THE UNITED

STATES
\\ "
STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

..
THE EFFECTS
OF
STRATEGIC BOMBING
ON
JAPAN'S WAR ECONOMY

Appendix ABC

OVER-ALL ECONOMIC EFFECTS DIVISION

December 1946

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents. U. S. Government Printing Office

Washiaaton 25, D. C. Price 65 cents

FOREWORD

..

This report was written parily for the use of the U. S. Strategic B0mbing
Survey in the preparatioll2f further reports of a more comprehensive nature.
Any conclusions or opinions ~xpressed in this report must be considered as
limited to the specifi~,material covered and as subject to further interpretation
in the light of fuitheqtudies <l~nducted by the Survey.

The United States Strategic Bombing Survey

was established by the Secretary of War on 3
November 1944, pursuant to a directive from the
late President Roosevelt. Its mission was to
conduct an impartial and expert study of the
effects of our aerial attack on Germany, to be used
in connection with air attackj; on Japan and to
n establish a basis for evaluating the importance and
\i- potentialities of air power as an instrument of
~-) military strategy for planning the future develop____ ment of the United States armed forces and for
"< determining future economic policies with respect
to the national defense. A SUIlliIlary report and
some 200 supportiqg reports containing the
findings of the Survey in Germany have been
published.
On 15 August 1945, President Truman requested
that the Survey conduct a similar study of the
effects of all types of air attack in the war against
Japan, submitting reports in duplicate to the
Secretary of War and to the Secretary of the
Navy. The oB:icers of the Survey during its
Japanese phase were:

.:1

Franklin D'Olier, .Chairman.

Paul H. Nitze, Henry C. Alexander, Vice
- Ohairmen.
Harry L. Bowman,
J.Kenneth Galbraith,
Rensis Likert,
Frank A. McNamee, Jr.,
Fred Searls, Jr.,
Monroe E. Spaght,
Dr. Lewis R. Thompson,
Theodore P. Wright, Directors.
Walter Wilds, Secretary.
The Survey's comp~ement provided for 300

civilians, 350 officers, and 500 enlisted men. The

military segment of the organization was drawn
from the Army to the extent of 60 percent, and
from the Navy to the extent of 40 percent. Both
the Army and the Navy gave the Survey all possible assistance in furnishing men, supplies, transport, and information. The Survey operatedfrom hoodquarters established in -Tokyo early in
September 1945, with subheadquarters in Nagoya,
Osaka, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki, and with mobile
teams operating in other parts of Japan, the islands
of the Pacific, and the Asiatic mainland .
It was possible to reconstruct much of wartime
Japanese military planning and execution, engagement by engagement, and campaign by campaign,
and to secure reasonably accurate statistics on
Japan's economy and war production, plant by
plant, and industry by industry. In addition,
studies were conducted on Japan's over-all strategic plans and the background of her entry into
'the war, the internal discussions and negotiations
leading to her acceptance of unconditional SUlrender, the course of health and morale among the
civilian population, the effectiveness ot the
Japanese civilian defense organization, and the
effects of the atomic bombs. Separate reports will
be issued covering each phase of the study .
The Survey interrogated more than 700 Japanese military, government, and industria~ officials.
It also rec.overed and translated many documents
which not only have been useful to the Survey,
but also will furnish data valuable for other studies.
Arrangements have been made to turn' over the
Survey's files to the Central Intelligence Group,
through which they will be available for further
e;'(amination and distribution.

jj

:385443

iii

Pare

Tabl.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

Introduction ____________ - - -- - - - - __ - _________________________________________________________________ _

Conclusions: Economic effects of the strategic bombing of Japan __________________________________________ _

1
2

Chapler

I. The road to Pearl Harbor ____________________________________________________________________ _

II. Japan's economy under stress of the waL ______________________________________________________ _
III. Air attack against Japan's economy ___________________.________________________________________ _
IV. Effect of the air offensive on Japan's economy __________________________________________________ _

Surrender __________________________________________________________________________________ _
on target selection _______ _________________________________________________________ _

15
35
41
57
61

A. Allied eco.nomic intelligence on Japan: Analysis and comparisons _____________ c _______________ ~ ____ _
B. Gross national product of Japan _______________________________________________________________ _
C. Statistical sources ___ - - _____________________________________________________________________ , __

69
83
97

V.
VI.
AprendiJ:

Postsc~ipt

Tabl,

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
II.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Relative growth of industrial and agricultural output, 1930-42 ________________________________________ _

Composition of industrial output, 1930-42 __________________________________________,___ ____________ _
Gross national product, fiscal years 1940-44 (billions of 1940 yen) ____ .__________________________________ _
Percentage of war expenditures to gross product, Japan and the United States __________________________ _
Comparison of the dynamics of "real" gross national product, Japan and the United States, selected years
1930-44.----------------------------------------------- ______________________________________ _
Production of basic materials, Japan proper, fiscal-years 1941-42 (thousands of metric tonsl ______________ _
Total labor conscription for essential work, 1939-42 __________________________________________________ _
Aircraft and engine production, fiscal years 1942-44 __________________________________________________ _
Capacity and production of aluminum, 1941-45 ___ ~ _________________________________________________ _
Allocation of primary aluminum, 1942-45 ___________________________________________________________ _
Japan's merchant fleet, selected months ____________________________________________________________ _
Planned and actual merchant ship construction, 1943-44 ______________________________________________ _
Merchant ship building, fiscal years 1943-44. _______________________________________________________ _
Production of naval ships, fiscal years 1942-44 (deadweight tons) ______________________________________ _
Armament production, fiscal years 1941-44_ _ _____________________________________________________ "_
Production of basic materials, Japan proper, fiscal years 1942-44 _______________________________________ _
Production and import of coal, fi~cal years 1942-44 _________________________________________________ _
Production and import of coking coal, iron ore, and pig iron, fiscal years 1942-44 ________________________ _
Production of finished steel, fiscal years 1942-41 _____________________________________________________ _
Crude oil production and stocks, fiscal years 1942-44 _________________________________________________ _
Percentage distribution of civilian laborforce, by industry and sex, Japan proper, October 1, 1940, and FebfIIary 22, 1944 _________________________________________________________________________________ _

12
12
15
16
17
20
22
24
25
25
26
26
26
27
28
28
28
29
30
30

31
22. Civilian labor force in Japan proper, 1 October 1940 and 22 February 1944, by industry __________________ _
,32
23. Reduction in the cotton industry, calendar years 1937-44 _____________________________________________ _
3:j; :
24. Allocation of cotton and wool cloth supply, ca.lendar years 1937-44. ____________________________________ _
33
25. Distribution of Fifth AF effort against Formosan targets ______________________________________________ _
38~
26. Distribution of bomb tonnage by fifth and seventh AF between June 1945 and end of waL ______________ _
3!J
27. Distribution of bomb tonnage by Naval Aircraft on Japanese targets __________________________________ _
3\'1~ .
28. Japanese merchant ship sinkings by Allied action, 1941-45 (thousands of gross registered tonsl ____________ _
43:
A-I. Coal a">'ailable in Japan proper, 1943-45 ___________________________________________________________ 76'
A-2. Steel ingot capacity, 1942-44 ___________________________________________________________________ _
7'f,.
A-3. Steel ingot production, 1942-44. ________________________________________________________________ _
77
A-4. Stock piles of oiL ~ _ - - - __________________________________________ . _____________________________ _
80A-5. Aviation gasoline stocks (inner zone) _______________________________________________ .______________ 80

,.

iv

A-6.
A-7.
A-8.
A-9.
A-I0.
A-II.

Synth~tic production, 1942-44 __________ - - -- - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - -- -- -- - -- - -- -- - - - - --- -- -Comparison of "real" gross national production estimates, 1940-44 __________ .------------------------Combat airplane production, 1941-45 ________ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - --- - -- - - - --- -- - - -- -- - - - - --Aluminum capacity, 1943-45 ______________ - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - -- - -- -- ---- -- - - -- - - - - ---- -- - - --'--Aluminum requirements, 1943-45 __________ - -- - - - - - - - - - -- - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - -- -- --- - -- - - - -- -Aluminum production, 1943-45 _____________ -- - -- - - - - - ---- - - - - - - - - -- - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - -- - -- -- - -- --

80
80
81
81
81
82

B-1.
B-2.
B-3.
B-4,
B-5.
B- 6.
B-7.
B-8.
B-9.
B-I0.
B-ll.
B-12.
B-13.
B-14.
B-15.

Gross national product, fiscal years 1940-44 ___ - - - -- - - -- --- -- - - - - - - - -- - - - --- -- - - - -- - -- - - - - -- - - - - --War expenditures, fiscal years 1940-45 _____________________________________ -- - c - - - - -- -- - - -- -- - - - -Army expenditures, fiscal years 1940-45 ____ ._______________________________ - -- ___ c - - - - -- - - -- - - - - - -Expenditures of the Imperial Navy, fiscal years 1940-45 ___________________________________________ _
Expenditures of the Munitions Ministry, fiscal years 1943-45 _______________________________________ _
War expenditures by obiect, fiscal years 1940-45_ - - -- - - - -- - - - - - - - - ---- - - - --- -- - - - - - - -- -- - - -- - - -- - -National government expenditures ________ -- - -- -- - --- - - - - -" - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - --- - - - -- - - - -- - - - - -- - - - -Derivation of national government nonwar expenditures _______________ .. ____________________________ _
Local gove;nment expenditures, fiscal years 1940-44_ - - -- - - - - - - -- --- - - - - - --- - - - - - -- - - - - --- - - - - - - - - -Derivation of local government expenditures, fiscal years 1940-44 ___________________________________ _
Private plant and equipment expenditures, fiscal years 1941-44. - - -- - -- - -- - - - - - - - - - -- - - - -- - - - - - - - - - -Derivation of residential construction activity, fiscal years 1940-44_ - - - - - - ----- -- -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - -Balance of international payments, fiscal years 1939-44. ___________________________________________ _
Consumer expenditures, 1940-44. ________ -- -- - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - -- -- - - - - - - - -- - -- -- - - - - - - -- - - - - - - --- -Wholesale prices in Japan ______________ - - - - -- - - - -- - -- - - - - - - -- - --- - --- - -- - -- - - - - -- -- - - - - - - - - -- - --

84
85
86
87
87
87
88
88
89
89
9b
90
91
92
96

G-l. Population, armed forces, and civilian labor force, by sex and activity, Japan proper, 1 October 19301 October 1940, 22 February 1944 _________ - - _- --- - - - - - - - - -- ---- - - - - - - - - -- - --- -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -C-2. Ci vilian population, labor force and unoccupied, by age and sex, Japan proper, 1 October 1930-1 October
1940,22 February 1944 ____ -:________________ _______ -- - ---------- -- --- - -- --- - --- - -- - - -- - -- ---C-3. Percentage distribution of civilian labor force, by sex and activity, Japan proper, 1 October 1930-1 October
1940 22 Februarv 1944
______ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - C-4. Percen~age distribu'tion of ~~l~~ -~~d-f~males in civilian labor force by activity, Japan proper, 1 October
1930-1 October 1940, 22 February 1944 __________________________________________________ -----G-5, Labor force, mining and manufacturing and construction, by sex and industry, Japan proper, 1 O<:tober
1930-22 February 1944 ______________ - - --- ----- ------ - ---- ------ -- ------- - - -------- - --- -- - --G-6. Workers in the labor force, aged 14c-59, manufacturing and construction, Japan proper, 1 October 1940
and 22 February 1944 ___________________ -------- ------ -- --- - -------- - - - - -- - --- - --- -- - ------G-7. Labor conscription into essential industries, Japan proper, 1939-45_ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -G-8. Survey of resident Koreans, by industry and occupation, Japan proper, 31 December 1941. - - - -- - - - - - -G-9. Number of Korean contract workers brought into Japan proper annually, by type of work assigned, 1939-45 ________________________________________________ ----------------------------G-I0. Survey of Korean and Chinese workers previously introduced in groups and prisoners of war among
regularly employed workers in factories and mines, Japan proper, 30 June 1944. ___________________ _
G-ll. Students mobilized for work by school and type of work, Japan proper, October 1944, February 1945, and
July 1945 _______________________________ , __________________
C-12. Index of employment and earnings of factory and mine workers in establishments not owned by Government, Japan proper, monthly, 1940-45 ___ - -- --- - - - -- - -- - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - -- - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -G-13. Industrial employment and productive man hours in 45 urban areas, Japan proper, monthly, October 1943Allgust 1945 __________________________________________________ -----------------------------G-14. Acti ve strength of the Japanese armed forces, 1930-45 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -G-15. Estimated movement of farm labor to industry, July 1937-February 1944 ___________________________ _
G-16, Coking coal imports into Japan proper, and percentage, by source, 1940-45_ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -C-17. Iron ore imports into Japan proper, by source, 1931-45 ___________________________________________ _
G-18, Iron ore, iwn sands, and pyrite sinters supply in Japan proper, 1931-45 ___ - - - - - - -- - - ---- - - - - - - - - - ---C-19. Pig iron imports into Japan proper, and percentage, by source, 1931-45 _____________________________ _
G-20. Scrap steel and iron supply, consumption, and stock piles, Japan proper, 1931-45 ____________________ _
G-21. Ingot steel production by type, Japan proper, Korea, and Manchukuo, fiscal years, 1931-45 ___________ _
G-22. Finished steel production, Japan proper, Korea, and Manchukuo, fiscal years 1931-45_ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -G-23. Rolled steel production, by product, Japan proper, 1935-45 ________________________________________ _
C-24. Finished steel distribution Japan proper, fiscal years 1937-45 ______________________________________ _
G-25. Finished steel, balance of ~upplY and demand in Japan 'proper, fiscal years, 1932-45_ - - - - - - - - - -- - -- - --G-26. Production of ferro-alloy ores, Japan proper, 1931-45 _______ - - -- - --- -- --- -- - - - - - -- --- --- - - -- - - - - --C-27. Imports of ferro-alloy ores, concentrates, and metals, by source and type, Japan pro~er, 1931-45 _______ _
--------------------------~-----

98
99
100
100

101
102
102

103
103
104

104
106
[07
107

107
108
109
110

111
111
112
113
115

116
117
117
118

,_

Tabl,

C-28.
C-29.
C-30.
C-3!.

Production of ferro-alloys, Japan proper, 1931-45 __________ . _________________________ ~ _______ ~ ___ _

Summary of supply of primary aluminum in Japan proper, Korea, and Formosa, 1933-45 _____________ _
Annual imports of bauxite to Japan proper and Formosa, by region of origin, 1935-45 ________________ _
Imports of North China aluminous shale into Japan proper and Korea, annually 1935-45, monthly
1942-45 ___________________________________________________________________________________ _

C-32. Stocks of bauxite aluminous shale, alumina, and primary aluminum ingot in Japan proper, Formosa, and
Korea, 1941-45 _______________________________________________________________________ ~ ____ _
C-33.
C-34.
C-35.
C-36.
C-37.
C-38.
C- 39.
C-'40.
C-4!.
C-42.
C-43.
C-44.
C-45.

Allotment of primary aluminum to allocation categories, by quarters, 1942-45 _______________________'_

Summary of Japan's magnesium capacity and supply, fiscal years, 1935-45 __________________________ _
Summary of copper refining capacity, and of supply in Japan proper, fiscal years 1935-45 _____________ _
Imports of copper ore and ore concentrates, by country of origin, Japan propet, fiscal years 1941-44 ____ _
Stocks of refined copper, Japan proper, 1941-45 _____________________________ ~ ____________________ _
Imports of electrolytic copper by country of origin, Japan proper, fiscal years 1935-44 ________________ _
Summary of Japanese total lead-producing capacity and Bupply, by fiscal years 1935-45 _______________ _
Summary of Japanese zinc capacity and supply, fiscal yellors 1935-45 ________________________ ~ _______ _
Summary of total Japanese tin-producing capacity and supply, fiscal years 1935-45 __________________ _
Summary of the coal position in Japan proper, fiscal years 1931-45 __________________________ .. _____ _
Coal production, fiscal years 1938-44 ___________________________________________________________ _
Coal imports into Japan proper, by source, fiscal years 1939-45 ____________________________________ _
Consumption of coif! in Japan proper, by industries, excluding consumption by coal mines, fiscal years
1933-45 _____________________ , _____________________________________________________________ _

Page

120
120
121
121
121
122
122
123
124
124
124
125
127
128128
129
129

130
C-46. Consumption of coal in Japan proper, by industries, excluding consumption by coal mines, in percentages
of total consumption, fiscal years 1933-45 __________ c __________________________________________ _
131
C-47. Interisland movement of coal to Honshu, by source and type of transportation, fiscal years 1941-45 ___ _
132
C-48. Coal mining l~bor force, production, and output per employee per year, in Japan proper, Great Britain,
and the Umted States, 1941-45 ___________________'_______________________________ ~ ___________ _
133
C-49. Production, consumption, and imports of liquid fuels and lubricating oil, inner zone, 1931-45 _________ _
134
C-50. Japanese imports, production, and inventories of crude oil, inner zone, 1931-45 ______________________ _
135
C-5!. Japanese imports of crude and refined oils inner zone 1931-44 ____ '
,
135
C-52. Japanese consumption of liquid fuels and 'lubricants 'inner zone 1931.::45---------------------------136
C-53. Japanese inventories of liquid fuels and lubricants, inner zone, i931-45 __ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~:~~~:::::
138
C-54. Japanese production of refined oils, by type, inner zone, 1931-45 (in three parts) _____________________ _
140
C-55. Japanese production of synthetic oil, inner zone, 1937-45 __ : _______________________________________ _
143
C-56. Production of lubricating oil from rubber, Japan proper, 1943-44- __________________________________ _
144
C-57. Production of explosives, Japan proper, 1931-45 __________________________________________________ _
145
C-58. Organic high e"!;'losives production in Japan and the United States, 1940-45 _________________________ _
'145
C-59. Process efficiency in explosives production in Japan and the United States, 1944 ______________________ _
145
C-60. Production, imports, and distribution of.salt, Japan proper, 1931-45 ________________________________ _
C-61. Production of chemical fertilizers in Japan, 1937-44 ______________________________________________ _ 146
146
C-62. Nitrogen balance, Japan proper, 1940-45 _____ : __ ____ _ ___ ____ _____
__
'
147
C-63. Production and distribution of ammonia, Japan proper and Korea, 193-1~5~~~~:~~~~~~~~~:::~~::~:~~~:
149
C-64. Production and distribution of nitric acid, Japan proper, Korea, and Manchuria, 1931-45 _____________ _
150
C-65. Consumption of crude rubber in Japan, 1931-45 __________________________________________________ _
152
C- 66. Synthetic rubber production in Japan proper, 1941-45 ____________________________________________ _
153
C-67. Production and consumption of calcium carbide in Japan proper, 1930-45 ___________________________ _
154
C-68. Production and consumption of superphosphates in Japan proper, 1940-45 __________________________ _
155
C- 69. Production and consumption of carbon disulfide in Japan proper, 1940-45 ___________________________ _
155
C-70. Japanese production, exports, and imports of refined naphthalene, 1940-45 __________________________ _
156
C-71. Production, imports, and exports of acetone in Japan prop"er, 1940-45 _______________________________ _
156
C-72. Production and imports of butanol in Japan proper, 1940-45 _______________________________________ _
157
C-73. Production and imports of glycerine in Japan proper, 1940-45 _____________________________________ _
157
C-74. Japanese imports of phosphorite, by source, 1935-44 ______________________________________________ _
157
C-75. Production, imports, and exports of ammonium sulfate and calcium cyanamide, Japan proper, 1940-45 __ _
158
C-76. Production, consumption, exports, and imports of caustic soda, Japan proper, 1931-45 ________________ _
159
C-77. Production and consumption of chlorine in Japan proper, 1931-45 __________________________________ ..
160
C-78. Produ~tion of sulfuric acid, Japan proper, 1931-45 ____________________________ '____________________ _
162
C-79. Production of tetraethyl lead in Japan, 1940-45 __ ~ _____________________________________________ _
163
C-80. Production and distribution of toluol, Japan proper, 1931-45 __________________________________ ~ ___ ~
164
C-81. Production and consumption of organic glass in Japan, 1937-45_,___________________________________ _
165
C-82. Production ~nd distdbution of methanol in Japan proper and Korea, 1931-45 _______________________ _
167

vi

1'ablt

C-83.
C-84.
'C-85.
C-86.
C-87.
C-88.
C-89.
C-90.
C-91.
C-92.
C-93.
C-94.
C-95.
C-96.
C-97.
C-98.
C-99.
C-lOO.
C-101.
C-102.
C-103.
C-104.
C-105.
C-106.
C-107.
C-108.
C-I09.
C-llO.
G-1l1.
C-112.
C-113.
C-114.
C-1l5.
C-116.
C-117.
C-118.
C-1l9.
C-120.
C-121.
C-122.
C-123.
C-124.
C- 125.
C-126.
C-127.
C-128.
C-129.
C-130.
C-131.
C-132.
C-133.
C-134.
C-135.
C-136.
C-137.
C-138.
C-139.
C-140.
C-141.
C-142.

Page

Production and consumption of ethyl alcohol in Japan, 1941-45 ____________________________________ _

168
Production and consumption of soda ash in Japan proper, 1935-45 __________ ______________________ _
169
Production, imports, and exports of vegetable and animal fats and oils for Japan, 1938-45 _____________ _
170
Production and consumption of sodium cyanide in Japan proper, 1940-45 ___________________________ _
170
Production and distribution of benzol,'Japan proper, 1940-45 ______________________________________ _
171
Production of rayon pulp in Japan proper, 1930-44 ___________ ,____________________________________ _
171
Production of oxygen in Japan proper, 1942-45 __________________________________________________ _
172
Electric power generation by public utility and railway plants, Japan proper, 1914-45 ________________ _
172
Japan home island electric generating capacity ___________________________________________________ _
173
Length of Japanese government railroad lines as of October 11,1945________________________________ _
173
Private railway and tramway companies, October 1945 ____________________________________________ _
174
Freight cars of the Japanese railroads ___________________________________________________________ _
174
Locomotives of the Japanese railroads __________________________________________________________ _
174
Tonnage and ton-miles of the Japanese railroads _________________________________________________ _
175
Tonnage of the prIncipal commodities carried on the Japanese railroads, 1936--45 _____________________ _
175
Average lengtn of haul and freight __________ c ___________________________________________________ _
175
Japanese merchant marine (excluding tankers) during the war (combined army-navy-civilian fleets) _____ _
176
Annual construction of four main categories of steel merchant ships in Japanese shipyards, 1931-41 _____ _
180
Japanese merchant fleet as of Pearl Harbor Day __________________________________________________ _
180
Japanese merchant ship construction during the war ______________________________________________ _
180
Wartime history of Japanese tanker fleet ________________________________________________________ _
183
Japanese merchant marine at the end of the war ____________________________ c ____________________ _
184
Foreign trade of Japan, 1900-43 ________________________________________________________________ _
186
Japanese imports of bulk commodities, 1940-45 __________________________________________________ _
187
Quantity and value of Japanese imports of selected commodities, 1936-43 ___________________________ _
188
Japanese imports of coal, 1940-45 ______________________________________________________________ _
189
Japanese imports of iron ore, 1940-45 _______________________' ____________________________________ _
189
Japanese imports of bauxite, 1940-45 __________________________________________________________ -190
Japanese imports of iron and steel, 1940-45 ________________________________________________ - _____ _
190
Japanese imports of scrap iron, 1940-45 _________________________________________________________ _
191
Japanese imports of lead, 1940-45 ______________________________________________________________ _
191
Japanese imports of tin, 1940-45 __________________________________________ ,_____________________ _ ,192
Japanese imports of zinc, 1940-45 ______________________________________________________________ _
192
Japanese imports of phosphorite and phosphate, 1940-45 __________________________________________ _
193
Japanese imports of dolomite and magnesite, 1940-45 _____________________________________________ _
193
Japanese imports of salt, 1940-45 ______________________________________________________________ _
194
Japanese imports of soybean cake, 1940-45 ______________________________________________________ _
194
Japanese imports of soybeans, 1940-45 __________________________________________________________ _
195
Japanese imports of rice and paddy, 1940-45 ________________________________________________,-- ___ _
195
Japanese imports of other grains and flours, 1940-45 ______________________________________________ _
196
Japanese imports of raw rubber, 1940-45 ________________________________________________________ _
196
Production of electrical equipment, Japan proper, 1935-45 ___ ~ _____________________________________ _
197
Exports of electrical equipment, Japan proper, 1937-43 _____________,______________________________ _
197
Imports of electrical equipment, Japan proper, 1937-43 ___________________________________________ _
197
Estimated construction volume in Japan proper, 1937-45 __________________________________________ :
198
Volume of Japanese army construction, 1937-45 __________________________________________________ _
198
Estimated volume of Japanese navy construction in Japan proper and overseas, 1937-45 ________________ _
198
Estimated ;volume of nonmilitary construction in Japan proper, 1937-45 ______________________________ _
199
Pl'9duction of principal building materials in Japan proper, 1937-45 ________________________________ _
199
Adjusted capacity rating of cement mills in Japan proper, 1941-45 _________________________________ _
199
Estimated consumption of cement by principal recipients in Japan proper, 1940-45 ____________ . ______ _
199
Production of cement in principal overseas areas under Japanese control annually, 1937- 44- _____________ _
200
Exports of Japanese cement, 1940-45 ________________________________________________ - ____ - -- _- - -200
200
Ordinary rolled stool consumed by army and navy for construction purposes in Japan proper, 1937-45 _____ _
Production, imports, and exports oflumber, Japan proper, 1937-44 _________ ~ _________________________ _
200
Consumption of lumber by principal uses in Japan proper, 1943-44 _________________________________ _
200
Japanese machine-building industry, annual production, Japan proper, 1936-45 ________ .. _____________ _ 201
Output, import, export, and domestic sales of machine tools and productive machinery __________________ _
201
Expansion of Japanese machine tool industry, Japan proper, 11l40-45 _______________________________ _ 201
Japanese national inventory of m!chine tools ____________________________ , _______________________ _
202

vii,

If

I
Table

I.

Pa

203
C-143. Japanese munitions output. __________________________________________________________ _
205
C-144. Monthly indices of Japanese munitions production, based on 1945 'prices, 1941-45 (fiscal years) _________ _
206
C-145. Japanese merchant ship yen value input (\1 1,000), 1941-45, fiscal year 1941. __________________________ _
208
C-146. Japanese merchant ship index of yen value input (1941 = 100), 1941-45, fiscal year 1941. ________________ _
210
C-147. Value of Japanese aircraft production, monthly 1941-45, in 1945 prices (1 ,000,0(0) , completed aircraft __
210
C-148. Value of Japanese naval vessels production, monthly, by fiscal year, 1941-45 ___________________ . ___ _
212
C-149. Monthly indices of Japanese naval ship production, by fi"cal year, 1941-45 __________________________ _
214
C-150. Delivered tonnage and number of ships, Japanese Navy, by fiscal year, 1931-45 ______________________ _
215
C- 151. Construction of important Japanese fleet units ___________________________________________________ _
216
C-152. Value of Japanese army and navy ammunition production, monthly, 1941-45, in 1945 prices (Y1,OOO,OOO) __
216
C-153. Japanese Army ordnance production by years, 1931-45 ______________________.__ .. __________________ _
217
C-l54. Japanese ordnance production by years, 1931-45 ______________ . _________________________________ _
218
C-155. Japanese Naval ordnance, over-all indices of output, 1931-45 ______________________________________ _
220
C-156. Japanese war materiel on hand, 1941-45 _______________________________________________________ _
220
C-157. Japanese production and imports of motor vehicles. by type 1936-41. ______________________________ _
220
C-158. Japanese planned and actual production of two- and four-ton trucks, 1940--45 ____________ ~ ___________ _
220
C- 159. Value of output of the Japanese motor vehicle industry in 1945 prices, monthly, 1941-45 (fiscal years) __ _
C-160. Monthly index of value of output of the Japanese motor vehicle industry, based on 1945 prices, 1941-45
(fiscal years) _______________________________________________________________________________ _ 220
221
C-161. Production of tanks.,and combat vehicles in Japan proper, 1931-45 _________________________________ _
C-162. Japanese aircraft production, all types, by months, January 1941 to August 1945 _____________________ _
222
C-163. Index numbers of Japanese aircraft production, airframe weight, and numbers of aircraft by month, January 1941-July 1945 _______________________________ c _______ , ________________________________ _
222
222
C-164. Japanese aircraft production by functional types, by quarters, 1941-4.5 _______________________________
223
C-l65. Percentage distribution of Japanese aircraft production, by functional types, by quarters, 1941-45 _____ _
223
C-166. Iudexes of quantities of selected goods available for civilian consumption in Japan proper, 1937-45 _____ _
C-167. Index of official retail prices in Tokyo, selected groups of consumer goods, annually 1930--39, monthly
1940--45 _______________ -____________________________________________________________________ _
22~
C-168. Prices of consumer goods on the black market, Japan proper, 1943-45 ____________________ . _________ _
225
Wholesale
prices
in
Tokyo
(Oriental
Economist
Index)
____________________________________________
_
C-169.
226
C-170. Index of salaried workers' living costs in Japan proper, 1937-44 ____________________________________ _
226
C-17l. Index of workers' living cost, Japan proper and Tokyo, 1937- 45 ____________________________________ _
227
C-172. Monthly index of factory workers' wages, Japan proper, 1937-44 ___________________________________ _
228
C-173. Monthly index of transport workers' wages, Japan proper. 1937-44 _________________________________ _
229
C-174. Monthly index of miners' wages, Japan proper, 1937-44 ___________________________________________ _
229
C-175. Consumption of staple food by coal millers and their families and its effect upon coal output, Japan proper,
1931-45_ _ __ _ __ __ _ _ __ __ _ ____ .______________________________________________________________ _
229
C-176. Imports of major textile raw materials, Japan proper, 1935--45 _____________________________________ _
230
C-l77. Civilian production, imports, exports, and amounts of textile cloth available for consumption, Japan proper,
1935--44 ___________________________________________________________________________________ _ 230
C-178. Production of cloth, Japan proper, 1935-45 ______________________________________________________ _
230
C-179. Production, imports, exports, and stocks on hand of raw silk, Japan proper, 1935-45 __________________ _
230
C-180. Production, imports, exports, and stocks on hand of silk cloth, Japan proper, 1935--45 ____________ . ___ _
230
C-181. Miscellaneous silk statistics, Japan proper. 1935-45 _______________________________________________ _ 230
C-182. Production, imports, exports, and stocks on hand of raw cotton, Japan proper, 1935--45 _______________ _
231
(;-183. Production, imports, exports, and stocks on hand of cotton cloth, Japan proper, 1935--45 ______ . _______ _
231
C-184. Production, imports, exports, and stocks on hand of raw wool, Japan proper, 1935-45 _________________ _
232
C-185. Civilian stocks, production, and consumption of woolen cloth, Japan proper, 1935-45 _______ ~ _________ _
232
C-186. Production, imports, cxports, and stocks on hand of synthetic cloth, Japan proper, 1935--45 __________.__ ~
232
(;-187. Quantities of footwear produced for civilian consumption, Japan proper, 1935-45 ____ ~ ________________ _
233
C-188. Imports of furs, hides, skins, leather, and leather goods, Japan proper, 1935--45 _____________________ ~_
233
C-189. Exports of leather, leather goods, and fur, Japan proper, 1935--45 ____ ~ ___ ~ ________ ~ __ ~ ______________ _
233
C-190. Monthly production of hides and leather, Japan proper, 1935--45 ________ ~ __ ~ _________ ~ _ ~ ~ __________ _ 233
C-191. Imports and estimated consumption of crude rubber, Japan proper, 1931-45 _____ ~_~ _________ ~ _______ _
233
C-192. Rubber production, Japan proper, 1940-44. __________ ~ _______ ~ ____ ~ _____ ~ __________ ~ ____________ _
234
C-193. Production, imports, exports, and domestic consumption of pulp, Japan proper, 1936-45 ________ ~ __ ~ __ _
234
C-194. ProduCtion, imports, exports, and domestic consumption of all types of paper, Japan proper, 1935--45 ___ _
235
C-195, Supply, consumption, and exportation of staple foods, 1937-45 ____ ~ __ ~~ ________ .. ________ ~ __ ~ ___ ~ ___ _ , 235
C-196, Domestic production of principal foods, JILpan proper, 1931-45 __ ~ _______ ~ __________________________ _
236
C-197.' Expansion and contraction of arable land, .Japan proper, 1933-43 _____ ~ ________________________ ~ ~ ___ _
236

viii

Page
Table

0-198.
0-199.

0-200.
0-20l.
C-202.
0-203.
0-204.
0-205.

Total arable land, acreages in various crops, and total c~ltivated acreage (including double cropping),
Japan prQper, 1931-44 _______ - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - -- - - - - -- - ~- - -- - - - --- -- --- - --- -- - -- - - -- - - -- - - - - - -Per-acre yields of rice, wheat,barley, and naked barley, Japan proper, 1931-44 _______________________ _
Rice imports from Korea and Formosa, Japan proper, November 1944 to October 1945_ - -------------:
Net imports of sugat, Japan proper, 1931-45 _____ - - - --- - - --- --- - -- --- -- - -- - -- - ---- - - - -- -- - -- - - -- -Food stocks on hand at specified periods, Japan proper, 1931-45_ - - - - ---- - -- - -- -- - -- - -- - -- - - - ----- -Quantity of foods. allotted to the armed services, Japan proper, 1942-45 ___ ---- -- -- - - - - -- - --- - - -- - - --Production, imports, and consumption of marine products, Japan ~rope~, 1939-45 _____________________ ~
Proportions of food derived from production and imports, on a calorIC baSIS, Japan proper, 1931-40 average,
annually 1941-45 _______________________________________________ -----------------------------

714928-46--2

237
238
'238
238
238
238
239
239

ix

II

INTRODUCTION

The present volume attempts to gauge broadly

the effects of air power on the Japanese economic
potential and to appraise the role of our attack
against the Japanese war economy in the 4 years of
our struggle in the Pacific.
It is not so much a summary of individual
reports on specific branches of the Japanese
economy/ as an effort to present an integrated
account which describes the extent of Japan's
economic paralysis caused by our military operations and the role of the economic disaster in the
final outcome of the conflict.
To accomplish this task, the. economic components of the Japanese war potential had to be
viewed against the social and political background
of modern Japan. This is the subject matter of
the introductory chapter, which sketches briefly
the events which led Japan into war and summarizes the results of the Survey interrogations
concerning Japanese war plans and strategy. An
analysis of the Japanese economy in 1941 assesses
the initial economic position of Japan on which
she based her decision to enter the' war. The development, the up's and down's of the
Japanese war economy, is described in some
detail in chapter II. Analyzing systematically its
strength and weaknesses, the chapter pictures the
target which our air and naval forces were directed
to destroy.
The actual course of these destructive assaults.
is traced in chapter III, while chapter IV gives an
. account of the damages inflicted uppn the Japanese
economy.
Chapter V gives a short narrative of the final
stage of the war and tentatively delineates the
, For detailed information, consult tbe reports prepared by the industrial
dlvlsloIll! 01 the United SlateB Strategic Bombing Survey.

role which air power, the destruction of the enemy's

economy, and other factors played in forcing
Japanese surrender.
The considerations underlying our target selection during the war are examined iIi the sixth and
concluding chapter in the light of the information
secured by the Survey in Japan. The conclusions
drawn point to some lessons which may be of use
for the formulation of the futl!-I'e military policy of
the United States.
Three appendices contain material which was
deemed unsuitable for inclusion in the report but
which may prove valuable to workers in the field
of Japanese economic intelligence:
A. Allied economic intelligence: Analysis and
comparison.
B. Gross national product of Japan and its
components.
C. Statistical sources.
This report is the result of collective work undertaken by the Over-all Economic Effects Staff of
the United States Strategic Bombing Survey
(Pacific). In their research, the members of the
staff relied heavily on other divisions of the Survey.
It may be appropriate, however, to list the following, who carried the major responsibility for the
completion of this volume:
Mr. Milton Gilbert, Chief, Over-all Economic
Effects Staff.
Mr. Paul A. Baran, deputy chief.
Mr. Thomas A. Bisson.
Lt. Russell Dorr, USNR.
1st Lt. Seymour J. Wenner and Sgt. Walter E.
Sanford, Jr., responsible for appendix A.
Mr. Lawrence Bridge, responsible for appendix

B.
Mr. Jerome Stoner, responsible for appendix C.

CONCLUSIONS
ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE STRATEGIC BOMBING OF JAPAN
By July 1945 Japan's economic system had
been shattered. Production of civilian goods was
below the level of subsistence; Munitions output
had been curtailed to less than half the wartime
peak, a level that could not support sustained
military operations aWlinst our opposing forces.
The economic basis of Japanese resistance had
been destroyed.
This economic decay resulted from the sea-air
blockade of the Japanese home islands and direct
bombing attacks on industrial and urban-area
targets.
The contribution of the blockade was to deny
Japan access to vital raw materials on the mainland and in the South Pacific area. Japan's dependence on these sources was crucial in the case
of oil, bauxite, iron ore, coking coal, salt, and, to a
lesser extent, foodstuffs. Heavy merchant ship
losses began to cut raw material imports as early
as 1943. As the blockade was tightened by submarines, the mining program, and airpower imports were almost completely stopped. Munitions
production reached its peak in the fall of 1944;
thereafter output began to decline, due to the
shortage of raw materials. Thus, before the largescale bombing of iapan was initiated, the raw
material base of Japanese industry was effectively
undermined. An accelerated decline of armament
production was inevitable.
The program was transformed from one of slow
strangulation to a relatively quick knock-out by
strategic bombing. It was initiated in November
1944, though the main weight of the attack came
between the months of March and August 1945.
The precision attacks on industrial targets were
of major Q.onsequence in the case of the aircraft
industry. The decli~e in aircraft output initiated
by lack of essential raw materials, was greatly
accelerated by the bombing attacks which caused
severe damage to production facilities and necessitated the dispersal program. In addition, a
2

carrier plane strike on the Hokkaido-Honshu rail

ferries virtually severed this transportation artery.
Other precision attacks, in which oil refineries and
arsenals were the major targets, accomplished a
considerable amount of physical destruction, but
had less effect upon production either because
material shortages had already created so much
excess capacity or because plants were aIieady
idle, due to dispersal.
The urban-area incendiary raids had profound
repercussions on civilian morale and Japan's will
to stay in the war. Sixty-six cities, virtually all
those of econom.ic s gnificance, were subjected to
bombing raids and suffered destruction ranging
from 25 to 90 percent. Almost 50 percent of the
area of these cities was leveled. The area raids
interrupted the normal processes of city life to an
extent that interfered seriously with such production as the shrinking raw material base still
permitted. Destruction of living quarters, disruption of food distribution, and curtailment of
public services resulted in the migration of a large
part of the urban population, thus increasing
absenteeism and inefficiency to paralyzing proportions. So concentrated were the attacks, both
in weight and time, that they overwhelmed
Japan's resources for organiziflg either defense or
recuperation. The economic disintegration caused
by the blockade was finished by the bombers.
The influence of the bomber offensive was not
solely dependent on t~e volume of .trms it may
have denied t:> .Japanese military forces. Japan's
production of munitions, at its peak, was only
about 10 percent of United States output. With
about one-third of its mobilized strength deployed
in the Pacific, the United Stat!lS had decisive
superiority. Ait, sea, and ground engagements
preceding the bombardment of the home islands,
had sealed Japan's doom. American armed
forces could have gone on to Tokyo at great cost
in American lives, even had there been no attack
on Japan's industrial structure. Blockade and
bombing together deprived Japanese forces of
about 4 months' munitions production. That

production could have made a substantial difference in Japan's ability to cause us losses had we
invaded but could not have affected the outcome
of the war.
It was the timing and the manner of surrender
which was largely influenced by 4llied air supremacy in Japanese skies. The bombing offensive
was the major factor which secured agreement to
unconditional surrender without an invasion of
the home islands-an invasion that would have
cost tens of thousands of American lives. The
demonstrated strength of the United States in the
B-29 attacks contra,sted with Japan's lack of
adequate defense made clear to the Japanese
people and to the government the futility of further
resistance. This was reinforced by the evident
deterioration of the Japanese economy and the
impact it was having on a large segment of the
population. The atomic bomb and Russia's entry
into the war speeded the process of surrender
already realized as the only possible outcome.

The effectiveness of strategic air attack was

limited by the concepts of its mission. Had the
purpose,?of strategic air attack been primarily to
force an independent decision rather than to
support a ground force invasion in November 1945,
there would have been no occasion to attack oil,
tetraethyllead, arsenals or, after March, aircraft.
Effort could have been concentrated against food
and fuel supply by attack on internal transportation and against urban areas, thus striking solely
at . the main elements upon which continued
Japanese resistance was based. Moreover, a part
of the bombing effort merely duplicated results
already achieved by blockade. Attack on the rail
transportation. system would have secured full
coordination with the blockade program. The
railroads were overburdened, defenseless, and had
only limited ability to ~eplace rolling stock or
major installations. This target system was
about .to be exploited by the AAF as the war
ended; it could have been given an earlier priority
with distinct advantage.

Chapter I

THE ROAD TO PEARL HARBOR

THE POLITICAL SETTING

...

Even a fleeting appraisal of the Japanese war

potential raises immediately the question' of the
rationale behind Japan's decision to initiate
hostilities with the United States. The dividing
line between erroneous calculations and adventurous irrationality in the conduct of national
affairs is always difficult to draw. Considering
retrospectively the policies which ultimately led
Japan to the catastrophe of 7 December, it would
be tempting to dismiss them summarily as expansionist megalomania of the Japanese war lords
and to abandon all search for a rational scheme
which could have guided the Japanese military
and economic planners.
.
Yet such an attitude would be wholly inappropria~e. It would render an understanding of
Japan's strategy impossible and would obscure
the nature- of the enemy whom we were fighting
for almost 4 years. That grave mistakes were
committed by the rulers of Japan during the last
15 years is beyond doubt. That the gravest of
these mistakes was the war against the United
States can also be regarded as demonstrated.
Nevertheless it was not "insanity" which drove
them into disaster, nor can the fault be attributed
solely to specific individuals in responsibilityit was a considered national policy whose pitfalls,
however, were insufficiently appreciated-whose
chances of suCCess were inadequately gauged.

THE ROOTS OF EXPANSIONISM

The origins of Japanese expansioIusm" date as
far back as the days of the Meiji restoration.
It was in this turbulent period of industrial
revolution that the poliUical structure of the
Japanese society -was adjusted to the necessities
of its economic growth. 'fhe terms of this adjustment were all-important. They did not involve
a complete breaking of the feudal grip on the
country, nor did they destroy in any essential
sense the position of the landed gentry. Japan
went the "Prussian way". Its newly emerging

captains of industry compromised with the traditional feudal ruling classes. Having secured most
of the institutional reforms needed for an unhampered development of a modern capitalist
economy, they conceded to the feudal overlordsbig and small-a practically unlimited control
over the armed forces and a dominant position
in the national administration.
The result of this arrangement was a UItique
system of "checks and balances" which transformed national policy into a p~cess of permanent
bargaining between the old and the new controlling
interests. The imperial institution became the
unifying factor in the struggle of opposing forces.
While each decision was a complicated deal concluded by shrewd political "wire-pullers", it was
presented to the nation as the sovereign will of the
imperial throne, beyond debate and above criti-
cism. The elevation of the Tenno to the status
of divinity, the stress placed on his impartiality,
his independence of all pressure and interest
groups, created in him a national symbol which
lent stability and authority to a government
frequently torn by internal strife.
In the midst of clashing interests, of deeply
rooted political and economic conflicts, there was,
however, one objective which-for different
re1tsons-commanded unqualified enthusiasm on
the part of both the rising industrial class and the
older military and bureaucratic ruling group receiving favorable acceptance on the part of the
population as a whole. This common goal was
Japanese aggrandizement through foreign expansion, leading to a dominant position in the Asiatic
family of nations.
The pressure in this direction was enormous.
The overpopulation of Japan .had reached disturbing proportions. The paucity of domestic
. resources seemed to presen t rigid limits to the
growth of output and income. Cultivation of
industrial skills and fostering of industries which
would import raW materials and export processed
goods appeared to be the only outlet for economic
5

energies and the only way to prevent a continuous

deterioration of the already low standard of
living. To the industrial interests of Japan, the
control of raw materials sources and the acquisition of exportmaIkets appeared thus to bean
essential condition fOI the country's economic
.prosperity.
The military rulers of Japan readily concurred
in this concept of foreign expansion. It warranted the maintenance of a large military
establishment; it provided the basis for the political power of the military camarilla; it moved
the leadership of the army and navy into the
center of the political scene.
The spectacular success in the Sino-Japanese
war, which secured for Japan the profitable
control of Formosa and Korea, and the even
mor~ impressive victory over Russia in 1905,
seemed to prove the fundamental soundness of
this national policy. Within a few decades
Japan became a world power, 100I1'.ing large in
the economic and politiral struggles of the Far
East.
A certain set-back was suffered in. connection
with the First World War. Although the eco)lomic prosperity enjoyed during the war was
substantial, and the increase of international
prestige was encouraging, the direct advantages
secured by Japan at Versailles were disappointing.
Neither important territorial acquisitions nor
significant economic concessions resulted from
adherance to the side of the victors.
This outcome of the war left a deeply rooted
grudge in the Japanese ruling group. Very
similar to Italian sentiments in the early 20's,
the reparation of the "wrongs" endured at Versailles remained an underlying motive of Japanese
foreign policy in the following two decades.
Not that it changed by any means the course of
Japan's national policy. On the contrary it accentuated the century-old trend toward aggrandizement and econorr.ic expansion and lent this
drive the additional stimulus of moral indignation.
This expansionist ideology was largely confined,
however, to the upper "policy making" strata of
Japanese society. It was not until the great
depression that foreign expansionism assumed
the proportions of a popular movement. In this
sens~, the early 30's may be regarded as one of
the important turning points in Japan's history.
The .severe economic dislocation caused by the
world crisis awakened the Japanese middle

classes, particularly the army officers recruited

in the main from the countryside, to the necessity
of some radical action which would open a way
out of their economic plight. Faced with the
danger of rapid pauperization and unable to see
any prospect of a positive solution of the structural problems of the Japanese economic and
social order, the young and energetic elements
in Japanese society turned to the traditional
panacea for all domestic ills-to foreign adventure.
It is a matter of definition whether the movement which developed in these years and which
culminated in the May 1932 assassination of
Premier Inukai should be properly called fascism.
There are striking similarities with fascism, particularly the Italian brand, but also significant
differences. The ideas of Hitler and Mussolini
certainly contributed much to its ideological
arsenal. Its aims and methods in the field of'
foreign relations could readily have been laid
down by Ribbentrop or Ciano. It was in their
domestic position, however, that the Japanese
. nationalists differed vastly from their European
forerunners: Although perhaps for the first time
in 60 years large numbers of Japanese citizens
transcended clique politics and tried to take active
part in the formulation of national policy, although
it may be 'approximately correct to speak of
popular support of the aggressive elements in the
officers corps, the m.ilitarists and nationalists who
moved into the center of Japan's political events
in 1931 had no organized mass support in the
fascist sense of the word.
.
An overthrow of the government and establishment of a fascist dictatorship was thus impossible.
The ascendance to power of the radical elements
was, consequently, the result of a compromise
with the traditional powers. While the army conducted an aggressive expansioni'st policy, big
business, powerfully entrenched in national councils, and-the old-line politicall~aders were assured
of continuing control in domestic affairs.
The Emperor once more became the "common
denominator." His immense popular standing
sustained the new combination just as it sustained
the previous ones. The radical elements were to
a large extent "tamed" and integrated into the
traditional stream of Japanese politics. What
Hindenburg and Victor Emmanuel were unable to
attain with respect to Hitler and Mussolini-to
canalize them into the mold of "normal" bargaining-the Tenno achieved without too much

difficulty. Unlike Hindenburg or Victor Emmanuel, he could not be pushed aside. In Japan, the
approval by the Emperor meant mass approval,
the support by the Imperial Household meant
support by the broad strata of the population
living in the ideology of Shintoism, governed by
awe of the supreme ruler.
. The resulting political and legal continuity of
the Japanese Government was welcome to the
ruling classes of the country. The new forces
were again absorbed by the institutionalized spider
web of the various pressure and interest groups,
and were certain not to develop into a threat to
the existing social and economic order. As a
consequence, however, the drive for aggrandizement which was initiated by the newly arrived
nationalists was to a large extent deprived of its
original momentum and singleness of purpose.
Political steps to be taken, m.ilitary operations to
be prepared, economic measures to be embarked
upon-they all were subject to bargaining, to
pushing and pulling in secret chambers, to continuous struggles among competing cliques. Japan
reentered the scene of conquest as an undecided
aggressor, with a domestic political setting which'
made continuous' ambivalence the outstanding
characteristic of its strategy and tactics.

