Professional Documents
Culture Documents
htm#TAB G_DU
Exposures in the Gulf War
Various scenarios exposed Gulf War veterans to depleted uranium. US Abrams tanks
mistakenly fired depleted uranium penetrators into some US combat vehicles, destroying
or damaging them. In addition, personnel recovering, repairing, or decommissioning DU-
damaged vehicles may have inhaled or ingested residual DU fragments and particles.
There were also several accidental tank fires and an ammunition explosion and fire at
Camp Doha, Kuwait, which burned, oxidized, and fragmented many DU rounds, creating
a potential exposure hazard to soldiers operating in the vicinity. Other personnel entered
Iraqi vehicles destroyed or damaged by DU.
FFFFF Level I includes veterans in or near combat vehicles at the time these FFFFF
vehicles were struck by DU munitions, or veterans who entered vehicles
immediately after they were struck by DU munitions. These veterans could
have been struck by DU fragments, inhaled DU aerosols, ingested DU
residues, or had DU particles land on open wounds, burns, or other breaks
in their skin -- or any combination of these possibilities.
FFFFF FFFFF FFFFF
FFFFF Level II includes veterans and a small number of DoD civilian employees FFFFF
who worked in and around vehicles (mostly friendly-fire wrecks)
containing DU fragments and particles. These individuals may have
inhaled DU residues stirred up (resuspended) during their activities on or
inside the vehicles, ingested DU after transferring it from hand to mouth, or
spread contamination on their clothing. Soldiers who were involved in
cleaning up DU residues from Camp Doha's North Compound after the
July 11, 1991, explosion and fires are also included in this group.
FFFFF FFFFF FFFFF
FFFFF Level III is an "all others" group whose exposures were largely incidental FFFFF
or fleeting. This group includes individuals who entered DU-contaminated
Iraqi equipment, soldiers downwind from burning Iraqi or US equipment
struck by DU rounds, or soldiers downwind from burning DU ammunition
(e.g., soldiers at Doha during the July 11 fire). While these individuals
could have inhaled airborne DU particles, the possibility of receiving an
intake high enough to cause health effects is extremely remote.
During the Gulf War, US Abrams tanks fired DU rounds at occupied US vehicles,
destroying or damaging 6 M1/M1A1 tanks and 14 Bradley Fighting Vehicles. A
combination of the featureless desert terrain, large, fast-moving armored formations, and
low visibility from darkness, heavy rains, sandstorms, etc., were all contributing factors
in these incidents. In some instances, a single DU round hit the friendly vehicle; in other
instances, multiple rounds hit the vehicle. One incident involved an Apache helicopter
that hit an Abrams tank carrying DU rounds igniting an on-board fire. (Tab J, "Tank
Fires," discusses this tank which is not included in the 6 tanks mentioned above.) An
Abrams also hit a 15th Bradley with DU, but the crew had already evacuated the vehicle.
(See Tab H.)[236]
Given the confusion and uncertainty on the battlefield, some of the soldiers in vehicles
coming under friendly fire initially believed they had been fired upon by Iraqi armor. It
was only after the fact that battle damage assessment experts confirmed that the entrance
and exit holes in the struck vehicles exhibited the distinctive radioactive trace left by
Abrams DU penetrators. Soldiers involved in these friendly-fire DU incidents found out
what actually happened to them from after-action investigations and word of mouth. Most
of these soldiers were unaware of the potential health effects associated with DU.
Consequently, the investigation of friendly-fire incidents was accompanied by an effort to
identify, locate, and contact all surviving soldiers who were in or on vehicles at the time
they were penetrated by DU rounds.
104 soldiers on board US combat vehicles struck by DU penetrators survived the attacks;
11 soldiers died. Table G-1 lists the vehicles and the number of soldiers onboard who
survived. (See Tab H for a description of each friendly-fire incident.) The "0" entry in the
right-hand column reflects the fact that the 2-2 Cavalry Bradley was initially struck by
enemy fire, evacuated, and subsequently struck by "friendly" DU rounds.
