THE BAKUN PROJECT REVIEW OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC STUDIES AND PRELIMINARY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE RESETTLEMENT OF THE KAYAN AND

LAHANAN OF THE UPPER BALUI A report submitted to the State Planning Unit, Jabatan Ketua Menteri (Chief Minister Deaprtment), Sarawak , Malaysia. s by Jrme Rousseau Professor, McGill University 27 September 1994 Final Report

INDEX

1. Introduction 2. Background 3. Review of existing reports 3.1 Ethnographic studies Alexander: Uma Lahanan, Long Panggai Guerreiro: Cash crops and subsistence strategies: Towards a comparison of Kayan and Lahanan economies Guerreiro: Report on the Kayan of the Upper Balui Tsugami: Report on the Kayan of Belaga district Nicolaisen: Pride and progress: Kajang response to economic change Strickland: Long-term development of Kejaman subsistence: An ecological study 3.2 Report of the SAMA-Consortium 4. Recommendations for additional studies 5. Reactions to the Resettlement Programme 6. Resettlement criteria for the Bakun HEP 7. Recommendations 8. References

TABLES

1. Advantages and disadvantages of alternative resettlement areas 2. Reactions to the resettlement programme

3. Resettlement criteria for the Bakun HEP 4. Policies which have failed 5. Recommendations

THE BAKUN PROJECT:

REVIEW OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC STUDIES AND PRELIMINARY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE RESETTLEMENT OF THE KAYAN AND LAHANAN OF THE UPPER BALUI by Jrme Rousseau

1. INTRODUCTION

At the request of the Sarawak State Planning Unit, this report considers the socio-economic aspects of resettlement of the Kayan and Lahanan of the upper Balui and makes preliminary recommendations about the planning of resettlement. It also presents suggestions for further studies which would help in the planning process. A report by Dr. Tan Chee-Beng covers the other communities of the upper Balui. This report is divided into the following sections:

a) Background. b) A review of existing socio-economic studies on the Bakun HEP as it affects the upper Balui. (In this report, 'upper Balui' refers to the portion of the Balui above the Bakun rapids). c) Recommendations for further studies. d) Observations on the affected population's perceptions of the resettlement project. e) Criteria with which to assess resettlements caused by hydro-electric projects (HEP). f) Recommendations about patterns of settlement, economic activities and infrastructural facilities, as well as the institutional set-up to implement the programme.

2. BACKGROUND 1. Basic characteristics of the Bakun HEP The impoundment of Bakun dam will create a lake of 695 km2 (i.e. 69,500 ha), flooding an area currently occupied by 15 communities. Land will be flooded up to 228 m above sea level. Most of the area to be flooded is constituted by swiddens, swidden fallows (temuda), gardens, fruit trees, plantations, graveyards, work areas, and areas of primary forest with economic value to the local population (as a source of food and raw materials). The territory used by the 15 communities extends beyond the area to be flooded.

2. The central purpose of the Bakun HEP is to provide electricity for Peninsular Malaysia By the time Sarawak needs the volume of electricity which Bakun can produce (2,400 MW), the dam will already have been decommissioned because of siltation (Bakun dam is expected to produce electricity for at most 50 years). There will be direct benefits to Sarawak insofar as individuals and enterprises from Sarawak will participate in building the dam and related facilities. In order for the Bakun project to benefit the local population which is affected by it, it is necessary to plan specifically for this. It is insufficient to hope for a trickle-down effect. Without appropriate planning, the disadvantages of the dam might outweigh the advantages for the resettled population.

3. Organizational structure of the Bakun HEP The Bakun project has been under consideration for over 10 years. It was abandoned in 1990 because of cost and concerns about its environment impact. The Malaysian Government has decided this year to go ahead with the Bakun dam and has awarded the contract to Ekran, a construction company. The cost of the project is currently estimated to be RM15 billion; Ekran expects to complete it in six years.

The project as a whole is under the overview of the Malaysian Government, except for resettlement which has been entrusted to the Sarawak Government.

4. Current resettlement plans The current plan is to resettle the population of the upper Balui in the Belaga river system (in the Penyuan, Asap and Koyan rivers), with a combined area of 45,000 ha, most of which is Class 3 land (i.e. of lesser quality than some of the land used by the affected communities). Given that the proposed resettlement area is much smaller than the present area occupied by the affected communities, the plan is to develop a plantation scheme which would transform subsistence agriculturalists (dependent on swidden agriculture, fishing and hunting) into cash croppers, either as independent farmers or agricultural wage workers. N.B. It should be noted that, prior to 1990, it had been planned to resettle the affected population within the upper Balui, and several possible resettlement sites had been identified.

5. Present socio-economic situation The upper Balui is one of the most isolated areas of Sarawak; consequently, socioeconomic change has come to it more recently. The great majority of the population are subsistence farmers practicing swidden agriculture (shifting cultivation); they derive most of their protein intake from fishing and hunting. The jungle also provides vegetables and other resources. This mode of life provides people with great autonomy. The people of the upper Balui have increasingly come in contact with the wider world in recent years, and they have had the opportunity to reflect about their mode of life. One comment by a middle-aged Kayan is particularly telling: "We are poor only insofar as we have little money. In fact, we are rich, because we have all we need now to feed ourselves and house ourselves. Rice is free, fish and meat are free, vegetables are free, water is free, lumber is free." Traditionally, there has been a high level of cooperation in economic activities. Several domestic units got together to form cooperation groups in rice cultivation; fish and meat were shared between neighbours. Land tenure patterns have changed through time. Brooke rule limited village migrations, and villages established permanent territories. This pattern was reinforced during the colonial and post-colonial period. There are boundaries between communities. At the local level, the ownership of fallows by domestic units has become the norm as the population increased. Each village is a distinct, tightly-knit unit. Unlike other groups of Borneo, it is exceptional that new communities are created. Each village has kept its name for over 200 or 300 years (even as it moved to new locations in the pre-colonial and early colonial period). There is a high level of village endogamy (i.e. people are very likely to find a spouse within their village). The people of the upper Balui value the independence of their villages. The domestic unit (amin) is typically composed of a stem family (i.e. parents, their unmarried children, one of their married children, and the latter's children), although extended families (i.e. parents with more than one married child living with them) and

nuclear families (parents with only their unmarried children) are also present. At marriage, it is usual for the man to join his wife's domestic unit, although there are exceptions. A longhouse apartment is usually occupied by a single domestic unit, but sometimes, there are two domestic units in an apartment. In such a case, it is usual for them to cook separate meals (hence the Kayan expression for such arrangements: dua' ta'ang taring, "two cooking pots"). Unlike the Iban or the Bidayuh, the people of the upper Balui have a stratification system. The major distinction is between the aristocrats (maren) and the commoners (panyin) (I have described the stratification system in greater detail elsewhere. See Rousseau 1990). Village chiefs are selected from among the aristocrats. The position is hereditary, although there is no automatic transmission to a specific individual. There is ideally a broad-based consultation when a new chief is selected. Aristocrats tend to marry within their class: they are much more likely than commoners to find spouses outside their community. Traditionally, aristocrats have played a predominant role in inter-community relations, and this is still the case to a significant extent in the modern context. Traditionally, chiefs were entitled to corvees (mahep) from their followers as compensation for their leadership role. This still exists to some extent, but changes are taking place. While the upper Balui is a remote area, there has been enormous change in the area in the last thirty years. In the 1960s, there were evident improvements in public health, and an increasing proportion of children had access to school. By now, schooling is available to everyone; many people have had secondary school training; there are now a number of university graduates. Change is particularly evident as one enters a community: longhouses are larger and neater, with many modern amenities. While the people of the upper Balui traditionally built solid and durable longhouses, they have gone even further in the last 15 years. Village territories are neat, ornamental bushes have been planted, walkways and stairs facilitate access from the river. There have been major improvements in hygiene. All longhouses have running water; pigs are penned, longhouse apartments have toilets; there are fewer dogs, etc. Many households have generators to power electrical devices. Apartments have furniture and are decorated. There have also been changes in the economy. In the 1960s, many people planted rubber, but the drop in its price discouraged further planting. More recently, people have been experimenting with cocoa and pepper, fish ponds, geese, etc. In the 1950s and 1960s, men were able to find occasional wage work by going downriver for a few months. In recent years, opportunities have been available closer to home, especially with the growth of timber companies starting in the 1970s. In the 1970s, it became possible to sell meat and fish to itinerant traders; consequently, the traditional practice of sharing meat and fish has dwindled considerably. Many educated people have settled in towns where they are engaged in the modern economy as civil servants, employees in the private sector, businessmen, teachers, etc. They keep links to their natal communities and contribute to bringing outside influences to the upper Balui. Thus, change has been rapid in the last 20 years. More change is to be expected and welcome. At the same time, it is essential not to force the rhythm of change as this could be counter-productive.

3. REVIEW OF EXISTING REPORTS I was asked to review existing reports on the Kayan and Kajang above the Bakun rapids in order to evaluate their usefulness for resettlement planning purposes. This includes four ethnographic reports: Alexander (1987), Guerreiro (n.d.1 and n.d.2), Tsugami (1987), and

the reports of the SAMA-Consortium (1988a, 1988b, 1988c, 1988d, 1989a, 1989b). In the section on ethnographic reports, I also make some comments on papers by Nicolaisen (1986) and Strickland (1986). Although they deal with the lower Balui, they provide information of direct relevance to the Bakun HEP. My review is also informed by numerous other publications of which only a few are cited here. In order to identify additional sources, the reader is advised to consult my bibliography of Central Borneo (Rousseau 1988) as well as the bibliographic notes published in every issue of the Borneo Research Bulletin. For an overview of the traditional society and economy of the Balui area, see Rousseau (1990).