ANNEXATION OF MANCHURIA
The expedition to Manchuria was the first
enterprise, of the new ruling- coalition. Leaving
entirely apart the ideology surrounding that move,
forgetting about the professed goal to create a
"national-socialist" state in Manchukuo which
should inspire the old country as a shining example
of justice and prosperity-the rational reasons for
the Manchurian adventure were transparently
clear. Strategically, the domination of Manchuria"
was to provide Japan with a firm base on the
Asiatic continent. Whether for further operations ag~inst China or against Russia, it was to
be the indispensable staging area for air power,
troops, and supplies. The economic resources of
the country promised to render it, fairly soon,
the arsenal of Japanese expansionism. Sizable
supplies of coal, steel, and nonferrous metals were
expected to be the rich reward of investment.
The development of Manchurian industries was
to become an important outlet for the overflowing
Japanese labor market. At the same time, the
army hoped to acquire a stronghold whieh would
further strengthen its domestic position.

The international sit~ation was well fitted for

the coup. China 'was deeply torn by civil war.
Russia was in the midst of its first 5-year plan,
with its military and economic strength at a low
ebb. The' Western Powers, preoccupied with
domestic difficulties and unable to reach common
decisions on foreign policy, were "most unlikely to
oppose forcefully Japan's unilateral move.
Militarily and politically, the venture was an
easy victory. The occupation of Manchuria proceeded swiftly and without much fighting. A
puppet government was set up and met with little
opposition. The international complications, conspicuous as they were, hardly amounted to much.
The Kwantung army, the main echelon of the
militarist group, took over the country and
rapidly established its exclusive uomination.
Economically, however, the Manchurian experiment soon becaIDe a disappointment. The semifascist regime introduced by the Kwantung army
was not such as to encourage conservative-venture
capital. A closer examination of the Manchurian
investment opportunities disclosed at an early.
date that returns could only be expected after a
long stretch of time. A considerable amount of railroad construction, road building, and other essential improvements had to precede the economic
exploi'tation of the province. Japanese capitalists,
accustomed to relatively quick returns of international trade, were little inclined to sink substantial funds into long-range Manchurian projects.
What is most important, however, is that it soon
became evident that Japan had little surplus
capital available for overseas investment. The
rather common belief among Japanese economists
and political planners that Japan had reached the
stage pf capital-exporting imperialism and was in
need of outlets for foreign investment proved to
be a fallacy. What Japanese business wanted was
markets' for export articles and snpplies of cheap
raw materials rather than opportunities for longrange foreign developments. As a matter of fact,
they were looked upon unfavorably as a source of
potential competition.
Nor was the government itself in a position to
provide the necessary investment. Participating
only half heartedly in the aggressive undertakings
of its imperialist wing, influenced strongly by its
big-business and traditional bureaucratic components, the Tokyo cabinet did not pursue a
determined policy of economic expansion. The
first 5 years of Manchurian occupation thus hardly
7

i,

resulted in any significant economic advantages to

it apparent that it would be unable to withstand
Japan. Whatever was done was largely organized
a combination of domestic opposition and foreign
by the Kwantung army which, living off the land, . pressure. The reaction of the Great Powers
began developing its own supplies of military
toward Japan's Manchurian undertaking and
toward similar moves by Germany and Italy warequipment. Japanese big business moved very
reluctantly, if at all, into Manchurian industrial
ranted the assumption that no serious anti-Japaenterprises. Some entrepreneurs, like Aikawa and
nese action would be taken should Japan advance
his Nissan group, assumed the pioneer function.
further in its expansionist drive.
They were frowned upon by the banks and the
Thus, . as was confirmed by many Japanese
business community. Treated as newcomers and
officials interrogated by the Survey, the 1937
intruders, they found it increasingly difficult to
thrust into northern China was not expected to
finance their commitments and to secure the
develop into a major war. Those responsible for
necessary management, fixed capital, and materials.
national policy at the time were fully confident
Nonetheless, the Manchurian expedition lived
that the Chinese government would yield quickly
up to the political expectations of the radical
to Japan:s demands and adjust itself readily to
wing. The Kwantung army-and, correspondthe position of a Japanese puppet. A full miliingly, the army as a whole-became an increastary conquest of China was considered to be
ingly important factolo: in the determination of
neither necessary nor desirable. Troops were
Japan's national policy. The control of Mansent to China not to force a military decision but
churia placed at the disposal of the Army a mighty
to serve as symbols of Japanese power. N egotiapolitical machine and a vast system of patronage.
tions-or rather intimidations-were to accomIn addition to the direct beneficiaries of army rule
plish the rest.
over Manchuria, thousands of small businessmen,
While the motivations for the drive into China
traders, and dealers of all kinds, established themwere similar to the ones which led Japan into
selves under the wings of the military and fur- . Manchuria, the immediate interest of the army
was even more pronounced. A large contingent
nished powerful support to its claim to power.
Many a politician, originally cautious and doubtof the army was anxious to secure foreign" grazing
ful as to the wisdom of the expansionist drive, begrounds" which would provide a lavish "master
came swayed by the political advantages of close
race" existence. Once more large numbers of petty
cooperation with the army. The" political climerchants, importers, and exporters swarmed into
mate" in Tokyo became markedly influenced by
the newly acquired-territories, to form the political
the radicals and their numerous fellow travelers.
and economic machine of the high' command.
The slogan "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
The control of northern China became, thus, the
Sphere" became the ,official motto of Japan's nabasis of continuous well-being of a large strata of
tional policy. Outstanding representatives of the
politically influential and vociferous Japanese.
"old line" political leadership, like Prince Konoye,
The Chinese enterprise reached, however, an
associated themselves with leagues and commitimpasse at a very early stage. To lead the Chinese
tees whose aim was to prepare the ground for . campaign to a victorious conclusion was miliJapanese penetration of further territories selected
tarily-and what is more important-politically
for membership in the" Co-Prosperity' Sphere."
impossible. For a military domination of 400 milIt is significant, also, that the improvement of
lion Chinese--if such could at all be envisagedbusiness conditions in Japan, which was worldJapan had neither the manpower nor the
wide in years 1933-1937, was interpreted widely
material resources. Even if feasible, a military
as a direct result of the expansionist initiative.
subjugation of China would defeat its purpose.
Japan could not conceivably substitute its own
THE NEXT STOP: NORTHERN CHINA
administration for the Chiang Kai-shek regime,
By 1936 the stage was set for the next move.
which would have necessarily collapsed ~n the
The international situation was increasingly promcase of China's outright defeat. What Japan
ising from'the Japanese point of view. The
wanted was monopolization of Chinese marketsChinese civil war, dragging on for more than 10
a hostile, probably communist-dominated, and
years, rendered China militarily impotent. The
guerrilla-ridden China would hardly be an attracinstability of the Kuomintang government made
tive outlet for Japanese economic energies. The
8

only arrangement which would have assured success of the Japanese scheme would have been a
Chinese government sufficiently popular with the
masses and at the same time willing to cooperate
with the invader.
The striving for truch a solution determined
entirely Japan's strategy in the China war.
It never contemplated an all-out military effort
to crush Chinese resistance. It was much rather
a series of discontinuous blows intended to intimidate the Chungking government, each followed by a period of attempted or actual negotiations. Those negotiations proved unsuccessful
throughout. For domestic and partly international
reasons Chiang'S government refused to yield.
The creation of a puppet regime in Nanking
aggravated the situation. Powerless as it was,
it forced Chiang even more strongly into an
intransigent position. The China affair dragged
on without any prospect of a conclusion. .
At the same time, a withdrawal from China was
politically impossible. The political standing of
the army was predicated upon the maintenance of
the Chinese stronghold. The equilibrium of
political power in Japan was predicated upon the
standing of the army.

ENTRY INTO THE WORLD CONFLICT

I t was not until the outbreak of the European
war in September 1939 that there appeared some
hope of a settlement of the Chinese conflict, Not
only did the European conflagration divert the
Western Powers' attention from Far Eastern
events, but the po~sibility of. Chiang'S swinging
over to the victorious Axis combination was
regarded as considerable.
Under the circumstances, it was self-evident to
all groups of the ruling coalition that the European
conflict had to be used to further Japan's drive
for aggrandizement. Only the method and the
timing of the appropriate move were at issue.
The fall of France rendered French Indochina
the most convenient target. After having blackmailed the Vichy government into concessions
with respect to northern Indochina in September
1940, the Japanese proceeded to establish military
bases in southern Indochina by the" agreement"
concluded with Petain in July 1941.
Interrogation of Japanese officials and perusal
of documentary evidence show that this undertaking was again not expected to result in major
hostilities. The driving spirts behind it were

the radicals in the Japanese Navy, who regarded

the possession of ample sources of oil as essential
to the maintenance of Japan's power position in
the Pacific. The official explanation of the move
as aiming solely toward an improvement of
Japan's strategic position with r.espect to China
was clearly ingenuous. Singapore, Hong Kong,
and eventually the Dutch East Indies, were the
ultimate goals. Indochina was to provide the
necessary bases.
The forceful reaction in Washington came as a
surprise. Germany's attack and spectacular successes in Russia, the United States policy of aiding
both Britain and Russia in their struggle against
Germany and the extremely precarious position
of the United Kingdom made it, appear very
unlikely that Japan's move would be seriously
opposed. The freezing of Japanese assets ordered
by President Roosevelt and the ensuing stoppage
of American oil shipments to Japan exceeded by
far the extent of retaliatory measure anticipated
in Tokyo. The negotiations with the United
States which had been going. on for aconsiderable
tim'e, attained thus suddenly supreme urgency.
Lacking further oil imports, the Japanese Navy
began living on borrowed time. In the near
future (l-17t years) its oil stocks would be exhausted. The most important card in the hands
of Japan, the possibility of naval domination of
the Pacific, would be obliterated.
Thus, the Chinese impasse led to an impasse of
Japanese-American relations. An understanding
with the United States implied withdrawal from
Indochina. This became incompatible with the
prestige of the radical elements in the navy who,
jockeying for domestic power with the army,
could not afford to lose face in their first
major ~dertaking. The evacuation of northern
China-the other demand of the UIJited Statesconflicted with the interests of the even more
powerful army. The coalition of militarist and
conservative elements forming the basis of the
Japanese govemment wa!j unable to take a step
amounting practically to a political catastrophe
to its major and strongest component.
The ensuing months were filled with bargain~
and anxiety on all fronts. There is good reason
to believe that the conservative wing of the ruling
coalition was advocating a moderate cQurse toward the United States. Though it had indorsed
each move of its coalition partners, it hoped, at
each stage, that the current step would not be the

breaking point leading to war. It arranged and

concluded the tripartite pact with Germany and
Italy and hoped that the Western Powers would be
sufficiently impressed with the might and solidaritv
of the Axis to understand the futility of furth;r
resistance. It approved of the Indochina adventure, assuming that Japan would 'get away with
this act of aggression as easily as with the previous
ones.
When the freezing of Japanese assets and the
embargo faced Japan and made it necessary for
Japan "to fish or to cut bait," the political conservatives lost contrel of the situation. They
were unable to suggest a formula which would
satisfy Washington and at the same time be
acceptable to their intransigent partners in the
government. Though not opposed to war on
principle, they believed-.that the time was not yet
ripe. They want.ed to repeat the 1914-1916
performance and enter the war on the winning
side. That Germany and Italy were on the winning side did not yet appear to them as established.
In this appraisal of the military situatioIl the
conservatives differed from the radicals. The
spectacular successes of Germany in Poland, the
low countries, France, and particularly in Russia,
created among Japan's Nazi sympathizers the
myth of Germany's invincibility. The defeat of
Russia seemed only a matter of months in the fall
of 1941 and German victory over Russia was
believed tantamount to Axis victory in the war.
That Great Britain and the United States would
then, at last, recognize Germany's dominant
position in Europe was regarded as self-evident.
If Britain still refused to listen to reason, Germany
could then easily invade the isles and dictate its
terms in London.
Japan's policy had to be adjusted to such an
exigency.. While the ideological affinity of the
Japanese "expansionists" to Hitler and his movement was very important in cementing GermanJapanese collaboration, it also accounted for a
profound distrust of the German fellow-imperialists. Tokyo was acutely aware of the possibility
that Hitler might attempt to obtain a settlement
'with Great Britain and the U. S. at Japan's
expense. Germany's frequent offers to respect
and to proteQ,t the integrity of the British and the
Dutch empires were clearly contrary to Japan's
expansionist ambitions. To experience another
Versailles and to leave the coming peace conference
empty-handed was a distasteful prospect to
10

Japanese nationalists. This could be avoided

if, instead of depending on Hitler'~ good
graces, Japan would seize whatever territories it
wished to annex as its share of the future war
booty.
This line of reasoning was predicated upon expectation of an early German victory. Germany's
foreign minister von Ribbentrop and the Japanese
ambassador to Berlin, Oshima, did everything in
their power to bolster such hopes with optimistic
reports on the German-Russian war. While not
necessarily bent on war, the radical wing of the
Japanese government did not feel that Japan
needed to make any concessions under international condition,.s as favorable as those. They
certainly refused to consent to any agreement
which, by yielding on the Indochina or northern
China issues would jeopardize their domestic political standing. The conservative group played
its usual game. It hoped to the very last that
it would be able to secure everything which the
radicals demanded by skillful diplomacy. It
negotiated with the State Department, it suggested
conferences between the President and Prince
Konoye, it dispatched special envoys to Washington-it was unable, however, to devise a single
proposal which would meet to any extent the
American viewpoint and at the same time have a
chance with the radical, fascist wing of the
coalition.
The radicals took over when the decision to go
to war was finally reached. The Imperial Household accepted this decision .as it had accepted, .
previously, all de(:isions presented to it as the
outcome of bargaining between the various political factions. True to century-old tradition, the
formula adopted was announced as the best considered resolve of the Emperor himself. Whatever
the preceding struggles may have been, the 7th
of December was the day of unity between the
groups and cliques forming the Japanese ruling
coalition.
.
o~ly

JAPAN'S WAR PLAN

Japan's decision to go to war with the United
States and the war plan upon which it counted to
achieve its ob,iectives can be understood only in
the light of the background sketched above. The
tradition of success with limited commitments, thE>
imminence of Germany's victory on the European
Continent-these counted for more in the minds

tional situation, the "degeneracy" of American

of Japan's war planners than any careful balancing
democracy, and the demoralization of the United
of Nipponese and American war potentials.
States, which would follow disastrous defeat!! and
Above all, they biased the thinking of the high
vain attempts at a come-back, were expected to
command toward the notion that the war would
prevent Washington from continuing, very long,
not be a lengthy enterprise. Total war, annihilaa hopeless struggle.
tion of the enemy, and occupation of the United
Comparisons .of American and Japanese ecoStates never entered the planning of the Japanese
nomic potentials were drawn up but could be
military. One or two crucial battles were exreadily dismissed. What mattered was not supepected to determine the outcome of the conflict.
riority in the long run, but supremacy in the immeThe Pacific war was to follow the .pattern set by
diate future. Even if the American capacity to
the Russian-Japanese hostilities in 1905. A terproduce the sinews of war was many times larger
rific blow at Pearl-Harbor would inflict a disastrous
than that of Japan, it would 'be too long before
Cannae on the American Pacific fleet. Combined
that capacity could playa role in the impending
with Russia's defeat and England's inevitable
conflict. By the time the United States would
doom this would assure American willingness to
be able to develop and deploy its war potential,
enter 'peace negotiations. A settlement satisfying
the
international factors would have decided the
most Japanese d~mands would be in sight within
war in Japan's favor.
6 months.
For the bold stroke scheduled for 7 December,
A less exuberant appraisal )f the war prospects
Japan had the military wherewithall. The immeanticipated a somewhat lengthier struggle but was
diately deployable striking force on land, at sea,
equally confident as to its ultimate success. By
and in the air was fonnidable, assuring the success
the surprise attack on 7 December, Japan would
deprive the United States of a major part of its. "of the initial operation. This operation was ex-.
pected to detennine the outcome of the war.
naval strength. The supremacy in the Pacific
This was the only kind of war Japan was able
gained thereby would be used to occupy the
to fight. The national economy was just strong
strategically important Pacific islands,and to
enough for a commitment of this magnitude. It
establish a "Pacific wall," impregnable to all
certainly could not support anything larger.
American attacks. This chain, properly fortified,
would be indefinitely defended. Japan's war
THE ECONOMIC POTENTIAL
potential was regarded as sufficient to sustain
such a 'defensive operation. The impossibility of
Although, in the first 5 years, the possession of v
breaking through the system of Japanese island
Manchuria contributed but little to Japan's ecodefenses would soon become obvious to the
nomic and military potential, the indirect repreUnited States. After some unsuccessful attempts
cussions of the expansionist initiative were very
to force a military decision, the United States
considerable. Japan was suddenly thrown into a
would be willing to consider a compromise agreestate of national emergency, and the economic life
ment. In return for an unconditional recognition
of the country soon felt the impact of the mobilizaof the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere"
tion effort.
and the American acquiescence to some territorial
The government embarked upon a large armaannexations, Japan would be prepared to restore
ment program. An increasing part of the budget
some of its initial conquests.
was earmarked for military purposes, and a fiscal
The early successes in the South Pacific were
deficit lifted the economic system rapidly to high
expected to strengthen Japan immensely for the
levels of output and income. Similar to what
possible American siege of the" defensive perimetook place almost simultaneously in Hitler's
ter." Raw materials in short supply, particularly
Germany, the prosperity thus attained determined
oil and bauxite, would be obtainable inlarge quanto a large extent the course of the country's
tities from the southern resources area. The
national policy. It cemented firmly the union
Japanese navy would not have to fear exhaustion
between the conservative, big business wing of
of its meager oil reserves. A genuine war of attriJapan's
political life and the aggressive, radical
tion, in which the United States would turn the
elements of the army and navy. It imbued the
tables and stage an all-out offensive against Japan
ruling coalition with a strong awareness of Japan's
proper, was considered unlikely. The interna11

Ii
I'

1,i,

III

growing military might which WRS to provide the

basis for future aggrandizement.
The increase of military capabilities in the 30's
was, no doubt, overrated. by the enthusiastic imperialists.. This optimism is, however, readily
comprehensible in the light of the sensational
growth experienced in this period by the Japanese
economic potential.
The rise in national production at the rate of
~bout 5 percent a year was in itself a very encouragmg phenomenon. Its military significance becomes obvious if the source of the increases is
considered. Due almost entirely to a rapid broadening of the industrial base of the Japanese
economy, the upward trend of output was most
pronounced in the militarily crucial heavy industries.

TABLE

Iii

1.-Relativ4 growth of industrial and agricultural

output 1930-42
[Million yen)

Yesr

Industrial

output (A)

Agricul
turaloutput (B)

- - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - _ _ ~_ _ _ _ _

1930____ . _________ ._~ ___ ._ 5,960

1937_____ ~. ____ . _____ ._. __ 16,360
1942___ - -- ________ . ___ __ __ 32, 130

2,400
4,040
5,700

2.5
4

5.6

I Since prices of industrial products were rising more than those of agricul~
~l!ral commodities, these ratios exaggera.te somewhat the relative growth

of

mdustrialoutput.

The shift toward heavy industries is strikingly

shown by the data in table 2.
TABLE

2.-Composition of industrial output, 1930-42

---.-~------

Heavy industries __________ _

Light ind ustries ___________ _

1930

1937

1942

Percent

Percent

Perc,nt

---------38.2

57.8

61. 8

42. 2

72.7
27.3

100. 0

100. 0

100. 0

The industrial effort which resulted in this

spectacular development and in the vast increase
of Japan's war potential involved a number of
almost equally important economic programs: (1)
The volume--Df plant and equipment had to be
markedly increased in order to provide for an
enlarged flow of armaments; (2) the raw material
basis of the industrial economy had to be deepened
by both development of current supplies and ac12

cumulation of emergency stocks; (3) a sizeable

output of finished munitions had to be maintained
in order to support current military commitments
(Manchuria, China); (4) the shipping potential
had to be expanded to assure a sufficient flow of
raw materials; and (5) the relative allocation of
manpower had to be shifted from agricultural
pursuits to industrial occupations.
Whether the economic planners of Japan were
able to attain the optimum distribution of resources between these partly competing purposes,
is a hardly answerable question. It is beyond
doubt, however, that remarkable accomplishments. marked the "expansionist" decade.
(1) No data are available to measure the size
of investment in fixed plants and equipment.
The information contained in th\3 tables presented
above and in the reports on individual industries
prepared by various economic divisions of the
Survey indicate, however, that the construction
of industrial facilities in the years 1930-42
assumed-for Japanese conditions-gigantic proportions. Almost the entire aircraft industry,
producing more than 7,000 planes annually by
1941; a tank and an automotive industry were
constructed during this period.
(2) This industrial expansion was based and
dependent on 'the availability of raw materials.
Considerable quantities of structural steel, coal,
and lumber were needed for the construction of
plants and equipment. Still larger quantities of
these and other materials were required to assure
continuous production. Immense efforts were
devoted to the increase of raw material output
in the home islands. In some respects, significant
successes were achieved. Coal production, for
instance, rose, within Japan proper, from 28
million tons in 1931 to 55.6 million tons in 1941.
Domestic mining of iron ore also made significant
progress. Nevertheless, no country could have
been further from self-sufficiency with respect to
raw materials than was Japan. Supplies from
the continent of Asia became the key to the arma. ment program. The gevelopment of Manchuria
and Northern China became almost the central
issue of Japan's economic policy.
By 1936 the preparatory moves toward a
systematic exploitation of Manchuria'S natural
resource~ reached a degree of completion. The
5-year plan of Manchurian economic development, based to a large extent on preliminary work
accomplished in the province in the years 1932-36,

envisaged sizeable shipments of Manchurian raw

materials. Together with Northern China, Manchuria became an exclusive source of some critical
materials and an important contributor to the msufficient home output of others. In addition,
food deliveries (in particular soybeans) from the
continental possessions of Japan became important
factors in maintaining Japan's food balance. By
the end of the decade Japan's salt requirements
were met largely from Northern China and Manchuria, while an increasing variety of nonferrous
metals and ferro-alloys were supplied by Manchurilland Korea.
The Japanese iron and steel industry depended
on Northern China for its major supply of good
coking coal. From 1938 to 1941, coal output rose
from 10 million to 24 million tons in North ChinaMongolia, and from 16 to 24 million tons in
Manchuria. Pig iron production in Manchuria
increased from 500,000 tons in 1934 to 1,417,000'
tons in 1941 and ingot steel from 137,000 tons in
1935 to 573,000 tons in 1941. Exports of Manchurian pig iron to Japan rose from 383,000 ton
in 1935 to 557,000 tons in 1941. In 1937, China
supplied 14 percent of Japan's iron ore imports;
in 1941 it supplied 50 percent.
Although the progress made in Manchuria and
China helped significantly to alleviate Japan's
raw materials shortage, insufficiency of raw
materials continued to be the most important
limiting factor on Japanese industrial output.
With respect to some materials, the Continental
possessions of Japan failed to enhance Japan's
position. Neither oil nor bauxite sources exist in
appreciable quantities within the "i'nner zone".
The output bf aluminum ingots-had risen from
19 tons in 1933 to 71,740 tons in 1941, of which
90 percent was produced from bauxite. Plans to
develop a synthetic oil industry or to exploit the
existing low grade substitute aluminous materials
failed to attain significant results.
Pending seizure and economic exploitation of
the oil and bauxite resources of the Southern
Pacific, stockpiling these vital materials was
unavoidable. The situation was similar in the
supply of certain ferro alloys, such as nickel, and
of such nonferrous metals as lead and zinc. A
considerable accumulation of bauxite and oil was
accomplished. By the end of 1941 bauxite stocks
totaled about 250,000 tons, sufficient for somewhat
less than 9 months supply at the current rate of
utilization or 6 months at the actual 1942 rate.

At the same time, 9,200,000 kilolitres of oil were

stored in Japan, 2,300,000 kilolitres more than the
combined imports and production during the war.
(3) The expansion of industrial facilities and of
the raw material supplies for .Japan's home industry were used almost exclusively for a substantial increase of military output. By December 1941, Japan was producing over 550 planes
monthly and had accumulated an air force
aggregating some 7,500 units of all types. The
naval building program reached unprecedented
proportions. In 1941-42, 331 naval vessels,
aggregating just short of 450,000 tons, were
added to the fleet. Ammunition on hand in
January 1942 totaled nearly 5 years production
at the 1942 rate, while land weapons exceeded
6 years production. At that time, there were
81,000 motor vehicles on hand, or well over 5
years production at the 1942 level, while the tank
park of 1,180 vehicles slightly exceeded 1942
output.
The war industries centered' around aircraft
production and shipbuilding. The development
of the automotive industry was very slow. Heavy
tanks werenotproduced at all. Japan's armament
program was directed toward a fight among the
islands of the Pacific and not toward mainland
warfare. Such ground operations as were conducted on the Asiatic mainland were to a large.
extent supported by the Manchurian industries
themselves.
(4) The necessity of enJarging Japan's merchant
fleet to handle the vastly increased turn-over of
supplies between Japan and the outside world
was a major aspect of the prewar armament effort.
During the decade as a whole, the shipping
potential had expanded by one-thi,rd, with
2,136,245 gross tons constructed. Peak construction occurred in the years 1937-39, when 1,027,514
tons were built, while in 1940 and 1941, 491,886
tons were added to the merchant fleet.
In spite of this serious attempt to provide a
merchant fleet which would be able to cope with
Japan's foreign trade, the country remained dependent on foreign shipping for its normal import
and export activities. Of 18,490 ships, aggregating 62,230,000 gross tons which entered Japanese
harbors in 1938, only 11,456 ships (36,659,000 gross
tons) were flying the Japanese flag. The remainder were foreign bottoms chartered by
Japanese shippers or negotiated on foreign account.
(5) The expansion of manufacturing activities

13

" ,
,,;

, I
!"I

II

II
Ii1:1'
"I','

I
I

during the thirties ill' olved a considerabl,e increase

in the industrial labor force. The total number
of males in manufacturing rose from 4.4 million
in 1930 to 6.1 million of 1940, while during the
same period, the number of women increased from
1.4 to 2 million. This additional labor force was
almost entirely provided for by the growth in
population. The number gainfully employed in
agriculture-14.1 million people-declined by only
0.5 million during the decade. In spite of the
industrialization process, Japan still remained
essentially an agrarian country in which roughly
half of the population was engaged in feeding the
nation. It was necessary to import from 10 to
20 percent of the food supply. At the same time
there was a considerable manpower "cushion",
consisting of "hidden unemployed", which prevented manpower from i:>ecoming a limiting factor
in spite of the considerable requirements of the
armed forces.
'Considering the economic performance of the
decade, one is impressed with the intensity of the
effort and the magnitude of the results. Without
them, the Japanese war planners would not have
even thought of a military operation like the one
undertaken during tl;te months following Pearl
Harbor.
Nonetheless, Japan remained with serious
economic weaknesses. Depending for an essential margin of food, for most important basic
materials, for the lifeblood of a modern industrial

nation-oil-on overseas imports, Japan was

desperately vulnerable to blockade operations.
Having a comparatively small, newly developed
war industry, it had to work without much of a
cushion of excess capacity. Havin/! had little
experience with munitions production or other
Chapter II
lines of mass output, the country was not able to
build up a large force of industrially and mechanJAPAN'S ECONOMY UNDER THE STRESS OF WAR
ically trained personnel. This meant later shortage of skills, shortage of ingenuity and little
over-all production of Japan remained relatively
THE PATTERN OF ECONOMIC MO. ability to improvise when the economy was under
stable
in the fiscal years 1941 and 1942. From a
BILIZATION
.
the stresses and strains of large-scale warfare.
j
level of 39.8 billion yen in fiscal 1940 the real gross
Being essentially a small and poor country with
The economic expansion which had been
national output, shown in table 3, rose to only
an industrial structure dependent upon imported ,achieved in the thirties, and the degree to which
41 billion yen for fiscal 1942. This stability is the
raw materials, Ja,pan was wide open to every Japan's economy was already functioning to meet
more surprising since that period includes 16
type of modern attack. Living from hand to the requirements of war, determined Japan's
months of war with the United States. That it
mouth, the Japanese economy had no reserves economic mobilization in the early phase of the
was due to inadequate planning and not to the
with which it could maneuver in a case of an war.
inherent limitations of the Japanese economy is
emergency. Crowded in primitively constructed
A thorough planning for total economic mobiliclear from the expansion that was secured both
wooden cities, the Japanese population had no zation appeared unnecessary. Contemplating a
before 1940 and after 1942.
dwelling possibilities in case of the destruction of short war and counting heavily on the initial adtheir homes.
TABLE 3.-Gross national product, fiscal years 1940-44
vantages enjoyed by Japan, the Japanese planners
The economic potential could support a short failed to consider Japan's economic potential in
[Billions of 1940 yen]
war of limited liability. The accumulated stocks relation to a protracted war of attrition. They
1940 1941 }942 194311114i
of munitions, oil, and ships could be thrown into examined only the economic requirements of their
action and produce a devastating effect on an immediate war plan. They did not plan to lift
-G--r-os-s-n-a-ti-o-n-al-p-r-o-du--c-t__-._-_-_-_-_-_~ 39. 8 40.-~ ~o. 6 ~~\~9. 3
unmobilized enemy. It could be done only once. the total level of output. They planned only to
Government-_ __ _ _ __ _ ___ _ _ _ _ 8. 010. 1 13. 2 18. 024. 1
When this unique blow failed to result in peace, make good certain. obvious deficiencies of their
Central government- __ _ _ _ _ 6. 0 8. 0 11. 616. 2:22. 2
. Nonwar ________________ 1. 3 1. 4 1. 7 1. 7 2.0
Japan was doomed. Its economy could not sup- economy and to supply little more than the reWar ___________________ 4.7 6.6 9.914.5 20.2
port a protracted campaign against an enemy placement needs of the military forces..
..
Pay, travel, and subeven half as strong as the United States.
The contrast with the kind of economlC mobllisistence ____________ 1. 2 1. 5 1. 8 2.3 3.4
Munitions ____________ 2.7 3.5 4.9 8. 6 i12. 2
zation sought in the Up.ited States is striking.
Other________________ ,8 1. 6 3.1 3.5' 4.6
The plans worked out in the second half of 1941
Localgovernment _________ 2.02,11.6 1.8 1.9
and put into effect by President Roosevelt's first
Private gross capital formation_ _ 5. 1 4. 2 3. 6 4. 7 6. 4
war budget were based upon achieving maximum
Net exports __________ . __ __ _ . 2 -, 6 (1) -. 6 1. 0
total output in order to allow the largest possible
Residential construction. _ _ __ _ ,4 . 5 . 2 ,2 . 1
flow of war material. Elimination of unemployPlant and equipment ________ 4.5 4.3 3.4 5.1 5.3
Munitions industries _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ 2. 8 2. 5 4. 5 4. 9
ment, drawing new workers into the labor Jorce,
N onmunitions industries _ _ _ __ __ 1. 5 . 9 . 6 . 4
increasing capacity of basic industries, multipleConsumer expenditures ________ 26. 7 26. 0 23. 8 22. 4 18. 8
shift operation of industrial facilities, and shifting
Food and tobacco ___________ 15.514.818.913.311.7
resources to more productive uses were all counted
Clothing and furnishings _ _
3. 5 3. 5 2. 9 2. 7 1. 4
Other ______________________ 7.7 7.7 7.0 6.4 5.7
upon in setting the sights for total production and
War expenditures abroad_. _ _ _ _ _ 1. 0 2. 2 2, 5 3. 4 7. 1
munitions output.
Japan, on the contrary, concentrated on limited
Less than 50 million yen.
objectives. It was essential that sources of basic
Source: Appendix B.
raw materials-particularly oil and bauxite-be
secured in the southern resources area. In addiWhile thus, total production increased impertion, it was necessary to increase the output of
ceptibly, a strong effort was made to expand.~ar
output. This manifested itself in a sharply rISmg
munitions in conformity with the military operatrend of government war expenditures during the
tions being contemplated.
period. From a level of 4.7 billion yen in fiscal
As a consequence of this limited program, the
1

14

15

.1940, this segment of outpll increased to 9.9

billion ill 1942, after adjustm( It for rising prices.
While the percentage change 'as large, the total
of war supplies secured, even [1942, was hardly
consistent with the size of Ja lln's military commitments. 'Indicative of th, assurance of the
ruling group during the ead} phase of the war,
and its appraisal of the probal e length of the war
is the fact that plant and equ: lment expenditures
in the munitions industries w ':e actually allowed
to decline between 1941 and 1 :42.
As total output was not l' ,ing, the increased
flow of war output in these ~ years was secured
by a gradual restriction of tl ' civilian sectors of
the economy. This occurred not so much as a
result of a well-rounded polic~ of eliminating nonessentials but rather of the : lcreasing encroachment of government war pure lasing upon Civilian
sources of supply. While the conversion of civilian plants to munitions produ tion was not extensive during this period, the g eater share of food
and clothing going to the I ilitary meant that
less was available for civilians Other consumers'
goods declined to a lesser ext nt, though by 1942
the shortages of basic materi Is were felt. Consumers' services generally te ded upward-a reflection of the expansibility Q this type of output
as well as the lack of real ti htness in the labor
market.
The most noticeable curt, lment came in' the
field of nonwar capital outlay, Real expenditures
of local government units dec ined as the channeling of materials . prevented r 'w construction and
even normal replacement ani maintenance work.
The same factor reduced the 'olume of residential
construction and plant and ( [uipment outlays in
civilian goods inilmlt,ries. IJ the latter field the
restriction of procef>sing mat rials tended also to
make plant expansion unneci isary.
The entire pace of Japan' economic mobilization during this period of c( [fidence can be seen
in the relation of war e:\ lenditures to total
gross product. The percentn ;e of total production
accounted for by governme It war expenditures
and capital outlays in the munitions industries
rose from 17 in 1940 to sligh ly over 30 in 1942.
The United States raised its war outlays from
2.6 percent ;)f total productio 1 to 33.5 percent over
the same period-at a time' hen total output was
substantially increased.
,
The spectacular and easy military successes of
the first half-year of the waJ seemed for a time to

16

TABLE

4 ......:. Percentage of war expenditures to gross product,

5.-Comparison of the dynamics of "real" gro8s

national product, Japan and the United States, selected
'years 1980-44

TABLE

Japan and the United States

Japan

1940 _____________________________ _
1941 _____________________________ _
1942 _____________________________ ,
1943 _____________________________ _
1944 _____________________________ _

17. 0
23.1
30.5
42.1
50. 9

[19tO=100j

United

States

Japan

2.6
11.2

1930 _____________________________ _
1936 _____________________________ _
1940 ___________ : _________________ _

33.5
45.0
46. 0

1941 ________ ~--------------------1942 _____________________________ _

1943 __ , __________________________ _
1944 _____________________________ _

Includes private capital outlays in munitions industries.

justify the prevailing notion of Japan's wartime f

economic requirements. Loss of the battle of
Midway was attributed to lack of radar, not to
any extraordinary recuperative powers of the
United States Navy. The shock of the Guadalcanal campaign, however, forced a fundamental
reappraisal of Japanese economic and military
plans. While this defeat was laid to over extension
of Japan's outer perimeter and was not taken as a !
foreshadowing of eventual disaster, it did demonstrate conclusively that the United States was
preparing to take the initiative much more quickly
than Tokyo had assumed. In addition, the Allied
invasion of North Africa and the German defeat
at Stalingrad blasted all hope of an eady Axis I
victory in Europe. Thus, it became evident that '
the entire Japanese conception of the war was no ~
longer tenable. There would not be a negotiated :
peace without large-scale fighting. The test of !
strength in the Pacific had already begun.
Allowing for inevitable administrati:ve reorgan- '
ization and the time lag between planrung and per- ,
formance, recognition o~ the true military sit~ation ~
was quickly translated mto an all out effort. m the!
economic sphere. Economic objectiyes were re- I
cast during the winter of 1942-43, and during the i
spring and f!Ummer of 1943 definite progress was :
made in giving effect to the new program: A very :
substantial increase in new production facilities I
was projected and extensive conversion of civilian I
goods plants was undertaken. Economic controls
over materials and manpower were tightened.!
The sights of virtually the whole munitions program were raised to the limits of the Japanese
economic potential, with particular emphasis on
aircraft and ships. The. civilian economy was
pared to the minimum of subsistence, with all,
luxuries eliminated and neither replacements nor;
maintenance of civilian facilities allowed for. t
Total war was made the order of the day.

57

84
100

United

Stat..

'89
86
100

101

118

102
113

136
158
165

124

11929.

Given the inherent limitations of the Japanese,

economy with respect to basic resources and technological skills, given the delay of over a year before the need for a supreme effort was recognized,
and given the fact that mounting ship losses interfered with the production drive, the performance
of the economy in 1943 and 1944 was very credit'able. A large expansion of total production was
achieved and the percentage of output devoted to
war purposes was sharply increased.
After the relative stability of the previous 2'
years, the real gross product rose from a level of
41 billion yen in 1942 to a.bD.ost 50 billion in 1944.
This increase was 'concentrated in the war pro. duction segment. Government w~r outlays, after
allowance for price changes, more than doubled
over the period, rising from 9.9 billion yen in 1942
to 20.2 billion in 1944.
The increase in the output of munitions was
made possible, in part, by the large expansion of
plant facilities. Capital outlays in the munitions
industries were increased from 2.5 billion yen in
1942 to 4.5 billion in 1943 and even exceeded that
level in the following year. Approximately 70
percent of this industrial expansion program was
in facilities to produce finished war goods, planes,
ships, and ordnance. Plant investment had to
yield 'quick returns in terms of military output as
it was no longer feasible to spare men or materials
to expand the basic industrial capacity of the
nation. It is ironic that this effort was partly
abortive since the growing shortage of materials
made some of the facilities excess capacity by the
second half of fiscal 1944. This was particularly
the case with shipbuilding facilities, which in the
expanded program of 1943-44 had been allotted
the largest increase in new construction.

The extent of Japanese economic mobilization

during this period can be seen by the growing absorption of resources into production for war.
Government war outlays and capital expenditures
in the munitions industries rose from 31 percent of
gross output in 1942 to about 51 percent in 1944.
At the peak of its war effort, the percentage for
these war expenditures in the United States was
46. In view of Japan's much lower productivity,
involving a much lower standard of living, the
difference between the two figures is a wholly
inadequate measure of the greater intensity of
Japan's war effort.
In the years 1943 and 1944 all nonwar activities
were sacrificed to $e greatest possible extent.
This is not fully revealed by the statistics in table
3 because of difficulties of classification. What
are. listed as nonwar government expenditures
rose, for example, only because they include certain home defense activities. Capital outlays in
nonmunitions industries were cut to an average
of a half billion yen in the 2 years. The most
substantial restriction of civilian output shows
up, however, in consumers expenditures. From
just under 24 billion yen in 1942,tliis component
dropped to less than 19 billion in 1944, representing a decline from the 1940 level of 30 percent.
The deterioration of the standard of living was
so great that by the end of the period shipping
had to be diverted from vital war purposes to the
importation of food.
In point of time, the peak of the Japanese war
economy came about the middle of the fiscal
year 1944. By then the Allied att8JCk on Japanese shipping had so reduced the importation of
raw materials that not only was a further rise of
total output impossible but a downward trend
was initiated. Thus, the decline of Japan's war
making powers started before her home island
industries were subjected to the main weight of
the bombing attack during the months of March
to August 1945.
Complete data for this period were not obtainable but available evidence shows that there was
widespread disruption of the economic mechanism.
It may be estimated roughly that the level of the
gross product for the whole of this period-the
first half of the fiscal year 1945-was 20 to 25
percent below that of fiscal 1944. This drop
could not have been regarded as a temporary
decline. It represented, obviously, a breaking
17

point. Complete disintegration of the entire

economy could already be foreseen.
With this general pattern in mind, the wartime
developments in the key sectors of the economy
can now be traced in detail.

THE FIRST YEAR

Tbe occupation of the southern areas accomplished in the first year of the war corrected certain
of Japan's basic raw material deficiencies, but
added little new strength to Japan's over-all
economic potential. The major accomplishment
was the se.izure of certain indispensable raw material resources of which the inner zone was basically deficient. Oil and bau~ite were the crucial
items. Of the two, contrary to popular opinion,
the Japanese position in ..bauxite was the more
critical. Processing capacity, however, in th.ese
territories was negligible, contrasting markedly
with the gains made by Germany in taking over
countries such as France and Czechoslovakia.
At the end of Hi41' Japan's stock pile of some
43 million barrels of crude petroleum and refined
products was adequate for nearly 2 years at the
estimated consumption rate. Refining capacity
totaled 35,000,000 barrels annually in the inner
zone, but production of crude and synthetic oil
amounted to little more than 5 million barrels.
The first imports of crude oil from the south began
in the spring of 1942, and had amounted to 6,213,000 barrels by the end of the calendar year. An
additional 9,395,000 barrels of southern crude oil
and refined products were consumed in the south
during calendar 1942.1 Under these conditions
total stocks declined no faster than anticipated,
and the outlook for 1943 was favorable.
In the case of bauxite, the stock pile of about
250,000 tons held on 7 December 1941 was
sufficient for 9 months' aluminum production at
the current rate of utilization.' At the higher
1942 rate, corresponding to rising aircraft production, this supply actually covered but 6 months'
requirements. During the fiscal year 1941, marked
by the "freezing" regulations imposed in July,
imports of bauxite had totaled but 146,711 tons,
the lowest since 1937. Imports were cut off until
the spring of 1942, and by the .end of June 1942
stocks were reduced to 172,620 tons. During
fiscal 1942, however, bauxite imports rose to
1 A negligible amount may have been "lost," presumably by sinkings.
J Approximately 00 percent of aluminum was being produced from bauxite,
obtained almost entirely {rom Bintan Island (NEIl, Malays, and Palau.

