in space but not ground-based ASAT systems, which (unsurprisingly) would undermine U.S. and European missile defense initiatives but would in no way impact Chinas direct-ascent ASAT weapons. In cyberspace, China has chosen to focus on information content as well as traditional security considerations, and actively restricts its peoples access to large swathes of the internet. Moreover, China is reportedly building a robust cyber military capability, and many suspect China as the source of many large-scale cyber-espionage operations conducted against U.S. and European government and corporate networks.8 The Imperative for U.S.-Europe Coordination in the Global Commons A concerted strategy to preserve the openness and stability of the global commons in the face of the significant challenges potentially posed by Chinas rise must be developed by the like-minded powers composed of the United States, its allies, and its partners. While addressing these challenges have become important elements of the United States relations with the Asia-Pacific region, these issues have yet to become regular elements of U.S.-Europe strategic discussions. Given the shared interests and values that undergird the United States relations with European powers, and the political nature of Chinas challenges, U.S.-Europe cooperation will be fundamental to preserving the existing international order. The following are recommendations for U.S.-Europe cooperation on the global commons: Develop Common Strategies and Initiatives vis--vis Space and Cyberspace. The United States and Europe should begin work on common strategies and initiatives regarding space and cyberspace. Using recent policy documents from both sides as a baseline, the United States and European powers should identify shared interests and threat perceptions, and develop joint initiatives regarding space and cyberspace. While the military components of this strategy may already be underway as part of normal NATO coordination efforts, political coordination between Washington and European capitals must guide these initiatives and support them with an overarching political structure. International agreements designed to preserve openness and stability in space and cyberspace should therefore be a top priority, given that the lack of positive space and cyber agendas puts the West on the defensive in the face of Chinese and Russian efforts. Specifically, the U.S. and European capitols should begin coordination on international political initia8 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples Republic of China, 2010, http://www.defense.gov/ pubs/pdfs/2010_CMPR_Final.pdf, p. 7; European Committee of the House of Lords, Protecting Europe against large-scale cyber-attacks, March 18, 2010, http://www. publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200910/ldselect/ldeucom/68/68.pdf.

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples Republic of China, 2010, http://www.defense.gov/ pubs/pdfs/2010_CMPR_Final.pdf.
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Marcia Smith, Debris from Chinese ASAT Test Now more than 3,000 Pieces, spacepolicyonline.com, October 15, 2010, http://www.spacepolicyonline.com/pages/index. php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1173:debris-from-chinese-asat-test-nowmore-than-3000-pieces&catid=91:news&Itemid=84.
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tives designed to preserve the openness and stability of space as a global commons. These agreements, be they formal international treaties or less formal codes of conduct, should avoid focusing on unverifiable capability limitations (generally, anything in orbit can be used as a space weapon) and instead deal with international behavior in space, such as limiting the creation of dangerous orbital debris. A No First Use agreement on anti-satellite weapons that create debris may help preserve the space commons without compromising U.S. and European freedom of action. Similarly, identifying specific satellite constellations (such as GPS) as global public goods that should be immune from destruction or jamming would promote shared U.S.-European interests. The United States and Europe should also work together to develop international norms and agreements in cyberspace, which is remarkably lacking in any form of international legal framework.9 Some states are focused on using international law to limit internet content while not actually addressing the security of vital global information networks. The United States and Europe share several interests in preserving the sanctity of civilian networks, defining cyber attacks as potential acts of war, and preserving internet freedom for all. Coordinate Efforts to Engage China in the Global Commons. As China is both the most powerful and most enigmatic emerging power in the global commons, engaging China on these issues must be a fundamental element of a shared U.S.-European strategy toward the global commons. As Chinese power in the global commons expands, engagement in the form of diplomacy, joint exercises, and combined operations with the West on initiatives that promote open and stable global commons will encourage the positive and inclusive use of Chinese power. A coordinated U.S. and European approach to China regarding the global commons will both ensure that China cannot play one off the other, and present China with a united front, further encouraging Beijing to pursue activities that avoid confrontation with the West.
9 For more on the development of international cyber norms, see Martha Finnemore, Cultivating International Cyber Norms, Americas Cyber Future, Kristin Lord and Travis Sharp, eds., Center for a New American Security: Washington, DC, 87-102, http://www. cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Cyber_Volume%20II_2.pdf.

About the Author

Abraham M. Denmark is an Asia-Pacific Advisor at the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), and is a former country director for China affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The views expressed herein do not necessarily reflect those of CNA, the U.S. Navy, or any agency or department of the United States government.

About the Stockholm China Forum

This is part of a series of papers informing and informed by discussions at the Stockholm China Forum. The Stockholm China Forum is an initiative of the German Marshall Fund, the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Riksbankens Jubileumsfond. It brings together policymakers, intellectuals, journalists, and businesspeople from Europe, the United States, and Asia on a biannual basis for an ongoing and systematic dialogue to assess the impact of Chinas rise and its implications for European and U.S. foreign, economic, and security policy

About GMF
The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a nonpartisan American public policy and grantmaking institution dedicated to promoting better understanding and cooperation between North America and Europe on transatlantic and global issues. GMF does this by supporting individuals and institutions working in the transatlantic sphere, by convening leaders and members of the policy and business communities, by contributing research and analysis on transatlantic topics, and by providing exchange opportunities to foster renewed commitment to the transatlantic relationship. In addition, GMF supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded in 1972 through a gift from Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has seven offices in Europe: Berlin, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, Bucharest, and Warsaw. GMF also has smaller representations in Bratislava, Turin, and Stockholm.