Total 104
The second sub-category of Level I includes personnel who rushed to the aid of the
soldiers in vehicles hit by DU rounds. Investigators have identified 46 veterans fitting this
criteria (although as many as 60 soldiers may be in this category). These soldiers often
entered damaged or destroyed vehicles moments after they were hit, possibly exposing
themselves to DU residues or oxides still airborne from the impacts or stirred up by the
rescue activities.
B. Level II
The seven sub-categories of Level II include soldiers who worked in and around DU-
contaminated vehicles (mostly friendly-fire wrecks) or who took part in the cleanup of
DU contamination at Camp Doha, Kuwait, after an explosion and fire on July 11, 1991,
detonated or burned several hundred rounds of DU ammunition.
Total 16 15
A total of 16 Abrams and 15 Bradleys (Table G-2) were contaminated with DU in the
Gulf during 1990-1991. In addition to the accidental friendly-fire vehicles mentioned
earlier, three bogged-down Abrams were deliberately destroyed by other US tanks (after
their crews had evacuated) to prevent them from falling into Iraqi hands. The Level II
group also includes personnel whose maintenance or salvage duties required them to
frequently enter and exit, or spend extended periods of time working in, contaminated
vehicles. Finally, soldiers who cleaned up DU residues or spent penetrators inside Camp
Doha's North Compound following the July 1991 ammunition supply point
explosion/fire, fall into this classification.
1. Removing Munitions
The standard uniform of EOD personnel clearing unexploded ordnance was body armor
(flak jacket) and a kevlar helmet. Because of the extreme heat of the Gulf, EOD
personnel often wore only T-shirts under the body armor. At Camp Doha, engineer
personnel assisted EOD by cleaning up non-explosive debris and identifying unexploded
ordnance. Engineers found DU penetrators in the 1st Squadron's motor pool during the
initial clearing and clean-up. They initially picked up these penetrators -- often with bare
hands -- and tossed them with the rest of the debris into a civilian dump.[237] Some soldiers
knew there were DU tank rounds in the Camp Doha stockpile, but were unaware of what
DU was or what its properties were. They were not advised of any contamination hazard
or protective measures against contamination, but were only ordered to wear kevlar
helmets and flak vests for protection against unexploded ordnance.[238]
Some soldiers entered US equipment contaminated with DU within hours or days of the
penetrator impact -- usually to recover weapons, gear and sensitive equipment, a task that
sometimes took hours. Many of these soldiers had earlier survived the friendly-fire
incidents in those same vehicles.[239] Unit mechanics spent hours, sometimes days,
removing reusable parts like engines and transmissions. They were never warned of the
dangers of DU. Some of these mechanics noted the dusty condition of the friendly-fire
wrecks they worked on.[240] A member of a US Army Battle Damage Assessment Team
said that more that 27 major components were removed from the first four Bradleys he
inspected (three of which were contaminated with DU).[241] The mechanics performing
this work were not only potentially exposed to DU dust, but also may have inadvertently
spread parts and equipment containing trace amounts of DU to other vehicles. In fact, a
mechanic from the 4-7th Cavalry Squadron reports that after spending several days
crawling around dusty friendly-fire wrecks, stripping them of usable parts, a Battle
Damage Assessment Team with RADIAC meters arrived and declared the vehicles to be
radioactive. They made the mechanics round up all the parts and, after checking each one,
assessed most of them to be radioactive and ordered them to be put back into the original
vehicles.[242] This office has identified 60 veterans who spent more than a half-hour
performing maintenance or equipment recovery inside contaminated tanks or Bradleys.
Despite this guidance, at least one logistics representative has stated that he entered
contaminated systems in a tee shirt and without a respirator.[245] When interviewed, the
deputy to the officer in charge of the M1-series tank LARs stated that, despite warning
messages that highlighted the potential exposure risks to DU, he had received numerous
reports after the war of his personnel entering damaged Abrams tanks without proper
protective equipment.[246] At least one representative has indicated that he was unaware of
the warning messages until after the Gulf War. He reported that he entered DU-
contaminated vehicles at King Khalid Military City without personal protective
equipment and with the knowledge and consent of the health physics officer and radiation
control personnel at the site.[247] Four out of 16 logistics assistance representatives
interviewed to date report working around DU-contaminated vehicles. Efforts are
continuing to identify and interview other logistics representatives.