3.1 ETHNOGRAPHIC STUDIES The studies by Alexander and Guerreiro were commissioned in order to obtain information relevant to the planning of a resettlement scheme for the Bakun HEP, and to collect ethnographic information on the Kayan and Kenyah (Langub, Kedit & Demong 1989: 1). Tsugami's study was carried out independently. An important concern of these anthropological studies (as well as Armstrong 1987, Brosius 1988 and Heppel, n.d) has been to gather basic information on lesser-known ethnic units. Together, these four reports cover the following communities: a) Lahanan (Kajang): Long Panggai (Alexander, Guerreiro) and Long Semuang (Guerreiro); b) Kayan: Uma Bawang, Uma Belor, Uma Juman (Guerreiro) and Uma Lesong (Tsugami). With the exception of Long Semuang, these villages are above the Bakun rapids. The reports of Alexander and Guerreiro are clear, well-organised descriptions which provide useful background information on the groups concerned. These reports focus primarily on economic matters (subsistence agriculture and cash crops, land tenure, division of labour), but they also brieflycover history and social organisation in order to put economic factors in a broader context. Alexander and Guerreiro (n.d.1) give particular attention to agricultural matters; they document recent changes in subsistence agriculture as well as the introduction and development of cash crops and agricultural schemes. Guerreiro's two reports are complementary: while Guerreiro (n.d.1) focuses on current agricultural matters, his Report on the Kayan of the upper Balui provides more general information. These three reports also deal with the crucial issue of land tenure. A useful synopsis of this issue can be found in Langub, Kedit & Demong (1989: 13-14).

Alexander, Uma Lahanan, Long Panggai A revised version of this report has been published (Alexander 1990). The original report contains some information which has not been included in the published version: a map of the community, detailed demographic data, a description of group identity and inter-ethnic relations, and a section on schooling. Both the report and the article deserve to be read. This is a clear, well-written introductory ethnography of the village, dealing with social, economic and religious matters. Not surprisingly, given that they are surrounded by Kayan, the Lahanan of Long Panggai share many traits with their neighbours. They have limited relations with the Lahanan community of Long Semuang below the rapids. Alexander reports that the average fallow period is six years; this is much shorter than the traditional practice. It seems to be a consequence of recent circumstances: the demands of cocoa cultivation (1990: 195) and the desire to stay in the longhouse rather than move

seasonally to a farm residence have increased the demand on nearby land. Cocoa farmers prefer to work hill padi plots near their cocoa holdings, hence cannot afford to have long fallows. This kind of interaction between cash and subsistence crops needs to be monitored. In this case, there are negative consequences; if well managed, the results should be positive. Another reason for the short fallow is the use of fertilisers, insecticides and weedicides. This seems reasonable, but it calls for further studies on shifting cultivation and ways in which it can be optimised. We need to know better the positive and negative effects of pesticides, weedicides, and fertilisers. Alexander's comments on the wet padi scheme in Long Panggai suggests that it has not been without problems: agriculturalists complain of the heavy labour output and a dissatisfaction with the taste and aroma of the product. The wet padi calendar conflicts with that of hill padi. At the time of the study, the cocoa scheme seemed to be proceeding well, but there were problems with the pepper scheme. Some Lahanan destroyed their coffee plants to replace them with cocoa but, in 1987, coffee fetched a better price than cocoa. This suggests that agricultural schemes must not limit themselves to agricultural matters, but also educate farmers about the realities of the commodity market. Hunting, fishing and gathering remain important in the economy. While there were few direct effects of logging in 1987, the people of Long Panggai complained that logging further upriver was depleting fish stock in the Balui. Furthermore, commercial fishing upstream seems to have affected the availability of fish. "The demand for cash has replaced the demand for labour as the dynamo of the Lahanan economy with concomitant changes in other aspects of society. Twenty years ago the Lahanan and their neighbours were relatively isolated subsistence farmers whose limited needs for cash were met by selling jungle produce and handicrafts on their infrequent trips to Belaga. They still produce most of the rice they consume, but their efforts to meet cash requirements which are increasing each year are making it more difficult to maintain subsistence production" (Alexander 1990: 210).

Guerreiro, Cash crops and subsistence strategies: Towards a comparison of Kayan and Lahanan economies This report has been published as Guerreiro (1988) after minor editing. After a brief but useful description of social organisation and history, Guerreiro focuses on the economy of the Lahanan villages of Long Panggai (above Bakun) and Long Semuang (below Bakun), which he compares to the Kayan villages of Uma Juman and Uma Belor (both above Bakun). He makes the important point that only a portion of a village territory is devoted to agriculture: The territory of Uma Juman is approximately 10,000 ha, of which 3,000 to 4,000 ha can be used for agriculture. Non-agricultural uses of territory must be taken into consideration in any relocation plan. This article is a useful description of the economic situation at the time of fieldwork (1986). It also deals with socio-economic changes such as the development of a cash economy. He describes the swidden cultivation of padi and other cultivars as well as wet padi and other agricultural diversification schemes. While subsistence production has remained the main activity in the last 40 years, since the early 1980s there has been a decrease in trade with Penan nomads and in forest product collection. Rubber tapping, present in the late 1960s, had dwindled in the 1980s and is being replaced by cocoa and pepper. The sale of fish and meat, which started in the early 1970s, had now dwindled. There have been increasing opportunities for wage labour. Guerreiro describes the initial stages of the Model Village Program in Uma Lahanan and Uma Juman, which were started in 1984, focusing on the planting of cocoa. At the same

time, FAMERU (Farm Management Extension and Research Unit) started a wet padi trial (Uma Lahanan, Uma Juman) and a cocoa hybrid trial (Uma Apan, Uma Lahanan) to convince farmers to use these cultivars (Guerreiro 1988: 33). These projects, as well as the agricultural master plan of the village, initiated in 1985, now require evaluation. In Uma Juman, where the first sawah was set up in 1976, the cultivation of wet padi has been abandoned because of the shift towards cash crops: the labour input required was too high and farmers preferred to transfer their energy to cash crops. On the other hand, the wet padi scheme has been popular in L. Panggai and Uma Belor. In these villages, wet padi constitutes only a small proportion of the cultivated land, in part because of the shortage of suitable land (Guerreiro 1988: 36). This report illustrates that the villages of the upper Balui demonstrate a variety of responses to agricultural choices; indeed, there is variability within villages. The same diversity is to be expected in resettlement villages.

Guerreiro, Report on the Kayan of the Upper Balui A revised version of this report has been published (Guerreiro 1992). It provides much useful background information on the social organisation and economy of the area, some of which has been taken from Rousseau (1974) and other publications of mine. It focuses on the village of Uma Bawang where I did fieldwork in 1970-72 and 1974. He shows that domestic units have gone down in size from 9.1 persons in 1972 to 6.7 in 1986. He says (Guerreiro 1992: 72) that, "according to Kayan adat, the senior male is always the amin's head". This does not correspond to my experience. In fact, insofar as there is a "head" to the Kayan domestic unit (amin), it is usually the oldest economicallyactive member, whether male or female. It would be more accurate to say that such a person is influential rather than describe him/her as "head", because decisions are taken by consultation within the domestic unit. The discussion of carrying capacity (ibid. 80, fn. 36 and 37) is rather difficult to follow. However, this is an important issue which needs to be clarified. The report contains recommendations which are not part of the published article (pp. 6468). He points out that resettlement planning must take into consideration the following factors: Resettlement is aimed at ensuring a better standard of living. Special training is needed in modern agricultural techniques, both for men and women. The Kayan wish to maintain their dispersed form of settlement, and the idea of concentrating villages in a kampong is unpopular. The Kayan are used to river transportation and to longhouses built along the river. A radical change in this pattern would be confusing and counterproductive. Resettling the Kayan of the upper Balui below the Bakun rapids would create tensions and stress between them and the present inhabitants of the region. The people of the upper Balui are strongly attached to their region. The resettlement process must actively involve community members in the planning process. Credit facilities should be developed to encourage the development of local entrepreneurship. For some cash crops, Guerreiro wonders whether mini-estates would be more convenient to manage and more profitable than small holdings. This suggestion raises a number of issues which could be discussed with the populations concerned.

 A rattan plantation scheme related to a handicraft centre (located in Belaga) could be profitable.

Tsugami, Report on the Kayan of Belaga district This report is of a different quality from those of Alexander and Guerreiro. It is based on fieldwork in the village of Uma Lesong, but it is not clear how much of the author's description is based on his fieldwork, and how much is taken from previous publications (The author does not cite the publications which he has consulted). There is little in this report which is not in Rousseau (1974). Unfortunately, as most descriptions in this report are vague, they cannot serve for comparison. There is a lack of quantitative data. On the whole, this report will have little use in the planning process, but some elements are useful. Thus, Tsugami suggests that the land used for cash crops might be redistributed so that agriculturalists could cooperate in the production of cash crops (p. 67-68). It is not clear that there is at this stage a desire to cooperate for this activity, but the matter might be followed up. He makes the important point that Kayan villagers are reluctant to express openly any differences of opinion with politicians and administrators visiting their villages (p. 71). This affects the consultation process and great sensitivity is required when consultation takes place. Tsugami addresses the issue of schooling. He suggests that there are weaknesses in the educational process, with a high rate of absenteeism (p. 72). Schooling also affects agricultural practices. The parents of school-age children are unwilling to leave them to board while they work away at far-away fields. At the same time, it would be too expensive to use outboard motors everyday to return from distant fields. Consequently, parents of school-age children prefer to cultivate fields near the longhouse so they can return home in the evening. As a result, some plots may be cultivated more often than is optimal (pp. 8889). It is possible that a co-operative use of outboard motors might alleviate this problem. Tsugami briefly describes some recent changes. For instance, 12 Badang households joined Uma Lesong in 1980s. While things went well at first, the Badang eventually refused to cooperate and join corvees for the chief, and they migrated downriver to Long Dugan (pp. 79-80).

Nicolaisen, Pride and progress: Kajang response to economic change In this article, Ida Nicolaisen (1986) tackles the commonly held view that the Kajang resist progress, by focusing on one Kajang group, the Sekapan. She shows that this view is incorrect and not supported by facts. At the same time, she shows how important it is to understand people's priorities and not limit oneself to economic considerations. For instance, she shows how economic development is affected by pervasive feelings of pride and envy. In discussing recent events, she points out that the migration of 1,200 Badang from the upriver community of Long Busang half a km from the Sekapan village of Long Dugan has created a high pressure on land resources.

Nicolaisen shows (1986: 84) that Sekapan agriculture is not male-dominated, but that men and women participate equally in the work and the planning. This is true of the whole region under consideration (see, e.g. Guerreiro 1988, Rousseau 1977, 1990), and any planning exercise must avoid a male bias. Nicolaisen tackles an important --and difficult-- issue relevant not only for the Kajang, but also the Kayan and the Kenyah. She argues that the traditional position of chiefs was strengthened further when "the Brookes introduced a system of indirect rule to secure law and order and ease the collection of taxes.... Formalizing the position of Kajang aristocrats and endowing them with governmental authority and the right to administer fines, upset the power balance between the aristocrats and commoners in favour of the former.... While their influence earlier was dependent on the authority they could master within the society due to their capabilities, they can now lean on an external power base" (Nicolaisen 1986: 83). In recent years, this situation has changed. New structures and opportunities have given commoners more say in village life, and the situation is correcting itself. This issue must be addressed with sensitivity. Many village chiefs exert a positive influence on their community. In any case, beneficial changes to the social structure will not be established by outside pressures. These must happen internally, and the most one should do is to provide the tools for change. For instance, chiefs have traditionally received corve labour from the commoners; whether this should continue, and if so, how, is a matter which is best solved by the people concerned without outside interference.