18

450,134 tons, thE) highest figure recorded up to

that time. By the end of December 1942, despite

the increasing utilization rate, bauxite stocks had

climbed back to 209,427 tons. At this time
imports of bauxite, like those of oil, were steadily
increasing..
By the summer of 1942, if not earlier, such
economic gains as could be expected from thl~
southern operations had become as evident as the
strategic triumph. These gains seem to have
delayed realistic appraisal of the economic task
which confronted Japan in the conduct of a total
Pacific war. For almost a year the measures and
means which had made the first conquest possible
were largely assumed to be adequate for the war
-itself.
There could be no exact calculation of the time
within which the initial advantage in mobilization
would continue to operate. The speed of American conversion to war output and the degree to I
which Germany would absorb American military
strength were unknowns. To maintain their
advantage, or even to prolong it, the Japanese
leaders were required to mobilize their limited
economic resources with exceptional skill. The
highest premium of all would del'ive from a correct
estimate of the needs that would develop immediately upon the occupation of the southern regions. !
With such an estimate, made effective through
speedy redeployment of resources to meet critical
needs, Japan might still be able to compenSate
for its relatively inferior economic potential. At
the very least, more time would be gained to secure
the maximum benefit from the southern areas.
As shown above, the steps taken during the
first year of the war did not measure up to the
requirements of the situation. With few exceptions the Japanese economy continued to
operate under directives laid down before the attack on Pearl Harbor. 'While these directives.
featured the continued expansion of the armament industry, they failed to lay adequate stress
on greater output of certain end products, notably
shipping, that rapidly assumed crucial significance.
N either the setting of higher goals nor timely readjustments in the programming of vital items,
both of which would have prolonged Japan's
initial military advantage, were thought to be
necessary.
When the difficulties finally caught up with
Japan at the end of 1942, they developed with
extraordinary rapidity. In part they were the

result of the completeness with which the objectives of the southern operation had been
achieved. Strategic plans had originally called
for the establishment of a relatively circumscribed
Pacific defense ring, permitting a maximum concentration of available forces and supplies. But,
in fact, Japan committed forces well beyond the
line set up in the original plan, more especially in
New Guinea, the Solomons, the Aleutians, and in
.operations which led to the Coral Sea, Indian
Ocean, and Midway engagements. Behind these
actions lay an underestimate of the prospective
speed and power of the United Stat~s come-back,
an overestimate of Japanese capacities for defense
of the enlarged empire, and a general lack of
economic planning in relation to this strategic
problem. The burden of heavy supply lines, the
:attrition on' shipping, the inability to defend
widely scattered outposts-all these concrete
:aspects of an unfavorable situation d'eveloped
with apparent unexpectedness. No previously
,organized measures with which to counter them
seemed to exist, and economic preparation lagged
well behind the emerging strategic demands.
Through most of 1942 this general problem
failed to emerge with sufficient definiteness to
make an impact on Tokyo. At the end of July,Japan's merchant shipping totaled 6,376,000 tonsalmost exactly the amount on hand when the
war began., Thus, for a period of nearly 8 months,
losses from sinkings had been offset by gains from
-construction, capture, and salvage. The first
marked reduction in total tonnage was not to
.occur until October. At midyear 1942 Japan
could set the occupation of the southern regions,
including Burma and much of New Guinea,
:against the one major defeat at Midway.
In August the American forces secured a
position on Guadalcanal, and thereafter the
picture changed rapidly. By October-November,
the decisiv-e engagements for control of Guadalcanal were being fought. In these engagements
.Japan's losses of all types of ships were un expect,edly heavy. In October-November over-all merchant ship losses climbed sharply to 482,000 tons.
By the end of November, total Japanese merchant
:shipping was reduced to 5,946,000 tons, or 430,000
tons below the December 1941 and July 1942 level.
Taking these developments at face value, and
-discounting only the Battle of Midway, there
would appear to be little reason for concern until
<October or November 1942. Midway was dis-

counted or explained. away, but the events around

Guadalcanal in October-November, combined
with the abrupt rise in total shipping losses,
evoked real dismay. After the war, Hoshino
Naoki, who had been Chief Secretary of the Tojo
Cabinet, exclaimed that the calendar of the
Japanese war economy should be dated "After
Guadalcanal".3 Not until then did the full
dimensions of the Pacific war's economic demands
strike home to Japan's leaders. The entire Guadalcanal campaign lasted from 7 August 1942 to 9 February 1943, but the handwriting on the wall had
become plainly visible in mid-November 1942.4
This date, 11 months after the Pearl Harbor
attack, marked the end of the first phase of
Japanese economic development in the Pacific
war. With November 1942 began the really
energetic effort to raise over-all production sights
and to adopt a selective approach involving a
fundamental redeployment of facilities and materials. The previous willingness to "coast" on the
military achievements of the early months, however, was reflected in production levels of the
entire fiscal year 1942. In many cases, therefore,
analysis of the economic data for the first period
can be projected into the early months of 1943.

DIFFUSED ADMINISTRATIVE
RESPONSIBILITY
During this period there was no centralized
responsibility for the planning and execution of
economic mobilization. The Cabinet Planning
Board had been established in the spring of 1937
as an agency designed to coordinate Cabinet policy
in the economic sphere. In October 1937, mainly
as a result of problems created by the China war,
its statutory powers and functions had. been
enlarged. Even so, it was far from being an
effective agency of central planning and control.
Its schedules were most important in relation to
mobilization of basic materials, but it had little
influence on the programming of key munitions
products such as ordnance, aircraft, and shipping.
The planning board, moreover, possessed no executive powers. It could only lay its plans before
the Cabinet for approval and enforcement. Thereafter. each of the Ministries carried through, in its
own sphere, the approved directives.
Primary executive responsibility was thus vested
3 UaSBS interrogation No. 505, p. 36.
4 Marked by the sinking DC 16 Japanese warships and 4 transports in the
Battle DC Ouadalaanal, ]3-15 November.

19

in the Cabinet. This responsibility, however, was

<:lxercised not so much collectively as Ministry by
Ministry. The Ministries of Commerce and
Industry, Agriculture and Forestry, Railways, and
Communications exercised an essentially exclusive
authority over their respective spheres of economic
administration. In addition, the'Army and Navy
Ministries dominated policy affecting ordnance,
aircraft, !md shipping. The different ministers
were supreme in their own spheres and jealously
guarded their jurisdictional prerogatives. They
were not amenable to thil orders of the Prime
Minister, who functioned more as the chairman of
a group of Ministers than as controlling head of
the government.
Centralized planning and control was further
handicapped by the induiitrial control associations
established in 1941-42. These associations, comprising the great industrial monopolies of Japan,
were responsible for the organization of production on the operating level. They were
dominated by the Zaibatsu executives who had
previously headed the .cartels in iron and. steel,
. coal, macpinery, light metals, and other mdustries but were imperfectly controlled by the
vari~us Ministries to which they owed juris~
dictional allegiance. Most of the control associations were responsible to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, but others were responsible
. to the Army, Navy, Communications, and Railways Ministries. On the operating level, the
associations tended to work along lines set by
the business leaders while, administratively, not
even the Premier could overstep the rigid lines
of jurisdictional authority set by the Ministries.
Virtually no changes were made in this administrative system during the first year of the
war: . In 1942 it was possible to ignore or discount the lack of centralized control in the mobilization of war production. The limited goals
set for aircraft and shipping did not require a
large-scale reallocation of facilitics and materials.
In administration, as in other respects, the
Japanese leaders were content to accept the existing system.
SUP.eLY OF BASIC MATERIALS

During this period the level of basic industries,

which sharply limited the capabilities of the
Japanese war economy, was not significantly
changed. In 1942, except in the case of iron
20

ore and aluminum, there was but sli~ht impr?ve- t

ment in the domestic output of basIC materIals. :
In absolute amount, the output of aluminum '
was still relatively small, despite the increase
recorded in 1942. Even more significant was the,
fact that, of the total primary ingots distributed, :
only 62 percent was channeled into aircraft pro- :
duction. Owing to considerable leakage of alu- :
minum into prohibited uses this figure overstates the percentage flow to aircraft. As far as
aluminum ingots were concerned, a more energetic
expansion of aircraft production would lave been
possible in ~942. Large-scale additions to plant I
capacity were not made an emergency requirement until late in the year, with full results delayed until 1944.
TABJ"E

6.-Production of basic materials, Japan proper,

fi8cal year8 1941-42
[Thousands of metric tons]
1941

Coal _________________________ _
Coke 1 _______________________ _
Iron ore , _____________________ _
Pig iron 3 _____________________ _
Ingot steeL ___________________ _
Finished steeL ________________ _
Alumina______________________ _
Aluminum ingot- ______________ _

1942

55, 602
4,567
6,625

54,178

4,982

5,184

4,773
7,669

6, 837

7,099 .

5,120

5, 161> ;
226
103

152
72

The low production of iron and steel was a.

prime limiting factor for the whole war economy.
An ambitious program of capacity expansion for
this industry dated from 1937-38 and continued
up to the last year of the war. In level of output,
. however, the Japanese iron and steel industry
fell far below capacity.5 During the first half of
the war, there existed a cushion of exce.ss capacity,
which was gradually used up in meeting operating problems created by poor quality refractory
materials and prefabricated linings.
At the outset of the war, the necessary raw
materials such as iron ore, coal, and ferro-alloys
were available in quantities adequate for normal
operations. Even at this early stage, however,
signs of the ultimate crisis in materials supply
S Sec Trble 6.
The capacity Is that assigned to the furnaces under Western
operating conditions. It advanced from 10,121,000 metric tons in 1941 to.,
13,665,000 tons in 1944.

:
I
i

.
I

'

_
I

were present. Both in 1941 and 1942, substantial

drafts were made on the iron ore stock pile, to the
extent of 1,207,000 and 1,206,000 tons respectively.
By April 1943 this stock pile totaling 2,605,000
tons at the end of 1941, had been reduced to
1,399,000 tons. Little iron ore was received from
the south, due to the shipping stringency. 6 Overoptimistic expectations as to raw materials supply
were nevertheless prevalent during both 1942 and
1943.
In its own context Japanese basic industry was
doing fairly well during the first year of the war.
The point is, however, that more was required.
Operation was not characterized by an energetic
effort to raise production levels. In this period,
for example, the Japanese were stiffening the
specifications for finished steel, thereby increasing rejections. Ingot steel output increased by
only 262,000 tons, and finished steel by 46,000
tons.
MUNITIONS PROGRAM

19.1

Submarine locators ______________ D3

Air-Force weapons ______________ C2
Air-Force ammunition and acces- C3
sories.

191,'

1943

C3

A7

B5

Al
A2

B6

Finished armament output rose about 30 percent

from 1941 to'1942 with substantial relative increases evident in merchant ships, ordnance and
aircraft production. However, these increases
give an' exaggerated impression of the achievements in this field. The absolute level of munitions output in 1942 was surprisingly small for a
nation engaged in a major war. Despite the
existence of an already organized munitions industry in 1941, Japan devoted only an additional
5 percent of its total output to armaments in 1942.
Besides the inadequacy of the over-all output,
there was also maldistribution of end' products
due to poor evaluation of emerging war requirements .. The southern operations were launched
at a time when ord.nance priorities, a key directional factor in industrial mobilization, were
pointed toward assuring the items needed for the
continental war in China. On the 1941 priorities
list, the A ratings were given, in order, to tanks
and tractors, medium and small guns, large guns,
car and craft radio, and large radios. For 1942,
the A ratings were given to three items, in the
following order: Tanks and tractors, large radios
and radio detectors. The changes in the prjority
ratings of the accompanying Jist of items, all of
which rapidly became vitally necessary, illustrate
the slow adj ustment to demands of the Pacific war.

More serious was the failure to lay due emphasis on the construction of merchant shipping.
In the fiscal year 1941, which included the first
4 months of the war, the total for new ships completed fell to 241,120 "gross registered tons, the
lowest since 1935. In fiscal 1942, the figure rose
to 358,280 gross tons, or approximately 50 percent. 7
In view of the low absolute level in both years,
however, it is apparent that the Japanese plans
discounted the need for merchant tonnage instead
of stressing it.
The slow awakening to realities can be traced
in the ship construction planning that took place
in 1942. Initial plans drafted in March set a
4-year schedule for merchant shipbuilding contemplating a gradual increase from about 470,000
tons in 1942 to 820,000 tons in 1945. Nine
months later, in December 1942, a drastic revision
of these plans virtually doubled the origmal goal
established for 1943, while scaling down 1942
construction nearer to the levels then being
actually achieved.
Errors in planning extended also to the type of
ships built. In 1940-41' no large tankers were
built, while aggregate tanker construction fell to
the lowest levels since the mid-thirties. For the.
three fiscal years 1940-42, new tankers totaled
3928 8486 and 47,743 tons. This oversight in
piannin~ could not be repaired, even though by
1943-44, with the tremendous pre~ium attached
to tankers, over one-third of the total merchantship constru~tions was accounted for by this type
of vessel.
Somewhat greater progress was being registered
in aircraft production. Unlike shipping, a moderate expansion program hud been scheduled; in
addition, the demand for more planes had developed
in the early months of 1942. At the beginning of
December 1941, the navy had on hand 2,120
planes, while the ar~y had 4,860. Only 1,068 of
the ar~y planes were in the first-line operational
category, however. The clamor was not only for
more planes but for improved models. A limited
effort to step up the aircraft expansion program
b!lgan early in 1942, but encountered obstacles

a As against over 3,000,000 tons supplied in the calendar -year 1940, Malaya
and the PhlUpplnes provided barely 150,000 tons In 1942.

7 The dead-weight tonnage of completed naval vessels actually declined in

this period, from 231,9lIO in 1941 to 216.416 In 1M2.

21

such as retooling problems and shortages of heavy

machinery and structural steel.
MANPOWER
The goals set for the Japanese war economy in
1942 were so limited that no special manpower
difficulties arose. By December 1941 the Japanese authorities possessed all essential powers
needed to control the allocation of manpower.
Employment exchanges were in Government
hands and labor conscription had been legalized.
For several years, measures designed to prevent
the uncontrolled movement of workers in essential industries had been in force. By means of
the "work record passbook system," workers
in designated industries <l,ould, not change their
occupations without hlloFing the shift approved,
in effect, both by the employer and the Government-controlled labor exchange. In case of
necessity the government had legal authority to
"freeze" the workers in a given industry. The'
coercive powers were supplemented by more
normal attractions, such as the higher wages and
larger food allowances generally offered by the
munitions industries. These various powers and
inducements were comprehensive, but they were
applied on a piecemeal basis without too effective
over-all integration. In 1941 and 1942, mainly
through the work of the labor exchanges in effecting transfers, quotas of 2.2 million and 1.9 million
persons required for the more essential phases of'
the economy, including industry, transport, and
agriculture, were successfully met. Some degree
of compulsion had already become necessary, so
that by 1941-42 a small, increasing segment of
the working force was being conscripted. The
threat of labor conscription, moreover, facilitated
the work of the labor exchanges by inducing
many workers, principally in commerce, to
shift to an essential employment category.

*
TABLE

7.-Total labor conscription for essential work,

1939-1,2
Year

1939 ________ -:-- ___ - - - __ _

1940 ______________________ _
1941 _________________________ _
1942 _________________________ _

22

Laboconscripts

850
52, 692
258, 192
311,649

Cumula.tive
total

850
53,542
311,n4
623, 385

During 1942 there was some expansion of ca-I

pacity, but not of output, in the Japanese i.ron .
and steel industry. The biggest gains were
achieved in the aircraft industry and primary
aluminum ingot production. Even in this field, i
as later achievements demonstrated, the sights!
were set far too low. In the priority estimates for I
1942, the crucial oversight was the lack of stress
on expansion of merchant ship construction. I
Realization of the attrition to which Japanese
merchant shipping was to be subjected did not:
com.e until November 1942. Here again, later
achievements demonstrated what would have been I
possible in the first year of the war, despite the:
intrinsic limitations of Japan's productive struc- :
ture. Within the Japanese economy of 1942 were!
the resources in manpower and civilian industry I
that were not fully converted to war production;
un til 1943--44. They could have been harnessed ,
to the task a full year earlier.
.

UNLIMITED EFFORT
The greatest achievements o{ Japan's war
economy were registered during 1944, peak output
of many essential items being reached in the early,
fall. Almost 3 years elapsed between December
1941 and peak industrial mobilization. The I
period was approximately the same as that taken
by the United States. Since the Japanese econ- f
om.y was better geared for war at the outset, how- :
ever, these equal periods actually measure an I
inequality in rate of achievement.
This should not be allowed to obscure the
essential. accomplishments of Japan's productive
system in 1943--44. By an immense effort, war
production was lifted to record heights, despite
the basic limitations within which the Japanese
were compelled to work. Large additions to plant
capacity were made, resources of all kinds were
shifted to a plane and ship construction, and the
civilian economy was cut severely. It proved
impossible, however, to raise basic industry to a
level which could sustain the peak output of essential munitions products. By the time the m.unitions industries had reached their peak, the supply.
of basic materials was suffering a sharp decline. !
By fall of 1944 it had already become impossible I
to hold steel, coal, and aluminum production at the:
1942--43 level, and thereafter the foundations of.
basic industry progressively crumbled. The Japa- ~
nese war economy disintegrated at its base, even I
while utilization of available stocks kept the'

munitions output at high levels for a few additional

ning Board. This new bureau, given the executive powers formerly denied to the Planning
months.
Board, was designed to function as the general
Parallel with the large-scale redeployment of
resources begun in 1943, an intensive effort was
staff of the war economy. Finally, under terms
made to wipe out the competing lines of jurisdicof a munition company act, the vital war industional authority which plagued the operation of
tries were made "designated munitions companies," and placed under the munitions minisJapan's war economy until the end of the war.
try's direction, thus limiting the role of the
The urgent necessity of raising production sights,
Industrial Control Associations.
finally recognized late in 1942, was the signal for
a series of administrative reforms_ during the
A full year had elapsed between recognition of
following year. As already noted, the possibilithe need for administrative reform and final
reorganization of the cabinet structure in Novemties of delay and friction within the administrative
system existing in 1941--42 were immense. When
ber 1943. Even then, the army and navy minisit was proved imperative to shift labor, materials,
tries were not fully subordinated to the authority
capital, and motive power rapidly to key war inof the munitions ministry. On many occasions the
dustries, the need for greater administrative
minister of munitions was forced into the positi~n
coordination became a primary concern of the
of arbiter between the army and navy. In the
Japanese authorities.
case of aircraft production, expedition of which
First efforts to deal with this problem led to the
was the primary function of the munitions ministry, the centralization of administrative authority
formation of an emergency Ministerial coordinating committee in November 1942. Two months
was most complete. To the very end, however,
later Tojo laid before the Diet sweeping proposals
no single and effective cent.er of authority for the
vesting the Prime Minister with dictatorial powers
allocation of materials was established, and ultiof supervision over the other Ministers and the
mate decisions were often the result not so much
war economy.generally. In these proposals five
of considered combined judgment as of bitter
industries-shipping, aircraft, light metals, coal,
wrangles in which the strongest voice prevailed.
and iron and steel-were set apart as requiring
THE DRIVE FOR AIRCRAFT
special powers on the part of the Prime Minister.
After an intense struggle, the Diet voted the
Formation of the munitions ministry was a
emergency powers, and Imperial approval was
direct outgrowth of difficulties experienced with
given on 17 March 1943. Associated with the
the aircraft industry. By the spring of 1943, the
Premier in the exercise of his new powers, however
construction of a number of new and enlarged
was an Advisory Council of seven leading Zaibats~
. aircraft plants was well under way. Despite
representatives, heading the most important of
substantial increases in physical plants, manuthe Industrial Control Associations.
facturers were having difficulty in meeting schedEight months later, on 1 November 1943, the
ules. It was clear that interservice jealousies and
munitions ministry was formally inaugurated as
uncontrolled competition might well undermine
the central feature in a drastic reorganization of
the whole effort. The allocation of available
Ministerial functions. The changes effected in
materials, tools, and manpower was a constant
November 1943 represented an attempt to probone of contention. During the summer of 1943,
vide coherent and unified direction of the war
moreover, the Japanese business leaders were also
economy. Authority over transport was hitherto
engaged in a determined struggle to protect their
divided mainly between a .railways and a cominterests in the administrative reorganization then
munications ministry. The former ministry of
pending. In the terms of the Munitions Company
commerce and industry, previously the central
Act,
as well as in the men chosen to head the
agency of control over industry, was divided.
munitions ministry, the Zaibatsu effectively
Half of it went to a new Ministry of Agriculture
maintained their position.s
and Commerce, charged with responsibility for
In this period, aircraft became one of the largest
the civilian economy. Administrative control
industries
in Japan. Key units were the Mitsu-,
over industry as a whole was vested in the muni During the period 16-28 August, the ZaIbatsu leaders of the Industrial
tions ministry. Within the new Ministry, a Total
Control ASSOCiations were successively called to the palace to render aD
Mobilization Bureau replaced the Cabinet Planaccounting to the Emperor.
714928-48--8

23

bishi airframe plant at Nagoya with an area of

2,204,000 square feet and the same company's
engine plant, also at Nagoya, with an area of
2,703,000 square feet. In spite of the large manufacturing areas available at assembly plants, a
considerable percentage of airframe and engine
subassembly manufacture was let to subcontractors, and a high percentage of the parts came from
an even larger network of sub-subcontractors.
Shops scattered throughout the industrial areas
supplied the thousands of instruments, electrical
accessories, and other bits and pieces that make
up modern aircraft. These areas, and the sprawling assembly plants, presented highly vulnerable
bombing targets.
In the fall of 1943 plant expansion slowed down
and a great productiQJl drive was inagurated.
Spurring this drive was a government demand
that aircraft manufacturers produce 2.16 times as
many planeJ and engines by June 1944 as they had
in September 1943. The full effects of improved
administrative coordillation under the munitions
ministry were not felt in airframe fabrication until
the spring of 1944, however, and the highest levels
of aircraft output were achieved during the spring
and summer of that year.
Engine production failed to keep up in the spring
of 1944 and became illcreasingly critical during
the months when airplane output was reaching
its maximum. In April 1944, the available supply
of engines fell below the 1.8 eJ'.gines per airplane
requirement considered minimum. From then on,
engine supply was a real bottleneck in the aircraft.
program. By cutting the spare engine allotment
of 20 percent included in the normal requirement,
the aircraft manufacturers were able to maintain
deliveries at 80 to 85 percent of schedule until
June 1944, but thereafter the position steadily
deteriorated. After the first B-29 raids in
November-December, dispersals from the huge
Mitsubishi and Nakajima plants at Nagoya and
Musashi began in earnest and the situation became
h~peless. As early as the spring of 1944, a wide
gap opened between actual production and production plans. A steep rise in output from about
2,400 planes in August 1'944, to 5,500 in March
1945 had been scheduled by Japanese planners.
As difficulties were encountered around the middle
of 1944, sights 'were lowered to 3,2.00 planes
. monthly by June 1945. Actual production leveled
off at about 2,400 planes during the 1944 peak.

24

TABLE

8.-Aircraft and engine production, fiscal year8

1942-44 1
Planes

Engines

1942:

1 ________________________ _
11 _______________________ _
111 __ c

___________________ _

IV _______________________ _
TotaL _________________ _

1,991
2, 187
2,852
3,206

4, 131 I
4,250 I
4,778 i
5,609 '

-------10, 236

18,768 :

1943:

1 ________________________ _

11 _______________________ _
111 ______________________ _

IV - _ - - ___ c -

_ - - - _________ _

TotaL _________________ _

3,
4,
5,
6,

565
250
672
756

---------20,243

34,884 .

7,332
7.391
6,701
4, 940

12, 468 i
11,507 I
10, 599
5,469,

1944:

1 ________________________ _
11 _______________________ _

IIL ______________________ _
IV _____________ _________ _
~

TotaL _________________ .
I

6, 380
7,434
9,118
11,952

--------26,364

40,043

Japanese fiscal year, 1 April-3t March.

During 1942, the output of fighters and bombers

accounted for roughly 60 percent of total prod uction, while in 1943 and 1944, the proportion rose:
to nearly 70 percent. In the latter year, however, fighters were almost half the total, while in
1942 they accounted for only one-third.
Employment data for the aircraft industry
showed a tremendous increase from 314,300
workers in December 1941 to 1,258,000 in April
1945. Of these totals 124,300 and 427,000 i
respectively were engaged in the manufacture of I
engines and propellers, with the remainder making i
airframes and accessories. These figures do not i
account for all the many direct alld indirec t con- i
tributors to the industry among the sub con- i
tractors. When these are taken into account, it.
becomes probable that 1.5 million workers were
involved in the manufacture of aircraft at the
end of the war. Women probably never exceeded'
20 percent of the total, but high-school boys,
physically substandard college students, and nonessential workers from other industries wrre i
drafted in large numbers for the aircraft plants.!
Skilled workers were desperately lacking, until i
the point came at which some key personnel,'

both engineers and production men, were released

from the services to retake their former civilian
jobs, and the Army and Navy arsenals d~tailed a
certain number of their own skilled workers to
private industry. Large Ilumbers of soldiers,
regardless of skills, were detailed for temporary
duty, usually of six months duration, with air, craft manufacturers. The labor problem was never
solved and contributed to the general decline in
aircraft output which began in the fall of 1944
and continued to the end of the war.
The aircraft industry, during the first half of
1944, W.ILs extending output at a time when
production of its critical raw material-aluminum--was begilming to decline. Impbrt~ of
bauxite, which had totaled 450,134 tons in fiscal
1942, rose to a record 820,534 tons in 1943, and
then dropped off to 347,335 tons in 1944. By
the end of 1944 bauxite stocks had reached the
vanishing point and a belated effort to transfer to
the use of aluminous shales was in full swing.
Conversion of the plants to the use of shale was
delayed too long, however, even if the imports of
shale-only 147,000 tons in 1944-had been
adequate to compensate for the decline in bauxite
supplies. A sharp decrease in aluminum output
occurred in fiscal 1944.
TABLE

9-Capacity and production of aluminum, 191,1-1,.5

Alumina

Fiscal year
Capacity

Output

Aluminum ingot
Capacity

Output

ever, only at the cost of an increasing utilization

of processing scrap. Virgin ingot declined from
75-78 percent of the aluminum entering the aircraft pipeline during the second quarter of fiscal
year 1944, to from 30-50 percent in the third quarter, and to but 20 percen t in the fourth quarter. By
these methods Japan was able successfully to
supply the 1944-45 requirements of aircraft production, and the evidence fails to indicate that
aluminum, in a quantitative sense; hindered aircraft output within the period of the .war. Had
aircraft production met its schedules, however, the
picture might have been materially different.
Japan put immense effort into aircraft production during the war, and the results were not inconsiderable. Between December 1941 and August 1945, the industry produced a total of 65,971
planes and 103,650 aircra1t engines. In view of
the essential limitations within which the Japanese economy had to operate, this achievement
cannot be minimized.
TABLE

[Metric tons]
Fiscal quarters

AircraCt

Army

Navy

1942:
L ________
lL _______
IIL ______
IV _ _ _ _ __ _

17,184
14,591
16,100
18, 339

4,221,
3,638
3,750
3, 245

1,216
1,233
1,923
1,520

229, 100
313,700
360,700
398,700
419;300

151,883
226, 181
318, 493
225,229
1 16, 255

111,200
132, 400
171,600
159, 100
159, 100

71, 740
103,075
141,084
110,398
16,647

TotaL __ 66,214 14,854

5,
4,
4,
5,

11 7
635
961
237

Total

27, 738
24, 097
26, 734
28, 341

5,892 19,950106,910

=======

1943:

L ________

25,961
lL _______ 25, 854
lII _______ 27, 185
IV _______
28! 290

2, 877
3,117
2,819
2, 515

1, 384
1, 543
1,571
2, 555

5,398
2, 7119
2,307
966

33,620
33,253
33,882
34,326

---------------

First quarter only.

TotaL __ 107, 290 11,328

The decline from 141,084 metric tons of aluminum ingot in 1943 to 110,398 tons in.1944, was
compensated by a much more rigid channeling of
available supplies into the aircraft industry. During the last quarter of fiscal year 1943 as much as 18
percent of primary ingot was still going into other
than aircraft uses. This percentage declined
sharply in 1944, making it possible to scrape together the necessary supplies of aluminum for the
aircraft industry. This was accomplished, how-

CiviUsn

---------------

--194L _________
1942 __________
1943 __________
1944 __________
1945 __________

1O.-Allocation of primary aluminum, 1942-45

1944:
L ________
lL _______
IIL ______
IV:. ______

33,017 2,175
34,419' 1,037
16,352
423
15,250
0

TotaL - 99, 038/

1945,
I

7,053 11,470135,081

=1======

3, 6351

2,134
1,156
465
0

0
0
0
0

37,326
36,612
17,240
15,250

3, 755 -.- - 0 106, 428

L------I~I=:~r=~r==;;~

Includes indirect military use.

25

TABLE

11.-Japan's merchant fleet, selected months

End o(month

Total afloat

Months elapsed

Tcm.

November 1942._ ......... .

December 1943 ............
~arch 1944 ............... .
October 1944............ _..
April 1945 ........... _.... .

5,946,000 ...........
4,944,000
13
3,966,000
3
2,911,000
7
1, 961, 000
5

THE SHIPBUILDING EFFORT

Behind the expansion of ship construction
during 1943-44 lay an urgency as intense as that
which spurred aircraft output. Table 11 shows
the successive periods within which the Japanese
merchant fleet was reduced by steps of roughly
one million tons. The .. rapid deterioration in
Japan's shipping position stimulated a series of
upward revisions in construction plans. Major
changes in plans for 1943-44, and their relation
to actual' production for the fiscal years are
shown in Table 12.
TABLE

12.-Plan.ned and Actual Merchant Ship COrlstruc

tion. Fiscal Year 1948-44

Planned 1943 Production as of~arch 1942 .. _.......................

~arch 1943 ............... _.......... .
Actual 1943 Production ................... .
- Planned 1944 Production as of~arch 1942...........................
December 1943 ..... _. ___ ... _..... _.. _.
~arch 1944 ...................... _....
August 1944. .. _. _. ____ ........._......
Actual 1944 Production ....................

689,310
818,880
1, 110, 553
675,580
1, 898, 110
2,631,250
1,966,480
1, 600, 049

Drastic upward revisions featured the planning

to March 1944. By the end of the first half
of 1944, however, actual production had lagged
so far behind schedule that a. reduced program
had to be adopted. The August 1944 plan reduced the total schedule for the year by the
amOlmt of the lag in the first half, but required
production at an annual rate of 2,500,000 tons for
the last half of the fiscal year.
These figures cover the planning and c(;mstruction of steel ships only. In fiscal 1943, a total of
87,210 tons of wooden ships was built, and in
1944, a total of 258,733 tons. Including wooden
ships, total' construction for 1943 and 1944
amounted to 1,022,837 and 1,655,580 tons respectively. These totals compare with the p~evious
record total of about 600,000 tOllS in 1919.
The great increase in shipbuilding in 1943 was

26

due to the centering of responsibility in the Navy,

the shift to the simplified design of the second
series of standardized ships, and the substantial
increase of shipyard capacity, as well as to the
upward revision of the planned program. Up to
February 1943 when the Navy assumed control,
both steel and yard capacity had been pre-empted
by the Army and Navy for purposes other than
merchant ship construction. Administration of
the program by the Navy provided the authority
and the drive needed to eliminate the leisurely
methods and general inertia characteristic of 1942.
Four new yards successfully applied mass production techniques to the building of small cargo ships
of 877' gross tons. For the most part, however,
shipyards continued to build ships in the traditional manner, assembling hulls piece by piece, !
using only a limited amount of welding, and
launching from single position slipways.
Additions to shipyard capacity during the war
represented the most significant factor in achieving expansion of outptl't. At the outset, Japan
had approximately 15 large and 24 small yards
capable of building steer ships of over 500 tons.
These yards were expanded to some extent, but
the building of siX new large yards and seven
small ones accounted for the major increase in
capacity. The major additions to yard capacity
came in 1943-44. When shortages ill material
forced abandonment of the expansion program
early in 1945, several of the new yards were
incomplete and a few were not yet in operation.
TABLE

13.-Merchant shipbuilding, fiscal years 1948-44

[Gross registered tons]

Fiscal quarters

Cargo

Collier

Tanker

Other

Total

During most of this period, yard capacity, and

especially lack of mass production facilities, held
the merchant shipping program within relatively
narrow bounds. Even in available facilities, however, there was a shortage of skilled labor which
became progressively worse as the war WeRt on.
And this as in other industries, conscription for
the armed services was carried through with a
-minimum of deferments. By mid-1944, when the
first cut-back in ship constructio~lans was made,
shortage of steel had become a major limitation
and soon became controlling. In fiscal 1944, 38
percent of ordinary rolled steel and 28 percent of
total steel was used in ship constructior.
Naval ship construction experienced a parallel
expansion during these years, advancing from
256,012 dead-weight tons in fiscal 1943 to 466,208
tons irr 1944. This program, however, utilized
but onethird of the steel consumed by merchant
shipbuilding in 1943, and one-sixth in 1944. The
last battleship was completed in 1942, after which
the major emphasis shifted to aircraft carriers,
destroyers, submarines, and coast defense vessels.
TABLE

l4.-Production of naval ships, fiscal

years 1942-44
[Deadweight tons]
1942

1943

1944

No. Tonnage No. Tonnage

--- -

No.

Tonnage

- - - - -- -

-78~3601-4

Battleships ....... 1 64,000 ...

Carriers ...... _.. 6 6,050 5
114,500
Cruisers .... _. _.. 2 14, 500 2 16,000
1 8,000
Destroyers ..... __ 9 21,660 12 25, 140
32 46,860
Submarines ...... 23 28,047 41 52, 565
37 53,560
~inelayers .... _. _ 38 18,859 27 14,609
7 4,465
Coast defense ..... 3 2,820 34 28,420 113 86,420
Transports ....... . . .
7 6,840
58 61,990
AUldliaries .... _. _ 105 30,480 107 28,245 138 48,290
Landing crafL .. . . . ------- 7 5,833 1,432 30,668
Special attack ... _ .. . - - - - - -- ... - - - - - - - 5,115 11,455

84,314
179,3G2
249, 531
422,420

- - - - -- - TotaL._ 480, 284 58,960 362, 143 34, 180

--II ........ 184, 002

IlL ...... 212, 259
IV .... , .. 190, 537

OTHER MUNITIONS
0110,205 5, 310
0154,684 9, 540
0138, 139 18,493
0 57,378 23, 626

---- ----

TotaL .. 839,472

- - -- - - - -

TotaLi187186, 416 242 256,012 6,937466,208

935,567

1944:
L ........ 252, 674

,- - - - -

368,
348,
368,
271,

189
226
891
541

0460,406 56,971 1,356, 847

Fiscal year:
Ratio (percent
1941. ..... _.......... __ ......... _...... 67.8
1942 .... _. __ ............................. 61.0
1943 ... ___ .................... _....... _.. 53.2
1944................................. _._. 51. 7
19451........ _............. _............ ~ 48.0
I

First rour months.

The drop in the ratio of production of strictly

ground-use munitions to total production of
finished munitions items is even more striking:
Fiscal Year:
Ratio (perunt)
1941 ............. __ ........... _....... 28. 9_
1942... _............... _........ _........ 2Q 5
19~3 .. _.. =...................... _
........ 2Q 5
1943 .... _.... ____ ._. _____ . __ . __ ._ ........ 12.48. 2
1944 .. _........ _.......... _..............
1945 I . . . . . _. ____ . ___ . _ . . . _. _ . . . . . . _ . . . . .
7. 5
I

First rour months.

~~----~

~------

1943:
L._ ...... 54, 301
0 26, 728 3, 285
139
II ........ 77, 703 21,260 80,200
III. ...... 114,767 16,572 100, 328 17,864
IV ..... _ 233, 513 21, 128 154,887 12,892

ammunition, and communication equipment, and

the general category of naval ordnance production
increases, to the 1944 peak, equalled or exceeded
the increased production of planes and merchant
ships. As this would indicate, munitions items
not connected with the expansion of air power were
generally neglected. Production as a whole
increased, but the ratio to total war production
declined through the war. This is shown by the.
ratio of munitions production, other than aircraft and air munitions, to total production- of
firiished munitions items in the years 1941-1945:

The general trend in production of munitions,

other than airplanes and ships, was toward an
accelerated increase in output. This reached
its peak in the early fall of 1944. A decline in
output then set in, becoming disastrous by the
summer of 1945. Aircraft annament, aircraft

These figures illustrate the extent to which the

developments of the war changed Japanese con
cepts of war production requirements. As the
priority of aircraft and aircraft munitions increased and the lack of raw material supplies grew
more stringent, production of motor vehicles,
naval guns and their ammunition, and ammunition for ground use dropped below 1941 levels.
Production of tanks and ground-use artillery remained at about the same level throughout the war.
The high level of naval ordnance production,
particularly machine guns and ammunition, and
radio and electrical equipment, was generally
sufficient to supply the naval aircraft and ships
that were produced. The low technical level of
part of this production-radar is a notable example-to some extent nullified this achievement.
While army ordnance production was inadequate
in many it.ems, lack of shipping and the loss of
supplies through ship sinkings were the primary

27

reasons for a shortage of Japanese Anny supplies

in overseas areas.
The drop in truck production (from 42,000 -in
the fiscal year 1941 to 20,500 in 1944 and to less
than 2,000 in April-July 1945) did not have an
immediate effect on the war because the Anny
and Navy were taking an ever-increasing share of
the existing output. By the end of 1944, however,
lack of replacement vehicles, lack of parts, and an
increased traffic burden resulted in a deterioriation
in the domestic economy which had strong repercussions on the whole war production program:
TABLE

15.-Armament Production, Fiscal Years 1941-44

[Millions 011945 yen]

.
Merchant ships ____________

1941

1942

1943

1944

- -- -- -

403
533 1,235
Navy ships _______________ 1,014 1,112 1,476
Navy surface and air ordnance __________________
972 1,540 2,551
Army ground and ,air ordnance ________ _.. ________
956 1,262 1,586
Motor vehicles ______ - - - - - 691
427
307
Aircraft __________________ 1,081 1,843 3,687

1,508
2,099
4,638
2, 107
270
5,024

- -- -- -- -

TotaL _____________ 5,117 6,717 10,842

15,646

These series Were derived by a 5lumma~ion of

available quantity data for all major items of
munitions output valued at 1945 prices. The
coverage is not as broad as the total munitions
expenditures shown in Table 3 for the latter includes Pl1!chases of miscellaneous equipment and
supplies.

DECLINE OF BASIC MATERIALS

The peak level for basic industry was reached
early in 1944, some months earlier than that for
the munitions industries. While aircraft, shipbuilding, and ordnance were achieving record
outputs in 1944, the position of the coal, iron,
steel, and aluminum industries was deteriorating.
Even more significant than the short-lived peak
for basic industry is the fact that the increases
achieved were confined within an extremely
limited range. Coal production hardly changed,
while ingot steel increased by only 700,000 tons
in 1943 andJinished steel by only 450,000 tons.
A better record was made for aluminum. These
results, however, were totally inadequate to
provide the basic materials needed to lift Japan's
munitions production to levels matching the
scale in which the Pacific War was being fought.

28

TABLE

16.-Production of basic materials, Japan prop~r,

fiscal years 1949-44
[Thousand metric tons1
Commodity

1942

1943

1944

---------------------1------1----------CoaL _-___________________ _ 54,178

Coke ____________________ _ 4,778
Iron ore 1~ _______________ _ 7,669
Pig iron 2 _________________ _ 5, 184
Ingot steeL ______________ _ 7,099
Finished 8teeL ___ ~~ _______ _ 5, 166
Alumina _________________ _
226
Aluminum ingot __________ _
103

55,538
5, 158
7,524
4, 947
7, 821
'5,609
318
141

49,335
3,980
6,077
3, 655
5,911
4,320
225
110

domestic production of iron sands, deliveries of pyrite, sinter.

and imports of iron ore,
2 Includes imports.
1 Includes

Coal production in the home islands reached I

its wartime peak during the last quarter gf fiscal
1943-15,344,000 tons. Production in this quarter, '
however, but slightly exceeded that for the cor- I
responding period of 1942, and total output for
1943 was only 1,360,000 tons above 1942. In
1944 total output declined by over 6,000,000
tons. When imports are taken into consideration the position became even more critical, with
total available supply in 1944 reduced by 9,000,- ;
000 tons.
TABLE

17.-Production and imports of coal, fiscal years

1949-44
[Thousa.nd metric tons]
Domestic
output

Imports

Total

supply

underlying situation even more hopeless tl ill the

output figures suggest. Abuse and neglc thad
featured virtually every aspect of the op ration
of the coal industry throughout the war.
)uring
1941--44 the total labor force increase( from
339,000 to 416,000 but indescriminate drn [, procedu'res, inadequate maintenance and other ,wtors
had reduced annual output per' miner ff( n 164
to 119 tons in these years. Coal produc rs experienced increasing difficulty in securi :{ the
supplies of steel, cement, and lumber nee led to
maintain efficient operation. Although L ,whinery steadily deteriorated from long and c( Istant
use, it proved impossible in most cases >0 get
new replacements or parts 'needed for ,-pairs.
The cutting of new galleries essential for su :ained
production was also neglected. Rationa' zation
of mining operations through the best use of the
most efficient and highest quality mines we never
accomplished, although the execution of uch a
program had been one of the tasks set, )r the
Coal Control Association in 1941.
By. 1944 the position of the iron and steel industry had become even more critical than ilat of
the coal industry. High level imports of ooking
coal, iron ore, anli even pig iron were 1 'quirements crucial to the full-scalE) operation of , ],pan's
blast furnaces and steel mills. '_ The dec ine in
these imports began in 1943 and reached 'ritical
proportions 'in 1944.

TotaL ______________ 54,178

TABLE

1934:
1st halL ______________ 26,249
2d halL ______________ 29,289

TotaL _____________ 55,538 -

,I, iron

[Thousand metric tons]

8,748

Domestic

Imports

(1)

output

62,926

4,073
1,956

30,322
31,245

6,029

61,567

=========

1944:
1st half _______________ 25,235
2d half ________________ 24,100

2,_259
876

27,494
24,976

TotaL__ __ _____ ___ _ 49,335

3, 135

52, 470

Coking coal:
1942 __________________
1943 __________________
1944 ____ " _____________

available.

Technical factors in the coal industry, as well

as the rapid shrinkage of imports, rendered the

Totel

(1)

4,025
2,939
1',435

Iron ore:
1942 __________________
1943 __________________
1944 __________________

2, 789
3,838
4,409

4,880
3, 686
1,668

7, 669
7, 166
6,077

Pig iron:
1942 __________________
1943 __________________
1944 __________________

4, 306
3, 813
2,713

878
1,134
942

5, 184
4,947
3,655

I
1 Not

18.-Production and imports of coking c.

ore, and pig iron, fiscal years 1942-44

(1)
(1)

===

1944.

>

-----------------1----- - - - - - 1942:
1st halL __ ____________ 24,899
2d halL ______________ 29,279

serious problem. Peak imports of 2,058,000 tons

were reached during the first half of fiscal
1942. By early 1944, imports were down to
about 40 percent of their wartime peak, and they
continued to fall off drastically. To counter the
severe shortage of imported coking coal, efforts
were made 'to utilize greater quantities of the
best available domestic coal. Of the coking coal
used by the YalVata iron and steel plant during
the first half of fiscal year 1943, 58 percent was
low grade domestic. This percentage rose to 62
in the first half and to 68 in the second half of

(I)

Not available.

The loss of good coking coal, most oj which

came from North China, was probably tl .J most

>

Imports of iron ore declined at about the same

rate as coking coal. The wartime peak for iron
ore imports, amounting to 1,356,000 tons, was
reached during the third quarter of fiscal 1942.
By the first quarter of 1944, they were down to
692,000 tons, and they fell successively to 458,000,
812,000 and 206,000 in the following quarters -of
the fiscal year. Some compensation was had in
the ri~ing domestic output, which reached its
peak in the second quarter of 1944. The last
drafts on the iron ore stockpile also helped to eke
out supplies in 1943, when 400,000 tons were used
and in 1944 when the remnant supply of 190,000
tons was taken.
Pig iron imports held up steadily until the last
quarter of '1944, then they turned sharply downward. Production declined straight through 1944,
largely as a result of short supplies and inferior
grades of available ore and cokiIig coal. Several
newly constructed blast furnace plants, including
the Amagasaki Steel Works and Nakayama Steel
Works, had to be shut down because of the shortage of raw materials.
By 1944, scrap was more plentiful than pig
iron, and most of the producers returned to the
high scrap to pig iron ratios they had used before
the war. Nevertheless ingot steel production
declined steadily and sharply through fiscal 1943
and 1944. Annual production of 5,911,000 tons
for fiscal 1944 was down nearly 2 million tons
from the 1943 peak of 7,821,000 tons.
Finished steel, reached its peak output during
the last quarter of fiscal 1943. This supply of
finished steel helped to sustain shipping, ordnance,
and aircraft production for the rest of 1944. After
the first quarter of fiscal 1944 there was a precipi~
tous drop, resulting in a decline of 1,300,000 tons
for the year as a whole.

