The Discourse of Civilization and Pan-Asianism Author(s): Prasenjit Duara Source: Journal of World History, Vol. 12, No.

1 (Spring, 2001), pp. 99-130 Published by: University of Hawai'i Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20078879 . Accessed: 24/01/2011 21:02
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at . http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=uhp. . Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

University of Hawai'i Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of World History.

http://www.jstor.org

The Discourse of Civilization

and Pan-Asianism*
PRASENJIT University DUARA of Chicago

reporter: gandhi:

What

do you think ofWestern

civilization?

It would be a good idea.

to those applying for U.S. cit to the guidelines provided a person may decline to take the oath of loyalty to the According izenship, if this oath conflicts with a religious belief. Despite U.S. Constitution to make deep claims upon the loyalty of the nation-state's prerogative it often recognizes its citizens, that the highest truths are not necessar to be found within the national but in a transcendent community, ily or universal tend to recognize the superiority of realm. Indeed, nations in a truths because their own raison d'?tre is often founded religious or universal in the era of truth. The discourse of civilization spiritual is closely tied to this yearning for a transcendent nation-states spiritual
purpose.

This lization

essay deals with in the twentieth

nationalism, particularly not the only sources of in the world, millions of people the older spiritual in a new conception of civilization incorporated

in the discourse of civi the transformations with century and its complex relationship in East Asia. Nationalism and racism were in the twentieth century. For many identity and religious ideals to be an continue

* are due to the many people who made pertinent comments and constructive Thanks at the various places I have presented this paper. I am particularly grateful to the following comments: who sent me written Cheek, Jerry H. Bentley, Timothy John Fitzgerald, Joshua Fogel, Joan Judge, and David Ownby.

1 Journal ofWorld History, Vol. 12, No. of Hawai'i Press ?2001 by University

99

IOO

JOURNAL

OF WORLD

HISTORY,

SPRING

200I

source of moral authority. The essay considers the potent the ideas of Asian East Asian civilization, ways in which civilization, were expressed, in var and eastern civilization realized, and embodied ious intellectual, cultural, and social movements political, during the interwar years in East Asia. The critical problem in understanding civ to which is the extent it could be identi ilization during this period fied with or appropriated nationalism, by a nationalist goal. Although to in civilization, its ultimate meaning it tried equally were it for expansionist purposes. As long as nationalists manipulate as a supplement to nationalism, able to deploy civilization the civili too, sought zational idea could scarcely realize its promise as the higher authorita tive principle the nation-state from which itself could be judged.

even more

Part

I: A Genealogy

of Civilization

some and civilizations The relationship between nations transformed time during or at the end of the First World War. From the late nine teenth century until that time, the signifier Civilization had become as a singular and universal in much of the established phenomenon nations world this period, Western imperial (Gong 1984, 12). During as a civilizing mission. invoked the signifier to justify their conquest were subjugated and held in thrall because they were continents Whole as civilized nations not constituted of a formulation where by means to be a nation was to be civilized and vice versa. To be sure, the idea other than that of Europe or of Christian that there were civilizations century; during the ity had been around from at least the eighteenth the singular conception of Civilization nineteenth century, however, and Enlightenment based originally Christian values came not upon but to be the only criterion whereby sovereignty only to be dominant in the world. In this way, it also became clear that to could be claimed to a higher, authorizing order of civilization. be a nation was to belong in the context of European domination of the non-Western Arising could be specifically found in the legal language world this conception of various treaties" and its interpretation by the interna "unequal term Civilization time. At an explicit tional lawyers of the level, the to the ability in these treaties and interpretations referred principally as of states to protect and freedoms and willingness life, property, for foreigners), but this usage necessarily also pre (particularly of the mod the existence of the institutions supposed and demanded ern European state, and its goals, values, and practices, ranging from manners and clothing. the pursuit of material progress to Civilized By rights the late nineteenth century, international law and its standard of "civ

Duara: The Discourse

of Civilization

and Pan-Asianism

i o i

and reflected the social Dar ilization" became positivist increasingly winist conception that certain races were more civilized than others. The renowned scholar of international James Lorimer, jurisprudence, to science seems destined to influ "No modern contribution declared, ... as or the ence international and jurisprudence ethnology, politics with a hierarchy of races of races" (quoted in Gong 1984, 49). While to achieve it civilization seemed natural, capacities of Civilization did not theoretically should be noted that the notion civilized.1 the ability of a "race" to become preclude an At the same time, from the late nineteenth century onward, was developing within the alternative formulation of civilization various inchoate of this hegemonic conception. Assuming penumbra at the intersections it would not become of multiple discourses, shapes science different War. Most older imper particularly studies of Sir

and dominant until the end of the First World recognizable in East Asia were the these discourses among significant the Christian ial Chinese of wenming, and conception the Orientalist of Chinese civilization, Jesuit valorization the world Buddhist William Jones and others in Calcutta, the Herderian notion

revival, and of Kultur, among others (Schwab 1984; Bunzl has elegaically 1990; Bechert 1996; Ketelaar 1984). Douglas Howland notion of the civilized documented the death of the imperial Chinese world or wenming when the exchanges between Chinese and Japanese diplomats thereby

conducted "brush-talk," signifying mastery?and through the world of the written became affirmation?of character, to the Japanese and the world irrelevant around them. evidently even as Fukuzawa Yukichi was exhorting Nonetheless, Japan to escape from Asia both Japanese and Chinese (datsua) and become Civilized, were reworking notions of the old Chinese of expressions vestigial common as well as impro civilization (tongwen/d?bun, tongjiao/d?ky?) visations ism, social Darwin upon these ideas influenced by contemporary or common race for example, the neologism tongzhong/d?shu these efforts 1993, 22, 28). While (Howland 1996, 262 n.22; Reynolds an effort to create an at the turn of the century may have represented East Asian alternative civilization, they were still closely associated ideas underlying Civilization. At any rate the social Darwinist did not make much headway. they to the transformation Also of the conception relevant of civiliza

with

1The embodiment in legal form had the effect of universalizing of Civilization it, or in other words, of disassociating it from the particular soil or conditions of its emergence in the West. It was in this particular that countries (such as Christianity) legal incarnation nation like Japan and Turkey could aspire to the status of a Civilized and, indeed, sought very hard to do so.

I02

JOURNAL

OF WORLD

HISTORY,

SPRING

200I

tion was the emergence of the idea of a world religion. Heinz Bechert in the last quar of "Buddhist modernism" has identified the emergence ter of the nineteenth with the Christian-Buddhist century beginning in Sri Lanka, the initiatives taken by Sri Lankan Buddhists and debates in the Theosophical their Western and the forging supporters Society, in Sri Lanka, Japan, and the of international links between Buddhists and Japanese West. thinkers have Buddhist Indeed, Sri Lankans to contemporary in the forefront of contributions remained Buddhist In East Asia, has (Bechert James Ketelaar 1984, 274-275)^ thought could survive the persecution of a new demonstrated how Buddhism Shinto national cult during the Meiji period only by refashioning itself as a "world religion." In all of these cases, the end product resembled or Hinduism less any particular or lived experience of Buddhism much than an abstract, rationalized, and, perhaps most of all, modernized, of thought the core of that served to represent Christianized body was the 1893 Chi to this development another civilization. Central in which each of these traditions of World cago Congress Religions as world were publicly reli first gained publicity?indeed, produced gions (Ketelaar 1990).3 there is a European?specifically German?intellectual Finally, in part with Herder's notion of Kultur /culture that identifiable current, into the new idea of civilization transmuted by the end of the Great War. Herder's notion of Kultur iswell known and Iwill trace no more intellectual tradition can, signifi outlines here.4 This state be found in what may be the most intellectual important cantly, ment of the new conception of civilization, Decline Oswald Spengler's if not unexpectedly, does not refer to of theWest. Ironically, Spengler or Kul entities of his world history as Civilizations, but Cultures the tur. This is because he reserves Civilization for a stage, the final stage, the frozen stage of a dynamic, evolving Culture.5 At any rate, for our are equivalent to what we have been calling the purposes, his cultures than alternative highest expression of civilization: conception multiple, of a people's achievements, the spiritual, and?as virtues, and authentic its broad

2The

same

reconstruction

of the Theosophical 3 See Welch dhism continued

was taking place in of Hinduism and and thinkers like Sri Aurobindo Society in for China and Taixu. Despite this remaking to play a role in nationalism and imperialism

India under the auspices Swami Vivekananda. universalist (Ketelaar terms, Bud 1990; Bechert

1984). 4 For the see to the ideas of Humboldt and Boas on culture, of this notion relationship Bunzl. 5One cannot association of the word 'civilization' of the German but be reminded and courtesy with an effete and superficial French cult of manners (see Elias 1978).