4. Battle Damage Assessment Teams
A group from the US Army Ballistics Research Laboratory (BRL) at Aberdeen,
Maryland, conducted battle damage assessments on damaged or destroyed US ground
combat vehicles. This 12-man battle damage assessment team (BDAT) looked at
damaged and destroyed US combat vehicles to determine how they had been knocked
out, what damage had been sustained, the type of weapon or munition used, how well the
vehicles' defensive features had worked, etc. These inspections required frequent entry
into disabled, often DU-contaminated vehicles. The battle damage assessment team
arrived in the Gulf on or about January 21, 1991, and were attached to combat elements
prior to the ground war (which began a little over a month later on February 23rd).
Because the team's personnel had more technical expertise with DU than most soldiers,
they were sometimes called in after the ground war began to help evaluate potential crew
and equipment radiation contamination and to assist in friendly-fire investigations.[248]
Investigators have interviewed all twelve members of the Ballistics Research Laboratory
battle damage assessment team. Most team members said they were trained in proper
handling procedures and safeguards for DU-damaged equipment, but three do not recall
receiving this training. Some members of the team followed the prescribed precautions
and only entered DU-contaminated tanks after donning yellow radiation suits, including
dust masks, gloves, and boots. Other members were not as rigorous in taking protective
measures. A few battle damage assessment team personnel have indicated that the
wearing of masks and gloves was an impediment to taking accurate measurements.
Others indicated that there were not enough masks for everyone and they eventually ran
short on gloves as well; apparently the gloves were easily torn on the sharp edges in the
close confines of the vehicles. Assessments typically took between six and eight hours to
complete, although some team members reported spending less than an hour inside
vehicles. They did not consistently adhere to the practice of checking themselves for
radioactivity after working in vehicles. While only one team member reported more than
marginal levels of DU on him, he indicated that he was unable to get all the DU off and
eventually everything in his pack became contaminated. Most team members practiced
good personal hygiene, particularly after working in contaminated vehicles.[249]
A seven- or eight-member battle damage assessment team from the US Army Tank and
Automotive Command (TACOM) also inspected DU-contaminated vehicles after the
ground war. This team, though they knew DU had been used, did not wear masks, gloves,
or head cover. One member of this team indicated that he didn't (and doesn't) consider the
DU contamination at that site to be a hazard. Another member said that the wearing of
masks would have hindered the team's ability to carry out the tasks inside the vehicles.[250]
Several of the Ballistics Research Laboratory battle damage assessment team members
said they wore radiation badges while they were in the Gulf and never received feedback
on the readings. In December 1997, the office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War
Illnesses requested information on these readings from the Army office responsible for
maintaining dosimetry data.[251] In response to that request, the US Army Radiation
Standards and Dosimetry Laboratory provided histories of exposure to ionizing radiation
for all twelve Ballistics Research Laboratory team members and two members of the
TACOM battle damage assessment team.[252] According to these histories, from January
17, 1991, to March 12, 1991, all battle damage assessment team members wore
thermoluminescent dosimeters capable of measuring external whole body radiation. All
readings were zero, as would be expected from a low-level radiation source such as DU.