29

TABLE

19.-Production of finished steel, fiscal years 1942-44

(Thousand metric tons}
Fiscal quarters

1942

1943

1944

----------1----------

1_________________________ .
1,033
11 _______________________ _
922
111 ______________________ _
1,021
IV ______________________ _
1,076

TotaL______________

4,052

1,401
1,307
1;389
1,512

1,429
1,051
1,059
781

5,609

4,320

Throughout the war, moreover, production delays occurred as a result of faulty administration
of steel allocations. Over-allocation of the limited
supply coupled with over-optimistic planning led
to chronic failure of scheduled deliveries. The
resulting dislocation of production added to the
difficulties caused by the 'intrinsic shortage.
The Japanese failure to develop an adequate
sYnthetic oil industry left a vulnerable point ia
the war economy. At the outbreak of the war
synthetic oil productlon, at the rate of :!OO,OOO
barrels annually, was less than 116 percent of
estimated requirements, and little or no expansion
was achieved during the war years. Limitations
of technical skill, and the inability of the economy
to supply competing military and industrial needs
for large quantities of high-grade steel and complicated equipment, combined to prevent the construction of large-scale synthetic petroleum plants
in Japan either before or after Pearl Harbor.
The plants that did operate, unlike those in Germany, were never an important factor in aviation
fuel production. Inner Zone production of na tural
petroleum averaged barely 1,500,000 barrels annually during the war years, with Manchurian
shale oil production supplying possibly 3,000,000
additional barrels. Combined Inner Zone production from all sources amounted to roughly
5,000,000 barrels, or about one-sixth of total needs.
Output of crude oil in the Netherlands East
Indies, along with Inner Zone imports, reached a
wartime peak in 1943. The situation rapidly
changed, however, and by the fall of 1944 Japan
was beginning to scrape the bottom of its oil
barrel. Last imports of crude oil from the south
were received in the final quarter of fiscal 1944.
In April 194,5.Jhe remaining Inner Zone stocks fell
below two' hundred thousand barrels. Although
Netherlands East Indies crude oil production was
about 80 percent of normal in fiscal 1943, stocks
in the Inner Zone declined continuously during

the war years because of inadequate shipping,

Japan's civilian labor force. In February 1944,
A large part of the East Indies production was
agriculture, forestry, and fishing absorbed 46.8
consumed in the south; in the 1943-44 period. percent of the total civilian labor force, with
much of it was lost in transit. Production was r manufacturing, mining, and construction taking
also cut back because more could not be moved.
32.5 percent. In October 1940, the corresponding figures hlld been 44.3 and 26.8 percent.
TABLE 20.-Crude oil production and stocks, fiscal' years
Other factors added to the difficulty of secur1942-44
ing a labor force adequate to man the munitions
(Thousands of barrels]
industries. Even in 1941 there was no longer a
reserve of adult unemployed workers. MobilizaConInn'tT zone
Output
Burned
Fiscal quarters
Imports I---~-tion of labor thus meant, for the most part, just
inNEr
in
south I
Output
Stock 2
a shifting of' workers from one occupation to
----------------------another. Between October 1940 and February
1942:
L _______________ 1,966 1, 133
1944, after adjustment for students not yet added
430 12,346
IL ______________ 4,003 1,861
to the labor force in the latter month,9 there was
407 10,390
IIL _____________ 3,426 3,093
400
8,748
a net gain of only 944,000 in the Japanese civilian
IV _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ 6, 020 2,059
453
7, 677
labor force. Male workers, which show an actuai
.--------------decrease of about 300,000, were drained off by
TotaL _ 25, 927 15, 415 8, 146 1, 670 ______ _
the military and only partially replaced by women,
==========
1943:
among whom the gainfully employed increased by
L _______________ 6,544 3,712
441
6,839
some 1,400,000 in the 1940-44 period. .
IL ______________ 9,552 2,264
442
5, 557
As mentioned above, Japan's labor force was
IIL _____________ 9,475 2, 546
466 .4,839
also marked by qualitative deficiencies. There
IV _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ 9, 555 1,326
465
3, 512
was an exceedingly small reserve of skilled workers,
--------------TotaL __ 149, 614 35, 126 9, 848 1, 814 ______ _
with insufficient attention devoted to training
- - - =;===:.-.=:::.=.=.. = =
programs in the prewar period. Yyhen such
1944:
programs were finally instituted, it was no longer
. L __________ ~ ____ 7,814
994
419
2,354
possible to keep the supply of skilled workers
IL _________ ~ ____ 8,442
224
386
1,240
IIL _____________ 8,881
abreast of industrial expansion. Uncontrolled
423
379
594
IV ______________ 6,816
military conscription, with only slight provision
401
490
--------------for deferment, also cut into the skilled labor force.
TotaL ~ _ 36, 916 31,953 1, 641 1,585
After 1942, during which year requirements
were met with ease, manpower difficulties became
1 Includes refined products; no breakdown fro: losses.
greater year by year. By June 1943 itwas evident
2 At beginning of period.
that the early pool of nonessential civilian proMANPOWER MOBILIZATION
duction workers had been largely exhausted and
that new sources had to be tapped. In late 1943
The conversion of civilian industry provided
and early 1944 mal~ workers were debarred from
relatively few workers to meet the war sectors'
working in 17 categories of industry. Tighter
increasing demand for manpower in 1943-45. By
controls were established over the nation's 1.8
the drastic reduction in cottonl!pindles after 1942,
million day laborers, and increasing numbers of
for example, only 82,000 workers were released
students
were brought into factories for limited
for essential industry. .Against this meager gain
periods. Some prisoners of war and penitentiary
from one of the largest of the converted industries
inmates were placed in the labor force. The
should be set the demands of the armed forcesmaximum age for labor conscription was advanced
roughly 5 million conscripts in the 1943-45 period.
from 40 to 45 years. Labor conscription placed
During these years, moreover, production sights
were raised to unprecedented heights in aircraft,
699,728 male workers in essential industries in
shipbuilding, and ordnance.
1943, raising to 1.3 million the total number conWeaknesses in Japan's economic structure in'As of February 1944, Table 22 shows 8 total civiliB.Il labor force ot 31,creased the difficulties of this manpower shortage.
657,(X)(), with 18,411,000 males and 13,246,000 femalp-s. Adding the students .
to ma.ke the data comparable to October 1940, tho corresponding total
A primitive agriculture absorbed nearly half of
becomes 33,427.000. with 19,415,000 males and 14,012,000 females.

30

714928-47-4

scripted since 1939. Large n lditional numbers

of workers were "frozen" to th ir jobs.
In 1944 the government tu!' ed largely to students and women for solutic I of the growing
manp~wer problem. All ren: ining restrictions
on student mobilization were removed in April
and industry began absorbing 'lem in greatly increased numbers. By the enc of the war, more
than three million students ha been successfully
placed in industry. A specil: effort to enroll
women- in the labor force had n~ ,re limited results.
The Women's Volunteer Co ps, organized in
March 1944, succeeded in 1 obilizing 470,000
women for factory work. Du!' 19 the last year of
the war the armed services rev( sed their previous
indiscriminate conscription pol :y. The military
authorities, in this period, gr' lted 850,000 permanent deferments and 1,600, 00 temporary deferments, even managing to del obilize and return
small numbers of skilled wo kers to essential
plants. In 1944-45 the goverJ1 nent also resorted
to shifting workers from one efential industry to
another deemed even more essp ltial.
21.-Percentage distribution () civilian labor force by
industry' and sex, Japan proper, 0,. 1,1940 and Feb. 22,

TABLE

1944
Oct. 1, 1940

Feb. 22, 1944

Industry
Total

Male F"

--- - - -

lIe Total

Male Fema.le

..

---- ---

Civilian labor force __ 100. 0 100.0 10,

Agriculture and forI
estry ____________ 42.6 33. 5 5
Fishing ____________ 1.7 2. 4
Mining ____________ 1.8 2. 7
Manufacturing and
construction _____ 25.0 31. 3 1
Commerce _________ 15.0 15. 2
Transport~tio~ and I
communIcatIOn ___ . 4. 2 6.2
Government and
profe~sional ~ _____
6.8 7.7
DomestIc servlce ____ 2.2
.2[
Others ____________
.7
.8

0100.0 100. 0 100. 0

I
1

6 42. 3 30. 3 59.0

5 1.5 2. 1
.6
6 2. 5 3.7 1.0
3 30.0 39.3 17.0
7 7. 5 6. 1 9. 3
2

5. 2

7.5

2.0

3
3
5

9.2 10. 3
1.5
.3
.4
.4

7: 6
3.1
.4

The slowing down of japan's var economy, first

evidence in basic industry (: Iring 1944, was,
however, not primarily attri lutable to labor
scarcity, the quality of the wo kers available, or
the administration of manpo ver , mobilization.
These factors had some infiuenr e in cutting down
Japan's ability to hold the mi 1-1944 production
level, but the primary cause was the growing

31

TABLE

22.-Civilian labor force in Japan proper, 1 Oct.

1940 and:e:e Feb. 1944 by industries
[Thousands oC persons]
Total
Oct. 1.1940 Feb. 22. 1944

Agriculture ________________________ 13,842

13,376
Marine products _______ ,____________
543
464
598
805
Mining____ ____ ___ _____ _________ __ _
Manufacturing and construction______ 8,132
9,494
Commerce__ ___ ___ ______________ ___ 4, 882
2,364
Transportation and communication_ __ 1,364
1,650
Government and professionaL _ _ _____ 2, 145
~ 900
Domestic servic.e___________________
709
473
Others ______ ~ ____ - _- _.. _- - - - - - - - - - - ~~

curtailerl throughout 1944. For lack of these

imports the Japanese economy was in effect
drying up at the roots from six months to a year
before the period of intensive air attack and
ultimate collapse in 1945.

IMPACT ON THE CIVILIAN ECONOMY

Cloth,ing supplies were' affected to a much

greater extent than most other nondurable consumers' goods as a result of the diversion of the
IIlajor portion of the textile industry'S facilities to
aircraft production, and the cutting 'off of most
imports of textiles. The large cotton spinning
industry provided the greatest single resource
within the civilian economy. Major reductions
in this industry had begun in 1942, but the cuts
went much deeper in 1943-44. The workers were
IIlobilized for military service or the war industries,
machinery was turned into scrap, and the buildings
were used to house war factories.

Resources of the Jap/l.nese civilian economy were

much smaller than those of most other belligerent
powers.. To the extent that such resources ex- i
isted, however, they were drafted in 1943-44 more
completely in the services. of war production. '
The pressure of the war effort on the civilian
population became progressively greater during
TABLE 23.-Reduction in the cotton industry, calendar
TotaL _______ ..
years 1937-44
the war years. As m9re and more manpower,
civilian goods, productive faciljties, and civilian
Calendar year
Spindles
Workers
supplies were diverted to the war machine, conand
services
declined
sumers' outlays for goods
Male
1937 _________________________ _
12, 165, 000 208, 154
from 26.7 to 18.8 billions of 1940 yen from 1940
1941 ____ : _______ ____________ _ 11,435,000 164,095
1942
_________________________
_
Agriculture ______________ - - - - _____ _ 6,618
to 1944--:-a decline of 30 percent.
5,569
8,646,000 115,605
1943 _________________________ _
Marine products __________ - - - - - -_ - __
476
380
Although the food situation at the beginning of
4, 166, 000
80, 977
1944
_________________________
_
Mining. _________________ - - - - _- ___ _
529
681
3,593,000
56,000
the war was satisfactory, Japan's dependence on
Manufacturing and construction _____ . 6, 179
7,243
imports
for
almost
one-fifth
of
rice
requirements,
Commerce ________________ - - - _____ _ 3,006
1, 127
and about four-fifths for such staples as sugar and
Transportation and communication __ _ 1,214
1,385
From this remnant cotton goods industry, a
soybeans necessitated great care in the handling
Government and professionaL ______ _ 1,515
1,895
much greater proportion of output was usurped
Domestic service __________ - - ______ _
58
39
of food distribution. In preparation for war, a
by the military for war use. By 1943-44, as
Others .. __________ - ______ - - -- - - - - __
154
73
rice rationing system in the six largest Japanese
shown in table 24, the military were taking more
cities was initiated during April 1941. Shortly
TotaL _____________ . ________ 19,730 118,411
than half of the reduced supply instead of the
after Pearl Harbor, rice rationing was made
________ 219,415
minute
fraction of a far greater supply taken in
country-wide. During the war years, the food
1937. Much the same picture is presented by the
situation rapidly deteriorated due to lowered imFemale
woolen industry. The cut-down for the civilian
ports, the drain upon manpower, and poor crop
population between these years was staggering.
yields. Domestic food production in 1944 was
Agriculture _______________________ _ 7,223
7,807
In
1937 the net supply of cotton clot:\:!. for civilian
about
25
percent
below
the
prewar
average.
Rice
Marine products ___________________ _
67
84
use had totaled' 2,184 million square yards. By
imports declined from 2.5 million metric tons in
Mining __________________________ _
69
124
1941 to !S75,000 tons in 1944, and by the end of
1943 the Japanese civilians were reduced to
Manufacturing and construction _____ _ 1,954
2,251
commerce ________________________ _ 1,876
1, 237
fiscal 1944, the rice reserve was exhausted. This
51 million square yards. Little or no additional
Transportation and communication __ _
265
150
decline was only partly off;et by trippling grain
Government and professionaL ______ _
1,005
680
imports from Manchuria. The supply of fish and
Domestit service ________ . _________ _
415
670
Others ___________________________ _
58 marine products was sharply curtailed, due to
64
manpower shortages and restricted fishing waters.
TotaL _ __ ______ __ ___ ________ 12, 753 1 13, 246
The food position became more alarming as the
________ 14,012
war went on and necessitated a tightening of the
rationing system, with the major emphasis on
1 To make territoriaJ areas comparable to the 1940 census, it is necessary to
channeling available supplies to essential workers
add about 140.000 (with 32.000 males and 108,000 females) to the total.
J ,Adjusted tor students not yet enrolled in labor force, and other statistical
and special segments of the population. The
differences between the 1940 and 1944 censUE.
'average caloric intake of the civilian population
in 1944 was estimated to have declined about 20
shortage of raw materials. Imports of coking
percent from the not too high level of 2,250 calories
coal, iron ore, bauxite and oil, to name but the
per day in 1941-substantially below the minimost significant commodities, had begun to fall
off late in calendar 1943 and were progressively
mum requirement of 2,160 calories.
1

-----~- --- ----~:~ ~~~ -I : ~!: :~~

32

silk or synthetic fiber was available to compensate

for the loss of the cotton cloth.
TABLE

24.-Allocation of cotton and wool cloth supply,

calendar years 1937-44
(Millions of square yards)

Calendar
year

-Total

Wool cloth

Cotton cloth
Civilian

Mill

tory

Total

CiYilian

Mill-

tory

- - - ----- - - - - - - - - - - 1937 ______ 2,214.0 2,184.0

1941- _____ 449. 2 310.2
1942 ______ 353. 3 182.4
1943 ______ 283. 9
51. 0
1944 ______ 375.3 174.6

30.0 259.5 248. 9

139.0 83.1 62. 5
170.9 66.0 39.1
332.9 71.8 43.0
200. 7 M3 19.3

10.6
20.6
26.9
28. 8
35.0

Civilian supplies of furniture in 1944 were only

about one-half the prewar volume while most of
the durable goods had almost completely disappeared from the market.
Although the supply for the medical care of
civilians was maintained at fairly high levels, the
nation's health was endangered by severe shortages of drugs, medical supplies, proper housing,
and lighting and heating materials.
Residential construction declined approximately
75 percent from 1941 to 1944. Despite the everincreasing demand resulting from the concentration of wOJ:kers in the large industrial areas, building materials were diverted from housing to war
construction. The allocation of lumber for residential construction fell from 9.7 million koku in.
1941 to only 2.2 million in 1944. In addition,
some 400,000 dwelling units were destroyed in'
early 1944 to provide firebreaks in anticipation of
large-scale B-29 raids. The feeble attempts to
provide government housing for war workers did
little to alleviate the housing shortage.

33

Chapter III

THE AIR ATTACK AGAINST JAPAN'S WAR ECONOMY

..

In the war against Japan, as in the European

struggle, a major part of the battle was carried
on in the skies. The forces engaged were, until
the last months of the war, much small!)r than
those co=itted in Europe, but these operations
constituted a very large fraction of the total
combatant effort. Starting from a virtual zero
point after the initial Japanese successes in 1941
and the first half of 1942, United States air
strength in the Far East i rose as follows:
First line com
bat aircraft

....

Men

Tons of bom b8

dropped

----

January 1943 ________

January 1944 __ . _____
January 1945 ________
April 1945 __________
July 1945 ___________
1

1,622
3,174
4,911
5,827
7, 260

91,060
24.5,677
402,307
439,628
467,957

7.52
7, 558
19,055
40, 756
50,798

Does not include mines.

Naval and marine figures for the same months

are as follows:
First line com-

bat aircraCt

January 1943 ________

January 1944 ________
January 1945 ________
April 1945 ___________
1945 ___________
July

1,915
8,2.68
13,065
104, 576
14,648

Men

-----.----------------------

-------------------

Tons of bombs
dropped

120
.1,723
3, 824
9, 161
5,612

Data on Japanese air strength are not lmtirely

reliable, but the following figures give the order
of maponit,ude of Japanese for-ces:
Firstlin6
combat

Men

aircraft i

----------il---- ---January 1942 __________________ _

2,520
78, 500
January 1943 _________________ _
3,200
84, 500
January 1944 _________________ _
117,000
4,050
January 1945 _________________ _
184, 250
4,100
July 1945 _____________________ _
4,600
I Includes reconnaissance aircraft, but not the 5,600 suicide planes available
by July 1945.
1 Including theaters from Hawaii as Csr west as India. Does no~ include
Eighth Army Air Force which was redeployed in the Far East but did not

become operational.

The total bomb tonnage used in the entire air

effort against Japan was 583,962. Of this, 161,425
tons or 28 percent were dropped on Japan proper.
Naval air forces accounted for 6,740 tons, Far
Eastern Air Forces for 7,109 tons, and the Twentieth AF for 147,576 tons. By contrast, the
total bomb tonnage in the European theater was
2,6rJ7,433 tons, of which 1,356,808 tons were
dropped on Germany.
Because of the depth of the Japanese defense
perimeter and the concentration of Japanese pro~
duction in the home islands, it was not until the
fourth year of the war that Allied air power was
able to mount heavy air attacks against Japan's
war economy. Although the air campaign against
shipping in 1944 was of major importance, the
bomb tonnage involved was comparatively small.
Until December 1944, the predominant weight of
air operations was devoted to direct attacks against
enemy air and surface forces. Such specific military operations, by notably increasing Japanese
combat wastage, had extremely significant effects
on Japanese strength, pfJ,rticularly in the fields of
shipping and aircraft. But they were not undertaken primarily for that purpose and their success
was measured in terms of their contribution to
current military operations.
Basic United States strategy contemplated that
the decision in the Japanese war would be attained
by a ground force invasion of the Japanese islands.
The bomb offensive against the Japanese home
islands was initiated in November 1944 with this
in mind. As in Europe, prior to D-day, the measure of success set up for strategic air action was
the extent to which it would weaken enemy resistance to our ground forces at the time of landings.
This led to selection of targets such as aircraft
factories, arsenals, electronics plants, and finished
military goods, the destruction of which could be
expected to weaken the capabilities of the Japanese armed forces to meet ours on Kyushu beachheads in November 1945, rather than of targets
constituting the more basic production facilities.
The possibility of attaining this result wbile at
the same time putting pressure on the whole Japanese economic and social order by attacking the

35

distribution of raw material) energy, and finished

and semifinished goods was not actively considered until the beginning of April 1945. While it
was recognized as not impossible that Japan would
surrender prior to invasion, it, was felt that intelligence appraisals of political and morale factors
were bound to be so uncertain that target selection
could safely be made only on the assumption that
ground force action would be inevitable. 2
Air operations against Japan's war economy fall
into two main categories: Those that contributed
to blockade (countershipping), and those -that
were directed against industrial and urban area.
targets.

COUNTERSHIPPING
Air attacks against sl!ipping were carried on
throughout the war. Until November 1943 they
were undertaken almost exclusively as part of
military and naval operations, first as delaying
actions in the Philippines, Malaya, Netherlands,
Indies, and Burma; later in support of the long
"offensives in the Southwest and Central Pacific.
Land-based aircraft of the Thirteenth, Fifth, and
Seventh Anny Air Forces, and of Navy and
Marine units were active both in search and
attack. Carrier-based forces mainly attacked
large shipping concentrations.
In the fall of 1943, attaeks against two Japanese
main economic overseas shipping routes-that
between Singapore and Japan and that between
the iron ore shipping points on the Yangtze and
Japan, which had hitherto been maintained by
submarines alone--were supplemented by Fourteenth AF operations from China bases. These
were the first air attacks of any magnitude
directed primarily against Japan's economy.
They took the form of sca sweeps, bombardment of shipping and ship loading and repair
facilities at mainland ports from Hainan to
Shanghai, and the bombing, mining, and strafing
of Yangtze shipping and ports.
In the spring and summer of 1944, effort which
would have otherwise been available for this
campaign was used to establish Twentieth Bomber
Command bases in China and to supply B-29
operations a~inst nonshipping targets from these
bases. The limited capacity of the air supply
lIt is to be noted, however, that in spite of the preparationfor-invasion
concept of strategic air attack, 8 number of urban area target chosen by the
field command of the Twentieth Anny Air Force were more consistent with
an objective of securing a decision by air power alone. See the discussion on
later pages of B-29 operations from the Marianas.

36

operation ovel! the "Hump" had been the limiting

factor on Fourteenth AF operations from the
beginning, and adequate logistic support of both
air forces was impossible.
In October 1944, a task force sweep against the
Ryukyus brought Japanese economic life lines for
the first time under naval air attack, and with the
fall of the Philippines late in the same year, landbased air power, not hampered by logistic limitations, was brought within range of the main enemy
sea routes. A carrier sweep of the South China
Sea against shipping concentrations at sea and in
ports from Cape St. Jacques to the Ryukyus was
carried out in January 1945, and until the Japanese abandoned the route in March 1945, FEAF
(Far Eastern Air Forces) and land-based naval
aircraft hunted down enemy shipping in the South
and East China Seas and along the length of the
China and Formosan coasts.
Even before the securing of Okinawa in June
1945, FEAF and long-range land-based naval air
units, operating from the island, extended their
countershipping activities to the Yellow Sea, the
Korean Straits, and the waters around Kyushu.
These activities continued until the conclusion of
hostilities.
"
In the final months of the war, several carrier
strikes were mounted against the Japanese home
islands. Merchant shipping concentrations were
not made a primary targe.t, but significant shipping
attacks occured incident to the main operatious
particularly in the southern Hokkaido-Norther~
Honshu strike of July ..
Beginning at the end of March 1945, the B-29's
took a powerful hand in the shipping attack. An
aerial mining campaign was undertaken against
all still active harbors and home island shipping
routes. It operated not only against overseas
traffic, but against the even more important inter. island movement and in the late stages of the ",~
was extended to the Korean ports. Appro:;imately 6 percent of the B-29 sorties flown d 1ll illg
this period were devoted to this effort, and more
would have been flown had enough mines boen
available. In all, 12,000 mines were dropped on
a total of about 20 target areas.

INDUSTRIAL AND URBAN TARGETSEARLY ATTACKS

Until June 1944 there was virtually no industry
of importance to the Japanese war economy within
range of United States air bases. The phosphate

rock mining facilities on Nauru and the ' elebes

nickel concentration were successfully put ,ut of
action in 1943. An attack was made on " Ie oilrefinery and storage at Balikpapan in Augu, 1943.
With the exception of the Doolittle raid ( April
1942, which was obviously in too little s "ength
to achieve anything but a morale' effect n the
United States, these were the only raids 01 Japanese industrial targets prior to the activatioi of the
Twentieth Bomber Command B-29 bases in ;hina.

Operating from India bases, the Twentieth

Bomber Command, in January, February, and
March 1945, mined the harbors of Singapore and
Saigon, and two mining missions were flown
along the Yangtze during the same months,
presumably from China bases.
Burmese and Siamese railroads, Singapore and
Saigon dockyards, and tactical targets in Burma
and Malaya were the principal objects of the
balance of Twentieth Bomber Command attacks.

TWENTIETH BOMBER COMM AND

B-29's

MARIANAS B-29's

Twentieth Bomber Command operations, vhich,

as we have noted, imposed a limitation OJ Fourteenth Army Air Force operations, had 1I their
primary objective the destruction of Manl mrian
and northern Kyushu steel capacity.3 Two
attacks were made by the Twentieth I )mber
Command on the Yawata steel plant in J yushu
and three on the Showa plant at Anshan Manchuria, the total weight dropped on the two a,rgets
being, respectively, 221 and 550 tons. Res] its are
discussed in the next chapter.
To~ard the end of October 1944, top 1 'iority
was given to aircraft targets, and between 7 July
1944 and 6 January 1945 some 500 tOIl were
dropped on the Omura Aircraft Assembly Plant,
the sole important Japanese aircraft tCtory
within range from Chengtu.
Attacks of 36 and 56 tons, respectivel., were
made against the naval dockyards at Sasp '0 and
the town of Nagasaki in July and August c 1944.
Of some 5,200 tons of bombs dropped by 3-29's
operating from China bases between 6 Jm ' 1944
and 17 January 1945, over 1,000 tons were d opped
on a total of four Japanese targets.
Insignificant attacks with from 2 to 60ms of
bombs were made on various Chinese PIts by
aircraft unable to bomb their primary targ' ts and
one heavy attack, primarily for tactical pll poses,
was made against Hankow.
In support of the Philippines campaii' 1, airfields and air installations targets on E' rmosa
received some 2,000 tons of bombs from ;hinabased B-29's.

The air attack on industrial objectives in Japan

proper did not get under way until the end of
November 1944, when the Marianas B-29 bases
became operational. Between 24 November and
9 March 1945, the effort was directed almost
exclusively against aircraft targets. Bombing
accuracy was poor, loads were light and opposition
was serious.
At the beginning of March it was decided to
make night incendiary attacks on the major
Japanese cities at comparatively low altitudes
(5,000-8,000 feet). This decision was made
partly for operational reasons and in the belief
that the industrial results of urban-area attacks
would be far more significant than they had been
in Germany, because of the greater fire vulnerability of Japanese cities and the importance of
small industry to Japanese war production. It
was further thought that destruction of the
principal urban areas would prevent any substantial recuperation of the aircraft industry and
prevent the conversion to its use of other industrial facilities, particularly machine tools. Finally, there was a strong opinion, that the will of the
Japanese people and of its government to resist
could be greatly weakened and perhaps destroyed
by urban area attacks. Between 9 March and
16 April 1945, 53.5 square miles of the cities of
Tokyo, Kawasaki, Yokohama, Nagoya, Kobe,
and Osaka were burned out in low-level night
incendiary attacks, and the new operating technique became firmly established.
At the end of March, B-29 operations were, as
noted above, broadened to include sea mining.
From that time on, about 6 percent of the total
effort was devoted to this target system.
Early in April the main weight of attack was
shifted back to precision targets largely because
the unprecedented heavy bomb lift which resulted

I The extent to which raW material shortage in Japan had alrea(

the operation of the Yawata area steel plants was unknown to Un
intelligence agencies and both the output and the exports to In
Manchurian steel plants were overestimated. While these facts c
the Dature oC the targets actually chosen, they were, of course, not
mining factor in the decision to base B-29's in China. Target appra
the movement had indicated that top priority should be given t
rather than steel plants.

,- reduced
I)d States
m of tlie
lditioned
he deter0.1 prior to
shipping

37

from lowering the operating altitude in the urbanarea attacks had depleted the supply of incendiaries on hand at the operating bases. In the
first half of the month, effort was again concentrated
on aircraft plants which still had top priority in
target directives because of the kamikaze threat
and our lack of knowledge of the drop in production which had occurred as a result of Japanese
plant dispersal efforts. Though some evidences
of dispersal had been discovered, there was nothing
in the information at hand or in the British or
German experience to indicate the extent of collapse
in production which had, in fact, occurred.
April also saw precision-bombing attacks on
two chemical plants which were believed to be
making tetraethyllead.
During the last half of April and the first half of
May, virtually the entire"8-29 effort was diverted
from strategic targets to the bombardment of Kyushu airfields in support of the Okinawa operation.
Beginning in May, a considerable tonnage was
directed against oil targets, and from the third
week in June on, about 20 percent of the available
B-29 effort was so employed. The 315th Wing,
with special precision radar equipment, was
devoted exclusively to this target system until
the close of the war.
In the latter part of June, urban area incendiary
attacks were resumed and from then until the
end of the war continued on an increasing scale,
absorbing about 70 percent of B-29 bomb tonnage.
Although an effort was made to direct these attacks
toward targets the destruction of which would do
damage to industrial production, the preponderant
purpose appears to have been to secure the heaviest
possible morale and shock effect by widespread
attack upon the Japanese civilian population.
To this end, the practice was adopted, in July,
of broadcasting, in advance, the names of towns
marked for destruction. Certain of the cities
attacked had virtually no industrial importance.
Others were significant o,nly as transportation
centers, but results of earlier attacks had demonstrated that incendiaIY bombs were ineffective
against railroad targets. During this period, 55
towns were subjected to incendiary strikes.
Large percentages of all these targets were burned
out. In 15"cases the figures ran from 70 to 90
percent and in 14 cases from 50 to 70 percent.
In May, June, and July, airframe plants and
certain other aircraft factories were a principal
target for precision attack. Seven thousand and

38

forty-five tons, amounting to about 8 percent of

the total effort during these months, were expended
against these objectives.
During June, July, and August, 5,270 tons of
bombs were dropped in eight precision attacks
on five army and navy arsenals. The same period
saw three attacks on two light metals processors
(1,020 tons) and one heavy electrical equipment
producer (806 tons).

TABLE

Tons

Total. __ . ______ _

TO~ge tot~

Buildings, urban areas_____________________

Industry _________________ ___ ________ _____
Railroads _____________________________ ..
Harbor facilities_ _ ___ ______ __ ____ ____ __ ___
Antiaircraft positions__ ___ _____________ __ __
Oil storage_________ _____________________
Military supplies___________ ____________ __
Shipping ________________________________ .
Others _______________________________ - __ _

4,851
4,565
1, 547
791
1,449
677
506
518
380
520

Total. _________________ - - - - - - - - - - - -

15,804

7,111

IWO-BASED FIGHTERS
P-51's were based on lwo primarily to provide
escort for B-29's. Strafing attacks wcre' carried
out mainly against airfields and railroads, but the
distance from base was too great to permit any
substantial weight of attack:

NAVAL AIRCRAFT
The primary mission of the operations against
Formosa was a tactical one, the neutralization of
enemy air strength on the island in support of
United States campaigns in the Philippines and
Okinawa. Two thirds of the available bomb
to=age was directed at Formosan urban areas,
ports, railroads, and industry on the theory that
this would assist the ground eampaign in Luzon
by affecting resupply-of Japanese ground forces.
Seven thousand one hundred tons of bombs
were dropped on Japanese targets by the Fifth
and Seventh Air Forces between June 1945 and
the end of the war. The distribution of this tonnage among target systems is sct out in table 26.

Tons

Percentage

Carricr strikes werc made against the Japanese

islands in 1945. The' main effort was expended
against opcrational aircraft, airfields, and naval
vesscls already rcndered inoperative by lack of oil.
Attacks werc also made on several aircraft plan ts,
on oil depots, harbors, and shipping. The tonnage was distributed among targets as follows in
Table 27.
One mission scheduled against the Kammen Tunnel entrance was frustrated by (oul weather and this particular target was later specifically assigned

to other forces. There remained, however, at least four vital rail yards in
the area, MOji, Shimonosekl, IIatabu, and Tobata as well as bridges sDd
yards on the Sanyo-, Kagoshima, and Chikubo lines which were essential
to the movement of Kyushu and Ube district coal.
t

Airfields________ ______________ _____ 3,176

47.1
Warships__________________________ 1,282
19.0
Military targets____________________
442
6.6
Countershipping____________________ 1,095
16.2
Merchant ships, 834 ___________________________ _
Harbors, 261.____________
_ ___________ _
Industry _ _ _ _ ________ ____________ __
603
8. 9
Transportation___ _____ __ ___ ___ __ ___
142
2. 1
TotaL______________________

6,740

99.9

100.0

It will be noted that over half of the countershipping' effort and 9 perceJ)t of the total was
expendcd against port installations, although, at
this stage of the war, the rr erchant fleet had been
so reduced that these facilities were used to only
small fraction of capacity. Over 35 percent of tl;e
effort was scattered over urban areas and industrial targets of minor significance. The railroad
attack, amounting to 15 percent of the tonnage,
was eentered on the rail net serving the rura~ areas
of southern Kyushu.~

25.-Distribution of 5th Air Force effort against

Formosan targets

Airdr~mes ____________________ . __________ .i

27.-Distribution of bomb tonnage by Naval Aircraft on Japanese targets

Percentage

TacticaL____ _____________________ 2,242

31. 5
Countershipping____________________ 1,287
18.1
Ships, 629 ____________________________________ _
Ports, 640 ____________________________ _
Naval installations, 18 _________________________ _
Land communications_______________ 1,103
15.5
Urban areas_______________________ 1,514
21. 3
Miscellaneous (principally industrial) __
507
7. 1
Unidentified___________ ___________
458
6.5

The liberation of the' Philippines brought Formosan targets within range of the Far Eastern
Air Forces, comprising the Fifth, Seventh, and
Thirteenth Air Forces. During the ensuing
months, airfields, aluminum plants, power plants
serving these, urban areas, railroads, ports, and
shipping were subjected to attack. The distribution of this tonnage is shown in table 25.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _1

TABLE

-------------1-----

FAR EASTERN AIR FORCES

TABLE

26.-Distribution of tonnage by Fifth .and Seventh AF

between June 1945 and end of war

Over one-third of the eft'ort against airfields

was expended in support of the Okinawa campaign.
Of the balance, the hulk, particularly in the early
strikes, was part of the eApense of conducting the
operation and was to a large extent for the purpose
of gaining control of the Japanese air.
Of the countershipping cffort, about one-quarter
was expended against harbor facilities, of which,
as noted ~ the discussion of Far Eastern Air Force
attack, thc cnemy had a plethora.
Long-range land-based naval aircraft from
Okinawa flew shipping search and attack missions
over the East China and Yellow Scas and KOI ean
Straits. The effort of this force and that of FEAF,'
against shipping, supplemented each other. Thcse
naval aircraft also attacked the main Korcan
rail lines.

TENTH AIR FORCE

The mission of the Tenth AF was tactical support of the ground forces in Burma. The bulk
of bom bard rr: ent was directed against Burmese
mih'oads and river traffic in support of ground
operations. Techniques of attack and tactical
target selection 'appeal to have been highly developed. Use of air power as a means of large
scale transport and supply of ground troops was a
prominent feature of the late stages of the operations of this air force.

ELEVENTH AIR FORCE

This air force was based in the Aleutians.
During the period of active fighting ill this area
its mission was tactical. After the recovery of
Attu and Kiska, its principal targets were Japanese
military installations and shipping in the Kuriles ..

39

Chapter IV

EFFECT OF ALLIED AIR OPERATIONS ON THE JAPANESE

WAR ECONOMY

In August 1945, the Japanese war economy was

bankrupt. Although accumulated stocks of military supplies were still considerable; the eurrent
output of aircraft, armaments, and oil had dropped
to levels insufficient to support any long-sustained
defense against invasion. The destruction of a
major portion of the plants in these industries
rendered the possibility of recuperation negligible.
While full-scale suicide effort could have been
supported by the supplies on hand, they not only
would have been exhausted in a few months of
full-scale combat but were qualitatively inadequate, with such essential items as tanks, heavy
artillery, and field-communications equipment
largely lacking. A serious shortage of trucks and
fuel made the Japanese army dependent on a
highly vulnerable and overloaded railroad system
and reduced dangerously its mobility. Overseas
supplies of foodstuffs amounting to 10 percent of
the national per capita subsistence requirements
were cut off. Edible fish supplies had been cut
35 percent. Domestic rice crops Were around 10
percent below normal and fertilizer shortages
threatened to cause a severe drop in domestic
food production during the coming rice year.
These factors threatened famine by the summer
of 1946.
About 33 percent of the urban population,
which included a major fraction of Japan's industrial workers, had lost its housing, household
goods, and clothing, and been driven to rely on
the bounty of relatives and friends. There was
no prospect of replacing these houses ~nd goods
in the immediate future.
Overseas shipping routes had been almost completely denied and vital coast-wise movement
fundamentally impaired. As a result, the supplies
-of basic raw materials such as coking coal, iron
-ore, and oil, large at the beginning of the war,
were exhausted and their replenishment had beeome impossibl~. The aluminum industry was at

a standstill, steel production could not be expected to exceed 20 percent of its wartime peak,
coal production was d~clining disastrously and
coal distribution in Honshu would have become
impossible once the threatened railroad attack
materialized. Under these circumstances it was
obvious that. the invasion would find Japan without means for prolonged resistance, and that,
even if it were initially repelled, disintegration of
the entire economy would occur in a short time.
To what extent was this destruction of the
economic baRe of the Japanese war machine the
result of the operations of Allied air power as outlined in the preceding chapter?

TRANSPORTATION
Shipping
Few countries in the world have been more dependent upon shipping than was Japan during
1941-45. Her industrial activity and her food
supply depended on a steady flow of shipments
from abroad and between the various Japanese
islands. Even at the outset of the war, as we
have seen, the Japanese-owned mercflant fleet was
not large enough to meet the needs ot the economy
and to meet the logistic requirements of her forces
in the Pacific areas. The original shortage of
shipping space was aggravated by the counteroffensive of the United States, which resulted in
ship sinking that exceeded new construction.
As will be shown presently, the deterioration of
the marine transportation system had a critical
effect on most aspects of the Japanese war economy.
Air power played a large part in achieving this.
Air attacks on shipping in the Pacific war constituted a part of the sea blockade enforced by
submarines, air power, and mining. This blockade resulted in the closing, to the Japanese, of all
major sea, lines, including home island coastal
routes. It reduced the Japanese merchant marine

41

from a first-class fleet of around 6.6 million tons

in early 1942 to a remnant of l.5 millions, much
of it inoperable and predominantly composed of
slow, comparatively small and inefficient vessels.
First phase.-In the first year of the war, the
contribution of air power to the blockade was
secondary. The main burden was borne by the
submarines which alone, during this period, had
the range and ability to penetrate deeply the
defensive perimeter established by the enemy.
Second phase.-During the ensuing 21 months
(November 1942-July 1944), the bulk of ship
sinkings continued to be made by submarines and
it was their operations which caused the abandonment of su~h major shipping lanes outside the
tactical areas as the routes along the east and
south coasts of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, and
Skikoku. But during this time, as advanced
bases brought more targets within range of our
land based air patrol.s, and as our carrier forces
built up their strength, air power moved steadily
toward a position of full partnership in the enterprise. During the first 11 months of the war,
loss of only 123,000 g. r. t. (18 percent of total
tonnage sunk) was caused by air attack. During
thfl period November 1943-July 1944, however,
sinkings of 897,000 g. r. t., or 29.5 percent of
total sinkings for the period were the result of
direct air attack on ships, or of aerial mining.
In addition, Fourteenth AF bombing, strafing
and mining of shipping on the Yangtze, which
were the earliest important strategic air operations of the Japanese war, had, by the end of
1943, interdicted light ship traffic on this vital
iron ore route, and greatly increased ship turnabout time !!nd marine casualties. Chinese ore
shipments to Japan during the January-March
quarter of 1943 had amounted to 91 percent of
Japanese receipts of Fe from overseas.! Owing
largely to the attacks on Yangtze shipping, shipments declined steadily until in the JanuaryMarch 1944 quarter they reached a level of only
55 percent of those for the same quarter of the
previous year. By July 1944, the Fourteenth
AF despite the logistic problems which always
limited its capabilities, had succeeded in closing the Yantgze almost completely and imports
or Chinese iron ore fell in the July-September
quarter of 1944 to 25 percent of their January-March 1943 level. It is, of course, true
1 Pig iron imports plus iron ore imports adjusted Cor fron content and an
estimated 3 percent smelting loss.

42

that during this quarter, a drop would have

occurred in any event owing to the increasing
tightness of shipping. The drop in bottoms
available, however, was not nearly as drastic as
the drop in ore movement. Sea sweeps by the
Fourteenth AF, in addition to sinking ships,
had the by-product for several months of forcing Japanese shipping routes further offshore and
thus increasing their vulnerability to submarine
attack.
As pointed out in the preceding chapter, supply
difficulties compelled the Fourteen.th AF to
curtail operations in the spring and summer of
1944 in order to permit China-based B-29 operations. In addition, the Japanese, stung by the
results of the 14th's attacks, undertook a major
land campaign in China which resulted in N 0vember 1944 in the capture of those bases from
which operations could best be conducted against
the Singapore-Japan sea lanes.
Third p'hase.-In the final 12 months of the war,
air power played a decisive part in the blockade.
The capture of the Philippines and later of
Okinawa, meant that, for the first time during the
war, .fully supplied land based aircraft could be
located in strength at points from which the
principal shipping arteries of the enemy-the
routes from Singapore, from North China and
finally from Korea-were readily accessible to
sustained attack. In addition, carrier forces were
able to operate in enemy waters. The ships
sinkings caused by dircct air attack jumped to
1,379,000 g. r. t. or to about 50 percent of the
total for the 12 months. More important, the
actual, and in some cases the suspected, ability
of our air forces to patrol the routes to Singapore,
and across the Yellow Sea and Korean Straits.
led to virtual abandonment of the Singapore and
Yellow Sea route by March. Because of air
attack, sailings in the Korean Straits were restricted to the hours of darkness in July 1945.
The interdiction of the Southern and Yellow Sea
routes produced a markedly more rapid effect
on cargo' movement than would have been
achieved merely by the reduction in the number of
ships available during this period.
Aerial mining also contributed largely to the
"ea blockade of Japan during the last 12 months
of the war. Mining of the Yantgze played an
important part in the reduction of iron ore shipments from China discussed above. Mining of
other mainland ports such as Singapore also.

caused ship sinkings. The principal effort, however, was carried out by B-29's from the Mariannas bases against Shimonoseki Straits and iIiland
Japanese sea ports. As indicated, this campaign
began at the end of March 1945. By July it had
reduced traffic through Shimonoseki Straits to
a trickle (12 percent of the pea~ lerel), and had
severely reduced the usefulness of the Japan SeaHonshu ports which were the only ones still
comparatively free from direct air and submarine
threat. Sinkings due to aircraft mining during
the period amounted to 353,000 g. r. t. or over
12 percent of the 12 month total. In addition,
more ships were damaged than sunk, and repair
of most of these became well nigh impossible
since access to all but a small fraction of Japanese
ship repair facilities could be gained only by passing the mine fields at Shimonoseki. Submarine
attack was well maintained during this period,
despite the restricted and relatively sheltered
areas in which Japanese shipping operated. It
accounted for 1,043,000 g. r. t. or 37.5 percent of
total tonnage slmk. Together with aerial mining,
it carried the blockade into the Japan Sea, the
only area in which at the end of the war, Japanese
shipping was not subject to direct bombing attack.
SUMMARY OF SINKINGS

The tonnage of Japanese merchant vessels sunk

bf submarine, aircraft and mines during the differentphases of the Pacific war is set out in table 26.
1. The sinkings, tabulated above constitute
about 92 percent of Japanese wartime shipping
losses. The balance were marine casualties.
Some of these were due to increased hazards
imposed by Allied countershipping action. Contributing to such casualties were inadequate ship
maintenance caused by shortage of bottoms,
running without lights, use of more dangerous
routes (often at night) and the like. No quaI1titive value can be attached to such factors, but
they were significant.
2. After 1942, mining was almost entirely an
aircraft activity. Land based air patrols could
establish and maintain continuous interdiction.
The limited time during which it was felt advisable
to hold a carrier force in a given area prevented
complete and continuous interdiction. Where the
loss of the last available ports was threatened,
the mine threat was insufficient to cause stoppage
of traffic, and movement continued on a reduced
scale despite heavy sinkings.

It will be observed from the foregoing discu

that it is a misnomer to speak of the "na
"air," or "submarine" blockade of Japan,
TABLE

28-Japanese merchant ship sinkings by

action 1941-46
[Thousands of gross registered tons]

Submarines

Tonnage
sunk

Percent
of
total

Aircraft

Tonnage
sunk

h<

Per- Ton
cent nBg(
of sunl
total

---------------- --December 1941-0ctober

1942.
(Outbreak of
war to beginning of
important
countershipping airoOperations
in Guadalcanal campaign)_______________ 48071.
November 1942-0ctober
1943 (Guadalcana.! to
beginning of major
14th AF operations
against shipping) _____ 1, 18874.
November 1943-Aligust
1944 (Beginning of
14th AF
countershipping operations to
beginning of carrier
strikes
supporting
Philippines operation) _ 2, 15070.
September 1944-Augllst
1945 (Philippine campaign to Japan Sllrrender) ______________ .:..!J~137.

12318.3

6.

37423.3

846 27. 7

6,1, 379 49,'7 ~

1

Entire war-------J4, 861/60. +,722 33.6 51:

1

ticularly in the light of tbe important role pl

by interdiction of routes. Each arm,
weapon played a significant and indispen
part. The submarine predominated at the
and in the middle period, carrier- and land-l
aircraft at the end.
THE ALLIED OFFENSIVE

III weighing the effect of submarine an<

attack against the Japanese merchant m
the wastage of Japanese shipping caused b)
requirements of the military establishmeD.t
be kept in mind. The Japanesc strategIc
had called for the immediate release of a
tonnage of Army and Navy opera ted ve~se
soon as operations in the Dutch East IndleE
Malaya were concluded. The inception oj

allied counter offensive in the late summer of 1942

and the maintenance of pressure against Japanese
peripheral positions continuously thereafter prevented release of substantial amounts of Army and
Navy merchant vessels for cargo movement until
all the outlying positions had been lost. Throughout 1942 and 1943, no more than 50-55 percent of
the total merchant tonnage could be made available solely for cargo carriage and it was not until
December 1944, when the South was virtually
cut off and all of the outlying positions were lost,
that more than 62 percent could be utiliied for
purely economic purpose!
Our military and naval operations diverted
shipping from cargo transportation. They also
brought Japanese shipping within easy range of
our air forces, both ashore and afloat, and of our
submarines, exposing it" to severe losses. The
heaviest and most concel'ltrated ship casualties of
the war were inflicted on the Japanese in connection operations against the Marshalls and the
Philippines. In the course of these campaigns,
around 2 million tons were sent to the bottom by
air, submarine, and mining attack.
The attack against Japan's shipping and
shipping routes have, for convenience, been referred to in this report as "blockade". In fact,
it was not a true Clockade in the sense of the slow
economic strangulation applied to the Confederacy in 1861-64 or to Germany in 1914 -18, but
rather, an active fighting call'paign in which the
infantrymen and marines in the Solomons, Gilberts, Marshalls, N cw Guinea, Marianas, and
Philippines not only secured the bases necessary
for the operations of th'e naval and air arms, but
in a very real sense shared with the men who
dropped the bombs and aimed the torpedoes, the
credit for the sunken wrecks strewn around the
harbors and along the bottom of the Pacific from
Cape Esperance, Rabaul and Truk to Manila Bay.