Duara: The Discourse

of Civilization

and Pan-Asianism

103

in war, the Ger At the moment of German defeat ity?authorizing. manic notion of Kultur gained a significant victory over the notion of a universal Civilization to cer which measured value only according standards of progress. To be sure, I am not seeking an explanation for the triumph of civ ilization from the history of ideas. Rather, this triumph must be under stood in relation to that other triumph of the world system of nation as a global ideology that ironically requires the states and nationalism, are impor of a transcendent civilization. conception Spengler's notions tant partly because they were so influential in global discourse?relayed to the English speaking world inmany ways by Arnold Toynbee?and constructive of this new discourse of civilization. thus clarified They in the penumbra of Civilization. the inchoate shapes that had hovered it is important to recognize I believe that the new discourse Moreover, Eastern civilization?was in the of civilization?especially affirmed in Asia. In this sense, too, civilization West before it was confirmed remains a postcolonial concept. two themes: The narrower one is the Spengler professes to examine as a civilization, as a thing already-become decline of the West which was predestined to decline; but his study also rather than coming-to-be, a new philosophy?"the of the future"?of occasioned the philosophy in contrast to the world-as-nature which had hitherto world-as-history, been the only theme of philosophy In his sweeping 1962,5). (Spengler vision of the new world history, Spengler lays out the basic features, to in our understanding of civilization many of which have endured this day. First is the critique of linear history based on the ancient sets the stage to make the rest of the medieval-modern division which world turn around the "little part-world" that is Europe (Spengler, 12). traces many mighty Cultures In its place, Spengler that develop upon its own temporal cycle of rise the model of organisms, each undergoing in isolation from the others. Need and decline, and each developing less to say, a culture cannot be judged from the standpoint of another to a particular mankind" because "truths are truths only in relation is to seek the relation the goal of history (Spengler, 35); also because ship that "inwardly branches of a culture" the expression?forms together 6). Thus does he distinguish (Spengler, and in the process confirms the irreducible binds of all the new tain Western

author history from science of Culture/civilization. ity In Spengler, Culture is a fundamentally spiritual or ideal phenom enon the history of which allows us to grasp its temporal character, its the world-as-history. It is this ideational or of becoming?of principle spiritual quality that authoritatively distinguished it from other Cul

104

JOURNAL

OF WORLD

HISTORY,

SPRING

200I

or perhaps already reflected, the most salient tures, and would become, characteristic of the new conception of civilization. Ideas of Eastern versus civilizations which Western the Great War increasingly accompanied were premised upon this ideal of civilizational In the West, spirituality. influential scholar to propagate and develop the most these ideas was In the course of over forty years (1920S-1960S) Arnold Toynbee. dur the twelve volumes of A Study of World History, ing which he wrote vision of (essentially broke with the vestigial progressivist Toynbee in some measure from Spen and even departed civilization Western) closed organic civilizations (McNeill 1989 gler's view of hermetically 103, 165; Bentley 1996, 7). But perhaps most significant was his con to Gibbon in civilizations. In contrast of the role of religion ception as the with barbarism and others, who often associated Christianity in his earlier volumes, of Civilization, Toynbee, destroyers already as a chrysalis which pre viewed religion as a kind of aid to civilization, served the germs of an older civilization. By the 1940s, he began to see as subsidiary to the growth of religion the rise and fall of civilizations came to reverse ear In this way, Toynbee 1948, 230-234). (Toynbee were frequently founded lier notions of Civilization which upon a of disenchantment. Thus did Toynbee seek to counter James to him, echoed in the West?that, Fraser's view of religion according of early Europe Gibbon's?as having (Toynbee, sapped the manliness For Toynbee, the historical from now on, the goal of history, 228). was to seek ever-deeper function of civilization, spiritual insight (Toyn In the final years of his life Toynbee was drawn to ideas bee, 238-239). in the technological civilization of a common originating global notion of the West, but spiritually achievements regenerated by the major It is not surprising to find his ideas fall on fertile world civilizations. as a major public thinker and ground in Japan where he was accepted a a series of dialogues with the leader of the Soka Gakkai, conducted new of East religion nourished precisely on such ideas of the blending and Western civilizations (McNeill 1989, 269-273). were the conditions of this new view of What for the emergence in tandem with the disillusionment The view surfaced civilization?

the idea of the "civilizing mis during the Great War with produced Front made a mock sion." "The nature of the battle on the Western conceit and invention were neces of the European that discovery ery to humanity," writes Michael Adas and beneficial sarily progressive writer denounced the materialism and after (Adas 1993, 109). Writer Civilization. At the same time, the wider destructiveness of Western forces produced by the end of the war and the new balance of political of decolonization, the emergence of new power, namely, the beginnings

Duara: The Discourse

of Civilization

and Pan-Asianism

105

of the ideology of anti and the concomitant ascendancy use for Civilization. in these nascent To many found little imperialism, seen not only to be compat was increasingly Civilization movements, and ible with, but to have furnished the moral ground for, imperialism or national war. The final triumph of nationalism self-determination nation-states, as the hegemonic global ideology was clinched by imperialism two political developments: revolution and Woodrow Wil the Soviet in the after son's advocacy of the right to national self-determination The philosophy math of the First War 1964, 118-122). (Barraclough reflected the world as a newly unified theater of Spengler and Toynbee insistence on seeing Europe as of history 1996, 3). Spengler's (Bentley over (rather than its telos) was well just a bit-part of the history of humanity suited to a changing world where other actors (nations) had learned to be heard. Not only the language through which they could demand were new nations to emerge all over the world, from the beginning were also telling their histories in the of the century, they early part same linear mode ilizations. greater the language of emergent national subjects linked to classical civ linked to a universalism Thus was nationalism genetically than itself, just as globalism itself came to be figured through

of nationalism. at the onset of the Second World War, Norbert Elias was to Notably the notion tell us that Europeans had already been subtly transforming to each other if not to the world in relation of Civilization?at least thus: "The concept they colonized. Elias defined the idea of civilization the self-consciousness of the West. One could even say: the expresses in which Western soci consciousness. It sums up everything national two or three centuries believes itself superior to earlier ety of the last ones. By this term Western societies or 'more primitive' contemporary to describe what constitutes its special character and what society seeks it is proud of: the level of its technology, the nature of itsmanners, the or view of the world, and much of its scientific knowledge development Elias notes that this civilization 1978, 3-4). Although as the "upper to think of themselves allows Europeans transnationally to large sections of the non-European world" class (Elias, 50), he is its transformation within much more concerned with intra-European into "national" civilizations. The German relationships bourgeoisie its role as the leader of the emerging German nation articulated by more" (Elias to the French it opposed idea of civiliza Kultur, which championing tion as merely external and superficial court etiquette (Elias, 29-34). in the same century the French bourgeoisie the Similarly, adapted notion of civilization into a national with which representation courtly it opposed the Germans (Elias, 38-40).

io6

JOURNAL

OF WORLD

HISTORY,

SPRING

200I

in the work, the thrust, timing, and references the reader well be led to believe that this transmutation of civilization has may to do with the European national wars that enveloped much the world in the twentieth century. This may thus prefigure the shift from a sin to multiple at least within notion of Civilization civilizations, gular At the same time, I believe civi that Elias tends to conflate Europe. lization with nation a little too readily, particularly when these nations Given as radically different. In doing so, he elides a perceived in the new conception of civilization: that very significant ambiguity are lesser than the civilizations territorial nations from which they is generative of civilization of value for the that the principle emanate; face societies of territoriality territorial nation; that the principle may of civilization; conflict with the principle and that nations of energy seeking to match the formal sovereignty deriving with the source of authenticity torial or civic nationalism also be in spend a lot from terri or truth of

from civilization. the nation deriving I seek to build my own understanding of the new "civilizations" by Elias's insights. First of all, it is necessary not only to sus reformulating in Elias's analysis, tain but also highlight the distinction implied as equal to the nation and civilization as transna between civilization tional.6 Indeed, nations this duality because often need to require they move between the two positions. New nations seek the transnational it is only as a transterritorial, uni of civilization because conception or Confucianism?with its potential capac versal ideal?of say, Islam condition and embrace all of ity to reveal the truth of the human self can achieve that this (civilizational) from recognition humanity, launched by the Other. At the heart of the critique of Civilization, and non-Western intellectuals after the Great War, was both Western the betrayal of the universalizing promise of the "civilizing mission"? a mission to conquer the which the desire not (simply) exemplified In this critique, Civilization had Other, but to be desired by the Other. to represent forfeited the highest values of the right goals or ultimate of being desired, or even recog and was no longer worthy humanity nized, good the legally articulated by the other. In so opposing the alternative and valuable posed by Civilization, notion of the civilizational

to another in the term: is closely related ambiguity duality state and as civilizing Elias's book Indeed, empirically, process. with the civilizing process before process as an unselfconscious dominantly into a "concept" of national achievement and superiority. Yet as Raymond in the nineteenth the civilizing this transformation out, despite century, As we have seen, this ismost evident (Williams 1983, 57-60). disappear achieved mission" idea.