Strickland: Long term development of Kejaman subsistence: An ecological study Simon Strickland's (1986) excellent study of subsistence patterns among the Kejaman provides a wealth of detailed information. As Sekapan subsistence patterns may be different from the Kayan's and Kenyah's, one cannot extrapolate from this study directly to the whole of the Belaga district. However, it serves as a model of the kind of information which is needed. This includes a description of shifting cultivation, including a list of the various cultivars, the sequence of cultivation, productivity estimates (i.e. productivity of fields and production efficiency in energy terms); consumption patterns (including a detailed study of sample households, surplus/deficit in human energy supply); analysis of energy and cash income; perceived and actual output and energy inputs; efficiency of energy use, significance of protein resources and use of domesticated animals.

3.2 REPORT OF THE SAMA-CONSORTIUM There is much which is useful in this report. It formulates general principles for effective development (e.g. 1989a: 1-3). It states the importance of consultation with the affected populations and the need for resettlement to be voluntary (1988c: 3). It clearly recognises that it would be a serious mistake to resettle the population in a large settlement (1989a: 32); instead, existing communities should keep their autonomy. It stresses that "not only the

design but also the timing of the agricultural project is central to the success of the resettlement project" (1989b: 13). The sections describing various crops and model budgets (1988a and 1988d) are useful background information, as are the demographic tables (1988b). It makes the important point that the Agricultural Survey of 1987 overestimated the productivity of the Belaga/Koyan site as well as the economic viability of monocropping of cocoa (1988a: 3, 1988d: 1). However, the report as a whole does not provide a sound basis for planning the relocation of the upper Balui population. There are several fundamental flaws:

i - It fails to consider alternatives to the Belaga scheme, although an obvious and much preferable alternative is available. The report assumes that the population of the upper Balui will be moved to an agricultural scheme in the Belaga river region (Asap, Koyan and Penyuan rivers). However, upper Balui people wish to stay in their present region, either along the (enlarged) Balui or into nearby tributaries (or both). The map (1988c: 6) suggests that this is indeed possible. While the catchment area will flood existing village sites and fields, much land is still available. Hence, from an agricultural viewpoint, there is no reason to resettle the people of the Balui in another area. Indeed, there is an obvious reason not to do so: the population density is higher below the Bakun than above it, and the Belaga river would be an potential area for local expansion. However, it is not suitable for the whole upper Balui population. It is clear from the SAMA report that the land quality is not high (1989b: 8); it is not suitable to intensive cash cropping. It lacks extensive jungle resources; this is a serious problem given that income derived from jungle resources constitutes on average one-third of the total household cash income; furthermore, if hunting revenues are accounted for, this share could rise to 40% (1988c: 40). This does not mean that the Belaga region is worthless, but rather that it is more suited to shifting cultivation with some cash crops. It would be counterproductive to move to the Belaga river system the majority of resettlers, especially as this area should be set aside as an extension area for the population of the lower Balui. In any case, the Belaga river area will be needed for resettlement if the Pelagus dam is built, and it is unwise to take decisions now that will make things more difficult later. Furthermore, I have been told that all or part of the planned Belaga scheme will be flooded by the Pelagus dam. This makes it even less suitable for resettlement. The proposal to resettle the Balui population in the Belaga river region is based on the idea that a more concentrated settlement would foster rural development because services could be provided more easily. Some infrastructural costs are higher for a dispersed population, but this is only one factor. Before starting such a complex undertaking, it is essential to consider the advantages and disadvantages of alternatives. A preliminary tally strongly suggests that it would be more effective to relocate the villages within the Balui area (Table 3). From the SAMA report, it is clear that the expenditure of the Belaga project would be very high; this amount would be better spent in the upper Balui (i.e. would bring about more improvements in standards of living). The right planning approach is first to establish the people's needs, and then to find a site compatible with it. The reverse has been done here. There are other advantages to relocation within the upper Balui. A local population is necessary for the management and protection of the forest (see Poffenberger & McGean 1993a and b) as well as for the development of tourism. The impoundment of Bakun will create a lake on which boat travel will be easy. It seems wasteful not to let the local population profit from this improvement. Also, if the local population is moved, the region will not remain unpopulated; we can expect an influx of squatters and non-Malaysians who will settle without any overall plan.

ii - The report pays little attention to the socio-cultural background of the affected population. The SAMA report makes little use of the information in the ethnographic reports. This is one reason why it presents an a priori model of the "way things ought to be". For instance, it assumes that the shift to wet rice cultivation is fairly unproblematic, when this is not the case. The suggestion that hill padi and wet padi together should cover 40% of demand in the resettlement area (1988a: 55) also fails to consider the problems of a radical shift from subsistence agriculture to commodity production. The report mentions that "wet padi returns are surprisingly low" [in villages of the upper Balui where it was attempted] (1988c: 28); surely, this raises the very question of the profitability of wet rice agriculture in the uplands. The suggestion that there should be a massive increase in cash crops radically contradicts a principle emphasised elsewhere in the SAMA report, namely that "resettlement populations are not at all suitable subjects for innovation, let alone experiment" (1989a: 2). Thus, wholesale resettlement of the upper Balui population in an agricultural scheme will not achieve the goal of improving their well-being.

iii - The report misunderstands the significance of hill padi cultivation. It does not consider the scientific evidence that shifting cultivation is in fact a sustainable agricultural method in the right environment (which the upper Balui is). Thus, the statement that "shifting cultivation has ceased to be a post-resettlement alternative (1989a: 27) is without foundation, especially as the SAMA report itself assumes that in the Belaga resettlement area, as much dry rice would be produced as wet rice! This has not been thought through, and again it weakens the case for the Belaga site.

Table 1: Advantages and disadvantages of alternative resettlement areas Resettlement in Belaga river area Relocation in upper Balui area Advantages Concentrated settlement reduces cost of infrastructure and communication. The lake created by the dam will make possible reliable, cheap water transportation. More land available. Better forest resources (for hunting, collecting). Option desired by population. More flexible option which reduces post-relocation dependence on subsidies. A local population is needed to protect the forest and to provide tourist services.

Disadvantages Insufficient forest resources for fishing, hunting, and collecting. Limited land is available. Land fertility is poor, This option is rejected by the affected population. A radical change in subsistence base increases economic and social risks. The depopulation of the upper Balui creates a vacuum which may be filled by squatters and illegal immigrants. It makes it more difficult to plan the resettlement for the Pelagus dam. Distance from administrative centres increases cost of infrastructure and communication. (However, the post-impoundment lake will create an easily navigable body of water.)

iv - The income analysis of the longhouse communities of the upper Balui is based on unreliable data. The SAMA report recognises that the data are flawed (Guerreiro 1992 makes the same point). Much of the income analysis is based on self-reporting by the people themselves; such data have a very low level of reliability. The problem is compounded by some methodological choices. Thus, "the agricultural outputs which have been used for own consumption have been evaluated in terms of imputed income, which is defined as: the income which would be realised if the output was sold instead of being consumed by the household" (1988c: 8). This is problematic. If resettlers produce less of their subsistence needs, one must also evaluate the cost of obtaining foodstuff and other agricultural products on the market, a cost which will be higher than the 'imputed income' mentioned above. Recognising that the data of the Agricultural Survey are unreliable, the author takes the astonishing step of eliminating from his consideration all households reporting an overall labour utilisation rate higher than 90%. Such households constitute about one third of the total sample (1988c: 9). From the viewpoint of statistical methods, this is unacceptable. If it is obvious that one-third of the sample does not provide adequate information, this does not mean that the remaining two-thirds is any better! On the contrary, it demonstrates that the data are hopelessly flawed. The stated purpose of this analysis was to provide "the economic reference for a new farming model or alternatives of new farming models" (1988c: 4). However, the data on which the analysis is based are too poor to have any significant value in the planning

process. There is at this point no accurate information on the actual incomes of the people of the upper Balui.

v - The report contradicts its own principles. While it emphasises that resettlement cannot be successful unless it is voluntary, it recognises that the people of the Balui are not favourable to this plan (1989a: 21) and suggests that the affected populations be placed with a fait accompli. It laudably points out that "no development plan will be successful that does not take into account their religion, social and cultural habits" (1988d: 5); unfortunately, it fails to take adequate consideration of those social and cultural habits. This is a recipe for failure. In short, the SAMA report presents useful principles and background information, but its recommendations are based on flawed data, on an uncritical acceptance of a sub-standard site, and on a failure to consider better alternatives.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADDITIONAL STUDIES 1. Socio-economic survey There is a need for a socio-economic survey of the whole Belaga district which describes: Information on the full resource base of the affected population, including income derived from informal sector and non-farm activities, and from common property. An accurate knowledge of the current situation is an essential tool in planning development and assessing the success of development programmes. The extent to which groups will experience total or partial loss of assets. Public infrastructure and social services that will be affected. Formal and informal institutions which can assist with designing and implementing the resettlement programmes. The magnitude of displacement (cf. World Bank 1990: 4). Some of the necessary data is already available in reports. However, the Agricultural Survey used by the SAMA consortium has serious methodological problems which make most of it an inadequate tool. It was unwise to base a survey on self-reporting of the whole population. It would be more efficient to select samples carefully and then to collect reliable data using effective data-gathering techniques. Instead of gathering data on all households of all communities in the upper Balui, it would be much better to select a few communities for intensive study. These communities should be selected on the basis of socio-economic characteristics so as to obtain a representative sample. For example, we can expect that there will be differences between communities in the upper part of the region and those nearer the Bakun, between large and small communities, and between communities which are involved in the timber industry and others which are not. Other factors such as degree of involvement in cash crops, presence or absence of school and dispensary in the village, presence or absence of lumber road may also be relevant. On the basis of such characteristics, one would select about five villages for study. Then, within those villages, a proportion of households should be selected for intensive study, again on the basis of socio-economic criteria (size of household, degree of involvement in the cash economy, education, etc.)