Land Transportation
Blockade forced a shift of a constantly increasing portion of coastwise traffic to the rails after the
early months of 1943. This additional burden
increased the vulnerability of an already heavily
laden railroai system. No systematic air attacks
exploited this weakness. A single carrier-based
air attack in July 1945 struck the rail ferries
I It is, of course. true that on occasion Army and Navy (HA" & "B") ships
carried commercial cargo. Aside from oil, however, the amount of cargo
moved by sucb vessels was small.

44

between Hokkaido and Honshu with brilliant

success. Out of 12 ferries, 10 were destroyed
completely and 2 damaged. The capacity of the
link, over which 30 percent of Hokkaido's coal
shipments moved to H:onshu, was reduced by
82 percent, with no prospect of recovery for
9 months. Other strafing attacks and naval
bombardments liad inconsequential results. The
urban fire raids, while hampering local transpor~,
were ineffective against freight movement, whether
through direct damage, destruction of rolling
stock, or effect on labor supply. There is no
evidence that, as a direct result of any urban
attack, the railroads were unable to handle any
freight offered for transport. Physical damage
was minor and consisted principally' of the destruction of transit sheds and perhaps one-half of
1 percent of the freight car pool.
A more important factor, in limiting Japanese
economic capabilities, was the state of local
transportation. Urban arca attacks, which destroyed a considerable number of vehicles, at the
same time increased the demand for loeal transport. Manufacture of motor vehicles, however,
had been declining from the outset of the war
because of diminishing steel allocations. Though
only a single 4,000 pound experimental bomb was
dropp!'d on a truck plant in June 1945, a panicky
dispersal effort shut off any bopes for further
manufacture of vehicles.
It should be noted, however, that in July the
decision was made to concentrate strategic air
effort against the railroads. A, program of
systematic attack had been worked out and the
first operation in pursuance of it took place on the
last day of the war. The Japanese statements
that in case of such attacks they would have been
unable to continue food distribution probably
assess the situation correctly. The chapter of
this report entitled "~ostseript on Target Selection" attempts to assess the required effort and
probable results of such a program.

BASIC COMMODITIES
Steel
The inadequacy of the Japanese steel industry
to support a war against a major industrial power
has been repeatedly pointed out. The history of
Japan's war economy, even before, the blockade
affected her position, is largcly of an attempt to
make up for the loss of supplies of iron from over-

seas and to spread a limited steel supply over a

number of competing and ever-increasing needs.
Nearly all the deficiencies in plants, raw' materials, and military supplies which so seriously
plagued the enemy's war effort can be traced to
these causes. Limitations of electric steel capacity
were at times a further disturbing factor.
The blockade exploited and greatly aggravated
these weaknesses. From April 1943 on, imports of
iron, in ore and pig fo~m, began to decline. , Steel
production cuts were staved off,however, for over a
year, since stockpiles provided a cushion and
even permitted an expansion of output during the
period.
By June 1944, the day of reckoning could be
postponed no longer. Iron ore stockpiles in the
home island, amounting to about 2.6 million tons
in December 1941,had dwindled to 800,000 tons.
Chinese iron ore accounted in 1943 for 89 percent
of the Fe contents of iron ore import3.to Japan.
This movement dropped from an average of 374,000 tons per month in the period January-June
1943 to 252,000 tons for the following 6 months and
by December 1944 to a mere 37,000 tons. The
loss was principally the result of 14th Air For.ce
bombing, mining and straffing of Yangtze shipping, but was also contributed to, particularly
in the later months, by the submarine and air
attacks against shipping. After June 1944, the
drop in iron ore imports was closely paralleled by
a drop in ingot steel production. Ev.en before
stockpiles of ore were exhausted, blast and steel
furnace operations were reduced and production
was allowed to fall below plan without apparent
regard to the effect on scheduled production of
finished goods.
.
, In the July-September quarter of 1944 a reduction in imports of pig iron, ingot and rolled steel
from Manchuria was added to the results of
attack on iron ore transportation. The decline
in Manchuria pig iron shipments was 28 percent
from the previous quarter. In the next 3 months
there was. further 5 percent drop. Ingot and'
rolled steel exports 'to Japan were also reduced.
This was primarily due to the 20th Bomber
Command attacks on Showa Steel, at Anshan,
in July and September 1944 and secondarily
to 14th AF and Chinese guerilla operations
against Chinese railroads, which reduced the
movement of North China coking coal to Anshan.
As a result of all these factors, monthly average
finished steel production for the second half of

fiscal 1944 dropped to 64 percent of the monthly

average for January 1943-May 1944.
At the April-June 1945 rate of production,
annual ingot steel output of around 1.5 million
tons, or 18 percent of the war time peak, would
have been possible. The naval bombardment of
steel facilities in July 1945, however, would have
prevented the processing of more than even a fraction of this amount. The Kamaishi and Wanishi
steel plants were processing locally produccd ores.
In 1944 they handled 41 percent of total domestic
ore supplies. These ores were smelted almost
entirely by the use of Hokkaido coking coal.
Naval sudRce vessel bombardments of these
plants in July 1945 wer~ successful.
Transportation between 'Hokkaido and Honshu
was a bottleneck even before the carrier based
aircraft destroyed the rail ferries. The already
overloaded railroads of Honshu were in no position
to move 700,000 additional tons of iron ore and
1.2 million additional tons of Hokkaido coal
hundreds of miles to the idle blast furnaces in
central Honshu and northern Kyushu.
The
strike, therefore, significantly reduced Japan's
chances of using even her inadequate domestic
resources of iron ore. At the close of the war, the
prospect was that Japanese 'Steel production for
the balance, of the year would hardly exceed all
annual rate of one million tons.,
The few air attacks directed against steel plants
had little effect on Japanese steel supply. With
the exception of China based B-29 operations
the steel industry was subject to air attack only
through transportation. The comparatively light
(221 tons) air bombardment of the Yawata plimt
by Twentieth Bomber Command in June 1944
caused only a negligible drop in production.
Plant capacity, unused because of lack of raw
materials, could be pressed into service to compensate for such bomb damage as was inflictcd.
The three raids on the Anshan works were somewhat heavier in weight and appea. to have caused
a loss in production of approximately 200,000 tons
of. pig iron (15 percent of fiscal year 1943 output)
136,000 tons of ingot steel and 93,000 tons of
rolled steel. The main impact was upon the
availability of iron and steel for Manchurian
consumption. The effect on supplies in Japan
proper is unccrtain but was clearly much smaller.
Pig iron loss fell somewhere within a range of
3 to 5 percent of the total amount of pig iron
available in Japan in 1944. The reduction in

45

ingot steel supply, excluding electric steel, was

not over 2 percent and in finished steel less than
1 percent.
Mariannas based B-29s di4 not specifically
attack Japanese steel plants, although the incendiary campaign against urban areas included
attacks on all principal steel manufacturing centers
from Tokyo south. By the time these occurred,
however, steel manufacturing operations had been
so restricted by lack of raw materials that what
little steel production remained was not materially
affected.

Oil
Of less pervasive importance to the economy as
a whole than steel, but of even more immediate
concern to Japanese fighting capabilities, was the
oil supply 'which largely depended on imports.
As noted in chapter II, the Japanese synthetic oil
industry was too small to be a substantial factor
in her oil economy. Japan's planners attempted
to provide against an oil shortage by building up,
in the years immediately preceeding Pearl Harbor,
a substantial stockpile. Despite withdrawals
from stocks necessitated by the United States
embargo in 1941, Japim entered the war with
reserves of 43 million barrels. If she expected to
tight beyond the time that these stocks might
last, it was obvious that she would have to depend
upon oil sources from Borneo south.
In the face of the blockade, such dependence
proved to be a fatal weakness. Requirements
mounted steeply during 1942 and 1943, under
pressure of military operations on a scale beyond
that anticipated by the Japanese war planners.
Although oil imports continued to follow a
sharply arising trend up to the end of 1943,
increases after the summer of 1942 were always
outbalanced by rising consumption. Never could
enough oil be shipped to Japan to close the gap
between oil receipts and expenditures. In spite of
the most stringent efforts to economize and to
employ substitutes, inventories of crude oil
declirided from 1941 on, fuel oil after 1937,
aviation fuel from early in 1942, diesel oil from
the beginning of 1943 and motor gas after June
1944. During the fall of 1944, motor gasoline
and diesel Oil consumption were reduced by 50
percerit of their wartime peaks, fuel oil by 40
percent and aviation gasoline by 24 percent
although requirements were more pressing than
ever before.
46

In 1944, oil imports dropped sharply, falling in

the October-December quarter about 33 percent
from' the same period of the preceeding year.
This was caused by a drop in shipping efficiency
under the impact of submarine and air attack.
During the October-December quarter of 1944
the tanker tonnage devoted to hauling oil to the
home islands was actually significantly higher
than in the same period a, year e'arlier. After
February 1945, imports of oil to Japan ceased entirely, owing to interdiction of the shipping routes
from the south, principally by air operations.
Such a state of affairs could obviously have but
one end. Military pilot training was progressively
reduced until in 1945 it reached a level of only
50 percent of the minimum number of hours previously thought necessary, with serious injury to
the fighting ability of the Japanese air force.
Reconnai'lsance flights and antisubmarine patrols
were curtailed. In the face of a desperate need
for bottoms, over 100,000 tons of oil-burning
shipping in the home island coastal trade was laid
up early in 1945. Even military trucks were converted to the use of charcoal gas. Despite these
and other drastic measures which prevented
further widening of the gap between receipts and
consumption, oil tanks all over the industrial
areas of Japan were running dry and tankage was
being town down for scrap. By April 1945, naval
stocks were so low that of five battleships left
afloat, only one, the Yamato, ~as able to sortie
against our forces invading Okinawa. The balance, along with lesser naval units, were left with
skeleton crews as floating antiaircraft and coast
defense batteries at the bases of Kure and YokoBuka. Later these were sunk or put out of action at their moorings by our carrier based
aircraft.
By the third week in June 1945, when B-29
,attacks on refineries began in earnest, stocks of
crude oil had been virtually' exhausted and the
refineries almost entirely shut down. Only a
minor fraction of the small finished products
stocks still in Japanese hands were located at the
points attacked and such destruction of those materials that occurred did not materially affect
enemy strength. The following data give an
indication of the importance of the stocks
destroyed:

Inventory as of
1 April 1945

Aviation gasoline_____________ 1,538,000

Fuel oiL ______________ , _____ 1,840,000
Diesel fueL____ ______________
308,000
Motor gasoline_______________
719,000
Lubricating oiL _________ ,._ ___
346,000
Crude oil _________'_ _______ ___
195,000
Other products __________________________ _
TotaL ________________ 3,948,000

Inventory
destroyed
by bombing

61,473
125, 309
37,047
12,498
29,009
103,785
101,257
470,378

I While thIs r('presented more thRll 50 percent of the remaining crude inventory the latter was suffic.:ient (or only 1.7 days of capacity operation.
kl Incomplete.

It appears from the above that the oil attack

was almost superfluous. Production had very
nearly ceased before the attack, and the destruction of stocks was not significant. The gasoline
required for the Ketsu Kamikaze air operations
against invasion 'was dispersed when the B-29
and carrier attacks were made. The potentialities of the Ketsu operation remained thus undiminished.
.
Nor were the attacks on tetra-ethyl lead production in April 1945 more significant. The drop
in TEL supplies which began in September 1944
was attributable only to a negligible degree to air
attack on producing facilities. In any event, it
merely paralleled the decline in aviation fuel supply resulting from blockade and had no independent effect OIl enemy strength. ,

Coal,

It has been noted that Japanese coal supplies

followed a rising curve through 1940, declined
slightly through 1943, sharply in 1944 and then
plummeted abruptly to collapse levels in 1945.
The decline in 1941-43 was attributable almost
entirely to reduced imports resulting from competing demands for shipping. Domestic production was sustained though "high grading" the
mines but at severe cost to the capital equipment
of the industry which, because of the pressing
needs for armaments and ships, was not allotted
sufficient steel for maintenance.
In 1944 the influence of blockade became prcdominant. Imports from China, the prime source
of high grade coking coal, were cut to 58 percent
and those from Karafuto and from Korea about
50 percent. While the drop in North China coking

coal imports did not prevent smelting of the also

dwindling supply of iron ore, it affected the quality
of the steel produced and increased fabricating
difficulties and rejections.
During this year, the blockade began also to
effect domesliic production. Equipment maintenance was further impaired by the increasing
steel shortage and undermaintenance of earlier
years, coupled with scarcity of trained manpower,
began to cut into production.
The year witnessed collapse of the Japanese
coal position. January saw the virtual end of
Chinese coal shipments and the beginning of an
almost equally rapid drop in movement from
Manchuria, Domestic production was maintained until July, but shipments from Kyushu to
Honshu by sea dropped sharply from April on
and those from Hokkaido to Honshu from June
on, primarily as a result of the mining campaign.
The percentage drop exceeded the drop in total
bottoms available.
The fleet carrier strike which. sank 10 out of the
12 Honshu-Hokkaido rail ferries and damaged
the other 2, cut movement of Hokkaido coal to
Honshu by nearly 40 percent. The same strike
also sank numerous cargo vessels which had been
carrying about 65,000 tons of coal a month to
Honshu. At the other end of the home islands,
FEAF attacks on noncoal targets in the Miike
area resulted in incidental but severe reductions
in the output of the Miike and Takashima fields,
causing a loss of about 500,000 tons.
Domestic production fell to 2,712,000 tons in
July and to 1,617,000 in August.
Until the end of the war, the major direct
effect of the declining coal supply was upon the.
steel industry. The loss of Chinese high grade
coking coal impaired the quality of such steel as
could be manufactured from vanishing inventories.
Incidental loss of capacity in the steel industry
itself was also significant. While the over-all
excess capacity was ample to handle the relatively
small amount of raw material available for processing, the drop in efficiency meant that some
Hokkaido and north Honshu ores 'could be used'
only by moving them at least as far south as
Tokyo on the already overloaded railroads.
The decline in coal supply had other significant
effects. The decrease in coke-oven operation
which was caused by both decreasing coking coal
supplies and the exhaustion of iron are stocks
reduced supplies of benzol and tolu~l severely.

47

\r!
11

During the second half of the calendar year 1944,

toluol production dropped 50 percent from its
early 1944 peak. By July 1945 production was
down to 15 percent of the highest 1944 month.
Corresponding figures for benzol are 36 percent
and 35 percent respectively.
The drop in toluol output threatened' explosives
production but apparently did not actually affect
it until May 1945. Benzol constituted only a
'small fraction of the liquid fuel resources but
production at peak levels would have been of
marked usefulness in supplementing dwindling
aviation fuel supplies. As a very rough measure
of significance it can be noted that peak benzol
production exceeded 200,000 barrels per month
while peak monthly aviation fuel consumption
was 500,000 barrels. In June 1945 the Japanese
army belatedly reque~ted the steel industry to
operate all coke ovens at full capacity, regardless
of coke-demands, in order to provide benzol and
toluol. The falling production of coal, however,
prevented this program from being carried out on
any substantial scale.
Increasing difficulty in coal production and
transportation contributed significantly to the 33
percent drop in cement output between 1943 and
1945, which hampered dispersion and reconstruction efforts after air attack. Limited domestic
coke supplies, which continued until the end of
the war, would apparently have become a limiting factor even on high priority production.
Given continuance of the war, the further severe
declines in. coal output which were in prospect for
the next 6 to 9 months would, by themselves,
have seriously threatened the whole economiC'
-structure.

d. Light Metals
Japan depended upon imports of war materials
for aluminum and magnesium production. Beginning in 1944 shipment of these materials to
Japan was seriously curtailed by the blockade
and by the end of the year bauxite imports were
completely interrupted. Attempts to substitute
. aluminous sh~le, mined in North Ohina, for
bauxite were not commenced early enough nor
prosecuted vigorously enough to yield any flubstantial am---?unt of alumina. By spring 1945
Japan's aluminum resources therefore consisted
almost entirely of scrap and finished and semifinished material in the hands of fabricating and
aircraft plants. The magnesium situation was

48

somewhat less difficult, since the Korean and

Manchurian sources of supply were not cut off
until the alloClltion of shipping to the hauling of
food supplies occurred in April 1945. Within a
few months, the position would have been parallel
to that of aluminum.
The aircraft industry was the only important
consumer of magnesium and aluminum. Had t
Japanese aircraft fabricating' capacity been
greater, limitations on light metal supply would,
have prevented full attainment of planned pro-I
duction schedules in 1944. As it was, other
factors discussed later in connection with aircraft
production intervened to prevent raw material
supply from being a production bottleneck in the
industry during this year. In 1945 the impending stringency in aluminum supply lead to some
substltution of other metals, seriously impairing
the durability of some types of aircraft. The
curtailment of aluminum and magnesium supplies
in this year would have forced a substantial cut in
production, but would not have reduced it to the
levels to which it was forC'ed by air attacks.

c. Chemicals

war reduced the supply of nitrogenous fertilizer

with the results which are noted later in the discussion of food supply. Explosive production
was not significantly effected until April 1945.
The curtailment of synthetic nitrogen manufacture appears to be principally attributable
to the lack of maintenance material for the very
high pressure equipment used in the industry.
This was the result of the limitations of Japanese
heavy industry and technology and, during 1944
and 1945, of the blockade caused steel shortage.
There is no evidence that air operations, aside
from their large contribution to the blockade
of iron ore movement, affected the supply of
synthetic nitrogen or its ,two most important
derivatives: fertilizer and explosives. While a
number of fertilizer plants were destroyed in the
urban area attacks, comparison of ammonium
sulphate and synthetic nitrogen supply curves
indicate that lack of raw material rather than ,of
processing facilities was the limiting factor in
fertilizer output. Had not synthetic nitrogen'
availability already been reduced, air attack would,
however, have cut ammonium sulphate' manufacture during the second half of 1945 by around
60 percent.
The effect of air attack on explosives production
is somewhat obscure. Nitric acid output dropped
by 80 percent between April and August 1945.
Explosives production followed .the same gcneral
trend during this period. The percentage reduction was 50 to 65 percent, army and navy arsenals
were hit in urban areas and precision raids, but the
extent to which this accelerated the already
established trend cannot be determined from the
da ta available.

Ship sinkings and interruption of shipping

routes had important repercussions in the Japanese chemical industry. They consisted mainly
of reduction of the coke oven operations and of
shortages of steel necessary for the maintenance
of high pressure equipment. The only high
priority basic chemicals (aside from those impOl:ttant to the oil industry) were synthetic nitrogen,
methanol and toluol. In the case of other basic
chemicals such as caustic soda,.soda ash, and sulphuric acid, the Japanese seem to have been content to accept declines in production from the
very beginning gf the war, since the civilian
MUNITIONS
economy was their main consumer.
Aircraft Production
The t~cnd of synthetic nitrogen production was
downward from April 1944 but fell off particuThe building of military and naval aircraft
larly seriously from July 1944-declining 50 perwas given top priority in the organization of the
cent between the latter date and June 1945. The
Japanese war economy and had first call on
impact of the decline seems to have been felt al- , materials and manpower from the outset of the
most entirely by fertilizer production. Output
war. The limiting factors in production to the
of ammonium sulphate was virtually parallel with
fall of 1944 were those inherent to the size and
that of synthetic nitrogen from the first quarter
organization of the Japanese economy. In 1942
of 1942 until the end of the war. Nitric acid
necessary plant expansion was hampered by lack
production, allocated mainly to explosive manuof steel and machine tools but this was before the
facture, was reduced somewhat in 1944 but not
blockade had begun to cut steel production and
severely curtailed until April 1945. The decline
was attributable to the intrinsic limitations of
in nitrogen output from the very beginning of the
the Japanese steel and machine tool situation.

In 1942 and 1943 the failure to integrate army

and navy programs and facilities held back production until Munitions Ministry control began
in November 1943. Raw material supply was
not a retarding factor during this period. However, planning of alloy material requirements
during the war did not take into account increases
in aircraft production and consequent increases
in demand, so that, as early as 1943, it was,necessary to alter the specifications of allo,}'" steels so
as to spread the supply over the rising demand.
A very considerable increase in airframe production was realized in 1944. September output
was about 175 percent of the 1943 average
monthly figure. Production fell far below plan,
however, due mainly to shortages of alloy steel
and labor. No restriction on output was imposed
by the aluminum supply though this would have
been limiting, had the Japanese been able to
approach planned output. The increase in production occurred in spite of the mounting success
of the blockade and the consequent drop in the
general level of all basic industrial activity. The
series of strikes by Ohina based B-29s on the
integrated plant at Omura beginning in July 194':1
may have cost Japan about 50 aircraft, but were
not sufficient to check the upward trend of
production.
.
Oombat airframe production reached a peak in
September 1944. It fell off in October and November but even during those months was maintained at or about pre-September level. In
December production dropped 7 percent from the
November level. Non-combat-aircraft production decreased sharply after June 1944, principally
because of a declining nced for trainer aircraft, the
tight fuel situation having forced a curtailment of
training.
Engine output was irregular in trend and failed
to keep pace with the increase in air frames.
Through November 1944, however, it was far
higher than for the previous year. (The average
for eleven months was 164 percent of the 1943
average.) Peaks were reached in March and
June 1944. After June, engine production declined irregularly through September, recovering
in October fwd November to a level around threequarters of the June peak. Total output still exceeded total installation requirements but there
were difficulties with a new engine which delayed
the equipping of some aircraft.
An important factor in the failure to sustain

49

peak production of engines was the alloy steel

situation which combined with labor inefficiency
and absenteeism to limit output. Planning mistakes, in 1942 and 1943, had resulted in a failure
to sufficiently expand the supply of alloy materials
available in Japanese controlled areas.
True, the Japanese did erect a nickel concentrator in the Celebes in 1943 but they failed to develop
available tungsten and chromium resources in
China - and the Philippines respectively. The
shipping a:ttack, particularly in 1942 and 1943,
cannot be blamed for this. Two or three shiploads a year of tungsten concentrates would have
provided a large stockpile. As for chromium,
arm.y and navy controlled ships were returned
from Manila with partial cargos, while chromium
was left on the piers. Peak ferro-chrome output
could have been doublea by movem.ent of about
100,000 tons of ore. Even had all shipping been
used to capacity this would have required a shift
of less than 1 percent. in the pattern of ship usage.
Changes in alloy specification created problems in
machining and increased rejections about six
months after the changes were initiated. These
difficulties were, however, met and production increased sharply through June 1944. Further declines in ferro-alloy availability occurred in 1944,
as supply, which.had up to then increased, took a
down turn. This was attributable to several
factors. Molybdenum and vanadium were available in .Japan and Korea only in small quantities
and the supply in Burma was inaccessible because
of air operations in that country. Cobalt did not
exist within Japanese controlled territories, except
for the Bawdwin mine. Nickel was cut off by air
attacks on the Celebes concentrator in the fall and
winter of 1943 and by the interdiction of shipping
from the Celebes by the Fifth AF. Chromium
and tungsten were available in the Philippines
and China respectively, but, as noted above, were
not exploited for reasons other than the shipping
shortage.
. Decreases in ferro-alloy increased aero engines
producti9n difficulties seriously in the fall of 1944
and led the Japanese to substitl'te, to an increasing
degree, high carbon steel to the detriment of output volume and quality. Increases in aluminum
capacity mOl-e than matched increases in aircraft
requirements and during the middle period of the
war, the material was actually in surplus supply,
as far as the aircraft industry was concerned.
However, the attainment of the sharply increased

50

aircraft goal in 1944 would have required m.ore combat and motor vehicles. Production of these
aluminum than could have been produced from latter items was awarded relatively low priority,
compared to plant construction and other ordnance
the raw materials available.
The blockade cut deeply into bauxite imports items and was consequently limited by the amount
from the beginning of 1944, and by the end of the of steel allocated.
Allocations of steel to nearly all armaments
year, had virtually cut off new supplies. This fact, I
together with the inability of the aluminum indus- were substantially higher in 1943 than in 1941
try to process shale from North China, to any sub- f and in eveq case higher than in 1942. In these
stantial extent, led to a 66 percent drop in alu- years, steel output held up and, in 1943, even
eXPanded slightly at t,he expense of the raw
minum output between May and December 1944
and indiated that the end of the production of material stockpiles. Countershipping operations
metal aircraft in Japan was in sight. Continued had no immediate direct effect on arms production.
production at a level of around 1,500 units a There were already important indirect effects of
month could probably have been maintained until the Allied counteroffensive, however. The presJune 1945, and at perhaps a third of that level for sure of Allied military operations and ship losses
the balance of the year by the fabrication of unused incident thereto compelled the Japanese to award
material still in the production pipe line, eked out merchant shipbuilding a priority claim on basically
limited steel supplies-second only to aircraftwith scrap and the few thousand tons a month
severely reducing the amount available for expanwhich could be secured from aluminous shale and
domestic raw material.
sion of armaments output.
The drastic reduction in iron ore imports during
'Such production never actually took place.
. B-29 operations from the Mariannas began on 241944 under the impact of the air in~erdiction' of
November 194-4 and for the next three months
the Yangtze, of general blockade and the attendant
were directed primarily against the aircraft
sharp drop in ingot and finished steel supply has
ibdustry. Production during these months nosebeen noted above in connection with the steel
dived (engines 55 percent, from 3819 to 1695 per
discussion. Allocation of steel to army and navy
month, airframes 37 percent, from 2220 to 1391)
ordnance reacted promptly. Ordinary steel allotFrantic measures to disperse the industry, underments fell sharply f~om the first quarter of 1944' on.
taken immediately and continued to the end of the
By March 1945, allocations of ordinary steel had
war, contributed even more heavily to the loss of
droppEld in terms of their peak level to 28 percent
output than did the direct effects of bombardment.
in the case of the Army, 52 percent in the case of
From March 1945 on, incendiary area attacks were
the Navy, and 63 percent in the case of the Air
added to direct attack on plants in maintaining
Forces. Cuts in the consumptions of special steel
pressure against the industry, particularly in the
were less severe, but substantial.
case of components manufacture. At the end of
The effect of the 1944 drop in steel supply on
hostilities, output of engines sank precipitously to
ground force armament was concentrated ou
around 'lioo per month or 16 percent of the preartillery, ammunition, and combat and transport
attack rate and of airframes to about 0500 per
-vehicles. Motor vehicle manufacture, which had
month or 21 percent of the pre-attack level. Direct
been held to 60 percent of its peak in 1942 and to
attacks in a few cases struck plants which had
44 percent in 1943 to conserve steel for other
already been abandoned under the dispersal
uses, was cut, in the first three calendar months
program .
of 1945, to 23 percent. The measure was undertaken -despite a critical shortage of local transporh. Ordnance
tation in Japan and an extremely low stock of
Japanese production of army and naval ordarmy vehicles in the home islands. The pattern
nance and vehicles was conditioned primarily by
of artillery production was altered to rednce the
the inherent limitations 0/ the .Japanese economy
output of field and heavy pieces. . Army chiefs
analyzed in Chapter I and II.
outside the home islands were told, in the spring
During 1941, 1942 and 1943 these limitations
of 1944, that heavy artillery manufacture was
were principally important in restricting the conbeing discontinued. Ammunition production was
struction of new facilities. Existing plants were
cut, and an order was issued early in 1944 pracgenerally used to capacity, except in the case of
tically forbidding the use of ammunition for train-

ing purposes. Output of the principal categories

of combat vehicles was also reduced in 1944, as a
direct result of the steel situation. Light tanks
were virtually cut out and medium tanks and
armored cars reduced severely.
Manufacture of electrical and communications
equipment and !lircrafi armament was maintained
at a high level through March 1945 despite the
blockade. Production of ordnance as a whole,
however, reached its peak in August-and September 1944 and thereafter declinlld irregularly
through March 1945 by a total of 18 percent.
A major effect of the countershipping attack un
armament supply was the sinking of a large percentage of finished material enroute to the fighting
zones. Losses mounted from 160,000 tons (3
percent of material shipped) in 1942, to 1,390,000
(17 percent) in 1942 to 1,405,000 (33 percent) in
1944. In the latter year half of the supplies sent
to the crucial area of the Philippines were lost.
In 1945, the 340,000 tons sunk amounted to nearly
50 percent of the supplies shipped.
The period of air attacks on Japan proper S9W
ordnance output plunge to disastrous lev ills.
There was a break of 11 percent between March
and April and of 14 percent between May and
June. In July production was only 50 percent of
its 1944 peak and 61 percent of its March level.
The bulk of the loss is attributable to other
factors than damage to producing facilities which
ranged from 3 to 30 percent for various categories
but for all averaged only 17 percent. In certain
instances, qualitative differences greatly increased
the s!gnificance of the damage. Destruction of a
gun sight factory in Tokio, for example, held up
artillery production in other cities. In general,
however, it was the disruptive effect of the urban
area attacks on local transportation and, to a
lesser degree, the absenteeism which such attacks
induced which cut arms output to the levels it
reached in June 1945.
As suggested earlier, electrical and communications equipment constituted a special case in the
armaments picture. Strategic air attack was an
even more important factor than it was in regard
to other ordnance, because of the industry's relatively low response to the effect of countershipping
operations. Despite high priorities given to this
type of equipment and a considerable wartime
'expansion of manufacturing capacity, the industry
had never been able to meet demands. All arms
of the service were underequipped.

51

There WaB insufficient skilled labor in Japan to

operate available plants on a two-shift basis. Had
there been enough such labor, supplies of raw
materials, which were always sufficient only for a
single shift, would have restricted two-shift operations of some plants. Lack of raw materiaL'!
within th~ Japanese controlled sphere compelled
use of inferior substitutes a,nd resulted in declines
in performance and durability. However, the
drop in steel,production resulting from attacks on
shipping did not affect this industry, because of
its low consumption of steel and its high initial
stockpiles of copper. The difficulties that had
affected the ,industry prior to area attack were
primarily technological ineptitude, a shortage of
skilled labor, lack of silicon steel, and absence of such
rare materials as diamonds, quartz crystals, cobalt,
tanthun and columbillll1. Production increased
throughout the war and was at a high level in
March 1945. At this time, the area attacks
struck the main centers of concentration of the
industry: Tokyo, Kawasak, Osaka, Kobe and
Nagoya. The communications equipment manufacturers depended upon subcontractors in these
urban areas for 60 percent of their parts. Other
sections of the industry were less vulnerable in
this respect but many suffered direct damage and
all were affected almost ~mediately by government orders to disperse their plants to the mountain regions. Between dispersal, direct damage,
absenteeism caused by area attacks, and damage
to subcontractor~, production was reduced to
almost negligible levels. While many dispersals
were eventually carried out, it appears that no
significant production could have been reestablished before 1946.
In August 1945, the communications equipment
industry was subjected to a precision bombing
attack by carrier-based aircraft. This attack was
effective in damaging the structures against which
it was directed but had no substantial -effect on
production because of what had previously been
accomplished by incendiary attacks and dispersal.

Naval Shipbuilding
Of Japan's naval construction of' about 1.5
million deadweight tons between 1930 and August
1945, 65 percent was completed during the war
years. The completion peak came in the suinmer
of 1944. The blockade, by limiting steel supply,
exerted a relatively early effect on naval construction. Oompletions in the major categories in the
52

peak year of 1944 amounted to only 72 percent of

plan; the plan for 1945 was set at only 15 percent
of the 1944 figure.
Because of the steel shortage direct damage and
labor absenteeism due to air attack was of negligible importance in n,aval construction.

MANPOWER

The demands of the armed forces were the

primary factor conditioning the labor supply up
to the spring of 1945, both in regard to quality,
and in 1944 and 1945, in quantity.
Air attack by intensification of the blockade
Merchant Shipbuilding
and
contributed to a reduction of the productivity of
Initial underestimates of requir~ments
the Japanese labor force. Blockade operated on
attrition and, during 1943, organizational and
the labor force by curtailing food supplies, paradministrative difficulties conditioned the size and
ticularly from early in 1944 on. This caused
absenteeis.~ due to for~ging and, to a lesser.extent,
degree of accompJishment of the Japanese shipbuilding program through the first two years of . poor nutntl~n. The madequacy of the dIet a~o
the war.
combined Wlth other factors, such as exceSSIve
hours,
depreciation of capital equipment, and
After the Guadalcanal compaign, the Japanese
difficulties in processing inferior raw materials,
war planners allotted to shipbuilding a priority
to reduce labor efficiency.
second only to aircraft, and programs were stepped
The Japanese did not maintain accurate records
up successively until March 1944. Actual launchshowing
labor productivity and it is therefore
ings always lagged behind plans, but between
impossible to make a precise sta~ement regarding
April and December 1944 averaged about 150,
the overrall extent of the drop in productivity.
percent of the 1943 rate. May and June 1944
Such qualitative evidence. as could be gathered
saw the greatest output and production was ll)ainindicates that the decline in output per man-hour
tained until the end of the year. It then dropped
in industries important to war production was
substantially and by :M;'arch reached 61 percent of
felt, prior to air attack, principally in coal mining
its 1944 average, The failure to achieve the hoped
and to a lesser extent in armaments, electrical
for increase was the result of the decline in steel
equipment, and aircraft.
output which, as already noted, had begun to
Falling labor productivity would have increased
fall sharply at this time. By August 1944, it had
the difficulty in shifting labor from the processing
become necessary to revise production schedules
and fabricating to the domestic extractive indownward from 2.5 million tons. Actual producdustrie~, if the Japanese had attempted to make
tion up to March 1945 was at the rate of only 7I
up for declining imports by more intensive expercent of the revised plan.
ploitation of home resources. There is no eviIn April 1945, a new plan was adopted,
dence, however, that the Japanese ever considered
apparently in the light of the now irretrievable
it possible to redress the balance of their economy
overseas shipping and steel situation. The
in this mapner.
amount of steel allocated in shipbuilding was cut,
Lack of accurate statistics on absenteeism
arastically and the program was reduced to,
compel
reliance on estimates and general stateslightly over half a million gross tons for the next
ments for an appraisal of the effect of bombardyear. A "secondary goal" of an additional
ment on manpower resourses. It is clear that air660,000 tons was set. The rapidly deteriorating
raid alarms and air attacks caused substantial
supply of steel plus the effects of area raids, which
man-hour losses and greatly increased absenteeat some yards caused a permanent loss of as much
ism. Estimates for some industries, such as
as 50 percent of the labor force, caused the induselectrical equipment, run as high as 50 percent.
try to fall short by 15 percent, during the months,
There were numerous instances of labor being
of March-June, of fulfilling even the final plan,
permanently driven from its normal' place of
It is doubtful if more than a minor proportion of
employment by urban attacks, particularly in the
this drop was due to the direct incendiary raid
Tokyo and Kobe-Osaka areas. The devastating
damage since there was already at least 60 percent
attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki failed rather
idle capacity in the industry. The smaller estabsurprisingly to accomplish this.
lishments, particularly wooden shipbuilders, sufOn the whole, the effect of urban area attack
fered most heavily and a considerable number of I
small marine engine builders were burned out.
on Japanese industrial manpower was significant

I
I

against construction, electrical and communications equipment industries and, in some cases,
against ordnance and aircraft plants,
Air attack created a large new labor demand,
principally in the construction field. The Japanese hastily 'attempted to ::!.!sperse high priority
war production, beginning in December 1944, and
attempted to put a large fraction of the aircraft
industry undergrouncr. Limited labor supply
seriously hindered the carrying out of the dispersal program and, thereby, reduced the production of aircraft, ordnance, and electrical
equipment.
CIVILIAN SUPPLY

Foodstuffs
Japan's total 1941 food supply allowed for aver~
age caloric intake only 6.4 percent above a subsistence minimum. This supply was mainLained only
by intensive exploitation of domestic resources
(Japan's rice yield per acre was the highest in the
world and virtually' all the land that could be
farmed was double cropped); by large-scale fishing, both coastal and deep sea; by imports of food
amounting to 15 percent of the total; and by lavish use of fertilizers of which the phosphatic and
potasic elements were imported. Stocks on hand
were not in excess of the normal carry-over.
From the beginning of the war, forces became
operative which impaired this precariously balanced position. Naval and military needs for
patrol, escort, small, transport, and landing vessels
led to requisitions of fishing craft which continued
throughout the war. Important .deep-sea fishing
grounds had to be abandoned because they were
within range of the United States action. Synthetic ammonia plants had to allot a larger share
of their production to explosives manufacture and
less to fertilizer. Nitrogenous fertilizer consump~
tion dropped 68 percent between 1941 and 1945.
About half the drop occurred after August 1944.
Farm labor was drafted, and with the qualitative
decline in agricultural labor supply came aband~
onment of marginal land, which more than offset
government attempts to increase the total area
under food cultivation.
These influences, which would have been felt
in any event, made the Japanese even more vul~
nerable t:.o the results of Allied attack. Phosphatic
fertilizer supplies were denied in 1943 by air bom~
bardment of facilities on Nauru, one of the earliest

53

strategic air operations of th~ Pacific war. As

early as 19.43, ship sinkings incident to tactical
operations began to reduce the amount of food
imports, consisting mainly of rice shipments from
the South. Japan took no effective steps to lessen
her dependence on southern rice supplies by shifting consumption to the more readily accessible
and higher food value Manchurian soybeans but
maintained the rice ration by running down stocks
until, by November 1944, they fell below an adequate working level. In the late fall of 1944,
food shipments from the south were virtually cut
off and domestic food production in the 1944 rice
year was but 93'percent of the 1930-1940 average.
Meanwhile, requisition of fishing vessels for
naval and coastwise cargo purposes and of
fishermen to replace 10,(lt merchant and naval
crews, as well.as lack of fuel which limited the
range and operating time of fishing craft, accelerated the drop in fish supply.. Consumption
of fish, for food, fell by 1945 to 65 percent of its
1939 level and the drop in fertili er was more than
20 percent greater.
As a result of these events, Japan, despite the
rapidly deteriorating supply of raw materials for
war production was, in April 1945, compelled
virtually to abandon the import of nonfood items
from the mainland. The entire program was
shifted to the movement of grains, soy beans, and
salt from Manchuria and Korea. By August,
the blockade had been practically achieved and
even food shipments had dropped to insignificant
levels.
Beginning in March 1945, urban area attacks,
which destroyed large sections of the principal
cities of Japan, increased the food shortage.
About 25 percent of the emergency rice stocks in
the hands of thousands of retail distributors were
destroyed and normal distribution of food supplies
interfered with. Millions of persons migrated
to small towns outside the larger cities. While
this meant greater proximity to the source of
that part of the food supply which had to be
secured on the black market, it increased' the
difficulty of distributing the official rations. All
these factors aggravated the effects of the basic
situation.
Further severe declines in the food supply' were
in prospect. The impairment of nitrogenous
fertili ;er manufacture had not occurred early
enough to reduce crop yields seriously through
the summer of 1945 but threatened to do so

54 .

during the rice year 1945 {beginning in October).

The close approach of Allied air power from the
south meant further heavy cuts in the fish supply
through inhibiting operation even in local waters.
Even if domestic food production had been
maintained by unusually favorable weather, the
normal carry-over was so greatly impaired that
only by going on starvation rations cquld the
supply be stretched until the rice harvest in the
fall. Such an expedient would be possible only
on the assumption that organized distribution
of food within the home islands could be continued.
The Japanese, themselves, expected that air'
attack on the railroads, which was about to start
when the war ended, would prevent even this.

and voluntary wave of evacuations occurred after

the fall of Saipan. Owing to scarcity of building
.materials, no attempt was made to furnish these
evacuees with new housing. They were either
quartered upon friends, relatives or in public
buildings.
The urban area raids which began in March
1945, reacted upon this situation with decisive
force., .About 13 million people were driven from
their homes by the destruction of around 2.6
million dwelling units and a substantial additional
number were affected by the burning of factory
dormitories. The economy had been stretched
too tight and Japanese organizing ability had been
too poor to permit the orderly rehousing-and feed-

ing of these millions and the replacement of even

a basic minimum of household goods and clothing.
Hordes were driven from the cities into the surrounding towns and rural areas, on a virtually unplanned basis. At the same time, what meager
stocks of civilian goods were still available, were
reduced by fire, and factories making such goods
suffered severely. The air raids are estimated to
have directly destroyed 2 billion square yards of
cloth and, in addition, to have demolished 18 perC(.mt of the capacity of the cotton industry.
Coupled with the food shortage already discussed,
the housing and civilian supply situation mllde
the plight of Japan's civilian population at the
end of the war difficult indeed.

h. Clothing and Shelter

During the war years, severe decreases in an
already meager .standard of living occurred in
Japan as a result of the scarcity of shipping. Even
before Allied attack lytd cut materially into the
merchant Heet, war demands on marine transport
had cut imports of goods for civilian consumption
(other than food) to very low levels. By 1942,
the im.ports of cotton and wool raw materials fell
to 7 percent and 8 percent, respectively, of the
corresponding imports for 1937. War production
demands removed pl\tnts and manpower fro:n industries working on civilian supplies, and allocations of basic materials were either eliminated or
reduced to a fraction of the prewar level. The
ploductive plants of many civilian goods industries, notably textiles, were, to a considerable extent, broken up for scrap or converted for war
purposes.
Pressure on the raw materials and internal transportation positions resulting from the blockade
constantly accelerated the downward trend. As
imports of raw materials were cut off, the over-all
production of textiles declined from 2% billion
square yards in 1943 to 400 million in 1944. In
the period January 1941 to August 1945, the ratio
of actual production to estimated mini:num
civilian requirements fell to the following levels:
cotton cloth 24 percent, wool cloth 19 percent,
and silk cloth 30 percent.
Ea:rly in 1944, the fear of air attack led to. the
destruction, for firebreak purposes, of several
hundred thousand dwelling units and to the
evacuation, under government auspices, of 2.1
million persons from 12 major cities. A second
714928-46-~

55

Chapter V

SURRENDERl

The war against the United States took a course

JistinctIy at variance with the original assumptions of the Japanese war planners and after
Midway and Guadalcanal became obvious, even
to the optimists in the Tokyo Government.. The
severe losses suffered by the Japanese Navy
in both engagements exceeded by far the anticipated costs of. the defense of the perimeter and
rendered the feasibility of this defense itseJ1 subject to grave doubt. The initial advantage secured at Pearl Harbor, which was supposed to
assure Japan's naval superiority in the Pacific and
to lay the foundation for a speedy termination of
the war, dissolved itself into an illusion. The
United States soon proved a formidable foe-far
from disheartened or defeatist.
The military engagements from Midway to
Saipan, from Saipan to the Philippines and on to
Okinawa was an uninterrupted series of Japanese
defeats. In spite of the high quality of the Japanese fighting men, one Pacific outpost after
another was wiped out by superior American
forces. The "Pacific wail," not unlike the Maginot Line, the Atlantic wall and other systems of
fixed fortifications, proved to be a liability rather
th,an an asset. In spite of the large investment
of forces, the necessity of defending the entire
island chain limited the strength of every link.
As the German Ambassador to Japan, the experienced General Ott remarked, it was entirely up
to the American High Command which island it
chose to attack. None was able to withstand the
power which could be concentrated against it.
Whichever sector of the outer perimeter was singled out for the American attack soon became a
graveyard of Japanese ships, men and supplies.
These graveyards were bottomless. All efforts
of the Japanese economy to live up to the demands
of the military establishmen t produced only a fraction of the actual requirements. As soon as
American war production overcame the hurdles
of conversion and assumed proportions commen-

surate with the country's economic potential, the

military doom of Japan became only a matter of
time. It may be very difficult to specify the point
in calendar or in geography at which Japan actually lost the war. There is much to be said for
Midway or Guadalcanal. It could be argued,
however, that if a miracle had enabled Japan to
multiply its military output at that time, the
catastrophe could have beeiJ prevented. Yet,
after Saipan was lost no miracle could have helped
the empire of the Rising Sun. Within reach of
the B-29s, subject to ever-tightening blockade and
facing an early air offensive against the home
islands, Japan could have thrown in the sponge
without fear of foregoing any serious chances of
victory.
But while defeat in a war is a military event, the
recognition of the defeat is a political act. The
timing of the political recognition of the military
realities is only partly determined by the actual
situation on the fronts. The int"ernational situation, the domestic balance of power, the interests
and antagonisms of relevant political groupsthey ail weigh heavily when the grim realities of
the armed contest have to be translated into the
blunt language of capitulation.
The attempts to draw conclusions from the
military failure and to negotiate peace date as far
back as the fall of Saipan. At that time (July
1944), the conservative elements in Japan's ruling
coalition began plotting to overthrow the Tojo
government and to find a way toward some conclusion of the war. The fascist 'Ying, however,
was far from ready to accept defeat. Vividly
aware of the close relationship between their power
position in the country and the continuation of
the war, the army and navy leadership were
clinging desperately to whatever hopes the objec1 For a detailed account of the history of Japan's surrender, as established
by survey interrogations aDd research, the reader should consult the speciRI
paper "Ja.pan's Struggle to End the Waf," prepared by the chairman'S
office ot the USSBS.