6 This

as an civilization is concerned pre it is transformed Williams points process does not in the "civilizing

Duara: The Discourse to counterpose universal. Note

of Civilization

and Pan-Asianism

107

self had

tically of Civilization. It is of the older Western conception by civilization core of civilizations that furnishes and universal the spiritual, moral, function nations with the same kind of authenticating and authorizing nations. Note fur forWestern that Civilization furnished imperialist is not between the territorial nation and civilization ther that the gap Because the spiritual impulse of a civ only territorial, but principled. are ultimately to be universalizing, ilization tends national boundaries artificial and may permit the problem to civilization.7 At the same time, there is no doubt that the territorial nation seeks to equate Elias is surely right about the role itself with a civilization. this exalted and defined?in of the bourgeoisie?loosely formulating it as a means of exercising noble vision of the nation and promoting its hegemony the nation. In this aspect, civili both within and without One the highly self-conscious ideology of the nation. or India, just as for that for nations such as China might one can stretch the nation to fit the civilization? France or England, if not in principle. But how can smaller nations do so? I territorially, believe there are several narrative within the historiography strategies become argue zation does stance of civilization thus transcendent limiting. The as we shall see, can produce a critique of the nation and, of loyalties divided between those to the nation and those

here

a still higher good and a truth that was authen the close relationship, indeed, mirroring,

to be the true repre of nations that can be deployed by many nations sentative or the leader of, if not equivalent to, a certain civilizational tradition. The most powerful of these?at least in terms of its impact on the domestic the Japanese claim of inheriting the population?was in mastering of its success of Asian civilization because leadership we shall deal with this in the next section. But Western Civilization; one can think of how Sri Lankan went about construct intellectuals a Buddhist in a way that made it the leader of such a civilization ing also the promotion of pre-Columbian civilizations project. Consider or pre-Islamic nations the relevant Latin American civiliza among tions among Middle in the era of nation Eastern nations. Civilization states thus needs to both transcend and serve the territorial nation. that civilization We have noted the Civilization both opposes of but also depends on it in the way that it authorizes this imperialism, in the selection ismost evident for nations. This of those opposition elements and themes from the history of this alleged civilization and

7Civilization also enables nation-states lessness, the eternal or unchanging subject

to found their sovereignty in a certain time of the linear, changing history of the nation.

io8 their reconstruction function. authorizing that are a) identical

JOURNAL

OF WORLD

HISTORY,

SPRING

200I

in a narrative it to perform this that will enable The basic approach involves combining elements to and b) the binary opposite of the constituents of Civilization. One identical to Civ strategy is to rediscover elements within of civilization: ilized society the suppressed traditions Confucian strat Hindu rationality, Buddhist humanism, logic, and so on. Another inAsian civilizations: egy identifies the opposite of theWest "peaceful" as opposed to "warlike," "spiritual" as opposed to "material," "ethical" as opposed to "decadent," "natural" as opposed to "rational," "timeless" as opposed to "temporal," and more. Finally, the nation its authorizes or harmonizing to imperialist Civilization opposition by synthesizing the binaries after the equivalence has been established. Thus Western materialism will be balanced and modernity by Eastern spirituality to be redeemed. the categories of civilization have Indeed, because into the new lexicon of modernity translated they are more meaning than to the historical society they sensibility is always re-made in ref In these ways, civilization represent. allegedly erence to Civilization. such as Samuel Hunt Contemporary analysts, whose notion of civilization that involves ancient continuities ington, and conceptually, are, historically are, like pure and closed entities, recent construction. nationalists, contemporary reifying a relatively ful to a contemporary

Part

II: Asian

Civilization

in Japan

and

China

The story of how non-Western with Japan, began societies, beginning to overhaul in an effort to become their entire society and cosmology is a well known one. The Meiji period repre Civilized and sovereign, nation in the sented the height of the effort to make Japan a Civilized name of bunmei kaika (Civilization and enlightenment). It is worth that the roughly ten-year period?between reiterating, however, 1894, it signed the Aoki-Kimberley when treaty with Great Britain, and the in 1905?during which Japan succeeded end of the Russo-Japanese War in reversing the unequal treaties and began to gain access to "Civilized" wars (Gong society, was a time bounded by two successful modern reasons detailed in histories of the 1984, 190). For equally well-known to it took nearly fifty more years for China of China, modernization in 1943 and be granted Civ treaties finally abrogated have its unequal did not of Civilization ilized status. Indeed, the European conception discourses until the turn of the century. The great Chinese penetrate was perhaps the most influential reformer and historian Liang Qichao advocate of the necessity for China to become Civilized. Liang was

Duara: The Discourse most

of Civilization

and Pan-Asianism

109 and sought

definitely

aware of the legal dimensions

of Civilization

to make China

into a Civilized legal nation even before his exile in

the failure of the 1898 reforms. However, he acquired Japan following a fuller understanding it during his stay in Japan where, of influenced among others, by the writings of Fukuzawa Yukichi and Kat? Hiroyuki in relation to the new ideas of History its significance and he perceived notion could have been further from the Confucian progress. Nothing is the mother of of wenming when he wrote, "Competition tion." Through the writings of Liang and others, Civilization in the words of Ishikawa, a "keyword" in Chinese intellectual by the first decade of the new century, when essays with titles Civiliza became, discourse contain

"civilized drama," and "civ ing phrases such as "civilized revolution," ilized races" began to appear among the modern reading community from the late Qing cited in Ishikawa 1995, 8, 9-10). Beginning (Liang and certainly from the reforms at the turn of the century (1902), of 1911, the Chinese revolution tried strenuously regimes Republican to make Chinese laws fully compatible with the general expectation Law Codi of "Civilized" countries for instance, the Revised through, situation was beyond But because fication Commission. the political real control, these regimes could not implement this legal and politi on Extraterrito to the 1926 Commission cal system which, according in China, would make it a Civilized nation riality (Gong, 157). But even as the regimes in both countries appeared to embrace the in order to become fully sovereign, this embrace of alternative of the development conceptions as we have seen, burgeoned the civilization, which, during particularly First World War. Thus, for instance, Zhang Binglin and his admirer Lu saw through the universalist Xun quickly of Civilization pretensions in the early 1900s. In Japan it was being fervently propagated when the notion of an alternate civilization centered around the concept of it was a conception Asia. Although that the Japanese distinctly inher a in the nineteenth it became ited from the Europeans century, only standard of Civilization excluded by no means in relation to which if changing, Japa powerful, spatial representation nese identity came to be repeatedly made and remade (Yamamuro 1994). was Okakura Tenshin, who the sharpest critics of Civilization Among on perceived the critical link between warfare and Civilization early in Japan. Among in Meiji and bi-cultural the first bilingual thinkers from the frenzied effort Okakura was able to gain some distance Japan, to "escape Asia" in Japan and build upon emergent Western ideas of an alternative Asian is instructive of The case of Okakura civilization. the extent Asian to which civilization or production of an alternative the "rediscovery" a deep familiarity with European modes of entailed

no

JOURNAL

OF WORLD

HISTORY,

SPRING

200I

to conversion the idea of a civilization. Indeed, Okakura's constructing came during his first voyage to Europe which Asian civilization turned out to be a voyage of self-discovery. To be sure, he was aware of differ ences between Asian but he believed that they all dif "civilizations," in principle?in fered from Western Civilization of their promotion saw Japan as the "exhibition and beauty. Okakura hall" of all of peace civilizations but did not advocate what would become in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War?that commonplace Japan it could harmonize because become the leader of an Asian federation the best of Asian civilization with that of Civilization. Rather he urged to look within to nations the various Asian their common traditions an alternative to the aggressive and dominating Civilization produce these Asian of the West (Ueda 1996, As Hashikawa Bunz? 16-18).8 in Japan con has revealed, Pan-Asianism tained both of these trends: the solidarity-oriented, non-dominating as well as the conception of Japan's role in reviving Asia, conception or synthe of Japan as, what we might call in short, the harmonizing in Japan both fed and resisted the nascent leader. Pan-Asianism sizing nation ofthat (Hashikawa 1980, 331-341). Increasingly imperialism the Russo-Japanese after the view that Japan was the War, however, East and only Asian nation capable of rescuing Asia and harmonizing civilizations West then became the charac began to take hold. This to absorb civi teristic Japanese response to the aporia of nationalism: to maintain nation the confines of the and the separa lization within so it may continue to perform tion of civilization the authorizing to Asia, it "belonged" Because function. the Japanese nation could to modernity it had the timeless of Asia, and because sacrality bring to it could bring material mastered Western Civilization, modernity Asia. Popular educational journals from the 1910s reveal the produc tion of this sense of belonging: the peoples of Asia as They depicted and racial ties with close cultural the Japanese but as being having or a sense of peoplehood. The message was clear: without nation-states it was imperative for Japan Given the danger ofWestern colonization, as their leader to bring them into the modern era without destroying or is how the idea of the closeness is remarkable their traditions. What eternal Asians?in the Japanese intimacy with Asians?the imagina so rapidly during the 1910s; indeed, the language of tion was produced

8 Born in reaction both to the Western and imperialist character of Civilization, the an anti-imperialist idea of "Asian" civilization rhetoric of liberation necessarily possessed in tension with that was often the celebration and egalitarianism of Asian traditionalism. see this particularly in the case of Manchukuo. We

Duara: The Discourse

of Civilization

and Pan-Asianism

in

in 1915 the Twenty-one Demands made upon the Chinese government was a compelling narrative reflected this narrative (Yamazaki 1994). It itmade the familial relationship between Asian peo precisely because pies appear so natural, and itwould compel an entire nation, under the to pursue its destiny in Asia. right circumstances, more aggressive Another based upon the confrontation of ideology Eastern versus Western in the immediate civilization post appeared I era. Fueled by the American World War racial exclusions of Chinese and Japanese, this ideology would re-appear during the Pacific War as the theater of an East-West showdown. This tendency was best repre sented by the thinker Okawa in Shumei and later by Ishihara Kanji an activist, writer, student of Indian Manchuria. ?kawa (1886-1957), and translator of the Koran, was significantly influenced by philosophy, saw an underlying Okakura. Like the latter, Okawa unity among the societies?a different Asian and timeless essence? spiritual, moral, toWestern which he opposed Unlike Okakura, civilization. however, in the value of peace and viewed history Okawa did not believe in Civ ilizational terms as progress born out of conflict and war, most centrally, war between Asia and the West. The ultimate victory of Asia over the West would be led by Japan's victory over America which would liber ate Asia from the enslavement ofWestern and which was colonialism, the ingratitude of the Asian But Japan's moral duty despite peoples. the first task for Okawa was to combat the corruption and obstacles state. He was implicated in the Taish? that he encountered in several one in which Prime Minster terrorist incidents, Inukai was including assassinated 1998, 43-47, 50). (Szpilman That civilizational in Japan had a violent discourse pan-Asian is well known, dimension but the ideology itself cannot be dismissed In the immediate aftermath of the war, merely as disguised imperialism. a group of Japanese Asianists, in alliance with disaffected Korean elites, sought to create their own Utopian, anti-Western polity called Koryo nation in the Jiandao region between Manchuria and (Gaoli) (1920) which had been the heartland of the ancient Koguryo state. The Korea, in this enterprise were stalwart Asianists in involved Japanese involved the 1911 Chinese such as Suenaga Misao of the Geny?sha, revolution, and far right political groups like the Black Dragon society of Uchida a syncretic the event was publicized reli Ry?hei; by the Omotokyo, with new world societies such as the gious cult associated religious the Red Swastika and the Dao Yuan Bahai, (more below) Society, to produce this 1982, 94). Several circumstances (Hasegawa converged movement. The evacuation of Russian power in northeast Asia follow revolution allowed the expansion of Japanese power ing the Soviet