2. Study of current cultivation techniques

Shifting cultivation should be retained because it would be unwise to force a shift to cash crops beyond 30% of the labour output. In order to plan effectively for resettlement, it is necessary to establish land needs for both shifting cultivation and cash crops. Not enough is known about swidden agriculture, in part because of the common but mistaken prejudice that it destroys the jungle. The truth of the matter is that the needs of shifting cultivation for clearing primary jungle are less than 0.025 ha per person per year, i.e. around 125 ha for the entire region! This is a negligible amount which does not affect the environment or timber resources, and it is certainly far less than town dwellers extract from the forest through their use of lumber and other forest products. We are fortunate in having an excellent study of agriculture in a Baram Kenyah community (Chin 1985); however, we cannot directly extrapolate from it because the community under study is in a lowland area, while the Balui presents a highland environment. Previous studies, including Rousseau (1977), provide useful information, but not a comprehensive overview. Furthermore, Guerreiro (1992: 77, 80) shows that there were serious flaws in the report of the Agricultural Survey. Other fundamental sources of information are missing. Chin's study in the Baram suggests that 10 ha of land (including secondary jungle being left fallow) is needed per person. Alexander (1990: 193-194) provides a very different figure: the Lahanan of Long Panggai, with 288 people on a territory of 14,000 ha, have just under 50 ha per person. It is not clear that Chin and Alexander define land in the same way, and further study is needed to establish how much primary jungle must be set aside for the needs of the resettlers.Also, recent studies of agriculture in the Balui area (e.g. Guerreiro 1988, 1992) cannot be taken as a baseline because special circumstances: timber exploitation and the uncertainty caused by the Bakun project had reduced the farm size from about 4 ha to 2 ha per domestic unit. Only in the village of Uma Belor did a majority of households cover their needs in rice (Guerreiro 1988: 37-39). Hence we may need more precise data to calculate land needs, as well as evaluate the cash crop schemes and the Model Agricultural Village scheme described by Guerreiro (1988: 33-34). Furthermore, there have been changes in the practice of swidden agriculture: Guerreiro (1998: 38-39) reports the use of fertilisers and weedicides in swiddens, which can increase yields by up to 50%. This deserves further study of the risks and benefits of the use of fertilisers (effect on rivers etc.) and pesticides (risk to drinking water, destruction of useful insects, etc.).A study of agriculture should also cover subsistence patterns, following the model of Strickland's(1986) excellent research on the Kejaman, which I have discussed in the previous section. Any resettlement exercise will require an effective evaluation of village territories. This cannot be established only on the basis of agricultural activities, as is well demonstrated by the example of Uma Juman described by Guerreiro 1988: 23; see previous section).The agriculturalists of the Balui area cultivate many varieties of hill rice (60 varieties are mentioned for the Sekapan: Nicolaisen 1986: 87). These varieties must be protected and studied to evaluate their characteristics and to preserve the gene pool. Like other crops, rice is less susceptible to blights if several varieties are in use. A study of the various rice strains could also have commercial benefits, as it could help in the production of better rice varieties.

3. A study of the success of cash crops All reports describe the development of cash crops. In 1988, these were at an early stage of development. It is important to know how the cultivation of cocoa, pepper, etc. has fared through the years. This is particularly important given the notes of caution about the profitability of cocoa cultivation in the area (SAMA-Consortium 1989a: 26). One should also ascertain which combination of cash crops is best suited to small holdings.

4. A study of the effects of schooling The in-depth studies understandably focused on the conditions within the communities under consideration. However, there has also been an increase in the number of Kayan, Kenyah and Lahanan educated young people; some of them have moved to towns for employment (Langub, Kedit & Demong 1989: 12); others have returned to their natal villages. It would be helpful to study various aspects of education in the area. For instance, what is the effect of the out-migration of educated youngsters? What is their social and economic impact on their natal communities? What is the specific contribution of educated people who reside in their natal communities? From the experience of a generation, would it be advisable to make some changes to the curriculum to better serve the next generation? Brosius (1988: 168-169) makes the suggestion that Penan children would be more likely to remain in schools away from their community if there were guardian families living with them. It is possible that such an arrangement would also be useful for the other people of the Balui.

5. REACTIONS TO THE RESETTLEMENT PROGRAMME I was asked to report on the reactions to the resettlement programme of the people of the upper Balui. Communities of the lower Balui will also be affected by the project and their opinions should be surveyed. This section is based on a field trip to the upper Balui. I have also consulted other sources providing information on the opinions of upper Balui residents. I visited all the Kayan communities above the Balui (Uma Lesong, Uma Balui Ukap, Uma Daro', Uma Juman, Uma Balui Long Liko, Uma Belor, Uma Nyaving, and Uma Bawang), as well as the Lahanan village at Long Panggai. (Dr. Tan Chee Beng conducted a similar survey in four Kenyah villages, the Bukat, and the Penan of Long Belangan. He also visited the Lahanan village.) Opinions were gathered both in public meetings and private conversations. Following the usual Kayan practice, public meetings took place at night on the chief's verandah. Informal interviews took place both in longhouses and in the Belaga bazaar. All conversations were carried out in the Kayan language. Night meetings were well attended; a broad range of people expressed their opinions, young and old, aristocrats and commoners. Given that women are often underrepresented and less vocal at public gatherings, I elicited the opinions of women in private conversations. Men and women shared the same views about resettlement. More generally, I was struck by the consensus which emerged from these meetings and conversations. There were very few differences of opinion between villages, between aristocrats and commoners, or between younger and older people.

1. Need to be informed and consulted The affected populations want to be informed and consulted on an on-going basis. At this time, there is a high level of anxiety because of the absence of dialogue. People first heard of the Bakun dam in 1981, but they feel they have been kept in the dark since then. Recent meetings have exacerbated the problem rather than help resolve it. For instance, while I was upriver, the Penghulus, Pemanca and Temenggong attended a meeting in Kapit about the Bakun HEP. I heard afterwards that they were not invited to present their views, and they came back unenlightened, especially because part of the meeting was carried out in English, a language which most of them do not really understand. Similarly, there was much anguish about the ground-breaking ceremony at Bakun on September 19.

People had wanted to express their concerns about the HEP, but they were told that they could not do so. The suggestion that a single person would speak on behalf of the upper Balui population was also rejected. Apparently, people were warned that police would be present to prevent people from carrying placards. The understandable anxiety of the population is further exacerbated by the fact that the project is clearly proceeding: there has already been a biological survey, an epidemiological survey, and an archaeological survey but, as yet, no dialogue with authorities. The situation is evolving rapidly, and several people expressed the fear that they were being taken advantage of. It is urgent to initiate an open and ongoing dialogue. Any delay will make the situation more difficult. Given that statements have been made to the effect that "Sacrifices that the indigenous people will have to make are an unfortunate but necessary cost of a development scheme that will benefit the whole nation," it is urgent to correct this image and reaffirm that everyone can benefit from the Bakun project. People are unclear about the spheres of competence of the Federal Government, the State Government, and Ekran, about the locus of decision-making and the source of eventual compensation. Their fears are intensified by a feeling of being misunderstood. While they know that shifting cultivation does not destroy the forest, they are told that it does, and while they are told that lumbering is not destructive, they know otherwise. The first request of the people of the upper Balui is to be informed about what is happening. Their second request is to be consulted. They want an input on how they will live in their new sites; they do not want change to be forced on them, but they want to be active participants in that change. The absence of consultation is creating a negative frame of mind. In order to be able to make an informed decision, they ask that arrangements be made for representatives from their villages to visit the Batang Ai and other HEPs, so that they can have an idea of what to expect.

2. Need for negotiations The people of the upper Balui want negotiations to start as soon as possible. They feel that, as they are being asked to relinquish their homelands, they are entitled to negotiate with the government in order to come to an agreement on the location of resettlement sites, the amenities to be provided in the new villages, the economic activities in the resettlement areas, and compensation for lost resources. As far as they are concerned, the upper Balui belongs to the population which occupies it, and the Bakun project may not go ahead before an agreement has been reached. The following paragraphs (3 to 6) describe the current thinking of the people Balui about topics to be negotiated.

3. Location of resettlement areas Some people are radically opposed to the idea of moving to the proposed resettlement sites in the Belaga river area, while others are willing to consider it. Those who are against it say that Belaga is foreign territory; they are comfortable where they are now. The upper Balui is not only a fertile area with rich resources, it is home. The landscape in which they live is part

of their history, and people are very sad at the thought that their natal villages and the surrounding land will be flooded. Most people are willing to consider the Belaga scheme if it turns out to be an improvement for them, but they do not think that the region can accommodate the whole population of the upper Balui. A proportion of interviewees indicated that they would accept to move to the Belaga area, but only on the condition that they would receive a guaranteed written title to the part of their existing territories which is not to be flooded, and, more generally, that the upper Balui would be reserved for them and their descendants as an extension area, and as an area where they might return if they didn't like the Belaga scheme. Demographic considerations were an important factor in people's concerns. They emphasized the importance of resettlement areas being large enough to accommodate a growing population. This is a realistic concern, given the high birth rate. In addition, resettlement plans should take into consideration the fact that all domestic units are not of the same size, and flexibility is needed to deal with that variation. Whatever happens, there is strong agreement that the people of the upper Balui insist on retaining the right of residence there, and that people from other areas (whether from Sarawak or Indonesian Borneo) must not be allowed to move into the upper Balui. People had various suggestions about resettlement areas. Some suggested that it would be simplest to move to high ground on their own territory. Others recognized that some form of grouping would be a more effective way to benefit from such resources as schools, dispensaries, etc., and they made specific suggestions. The preferred option for the Kayan villages of Uma Lesong, Uma Balui Ukap, and Uma Daro' in the upriver part of the upper Balui is to move to a nearby tableland, forming three distinct communities with distinct territories, which would share a service centre. (When I visited these three Kayan villages, they mentioned that the Bukat would also want to join them. However, Dr. Tan, who visited the Bukat, says that they want to be in Lusong Laku with the Penan.) The people of Uma Juman, Uma Balui Long Liko, Lahanan, Uma Belor and Uma Nyaving have been considering various options, but many people think it would be a good idea for them to gather in the area of Lusong Laku. The people of Uma Bawang, nearest to the Bakun dam, feel that they have a wide choice in the Murum and Seping rivers. In all cases, they thought that the existing timber roads might form the basis for developing roadways to these concentrations.