57

tive situation may hlive left. The fact that

Germany was fighting and that Hitler made dark
suggestions of powerful secret weapons was im- .
portantly p.ositioned on the otherwise cloudy
international horizon.
The notion that an actual victory by the United
States could be obtained only by an outright invasion of the Japanese home islands and that such
an invasion was bound to be very hazardous and
costly was widely accepted in the Japanese army
circles. Preparing to repulse landing attempts
with ail the fighting powers of. the Japanese
soldier and to render the American sacrifice prohibitive by a large scale employment of Kamikaze
tactics, the military leadership hoped that there
was still a large gap between Japanese defeat and
American victory. Independent of such calculations, the reluctance &n the part of the fascist
wing of the Japanese ruling coalition to admit
complete bankruptcy of its policies, which were
forced upon Japan during an entire decade, was
the most important single force preventing the
recognition of defeat. The substitution of Koiso
for Tojo symbolized the victory 9f the intransi
gent group. An army general like Tojo, Koiso
disappointed the conservative wing and actually
followed all the policies of his predecessor. It was
a change in name, not in direction.
Popular sentiments. did not materially aid tbe
"surrender party". Exhausted and disheartened
by long privations and strains of the war, the population was hardly aware of the extent of the
adversities suffered by Japanese arms. The fear
that a sudden announcement of a'debacle might
have a shock effect which would endanger the
stability of the social and political system was
seriously cntertainedby the conservative wing of
the Government and strengthened markedly the
position taken by the military. The front had to
move nearer to the homeland and the nation had
to have immediate experience of the war before
the capitulation would be accepted as an incvitable result of overpowering circumstances.
The bomber offensive against the home islands
accomplished this task-it brought the war home
to the Japanese. The reverses on the distant
islands of the newly created Japanese Empire,
known to t!!e populous only from hearsay, became
tangibly evident in the air raids on Tokyo,Nagoya
and Osaka. The inability of the Japanese
air fOI'ce to stave off the American bombers and
the resulting defenselessness of the Japanese
58

CIties made the magnitude of the disaster obvious

to the man in the street. While public morale
may have never reached an ebb which would have
rendered the prosecution of the war impossible,
incessant bombardment and continued shortage
of food, clothing and shelter created ever increasing popular despair. The possibility of such
despair expressing itself in rioting and violent
actions was not discounted by the Government.
The decline of war production, which set in
in the fall of 1944 and which assumed disastrou,s
proportions in 1945, rendered the possibility of
supporting anti-invasion operations of the Japanes!3 army very problematical. The tightening
of the blockade made possible by American
acquisition of nearby bases strangled, further, the
meager flow of basic materials. The wholesale
destruction of shipping clearly signaled the day
on wh!ch stocks of raw materials would be entirely
exhausted. The break-down of dispersal and
repair operations reduced Japanese manufacturing
capacity to a level at which significant output of
military supplies was out of question. Possibilities of a recovery were not visible. In spite
of the availability of sizable stocks of military
supplies, defense of the home islands against an
American amphibious assault based on a vast
array of ships, planes and supplies, appeared to
be a fantastic undertaking. The best that could
be expected was "death in honor" with comparatively large costs to the American forccs.
While the army radicals were inclined to accept
the last ditch fight, the only alternative being ignominious defeat and probably apprehension for
war crimes, the conservative elements in the
Japanese ruling coalition refused to facrifice all
chances of Japan's ultimate survival for the sake
of the army's "honor." Determined to bring the
war to an end, the forces around Suzuki, who became the symbol of the entire conservative group,
maneuvered only to improve, somewhat, the terms
of unconditional surrender.
These maneuvers were speeded up and intensified after the capitulation of Germany. May 8,
1945, the day of Germany's official departure
from the war, was, in full corroboration of the grand
strategy adopted by President Roosevelt, the decisive date in the history of Japan's internal struggle
for termination of the war. Whatever illusions
may have existed in Tokyo prior to Germany's
surrender evaporated after the Allied victory in
Europe. Japan, drained of all power of resistance,

I
i

was ready to capitulate, though a formula that

would take a little of the sting out of unconditional
surrender was still being sought.
The atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima made
it clear that the United States was prepared to
enforce by overwhelming means the Potsdam
ultimatum. Further delays would mean only
larger sacrifices without the slightest hope of improvement of the peace terms. The increasing
tlIreat to the Japanese internal transportation
system rendered the prospects of mobility of the
Japanese anti-invasion forces well-nigh negligible
and promised increasing disaster to the civilian
population. The continuation of the war was
nothing short of .irrational and Russia's declaration of war and advance into Manchuria added to
the pressure by threatening a ground army disaster. The army, which thus far suffered only
limited defeats in the Philippines and in Okinawa,
faced a supreme test of strength. Difficult as it
was to conceive of supplying adequately the forces
charged with the defense of the home islands, to
support simultaneously a large scale campaign on
.the Continent of Asia was an entirely hopeless
undertaking. The industries of Manchuria, not
strong enough to provide the Kwantung Army
with the limited wherewithal of the North China
campaign, could not possibly serve as a basis for
protracted figbting against an enemy as powerful
as the Russians. For the first time during the
war, the Army, itself, faced the prospect of inescapable doom.

There is little point in attempting to impute

Japan's surrender to anyone of the numerous
causes which, jointly and cumulatively, were
responsible for the disastrous outcome of the
nation's greatest military undertaking. The time
which lapsed between the military decision and
the political acceptance of the inevitable might
have been shorter had the political structure of
Japan permitted a more rapid formulation of
national policies. As it was, the struggle between
the differen.t forces dominating Japan's society
had to reach a point at which the Fascist, intransigent wing, could be subdued. The partnership
between the conversatives, big business and Inilitary radicals had to result in bankruptcy . before
the groups which led Japan into war could be
ousted from the political saddle.
While the outcome of the war was decided in
the waters of the Pacific and on the landing beaches
of invaded islands of the outer and inner perimeter, well in advance of the strategic bomber
offensive against Japan's home islands, the '1ir
offensive against Japan proper was the major
factor determining the timing of Japan's surrender.
Without strategic bombing, a landing on Japanese
shores would have been costly, in spite of all the
weaknesses of the defending forces. The victory
actually gained was cheaper and earlier than that
which would have been gained in the absence of
strategic bombing. The importance of this contribution of strategic air attack and its implications for the future cannot be overestimated.

59

Chapter VI

POSTSCRIPT ON TARGET SELECTION IN BOMBING OF JAPAN

FAR EASTERN AIR FORCES'

opposition to the Olympic operation were actually
in Kyushu. During June, large movements of
:The primary mission of these forces during the
troops and supplies from Honshu to Kyushu
summer of 1945 was preparation for operation
were accomplished. Though these were not mterOlympic, a troop landing in southern Kyushu,
fered with by FEAF, whose counter-railroad
scheduled for N6vember 1945. It was apparent
operations were confined to. southern Kyushn,
that the strength of the ground 'opposition to be
they were of sufficient magnitude to affect 000experienced by U. S. forces would depend mainly
.nomic traffic as far east as Osaka. Even heavier
upon the troops and supplies which the enemy
movements were in store for coming months, if
could move into southern Kyushu from the main
the planned deployment was to be accomplished.
garrison, depot, and production areas in Honshu.
It also developed that current munitions proAny troops or supplies which the enemy succeeded
duction was not of major importance to Japanese
in. moving from the mainland, in the face of the
strength. Stocks of finished equipment and
mine blockade, could be expected to be landed in
sfipplies amounted to over 2 years' production at
Honshu, on northern Kyushu, and moved thence
rates current in the first fiscal quarter of 1945.
to southern Kyushu by rail. The main producing
It was clear that Japanese resistance on the beachand depot facilities on Kyushu itself were located
heads was primarily dependent on the extent to
in the extreme north, in the Moji and Fukuoka
which the material in existence could be deployed.
areas.
The consequence was, of course, that transportation'
It was also clear that the available military
was more significant than new production.
supplies and equipment would playa much larger
As noted in chapter III, however, the air effort
part in Japanese defense than the comparatively of FEAF, which resulted in the dropping of some
small additional amounts whic4 might be produced
7,100 tons of bombs, was distributed over a half
between June and November 1945.
dozen target systems. Only 15 percent of the
The logic of these facts indicated that .Japanese
effort was directed against railroads and 9 percent
railroads would be the most effective target for
against shipping. The tonnage against railroads
preparatory air operation. It was suggested that
was expended in the south and central regions of
the initial operations be undertaken in the
the island, which permitted military traffic origiShimonoseki Straits, western Honshu, and northnating in Honshu to accomplish the major part of
ern Kyushu areas, with later operations developits journey to the prospective battle fields without
ing into central and southern Kyushu, after the
hinderance.'
northerly facilities were neutralized. It seemed
Nine percent of the FEAF tonnage was directed
likely that attack in these northern areas would
at harbor installations, despite the fact that the
stop the large coal traffic originating in extreme
reduction in the merchant fleet and the mining
northern Kyushu and, to a lesser extent, in
operations had created a great excess of such
western Honshu, which was vital to continued
facilities and that, in any case, the physical
railroad and industrial operation in Kyushu and
vulnerability of such installations was very low.
in Honshu, from Nagoya west ..
More important was the expenditure of 21 percent of the tonnage against. urban areas and 13
The facts developed by investigation in Japan
percent against miscellaneous industrial and
bore out this analysis. It developed that prior
to June, only a small fraction of the forces and
I For example. the most successful operation was tbat against Q bridge in
equipment which Japan planned to deploy in
southwest Kyushu, only a few mUes back oC one of the projected beachheads.

61

Ii

TWENTIETH BOMBER COMMAND

already been proved at Pearl Harbor, off Malaya
and Ceylon, among the Solomons, in the Sibuyan
Target appraisals available at the time that the
Sea, anti north of Okinawa. They contributed
first B-29 units were being moved to China in
virtually nothing toward weakening Japanese
1944 stressed the paramount strategic importance
naval power to resist, since that power had already
of Japanese shipping. The evidence secured in
Japan reinforces this conclusion and strongly
been wiped out.
About 9 percent of the carrier-based effort was
suggests that Japan's position in eo.rly 1945 would
directed against industrial targets, principally
have been considerably weaker had an even
aircraft factories. The tonnage employed constronger attack been mounted against her shipping
tributed somewhat to the decline in aircraft
lanes in 1944. The ineffectual nature of the
production.
attacks which could be undertaken against
Only 12 percent of the carrier effort was directed
Japanese industrial and urban targets, from inagainst merchant shipping in Japanese home
adequately supplied China bases, has been pointed
waters. . The small fraction of effort devoted to
out. In retrospect, it appears that India based
this target system included the highly successful
aerial mining operations of the character later
and useful attack on the Hakodate-Aomori rail
undertaken against Japan, directed against Singferries and shipping concentration at Hakodate
apore, Palembang, Bangkok, Saigon, Hainon,
in July 1945, the important effects of which have
and such China ports as were within range would
been noted above. This attack was another
have afforded an opportunity to gain the necesdemonstration of the devastating effectiveness of
sary B-29 operating experience and at the same
carrier aircraft attack on shipping which had
time permitted a more effective attack on the
been proved repeatedly from Truk through Palau
princip.alstrategic target within reach. 3
CARRIER-BASED AIRCRAFT
and Manila to Formosa, the Ryukus, and the
TWENTY-FIRST BOMBER COMMANDSouth China Sea, but which was hardly employed
The pattern of carrier-based aircraft attack has
.
TWENTIETH AF
against
Japan
proper
despite
the
fact
that
photobeen set forth in chapter III. It will be recalled
reconnaissance often disclosed the presence of
that the largest single block of effort (47 percent)
As noted in the discussion of the effects of air
concentrations of 60,000-100,000 tons of shipping
was against airfields and falls largely into the
attack on Japan's oil supply, it appears that the
at Shimonoseki, Osaka and Kobe.
tactical category. These airfield strikes aided the
tonnage expended against oil and tetraethyl lead
Only 143 tons were directed against railroad . produced little effect on Japanese military capaOkinawa invasion and weakened Japanese kamiinstallations, aside from the rail ferries, although
kaze capabilities to some extent.
bilities or will to resist. To a lesser extent the
There is no evidence that the attacks on mili- the high precision attack of which carrier air-craft
same is true of attacks on non urban area targets
are capable is particularly suited to such targets
tary installations, which absorbed 6.6 percent of
after April 1945. 4 The pattern of B-29 operations
as bridges. While it is true that carrier-based
carrier deli;ered tonnage against Japan, would
against such targets was conditioned by the
attack was not large enough in volume or of a
have materIally weakened the resistance to the
limited conception of the role and capabilities of
sufficiently sustained character to have accomOlympic or Coronet operations in the fall of 1945
air power inherent in the basic United Sta.tes war
plished a decisive stoppage of Japanese rail traffic,
and the spring of 1946.
plan of reducing Japan by ground invasion.
it appears, in retrospect, that concentrated attack
Nineteen percent of the carrier-borne tonnage
resulting in virtually complete destruction of four
EFFECT OF TARGET SELECTION THEwas directed against enemy naval units and inor five long bridges on the Hokkaido main line
ORY ON THE AIR CAMPAIGN
st~llations, mainly in July and August. Entirely
would have been well within carrier task force
aSIde from the fact that such units had been imAGAINST JAPAN PROPER
capabilities and would have severely reduced
mobilized for lack of fuel since April, the Iwo and
The purposeef the strategic bombing campaign
Japanese rail freight movement. Transportation
Okinawa operations had amply demonstrat.ed
was, until the last weeks of the war, the reduction
was already a limiting factor on armaments prothat the remnants of the Japanese Navy were
of the armed strength with which the enemy could
powerless to interfere with amphibious operations,
duction in the spring of 1945 so that a substantial
be expected to oppose a landing by our ground
even when carried out practically at Japan's front
result would have been achieved by such reductroops in November 1945. Carrier-based and
door. Under these circumstances, the carrier
tion. More important, it now seems that such
attacks on :fleet units at K ure and Y okosuka were
3 Fourteenth AF conntershipping operations would also have bC'en facilia traffic reduction. would have considerably
tated by the better logistic support which it would have been possible to
merely redundant demonstrations of the capabiliincreased the shock effects of urban area attacks
provide had the competition of the B-29's heen removed.
ties of aircraft against surface vCiisels which had
4 As noted, the fuel poSition was such that the enemy could not have
and done more to reduce, immediately, food
operated a substantially larger number of aircraft had these been available.
, Even if it had proved impossible to do serious damage to the Kamman
availability
outside
rural
areas
than
any
other
Neither would the ordnance output at preatta.ck levels have substantially
tunnel whIch had been designa.ted as a target for special weapons. ResPODSiincreased enemy capabilitIes.
bJlity for its destruction had been shifted to the B-29'B.
form of attack.
unidentified targets. Much of the urban area
tonnage consisted of high-explosive bombs, which
were known to be of row effectiveness, compared
to incendiaries, against this type of target. Neither
the industries nor the cities were of major importance to the defense of Kyushu in November,
since neither contributed any substantial production of immediate use to Japanese forces. The
effort employed in these attacks was, on the other
hand, excellently adapted to attack on railroad
yards and bridges, since a high proportion of the
aircraft involved were fighters and medium bombers. Consistent attack on as few as 10 rail targets
(5 yards and 5 bridges), would have severely
hampered both military and economic rail traffic
between Honshu and Kyushu. 2 The build-up of
strength in Kyushu "OPuld have been substantially smaller and very serious effects on Honshu
and Kyushu coal supplies would have been caused.
Nothing comparable was accomplished by the
FEAF operations actually undertaken.

714928---4~6

FEAF operations had the same fundamental end

in view. The evidence suggests that definition
of the air mission in these limited teflUs somewhat
delayed the termination of the war.- The larger
mission of achieving a decision without invasion
does not appear to have been recognized as the
major objective until almost the end of the conflict
and then only by part of the air forces engaged.
Urban fire raids had, of course, begun on a large
scale as early as March, but these appear to have
been initially undertaken largely for operational
reasons, as an easier way, than precision' bombing,
of getting at war production and of preventing its
recuperation from precision attack. It was not
until incendiary attacks were scheduled against
urban areas of minor industrial importance,
advance announcements of urban area raids made
to the enemy and the atom bombs were dropped,
that the primary mission of securing an independent decision was explicitly accepted for the
B-29's. It was never accepted so far as the Far
Eastern Air Forces and carrier forces were
concerned.
Although a decision was iIi. fact obtained without invasion in the Japanese war, perhaps partly
because United States forces were ready to invade
in the immediate future, adherence to the limited
concept of the role of strategic power caused a
scattering and division of effort which probably
delayed this result. As noted in chapter III,
B-29 strategic effort from December 1944 on was
distributed over sevcn different main types of
targets. About 70 percent was directed against
urban areas and may be said to have achieved
both the limited and the broader strategic objectives. The balance was distributed over such
targets as oil, ordnance, and aircraft and did not
put much pressure directly on the Japanese social
organization. It was also expended ill sea mining
which tended more toward external than internal
blockade and was by that time less conclusive.'
The carrier-based aircraft directed almost their
entire effort toward reducing enemy first-line air,
naval, and military strength rather than the
foundations of the Japanese economy. FEAF
scattered its effort over transportation, urbanarea, and industrial targets of distinctly secondary
importance while passing up targets upon whose
The volume of overseas traffic in early 1945 does not appear to have
exceeded a rate of about 9 million tons a year, or 5 percent of 8 rail mon'
ment of around 180 million tons. The qualitative importance of this traffic
was no greater.

63

continued functioning large segments of the

It would have been possible by concentration
social organization were dependent. Had the
of effort, from April on, to drop, say, 10,000 tons
effort of all these forces not needed for the immeof HE a month on railroad targets, without
diate support of the Okinawa campaign been
materially weakening the urban area attack. 8
directed exclusively against targets, destruction
From experience in Europe and the relative size
of which tended independently to force a decision
and vulnerability of the Japanese system it might
as well as to weaken enemy front lines, it seems
hlj,ve been expected that under a bombardment
probable that the war could have been won
of this magnitude, traffic would have been reduced
earlier.
to disastrous levels within about 2 months. 9
Action against war production is relevant to
Use of high-precision forms of air attack, parforcing a surrender only insofar as it is backed up
ticularly carrier-ba~ed aircraft, at the two vital
by the threat of armed invasion. Action which
bottlenecks at the extremities of the island of
threatens the subsistence of large sections of the
Honshu would have strengthened the campaign
population and at the same time, through re- - out of all proportion to the relative effort.lO
stricting communications, menaces the continuThe undertaking of this program would not
ance of centralized and integrated social control,
have detracted from the accomplishment of the
can exert powerful pre~ure toward termination
more limited objective of reducing Japan's front
of a war, even though invasion is not in the
line Inilitary strength but would have increased
offing. A government unable to feed its people
the chance of its attainment. It seems that the
and to maintain mobility and cohesion of its
effect on virtually all top priority production
. forces cannot long survive. By April 1945 the
would have been decisive. After March 1945
threat to subsistence posed by the reduction of
either dispersal, lack of transportation, absenteeimports, fishing, and fertilizer, as well as by
ism, or lack of raw materials was the limiting factor
urban area casualties and disorganization, had
in such production. Rail attack would have
become substantial. Nevertheless, the railroads
severely ag!iavated all those problems. In addiwere free to move the main bulk of living req~e- . tion, virtually all production centers were remote
ments and internal communication remained
from coal and dependent on rail movement for a
open. The process of disintegration remained slow.
large part of their food. Finally, a large part .of
Had attention been directed towards spectacular
Substantial diversions from the urban attar.ks to reinforce the rail program
increases of pressure rather than toward facilitatwould have been justified in the event that the tonnage shifted from other
targets proved insutllcient. Since the spillage from bombardment of major
ing invasion, the railroads would have presented
rail yards would have resulted in serious urban damage the shifting of tonnage
a promising target. Railroad attack would have
to ran targets would not have resulted in a proportional weakening of the
carried with it an almost immediate threat of
urban attacks.. Moreover, denial ot rail transportation of the major urban
areas would have greatly aggravated the elIects of the urban area attacks
starvation, not' only for the major urban consince the accomplishment of evacuation and the provision of emergency food
centration but for the entire deficit food areas,
snpplies would have been rendered most difiicult. Finally there appears
to have been substanttal overbombing of urban targets so that in some cases
such as western Honshu, and would have placed
a large diversion ot tonnage would have elIected only a minor change in result.
a severe restriction on internal communications.
'Day and night bombardment principally by heavy bombers in a weight
of about 20,000 tons a month directed against 90 French railroad yards, during
In view of the already overstrained truck, motor
2;i months in the spring oJ 1944, reduced economic traffic to 13 peroent of its
fuel, and shipping positions, the dependence of the
preattack level in the area under attack although the rail system was working
at only a fraction of capacity. Even if weather conditions had prevented
railroads themselves on the continuance of coal
the use of t.he more efficient method of line interdiction rather than -yard
traffic over only four lines 6 and the importance of
attack, not over 30 yards would have had to be attacked in 1apan to take out
a larger proportion of capACity than was at~ in France. In Japan,
food shipments from Hokkaido, tliere is very
unlike France, the railroad system was heavily overloaded. There were a
good reason to believe that an effective railroad
nnmber of outstanding bottlenp.cks and, except in the urban areas, only two
or three alternate routes for the main traffic flow. The Japanese Bystem
attack might have brought about a very rapid
was relatively small and weak. Compared to the French it had but 08
capitulation. 7
percent of the route mileage, 10 percent of the multitrack mileage, 40 percent
Next to the steel industry, the railroads were the largest single consumer
of coal in Japan and, from early in 1945, their coal stocks amounted to no
more than 2 or 3 '\Ueks' supply.
1 When questioned on this point. Hosbino, cabinet secretary and economic

pll\Ill1er to To]o, stated that had coal and food from Kyushu and Hokkaido
been cut off by interruption of the railroads, further resistance would have
heen impossible; as the population would have starvad. Lt. Col. Iwakeshi,

Japanese Imperial General Stat!, Supply Officer, said that the General
Stat! had been surprised at the failure of the United Stat.. air forces to attack
the railroads instead of factories; surrender would have come earlier.

64

the movement of seInifinished goods such as steel

plates, shapes and bars, light metal ingots, plates
8Jld shapes, chemicals, and so forth, had to be
Illoved to fabricating plants by rail and to a
considerable extent from distant plants in Hokkaido, northern Honshu, and Kyushu. The
results of rail attack would thel'efore have been
Illore devastating than direct plant attack.ll
:More important, greater prospect of success in
achieving the limited strategic objective of weakening enemy forces at the Kyushu beachheads would
have attended this form of attack than any other.
Not only would additions to strength through new
production have been prevented, but the mobility
of existing strength could have been severely
hampered. The main stocks of military supplies
and material were located in Honshu. Large
movements of troops and supplies from Honshu
to Kyushu were accomplished by rail during the
11

German experience seems to eollaborate this conclusion .

month of June. Even larger movements were

scheduled at the time the war ended. Because
of the difficult truck and ship position of Japan,
these movements could not have been accomplished without use of the railroads.'2
The evidence available indicates that a concentration of air attacks exclusively on railroads
and urban areas, at least from March 1945 on,
would in all probability have led to an earlier
surrender and would at the same time have more
successfully reduced enemy military capabilities
to oppose a landingY
11 The Japanese army had. In the home islands at the end of the war but
8,900 trucks. There were, it is true; a. considerable number of civilian trucks
which, at a serious cost to war production, could, theoretically. have been
requisitioned. As a practical matter, such requisitions on a large scale seem
to present insuperable difilculties in the provision of ddvers, fuel and repair
echelons. The Germans in France in a similar situation secured little benefit
from truck requisitions.
18 It should be repeated here that, in July 1945: a command decision was
made awarding top target priority to Japanese railroads and that this was
about to be implemented when the war ended.

oc the locomotives, and 25 percent ot the freight cars. And a considerable

portion of the Japanese factHtfes were in Hokka.ido and Kyushu and would
have been unavailable once the bottlenecks at the Kammon tunnel and the
Amori-Hakodate rail ferries were plugged.
10 About 12,000 tons of bombs dropped by fighter and medium bombers
were sufficient to interdict virtually all railroad traffic in the Italian peninsula

for 6 weeks in the spring of 1944. This was about the tonnage of bombs

dropped on Japan by carrier forces and FEAF. While tbe geography and '
railroad system of Italy resemhled that of J span far more closely than did that
of France and Germany, the Italian network was at least 50 percent denser
than the Japanese.

65

..

Over-All Economic Effects Division

Appendixes A, B, and C

Appendix A
u. S. ECONOMIC

INTELLIGENCE ON JAPAN

ANALYSIS AND COMPARISONS

General Discussion

..

Two opposing views characterized United States

estimates of Japan's wartime economy. The
first was that J~panese production was at a low
level. The second was that her productive
capacity was large and that stock piles and imports were sufficient to support capacity production. The latter view was more widely held.
However, USSBS findings indicate that the lower
estimates were more accurate.
It may be argued that it is always safe to overestimate the enemy. But if one accepts this view,
precise intelligence is unnecessary; a conservative
bias could replace skilled judgment. Moreover,
overestimates can be as dangerous as underestimates. Overestimates of German potential in
many cases guided diploma"tic dealings with Germany during the years before the war. Failure
to realize that Japan's productive machine had
come to a standstill in 1945 might have led us unnecessarily to undertake Operation Olympic, an
invasion that could have cost an enormous number
of lives. There is no security in being "conservative."
I
Analysis suggests three major causes of error in
the various estimates of Japanese production:
lack of basic data, failure to consider the over-all
situatipn in making estimates for individual items,
and the ~mission of administrative, cultural and
psychological factors.
In making estimates, it is generally necessary to
set" up a base year and to measure changes from
this base. In ascertaining Japanese production
during the course of the war, it would have been
most helpful to have had a good knowledge of production, capacity, and stock piles as of Pearl
Harbor. However, data to establish. such indices

were generally lacking. The Japanese had forbidden the publication of statistics on most industries since 1929. Information on Japanese
shipyards, docks, and harbor facilities was obsolete and very little was known about some of the
most important shipbuilding and repair yards .
Moreover, we had failed to secure much information that was readily available, such as all the
published registers of Japanese merchant ships.
A great deal of the research effort expended during
the war was devoted to compiling this kind of
basic prewar data. Thousands of man-hours were
used to ascertain the number, type, and tonnage of
ships available to the Japanese at the outbreak
of the war. To determine the stock pile of oil in
Japan at the time of Pearl Harbor, information
was being sought as late as 1945, on American
shipments of oil to Japan from 1929 through 1941.
There were instances of a surp"rising lack of elementary data. For example, the koku is a Japanese unit of volume used to measure rice and other
foods. USSBS found that the Japanese were
using a conversion factor of 6 koku per ton of
brown rice, whereas research analysts used a factor
of 6.838, causing an error of 12 percent for part of
the food estimates.
Partly as a result of this dearth of information,
Japan's stock piles of raw materials in 1941 were
generally overestimated. Most agencies placed
her oil reserves at 75 to 80 million barrels, enough
to sustain a 2 years' war. The lowest estimate
was that of MIS,-JFEOC,' 57 million barrels.
The actual figure was 43 million barrels. Bauxite
reserves were assumed to be 500,000 tons, when
they totaled only 250,000 tons. Instead of
I The follOWIng abbreviations will be used: JFEOC for Joint Far East
Oil Committee; EOO for Enemy on Committee; MIS for Military Intellf.
genae Service; FEA for Foreign Economic Administration; BEW for Boar<l
of Economic Warfare; OSS for Office of Strategic Services; ONI for Office o.
Naval Intelligence; eOA (or Committee of Operations Analysts; JTO foe
Joint Target Group; and JANIS ror Joint Army Navy Intelligence Service.

69

building. up her stocks of iron ore during 1941 as

supposed, Japan had been forced to draw. upon
them to the extent of 1,207,000 tons, leaving only
a 4 months' reserve.
The second cause of error was that some of the
estimates for particular products were made
without adequate consideration of the over-all
situation. FEA, for example, made excellent
estimates of the capacity of various Japanese
industries and of the requirements for their
products. However, a study of the FEA reports
for 1944 indicates that the estimates for production
in these various industries are not in consonlJ,nce
with any reasonable estimate of the total supply
of available raw materials. In December 1943,
FEA predicted production at capacity for Ip.ost
industries. At this time,.. the shipping section of
FEA estimated shipping available to the Japanese
at approximately 4,800,000 tons. A year later it
was known that losses in merchant ships had been
even greater than anticipated and tonnage available was correctly placed at 2,500,000 tons.
Nevertheless, the FEA steel report issued in
November 1944 again estimated steel ingot
production at capacity, 13,690,000 tons, stating,
"Equipment * * * being utilized at its full operating
capacity. * * * Ample raw materials are available
for such operations." The coal section's estimate
was also the same as the preceding year, 68
million tons, "sufficient to meet essential requirements." Analagous views of "capacity production" , or "sufficien t to meet essential requiremen ts"
were expressed by the other research sections at
FEA. A similar attitude, though less extreme,
characterized some of OSS estimates.
Curiously, the FEA shipping section was alert
to the danger of the shipping shortage. In December 1943 it warned, "The situation will probably be considerably more serious than the figures
indicate . . . the Japanese shipping situation is
already serious, and is deteriorating at a rate which
will either limit industrial production or restrict
military activity before the end of 1944. Any
substantial increase in shipping losses would
precipitate a situation that is already developing.
There is 'very little slaek left in the Japanese
economy." The "general conclusion section" of
the' 1943 YEA's "Japan's War Economy" also
refers to "difficulties already encountered in supplying enough raw materials to utilize fully the
capacity already at hand." Nevertheless, as
noted above, the individual sections of FEA

70

blithely disregarding the warnings of their own

shipping section, estimated capacity production
for their respective industries late in 1944.
Most other agencies did not realize how early
in the war, even in 1942 and 1943, lack of raw
materials due to shipping shortages was limiting
Japanese production. Thus, in November 1943
the COA wrote: "Continuation of the present rate
of sinkings,... would result in a serious,
though not critical, reduction in Japan's military
and economic strength."
In this report the COA found the major weakness in Japan's economy to be that "she lacks the
excess capacity, often found in other countries, in
the basic industries essential to war." Prodding
from'MIS and the Far East Target Section of A-2,
particularly their joint dissenting opinion to the
1944 COA subcommittee report on iron and steel,
induced some change in the COA opinion, expressed in its report of October 1944: "The present view of Japan's coke, iron, and steel position
differs materially from that held in November
1943. Shortage of ore, rather than open hearth
and rolling mill capacity, now limits iron and steel
output." However, even at this stage, the COA
did not fully appreciate the desperate straits to
which Japanese industry had been reduced by
shortages of raw materials.
An over-all view wQuld have suggested that at
all stages of the war Japan's industry was almost
entirely dependent on imports for her supply of
raw materials, and that the declining Japanese
merchant fleet could not bring in enough to continue to supply all industries. Yet many research
sections appear to have shared the notion that the
Japanese would provide enough raw materials for
the particular industry they were interested in
developing as a target.
The MIS approach was to appraise the general
situation on the basis of raw materials on hand at
each stage in the war, which was in turn considered
a function of the shipping section. Estimates for
each industry were then made in the light of the raw
materials which the general picture indicated were
. currently available for this purpose. Capacity
was regarded as an outside limit which was not
significant because of the stringency of almost all
materials. This method proved the most reliable.
That the capacity-requirements method could
be used successfully, if coupled with an over-all
view, is shown by the 1943 report of the Far East
Target Section of A-2, "North China Coal." This

report accepted the FEA requirement figures, but

.instead of assuming that sufficient coal was available to meet this need, made an independent analysis of available shipping and concluded that "the
present scale of war effort means an annual'coal
deficit of 10 million tons for Japan proper," an
estimate which erred somewhat on the low side.
It is interesting to note that throughQut the
war, the Japanese broadcast and published annual
estimates of national income, the total value of
goods and services produced. These estimates
were analyzed by OSS and used in their study of
Japanese national income, which was revised by
the State Department in a reparations study.
There is a high correlation between these revised
estimates and the USSBS findings. These national
income estimates, considered in conjunction with
published information on Japanese consumer income, would have suggested that the Japanese
economy could not support the sum of the estimates for individual products. So far as is known,
these national income estimates were never used
to evaluate the individual estimates, either at
OSS or any other agency.
Each item in an industrial system is interconnected with the whole. The vice of making estimates in separate compartments is that each
analyst makes his estimate by assuming "other
things being equal". But the crux of the Japanese
situation was that other things were not equal; the
production of each item was a function of what
matetials were being used for "other things". All
of Japan's economy depended on water transportation, overseas and coastwise, and the making
of isolated estimates resulted in various groups
using the same space on the same ships at the
same time for different commodities.
The third cause of error was the failme to give
sufficient weight to administrative, social, and
technological factors. The analysis in many of
the estimates' was almost wholly concerned with
economic and statistical matters. Other elements which were not subject to quantitative
measurement were often rejected as subjects for
discussion. But these factors could not really be
exorcised. Although they were not deliberately
taken into account, they appear in the conclusions
as hidden assumptions.
Most agencies did not adequately study the
question of how well the Japanese could handle'
large scale industrial enterprises. requiring much
organization and widespread technical skill. It

was known that the Japanese were acquainted

with the most advanced industrial processes, and
on this basis, they were generally credited with
success in many fields of production. What was
assumed by most estimators, however, was that
knowledge on the part of a few engineers could be
translated into large scale developments. "The
Japanese have the know-how * * *", FEA wrote
in 1944. JTG, knowing that the Japanese had
successfully operated small plants for making
alumina from aluminous shale, concluded that
"conversion of the Japanese alumina industry to
non-Bayer plants had been virtually completed by
June 1945." Similar views of success in this field
were entertained by FEA. In fact, the Japanese
failed completely to attain substantial production
by this.method because they lacked sufficient personnel witli the requisite technical skill to supervise operations. All estimates of synthetic oil
production were based on the premise that the
Japanese would be fairly successful in utilizing
complex chemical processes on a large scale.
These estimates varied f!'Om 16 million to 20 million barrels for the years 1942--44. USSBS
findings show that total synthetic production from
1937, when it was introduced, through July 1945
amounted to only 5,500,000 barrels. Remarkably accurate estimates were made of the number
of ships available to the Japanese. But estimates
of what materials could be imported with this
fleet were too high because the Japanese managed
their ships less efficiently than was generally supposed; loading and unloading times were excessive; cargo was often poorly selected; ships sometimes retUIned emptly; army and navy quarrels
delayed convoys unnecessarily.
A skeptical view of Japanese technological
ability was taken by the Far East Target Section
of A-2. Referring to "claimed exploitation of
Manchurian aluminous shales," it observed that
"any substantial achievement along those lines
would be dependent . . . upon remarkable technological progress . . . . " However, no specific
estimates were made in the air objective folders,
which were primarily area studies.
One of the few instances of adequate treatment
of Japanese technology appears in the BEW's
"Japan's War Economy" of March 1943. Ten
of the 20 pages of the chapter on combat armament are devoted to a discussion of" the technical
efficiency of Japanese industry and Its effect on
the production of combat armament." Limita-.

71

tions were considered to arise from the fact that

"althougb remarkable progress has been made
from the low levels of 15 years ago, Japanese
industry is not as yet abreast of western industry
in methods or efficiency. . .. It is not that the
techniques cannot be mastered but that several
years must elapse before they are completely
mastered." Major obstacles to the development
of large-scale production were seen as: difficulty
in learning the techniques necessary for the production of new alloy steels; limited number of
precision quality single. purpose machine tools;
inexperience in mass production techniques; shortcomings of industrial personnel. Under the latter
section it was stated: "The Japanese are skillful
artisans and under able supervision become
efficient indu,strial workers. Facilities- for training new workers . . . are limited and in the
absence of a tradition of mass production, the
difficulties are magnified. . ., There is an essential shortage of supervisors at the shop foreman
level. Moreover, the supervisory class as a whole
is less efficient and less competent than are the
workers. . .. The strict caste system prevailing
in Japanese industry constitutes another obstacle.
Management is frequently uninformed on
technical problems. There is a wide gap between
the technical and practical sides in the management of Japanese industries:' With these limi,tations in mind, the BEW estimated production
of airplanes engines 'at 18,000 for 1942 and 28,000
for 1943. .The actual' figures were 17,000 and
24,000, respectively-a good estimate considering
the paucity of information available early in 1943.
In the main, the' USSBS findings corroborate
the more cautious views. In the later stages of
the war, the Japanese succeeded in applying mass
production methods in a few industries, shipbuilding and aircraft. A small segment of their
industry was successful in producing high-precision
instruments. But on the whole, they were
markedly inferior to the American standards
with which many estimators credited them.
Similarly, no extensive inquiry was made as to
whether the Japanese could plan and direct the
vast intricate industrial-governmental com,plex
which is necessary for modern war. Estimators
had opinions on this matter, snap jud~ents pro
or con Japanese administrative ability being made
on. the basis of an anecdote, an isolated instance,
or on the surprising extent of Japan's victories
early in the war. "Management and over-all

72

planning are 'excellent" the COA reported in 1943.

The BEW included a chapter on Problems of War
Time Economic Administration in its "Japan's
War Economy." This discussed the development
of wartime con tlOls , the resistance to such controls by the industrif!.lleaders, the internal stuggles
between competing groups in Japan and suggested
that "these serious limitations on efficient administration" might have had adverse effects on war
production. Referring to the establishment of
what was to become the Munitions Ministry, it
pointed out that "the centralization of authority
over economic administlation should materially
increase efficiency of production during the coming
year." These observations were in the right
direction, but the degree to which administrative
difficulties were interfering with Japanese production was not fully appreciated, even by the
BEW. OSS made a short study of the Japanese
civil service system in "Civil Affairs Handbook,"
a section on government and administration, prepared for the military government. This is a
descriptive study only, listing the various titles,
grades, promotion rules, etc., in the Japanese civil
service. . It does not discuss the administrative
ability of the civil service, except for one sentence
to the effect that it is "honest and efficient." The
chapter in the BEW report is the only attempt
to determine the influence of administration on
production. Nowhere was any systematic study
made of the habits, attitude, and competence of
Japanese administrative agencies.
USSBS findings indicate that the practices and
psychological attitudes ,of the Japanese administrative group were factors in the decline of Japan's
economy. Until the end of 1942 they coasted
along, lacking a sense of urgency. They did not
anticipate the need for substantial increases in
production and. as a result did not make vigorous
enough attempts to import raw materials from the
southern areas. Although they had acquired a
vast overscas empire and "Were completely dependent on imports which had to run the gauntlet of
Allied submarines, ship construction plans for
1944, made early in 1942, were only 700,000 tons,
in contrast to the 1,600,000 tons they were able to
produce in 1944 when aroused to their peril.
Stocks of scarce materials were wasted, expanding
industries in which there was already excess
capacity, Even after aircraft production was
ostensibly unified under the Munitions Ministry
in 1943, the testimony of its chairmen, Fujihara

Genjiro, shows that this (,ltrol was not effective,

branches of the army and avy continuing to grab
materials and tools from :anufacturers to whom
they had been assigned. Accounting practices
were so poor and the officitl language so ambiguous
that control agencies WeI' never able properly to
regulate the dist[ibutiOl of materials. Scarce
commodities leaked into tl . black market throughout the war. Materials w re sometimes channeled
into low priority industri, ; because the only way
to keep peace between the Irmy and the navy was
to give each 50 percent of available supplies.
Real power rested in tIl hands of committees
which seldom agreed on lefinite action. Faced
with a catastrophe, the i treaucracy was unable
to change its stereotype, routine. The exuberance of yesterday'S victOl'S was replaced by tlle
depression of preEjent de. at. Noone dared to
assume individual respom bility when group control was shattered. All ( . this behavior had ad,
verse effects on the econm v and was a substantial
contributing cause of tl ' decline in industrial
output.
II
Many agencies work! l ,in Washington 1 on
,problems connected With, 'timating Japanese production. Joint Jntellig(' Ice Committee (JIC)
made special studies for he joint chiefs of staff.
Navy groups included th Far Eastern section of
ONI, OP 16 VA, Pacifi Strategic Intelligence
Service (PSIS). Army gencies were the Far
East Target Section of l\ -2 and Military IntelliO'ence Service. Civilian gencies were the Office
~f Scientific Research an. Development (OSRD),
Office of Strategic Servic , and the Foreign Economic Administration.
It is sometimes said tJ It these agencies were
wastefully competing and ,luplicating each other's
work. Examination indi ,1tes such a view is exaggerated and omits cert: n facts:
1, Some agencies speci:1 ized i,n types of research
which they were peculiar, equipped to do. For
example, OSRD studied physical damage from
various types of explosiv, , and incendiaries; ONI
confined its strategic inte] igence to certain phases
of shipping, lending per, ,nnel to other agencies
engaged in research on oller subjects. .
2. Several committees 0 coordinate the work
of the various agencies :ere formed, the CO:o1I

Area (lIGPOA) and severa} others

operated in.the Paciftc Ocean ares but

l'

not included in this study. They

concentrated on tactical and operation

intemgen~.

Joint Intelligence G.roup Pacific

OCI

mittee of Operations Analysts (COA) , the Enemy

Oil Committee (EOC) , which was replaced by
the Joint Far Eastern Oil Committee, in 1945
sponsored. by MIS. These committees issued
their own reports after considering the views of
each agency.
3. Joint Target Group was formed in 1944
through the merger of Far East Target Section
of A-2 and the target Section of OP 16 VA to
supply target intelligence for the Army Air Forces
and the Navy. Personnel for JTG were also
drawn from OSS and FEA. Joint Army-Navy
Intelligence Service (JANIS) took over activities
which had previously been done independently
by the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and OSS.
The Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee
r,eviewed claimed ship sinkings and its findings
were accepted by all services.
4. There was a great deal of useful collaboration
among the agencies. Much basic work on the
capacity of Japanese industries was done by
FEA. ,Other groups accepted these calacity
figures but applied their own methods for ascertaining the rate of production. After 1944, PSIS
and MIS exchanged information, MIS taking
over the economic estimating. During 1945, MIS
frequently briefed sections of JTG and other agencies on the results of its findings. JANIS concentrated on area studies, adopting OSS's industry
analyses.
5. There was also a great deal of unofficial cooperation, interchange o~data and ideas among
the operating personnel of the various agencies.
The existence of several agencies permitted
publication of different opinions. This study indicates that the point of .view of the estimator on
the general Japanese situation was an important
factor in determining estimates for particular
items. Had there been a single agency, a unified
but erroneous point of view might have led to the
supp~ession of dissenting opinions. The country
was not so poor in research talent that it could not
afford some duplication. The advantage of providing a forum for the free expression of varying
views outweighed the slight waste.
However, within the limits of security, information and data possessed by one agency should be
available to others with .a legitimate interest.
Occasionally, military personnel did not apprcciate that certain tactical information had an important bearing on economic intelligence. For
example, in the early stages of the waI', the Navy
73

was reluctant to keep research divisions, including

its own OP 16 VA, fully informed of the progress
of Japanese ship sinkings. Japan's merchant
fleet was regarded too exclusively as a t(l,rget, and
there was not sufficient understanding of the relation of shipping to the economic situation. As
the war progressed, this attitude was somewhat
changed. Cominch, for example, screened its
tactical reports for economic data and this was
exchanged with MIS.
'A considerable degree of cooperation finally
prevailed among the various agencies at the close
of the war. However, there is evidence of poor
coordination between research agencies and field
operation centers. Planners, not appreciating
the time required for careful research, sometimes
failed to notify research agencies of proposed
operations early enough' for them to prepare
strategic data. For example, because of late
notice, some JANIS studies of New Guinea and
the Marshall Islands were not ready until after
invasions of these areas had taken place: This
situation appears to have been improved by the
latter stages of the war.
Difficulties for research analysts were also
caused by some operational reports which were
written from a "press release" viewpoint without
sufficient regard for accuracy. On the other hand,
research analysts sometimes devised target systems without adequate consideration of operational
limitations, such as w~ather, visibility, possible
target accuracy, etc. Oonflicting reports were
sometimes sent to field target officers. In considering the oil attack, the target section of the
Twentieth Air Force received four different
estimates from four different agencies concerning
the Japanese oil position. It has been suggested
above that it is not disadvantageous to have
several agencies studying economic intelligence.
But so far as possible, information should be
coordinated before being sent to the field. .
Some agencies were alert to the importance of
getting the results of their research into the field
quickly. MIS had its studies mimeographed and
flown to Guam. A special challllel was arranged
for prompt radio communication. When it was
found that printing delayed distribution, JANIS
had 25 copies of each of its studies mimeographed
and flown overseas with instructions that printing
copies would follow.
Perfectionism about unessential trivia cimsed
tragic delays in the publication of JTG's studies.
74

Target sheets were reprinted two and three times,

multicolored mosaics were made when photostats
of a crayon drawing would have been adequate.
Sample checks reveal that the average time consumed in printing was over 2~ months. Delays
were also caused by modifications in the presentation of material. The air objective folders had
been made on an area basis, industrial data being
given for each area. This format did not adequately indicate the economic vnlnerability of the
various industries. To remedy this, JTG made
its first studies on an industrial basis, but unfortunately, this method proved unsuitable for
use at operational centers because it did not
sufficiently locate the targets. In the spring of
1945, JTG began redoing its studies to combine
a functional and a geographical analysis. This
proved to be an excellent system. However as
a result of these delays, most' JTG target data
arrived in the field after the target had been
bombed.
To make proper use of strategic research, a wellmalllled field intelligence staff is required to
evaluate it in the light of operational intelligence.
The target section of the Twentieth Air Force was
badly understaffed. During the most important
stage of operations it consisted of a lieutenant
colonel, a first lieutenant, and a private first class.
For short periods they secured the loan of a civilian,
a signal officer, and two Navy language officers.
While the understaffed ta,rget section of the
Twentieth Air Force was slaving away in midnight sessions improvising target material, JTG
personnel were demoralized with the realization
that their completed research came frequently
too late to be of any use.