112

JOURNAL

OF WORLD

HISTORY,

SPRING

200I

disaffected one million

the region. The erstwhile Confucian elite?were yangban?the because of their displacement by Japanese policies. About were in the Jiandao region of Manchuria Koreans laboring rendered vulnerable their stateless condition. American by Finally, sentiments. immigration policies sparked off renewed anti-Western societies in an alliance Uchida's group joined with nativist Korean

into

its named Isshinkai to create this Utopian nation and even formulated constitution In this constitution, Confucianism 1982, 95). (Hasegawa was to be the national religion; property was to be owned collectively; to the ancient Chinese well-field land was to be distributed according was to be wuwei and its goal datong. the system of governance was to be equal without on the basis of eth discrimination Citizenship or race. Koreans, and Asian Russians would nicity Japanese, Chinese, If we are to believe the proclamations, all be equal citizens. the doc trine of equality was of particular because the Isshinkai was significance to the Japanese state policies in Korea and viewed the annex opposed system; ation as an imperialist act which denied the equality of Asian peoples. its ideology contained elements of a return to East Asian Thus tradi an opposition to the modern tions which embedded self-consciously or Westernized state. At Western the same time it also proclaimed it prefigured notions of republicanism and equality. modern Indeed, some of the theoretically in the ideas that were radical implemented state of Manchukuo such as equality among ethnic puppet (1932-45), we cannot but see this or Xiehehui. While groups, following Ky?wakai as an effort to expand Japanese (albeit non-state) movement power on at the same time we also see how the new ideology of the mainland, of nationalism civilization with its roots in the Utopian egalitarianism and its projected forms. A similar the movement political shaped to usher in a new inMongolia adventure designed supposedly political was led by the Omoto era from the heartland Asian of Asiatic power by the Japanese press as an kyo in 1924. This venture was applauded to keep Asia out of Soviet hands effort (Hasegawa, 100-104). and its links to pan-Asian In China the new civilization discourse or dismissed in the historiography ism has been largely neglected pre the with Japanese imperialism. During cisely because of its association the discourse of Eastern three decades from 1911 until 1945, however, or as neces as superior toWestern civilization civilization?whether as an intellec in China flourished sary to redeem the latter?actually To what extent the discourse of tual, cultural, and social movement. from Chinese Eastern civilization could be distinguished civilization was both a subject of debate and of ambivalence. The ambivalence or even aporia, to be found in the the structural ambiguity, mirrored

Duara: The Discourse

of Civilization

and Pan-Asianism

113

between nationalism and civilization noted above. While relationship to conflate civilization the (Chinese) nationalist with impulse sought the territorial nation, the spiritual impulses sustaining the formulation of civilization tended to seek a universal sphere of application, viewing as artificial walls. To some degree, as we shall see, national boundaries the modern intellectualist the conflation, whereas more view civilization construction of civilization tended towards the more popular, social movements tended to

transnationally. Ishikawa Yoshihiro has persuasively of argued that the development East-West civilizational discourse intellectuals among Chinese during to that in Japan, even though the years 1910-19 was closely connected it would take distinctive the years 1910-19 shape in China. Through to be the principal and the early 1920s, Japan continued lens through which Chinese modern there was a steady influx of gained knowledge; together with continuing growth of The new civilizational (Sanet? 1940). discourse also entered through the same routes and brought with it the or recon it had been constructed upon which assumptions particular structed in Japan: the geographical and environmental bases of civi lizational differences, the role of linear progressive the binary history, the synthesis formulation, and the redemptive character construction, of Eastern civilization, others. among One of the more influences on Chinese think important Japanese ers during World War Iwas a middlebrow writer by (ya interi) Japanese the name of Kayahara Kazan (1880-1951). He was popular with Chi nese intellectuals because his Japanese writing was relatively precisely to synthesize and simple. Kayahara's sought philosophy of various Western such as Hegel, thought philosophers Bergson, determinism of Henry Buckle Emerson, as well as the geographical lucid Ratzel. the and and the Japanese books and magazines from the Japanese translations

his own stages of civilization, Kayahara delineated posited distinction the dynamic northern between of the Euro civilizations and explained these in peans and the "still," southern civilizations, terms of geography and environment. Like other Taish? intellectuals he too arrived at the necessity of synthesizing the two civilizations (Ishikawa Kayahara's one Communist

1994, 398-403). was considerable intellectuals and impact on Chinese even wrote toMao urging him to fulfill Party member the world historical tasks of Lenin and Kayahara. His most significant founder of the Communist impact, perhaps, was upon Li Dazhao, Party a large number of and librarian at Beijing University, who collected that included the writings of Kaya contemporary Japanese magazines hara. This impact was particularly felt by Li's Spring Youth group which

114

JOURNAL

OF WORLD

HISTORY,

SPRING

200I

was centrally concerned with the problem of renewal?the renewal of Li was ancient civilizations such as those of China and India. Although aware of Japanese expansionist in these embedded designs perfectly of history influenced his conception ideas, Kayahara appears to have to create a new East and West and his particular mode of synthesizing in the aftermath of the Great War 1994, 430). (Ishikawa also revolution Li Dazhao believed that the Russian Incidentally, intermediate from Russia's its world significance derived geographical the East between and civilizational location, thus being able to mediate civilization 1994, 420). (Ishikawa of civilizational for the introduction channel Another important discourse was the popular Chinese (Eastern Mis journal Dongfangzazhi Its editor Du Yaquan was a tireless promoter of the idea of the cellany). of the East which was obliged superiority of the still or quiet civilization of the West from the restless civilization responsi war. The editorial essays of of world-wide towards the end the journal frequently dwelt on this theme, especially often translated Japanese essays on the prob of the war, and the journal a translation of a Japa lem. In 1919, the Eastern Miscellany published nese article entitled Ishi the European "Chinese Spirit." Spirit and which led from the writings of an kawa has tracked the chain of writing to rescue the world ble for the terrible violence via Europe and Japan back into China. alienated, diasporic Chinese into Ger two essays translated from the English The article discussed man by Gu Hongming, Britain and German the Malay-born, educated, scholar. One of Gu's essays was titled "Reasons for classical Chinese to European Concepts" and the Japanese article China's Opposition his essay by a group of disaffected German of reported the reception it led to a major In China intellectuals 1994, 415-416). (Ishikawa versus Western civili civilization of Chinese the question intellectual the giants of Chinese in which life, including Li Hu Shi, Feng Youlan, Chen Dazhao, Liang Shuming, Liang Qichao, the took a position. and others, Thus, with Duxiu, Zhang Dongsun, in the Eastern Miscellany, the idea of the of this translation publication entered China civilization of Chinese through a com acceptability not only the emergence of a plex global loop. This route underscored of its recognition by the sphere, but the necessity global intellectual in order to be affirmed by the self. Other The debate in China was framed in terms of whether Chinese and, more broadly, Eastern traditional could redeem the West. civilization debate zation on There were, to be sure, various thinkers who took different positions for instance, those like Liang Shuming who in the debate including, those who favored in the superiority of Chinese believed civilization, and the West

Duara: The Discourse

of Civilization

and Pan-Asianism

115

a synthesis?such as Li Dazhao in different and Du Yaquan?though of radical intellectuals who the ways, and the mainstream rejected value of Chinese the debate underscored civilization. Nonetheless, certain common East and that the differences between assumptions: and that such differences West were civilizational differences, posited To be sure, this was assumed holistic, isolated, and pure civilizations. even when such thinkers called for the synthesis of the best qualities are well known, I shall of the two. Since the ideas of these intellectuals not dwell on them. By the mid-i92os, the discourse begins to however, as well and social practices appear in cultural, political, (see Grieder Alitto 1981; 1979).9 successful realm in which the least studied and the most Perhaps the idea of an Eastern civilization was constructed was culture. We have a rough idea of how the notion of an essentialized Eastern civilization was constructed interactions the 1920s between Chinese by during intellectuals and a host ofWestern such as Bertrand Rus philosophers sell, John Dewey, Henri Bergson, Rudolph Eucken, Irving Babbit, and the Indian, Rabindranath research in a wide range Tagore. Emerging of cultural practices reveals that perhaps more the significant were in realms such as the revival or reconstruc Sino-Japanese exchanges tion of traditional medicine, in the reconstructions of Buddhism and art and in the representation of literati and Buddhist Confucianism, among others as exemplary of Eastern civilization (Wong 1999). As we were made to in reference have observed earlier, these representations Western forms in that their significance either in opposition developed to or in a pr?figuration of the latter. in China Its political moment is associated with the famous lecture in December "Greater 1924 in Kobe, Japan, entitled by Sun Yat-sen I have discussed Asianism" this lecture in some ("Da Yaxiyazhuyi"). so Iwill only note that its significance detail elsewhere, has often been in the historical minimized of the perhaps also because scholarship in China. actions Yet Sun seems to have later record of Japanese absorbed the Asian civilizational discourse quite deeply and spelt out its key political category of wangdao or the way of the ethical mon and violent way archs and peaceful rulership, opposed to the unethical

to dominate continues ambivalence "civilization" regarding the value of Chinese on the subject. Partly as a result, both the Enlightenment intellectual discourse as well as the post-Great to inform the continue War conception of civilization conception it is by identifying Chinese the translation of'civilization'. Thus the con signifier wenming, text of its use as well as by differentiating in the Ger the usages of "culture" (wenhua)?as we can grasp which man usage of Kultur?that sense of civilization is intended. Chinese