4. Nature and layout of communities There is a consensus that the existing communities wish to maintain their autonomy. Whether they stay in the upper Balui or move to Belaga, they are opposed to any idea of amalgamating them into large communities. The desire to maintain present community structure is based in part on an economic rationale (see below), but also on more general principles: the community is the basis of social organization in the upper Balui. Furthermore, people feel that large communities would create a number of social problems, in particular quarrels and violence. Similarly, there is agreement that longhouses must be retained (Even those who have built single-family dwellings seem to support the maintenance of the longhouse). In our meetings, much attention was given to the question of longhouses. In every community, people feel that longhouses should be completed for them in the resettlement villages. They should be built according to the high standards of existing communities in the upper Balui (and these standards are indeed high). They want running water and electricity to be

provided free of charge (all upper Balui villages currently have running water without charge). They want guarantees that schools and clinics will be rebuilt, preferably with improved amenities. 5. Economic factors People are well aware that the proposed resettlement area in the Belaga area is too small for all of them to continue to practice swidden agriculture, given the intention to provide plots of about 10 or 12 acres. When they are told that the intention is indeed for them to abandon shifting cultivation to turn to cash crops, they find this preposterous. Nobody is opposed to the development of cash crops, and many people are keen to be more involved in cash crops. On the other hand, there is general agreement that shifting cultivation must continue. Without it, they say, they will be completely dependent on the market to feed themselves, and the wholesale move to a cash crop scheme will in effect impoverish them, as they will lose access to free rice, free fish, free meat, and free vegetables. It is recognized that some people might be happy to devote themselves entirely to cash crops, commerce, and small industries; they wish them well, but the overwhelming majority of upper Balui people want to continue to be primarily subsistence agriculturalists, based on shifting cultivation, while devoting a portion of their time to cash crops. As regards cash crops, the only option which is considered viable is one in which people receive title to plots of land prepared for cash crops. There is a strong rejection of plantations in which they would be wage labourers: they do not want to work to fixed schedules, they do not want to be dependent on wages on a permanent basis. While the majority of the population fear that their future will worsen with the Bakun dam, it is also recognised that, in theory, the project could mean jobs and new economic opportunities, as well as better transportation, schooling, and medical care. More people would have a positive attitude if there were an ongoing dialogue about the project. While people wish that subsistence agriculture continue as the core of their economy for the time being, they are open to new possibilities. I have already mentioned that they want to grow cash crops and have already been doing so. In addition, some of them wish to have access to wage labour, and they make the following suggestions: job vacancies should be advertised in such a way that longhouse residents could be informed of them. Secondly, it is strongly felt that the local population should be given priority in employment for the Bakun project, including logging the area to be flooded and work at the dam itself.

6. Compensation People are afraid that they will not receive sufficient compensation for their land, longhouses, huts, fruit trees, forest resources, etc. There is great anxiety because of a recent statement of the Chief Minister whom they understood to say that there would be no compensation for fallow swiddens (temuda). If this is a misunderstanding on their part, it is urgent to correct it; if it is not, it goes at the core of their way of life. In a first step, people want negotiations to establish the value of resources to be flooded (e.g. how much for an acre of fallow swidden, how much of a durian tree, etc.) so that there is a basis for establishing the amounts of compensation for each household and community. Communities which have spent much energy in beautifying village grounds (e.g. Uma Daro') are concerned that adequate compensation should be given for this. If people are moved to a new location where they cannot use their boats and outboard motors, they want compensation for this. There should be compensation when graves of known people have to be moved. (Old graves of people who have been forgotten do not call for

compensation. N.B. Upon receiving compensation for graves, people plan to move themselves the remains of their relatives.) Secondly, people are adamant that they must receive compensation in full before moving to the resettlement sites. Given what they have heard about the Batang Ai HEP, and from past experience with some timber companies, they feel very strongly about this, and they are not willing to accept delays in compensation. Third, some people are concerned about wasting compensation money, a problem which arose in Batang Ai. It would be worthwhile to explore with them ways of solving this problem. Depositing the amount in some kind of savings account has been suggested, but I am not clear what kinds of limitations on withdrawals they would support. Cash compensation for lost resources is only a part of the package expected by the people of the upper Balui. They also expect replacement of homes, land, and other resources (i.e. they want to have as much agricultural land and as much jungle as they do now). For some items, there seems to be duplication: they want compensation for their homes, and new homes provided free of charge; they want compensation for flooded land, and new land. When I pointed out that there might be some reluctance to go along with such duplication, I was told that the rationale for this double request was the fact that, (a) - the resettlement is involuntary and (b) - that Bakun is being financed from cutting timber, a resource which is theirs because it is in their territories. Resettlers want assistance when they move. They want their belongings to be moved for them to their ready-to-occupy new houses. They request adequate food until they can regain economic independence, at least for two years.

7. Participation in the benefits of the dam The people of the Balui are sceptical about their chances of benefiting from the project. This scepticism is in large part a consequence of the lack of communication. In any case, they expect that they ought to profit from it. They request that resettlement communities be provided with free electricity, on the grounds that this electricity will be produced from a resource which is theirs. They expect a share in the revenue from the sale of electricity. In 1985, 1% was suggested (to be managed by a Foundation; see Suara Sam 2(1), Feb. 1985). A higher proportion was mentioned during my field trip.

8. Fears about consequences of the hydro-electric project The people have heard of the serious problems experienced in the Batang Ai project and they fear that they will be similarly neglected. (Mahdzan & Fauziah 1991 provide a useful description of the perception of resettled Ibans in the Batang Ai. A remarkable 80% have regrets about resettlement.) There is a mixture of despair and anger at the continuing uncertainty and what they see as a lack of interest in their plight. "The Lahanan are concerned not only about compensation for the money, time and labour invested in their various crops, but particularly with the future of their children. Their major concern is that they can continue their current lifestyle and acquire sufficient land to replace that wiped out by the Bakun hydro-electricity scheme. While undoubtedly aware that the

demands for cash crops will increase, they wish to maintain direct access to traditional subsistence sources such as hill padi, hunting and fishing" (Alexander 1987: 84). There is a fear that outsiders will come to the area and ignore the rights of the local population. They think they are likely to be treated with the same lack of respect as they have been by loggers. They are apprehensive about the impact of outside influences.

Conclusion It is obvious that the answer to the majority of fears lies in communication. Where fears are unfounded, the information should be transmitted as soon as possible to the local populations, via trusted individuals. Secondly, the population should be informed that the resettlement plans will take into account their needs and fears. Effective two-way communication will go a long way to changing resistance into co-operation.

Table 2: Reactions to the resettlement programme 1. People want to be informed and consulted. 2. They need to enter into negotiations with the Government. 3. The resettlement area must be large enough for shifting cultivation as well as cash crops. 4. The resettlement area must allow for population increase. 5. The upper Balui must continue to belong to the populations which currently live there. 6. Most people prefer to remain in the upper Balui area. 7. Existing communities must maintain their autonomy; they should not be amalgamated into large villages. 8. Longhouses must be retained, and they must at least match the existing houses in size, materials, and quality of construction. 9. The plan for a wholesale shift to cash crops is rejected. 10. People want to continue shifting cultivation while also growing cash crops. 11. People must have full title to their cash crop gardens. 12. Employment opportunities should be improved. 13. People are afraid that the Government will not provide adequate compensation. 14. They want to be compensated in full for lost resources, and the compensation should be established on the basis of negotiation. 15. They do not want the Bakun project to start before compensation has been paid in full and resettlement sites readied. 16. Resettlers want assistance when they move, and support after they have moved, until they have re-established economic autonomy.

17. Resettlers want to benefit from the dam: they want free electricity and a share of the profits. 18. People are apprehensive about possible negative consequences of the Bakun HEP.

6. RESETTLEMENT CRITERIA FOR THE BAKUN HEP In order to plan and implement the resettlement of the upper Balui population, it is necessary to formulate criteria by which success or failure can be evaluated. Gutman (1993) and World Bank (1990, 1994, Ms.) have been particularly useful in identifying such criteria. They are based on a detailed knowledge of successful and less successful resettlements caused by HEPs. 1. The population subject to resettlement should not only maintain its current standard of living but also share directly in project benefits 1.1 Resettlement should achieve the complete social and economic re-establishment of those dislocated, on a viable productive basis, through the creation of project-funded activities. If the resettled population clearly benefits from the project, this will not only be good for them, but for Sarawak and Malaysia as a whole. On the one hand, development will reduce regional disparities in socioeconomic matters. On the other hand, the stature of Malaysia and Sarawak will be enhanced in the international community. Malaysia has shown an active interest in the protection of indigenous people (e.g. the recent conference in Kuala Lumpur, Indigenous People: The Way Forward, whose purpose was "to show the world how Malaysia is deeply concerned in the growth and development of its indigenous people" <<from the official brochure>). The Bakun project is another opportunity to demonstrate a commitment to this cause. An effective resettlement and development programme will only be a small proportion of the total cost of the project, given its size and the relatively small population (compared to other major hydro-electric projects elsewhere). 1.2. House and dwelling size allocation at new village sites should show improved standards and conditions.

2. The problems caused by resettlement should be minimised 2.1. Resettlement plans should have adequate institutional arrangements to ensure effective and timely implementation as well as adequate monitoring and evaluation arrangements. The dislocation caused by resettlement can be minimised by building resettlement plans around a coherent development strategy. Appropriate support for both social and economic development must be provided during the transition period. This calls for effective interagency coordination. The new reservoir will increase the risk of health problems, such as malaria, schistosomiasis, typhoid, dysentery, and hepatitis. Are there plans to counter these dangers? ("Disease control is relatively cheap if done correctly and in time; if control is

delayed or botched, cure of epidemics is very expensive and rarely totally effective. A rule of thumb is that control of most water-borne diseases can be had for an annual $3 per person.... Such financing must continue for the life of the project" [World Bank, Ms. 49]). If the promoters of the project have financial difficulties, will the Malaysian and Sarawak governments be able to guarantee adequate financing for projects aimed at improving the life of the Balui people? Displaced persons need to be

compensated for their losses; assisted with the move and supported during the transition period, including the provision
of food, housing, infrastructure and other needs; assisted in their efforts to improve their former living standards; provided with the means to attain sustainable economic development; provided with a resettlement schedule which allows them to plan in the short-, middleand long-terms. 2.2. The resettlement transition period should be minimised and adequate support for both social and economic development should be provided during the transition period.