III
We have seen "that, throughout the war, there
persisted two views of Japan's economy, one that
it was weak and starving, the other that it was
powerful and well stocked, retaining a substantial
residuum of strength till very late in the war.
These divergent views led to different estimates of
particular items. In general the lower estimates
were more accurate because to a greater extent
than the others, they were based on a truer. picture
of the over-all situation.
Most American intelligence agencies overestimated Japan's economic strength, and the error
was, in the main, caused by impmper evaluation
of two factors:

1. A misunderstanding of the over-all position

of Japan's economy. Completed preparations
were assumed to represent minimum war potential.
Only a very few realized that, right from the start
of the war, Japan's industries were starved for
raw materials.
2. Failure to consider sufficiently the effects on
the war economy of the administrative ineptitude
of the Japanese in industry and government.
Strategic economic intelligence must be bas!)d on
a wider set of factors than those generally considered in statistical analysis. It requires the
collection of all relevant facts about a country,
including the level of education and the social
organization and customs of.the people, as well as
their industrial and natural r!)sources. It must
use the methods of all the social sciences, even if
they be still in the qualitative stage. Though no
precise quantitative assessment can be made for
some factors, they must still be given weight. '

Specific Studies
Coal Estimates

1,

The Japanese Government issued no statistics

on the coal industry after 1936. The various
United States intelligence agencies were, therefore, confronted with the twofold task of determining the rate of expansion of coal production
within Japan proper and the occupicd countries
during the period fr.om 1936 to Pearl Harbor, and
the effect of the war on the output of coal in
Japan proper and on imports.
In general, two approaches to the problem were
utilized. The first, which might be called the
'requirements method, assumed that Japan's key
industries were operating at full capacity. The
output of coal in Japan proper was then estimated. It was then further assumed that the
coal required to make up the deficiency, was
being imported.
The 1943 FEA-COA report illustrates this
technique. This survey placed coal production
in Japan, during 1943, at 52 million metric tons;
the actual figure was 55,5 million tons. It also
estimated that Japan's general industrial activity
was at capacity rate, consuming 68 million tons.
Therefore, coal imports were calculated at 16,6
million tons.
In its 1944 report, FEA again assumed requirements of 68 million tons. Believing that domesI

This section is based on a special memo by First Lt. Raymond Burnes.

tic production had risen 2 million tons to 54 million, it inferred "Japan proper will have to import
by water shipment about 14 million metric tons
to meet essential war needs." The report further
high-lighted the importance of water transportation by estimating that in addition to the 14
million tons of water borne imports, about 10
million tons of coal produced in Japan proper
would have to be shipped from point of production
to a point of consumption wholly, or in large part,
by water. Nevertheless, the report concluded,
"The 1944 coal supply should be sufficient to meet
essential requirements."
MIS adopted a substantially different technique.
An appraisal of the rate of general industrial operations was made in terms of the available supply of raw materials, particularly lln.ports. Attention was focused on shipments of coal and
available shipping from the occupied areas to
Japan proper. Revisions in estimates were made
periodically, in the light of the rapidly shifting
shipping situation.
Using this approach, MIS concluded in December 1944 that Japan was facing a general coaJ
shorta:ge, and that the iron and steel industry was
suffering from a lack of coking coal. Japan's coal
imports were estimated at 4.5 to 5.2 million tons,
including coking coal, from the mainland. In
July 1945, a second study concluded that Japan's
industries were receiving coal at the rate of 42.25
million tons per year; the actual rate in June was
42.8.
The tables below indicate that the COA-FEA
estimates of coal production in Japan proper compare favorably with the actual output. The basic
weakness of the COA-FEA approach was the assumption that the Japanese economy was operating at close to full capacity through 1944. As
late as November 1944, FEA estimated that
Japan's industries would consume 68 million tons
of coal. Total 1944 consumption did not, in fact,
exceed 50 million tons. The MIS production estimate of 50.5 million tons on the other hand, was
a result of its view of a much lower rate of general
industrial activity.
The COA-FEA assumption that Japan could
import the coal needed to maintain capacity operations in key industries during 1943 and 1944
was also unfounded. Actual imports were dictated by her deteriorating shipping positio.n rather
than by industrial needs and fell subs tan tially
below their estimates.
75

..
The table below indicates the estimates of coal
available in Japan compared with the USSBS
figures.
ApPENDIX TABLE

Year

1943 ____ . __
1944 ______ _
1945 ______ _
1

A-l.-Coal available in Japan proper,

191,8-J,5

USSBS

JANIS
OSS

MIS

eOA-FEA

A2

61. 5 ________ ________

68
'58
52. 4
50. 5
57
68 _____ _
42.8
42.25 _____________________ _

10,000,000 tons deficit figure based on FEA requirements figure.

Source: MIS, report of December 1944 and July 1945; JANIS report of .

~a:, ~:~~~~ 19~~P~~ ~~:e~~~r\J/~~, FJ~hJ~~: ~o~, E~~

1943.

Steel Estimates

Two different appro8iChes were used to estimate

Japanese iron and steel production. The first,
typified by FEA, attempted to determine capacity
and. then applied a rate of production to that capacity. The second, exemplified by MIS, attempted
to determine the amount of raw materials available and then applied conversion factors to this
amount. of raw materials. All analysts, of course,
realized that the upper limits of production are
determined by capacity and by raw materials, as
well as other elements. The first group, however,
believed that in the main, capacity was the specific
limiting factor, the second that raw materials were
the bottleneck in Japanese production.
In 1942, the BEW began its studies of Japanese
steel capacity. Available information was collected and analyzed, and persons familiar with
Japanese steel industry were interviewed. In
March 1943, BEW estimated Japan's steel ingot
capacity for 1942 at 9,526,000 tons. It was also
believed that mills were operating at 90 percent
of capacity, giving a' production of 8,750,000 tons;
actual production was 8,004,000 tons. Capacity
was underestimated because much of the recent
Japanese expansion was not yet known. The rate
of production was overestimated at 90 percent of
this capacity; the true rate was 75 percent of a
larger capacity. The two errors compensated
and the estimated production was quite close to the
actual figure.
The BEW'S-view was: "The primary limitation
on Japan's steel production is processing capacity
* * '!' raw materials of all essential types
are available to Japan in ample quantities."
The actual situation was that, even at this 'early

76

date, one third of Japan's steel facilities were unused because an insufficient amount of raw materials were being imported. To maintain production in 1942, Japan had to dip into its stock pile of
iron ore to the extent of 1,206,000 tons.
By the fall of 1943, evidence of recent Japanese
expansion was discovered and' FEA raised the
estimate of Japanese capacity to 13,690,000 tons;
the actual 'figure was 13,976,000 tons. Production :was assumed to be equal to 100 percent of capacity. "Raw materials will be adequate, unless
shipping stringencies are greater than previously
estimated." The COA adopted this report stating: "The committee believes there are now
sufficient labor and :raw materials * * * for
the maintenance of the above steel production."
The OSS estimate for 1943 was 13,600,000 tons .
Actual production was 8,838,000, leaving 5,138,000
to~ excess capacity.
.
On the basis of new studies of Japanese imports
of raw materials, MIS in April 194.4, concluded
that all estimates of Japanese steel production
were too high. In May, MIS translated this view
into an estimate of Q,500,000 to~s. The Far East
Target Section of A-2 had come to a similar view
and a joint MIS--A-2 minority report was presented to the COA. In disagreeing with the subcommittee's calculation of 13,690,000 tons, this
report stated: "a basic disagreement exists with
the conclusion that availability, in the absence of
confirmatory evidence, necessarily implies full
utilization of steel-furnace capacity * * * it
is believed that the limiting factor in Japanese
production of iron and steel is the supply of iron
ore." A further caution was added to this estimate of iron ore production: "This amount
represents mine production and not deliveries,
which will be further conditioned by transportation factors."
In June 1944, OSS, using FEA capacity figures,
estimated 1944 ingot production at 11 ,300,000
tons. The reduction in FEA figures was based on
the view that industrial activity and imports had
fallen off somewhat.
In November FEA again estimated production
at 100 percent of capacity of 13,690,000 tons,
stating, "Ample raw materials are available for
such operations."
The COA in November 1944 accepted FEA's
capacity figures, but adopted the MIS-A 2 view
that production did not exceed 9,500,000 tons,

stating, "Shortage of ore, rather than * * *

capacity now limits iron and steel * * *".
In February 1945, JTG estimated 1944 production at 7,923,000 tons. JTG accepted the FEA
capacity figures. However, from a study' of
blast furnace and coke activity based on photos
which had become available from B-29 flights, a
valuable (though somewhat ambiguous) captured
document, and estimates of raw material imports
by MIS, JTG concluded that production was at
only 54 percent of capacity.
In March 1945, MIS estimated Japan's current
rate of production at 4,560,000 tons; the actual
rate then was 4,300,000 tons. In June, JTG
placed March production at '6,024,000 tons. An
unprinted July memorandum suggested, on the
basis of photo interpretation and import figures
from MIS, that current production might have
fallen to a rate of 2,240,000 tons.
The capacity estimates, begun by BEW and
completed by FEA, were remarkably close. However, production was substantially overestimated,
ApPENDIX TABLE

partly because the Japanese were credited with

greater technological efficiency than they achieved.
"The Japanese have the 'know how' * * *"
FEA wrote in 1944. Yet the USSBS steel report
is replete with examples of improper use and. care
of equipment, which reduced the productive
ability of equipment. The primary source of
error was the assumption by some groups that
Japan had an adequate supply of ore and coke.
What was not generally realized was that the
Japanese shipping situation was tight, right
from the start of the war, becoming desperate
during and after 1943. Some estimates failed to
consider that, at all stages of the war, the Japanese
had to adjust their imports of raw materials for
steel production to the limited supply of shipping
aVQ.ilable, and to the simultaneous demands by
other industries for imported materials.
The tables below ompare the various estimates
for steel ingot capacity and production with the
USSBS figures:

A-2.-Steel ingoi capacity, 1942-44

[Thousands of metric tons]

Year

USSBS

1942 __ ! _________________________ _
1943 ____________________________ _
1944 ____________________________ _
I

BEW

FEA

JANIS

OSS

eOA

JTO

9, 526 _________________________________________________ _
12,716
9,526
13,060 __________
13,600 ___________________ _
13, 976
15,326
13,517
13,687
14,131
13,524
15, 236 __________

Extmpolated from 1941 tlgure of 11,456.

repo~~~'j~~~;recf81,Oig~a:n~~~!~J:n~'~~~~~~F:b~r;na~~9j'~~~~~' Japan's Resources and Trade, September 1944 and May 1945; 088,

ApPENDIX TABLE

A-3.-Steel ingot production, 1942-44

[Thousands of metric tons]

Year

USSBS

BEW

FEA

JANIS

OSS

eOA

1942 _________________ _
1943 __________________ .

8,004
8,838

1944 _________________ _

6, 503 __________
13,690 { 1~: ~~ ___ ~~~~~~ _____ =~~~~_
4,301 __________ __________ __________ __________ __________

1945 _________ : ______ _

MIS

ITO

8,750 __________________________________________________________ _
8,750
13,060 __________ '13,600
13,060 ___________________ _

}_________ {
4,560

:~: ~:~
6,024

I Revised in June 1944 to 11,600.

, Estimate of June 1945.
S Estimate of February lQ45.
t March rate.

repo~~~~~~~:i :~~~ ~~1.,1t1~:~~1,a~TI~ ~r~~~M~~J\~4~~~/~~;J l1~~~.rcr,~t~r;t~o~8j:g:~~;~:dTu~~1J5~de September 1944; 088,

77

'.
Steel Consumption Pattern
Estimates of consumption of rolled and semifinished steel were prepared by FEA and JTG.
The FEA estimate was based on practices and allocatiQns during the war years which were followed
in the United States, Great Britain, and Germany.
Adjustments were then made for Japanese peculiarities and known plans. These results were
checked with estimated Japanese production
figures of various steel-consuming industries.
JTG approached the problem somewhat differently. In 1945 it translated estimates of activity
in the Japanese ship, aircraft, and railroad industries, etc., into steel requirements. This method
proved more accurate but it could not be used
until much more information was available on
Japanese war productio:q plans, types of weapons,
etc., than had been available at an earlier date.
In addition, this method demands that other
groups shall have completed estimates of industries using fabricated steel. It can be used only
if the steel estimators are part of a large and
coordinated group.
Exact comparisons with the Japanese. figures
were not practicable because the Japanese included different items in the various categories
than listed by the American estimators.

Urban Areas I
The FEA study, Mass Attack on Japanese
Cities, published in Fcbruary 1943, was the first
complete study of the possible effects of urban
area attacks on Japan. Starting with the RAF
premise that "the total effect of an area raid
depends primarily upon the proportion of houses
rendered uninhabitable," tbis report was directed
"solely to demonstrating the great susceptibility
of the Japanese industrial economy to such profound dislomition as would result from air operation on population centers." A pioneering effort,
this report is of interest as an indication of how
little detailed analysis of urban attack problems
existed before 1943, despite widespread popular
and official interest in that subject. The report
pointed out that a high percentage of total Japanese population and industrial labor had been concentrated, prior to the war, in a few large Japanese
cities. British experience was drawn upon, as
well as some of the available Japanese fire insurance data, to suggest Japan's high vulnerability
to incendiary attack.
1

This section is based on

Canfield.

78

specia.l memora.ndum contributed by Mr. Lee

The bulk of the report was devoted to a general

description of Tokyo, Yokohama, Kobe and Osaka,
using prewar census data to establish districts of
highest residential density. The study did not go
into attack objectives or operational methods and
no attempt was made to estimate production loss
or to compare the results which might be achieved
with the effects of precision attacks on war industry. A brief general discussion of urban attack
consequences mentioned (1) housing and consumer
, goods replacement, which "might mean diversion
of labor and materials from war industry and have
a profound effect on output," (2) temporary disruption of essential rail traffic in connection
with emergency relief measures and (3) factory
absenteeism.
In October 1943, the Far East Target Section
of A-2 published its Japanese Incendiary Attack
Data. This study may properly be regarded as
the basic planning document for B-29 operations
against Japanese cities. In contrast to the
primary emphasis on dehousing in the FEA report
discussed above, this study stressed the possibilities of heavy physical damage to war industries,
and particularly to smaller feeder plants, concentrated in the main Japanese cities. Twenty selected cities were "zoned" for incendiary attack,
after a detailed study of industrial and residential
construction, factory 10Clition, roof coverage, firebreaks, fire-fighting facilities, and weather factors.
On the basis of tests conducted against sample
Japanese structures with the various available
incendiaries, the M-69 gasoline-jet bomb in aimable clusters was recommended for use against
urban incendiary zones and estimates were made
as to the bomb tonnages which would have to be
properly distributed to over}Vhelm civil-defense
services and cause fires of copflagration proportions in the more vulnerable districts of each key
city. In the absence of large operation tests, no
attempt was made to determine the operational
tonnages that would be required.
Regarding the results to be expected from urban
attacks, this study pointed to reduction of industrial output as the primary consequence of urban
attacks-through damage to (I)-major war
plants; (2) small factories supplying critical components; (3) factories producing repair and replacement items, such as machine tools, and (4)
finished and semifinished military and industrial
goods in storage. Dehousing and destruction of
consumer goods as well as disruption of supporting

public services were expect!)d to hinder seriously

the restoration of essential production. The
primary impact of incendiary attacks was expected to fall upon aircraft and ordnance components, marine engines, electrical equipment,
roachine tools, and general machinery-much of
the capacity for which was concentrated in Tokyo,
Kawasaki, Yokohama, Nagoya, Osaka, and Kobe.
Particular emphasis, from the standpoint of delaying recuperation, was placed on relatively complete incendiary coverage of each center in a miniroum time period. Likewise, the report stressed
the need for a flexible plan of operations so as to
roaximize the cumulative inter-effects of precision and area attacks on those end-product
industrial categories of highest priority at the
time operations were instituted.
The Air Objective Folders, 1944, continued the
thesis that urban area attacks would cause grave
economic disturbances to Japanese economy.
The regional configura~ion of essential production
and the degree of economic interdependence among
cities within and without given areas was emphasizecl. In assessment of the ilnportance and vulnerability of major and satellite cities, t.rartsportation problems received cqnsiderable attention.
In its 1943 report, the COA adopted the basic
approach and tentative conclusion of the A-2
"Incendiary Attack" study without making any
further analysis of the economic or operational
problems involved. Subsequently, a COA subcommittee was set up to apply British techniques
'in Ii detailed estimate of direct and indirect production loss which might be achieved through
incendiary attacks on the six major industrial
cities. A report appearing in September 1944
used more restrained language in affirming the
thesis of Japanese industrial vulnerability to area
attack. The diffuse effects of such attacks on key
war production front line strength was emphasized
and production loss estimates were posted on the
assumption of a relatively vigorous repair and
replacement program. The revised COA report
of October 1944 continued urban areas in a third
priority position, urging concentration of efforts
on the six major centers, with attacks heavy
enough to assure successful completion within a
minimum time period.
The JTG urban study materials were pointed
toward., economic damage resulting from the
destruction of urban areas containing high concentration of industrial activity. Elaborately

annotated and zoned mosaics, listing areas suitable

for incendiary or radar HE attack, were prepared.
However, there was considerable reproduction
delay and most of it arrived in the field after the
targets were bombed. Field officers did not have
the benefit of JTG work on radar alternates or the
large volume of detailed material on secondary
cities.
Analysis by the Urban Area and other divisions
of the Survey measures the accuracy of estimates
on location and distribution of industrial capacity,
physical damage and production loss. In general,
zoning of vulnerable residential and industrial
areas was confirmed by later photo reconnaissance.

Oil Estimates
Shortly after Pearl Harbor, all intelligence
agencies joined in forming the Enemy Oil Committee (EOC) to study the German and Japanese
oil situation-study of Japan's position being
assigned to the EOC's far eastern subcommittee.
Representatives of BEW, Petroleum Administration for War, OSS, Ministry of Economic Warfare,
ONI, State Department and MIS were on this
subcommittee. It published a series of reports
until its activity was terminated by a March 1945
directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which transferred responsibility for assessing the Japanese
oil situation to a newly formed Joint Far East
Oil Committee (JFEOC), composed of representatives of the War Department (MIS and A-2)
and the Navy Department. The new committee
employed a "working group" made up, for the
most part, of tbe Oil Section of MIS; the group
also included Navy and A-2 personnel.
The JFEOC made the following major revisions
in the EOC estimates:
1. Japan's importe from 1929-41 were restudied
and the estimates were reduced.
2. The loss in refining was increased from 10
to 15 percent.
.
3. Consumption estimates for the pre-Pearl
Harbor period were increased by one million
barrels.
4. Synthetic oil estimates were reduced.
PSSBS statistics indicate that all of these changes
were improvements.
EOC estimates of Japan's stockpile of oil at the
time of Pearl Harbor varied from 75 million to
80 million barrels. The JFEOC estimate was 57
million barrels. USSBS findings indicate a stockpile of 42.7 million barrels. Stockpiles of oil for

79

July 1945 were estimated by JFEOC at 5,700,000

barrels; the USSBS figure is 2,830,000 barrels.
Estimates for synthetic oil production were
high, EOC placing them at about 9,500,000
barrels for 1944 and JFEOC at about 8,000,000
barrels. Total production from 1942-1944 was
only 3,900,000 barrels.
For the key item of aviation gasoline reserves
available in July 1945, the JFEOC estimate was
1,037,000 hrrels, the USSBS finding 1,157,000
ba;rrels.
The Oil Division report presents a detailed
estimation of presurrender intelligence.
The oil assessments were among the most
difficult to make because of the paucity of data
about Japanese stockpiles, consumption and
technological progress. ,
If the JFEOC revisions had been made earlier,
the stringency of Japan's oil position would have
been apparent sooner. An intensive submarine
and mining campaign against the Sumatran oil
sources could have been undertaken in 1944, which
would probably have hastened Japan's collapse.
The tables below compare the estimates with
USSBS findings:
ApPENDIX TABLE

A--4.-Stockpiles of oil

[Thousands of barrels]
USSBS

Date

1941 December- _____

1944 DecembeL _____
1945 July ___________

JFEOC

42,696
6,434
2,836

EOO

57,403
12,244
5,795

75,533
'32,000
227,859

1 EOC report 76, February 1944.

, EOO report 86, March 1945.

Source: EOa, reports #76 and #86; MIS, report of August

ApPENDIX

TABLE

~945.

A-5.-Aviation gasoline stocks (inner

zone)
[Thousands of barrels}

Date

USSBS

July 1, 1945 __________________ _

MIS

1,157

1,037

Source: MIS, report oC August 1945.

ApPENDIX TABLE

A-6.-Synthetic production 1942-44

[Thousands of barrels]

Bate

DaSBS

MIS

EOO

-------------1---- -------Total synthetic production

1942 through 1944- _ _ _ _ _ _

3, 929

16, 560

20, 692

Source: MIS, report of AugtlCJt 1945; EOa report '86 March 1945.

80

Estimates of Nationl!-l Income

A-8.-Combat airplane production,

ApPENDIX TABLE

1941-45
OSS made an excellent study of Japanese
national income during the war. The extimates
Year
DSSBS 1
FEA
MIS'
of the Japanese Cabinet Bureau of Statistics were
carefully analyzed and revised. The OSS esti. 1941. ___ --- - - - - - ___ _
3, 180
4, 170
mates were reworked by' the Foreign Economic 1942 _____ --- - ---- - __
6, 335
5,812
7,308
Division of the State Department in its study, 1943---- - -- - - - - - - - -13,406
13,794
11, 134
21, 058
"Japan's Capacity to Pay Reparations." The 1944.- ___ -- -- - --- - __
23,918
1945 ______________ _
7, 128
8,980
findings of the State Department after removing
price fluctuations from the OSS estimates are
I 1945, January-June.
remarkably close to the USSBS findings. It is
'MIS as of July 1945.
the only source that indicates the lag in Japanese
Source: FEA, August 1944 report; MIS report for July 1945.
production in 1942. These studies could have
been very valuable as trend indicators. HowIn the BEW report Japan's War Economy,
ever, no attention was paid to them.
March 1943, estimates of total plane production
The following table compares the OSS State for 1942 and 1943 were 7,200 and 16,693 planes,
Department estimates with USSBS findings, using respectively, are comparable to USSBS figures of
1940 as an index year.
, .8,861 and 19,000 plane~.
ApPENDIX

TABLE A-7.-Comparison of "Real"

national product estimates, 1940-1944

gros.

[Indexes, 1940=100)
Year

1940 _________________ : _______ _

1941 _________________________ _
1942 _________________________ _
1943 ____ ____________________ _
1944. ______ _
~

USBBS

100
101
102
113
12~

S tate Depart
ment

100
102
103
109
125

Estimates for Aluminum

In estimating Japanese aluminum production,

most agencies adopted the capacity-requirement
method, MIS alone made fudependent estimates
for requirements and for production.
The estimates for aluminum capacity and requirements follow below:
ApPENDIX

Estimates of Japanese aircraft production were

bll;sed on a few prewar studies, studies of captured
planes, intenogations of prisoners, photographic
intelligence and analogies from American utilization of raw materials in aircraft production.
Estimates were published by FEA in August
1944. In the summer of 1944, by agreement
among British and American intelligence agencies,
information on Japanese production of aircraft
was centered in MIS. The first MIS estimate
was made in January 1945 and the second in July
1945. Curiously, the first MIS estimate was
somewhat more accurate. The reason was that
the disIUption caused by dispersal, after March
1945, was not sufficiently known and considered
in the second estimate. These estimates, and
those made by FEA in August 1944 al!3 compared
with the USSBS findings in Appendix Table A 8.

A-9.-Aluminum Capacity, 1943-45

TABLE

[Thousands of metric tons]

Year

Estimates of Airplane Production

DSSBS

OOA

FEA

JTO

OSS

----1----------------1943 __ . __
1944 ____ _
1945 ____ _

166 120-145 _______________________ _

185
184
199
199 ________
170 _ _ ___ _ __ __ _ _ _ _ _ _
245 _______ _

ApPENDIX TABLE

A-IO.-Aluminum requirements, 1943-45

[Thousands of m('tric tons]

Year

USSBS

OOA

1943________

144

105

1944 ________

{(~~~)

} 150

1945 _ _ _ __ __ _

OSS

FEA

JTO

MIS

100 _________________ _
118

168 ______

40 _ __ _ __ _ __ _ _ _ __ __ _ _

(130)

154 _____ _

( ) Indicate fiscal year.

Represents first halt of fiscal year.

I This section is based on a. special report prepared by First Lt. Arthur

Freedman.

A study of the requirements estimates suggests

.an interesting statistical error. The requirements
for aluminum were determined by estimating aircraft needs and providing some additional allowances for other uses.
Most agencies based the aircraft-aluminum relationship on American experience. However, insufficient allowance was made for differ ences
between the American 'and Japanese situations,
including scale of output, degree of excess inventory accumulation, rate of expansion, size of.
planes, loss and wastage ratios, and perSJentage
utilization of secondary metals. The significance
of expansion is illustrative. The rate of expansion
of United States plane production in 1942 and 1943
was greatly in excess of the Japanese. The vice in
the analogy was accented by the 'fact that, in contrast to American experience, Japanese requirements during the last half of 1944 and 1945 declined as their aircraft production leveled off.
Consequently, figures for receipts of aluminum
shapes by aircraft plants during identical periods,
overweighted input per plane by the amount of the
increased inventories and work in process required
for the next period. The quantitive magnitude of
this factor was considerable. In addition to exaggerating the total aluminum mput per plane, since
recovery of scrap on aluminum input came in a
later period when input had increased, the effect
also was to undervalue the percentage of secondary
availability, further exaggerating primary requirements.
On this basis FEA, COA, and JTG calculated
that input of aluminum per plane was over 7 tons.
MIS using British as well as American data and
making adjustments for differences, estimated input at 5.46 tons 'per plane. The actual figure was
5.5 tons.
These estimates, except for the JTG and MIS
figures are really requirements estimates rather
than those for production. The analysis runs in
these terms: The Japanese will require a certain
quantity of aluminum during 1943 and 1944, an
amount which the capacity estimates indicate is
possible. The requirements estimates are therefore taken as production estimates. So long as raw
materials were available, this technique worked
fairly well, but it failed when shortages became
important restrictive factors on production, as
bauxite was after June 1944.

.81

The following table compares the estimates for

the production of aluminum with USSBS findings:
ApPENDIX TABLE

A-ll.-Aluminum production, 191,3-1,5

[Tbousands of metric tons]

1943 _______________ 142

105

100 ________ ~ ____ _

1944 ___ ~ ______ ~ ____

'150

118

1945 _______________

gi:}
!

168 __ ~ __

26 __ ~~ __ ~ ________ 182

165
227

Rate 851:11 June.

Based on estimate for Apr.-July. 9,000 tons.
Source: eOA reports far Nov. 1943 and Mar. 1944; OSS, report of May 1944;
FEA, report of June 1944; lTG, report of June 1945.
I

i:
o

il
"

JTG's high estimate of 182,000 tons in 1945

compared with Ii rate..of 26,000 tons in June was
due to two additional errors:
1. It was assumed that the Japanese had enjoyed complete success in converting bauxite
capacity to aluminous shale processing capacity.
In fact, the Japanese ran into unexpected technological difficulties which severely limited production.
.
2. It was assumed that the Japanese had been
able to' import adequate supplies of shale or that
there was an adequate st.ockpile. "There is no

evidence that aluminum production has suffered

from lack of imports," the report for June 1945
states. In fact, the decline in production from a
rate of some 20,000 tons in June 1945 was paralleled
by a decline in imports: Bauxite from 350,000
tons in 1944 to 1,800 tons in 1945; shale from
150,000 tons in 1944 to 37,000 tons in 1949.
That this decline in imports caused the drop in
production is shown by the virtual disappearance
of the stockpile of materials during this same
period.
The MIS produ ction rate of 27,000 tons for 1945
was based on an independent estimate of imports.
The actual figure for Japan proper was 18,000 tons.
All agencies overestimated Japanese technical
capabilities in utilizing raW materials. Intelligence estimates were based on the inference that
the Japanese would require 2 tons of bauxite or
2.5 tons of aluminous shale per ton of alumina.'
The actual quantities required were 2.5 and 4 tons
respectively. This implies a 20 percent lower
yield from given suppiies of bauxite and a 38 percent lower yield from shale than estimated
Japan's stock of bauxite at the beginning of the
war was overestimated, the COA-FEA figure being
500,000 tons. The actual figure was only 250,000
tons.

APPENDIX B
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT OF JAPAN, AND ITS COMPONENTS,
,
1940-45
The estimates of the gross national product of
Japan for the fiscal' years 1940-44, presented in
this report, were prepared by the U. S. Strategic
Bombing Survey from a wide variety of source
materials secured by the survey from Japanese
Government agencies.! Althollgh official national
income estimates for the war years had been
prepared by the Japanese Government, these
were found to be so little suited to the analysis of
economic developments that it seemed preferable
to begin anew with the source data than to attempt
to adjust the official estimates.
The major difficulty with the Japanese estimates was conceptual. In contrast to British
and United States experience, the national income
data in Japan were not used as the statistical
framework for over-all economic planni]).g during
the war but were, rather, restricted largely to
setting thc sights for the sale of War bonds. Even
in this use, an eye was kept on the propaganda
impact of the estimates made public. The
resulting concept of national income was a cross
between the American definitions of income payments, national income and gross product. In
addition, the Japanese' estimates did not meet
the needs of the survey from the standpoi,nt of
either their geographical coverage or the breakdown of items in the yearly totals. The latter
difficulty would have been particularly troublesome in deflating for the substantial price rise
that occurred during the war period.
The gross product estimates prepared by the
survey'were designed to cover the home islands of
Japan-Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, and Shikoku
-thereby excluding Korea, Formosa, and Manchuria, as well as all more recently acquired
1 Particular mention should be made of the invaluable assistance given by
Yoshimitsu Assno, assistant chief of the planning division, ministry of
finance a.nd by Professor Yuzo Morita. of the Yokohama college and the

bank of Japan.

82

territories. The concept used was in general

similar to the U. S. Department of Commerce
concept of gross national product. This aims to
measure the value of total goods and services
produced within a given time period, before
allowance, for depreciation of. capital' goods.
There are, however, several differences between
the U. S. concept and that used for the Japanese
economy.
1. The Japanese estimates include imputed
rente of owner-occupied dwelling units.
2. They exclude interest on government debt
from the total gross'product and from government
expenditures on goods and services.
3. They exclude government subsidies to private
producers from the total and from government
. expenditures.
4. Overseas expenditures for direct war pur~
poses, other than pay of military forces, are not
included in government ~ar outlays or in the foreign balance. Such expenditures are shown
separately from the gross product categories. It
was felt that by this treatment of overseas expenditures the allocation of Japan's home resources between war and nonwar use would remain
clear.
In addition, it must be noted that the Japanese
estimates do not include any time for the change in
business inventories. This exclusion was not a
conceptual one but was due to the lack of even
reasonably satisfactory data on inventory move.
ments.
As to the general adequacy of the results of this
investigation, it is believed that the estimates
accurately reveal the general. structure of the
Japanese war economy and the significant changes
that occurred during the war years. Apart from
the lack of inventory information previously mentioned, more or less complete'source material was
found for all the component elements for the gross
83

..

.~l:.i
"

.,
.',"

'll
I

", . .1,:

I.

'I
\

'

.C

" I

~I

?,
CI

national product. It may be noted, however,

that in the time available to the survey staff, it
was Dot always possible to fully trace the precise
contents of the various statistical series, a task
which was made the more difficult by the language
barrier.
More important as a source of error in the estimates was the considerable difficulty that arose in
connection with black market pricing and the deflation problem. It was quite apparent from a
study of the value and quantity data for many
individual components of the gross product, including goods purchased by the government, that
the government's official prices were exceeded in
the sales of a significant part of total output. It
was, however, impossible to determine the volume
of black market transactions as a whole, and thus
to adjust indexes of 'Official prices for prices on the
black market. It 'Was neCessary, therefore, to
build up the deflated estimates as far as possible
from quantity data and for the deflation of the
remaining components to use a derived price index
that reflected the course of both official and black
market prices. The methods used are fully explained in the technical appendix to this report.
In order to provide some historical perspective
to the data for the war years, the national income
estimates of the ministry of finance for the period
1930-40 were linked to the survey's gross product

data. This series was deflated by the Bank )

Japan cost-of-living index for the prewar years. I
The following notes will describe the statistical \
source material from which the gross product estimates were derived as well as the details of statistical methodology used for the various I
components.
.

ApPENDIX TABLE

__-----------~------------------_r--~[M::ill:io:~10~fy:.:nJ~--~--~--1l--~~_r--~~~~~~;,

._________________________

.-

1___
19_44_ _ 1_ AymOCt.

30,787
75,052
47,412
TotaL ________________________ - - - - - - _1_--.:5:.,.'7:.::2:::3_1 ___
9'~4_8_7+_18_'_7_53_\---_ _ 1--~~:_\--_=~:

4,191
6,383
10,368
15,764
45,511
Army __________________________________
1,532
3,104
8,38513,77919,069
Navy__________________________________
1,244
10,472
WAR EXPENDITURES
Mu~itions Ministry ______________________ ----4~44i- ----6~562- ---i4~07420,984
31,601
The basic sources for this component werel Japan proper________________________________
2988
3,781
6,653
8,611
10,198
Army__________________________________
l' 453
2,781
7,421
11,129
10,931
checks, paid by the Bank of Japan out of the army
Navy ________________ o_________________'
__________
1,244
10,472

20,868
17,553
28,993
34,842
11,743
14,106
8,993

and navy special war accounts and expenditures I

by the munitions ministry, as they appear in the
settled accounts of the finance ministry. The only
adjustment made to these data was the deduction.
of discharge allowances to military personnel.
(Table 1).
No .estimates were available for either the purchase of existing assets or for the net prepaymen ts
on supply contracts.
In addition to the above source materials, the
war and navy ministries submitted a breakdown
of their total outlays by object of expenditure
(Tables'2 and 3). However, only the war ministry was able to further allocate its, detailed expenditures between Japan proper and the overseas
empire. The geographical allocation of navy expenditures, by object, was made by the survey
on the basis of Bank of Japan data on the navy
ministry's expenditures by territories.

I
I O"Efi~~:~i"i"i'Y-:---:---:-::~l!
Korea ____ - - - -- -- - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - --- - Army__________________________________
Navy__________________________________
Formosa____________________________________
Arrny__________________________________
Navy __________________________________
Manchuria _________________________________ ~
Army - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Navy - - - -- -- - - - - - - - - --- - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - China______________________________________
Army__________________________________
Navy__________________________________
Southern Territories_________________________
Army__________________________________
Navy __________ : _________________ c_____
Discharge AlI<?wances 1_______________________

~a~:~_~~o~e~:===~=======================

[Billions of yon]

1940

1941

1942

1943

1944

-----

Gross national product. __________________________ _

39.8

42.7

52.6

54. 7

82.4

GovernmenL _________________________________________ _
NationaL _______ __ _ _ ____________________________ _
War __ " ______________________________________ _
N onwar _________________________ ____________ _
Local. ____________________________________________ _
Private capital formation _____________ ~ __ _____________ _
Plant and equipment- _____ , ________________________ _
Residential construction _____________ .. ______ ______ _
Foreign balance ____________ ______________________ _
Consumer expenditures _________________________________ _

"8.0
6.0
4. 7
L3
2.0
5. 1
4. 5
.4
.2
26. 7

10. 8
8. 5
7.0
1. 5
2. 3
4.6
4.7
.5
-.6
27.3

19. 1
17.0
14. 9
2.1
2.1
5.0
4.7
.3

26_7
24. 2
21. 8
2. 4
2.5
7.5
7. 9
.2
20.5

39.8
36.7
33.4
3.3
3.1
11. 1
10.0
.1
1.0
31. 5

9.0

41. 6

1.

2.51

-.6

(1)

28. 5
3.9\

84
7
49
38
11
370
369
1
772
712
60
0
0
0

--:: il : m l: ~ :iil 'Ull

209
209
179
13
30
51
120
148
280
64
58
120
56
90
160
1,200
1,405
1,661
1,198
1,405
1,661
2 _ __ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ __ __ _ _ __ _
1,062
1,512
4, 301
831
1,123
2,638
231
389
1,663
321
1,373
3,328
300
919
2,554
21
454
774
2
2
2