9The

ii6

JOURNAL

OF WORLD

HISTORY,

SPRING

200I

Sun was rhetorically (badao) of the hegemon (the way of the West). to draw the Japanese into a discourse of solidarity, skillful in being able retaining a Chinese simultaneously centrality by invoking the imperial was based upon the recognition Chinese of tribute system. Wangdao the Chinese emperor through the hierarchical system of reciprocities to the Japanese to renounce of the tribute system. Thus Sun appealed the Western methods of badao and return to the Asian method of it turned out, the Japanese military appropri solidarity. As peaceful instead. The ated the language of wangdao and used it to rule China interest in pan-Asianism in China is also indicated political by the in Nagasaki of two successive Asian conferences: convening People's in 1927. To be sure, these conferences in 1926, and in Shanghai hardly much demonstrated the Chinese and Korean dele solidarity, because used the forum to argue that the condition for gates understandably Asian unity must be Japanese renunciation of imperialism (Mizuno 1994). in two direc In any event, Sun's discourse of civilization developed to the idea tions which nationalism's aporetic exemplify relationship of civilization. On the one hand, the Goumindang (GMD) actively of the East and West the idea of two civilizations by the propagated in itsNew Life movement is perhaps best expressed 1930s. This notion it sought to revitalize material modernity of the 1930s through which by means of an ascetic Confucian by the West spirituality represented and morality. Chen Lifu, the theorist of the New Life movement made a classical statement of the East-West synthesis. Creatively employing a parallel material the framework of evolutionism, Chen outlined and the evolution evolutionism. Without of spiritual spiritual progress, of man civilization would lead to the enslavement material inevitably kind moral was to infuse the by things. The role of the New Life movement into the evo from the essence of Chinese civilization qualities into the civiliza life. Thus will history be propelled lution of material tional ideal of datong or the Great Unity (Chen 1976, 128, 133).

is uniquely a Chinese that Chen's civilization civili Note, however, it represents that that aspect of the new doctrine of civilization zation; to the nation-state. But for several reasons, the GMD's becomes tied could not always work even of civilization and nationalism equation own statist purposes. Sun Yat-sen's of a Pan-Asian for its conception was also centered on Confucian virtues of the "kingly way," but he ism saw these ethical to in opposition and moral goals as fully Asian was picked up in the GMD Chen's This strand of thought conception. by another an institute alive Sun's theorist and leader, Dai Jitao, who created leading GMD and a journal in 1930 by the name of Xin Yaxiya to keep well expressed the tensions of the ideas. The publication

Duara: The Discourse new

of Civilization

and Pan-Asianism

117

materialist

to both counter European in its mission discourse as well as to create a sufficiently and imperialist civilization Asianist trans-Chinese, important function of this Asia ideology. An nism was to secure the allegiance of the minority who populations over which the nation-state the vast hinterland sought to occupied civilizational its sovereignty. Thus, even the Chinese statist conception of not fully contain the trans-national could civilization impulse embed ded in the conception. exercise

Part

III: Redemptive

Civilizational In China

Societies Discourse

and

an intellectual was not merely of civilization an astonishingly but became associated with widespread development movement whose social movement?a exceeded following by far the movements base of any modern from the May emanating popular to which is the extent Fourth events. Perhaps even more astonishing the discourse to of what I call "redemptive this phenomena societies"?determined save the world from strife, greed, and warfare, and which affected the in the first half of this century?has lives of many millions of followers in English, Chinese, been ignored by historiography, whether or, to a lesser extent, argue that this historical Japanese. Some might neglect is a consequence of the highly varied nature of these societies. They to occa charitable ranged from "morality cultivating" organizations to them difficult entities, making violent, sionally secret-society-like a single category. within analyze is just as likely to be a result of modern the neglect However, nationalist towards social movements that repugnance historiography's to the nation-state. refuse to acknowledge Recall the split, allegiance or aporia, in the relationship to civilization of nationalism the whereby as the of the nation from civilization necessary (as necessary separation of the two) sanctions divided conflation significant loyalties. Despite these societies were often defiantly universalist. variations, Rejected by the civilization-based Chinese rhet nationalists, they often embraced oric of the Japanese invaders in the 1930s and 1940s. Given this back the term "collaborationism"?a nationalist pejorative?is ground, to characterize their situation. A study of these groups hardly adequate are made more thorny by our thus raises buried moral questions which own moral assumptions the nation-state. shaped by Some thropic of wing, the more famous of these societies were the Daodehui the Tong

(Morality Society), the Dao Yuan (Society of the Way) and its philan
the Hongwanzihui (Red Swastika Society),

Il8

JOURNAL

OF WORLD

HISTORY,

SPRING

200I

shanshe (Fellowship of Goodness), the Zailijiao (The Teaching of the Abiding Principle), the Shijie Zongjiao Datonghui (Society for the
in Sichuan in 1915 as of World Religions, first organized Unity theWushanshe), and the Yiguandao of Pervading Unity), among (Way of the spread of these societies many others. Our principal knowledge comes from Japanese societies in surveys of religious and charitable in the 1930s and 1940s. According to Japanese China conducted in north China, researchers and officials of the puppet administrations enormous to command these societies claimed Thus the followings. Great a following in 1929 of Goodness of 30 million claimed Fellowship a following and the Red Swastika Society, of 7 (Suemitsu 1932, 252), to 10 million in 1937 (Takizawa 1937, 67). There are also some notable for example, the famous study Chinese works on individual societies,

of the Yiguandao by Prof. Li Shiyu of Shandong University who joined

in order to study them. The few Chi the society on several occasions nese studies of these societies by modern intellectuals tend to be dis who regards them as "negative missive, however. Thus Wing Tsit-chan, in outlook, in purpose, in belief" utilitarian and superstitious (Chan a figure of merely for 30,000 members (not followers) 1953, 167), cites to Suemitsu's in 1927 as opposed the Red Swastika Society figure of 3 in 1932 (Chan, 164; Suemitsu, million followers 302). Chan, however, of Goodness claimed more than a thou does note that the Fellowship in 1923 in all parts of China proper and Manchuria (Chan, 165).10 to be understood in the complex societies have These interplay the particular historical tradition of their derivation and the between of the second decade of the twentieth contemporary global context tradition of historical century. They clearly emerged out of the Chinese some of these societies were closely sectarianism and syncretism. While the worship of Bud associated with the sectarian tradition, including sand branches dhist the and folk deities like the Eternal Mother, they also represented that combined the three late imperial syncretic tradition (sanjiaoheyi) into a single univer and Daoism Buddhism, religions of Confucianism,

10 data on these societies, the best we can do is to inter Given the paucity of Chinese we can assume that the Japanese researchers may have records. While rogate the Japanese to exaggerate in these groups, there was also a concern for accuracy the numbers wanted to assess the potential since these surveys were conducted for support and oppo principally sition to their rule. The figures cited above refer to the spread of these societies all over Most of the surveys were marked "secret" or China largely before the Japanese occupation. Note of exaggerated for internal consumption. that a similar mystery numbers accompanies as the Falungong or the Zhonggong societies the the rise of such redemptive today. Given and secrecy in which climate of suppression these societies had to operate during both peri is perhaps not accidental. ods, the resemblance

Duara: The Discourse

of Civilization

and Pan-Asianism

119

sal faith. Late imperial syncretism, which of urged the extinguishing in moral desires and engagement action, worldly gained popularity and Daoist among the Confucian gentry and the Buddhist laity in the sixteenth centuries and seventeenth (Chow 1994, 21-25). The mod ern redemptive societies inherited the mission of universalism and self-transformation from this syncretism. At the same time, these societies also retained the association of the older syncretic soci eties with sectarian traditions, popular gods, and practices such as div and spirit writing In this way they ination, planchette, (Chow, 22-27). to remain organically continued to Chinese connected popular society. it might to associate while confused these movements Hence, appear with secret societies, it was their connections to popular culture and local concerns that caused several of them to blur with secret societies moral at their rural edges. The new global context of the twentieth trans century significantly formed the meaning of their project. A number of these societies were or saw their the period formally established rapid expansion during from World War I through the 1920s (MDNJ 1934,4:1; Takizawa 1937, as we have seen, a critical dis 1941, 505-5070^), ?7cf.; HZN when, course of Western as being overly materialist civilization and violent to emerge globally. These societies and began sought to supplement correct the material of the West with the spiritual civiliza civilization tion of the East. The resultant synthesis took the shape they envisaged of a religious universalism that included not only Confucianism, Dao but also Islam and Christianity. ism, and Buddhism, Several of these to represent the essential societies claimed truth of the five world reli and by spreading this truth, to bring an end to religious parti gions salvation. sanship and achieve world peace and personal Not only did these societies adapt their to the new geo cosmology of the universe and graphical conception (to include Christianity but some of them also adapted to the temporal vision of a pro Islam), in 1918 gressive history. The Morality Society which was established declared that it sought to synthesize the scientific view of the world with the religious and moral visions of Asian thought (MDNJ, 1:3-6). The until his death in society of which Kang Youwei was president 1927 argued that without moral and spiritual regeneration, human evo lution (jinhua) would stall and turn even more destructive because of the present trend towards hedonistic materialism (MDNJ, 4:1; Taki zawa, 67). Even the Yiguandao, the least "modern" or "this perhaps added the truths of Christianity and Islam worldly" of these societies, to its earlier synthesis and cross-referenced its own esoteric temporal scheme with the modern of dynastic and republican his chronology tory (Li Shiyu 1948, 50-55).