These devices were not capable of measuring how much DU may have been inhaled or
ingested. At the request of the Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, the
Army provided these histories to the battle damage assessment team members.[253]
5. Processing Damaged Equipment
US forces transported disabled or destroyed US combat vehicles to King Khalid Military
City, the central receiving and storage site for such vehicles (as well as many Iraqi
"trophy tanks"). The Pentagon ordered the 144th Service and Supply Company, a National
Guard unit from New Jersey, to assess battle damage and prepare the vehicles for
shipment back to the US. Although their mission did not include maintenance or repair,
members of the 144th have indicated that they periodically re-entered the contaminated
vehicles to cannibalize equipment for other units.[254] The 144th personnel were not
familiar with proper procedures for handling DU-contaminated M1-series tanks or
Bradleys. Because their original mission did not involve tanks with DU armor, unit
personnel were not familiar with Army Technical Bulletin (TB) 9-1300-278,[255] which
contained guidance for handling DU-contaminated M1 tanks.[256]
The 144th worked on DU-contaminated equipment without taking any precautions (e.g.,
wearing dust masks). They reportedly had no knowledge that some of the damaged
equipment was contaminated with DU until after March 11, 1991. In many cases,
contaminated equipment was mixed with uncontaminated equipment. Until the arrival of
a radiation control (RADCON) team from the Armament Munitions and Chemical
Command (AMCCOM), no one controlled access to the equipment. As many as 27
soldiers in the 144th worked in or around damaged Bradleys and Abrams without
protective gear for an undetermined period of time.[257] Although the battle damage
assessment team commander stated that he informed personnel from the unit about the
potential hazard from contaminated vehicles on or about March 11, 1991,[258] various
members of the 144th have questioned the date they were actually notified, and stated that
they continued to enter contaminated equipment after this date.[259] While AMCCOM sent
communications to ARCENT addressing DU contaminated equipment, there is no
documentation indicating that personnel from the 144th were informed that the equipment
in their control was contaminated, therefore the exact date will probably never be
confirmed.
Approximately 10-15 maintenance personnel from the 556th Corps Support Company
assisted the 144th. According to the team's non-commissioned officer in charge, 556th
personnel worked in the storage yard evaluating the extent of damage to the vehicles for
approximately two weeks before they were informed of the potential DU contamination
hazard.[260]
The 144th ultimately shipped 14 Abrams and 9 Bradleys with DU contamination to the
Chem-Nuclear Systems' Defense Consolidation Facility in Snelling, South Carolina for
decontamination and disposal. Initially, Chem-Nuclear Systems' (CNS) facilities could
not meet security, structural, and environmental requirements to handle the larger
equipment such as the Abrams tank. Therefore, after receiving the initial Abrams
involved in the December 1991 tank fire, CNS built a new building which was fully
licensed by South Carolina's Department of Health and Environmental Controls. CNS
instituted appropriate industrial hygiene and radiation protection procedures throughout
the entire processing operation, including external dosimetry and pre- and post-urine
uranium and blood lead analyses. CNS tailored personal protective equipment to each
vehicle. Removable alpha contamination levels inside the vehicles were typically less
than 1,000 disintegrations per minute per 100 square centimeters (dpm/cm2), but CNS
detected levels of up to 10,000 dpm/100 cm2. (Note: NRC guidance for unrestricted use is
1,000 dpm/100 cm2, i.e., there is no requirement for any protective measures or personnel
protective equipment.[261] In addition, personnel protective equipment is generally not
required when the removable surface contamination is less than 10,000 dpm. For
contamination levels between 10,000 and 1,000,000 dpm, personal protective equipment
is required, i.e., shoe covers, gloves, coveralls, and respirator.)[262] Typically, workers
wore safety glasses, coveralls, gloves, safety shoes, and booties. CNS performed
continuous air monitoring when needed and personnel wore respirators as required.
Radiation exposure was minimal and CNS observed no uptake of radioactive or
hazardous material in any of the workers.[263]
CNS eventually decontaminated and returned all nine Bradleys to the DoD supply system
or for rebuilding at a depot level maintenance site. In addition, CNS returned scrap metal
from 11 Abrams to the Aberdeen Proving Ground, and returned two restored Abrams to
the active inventory.[264]
6. Radiation Control Activities
After completing their initial battlefield assessments, the Army's battle damage
assessment team went to King Khalid Military City (KKMC) on March 11, 1991, to see if
any equipment they had missed had been evacuated to the vehicle collection point, which
was being managed by the 144th Services and Supply Company. Finding many DU-
contaminated vehicles at KKMC, the team requested on-site personnel from the
Armament Munitions and Chemical Command (AMCCOM) to arrange for a radiation
control team to go to King Khalid Military City.[265]
AMCCOM deployed radiation control teams to identify, assess, and respond to incidents
involving DU contamination. Radiation control teams performed their duties primarily at
King Khalid Military City (KKMC) and at Camp Doha, although there were some limited
excursions to other locations.