The construction of the dam, roads, and other elements of the infrastructure will increase demand for consumer goods. How can the local population be protected against inflation? The arrival of a large transient population of workers could create various problems such as prostitution. How will this be alleviated? What strategies can be developed to protect the local population? Flooding will produce de-oxygenation and hydrogen-sulphide rich outflow in the RejangBalui basin and reduce the fish population. How long will the problem last, and how will other forms of proteins be provided? 2.3. Resettlement distances should be minimised and opportunities for resettling entire communities and natural groups should be provided. Minimising the distance of relocation has several advantages. Resettlers will feel less uprooted; they will know the new environment better, with consequent psychological and economic advantages. It may also be cheaper.

3. Resettlement plans should have popular acceptance and the affected population should be consulted "Participation is now regarded by development practitioners as the most widely accepted strategy and a key element in the design and implementation of rural development programs" (Songan 1993: 101). Resettlers should have the opportunity to form communities which answer their needs. "Most displaced people prefer to move as part of a pre-existing community, neighborhood, or kinship group. The acceptability of a resettlement plan can be increased and the disruption caused by resettlement can be cushioned by moving people in groups, reducing dispersion, sustaining existing patterns of group organization and retaining access to cultural property (...), if necessary, through the relocation of the property" (World Bank

1990: 3). As well, planning for the new communities should also take into account population growth. The people's active participation in all phases of planning will increase the effectiveness of the resettlement project. "To obtain cooperation, participation, and feedback, the affected hosts and resettlers need to be systematically informed and consulted during preparation of the resettlement plan about their options and rights. They should also be able to choose from a number of acceptable resettlement alternatives. These steps can be taken directly or through formal and informal leaders and representatives. Experience has shown that local NGOs can often provide valuable assistance and ensure viable community participation. Moreover, institutionalised arrangements, such as regular meetings between project officials and communities, should be provided for resettlers and hosts to communicate their concerns about the resettlement program to project staff throughout planning and implementation. Particular attention must be given to ensure that such vulnerable groups as indigenous people, ethnic minorities, the landless, and women are represented adequately in such arrangements" (World Bank 1990:3).

Participation minimises problems which hinder effective development such as: > > > > Mistrust about the eventual success of the project; Fears that the government will take away rights to land; Fears that they will not be allowed to develop their land as they want; Lack of involvement of beneficiaries in the decision-making process (cf. Songan 1993: 106-111).

3.1. Any changes in economic activities should be introduced on a voluntary basis. This follows from the principle that the affected people are to be active participants in the process of development in order for it to be successful. If some changes in occupation are necessary, the new opportunities must recognise the socio-cultural characteristics of the populations concerned.

3.2. The selection of sites and the timing of resettlement should be established on the basis of a broad-based consultation. In selecting sites, attention has to be paid both to the adequacy of agricultural land and the availability of sources of non-agricultural income (fishing, hunting, gathering forest product, seasonal wage employment) (World Bank 1990: 4). The timing of relocation is to be established by agreement with the populations affected.

4. Resettlement of the population should be land-based 4.1. The resettled population should be provided with adequate amounts of land which can sustain agriculture on a long-term basis. Estimates of land needs should take into account potential population increases.

4.2. Adequate land tenure arrangements must be guaranteed to the resettled communities.

Without secure long-term rights to land, effective development is impossible; feelings of insecurity will sap the enterprise of the population concerned. There are different forms of land tenure: village territories are jointly controlled by the villagers; fallow land, kitchen gardens, fruit trees, and cash crops are owned by individuals or domestic units.

5. Economic development plans must be suited to the displaced population and the resettlement area In a remote area, it would be unwise to encourage a wholesale change from subsistence agriculture to cash agriculture. When people are primarily engaged in subsistence agriculture, it is more effective to foster a mixed economy in which the population continues to provide for its own subsistence while devoting a proportion of its time to cash crops and other forms of commodity production. The success of cash cropping depends not only on environmental circumstances and agricultural techniques, but also on many socio-economic factors. A successful transition from subsistence agriculture to cash crops is slow and gradual. It is certainly a mistake to attempt a sudden change from subsistence agriculture to large-scale plantations. Distance from the markets and, in some cases, the unsuitability of the terrain can also militate against large cash crop schemes.

6. Displaced persons should be compensated for their losses at replacement cost By itself, cash is not adequate compensation for the dislocation of resettlement, but it is an important element in the process. A thorough inventory should be made of resources which will be lost in the move. A mechanism is needed to establish the scale of compensation in consultation with the affected population. It is unacceptable to charge the cost of new amenities to the resettled population.

7. The financial resources to carry out the relocation and development proposals should be available when and where required. Development plans should be developed in concert with relocation plans Given the complexity of this project (magnitude of the investment, duration of construction), and the consequent impossibility of predicting every outcome, flexible plans are necessary. Locking the affected people into a narrow-focused scheme would reduce the government's ability to respond to changing conditions. Furthermore, all resettlers may not necessarily all want the same thing. The cost of resettlement is an intrinsic part of any hydro-electric project and as such should form part of its budget. Adequate amounts must be budgeted to guarantee a successful relocation. Estimates of labour costs must take into consideration the fact that the increased demand for labour will create inflation of hourly wages.

Table 3: Resettlement criteria for the Bakun HEP 1. The population subject to resettlement should not only maintain its current standard of living but also share directly in project benefits.

1.1. Resettlement should achieve the complete social and economic re-establishment of those dislocated, on a viable productive basis, through the creation of project-funded activities. 1.2. House and dwelling size allocation at new village sites should show improved standards and conditions.

2. The problems caused by resettlement should be minimised. 2.1. Resettlement plans should have adequate institutional arrangements to ensure effective and timely implementation as well as adequate monitoring and evaluation arrangements. 2.2. The resettlement transition period should be minimised and adequate support for both social and economic development should be provided during the transition period. 2.3. Resettlement distances should be minimised and opportunities for resettling entire communities and natural groups should be provided.

3. Resettlement plans should have popular acceptance and the affected population should be consulted. 3.1. Any changes in economic activities should be introduced on a voluntary basis. 3.2. The selection of sites and the timing of resettlement should be established on the basis of a broad-based consultation.

4. Resettlement of the population should be land-based. 4.1. The resettled population should be provided with adequate amounts of land which can sustain agriculture on a long-term basis. 4.2. Adequate land tenure arrangements must be guaranteed to the resettled communities.

5. Economic development plans must be suited to the displaced population and the resettlement area.

6. Displaced persons should be compensated for their losses at replacement cost.

7. The financial resources to carry out the relocation and development proposals should be available when and where required. Development plans should be developed in concert with relocation plans.

Table 4: POLICIES WHICH HAVE FAILED Displacing populations. Concentrating communities into large villages. Forcing people to become strictly sedentary agriculturalists [i.e. banning shifting cultivation].

Inducing them to devote more than 30% of their activities to the market economy. Providing them with insufficient land or not guaranteeing land tenure at all. Developing educational systems which reduce their knowledge of the environment. Subordinating their activities to environmental protection or tourism (i.e. placing them in reserves or treating them as tourist attractions). Subordinating them entirely to external political power (even if democratic). Making overall plans on too large a scale. From a report to the European Community on the Situation of indigenous populations in tropical forests (Bahuchet 1993: 58-59)

7. RECOMMENDATIONS At this stage of the project, none of the criteria for a successful resettlement (Table 1) have yet been fulfilled. This is a consequence of (a) - the absence of consultation with the affected population, a consultation which is necessary to formulate appropriate resettlement goals and (b) - the absence of integrated planning for the Bakun project. The division of tasks between the Federal Government and Ekran on the one hand, and the Sarawak State Government on the other, is not viable without an effective coordinating body. For example, the lack of coordination is evident in relation to logging. The useful life of a dam is limited by siltation. This is a significant problem with the Bakun HEP, given the high silt content in the water; hence, the estimated 50-year usefulness of Bakun may be optimistic. Logging activities have increased siltation since this estimate was made. Logging needs to be curtailed or stopped well before impoundment; furthermore, reforestation must take place to control erosion. As of now, I have no evidence that this issue has been addressed. As mentioned earlier, the continued presence of swidden agriculturalists in the upper Balui after impoundment would help protect the forest, especially if they are active participants in a reforestation project.

1. Consultation with the affected people should start immediately It is urgent to start a process of consultation. Without participation, resettlement plans are doomed to failure, as numerous examples around the world have shown. Consultation can start with the existing structures; at the same time, the people of the Balui should be given the means to participate more effectively in the consultation process. They can be provided with incentives to form local consultative groups. If their goals and wishes are not identical to those of the Government, it is not productive to tell them that they are "against development", that they "resist change", or that they "stand in the way of progress". In fact, they are interested in change, progress and development. They simply do not want someone else's idea of "progress" forced on them. For effective consultation to take place, all communities must be visited several times. People must be encouraged to present their opinions and to comment on Government proposals. Officials involved in the consultation must understand clearly that their role is not only to express official views, but also to listen to the views of the population and respond to them. In between visits, communities must be able to communicate easily with the administration to deal with issues as they arise. Consultation should cover all aspects of the project: compensation, selection of areas of relocation, infrastructure to be provided, timing of the relocation, nature of economic activities (e.g. continuation of shifting cultivation), employment possibilities related to the project, etc. Through the years, local residents have formed several groups to respond to

the project. The Bakun Development Committee is the most recent example of such groups. Dialogue with the BDC and any other existing local groups is an effective way of fostering participation and developing useful resettlement strategies. In addition to such consultations, it is worthwhile to implement the recommendation of the SAMA-Consortium (1989a: 18-19) that a senior Information and Communication Officer should be appointed who would have a sociological or anthropological background and, ideally, who would be fluent in Kayan. His task would be to conceive and organise information and communication between the project authorities/planners and the resettlement population. The Information and Communication Officer should be ex-officio member of the Steering Committee, the Resettlement Sub-Committee and other subcommittees which deal with resettlement. In planning the relocation project, it will also be important to have joint consultations with communities which are now neighbours and/or might be neighbours after relocation. The Bakun Development Committee has suggested that an ombudsman be appointed to deal with problems. Experience has shown that an ombudsman helps resolve conflicts and benefits the project as a whole. More generally, broad-based consultation will increase public confidence in the project. Critics have raised a number of concerns which it is important to answer, otherwise the uncertainty may cause social and political problems. Concerns have been raised about the following points: Financing problems after the project is started and need for Sarawak and Malaysia to commit funds beyond the original plans; Shorter life-span of the dam than the 50-year expectation; Degradation of the water supply downstream along the Rejang; Problems with the resettlement projects. 2. An integrated resettlement and development strategy is needed Development plans need to be developed in concert with relocation plans. An effective resettlement and development strategy will take into consideration the short, middle, and long-terms. Consultation with the resettlers is an essential element in formulating this strategy. A Belaga Development Authority should be set up on the same lines as the Bintulu Development Authority. After all, the Bakun investment is five times as high as that of Bintulu. In formulating an integrated strategy, the experience of the Batang Ai HEP is invaluable. As we know, the human aspect of the Batang Ai project has not been a success, and one can learn from past mistakes. The Batang Ai project suffered from a lack of consultation. Insufficient land was provided. The new villages were not ready in time and the quality of housing was uneven. (The delays in completing the new villages were in part a consequence of the fact that SALCRA was unable to offer competitive wages). There were problems with compensation, not all of which are resolved. Batang Ai settlers were asked to pay for their new houses. This goes against a basic principle of involuntary resettlement, according to which full replacement must be provided at no cost. In the Batang Ai, the plan to establish an oil palm scheme was rejected because "the disciplined nature of work associated with the establishment and maintenance of oil palm

would be difficult for the settlers to adapt [to]" (Ngidang 1991: 39). It would be most unwise to attempt a similar scheme with the upper Balui resettlers. On the other hand, the Bakun HEP could also benefit from the experience of more successful HEPs, such as the Temengor dam in Perak, where resettlers received in compensation an average of RM 177,419 per family, while in Phase I of the Batang Ai project (affecting those who lost all their property), resettlers received an average of RM 90,114 per family.