I20

JOURNAL

OF WORLD

HISTORY,

SPRING

200I

is also revealed by their engagement in with charters and by-laws, armed contemporary projects. Organized orientation and a rhetoric of worldly redemp with a strong this-worldly other modern these societies resembled and morality tion, religious to Save the World societies all over the world. The New Religion (Jiu shi Xinjiao) sought to save the world not only through philanthropic institutions such as hospitals, and refugee centers (HZN orphanages, Their modern but also through dissemination and publicity (schools, 1941,485-486), such as libraries, lectures), newspapers, through charitable enterprises the poor, savings and loan associations, factories and farms employing and even by engineering projects such as road and bridge repair (HZN, As for the "red swastika" of the society with that name, 491-493). in Buddhist while this can, of course, be understood terms, it was also of the Red Cross Society. The modeled upon an Eastern equivalent and modern chari Red Swastika society not only pursued traditional such as contributions international activities, ties, they also included to relief efforts and the establishment in of professorships of Esperanto and Tokyo The Zaili (Suemitsu Paris, London, 1932, 292-305, 354). in the very late Qing period and had established jiao, which emerged centers in Beijing and Tianjin in 1913 (HZN, 507-527), twenty-eight centers in Tianjin alone by the late appears to have had forty-eight movement and developed 1920s. It was a strict disciplinarian drug centers using herbal medicines and self-cultivation tech rehabilitation niques (zhengshen) which were said to fully cure over 200 opium addicts a year (Suemitsu 262-263). was matched This outer or worldly dimension by a strong inner to moral and religious cultivation of the individual dimension relating the inner and outer dimen between spirit and body. The relationship a leader of the Daoyuan sions is summed up by an interview between (the parent of the Red Swastika Society, with close ties to the Omoto sometime before 1930 (308-309): kyo) and Japanese surveyor Suemitsu Q: What is the Daoyuan about?

orientation

A: To simultaneously cultivate the inner and outer; the inner through and the outer through philanthropy. meditation Q: What A: is the dao of Daoyuan?

It is the source of all things (wanyou genyuan). It isnot a single reli .. Actually the dao has no gion; it has the power to clarify the good..
but we in the human revere the and world founders cultivate have of reverence. respect So we nature, the the to give five self it a name religions. through to show our also . .. We charity.

name,

morality,

Duara: The Discourse

of Civilization

and Pan-Asianism

121

from traced a path directly map of these societies cognitive to the universal. Self-cultivation individual (ziji xiuyang, xiushen) the habit of close moral ranged from practicing charity, to cultivating The the to the exercise of a strict disciplinary and spiritual introspection, regi men. The disciplinary in some societies strict regimen emphasized vows of abstinence the from drugs, meat, and alcohol, and sometimes of the family, and in others, detailed codes of moral quasi-renunciation behavior Takizawa all three. 1932, 266, 326-328; (Suemitsu bodily comportment Most societies combined 1937, 76-78; Chan 1953,164-167). from the self to the In the characteristic reciprocal movement For defied political these societies boundaries. frequently and

universal, construction transmission of the genealogical instance, the Yiguandao's the Chinese of the "way" (daotong) begins with sage kings, Yao and line until Mencius. There Shun, and follows the orthodox Confucian is carried loses the way and the mantle after, the Confucian orthodoxy In its genealogical record of masters forth by Buddhists and Daoists. to transmit the way, Buddhist teachers from all over who continued India and Central Asia are cited together with the classical Chinese place of their provenance the geobody genealogy to its principally spiritual mission. reveals how names The Yiguandao (Li 1948, 51-55). of the nation was quite irrelevant

It is in significant part for this reason that the GMD, the national ist rulers of China from 1927 until 1949, sought to prohibit all such societies almost since it first came to power (Otani 1937, 69, 123; Sue mitsu 1932, 251, 255). We have seen through Chen Lifu's nationalis tic conception of civilization outlined earlier, how a nationalist regime want to outlaw and persecute many of these societies might including elitist ones like the Morality and the Tongshanshe, which Society tended to be apolitical, yangxiu (moral gentry-merchant upper-class, societies and philanthropic) their cultivation (Suemitsu, 251). While reason behind defiance of territorial allegiance was a major underlying the national their interdiction, however, question was played out in a The GMD condemned these societies as dri complex way. frequently ven by superstitions Behind this rhetoric, religion and national dominated and warlords. by local bullies a strategic representation of modern though, lay a In this strategy, the GMD tradition. produced into which it incorporated realm of legitimate modern, spiritualism licensed religions and designated them as part of China's national civ ilization. At the same time, many popular religious traditions were con as superstition and banned demned (Duara 1995, ch. 3). As we have societies were, seen, many of the religious practices of these redemptive was also threatened in fact, drawn from popular culture. But the regime and

122

JOURNAL

OF WORLD

HISTORY,

SPRING

200I

subversive power of these societies deriving from their by the historical, vision. The of these redemp transnational transcendent spiritualism of the mod the GMD's definition tive societies not only transgressed of spiritual civiliza of the national boundaries ern, but its definition tion. Certainly the cultural bonds of these societies to similar Japanese to these attacks. made them susceptible societies such as the Omotokyo their role in the Japanese Before going on to examine invasion, we character of these societies. need to clarify further the civilizational those closely associated with rural Many of these societies, particularly as restoring or redeeming or popular culture, saw themselves lost civili to advocating Eastern civilization zational values as opposed against, or an older to supplement, Western civilization. Thus, they represented as "civilizing process"?of of civilization Chinese bring understanding virtues to all, rather than self-con of the East or East Asia. This was the civilization sciously representing societies which David the case among the more popular especially as a kind of a "fundamentalism," has identified as representing Ownby movements that were "both against and from within the mainstream." the Buddhist which condemned For example, there were movements its own mission of self-abnegation and abandoned church "for having recent of the transcendence" 1999, 1528). Ownby's study (Ownby ing true and proper civilizational Immortals exemplifies apocalyptic Way of the Temple of the Heavenly or "fundamental" val orthodox societies mediated how these deeply to or Daoism with popular cultural traditions ues from Confucianism even Utopian prescriptions reconstruct community along traditional, are civilizational in the sense societies (Ownby 2000, 15-20). These not only do they mediate between used by Robert Redfield: great and com are a means between "for communication little traditions, they and compo and indoctrinating, that are universal, reflexive, ponents nents which are local, unreflective, and accepting" (Redfield 1962-63,

394)'
the East was by no means absent To be sure, the idea of representing or modernized more societies. As the syncretic among upper-class or the Morality had the Red Swastika noted above, Society Society cultivation and public activity which ideas of moral well-developed the project of redeeming they saw as part of the Eastern civilizational world. But a great number of the followers of these syncretic, redemp focused on their transcen tive societies appear to have been centrally dent vision, and it is perhaps fair to say that at least through the 1920s, tended to be stronger than the East their emphasis on saving humanity of Eastern civilization the advocates While West certainly also binary. their scope to be universal, declared they found it neces significantly, sary to stress the Eastern origins, and hence the distinct authority, of this

Duara: The Discourse

of Civilization

and Pan-Asianism

123

civilization.

This

distinction

between

nineteenth-century ambiguity noted versal or universalizing and exclusive achieved fact. While made civilization absent nificantly

the scope and origins overlaps as uni above between civilization or national, between process and

the claim to the authority of, and for, the East, to nationalisms it was sig attractive (of the East), or underplayed in the redemptive societies. Japanese to appropriate their universalism and con imperialists sought precisely vert it into a more exclusive ideology of Eastern civilization. invasion of northeast in the 1930s The Japanese and north China a breakdown in the formal structures of control and author produced or the warlords. of the GMD Secret societies, sectarians, ity, whether and even redemptive this vacuum. Indeed,

in societies were able to enlarge their influence in some cases, the Chinese communists and Jap anese forces often competed for their allegiance (Mitani 1998, 104). to the GMD, which had earlier driven most groups belonging Unlike the Japanese military all three types of societies underground, sought to bring the redemptive societies under their wing. Indeed, particularly like Suemitsu and Otani believed researchers that by (1932, 208-209) them underground, the GMD had actually increased the asso forcing secret societies ciation of these societies with the violent and made a civi them politically unreliable. As organizations which promoted as well as selected secret lizational these redemptive societies, ideal, societies traditional Confucian that valued were attractive to the Japanese imperialists the ideology of pan-Asianism they developed materialism. values versus Western like zhong and yi, from the early 1930s, when and Eastern civilizational ideals

in Japan, such as the Shibunkai, societies Similar "redemptive" as the spiritual alternative to exces and Shinto offering Confucianism to grow in strength from sive materialism and individualism, had begun as economic the 1920s, particularly conditions worsened and social unrest grew. Asiatic moral systems emphasizing ethical responsibilities were celebrated as alternatives to capitalism and Marxism, both West ern doctrines In the 1930s, the redemptive 1959, 123-126). (Smith societies rhetoric of elite Confucian and the right-wing nationalists not only began to come together but were also assimi and militarists and educational program by the Japanese systematic and sustained effort to formulate was undertaken pan-Asianism by the young officers and in the Kwantung Army inManchukuo intellectuals and north China. the 1930s, the Manchukuo state, the real power behind which was By the Japanese military, inherited an ideology and language with which government. a redemptive But political the most to forge an alliance with the redemptive in Nanjing, Like the GMD government in northeast China. societies the Manchukuo government lated in an active