On March 24, 1991, a radiation control team of health physicists from AMCCOM arrived
at KKMC to assume responsibility for identifying, collecting, and surveying DU-
contaminated equipment.[266] Much of this equipment was already at KKMC. The
AMCCOM radiation control team segregated the DU-contaminated vehicles, set up a
guarded perimeter to restrict access, and instructed 144th personnel in the proper handling
of DU. The team examined the vehicles at the site and concluded that their DU
radiological and chemical contamination levels, while low, required basic protective
equipment, such as surgical gloves and dust masks, and strict personal hygiene
measures.[267] Their work, completed around April 12, 1991, cleared the way for contract
personnel to inspect, decontaminate, package, and ship the contaminated systems to the
US.[268] In all, 15 Bradleys and 10 Abrams at KKMC were contaminated with DU. Some
merely had DU "splatter" and could be returned to duty after decontamination. Others
had to be sealed to contain the contaminant and then shipped to the US for final
processing and disposal.[269]
The AMCCOM personnel also surveyed captured Iraqi equipment being prepared for
shipment to the US. According to the person in charge of the survey operation, the most
acute radiological hazard on these Soviet-built tanks was the radium used in their gauges,
which were often leaking.[270] These gauges had to be removed prior to shipping. One T-
72 tank had substantial internal and external DU contamination.[271] It was not shipped,
but its ultimate disposition is unknown.[272]
An AMCCOM recovery team deployed to Camp Doha, Kuwait, from July 19 until early
August 1991. The team did a radiological survey in and around four M1A1 tanks that
were damaged or destroyed in the July 11 fire. After determining that three of the tanks
contained low-level contamination, the AMCCOM team did an initial decontamination of
their exteriors and prepared them for shipment to the Saudi Arabian port of Dammam.
The team also collected a sizeable quantity of spent DU penetrators and fragments from
the 2nd Squadron motor pool pad and deposited them in the tanks' interiors, which were
then sealed. On August 6th, the tanks were shipped from Dammam and returned to the US
for processing at the Defense Consolidation Facility at Snelling, South Carolina.[273]
On July 24, 1991, a radiation control Emergency Response Team from the US Army's
Communications Electronics Command (CECOM) Safety Office at Ft. Monmouth, NJ,
arrived at Camp Doha.[274] The Project Director for the US Army Radiological Control
Team headed the CECOM team. The team conducted what one member called a "site
characterization survey."[275] According to the CECOM team chief, they did a
comprehensive radiological survey of the motor pool area and when they detected
penetrators or DU "dust," they thoroughly swept the area. The CECOM team was able to
survey and clear an estimated two acres of the motor pool (which was the size of several
football fields).[276]
Investigators have interviewed several members of the AMCCOM and CECOM radiation
control teams. All the individuals interviewed said they used some form of personal
protection, although only about half routinely used respiratory protection while working
in and around contaminated vehicles. All team members interviewed said that they were
careful to monitor each other with a RADIAC meter at the end of each work day to
ensure that they were not tracking DU residues away from the cordoned-off portion of the
2nd Squadron motor pool pad.[277] Ten to twelve individuals performed radiation control
activities at one time or another. Investigators from the Office of the Special Assistant are
continuing their efforts to locate and interview these personnel.
7. Camp Doha Cleanup Activities
A July 11, 1991 fire in Camp Doha's motor pool complex (the North Compound)
destroyed or damaged tons of ammunition, as well as 20 to 30 combat-loaded vehicles,
dozens of support vehicles, and equipment. The fire externally damaged one M1A1 tank
and destroyed three others. Detonated DU rounds inside the three destroyed tanks
(approximately 37 rounds per tank) contaminated these vehicles. In addition to the
estimated 111 DU rounds in the tanks, the fire also damaged or destroyed more than 500
DU rounds stored in nearby conexes (metal shipping containers). Most of these rounds
detonated, leaving behind scorched, exposed DU penetrators. In most cases, these
exposed penetrators showed little oxidization, but some were oxidized or fragmented to a
significant degree.