An integrated strategy will suggest solutions for the following problems: How is the local population to be protected against inflation during the construction? What strategies can be developed to protect the local population against such problems as prostitution? How will the resettlers be provided with adequate food during the transition period? How will the affected population be protected against the long-term health risks brought about by the flooding? Who will pay for the cost of disease prevention? How is the development project to be protected against potential financial difficulties of the promoters of the dam? Are there plans to ensure that the local populations participate in the short- and middleterm activities generated by the project (e.g. lumbering of the area to be flooded, construction of new longhouses)? An integrated strategy must pay attention to timing of activities. The compressed schedule of the Batang Ai HEP was a major factor in the difficulties which arose (Ngidang 1991: 94). The same problem might arise with the Bakun HEP, given Ekran's plan to complete the project in six years rather than 12 years, as originally planned. In order for the resettlement and development strategy to be effective, it must be fully coordinated with the ecological, engineering, and economic aspects of the project. For instance, before starting to cut the vegetation on the land to be flooded, there must be firm guarantees that the Bakun HEP can be carried to successful completion. This means that financing of the whole project must be guaranteed, including cost overruns, and fully backed up by the Malaysian Government in the eventuality that Ekran faces financial constraints in the future. Without such guarantees, there could be a situation where the Bakun HEP might have to be postponed or even cancelled after clearing the vegetation, which would create a disastrous situation. Similarly, it is essential to allocate sufficient funds for relocation. Given the relatively small population, we can expect that the total cost of relocation will be closer to 5% than 10% of total costs for the whole project (These figures are the usual range for ongoing projects; see Gutman 1993: 43). In this context, it should be noted that the amount of RM 100 million currently set aside for resettlement (Tan Sri Ting Pek Khiing, Sarawak Tribune, 24 February 1994) is insufficient, given the estimate of RM 15 billion for the whole project. From the above formula, we would expect that a figure in the range of RM750 million would be necessary (if there are no cost overruns). Costs which result directly from the dam, such as the ongoing disease prevention programme, should form part of such estimates. On the other hand, the responsibility of guaranteeing the well-being of the people concerned rests with the Sarawak Government, which is in the best position to take charge of resettlement and development, as this fits into its other social and economic commitments.

Flexibility is essential for an effective strategy. It is impossible to predict all outcomes in such a complex project, and it is simplistic to expect that all resettlers have the same needs, aspirations, or capabilities.

3. The existing communities must retain their autonomy Concentration of several longhouse communities into a few large villages would create unnecessary social problems. There would be friction between the groups about control over resources and other matters, exacerbated by the fact that the people of the Balui are not used to such concentrations (cf. Langub, Kedit & Demong 1989: 20-23). It may be true that a few large villages are slightly easier to administer than several small communities, but this is more than offset by the damage done to the affected population. At any rate, the government is administering several small communities at present and this has already resulted in development. Community structure should answer the needs of the local populations before those of administrators. In any case, large villages would not actually be easier to administer, because the problems they would create would require more policing and adjudication. An important element of this autonomy is the formulation of appropriate rights of land tenure which reaffirm customary rights in this new context. Each community must have its own territory. Boundaries between village territories must be established in consultation with the communities concerned. The villages of the Balui have experience in dealing with boundary issues; their participation is a crucial factor. The way in which resettlement is managed also affects village autonomy. For instance, it is preferable to involve resettlers in the construction of their new houses under appropriate supervision (cf. Ngidang 1991: 100). Active participation will increase satisfaction with the results.

4. Adequate resettlement areas must be identified in the tributaries of the Balui above the Bakun rapids Resettlers require territories which allow them to practice shifting cultivation as well as produce cash crops. Given the very low population density and the availability of fertile soils in the upper Balui area and the fact that most villages are currently situated along the Balui river, it is easy to resettle villages in tributaries near their present sites in tributaries of the Balui. Relocation within the upper Balui has the further advantage that it will not affect the eventual relocation of the people below the Bakun if the Pelagus Dam is built. Many tributaries of the Balui would be suitable areas for relocation because they were occupied by the Kayan, Kenyah and Kajang until early in this century (including, but not limited to the Murum, Plieran, Danum, Usun Apau and Linau). "All these areas formerly occupied by longhouse peoples and presently occupied by Penan are rich agricultural land, and have a great deal of potential for further agricultural development" (Langub, Kedit & Demong 1989: 5). Serious attention should be given to the appropriateness of having two or three concentrations of villages in the upper Balui, along the lines suggested by the local population. It is urgent to identify possible resettlement areas above the Bakun with the following characteristics: Good agricultural land (both for swidden agriculture and cash crops). Proximity to primary jungle.

 Good access to the impoundment lake (and/or roads). Proximity to existing settlements. Availability of extension areas to accommodate population increase. Several sites seem appropriate. Some of them were identified in 1985 by the SAMAConsortium (as per a SESCO map), and there may be others. Some of these areas have already been mentioned in Part 6 (Section 3). In the section on the SAMA-Consortium report, I have already listed the reasons why relocation in the Balui is preferable to resettlement in the Belaga river system (Table 3). However, it has been argued that relocation in the upper Balui basin would displace the Penan communities which now occupy these areas which were vacated by the Kayan, Kenyah and Kajang. In fact, this issue is relevant only for the resettlement of a few Kayan communities, not for the majority of villages in the region. It is essential to look after the interests of the Penan, but the solution is to survey the area carefully and first find out how much land is available without encroaching on existing Penan lands. The disturbances of relocation will be reduced if the people of the Balui can remain in the same area. On the other hand, if the people of the Balui are relocated in the Belaga river, the end result will be that the Penan have much more land than they can use, while everyone else has far less than they need. This is unreasonable and it is bound to create serious problems. The relocation of Balui communities in nearby tributaries is also in the interests of the Penan. The current plan to leave them isolated in the Balui area is not realistic. In order to protect the interests of the Penan, they must retain territories which are distinct from those of the Kayan, Kenyah and Kajang. Furthermore, each Penan community needs to retain a distinct territory. It would be preferable not to displace Penan village but, if this becomes necessary, a plan must be developed with Penan resettlers to guarantee that the appropriation of natural resources is properly managed in the interests of the whole community (cf. Brosius 1988: 160-161).

5. The timing of relocation should be established by agreement with the resettlers Traditionally, community migration in central Borneo took place in steps. Some people moved first and the rest of the population followed when the new site had become viable. This allowed old farm sites to feed part of the population for a few years while the new site was being readied. There should be consultation to find out whether this approach would be less disruptive and potentially more economical.

6. Longhouses should be retained The plan to move people from longhouses into single-family dwellings is not advantageous from technical and social viewpoints; it is based on cultural prejudices about what is a "proper dwelling". Longhouses are economical and practical forms of housing which lend themselves well to modernisation. They are less expensive to build than separate dwellings, and it is easier to provide basic services such as electricity and piped water. Given that the affected populations wish to retain longhouses, this is the obvious option. At the same time, households which prefer to have single-family dwellings should be allowed to do so, subject to a master plan of each village community. An appropriate compensation procedure should be developed for households electing to build single-family

dwellings. This compensation should not exceed the cost of building a longhouse apartment.

7. The resettlement/development plans should encourage a mixed economy An exclusive emphasis on cash crops will be detrimental to the population and the economy of the region; it will hinder rather than foster long-term socio-economic development. It is economically preferable to allow for a mixed economy in which subsistence production continues alongside commodity production. This strategy protects the population from the fluctuations of commodity production, to which they would be more vulnerable than established cash-crop agriculturalists. A massive change in the economic basis will increase rather than decrease dependence on State assistance. A mixed economy allows for a smooth transition from subsistence to cash production and it gives greater flexibility. The immediate goal should be to foster a situation in which 70% of the work is devoted to subsistence agriculture and 30% to cash crops and other forms of cash production. The 70% time allocation to subsistence activities will allow the resettlers to maintain their economic and social autonomy, giving them the security to learn and experiment with new techniques. Within the subsistence sector, new cultivars can be introduced (and this has already been done to some extent with fruit trees, maize, and some other vegetables) in order to reduce undue reliance on market-bought food. The cash sector should not be devoted entirely to a single cultivar. Because of changing markets and natural circumstances, it is important that there be at least two cash crops. Because of the distance of the Balui area from the coast and the difficult terrain, some cash crops may not be economically competitive. The ecological and economic viability of specific cash crops needs to be established before they are suggested to the resettlers.