124

JOURNAL

OF WORLD

HISTORY,

SPRING

200I

the "superstitious" censured character of the redemptive societies, but it saw in them instead of seeking to eradicate the societies themselves, into state-controlled the potential for their transformation civic orga nizations In this new political (Takizawa 1937, 82-86, 100-102). of framework, many of these societies became, under close supervision in Japanese) organizations the Manchukuo government, jiaohua (ky?ka of the people (Gluck ?agencies engaged in welfare and enlightenment Garon 1985, 103; 1993) in north the same policies The occupying Japanese forces followed era governments in 1937. Occupation in China after the invasion at the county and city levels conducted North China of investigations in order both to identify opposition and to bring out religious societies sectarian and redemptive and encourage societies the registration of as "jiaohua" organizations. Records reveal the registration of, precisely or petitions to register, a very large number of these societies between of Police, the Department 1937 and 1945 with either the Department or the Department In some places, of Social Affairs, of Rites. these societies the quasi-official "Revive Asia Association" registered with or the "New Peoples Society" The total (Xinminhui). (Xingyayuan) or followers a single of all societies within figure for participants tens of thousands. The records county or city often reached beyond of the religious reveal the dates of the formal establishment frequently in Shanxi, of twenty-seven society. In one survey of several counties societies after 1941, twelve were registered, only one was founded founded after 1931, and the rest predated the Japanese invasion. These were typically syncretic or Buddhistic societies that sought to uphold to salvage society, and more and more, to traditional Eastern morality, new order. Many have resist Communism and uphold the East Asian the names we have encountered above, but there were also several some purely local ones. Of the societies societies Buddhist and that were registered only after 1937, it is difficult to know how many may have regime been due created under an occupying just to seize opportunities as to the fact that the evidence is only of their registration

public bodies and not of their founding (WWD).

on these societies? For Can we bring the charge of collaborationism societies were permitted the first time in their history, the redemptive to pursue their trans-territorial, fear of sup redemptive goals without For them it was a matter of pursuing and incarceration. their pression or even anti-national and the Manchukuo non-national regime goals, more even in so many ?ruthless tolerant, respects?was ostensibly of them than the other regimes. As societies with civiliza welcoming, tional or religious government may have ideals, the issue of a national to them than the ability to pursue their vision. been less important

Duara: The Discourse

of Civilization

and Pan-Asianism

125

Thus, for instance, theWay others (see note 11 below),

of the Temple cooperated

with

studied by Ownby, like many the Japanese, but battled

the GMD
because

and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), presumably

vision. Nationalism the latter opposed their transcendent and were seen by them as restrictive and repressive modern ideas of society in this sense, the Japanese military-sponsored of their activities; ideas of "clash of civilization" often made sense to them even if they did not as representing a civilization in earlier see themselves self-consciously conflict. it is also abundantly At the same time, however, clear that their or transcendent trans-territorial goals were just as clearly appropriated its rhet and subverted by the Japanese puppet state, no matter what set of issues. How far can we hold a peo oric. But this raises a different for the state's manipulation of their ideals? Does this ple responsible of the varied, authorize our dismissal or condemnation responsibility and even mixed, motives of people?like people everywhere?who in any society? Several soci pursue their goals and ideals as they might to their that an East Asian ety leaders believed regime committed was preferable to a national to their vision of civilization hostile regime it was possible, societies cooper when the redemptive goals. Indeed, the Japanese only to the extent to which they saw them fur their goals. In the rural and peripheral areas, wherever the soci thering as inimical to their ideals and eties saw the Japanese-backed regime or towards their vision towards their transcendent goals?whether to the regime was of ideal community?the opposition conception (Otani 1937, 27-32, 38, 46, 58-60, 97, 104-108; Taki quite sustained zawa 1937, 89?92, societies had no need for a state which These 95). did not further their goals.11 The new discourse of civilization, derivative from the old, however it a redemptive and egalitarian carried with The thrust of utopianism. lost in the twen my essay has shown that this potential was repeatedly tieth century as the expansionist and exclusive tendencies of national ism tended to transform civilization from a process of the Self's desire ated with of the "civi by the Other through the latter's emulation lized" Self, to a mark, however of superiority and distinc defensive, tiveness. Elias emphasized the utter nationalization of the idea of civ on the eve of the second ilization among the French and Germans on civilization, such as the writings of World War. Recent scholarship has tended not to see the tension between the two, but Huntington, to be desired

11 Details Manchukuo

can be found in Manchukuo about these societies and the Frontiers of the East Asian Modern.

in my

forthcoming

work,

126

JOURNAL

OF WORLD

HISTORY,

SPRING

200I

for granted. And yet we must recognize rather, taken their conflation that the ideological relations nationalism between and civilization some separation of the two. There are many social groups and require forces or tendencies which ideals in the world. espouse civilizational Most the recent appearance?or rather, visibility?of dramatically, the Falungong and related movements in China testifies to the persis tent search for transcendence.12 It is not the business of historians to or oppose such groups, but by acknowledging and sustaining support we may hold nationalism the relative autonomy to a of civilization, standard than it has been in the past. higher

References Adas, Michael. 1993. "The Great War and the Decline of the Civilizing Mis sion." InAutonomous Histories: Particular Truths. Ed. Laurie Sears. Mad
ison: University of Wisconsin Press, pp. 101-122.

Alitto,

Guy S. 1979. The Last Confucian: Liang Shu-ming and the Chinese Dilemma ofModernity. Berkeley: University of California Press. 1964. An Introduction toContemporary History. Lon Barraclough, Geoffrey.
don: C. A. Watts.

in East and West." In The World of Bechert, Heinz. 1984. "Buddhist Revival Buddhism: Buddhist Nuns and Monks in Society and Culture. Ed. Heinz Bechert and Richard Gombrich. London: Thames and Hudson, pp.
273-285.

Bentley, JerryH. 1996. Shapes ofWorld History inTwentieth Century Scholarship. Essays on Global and Comparative History Series. With a foreword by D.C.: American Historical Association. Michael Adas. Washington Bunzl, Matti. 1996. "Franz Boas and the Humboldtian Tradition: From Voiks geist and Nationalkarakter to an Anthropological Concept of Culture." In "Volksgeist" asMethod and Ethic: Essays on Boasian Ethnography and theGerman Anthropological Tradition. Ed. George W. Stocking Jr. Madi
son: University of Wisconsin Press, pp. 17-78.

Chan, Wing-tsit. 1953. Religious Trends inModern China. New York: Colum Press. bia University

and many other qigong-based movements Falungong appeared initially after June state praised in order to dis the Communist civilization traditional Chinese 1989, when is strongly reminiscent soci influences. The Falungong of the redemptive courage Western eties in its syncretism Its technology and its message of universal of self-disci redemption. in a form of qigong?also the empowering between the pline?expressed parallels pathway in the redemptive societies. self and cosmic forces that we have observed the state's Finally, to them as well as their rather disciplined fierce opposition and principled defiance of state suggest, to some extent at least, a continuing pattern from the first half of the proscriptions, last century 2000; Benoit (Falundafa 1999; Micollier 1999).

12 The

Duara: The Discourse

of Civilization

and Pan-Asianism

127

Lifu. 1976. Xin shenghuo yu minsheng shiguan (New Life and the Min sheng conception of history). In Geming Wenxian, vol. 68: Xin sheng huo yundong shiliao. Taipei: 128. Chow, Kai-wing. 1994. The Rise of Confucian Ritualism inLate Imperial China: Ethics, Classics, and Lineage Discourse. Stanford: Stanford University Chen
Press.

[DMDY] Manchukuo Daodehui bianjike (Manchukuo Morality Society edi torial department), ed. 1936. Disanjie Manchukuo Daodehui daodejiangxi yulu (Oral Records of Morality Seminars of the Third Manchukuo Morality Society). Xinjing (Hsinky?): Manchukuo Daodehui huijike. Duara, Prasenjit. 1995. Rescuing History from theNation: Questioning Narra tives ofModern China. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Elias, Norbert. 1978. The Civilizing Process: The Development of Manners. Translated by Edmund Jephcott. New York: Urizen Books. to Falungong). "Falundafa in (Introduction jianjie" 1/30/2000 http://falundafa.org. Fukunaga Tadashi. 1944. Mansh?koku no minzoku mondai (The national ques tion of Manchukuo). Hsinky? (Xinjing): Mansh? Tomoyamab?. Furuya Tetsuo, ed. 1994. Kindai Nihon on Ajia Ninshiki (Modern Japan and the Perception of Asia). Kyoto: Jinbun kagaku kenky?j?. Garon, Sheldon. 1993. "Women's Groups and the Japanese State: Contend to Political Integration, 1890-1945. "Journal of Japa ing Approaches nese Studies 19 (1): 5-41. Geyer, Dietrich. 1986. "Modern Imperialism? The Tsarist and the Soviet Examples." In Imperialism and After: Continuities and Discontinuities. Ed. Wolfgang G. Mommsen and J?rgen Osterhammel. London: Allen
and Unwin, pp. 48-62.