Within the North Compound, almost all of the DU penetrators, fragments, and oxides
were concentrated in the 2nd Squadron motor pool and wash rack area. Between July 14th
and July 23rd, an explosives ordnance demolitions detachment and a company of Combat
Engineers cleared approximately a third of the 2nd Squadron motor pool pad. Although
AMCCOM and CECOM personnel cleaned up the area with the heaviest concentration of
DU -- the burned M1A1s -- the surrounding motor pool pads may have contained residual
DU. In addition, the fire and explosions partially burned and scattered many exposed or
spent DU penetrators around the conex containers.[278] As the AMCCOM and CECOM
teams cleared unexploded ordnance and DU from sections of the concrete pad, regular
soldiers were brought in to do a final cleanup using brooms and other hand tools. These
soldiers could have inhaled or ingested residual DU stirred up by sweeping and picking
up DU penetrators or pieces of DU penetrators with bare hands.[279]
A more comprehensive discussion of the Camp Doha explosion, fires, cleanup, and
recovery operations can be found in Tab I.
D. Level III
This group comprises "all others." It includes soldiers downwind of burning DU-
contaminated equipment and personnel who entered DU-contaminated Iraqi equipment. It
also includes personnel who were present at Camp Doha during and after the motor pool
fire, but who did not take part in cleaning operations in the North Compound. Based on
existing research, this entire group received minimal exposures.
1. Camp Doha
This group consists of individuals who were at Camp Doha during the fire and
subsequent cleanup activities, but were not directly involved in the sweeping operations
or with picking up spent DU penetrators, fragments, or oxides in the North Compound.
Individuals in the North Compound (motor pool area) when the fire and initial explosions
started are also included in this group. An M992 ammunition carrier loaded with non-DU
155mm shells burned for approximately 30 minutes before the explosions started, giving
most soldiers time to evacuate the area. Cleanup activities in the South Compound are
included in Level III because all of the known DU contaminant remained in the North
Compound, except for a number of penetrators transported to an nearby trash dump.
2. Tank Fires
During Operation Desert Storm and Desert Shield, three accidental tank fires caused
onboard DU munitions to detonate. In addition, a large shaped-charge weapon, most
likely a Hellfire anti-armor missile fired from an Army AH-64 Apache helicopter, struck
an Abrams carrying DU rounds, setting the tank on fire. All but one of the crewmen
assigned to these four tanks escaped without injury, and all escaped before the DU rounds
detonated. Some individuals, however, may have been exposed to DU aerosols from
these fires. Individuals who were potentially exposed to fumes from the fires and related
incidental contact with DU are included in this category. Those who performed cleanup,
equipment processing, and similar activities on these burned tanks are included in Level
II. TAB J contains an account of each of these incidents.
3. Entering DU-contaminated Iraqi or Coalition Equipment
This is the largest group of veterans potentially exposed to DU. American soldiers often
entered destroyed Iraqi armor out of curiosity or to collect souvenirs despite express
warnings against this practice from AMCCOM and other environmental health agencies.
The VII Corps Deployment After Action Report said:
A March 11, 1991 message stipulating the Army policy on captured Iraqi vehicles warned
that "many of these captured vehicles pose a radiation hazard, either because devices on
the vehicles do not meet US safety standards, or because of damage or destruction by
depleted uranium munitions."[281]
Many soldiers had legitimate reasons to enter Iraqi equipment, such as checking for
survivors, completing the destruction of the vehicles, or looking for items of intelligence
value. Exposures of individuals searching enemy equipment would depend on the
frequency of entry, their activity level inside the vehicle (i.e., how much dust they stirred
up), as well as the length of time spent inside the vehicle.
Radioactive items in various foreign vehicles are typically sealed and contained in
chemical agent detectors, radiation monitors, and radiation instruments. Exceptions
include instrument dials painted with luminous paints containing radium, tritium, or
promethium. The sealed radioactive materials are normally in very small quantities and
are not a hazard unless the source is damaged. The types of radioactive sources in Iraq's
Soviet-made equipment (and the radioactive elements in each source) include the
following:[282]
• The chemical agent detector found on the T-72 tank, the BMP infantry fighting
vehicle, and the BTR-series wheeled armored personnel carrier (plutonium-239,
weighing 185 to 260m g);
• Various instrument dials and switches designed to glow in the dark (radium-226,
tritium, and promethium-147);
• One of the case straps of the RWA 72K Radiation Warning and Detection Kit
(cesium- 137, emitting 5.9 m Ci).