8. Shifting cultivation needs to continue Shifting cultivation is the most efficient agricultural technique in the Balui area at this time. Despite common prejudices to the contrary, study after study has shown that shifting cultivation is a sustainable agricultural technique which does not degrade the environment or deplete timber resources. Shifting cultivation is sustainable because nearly all the clearings are on secondary jungle; thus the same lands are used in rotation, after the vegetation has been allowed to regenerate. Shifting cultivation becomes a problem only when the population density is too high. The population density in the upper Balui is very low, hence the continuation of shifting cultivation is unproblematic. It is not suggested that all resettlers must continue to practice shifting cultivation, but rather that they be allowed to continue to do so in a sustainable fashion. In fact, given the growing interest in producing cash crops and engaging in other cash-producing activities, a significant sector of the affected population can be expected to reduce or even cease to practice shifting cultivation; this means that the population increase which can be expected in the coming years will not bring about a comparable increase in hill padi cultivation. I am not suggesting that resettlers should continue swidden agriculture for ever, but rather that they will progress better if they maintain a subsistence economy which they master while becoming more proficient with different agricultural activities and industries. Instead of fighting shifting cultivation, it will be more productive to enhance its effectiveness further. For instance, it would be useful to collect and study all the varieties of rice cultivated

in the area in order to study their properties. The development of soil-measurement kits and other techniques could help in an enhanced selection of farm sites. Elsewhere in Borneo, the development of rattan gardens has been profitable in remote areas (Poffenberger & McGean 1993b: 46-47), and the same would probably be the case in the Balui.

9. Access to forest resources must be maintained All communities in the Balui have easy access to forest resources. Hunting, fishing, and collection of jungle produce are still important activities. This should be taken into consideration in the planning process (Langub, Kedit & Demong 1989: 21). Access to forest resources should form part of an integrated planning process in which the needs of shifting cultivation, commercial agriculture, and use of the jungle are integrated. Shifting cultivators have a vested interest in protecting their environment. What has been said about East Kalimantan applies equally to the Balui: "Dayak communities have both ecological knowledge based on generations of experience and strong motivations to manage the environment sustainably.... Non-timber forest products are important in generating both cash and subsistence goods. If these products are to be harvested sustainably, community forest management groups will need to be assured that they have exclusive rights to such benefits. The desire to secure their homelands, which are increasingly threatened by outside interests, provides indigenous people of East Kalimantan with powerful incentives to protect forest resources from further degradation" (Poffenberger & McGean 1993:58). Similarly, it has been found in Thailand that "Decentralized controls over clearly defined microwatershed areas by organized local hamlets have reduced threats of fire, illegal logging, and upland erosion and are resulting in impressive natural forest regeneration" (Poffenberger & McGean 1993a: viii).

10. Substitute sources of protein should be planned for Given that the flooding and consequent de-oxygenation will reduce the fish population in the Balui, other forms of proteins must be planned for. The availability of fish and game should be factors in the selection of resettlement sites. In the upper Balui, several people have built fish ponds. It would be worthwhile to see how successful this has been. It is also worthwhile to ascertain whether fish ponds are always safe for the environment. Introduced Tilapia fish may escape to the rivers and compete with native wildlife. How easy would it be to raise local species in fish ponds? Some people have done so, and their experiments should be studied. It might be worthwhile to ask the Sarawak Fisheries Research Institute for suggestions. Several in-depth community studies have raised the issue of commercial fishing and hunting, which has become an important activity in several villages of the upper Balui. This new practice may create problems in the long-term availability of fish and game. Consultations should take place with the communities to regulate commercial fishing and hunting. Some communities already discourage the practice, but concerted action is necessary (e.g. if an upriver community overfishes, this affects their downriver neighbours).

11. Arrangements are to be made to monitor the resettlement and evaluate its impact Monitoring has to proceed on an on-going basis, starting well before the resettlement starts, and continuing until a stable situation has been achieved. In a project of this size, it is normal to expect that problems will arise, so an effective mechanism is required to deal with

complaints and delays. Monitoring can be expected to last for about 20 years (World Bank 1994: 174-179).

12. Small-scale local industries which use local resources in a sustainable way should be encouraged Three possibilities come to mind: Collection of jungle produce that can serve as basic material for medical drugs (The demand is increasing, and this can be done profitably in a remote area because of the favourable value/weight ratio); It would be possible to encourage the formation of small companies which carry out reforestation; they would be paid by timber companies to do so. It should be noted that, as shifting cultivators, the people of the Balui have learned to manage the environment in a sustainable way and are well prepared to practice reforestation. This will increase the productivity of Sarawak's natural resources: "The productivity of valuable timber and non-timber forest products can be greatly increased through enrichment planting and other manipulations of the natural environment" (Poffenberger & McGean 1993b: vii). The project may create new possibilities for ecotourism. On the one hand, the catchment lake may eventually be a tourist destination after the rotting vegetation has ceased producing hydrogen sulphide gas. Also, if the resettlement areas are adjacent to primary jungle, this creates other possibilities for ecotourism. It might be useful to gather information about Lake Toba in Sumatra, where some of the conditions might be similar to what is about to be created here.

13. Training is to be provided to all participants Development calls for training. The people of the Balui need training; the other participants in the project also do. This means: Providing information about the project to the people of the Balui. Training key community members to participate in the development project. Training state personnel so that they can respond adequately to the needs of the local population. For instance, the personnel of the various units coming in contact with the affected populations (Department of Agriculture, Home Economics Programme, etc.) must have some understanding of the social organization. While the Kayan, Kenyah and Kajang are in some ways similar to other indigenous groups such as Iban and Bidayuh with which Government personnel has more contact, they are different in other ways: village communities are more autonomous and distinct from each other, the chief has a special position in the society, etc. An understanding of these factors is important for effective interaction. Establish two-way communication between all the levels of participation: for instance, the engineers planning the dam and other features should be made aware of the needs of the local population so that they can come up with alternatives if their initial plans create undue problems. While there might be resistance to this on the grounds that it takes time, this will improve efficiency in the long-term (and therefore reduce costs) and bring about a more satisfactory outcome. Booklets should be produced for the benefit of the participants. There is extensive documentation on the affected populations (e.g. the reports discussed above). These need to be abstracted and rewritten in clear, simple language for a non-specialised audience. In the same way, when resettlement/development plans have been

formulated, these should be written in a non-technical language so that there is documentation for a wide readership. Extension work is an important element in training. As Ngidang (1991: 97) puts it, extension work must not be done "on an impromptu basis where government agencies send their extension agents to the longhouse for a while and then disappear for months", returning to complain unfairly that villagers do not cooperate. Effective extension work is time-consuming, but effective if the extension agents are facilitators rather than "dictators" (ibid.)

14. Roads and river transportation should be planned A road will be built up to the dam. It should be integrated with wharf facilities which allow the transfer of persons and goods between boats (above the Bakun) and road transport (below the Bakun). Local entrepreneurs might be encouraged to provide regular transportation by road and river. (The EIA should estimate the size of waves which can be expected in the post-impoundment dam, as this will affect transportation as well as siltation.) The wharf area where road and river transportation meet can be expected to become a bazaar. It would be preferable to plan for such a bazaar rather than let it develop in a haphazard fashion. There is now an extensive network of logging roads in the upper Balui, some of which might be maintained, either during the period of resettlement, or on a continuing basis. In some cases, paths could be cleared to link neighbouring villages.

15. The affected communities should have preferential access to electricity Given that the goal of the dam is to produce electricity, villages should be wired to the grid and electricity provided free of charge or at a nominal cost for at least a generation (30+ years). Given the small population size, this will not be a significant cost, but it will have significant symbolic impact.

16. Additional studies are needed Part 5 makes recommendations for additional studies, including a socio-economic survey, a study of current cultivation techniques, a study of the success of cash crops schemes, and a study of the effects of schooling.

Table 5: Recommendations 1. Consultation with the affected people should start immediately. 2. An integrated resettlement and development strategy is needed. 3. Existing communities must retain their autonomy. 4. Adequate resettlement areas must be identified in the tributaries of the Balui. 5. The timing of relocation should be established by agreement with the resettlers. 6. Longhouses should be retained. 7. The resettlement/development plans should encourage a mixed economy. 8. Shifting cultivation needs to continue. 9. Access to forest resources must be maintained. 10. Substitute sources of protein should be planned for. 11. Arrangements are to be made to monitor the resettlement and evaluate its impact. 12. Small-scale local industries which use local resources in a sustainable way should be encouraged. 13. Training is to be provided to all participants.

14. Roads and river transportation should be planned. 15. The affected communities should have preferential access to electricity. 16. A socio-economic survey, as well as studies of current cultivation techniques, cash crops, and education are needed.

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Nicolaisen, Ida (1986) Pride and progress: Kajang response to economic change. Sarawak Museum Journal 36: 75-116. Poffenberger, Mark & Betsy McGean (eds.) (1993a) Community allies: Forest comanagement in Thailand. Research Network Report no. 2. Center for Southeast Asia Studies, University of California, Berkeley. Poffenberger, Mark & Betsy McGean (eds.) (1993b) Communities and forest management in East Kalimantan: Pathway to environmental stability. Research Network Report no. 3. Center for Southeast Asia Studies, University of California, Berkeley. Ritchie, James (1994) Compensation a thorny issue. New Straits Times, 17 May, p. 33. Rousseau, Jrme (1974) The social organization of the Baluy Kayan. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Cambridge. --- (1977) Kayan agriculture. Sarawak Museum Journal 25: 129-156. --- (1987) Kayan land tenure. Borneo Research Bulletin 19(1): 47-56. --- (1988) Central Borneo. A bibliography. Special monograph no. 5. Kuching: Sarawak Museum. --- (1990) Central Borneo: Ethnic identity and social life in a stratified society. Oxford: Clarendon Press. SAMA-Consortium (1988-89) Bakun hydroelectric project: Ecologic and socio-economic studies/ Planning handbook. Unpublished report in six parts: --- (1988a) Basic consideration on farm development in the resettlement area. --- (1988b) Demographic survey - Evaluation tables. --- (1988c) Agricultural survey; Income analysis of the longhouse communities in the upper Balui. --- (1988d) Development plan for farming in the resettlement area. --- (1989a) Principles and outline of a resettlement plan for the Balui population. --- (1989b) Planning schedule for the resettlement of the Balui population. Songan, Peter (1993) A naturalistic inquiry into participation of the Iban peasants in the land development project in the Kalaka and Saribas districts, Sarawak, Malaysia. Borneo Research Bulletin 25: 101-122. Strickland, Simon (1986) Long term development of Kejaman subsistence: An ecological study. Sarawak Museum Journal 36: 117-171. Tsugami, Makoto (1987) Report on the Kayan of Belaga district, Seventh Division. Unpublished report. World Bank (1990) Operational Directive 4.30: Involuntary resettlement. The World Bank Operational Manual. World Bank (1994) Staff appraisal report. China. Xiaolangdi resettlement project. Washington: World Bank. World Bank ([Ms.]) Environmental sustainability in the power sector: & The "big dams" debate. An environmental status list of Southeast Asian renewable energy projects. Draft, Washington: World Bank, June 1, 1994.