Carol. 1985. Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Gong, Gerrit W. 1984. The Standard of "Civilization" in International Society. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Modem China. New York: Grieder, Jerome B. 1981. Intellectuals and the State in Gluck,
Free Press.

Hasegawa Y?ichi. 1982. "Taish? ch?kki tairiku kokka e no imeiji?'Daik?rai koku' (Dagaoli, Koryo) k?s? to son? sh?hen" (The image of amainland nation in the mid-Taish? era?the of the "Great Koryo conception nation" and the area around it). Nihon kokusai seiji gakkai, ed. Nihon gaik? no shis?. Kokusai Seiji 71. Hashikawa, Bunz?. 1980. "Japanese Perspectives on Asia: From Dissociation to Coprosperity." In The Chinese and the Japanese: Essays in Political and Cultural Interactions. Ed. Akira Iriye. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, pp. 331-341.

Howland, Douglas. 1996. Borders of Chinese Civilization: Geography and History at Empires End. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. Samuel. 1993. "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs 72 Huntington, 22-49. (3):

128

JOURNAL

OF WORLD

HISTORY,

SPRING

200I

ed. [HZN] Xingya zongjiao xiehui (Revive Asian Religions Association), 1941. Huabei zongjiao nianjian (Yearbook of the religions of north China). Beijing: Xingyayuan Huabei lianlobu. Ishikawa Yoshihiro. 1994. "Tozai bunmeiron to Nihon no rondan" (The dis course of East West civilization and the Sino Japanese world of letters). In Kindai Nihon no Ajia ninshiki (Modern Japan's Perceptions of Asia).
Ed. Furuya Tetsuo, pp. 395-432.

-.

1995 "Bunmei, bunka, soshite Ro Chicho." (Civilization, culture, and Liang Qichao). Unpublished mss. (JG) Jilinsheng gongshu xunling (Jilin provincial government order) 480.44, June 12, 1936; 806.95, June 29, 1936. Jilin Provincial Archives,
Changchun.

Ketelaar, Li Shiyu.

James E. 1990. Of Heretics and Martyrs

Princeton, N.J.: Princeton

in Meiji Japan: Buddhism and

University Press.

its Persecution.

1948. Xianzai Huabei mimi zongjiao (Secret religions

n.p.

in north China

today),

[MDNJ] Wanguo Daodehui Manchukuo zonghui bianjike, ed. 1934. Manchu kuo Daodehui nianjian (Yearbook of the Manchukuo Morality Society). (Xinjing): Wanguo Daodehui Manchukuo Hsinky? zonghui bianjike. Martin, Bernd. 1986. "The Politics of Expansion of the Japanese Empire: Imperialism or Pan-Asiatic Mission?" In Imperialism and After: Continu ities and Discontinuities. Ed. Wolfgang G. Mommsen and J?rgen Oster hammel. London: Allen and Unwin, pp. 63-82. McNeill, William H. 1989. Arnold Toynbee: A Life. New York, Oxford: Oxford
University Press.

Micollier, Mitani

Evelyne.

1999. "Control and Release

Perspectives 24 of Chinese (July-Aug.): secret

of Emotions
22-30.

inQigong Health

Practices."

Takeshi.
no ch?sa"

1998. "Senzenki Nihon

(Surveys

no Ch?goku
societies

himitsu kaisha ni tsuite

in prewar Japan). In Sen

zenki Ch?goku jittai ch?sa shiry? no s?goteki kenky? (Composite studies in China). Ed. Honj? Hisako. of pre-war surveys of actual conditions [kiban Heij? nananendo-Heij? ky?nendo kagaku kenky?hi hojokin kenky? A (1)] kenky? seika. h?kokush? (Report of the Research Results of the Scientific Research Expenses Grant for 1995-1997 [Foundation research A (1)]). (no pub. data) Mizuno Naoki. 1994. "Senky?hyaku nij? nendai Nihon, Ch?sen, Ch?goku ni okeru Ajia ninshiki no ichidanmen?Ajia minzoku kaigi o meguru sankoku no roncho" (An aspect of the perception of Asia in the three
countries ments of of the Japan, three Korea, countries and China sunounding during the the 1920s?The conference argu on Asian

peoples). InKindai Nihon no Ajia ninshiki (Modern Japan's Perceptions of Asia). Ed. Furuya Tetsuo, pp. 509-544. In Imperial Ian H. 1986. "Some Thoughts on Japanese Expansionism." Nish, ism and After: Continuities and Discontinuities. Ed.Wolfgang G. Momm sen and J?rgen Osterhammel. London: Allen and Unwin, pp. 82-89. Otani Komme. 1937. Shy?ky? ch?sa shiry? (Materials from the survey of reli

Duara: The Discourse

of Civilization

and Pan-Asianism

129

-.

gions). Vol. 2, Kirin, Kento, Binko, kakosh? sh?ky? ch?sa h?koku (Report on religious surveys of the various provinces of Jilin, Jiandao, and Bin (Xinjing): Minseibu (Minshengbu). jiang). Hsinky? David. 1999. "Chinese Millenarian Traditions: The Formative Age." Ownby, American Historical Review 104 (5): 1513-1530. 2001. "Imperial Fantasies: The Chinese Communists and Peasant Rebellions." Comparative Studies in Society and History 43(1). Redfield, Margaret Park, ed. 1962-63. Human Nature and the Study of Society. Vol. 1 of The Papers of Robert Redfield. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.

Reynolds, Douglas R. 1993. China, 1898-1912: The Xinzheng Revolution and on East Asian Studies, Harvard Japan. Cambridge, Mass.: Council Press. distributed by Harvard University University; Sanet? Keish?. 1940. Nihon bunka no Shina e no eiky? (The influence of Jap anese Culture on China). Tokyo: Keisetsu shoin. Schwab, Raymond. 1984. Oriental Renaissance: Europe's rediscovery of India and and Victor the East, 1680-1880. Translated by Gene Patterson-Black with a foreword by Edward W. Said. New York: Columbia Reinking;
University Press.

Modern Japan: A Study of Conser Smith, Warren H., Jr. 1959. Confucianism in vatism in Japans Intellectual History. Tokyo: The Hokuseido Press. West. An abridged edition by Hel Spengler, Oswald. 1962. The Decline of the mut Werner. English abridged edition prepared by Arthur Helps, from New York: Alfred A. the translation by Charles Francis Atkinson.
Knopf.

Suemitsu Takayoshi. 1932. Shina no mimi kaisha to jizen kaisha (China's secret societies and charitable societies). Dalian: Manshu hy?ronsha. SunYat-sen. 1930. "DaYaxiyazhuyi" (Great Asianism). Xinyaxiyai (1): 2-7. Szpilman, Christopher W. A. 1998. "The Dream of One Asia: Okawa Sh? mei and Japanese Pan-Asianism." In The Japanese Empire and Its Legacy in East Asia. Ed. Harald Fuess. Munich: German Institute of Japanese
Studies, pp. 49-63.

Takizawa Toshihiro. 1937. Minkan shiny? ch?sa h?kokush? (Report on the sur vey of popular beliefs). Vol. 3 of Sh?ky? Ch?sa Shiry? (Materials from the survey of religions). Hsinky? (Minshengbu). (Xinjing): Minseibu Tanaka, Stefan. 1993. Japan's Orient: Rendering Pasts intoHistory. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. In Civilization on Toynbee, Arnold J. 1948. "Christianity and Civilization." Trial. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 225-252. Ueda Makoto 1996. "Okakura Tenshin?aru ky?kai no Ajia kan" (Okakura view of Asia from a certain margin). Kokusai ky?ryu 77: Tenshin?a
56-58.

Vermander,
Aug.):

Benoit.
14-21.

1999. "The Law and the Wheel." Dangan

2018,

Perspectives 24 (July of

(WWD) Wang Weizhengfu

Wang Jingwei). juan

(Archives
48, 69,

of the Puppet Government

93, 107, 108, 113, 146.

cases

130

JOURNAL

OF WORLD

HISTORY,

SPRING

200I

Holmes. 1968. The Buddhist Revival inChina. With a section of photos Henri Cartier-Bresson. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. by New York: Oxford University Press. Williams, Raymond. 1983. Keywords. Aida Yuen. 1999. "In Search of the East: Art History and Sino-Jap?? Wong, ese Relations." Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, New York. "Xinyaxiyazhi shiming" (The mission of New Asia). Xinyaxiya (New Asia) 1.1. Welch,
Dec. 1930: preface.

Yamamuro Shinichi. 1994. "Ajia ninshiki no kijiku" (The axes of perceiving In Kindai Nihon no Ajia ninshiki (Modern Japan's Perceptions of Asia).
Asia). Ed. Furuya Tetsuo, pp. 3-46.

Yamazaki Mugen. 1994. "Kyoiku zasshi ni mini Ajia ninshiki no denkai" of the perception of Asia as seen in educational (The development In Kindai Nihon no Ajia ninshiki (Modern Japan's Perceptions journals). of Asia). Ed. Furuya Tetsuo. pp. 299-350. Yamazaki Seika. 1938. Nekka, Mensh? ry?sho sh?ky? ch?sa h?kokush? (Report of the survey of religion in the two provinces of Rehe and Mianzhou). Vol. 4 of Sh?ky? Ch?sa Shiry? (Materials from the survey of religions). (Minshengbu). Hsinky? (Xinjing): Minseibu