1 .All

442
163
557
293
264
2,295
2,288 I
7
27,828
21,988
5,840
12,166
10,301
1,865
3

_ _____________________________ _

~~~=============~=======-========-=== --------i- --------2

Net expenditures:
B-1.-Gro88 national product, fiscal year. 1940--1,4

War expenditures abroad __________________________ _

1_1940------19--41---,---1942----.,---19-43.--

I,

I
ApPENDIX TABLE

B-2.-War expenditures, fiscal years 194G-4JS

4,440

6 560

5,722

9:485.

14,072
18, 751

20,982
30, 785

31,598
75,049

1, 179
254
1,403
861
542
1,711
1,711
6,837
4,597
2,240.
1,186
777
409
2,583
1, 134
1,449
32,259
44,829

discharge allowances were pald in Jspan proper.

, Partly esllmated by USSBS.

Source: Finance mlniBtry.

1 Less than 5<t million yen.

Source: iJSSBS.

85
84

ApPENDIX TABLE

B-3.-Army expenditures ;fiscal years 1940-45

ApPENDIX: TABLE

B-4.-Expenditures of the imperial navy, fiscal years 1940-45

[Millions of yen]

Total expenditures _____________________

IMill!ons of You]

1940

1941

1942

4, 285

5, 258

8,666

1943

11,570

1944

48,622

Japan proper ________________________________

3,057
3,542
5,723
7,933
8,973
Pay, travel and subsistence _______________
826
819
1,094
1,566
2, 661
Pay to armed forces _________ , ________
172
195
278
518
1,008
Clothingc ___________________________
319
352
482
546
924
Food _______________________________
283
216
242
393
556
Discharge allowances ____________________________________________________. ______________ _
52
56
92
109
173
Other______________________________
Munitions and fueL ___________________ .__
1,625
1,797
3,267
4,558
3,085
War construction________________________
204
223
407
563
1,067
Other._________________________________
422
703
955
1,246
2,160
Overseas _____ .---------------------------___
1,228
1,716
2,943
3,637
39,649
Pay, travel and subsistence - - - - - - - - - - - - ___
760
987
1, 444
1, 622
14, 070
Pay to armed forc~s-----------------280
345
650
624
1,550
Clothing____________________________
36
34
45
83
1,807
Food_______________________________
401
550
667
829
10,488
Other_____________________________
43
58
82
56
225
Munitions and fueL______________________
62
122
166
214
2,911
War construction________________________
164
284
468
674
4,163
Other _______________ "__________________
242
323
865
1,127
18,515

Apr.-Nov.
1945

1940

(1)

1,531

11,857
3,847
919
1,002
600
1, 134
192
3, 725
1, 667
2, 618

Pay, travel and subsistence __________________ _

Pay to armed personneL ________________ _
Discharge allowances ____________________ _
Other _________________________________ _
Munitions _________________________________ _
Naval ships ________________________ ~ ___ _
Aircraft _, _____________________________ _
Other _________________________________ _
War construction ___________________________ _
0ther _____________________________________ _

86

3, 106

8,386

13, 779

19,069

18,055

752
235
2
515
5, 629
1,762
3,045
822
1,131
874

1,310
315
2
993
9,114
3,293
4,092
1, 729
1,948
1,407

3,977
554
3
3,420
8, 522
4,122
2,203
2, 197
3,393
3,177

5,499
504
1,449
3,546
5.619
2, 189
1,572
1,858
2,786
4, 151

170
366
39
97
1
2
267
130
1,814
978
457
906
460
906
61 ---------249
651
134
269

ApPENDIX TABLE

132
(1)
(1)
(1)

were deflated by Professor Morita's wholesale

price index (described below).
The deflatIon of Japan's overseas war outlays
presented a much more difficult problem. The
absence of any output data necessitated the use
of a price index for deflation purposes. Despite
the sharp upward movements in prices (especially
in China and the southern territories) the exchange rates were held constant through the entire
period. The only avails.ble price indexes were for
wholesale prices in the Chinese cities of Shanghai,
Peipen, and Tientsin. The latter two cities experienced a sixfold increase in price level from
1940 to 1944 while the increase in Shanghai was
sixty-six times. Consultation with informed Japanese suggested that the only expedient was to
use an average of prices in Peipen and Tientsin
to deflate the overseas' war expenditure component
as it was felt that smaller price rises in other areas
would offset the fantastic rise in Shanghai. N eedl~ss to say, the margin of error of this series is
considerable.

1943

1944

Source: Navy ministry.

(1)
(1)

B-:-5.-Expenditures of the munitions ministry, fiscal years 1943-45

[Millions of yenl
1943

1944

----

1 Not available.
Source: War ministry.

The distribution of war expenditures between

home and overseas and by object was required
to show the approximate utilization of home
resources and to permit satisfactory elimination
of the influence of price changes.
The deflation procedure for these outlays in
Japan proper was as follows: The changes in the
physical volume index of munitions were applied to
the 1941 value of munitions outlays to compute
the output in 1941 yen for the years 1941 to 1944.
Since the munitions index was not available for
1940, an estimate of a lO-percent increase in munitions prices from 1940 to 1941 was utilized in adjusting the derived series to the 1940 price level.
A somewhat similar method was used in reduc. ing the pay, travel, and subsistence costs of the
Japanese armed forces to the 1940 price level.
This method was to move the 1940 value by the
changes in the average number of the military
personnel in the years 1940 through 1944.
"All other~ war expenditures in the home islands

1942

(1)

788

Apr. I-Oct. 25
1945

1941

Apr. I-Oct. 15
1945

Total _______________________________________________________________ _

1,244

10,472

8,993

Atrcraft _____________________ c _____________________________________________ _

Other __________________________________________________ - __________________ _

289
955

8, 528
1,944

6,893
'2,100

Partly estimated by USB BB.

Source: Finance ministr:f.

ApPENDIX TABLE

B-6.-War expenditures by object, fiscal years 1940-45

[Millions of yen]
1940

Home Islands 1_____________________________ _

Pay, travel andsubsistence __. ____________ _
Munitions _____________________________ _
Other ___________________ _____________ =
Overseas ___________________________________ _
Travel and subsistence __________________ _
Munitions _____________________________ _
Others ________________________________ _
I

IDcIudes pay of 1apanese armed (orecs wherever stationed.

Not available.

1941

!942

1943

1944

------------------

Apr.-Oct. 1945

5, 732

9,485

18,741

30,785

75,048

44,831

4,740
1,167
2,685
898
982
500
119
363

6,950
1,330
3,822
1,798
2,535
697
272
1, 566

14,852
2, 145
8,368
4,329
3,899
956
1,166
1, 777

21, 786
2, 745
13,501
5, 540
8,959
1,384
1,414
6,201

33,448
5,410
19, 190
8,848
41,600
13,925
5,911
21,764

33,297
4,581
15,534
13, 182
10, 634
(2)
(2)
(2)

Source: U8SBS, based on data from various government agencies.

714!i28-46--7

87

CENTRAL GOVERNMENT NONWAR

EXPENDITURES
N onwar expenditures of the central government
were based on actual outlays in the years prior to
1944 and on the "working budget" for 1944
(table 7). In addition to the exclusion of subsidies and interest payments-indicated in the
introduction-all current accounts of governmentoperated public utilities were excluded.
Other adjustments made to these data in de-

. rIvmg nonwar outlays for goods and services

LOCAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDI.
ments only in 1944-an
(table 8) were the elimination of duplication be_
TURES
extrapolation
of the 1(
tween the various accounts, of the purchase of
The basic data on local government expenditures
expenditures.
existing assets, and of transfer payments to indi(table 9) supplied by the ministry of home affairs
The adjustments, sh,
viduals.
consisted of the" settled accounts" for 1940 and
deflation procedure ff
In'ability to obtain any data on government
1941 and the budgets for 1942 and 1943. Budsimilar to those used
man-hours or other physical volume indicators of
getary data were available for prefectural governnon-war expenditures.
government's nonwar expenditures necessitated
the utilization of wholesale price indexes for
ApPENDI~ TABLE B-9.-Local government expenditures, fiscal years 1
eliminating price fluctuations.
[Million, of yen]

__________________ _____________
ApPENDIX TABLE

1~

B-7.-National government. expenditures'

[MUllons of yenl

I--l~9-~--~~~~,

Total ____________________________________________________ _

3, 114

1941

3,49'1

Education ______________________________________________________ ""

600
70
General account ____________________________________________ ~~~ 14, 400 _~I Publicworks ______________________________ c _____________ - - - - - - - 341
375
Sanitation ______________________________________________________ _
109
N
.....
_________________ 1 831
2,259
4,475
7,006
10,827 Subsidies _______________________________________________________ _
292
325
Ad~rustratlve exp.e?ses_________________________ _________________
'296
375
424
479
568
Social services ___________________________________________________ _
PensIOns and annUltles __________________________ _
79
84
654
1,191
1,694
2,973
4, 949 Police and civilian defense ________________________________________ _
Subsidies________________________________________________________
161
229
Interest on national debt__________________________________________
975
1,238
1,793
2,356
3,346 Town planning _________________________________________________ _
61
64
Reserve funds __________________________________________________ ._
110
340
840
1, 580
2, 140 Gas and electric _________________________________________________ _
163
222
War a~d Navy Ministries _____________________________________.:-___ 2,304
3,250
79
Water works ____________________________________________________ _
9R
78
1 Interest on local bonds __________________________________________ _
Impenal household___ _______ ____ ______ _____ ______ ___ __ ___ ____ __ __
4
4
4
488
473
Reserve fund _____________________ " _____________________________ _
50
45
Capital accounts __________________________________________ _
1,231
609
856
1,242
1,922 Motor bus operation ________________________ c ____________________ _
34
33
Another
_______________________________________________________
_
1-----1----- ------------ ----663
758
Investment _____________________________________________________ _
396
618
194
465
475
Imperial railway _____________________.___________________________ _
503
390
346
618
1, 025
I Excludes electric railwa.ys accounts.
Communications ________________________________________________ _
69
70
110
159
422
Source, Department of Home AlIBirs and USSBS, 194()-41 are aetoa! expenditures; 1942-43 bssed on budgets; 1944"

prefectural government budget..c;.

Excludes special war account.

ApPENDIX TABLE

Source: Budget Bureau, Finance Ministry. 1944 based on working budget; other years from settled accounts.

1940
1941

1942

1943

1944

----------------1"--11---------General account: Administrative expenses___________________________ 1,831

4,475
2, 259
Add: Imperial household__________________________________________
4
4
4
Less:
Extraordinary military expenses ______________________________ _
2,623
885
600
Grants to local governments ___________ . ______ ~ _______________ _
320
453
277
Assistance to soldiers' families ________________________________ _
" 54
69
84
Transfer to government investment fund ________________________________________ - - -- - __ _
Purchase of existing assets , ___________________________________________________ ----- __ _
Munitions department expenditures (other than subsidies) __________________________ - --- __ _
Equals: Expenditures for goods and services________________________
904
989
1,319
Capital accounts, totaL __________________________________________ _
Less:
Transfers to general account _________________________________ _
Transfers to special war account- ________________________ , ____ _
Equals: ExPenditures for goods and services ______________________ ~ __

7,006
4

10, 827
4

4, 369
572
104
12
200
247
1,506

7,206
902
161
40
500
72
1,950

609

856

1,231

1,242

1,922

100
67
442

240
80
536

230
230
771

189
180
873

150
467
1,305

===--:---

Total expenditures for goods and services _________________ __ _______

Compensation for property destroyed in preparation of air-raid firebreaks.

88

1, 346

1, 525

2, 090

vn in table 10, and the

this component were
for central government
;0--44'
1942

1943

1944

- - - ----- ----3, 172

3,557

4,375

695
293
125
201
85
226
102
163
117
445
2.9
64
627

818
339
162
247
81
297
126
128
136
460
38
43
682

1,100
375
250
300
125
375
100
125
175
650
25
25
750

- - - - ----- ------

mated by USSBS on basis 01 tread In

,ars 1940--44

[MUIlons of yenl

[MUllons 01 yenl
1940

B-lO.-Derivation of local government expenditures, fiscal

B-8.-Derivation of national government nonwar expenditures

ApPENDIX TABLE

Source: Finance ministry and USSBS.

these data were used for

4 municipal and village

2, 379

3,255

Total expenditures ____________________________________________ " __

Less:
Subsidies_____ _____ ____ ___ ____ ___ ___________ ___ _____ ___ ______
Interest______ _____ ___ ___ __ ___ ___ ___ ___ ______ _____ _____ ____ __
Public service enterprises______ __ ________________ ___ _______ __ __
Reserve fund_ ---- __ - - - ___ , _____ "_ __________ ____ ______ ___ ____
Equals:
Purchases of goods and services_____ __________________________

1941

3,114

1942

3,172.

292
488
275
45

325
'473
353
50

2,014

2,293

1943

1944

----------- ----3,557

4,375

201
445
344
29

247
460
306
38

300
650
325
25

2, 153

2,506

3,075

Source: USSBS based on appendix table 9.

PLANT AND EQUIPMENT OUTLAYS

The source of these data for 1942-44 was the
authorizations under the Emergency Funds Control Act. Under this legislation, all expenditures
for new plant and equipment by companies with
capitalization of more than 200,000, and expenditures of 50,000 or over by smaller companies had to
be approved and authorized by the Finance
Ministry.
The Ministry in cooperation with the Bank of
.Japan was able to adjust this information for

timing and unused autb ,rizations. Purchases of

eXisting assets, other tha land were excluded. It
was believed that most ( :penditures on land were
for improvements rathr than direct purchases.
These estimates were av, lIable by type of machinery in 1942 and by indutries for 1943 and 1944.
The data were availabl ' in somewhat modified
form in 1940 and 1941 and permitted a rough
allocation between muni :ons and other industries
in the latter year.
The all"ocation of c, :)ital expenditures into

89

munitions industries and nonmunition industries,

shown in the gross national product tables and
appendix table 11, is only intended as an approximation. Outlays in the mining, metal refining and
fabricating, and the chemical industries were included in the "munitions" category while capital
expenditures in all other industries were classified
as "nonmunitions" (see table 11). Even though
outlays of the latter group were quite small by
ApPENDIX TABLE

1944, it is probable that they, too, were rather

directly related to the war effort by that time.

RESIDENTIAL CONSTRUCTION
The estimates of the value of residential construction were based on the monthly construction
statistics collected by the Ministry of Industry and
Commerce from 1937 to mid-1943 (at which time
the series was discontinued). These data covered

B-l1.-Private plant and equipment expenditures, fiscal years 1941-44'

[Millions of yen]
1944

1941

1942

1943

TotaL ___________ - - - - - - - - - _. _ . _______________________ . ___ _

4, 615

4,743

7,904

10, 125

Munitions Industries _____ - - - - - - - _____ . ___________________________ _

2,965

3,506

7,019

9,371

1,551

30<1

17
39
473
107
204
96
.152
254
170

1,076
1,941
1,835
523
7
24
295
234
262
. 96
142
270
314

1,701
2,402
1,873
404
11
5
832
534
680
130
129
368
302

1,650

1,237

885

754

25
525

25
453

14
242
32
37
24
68
468

39
146

Aircraft ______________ .. ___ . ___________________ . _____ .. ______ _

Ordnance ___________ - - - - - - - _- _- _ _____________________ . _____ _
shipbuilding ________ - - - - - - - - - _- ________________ . ____________ _
Wooden ships _____ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _- __ _______ __ ___ ___ ______ _
Railway cars and locomotives _________________________________ _
Motor vehicles _________________________ . ___________________ _
Iron and steeL ______ - _____ - _________________________________ _
Light metals __ - _- _- - - - - - - - - - - - _- __ _____ _________ _____ __ __ __
Chemicals ________ . _ -- - - --- -- -- __________________________ . ___
Machine tools ___ . __ . ____________ , _____________ .. ______________ }
Other machin.ery and tools __________ .. __________________________
Coal mining _________ - - __ -- -- -- _______ .. ____________________ _
Mining other than coaL _____ - ______________ . ______ ____ _
Nonmunitions industries _______________________________________ . ___ .

443
1, 800

501)
175
190

(
1,100
1

Includes small amounts Cor purchases of land.

Source:

1~4.

Finance Ministry.

759

17

13
24
51
464

1941, DSSBS based on loana for new plant and equipment authorized under the ""orking Capital Regulation Act.

ApPENDIX TABLE

B-l2.-Derivation of residential con.truction activity, ji;cal years 1940-44

{Expenditure data in millions of yenJ

1940

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Expenditures in 21 leading cities , ______________________________ _

Total expenditures (1) X 1.65' ______ . _________________________ _
Lumber allocated to residential construction (thousand koku) , _____ _
Lumber allocation index _______________________________________ _
Wh~lesaJe price index of construction materials , __________ .. ______ _
Index of average wages , __________ . ___________________________ _
Construction cost index' ______________________________ .. _______ _
Estimated 'oonstruction expenditure index (4) X (7) ____________ . __
Total expenditures ____________________________________________ _

na-not available.
1 Department of Industry and Commerce.
S See technical notes tor derivation of this multiplier.
'Bank of lapan Index.
Cabinet Bureau of Statistics.

90

238
393
8,460
169
92
82
87
147
393

1941

1942

1943

1944

- - - '- - - - - ----na
na
300
158
495
260 -------- - - - - - - 3,864
2, 166
9,720
4,992
-194
43
100
77
122
105
97
100
III
138
100
97
108
130
100
97
56
83
100
188
145
220
495
260
~

Arbitrary assumption that materials and labor costs have equal weight.
Tho attempt to economize on materials during the war probably introduces
a downward bias in this cost index.

21 of the leading cities of Japan. The cities, all of

more than 100,000 population, represented (according to the 1940 census) approximately twothirds of the urban population and one-fourth of
the total population. This sample, for the years
1940 through 1942, was blown up by 65 percent to
arrive at a nation-wide total. This factor rests
upon the assumption that the sample was representative of the entire urban population and that
rural outlays for housing were about 10 percent of
urban outlays. Judging by American experience
these assumptions may result in some overeStimation.
This series was extrapolated to 1943 and Ui44
by use of an index based on lumber allocation,
construption material prices, and wage rates.
The annual changes in this index corresponded
closely to those of the value data in the overlapping
1940-42 period (table 12).
The price variations in the residential construcApPENDIX TABLE

tion series were removed by use of the index of

lumber allocations to residential housing.

FOREIGN BALANCE
The Finance Ministry supplied complete data
on the balance of international payments apart
from military expenditures that were not made
through ordinary controlled channel'!, inva&ion
currency, and locally arranged bank credits.
These financing methods are believed to account
for the bulk of overseas military expenditures.
The major difficulty was the separation of accounts
between Japan proper and Formosa and Korea.
In some cases it was impossible to remove the
transactions of the latter territories, but it is not
felt that this shortcoming introduced any significant error into the net balance.
The foreign balance (ctll"rent account) series,
shown in table 13, was not adjusted for price
variations.

B-13.-Balance of international payments, fiscal years 1939-44

[Millions of yen]
1939

1940

1941

1942

1943

Exports:
Mercha.ndise ____ ---------------Shipping ______________________
--------In~urance _______________________________
Interest and dividends __________________ .
Tourists' expenditures ___________________ .
Government receipts _____________________
Miscellaneous services ____________________

3,891
41
23
74
19
464
260

4,219
107
31
104
21
640
369

2, 888
70
42
126
33
741
411

2,010
18
49
218
50
748
559

1,778
15
43
247
49
1,028
814

1,321
15
19
229
181
1,774
1,069

TotaL _______________________________

4, 772

5,491

4,311

3, 652

3,974

4, 608

Imports:
Merchandise ____________
----------Shipping ________________________________
Insurance ______________ . ________________
Interest and dividends ___________________
Tourists' expenditures ____________________
Government payments ___________________
Miscellaneous services ____________________

2,654
60
27
57
19
1,479
217

3,087
79
32
42
26
1,688
347

2,198
54
21
31
19
2,219
359

1,477
37
31
9
45
1,919
125

1, 607
50
27
3
66
2, 582
256

1, 161
74
29
106
127
1,778
327

TotaL _______________________________

4,513

5, 301

4,901

3,643

4, 591

3,602

Net balance on current account ____________ --

259

190

-590

-617

1,006

Investment of foreigners in Japan ______________

Withdrawal of overseas' investments ___________

61
100

85
154

lO3
184

677
167

505
219

285
239

287

844

724

527

1,614
79

1,640
119

1, 760
85

1,274
255

________________________________

161

239

Investment of Japanese in foreign countries _____

Withdrawal of home investment of foreigners ___

1, 176
135

1, 290
106

T~tal

1944

Total. _______________________________

1,311

1,3g6

I, 693

1,759

1,845

I, ;;29

Net balance on capital accouIlL ______ ..

Other transactions and residuaL _______________

-1,150
'891

-1: 157
967

-1,406
=1,996

-915
906

-.1,121
1,738

-1,002
-4

Source: United States Strategic Bombing Survey .

Source: FIDauCE! Ministry.

91

CHANGE IN INVENTORIES

items of consumers' expenditures may have been

excluded.
Wherever possible, production and civilian supply data were used in removing the effects of price '
fluctuations. In other cases, relevant components
of the cost of living index were used for deflation ,
purposes.

As it was impossible to obtain any quantitative

data on the levels of business inventories, no series
is included in the capital formation estimates.
There is no doubt that there was continuing liquidation of consumers' goods stocks, starting in 1937.
It is believed that these stocks had already reached
a rather low level by 1940. On the other hand,
Finance Ministry officials were of the opinion that
there was a substantial accumulation in each war
year of inventories in the munitions industries.
It was believed, however, that a very substantial
part of the increase would be accounted for by
finished munitions that had been rejected as unusable by the military authorities.

ApPENDIX TABLE B-14.-Con8umer expenditures, 1940-44-Continued

1940

1,140 '

1941

1944

1, 120

874
19
156
327
372

As has been mentioned previously, current value

data expressed exclusively in terms of official prices
could not be obtained for all component elements
of the gross national product. Many elements
were derived from source material on actual transactions, in which prices were known to be substantially above the official level. When such
value series could not be matched with 'comparable quantity data, it was necessary to deflate for
price changes by meai:J.s of a price index which
reflected extralegal pricing. The most appropriate
index of this sort that could be secured was that
computed by Professor Morita of the Commercial
College of Yokohama.
In general, this index was a derived series obtained by comparison of the available quantity
data on production and trade with a comparable
transactions aggregate. While any method of this
sort is not without serious pitfalls, it may be noted
that the results obtained for the period 1936 to
1940, when the official price index was representative of actual price changes, are in line with the
Bank of Japan index. Professor Morita was of
the opinion that his index might well understate
the price rise during the war years but that a bias
towards overstatement was very improbable. A
comparison between Morita's wholesale price index
and that of the Bank of Japan is shown in table 15.
Other price data are shown in subsequent tables.

CONSUMERS' EXPENDITURES

D. All other ___________________________________ _

1,740

1,433

891

4,800

4, 529

7, 157
3,336
308
274 .
558
2, 196
586
220
173
111
82

3. Fish and fish products _______________________________________ _

2,945
1------1------1------1------1-----824
1,060
1,873
295
415
428
398
777
_9 54

a. Fish and shellB- ______________________________________ _

b. Dried fish ___________________ ., _______________________ _
c. Seaweeds ____________________________________________ _

==="'I===-=-=I~-=-=--~=====

ApPENDIX TABLE B-14.-Consumer expenditures, 1940-44

[MlUloDB of yen]
1940

1941

1942

1943

1944

30,422
28,423
31, 371
Total expenditures_ ------- -- - - - - _____________ ----I=~2::o:1~,,::,55"=4~F==27~,~1~5"=3=1=~===~=I==:~~""I==~~;;:;
12,214
11,341
nonalc~holic beverages , _____________________ 1=~1~3?=,~15~5~~=;;12~,~3~0~O=I=~~:=I===j=~;=I====;=;;:~
13, 857
A. Grain and grain products______________________
5._475
5,218 _ _4,277
-,--_
4,945
4,935
1. Rice ______________________________________________________ _1
4,260
3,560
3, 941
2. Barley _______________________ . ____________________________ _
126
142
170
3:- Rye ______________________________________________________ _
171
175
238
4. WheaL ___________________________ ~ _______________________ _
119
98
222
5. FlOUT- ______________________________________ .______________ _
146
133
153
6. Bread _____________________________________________________ _

1. Food and

63
53
74
92
84
7. Other cereals and products ________________ ,;_~-,::,:;,:-;,:_~-,::,-;,:--;,,::,;--;,;-,::,-,::,--;,;-;,;-,::,-~-,'===='===="====
137

92

1943

CHANGES IN PRICE LEVEL

The estimatIon of co~sumers' purchases was

made by the Ministry of Finance by the means
of the following data:
1. Consumption tax data.
2. Production statistics adjusted for nonconsumer flow, exports, imports, and stocks. These
physical volume series were valued at official
prices.
3. Government revenue data for such items as
transportation and communication.
4. Special government inquiries and other miscellaneous sources.
Most estimates of food expenditures were based
on investigations of the Department of Agriculture
and valued by use of the official price series.
Two comments that should be made in considering the detailed data on consumers' expenditures
(table 14) are that they probably include a sizable amount of second-hand items toward the end
of the war and that in all probability some minor

See footnotes at end of table.

1942

II. I.

Juor' ___________________________________________

III.

obacco and tobacco products , ______________________

IV.

1 ,staurants, hotels, geisha houses, etc.' _______________

531

326

290

55
32
64
23
196
23
25
8
105

38
27
64
23
59
23
25
8
59

23
30
86
23
52
23
25
8
.20
1,510

998

1, 239

1,667

1,368

510

570

870

1,265

858

1, 140

1,694

1,920

1,445

-----

1,374
~=

(included above) _______________________________

128

200

482

751

554

V. C ,thing and furnishings ___________ ~ __________ " ______

3,464

3, 786

3,329

3,326

1,979

A. Clothing excluding footwear ____________________

3, 128

3,403

2,962

2, 728

1,454

'I u

SCI'

footnotes at end of table.

'-

93

ApPENDIX TABLE B-14.-Con8umer expenditures, 1940-44-Continued

ApPENDIX TABLE B-14.-Consumer expenditure3, 1940-44-Continued

19to

V. Clothing and furni~hings-Continued

B. Other , ______________________________________ _

336

19.11

383

1942

'367

598

1. Tax_________________________________ __
29
46
2. Footwear __________________________________________________ _

52
129

159
135

a. Shoes ______________________ ____ . _____ .. _____ . _____ ._

b. Clogs. ______________________________________________ _
c. Rubber-soled socks_. ________________________ ~ ________ _

48
34
47

40

3. Hats, canes, umbrellas _____________________________________ _

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Bags _____________________________________________________ _
Miscellaneous leather goods __________________________________ _
Needles ___________________________________________________ _
Fans __________________________________________________ .____ _
Shoe polish ________________________________________________ _
Baby carrilges _____________________________________________ _
Thermos bottles, etc ________________________________________ _
Jewelry ______________________ ~ ___________._________________ _

19to

.19.14

1943

48
47

60
34
2
4
2
7
7
4
24

72
48
2
3
5
7
33
. 4
20

18
1
5

14
1
5

5~ I

241 .

64

15 1

241

25

48

2~ I

': I
30
3

I------I------il------I------I----Watches __________________________________ . _________ _

a.
b. Precious metals ______________________________________ _
c. Jewels, feathers; etc __________________________________ _

12. Other personal equipment- ___ - ______________________________ _

VI. Lighting and heating materials" ____________________ _
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

1,286

1,126

394

442

1. Water supply_________________________________
51
56
2. Gas ___ -- - -- - - - - ________ .. _________.- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ _
63
64
3. Electricity __ --- __ _ _ _ __ __ _ _ __ _ _ _ __ _ _ __ _ _____ _ _ _
280
322
4. Tax on electricity _________________________________________________ _
VIII. FUr1!iture and furnishings' _______________________ _
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8
9.

435

498

Bamboo articles __________________________________________________ _

Screens and l!IDterns ______________________________________________ _
Lighting fixtures __________________________________________________ _
Electric bulbs ____________________________________________________ _
Indoor ornaments _______________ ; ________________________________ _
Metal goods _________________________________________________ ____ _
Plate glass _______________________________________________________ _
Marble, etc ______________________________________________________ _
10. Cutlery ___ ~ _____________________________________________________ _
11. Tea sets __ - ---- - - --- -- - -- - -- - -- - - - - _- __________________________ --c
12. Pottery and lacquerware ____ c ____________________________ ,_________ _

94

86

1,052

995

750

51
62
7
535
320
18
2
57

56
50
5
572
252
2
2
56

70
49
309
251
2
1
65

478

488

480

60

76
327
15

71
58
344
15

71
35
362
12

662

727

616

231
41
5
34
40
28
4
10
4
2
3
50

173
45

1-------1-------1-------1Wood furniture ___________________________________________________ _

See footnotes at end of table.

:1

= =----=

Matches' _______________________________________________________ _
CoaL ___________________________________________________________ _
Coke ___________ ._________________________________________________ _
Firewbod __________________________________ c _____________________ _
CharcoaL _________________________ .______________________________ _
Candles _____ . ___________________________________________________ _
Kerosene ____________________ . ________________ ~ __________________ _
Other fuel substitutes _____________________________________________ _

VII. Household utilities , ______________________________ _

110

42

231
41
2
31
37
21
34
10
8
15
2
28

1941

1. Rented dwellings 6 ____________________________ _

2. Owner-occupied dwellings (imputed) ____________ _

0
4
56
39
9
94

0
3
34
33
11
194

0
2
7
8
257

Ii

1,590

1,831

1,864

1,864

611

611

979

979

703
1,128

716
1, 148

716
1, 148

580

679

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Medicines , ________________________________________________ _
Soap , _______________ .______________________________________ _
Toilet goods , ______________________________________________ _
Tonics '_. _________________________________________________ _
Insecti~ides' _______________________________________________ _
Tooth powder' _____________________________________________ _
Shampoos' ________________________________________________ _
Incense' ____________________________________________ _
Bandages , ________________________________________________ _
10. Razors' ___________________________________________________ _
11. Thermometers , ____________________________________________ _
12. Medical instruments , _______________________________________ _

460

562

1. Medical care ___________________________________ ! ________ .___ _

2. Bath houses _______________________________________________ _

XI. Miscellaneous goods , ______________________________ _

661

752

1,551

1, 702

1,895

829

666

533

360
165
108
112
36
16
13
3
1
8
4
3

216
133
104
112
36
20
17
5
2
8
4
9

187

722

1,036

1,362

461
261

612
424

811
551

150
0

199
78

264
112

799

951

869

1======1======1======1======
213

237

19
31
12
16

1. Fishing tackle and supplies _________________________________ _

2. Other. ____________________________________________________ _

I
2

D. Art and literary products curios ________________________________ ___ _

23

1944

1,590

B. Photographic equipment __________________________________________ _

1943

1======11======1======1======1'=====

1942

71

72
112
36
11

13
8
3
7
.4
9

563

635

443

248
295
20

302
277
56

203
214
26

37

36

16

10
27

8
28

2
14

11

15

4
7

4
11

5
3

1=====1=====1=====1=====1=====

See footnotes at end of table.

714928-46--~

58

61

1=====1=====4=====1=====1====,=
95

ApPENDIX TABLE B-14.-Consumer expenditures, 194G-44-Continued

1940

19(3

1942

1941

XI. Miscellaneous goods-Continued

E. Musical instruments and supplies __________________________________ _

III

24

16

1. Musical instruments ________________________________________ _

2. Grllmophone disks __________________________________________ _
3. Gramophone _______________________________________________ _

8
15

11

F. Flowers _________________________________________________________ _
G. Fireworks _________________________________________________.______ _
H. Other ___________________________________________________________ _

6
11
17

11

72

1
18
158

24
1
18
280

I. Tax ____________________________

STATISTICAL SOURCES

36

59

XII. Amusement' ____________________________________ _

255

294

377

415

394

1. Spectator amusements" ______________________ _

2. Tax ___________________ - _____________________ _
3. Radio listeners' c~rge ________________________ _

207
23
25

231

249
93
35

257
122
36

240
118
36

XIII. Private education and religion ____________________ _

30

37

50

67

78

30
20

40
27

43
35

I, 606

1,667

,2,354

725
76
365
237
203

886
90
365
154
172

1, III
143
694
144
262

157

179

218

41
116

56
123

60
158

959

1,274

1,688

~____________

33

30

1. Private education , _______________________________________________

2. Religion , _____________________________________ --- ________________ _
~

XIV. Passenger transportation _________________________ _

1,149

1,268

1. Government railway 3 _____________________________________________ _

2. Government railway tax'_______________________
23
23
3. Local transit , _________________________________ - __________________ _
4. Automobile and parts , ________________ .____________________________ _
5. Other' ___________________________________________ c ______________ _

XV. Other transportation and communications ___________ _

117

122

1. Freight transportation 3 ___________________________________________ _

2, Communications '- - --- - ----- -- - ---- - - -- - - - - - - - - ------ - -- --- - __ -- -_

XVI. Miscellaneous professional and domestic services' ___ _

612

748

3 Based on government revenues.

Other methods.
6 Based on 1940 ratio of the number of owner-occupied dwelling units to
rented units.

NOTES: The following footnotes apply in all cases to the Y88l'S 19(2-44 and,
in the case of service items, to 1940 and 1941 as well. Expenditures for goods
in 1940 and 1941 are based on production data exclusively.
1 Based on production data. adjusted for changes in inventories, exports
and imports, and nonconsumer fiow-valued at official prices.
2 :Based on consumption ta.xes.

Appendix C
The collection and collation of economic statistics which would provide an accurate picture of
the economic development of Japan prior to and
during the war was one of the foremost -tasks of
the U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey. It was
much more difficult to accomplish than one might
have thought. The coverage as well as the quality of economic statistics in Japan are highly unsatisfactory. Japanese statistics are contradictory, based on unreliable raw material, and the
method of collection of basic information is
greatly deficient.
There is no single agency which would be responsible for the entire field of statistical information. Government bureaus, industrial control associations, individual company records, had to be
consulted in order to obtain a set of figures depictingthe most important events in Japan's war
economy with reasonable accuracy. The Cabinet
Planning Board, the Cabinet Bureau of Statistics,
and the Total Mobilization Bureau of the Munitions Ministry, all made attempts to secure ,the
data needed for governmental planning-most of
those attempts failed.
The statistics used by the Survey had, therefore,
to be built up from scratch. They represent a
considerable advance over what has been done in

that field by the Japanese themselves. The reports 9f the individual divisions of the Survey
present the time series relating to their specific
fields. The following set of statistical tables
covers the most relevant aspects of Japanese
economic development in the last decade. They
should prove useful to students of Japan's economic problems.
In the following tables, unless calendar year is
explicitly stated, fiscal year should be understood.
The Japanese fiscal year runs from 1 April to 31
March and almost all statistical series begin on 1
April of each year. When fiscal year is used, first
quarter means April, May aI).d June of that particular year. Last, or fourth quarter of 1943, for
example, when on a fiscal year basis, would be
January, February, and March of 1944. The rice
year runs from 1 November to 31 October, while
'the fertilizer year extends from 1 August to 31
July. A "koku" is a measure of volume roughly
equivalent to 5.12 bushels. A "kan" is a measure
of weight equal to 3.75 kilograms or 8.27 pounds.
A ;'sho" may be either a measure of volume in
which case 100 sho equal 1 koku, or it may be a
measure of area in which event it is equivalent to
2.45 acres. A "picul" is a llnit of weight equal to
60 kilograms or 132 pounds.

Source: Finance Mlnfstry.

ApPENDIX TABLE B-15.-Wholesale prices in Japan

[Indexes,1936=IOOj
:Morita's series Bank of Japan

1936 _______________________ __
1937 _________________________ _
1938 _________________________ _
1939 _________________________ _
1940 _________________________ _
1941 _________________________ _
1942 _________________________ _
1943 ____ ____________________ _
1944 _________________________ _
~

96

100
119
126
145
171
184
236
267
325

100

121
127
141
158
167
180
191
214

97

Manpower Tables
C-2.-Civilian population, labor force and unoccupied, by age and 8ex, Japan proper, 1 Oct. 19S0.
1 Oct. 1940, ee Feb. 1944

APPENDIX TABLE
ApPENDIX TABLE

C-I.-Population, armed forces, and civilian labor fwce by sex and activity, Japan proper,
1 Oct. 1940, ee Feb. 1944
.

Oct. 1930,

[In 1,000'.1
1 OCTOBER 1930 1

[In 1.000"1
1 Oct. 1930

Total

Male

Female

Total

------

Male

Female

Total population ___________ 64, 450 32,390 32,060 73, 114 .36,566 36, 548
- - - - - - - - - - - -- - Armed forces ____________________
243
243 ----_._- 2 I, 694 '1,694 ------Civilian population _______________ 64,207 32, 147 32,060 71.420 34,872 36,548
Unoccupied __________________ 34,830 13,360 21,470 38,937 15, 142 23,795
Civilian labor force' __________ 29,377 18, 787 10,590 732,483 19,730 12, 753 {
Agriculture and forestry _______ 14, 131 7,735 6,396 13, 842 6,619 7,223
Fishing _____________________
568
515
543
53
476
67
Mining ______________________
316
271
45
598
529
69
Manufacturing and construction
Commerce ___________________
Transportation and communication _____________________
Government and professional. _
Domestic service _____________
M~cellaneou8 ________________

5,876
4,906

4,428
3, 406

1,448
1,500

8, 132
4,882

6, 178
3,006

1,954
1,876

945
I, 762
802
71

907
I, 369
92
64

38
393
710
7

1,364
2, 195
709
218

1,214
1: 515
39
154

150
680
670
64

1 Sum of civilian population (census) and armed forces (estimated). This

overstates size of population of J span Proper since armed forces include
some persons recruited from territories outside Japan Proper.
I Information obtained by census takers from closest civilian relativ~.

Adjusted on the basis of information obtained by USSBS from Army and

Navy ministries. Sep8Cstion into those in Japan Proper and those overseas bas not proved feasible.
J Estimated from data supplied by Army and Navy ministries. Includes
all members of Japanese armed forces, due to impossibility of segregating
those from outside Japan Proper. Also includes some females (numbers
unknown).
, Figures are subject to revision, since final figures have not yet been prepared by Japanese census authorities. Several differing sets of statistics
have been drawn from the 1944 enumerations by various Japanese Government agencies using differing principles of coverage, classification, etc.,
without adequate explanation reconciliation of these ditterences, and at
certain Internal inconsistencies, must await a recomputation of the bB.Sie
returns. The figures presented here are considered the most reliable of the
various versions. It should be noted in comparing 1944 with other years,
that the 1944 Census officially excluded from the count the population of
certain administrative subdivisions of Toky~To and Hokkaido; the population of these districts In 1940 was approximately 24,000 ..
'The figures for the Labor Force and the Unoccupied in 1944 are subject
to a bias relative to the corresponding ftgures for 1Q3O and 1940. See table 2
where the bias is discussed and adjustment Is attempted.
The break-down of the Clvman Labor Force by activity has been done in
terms 01 tbe Industry to wblcb an Individual I. attached (Sangyo-bet,u).

Civilian population

22 Feb. 1944

1 Oct. 1940

Tota]

Male

Female

---177,044

138,605

38,439

3, 980 -------- 3, 980

73, 064 34, 625 38, 439
& 41, 267
& 16, 182
& 25, 085
618,443 13,354
& 31, 797
'(31,657) '(18,411) '(13,246)
13,376
5,569
7,807
464
380
84
805
681
124
9,494
7,243
2,251
1,127
2,364
1,237
1,650
2,900
473
131

Unoccupied

Labor force

Age

1,385
1,895
58
73-

265
1,005
415
58

Unemployed workers were considered as attached to the industry in which

they were 18.5t employed.
7 Excludes a group officially designated as "foreigners," numbering about
40,000 in the civilian population.
S Figures in parentheses are a total of the industry subdivisions below them.
The total is somewhat smaller than the figures for the labor foroo given on
the line immediately above, due to the exclUSion of certain civil -divisions of
Japan Proper, primarily Okinawa. Part of Karafuto, not included in
previous census counts, is included.
Sources: 1930-All data from census enumerations as submitted by
Japanese Cabinet Bureau of Statistics.
1940-Total population from census enumerations as submitted
by Japanese Cabinet Bureau of Statistics.
Armed forces estimated from census data and data submitted by officials of Japanese Army and Navy ministries.
Civilian population and labor torce from census enumerations as submitted by Labor Bureau, Ministry of Welfare.
1944--r rotal population estimated (see I\ote I).
Armed forces estimated from data submitted by officials
of the Japanese Army and Navy ministries.
Civilian population and labor force tram census data
submitted by Cabinet Bureau of Statistics.
Industrial classification of labor force from census data
submitted by Labor Bureau, Ministry of Welfare.

Total

0-14 _________________________
15-19 _________________________
20-24 _________________________
25-29 ___ - _- - - - - __ - _____ ~ ______ .
30.:-34 _________________________
35-39 _________ _______________
40-44 _________________________
45-49 _________________________
50-54 _________________________
55-59 _________________________
60 and over ________________ ___
~

23,579
6,540
5,531
4,835
4,214
3,585
3,286
3,046
2,831
2,217
4, 786

Male

Female

Total

Male

11,895
3,319
2, 815
2,480
2, 175
1,857
I, 688
I, 525
1,411
1,086
2, 139

11,684
3,221
2,716
2,355
2,039
I, 728
1,598
1,521
1,420
I, 131
2,647

1,072
4,595
4,048
3,499
3, 129
2,722
2,513
2, 295
2,065
1,508
2, 174

483
2,605
2,585
2,399
2,131
1,823
1,652
1,479
1,344
998
1,531

Total

MaJe

22, 507
1,945
1,483
I, 336
1,085
863
773
751
766
709
2, 612

11,412
714
230
81
44
34
36
46
67
88
608

11,095
1,231
1,253
1,255
1,041
829
737
705
699
621
2,004

34,830

13,360

21,470

499
2,439
1,781
1,295
1,176
I, 134
1,041
907
814
684
983

25,442
2,076
1,482
1,608
1,318
1,072
856
694
682
750
2,918

12,898
824
218
88
54
44
40
43
66
115
730

12,544
1,252
1,264
I, 520
1,264
1,028
816
651
616
635
2, 188

12, 753

38,898

15,120

23,778

Female

-----------------------589
1,990
1,463
1,100
998
899
861
816
721
510
643

- - - - - - - - - - - ----------- -32,390
32,060 29,620 19,030 10, 590

TotaL __________________ 64,450

Female

1 OCTOBER 1940'

0-14 _________________________ 26,367

15-19 ___________ _____________ 7,337
20.:-24 ______.___________________ 5,010
25-30 ________________
5,278
30--34 _________________________ 4,855
35-39 _________________________ 4,392
40-44 _________________________ 3,820
45--49 _________________________ 3,200
50-54 _________________________
2,882
55-59. ________________________ 2,559
60 and over ____________________ 5,681

13,324
3, 646
1,965
2,463
2,411>
2,230
1,963
I, 642
1,452
1,240
2,510

13, 043
3,691
3, 045
2,815
2,440
2, 162
1,857
1,558
1,430
1,319
3,171

Total. __________________ 71,381

34,850

36,531

________

---- - - - - ----

925
5,261
3,528
3,670
3,537
3,320
2,964
2,506
2,200
1,809
2,763

426
2,822
1,747
2,375
2,361
2, 186
1,923
1,599
I, 386
I, 125
1,780

32, 483 119, 730

- - - - - - - - ---- -

22 FEBRUARY 19H'

0-14 _________________________ 26, 107

15-19 _________________________ 7,837
20.:-24 _________________________ 5,227
25-29 _________________________ 4,625
30-34 _________________________ 4,716
35-39 _________________________ 4,475
40.:-44 _________________________ 4,200
45--49 _________________________ 3,604
50-54 _________________________ 2,968
55-59 _________________________ 2,647
60 and over __________ .__________ 6,381

13,222
3,822
I, 782
1,823
2,036
2, 170
2, 130
1,855
1,524
1,318
2,827

12,885
4,01Q
3,445
2,802
2, 680
2,305
2,070
1,749
1,444
1,329
3, 554

13,184
1,451
212
66
45
36
35
38
49
82
900
- - - - ---- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Total ___________________ 72,787 34,509 38,278
31,657 18, 411 13,246 41,130 16,098
113
4, 784
3,939
3,068
3,217
3,274
3, 193
2,805
2,295
1,946
3,023

38
2,371
1,570
1,757
1,991
2, 134
2, 095
1,817
1,475
I, 236
I, 927

75 25, 994
2,413 3,053
2,369
1,288
1,311
1,557
1,226
1,499
I, 140
1,201
1,098
1,007
988
799
820
673
710
701
1,096
3,358

12,81 o
1,602
1,076
1,491
1,4 54
I, 165
972
76 1
624
61 9
2, 458
25,03 2

98

1 Dillers from totals of civilian population and labor torce In table 1 since
data In tbls table lor 1930 Includes armed lorces wblcb numb07ed 243.000.
I Di1Iers from totals in table 1 as 8 result of exclusion of a group oftic1ally
designated as "foreigners" numbering about 4O,(X)() in civllian population.
Dltfers from totals in table 1 as aresult of exclusion of certain civil divisions
of Japan proper, primarily Okinawa; but includes part of Karaluto. The
latter was not included in the census counts of earlier years.
4 The break-down of these age groups into civilian labor Corce and unoccuPied Is subject to bias as desC7ibed in appendix table 2. An adjustment 01

this bias has been computed from a more detailed age break-down and results
in the tollowing net additions to ;,c InpUed to the 1944 labor force in the table
above:
Age 0-14: 803,000 (385,000 malesj 418,(0) females),
Age 16-19: 827,000 (587,000 males; 240.000 temales),
Total civilian labor force: 1,630,000 (Q72,00Q males; 668,000 females).
A corresponding decrease in the unoccupied should be made.
Source: Census data submitted by labor bureau, Ministry of Welfare.

99

ApPENDIX TABLE

C-3.-Percentage distribution of civilian labor force by sex and activity Japan proper,
1940, :e:e Feb. 1944
1

Total
Civilian labor force _____________
Agriculture and forestry _________
Fishing _______________________
Mining ________________________

Oct. 1930
Male

Female

Total

Oct. 1940
Male

22

Female

Oct. 1930,

Oct.

Feb. 1944
Male

Total

Female

Manufaoturing and construction __

Commerce _____________________

100. '0
60.4
.5
.4
13.7
14. 1

100. 0
42.6
1.7
1.8
25.0
15. 0

100.0,
33.5
2.4
2.7
31.3
15.2

100.0
56.6
.5
.6
15.3
14.7

100.0
42. 2
1.5
2.5
30.0
7. 5

100. 0
30.3
2.1
3.7
39.3
6.1

100.0
59.0
.6
1.0
17.0
9. 3

Transportation and communica...tion ________________________

Government and professionaL ____
Domestic service _______________
Miscellaneous __________________

3.2
6. 0
2.7
.3

4.8
7.3
.5
.3

.4
3.7
6.7
.1

4.2
6. 8
2.2
.7

6.2
7.7
.2
.8

1.2
5.3
5.3
.5

5. 2
9. 2
1.5
;4

7.5
10.3
.3
.4

2. 0
7.6
3.1
.4

ApPENDIX TABLE

"

C-4.-Percentage distribution of males and females in civilian labor force by activity, Japan proper,
1930,1 Oct. 1940, :e:e Feb. 1944

1 Oct. 1930

Total
Civilian labor force _____________
Agriculture and forestry _________
Fishing __________________ - ____
Mining ________________________
Manufacturing and construction __
Commerce _____________________
Transportation and communication ________________________
Government and professionaL ____
Domestic service _______________
Miscellaneous __________________

100. 0
100. 0
100.0
100. 0
100. 0
100. 0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---- ----- ---100.0

41. 2
2.7
1.5
23.6
18. 1

Based on table 1.

0-5.-Labor f~rce, mining and manufacturing and construction, by sex and indu8try, Japan proper,
1930 and:e:e Feb. 1944 1
[In tbousandsl

100. 0
48.1
1.9
1. 1
20. 0
16.7

Sour~e:

ApPENDIX TABLE

Male

Female

Total

Oct. 1940
Male

22

Female

Total

Oct.

Feb. 1944
Male

Female

---- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 64. 0
54. 7
90.7
85.8
75.4
69. 4
96.0
77.7
11. 5
90.1

36.0
45.3
9.3
14.2
24. 6
30.6
4.0
22. 3
88. 5
9.9

100~0

100.0
100. 0
100.0
100. 0
100. 0
100. 0
100.0
100. 0
100.0

60.7
47.8
87.7
88. 5
76. 0
61.6
89.0
69.0
5. 5
70.6

39.3
52.2
12.3
11. 5
24.0
38.4
11. 0
31. 0
94. 5
29.4

100.0
100.0
100.0
100. 0
100.0
100. 0
100. 0
100.0
100. 0
100.0

58.2
41. 6
81. 9
84. 6
76.3
47.7
83.9
65.3
12.3
55.7

41.8
58. 4
18. 1
15.4
23.7
52.3
16. 1
34.7
87.7
44. 3

Oct. 1930

Total
Mining ___________ - _- _- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -MetaL _____________ - _- _- _- - - - - - - - - - - - - Coal ___________________________ - _______
Oil _____________________________________
Other mining ________________ - _- _- - - - - - -Stone and earth quarrying ____ - _- -- ---- --Manufacturing and construction ________ -- -- --Metals ______________________________
Machinery and tools _____________________
Shipbuilding ________________ - _-_ - - - - - - -Aircraft and parts ______________ - - - _- - -Vehicles and conveyances _________________
Ordnance' ______________________________
T __

Precision Instruments' _______ - _- ~- ------Chemicals 6 _________________________________

Textiles' ___________________________________
Ceramics, earth and stone ____________________
Lumber, woodworking __________ - _--- __ ------Printing, pubjishing ______ - ___ - _- - - - - - - - - - - - -Food products ___________ - _- _- _- - - - - -- - - - - - -Gas, electricity and water_____________________
Construction and civil engineering - - _ - - - - - - - - -Miscellaneous _________________ - - - - - - - - - - - - -1

See note

(fJ of table 1.

Total

Female

45
271
5
41
189
37
5 ---------3 ---------3
33
1,448
4,428
19
380
10
207
1
99
9 ---------89
1
33
3
54
164
37
1,116
844
180
30
69
583
36
230
100
396
4
118
7
956
14
86

316
46
226
5
3
36
5,876
399
217
100
9
90
34
57
301
1,960
210
652
266
496
122
963
.100

Estimated from ce~us data covering only those aged 13 to 60 to include

all thOBe In labor force,
I A.ssemb1tog of aIrcraft, manufacturing of aIrcraft body, engine propeller,
special parts, and aircraft ordnance.
4 Manufacture of ordnance for aircraft is classlfled under aircraft and parts.
6 Measuring instruments for aircraft is classlfled under aircraft and parts.
I

Male

22

II

805
159
540
' 12
36
58
9,494
836
936
2693
1,988
194
496
85
613'
824
232
372
110
364
157
1,075
519

I,

Oct.

Feb. 1944
Male
681
133
461
10
29
48
7,243
720
757
638
1, 574
171
395
65
428
251
170
309
77
227
139
1,026
296

Fema.le

124
26
79
2
7
10
2,251
116
179
55
414
23
101
20
185
573
62
63
33
137

i8
49
223

Includessynthetic rubber and oil.

r Includes apparel.

Sources: 1930 data are adapted from the 1930 census, final report, t.able 47;
industrial distribution 1944 data Me adapted from census enumeration data
submitted by labor bureau, Ministry of Welfare and cabinet bureau of sta
tistics.

Source: Based on table 1.

100

101

ApPENDIX TABLE

C-6.-Worker8 in the labor foru, aged 14-59, manufacturing and con8t~uction, Japan proper, 1 Oct. 191,0
and ee Feb. 1944'
lIn thousandsl

ApPENDIX TABLE C-8.-Survey of resident Korean8, by indu8try and oClJupation, Japan proper, 91 Dec. 1941
In labor force _____________________________________-___ - - - - ______________________________ - - - ______ _
777,023
Agriculture and fishing ______________________________________________________________________ _
9,480
________________________________________________________________________________ _
94,320
~anufacturing---- __________________________________________________________________________ _
208,338
Metal, machinery and tools _______________________________________________________________ _
102,648
Chemical_______________________________________________________________________________ _
47,053
Fiber __________________________________________________________________________________ _
43,953
______________________________________________________________________________ _
6,488
Other manufacturing- ________________________________. ___________________________________ _
8,196
Construction and civil engineering~--- _________________________________________________________ _
220,969,
Communication and transportation ______________ .____________ .__________________________________ _
15,754
Stevedore _____________________________________________________ ~.--------------~------------26,982
General workers _____________________________________________________________________________ _
32,830
Other workers _______________________________________________________________________________ _
66,084
Hotel and restaurant- _____________________________________________________________________.__ _
4,751
Trade ______________________________________________________________________________________ _
60,430
Profes&onal _________________________ ! _________________________________________________ : ____ _
5,116
Other employed _____________________________________________________________________________ :
31,630
Unemployed _____________________________________ ~ ________________________________ : _________ _
339
Not in labor force _______________ : _______________________________________________________________ _
692,207
Total Ko~eans ____________________________________________________________________________ _ 1,469,230
~ining-----

October 194{)

Total manufacturing and construction ______________________ _

___________________ . ___________________________ _
Female _________________ . ___________________________ _
__________________________________________________ _
_______________________________________________ _
Female _____________________________________________ _
~achinery, Tools,' etc ___________________________________ _
~ale _______________________________________________ _
Female _____________________________________________ _
ChemicaL ______________________________________________ _
~ale _________________________________ " _________ c ___ _
Female _______________________ _____________________ _
Utilities (gas, electricity, w-.ter) ___________________________ _
_______________________________________________ _
Female _____________________________________________ _
Ceramics and earth stone _________________________________ _
_______________________________________________ _
Female _____________________________________________ _
Textiles' _______________________________________________ _
________________________ ______________________ _
Female __________
Lumber and wood products _______________________________ _
_______________________________________________ _
Female ______________________________
Foodproducts ___________________ ______________________ _
_______________________________________________ _
Female _____________________________________________ _
Printing and publishing~ _________________________________ _
_______________________________________________ _
~ale

~etal

~ale

~ale

~ale

~ale

--T -

_______________________________ _

~ale

______________ _

~ale

~ale

Female ___ --- - - - -- - - - --- --- - -_ -r -- - - - _____ - _________ _

Engineering and construction _____________________________ _
_______________________________________________ _
Female _____________________________________________ _
___________________________________________ _
______________________________________________ _
Female _________________________________________ _
~ale

~iscellaneous
~ale

6,981
5, 271
1,710
594
550
44
1,800
1,633
167
475
347
128
82
79
3

256
205
51
1,497
533
964
431
399
32
368
249
119
116
98
18
825
809
16
537
369
168

February III

7,814
5,936
1,878
695
610
85
3,681
3,067
614
471
321
150
94
89
5
188
134
54
717
178
539
294
243
51
284
166
118
85
57
28
885
850

35
420
221

199

DUIerence

Percent change

19(()-111

19(()-111

833

12
13
10
17

665
168
101
60
41
1,881
1,434
447

11

93
105
88
268

-4

-1

-26
22
12
10

-7

-68
-71

17
15
13
67
":"27
-35

-780
-355
-425
-137
-156
19
-84
-83

-52
-67

-44

El~ctrical

Source: Pla",!or carrvlnq out 1948 National mOOUizotion, Cabinet planning board, Tokyo,141unel943, p.l28.

ApPENDIX TABLE

-32
-39
59
-23

Type of work assigned

Year'

-1

-31
-41
10
60
41
19
-117
-148
31

-27
-42
56
7
-22

38, 700
54, 944
53,492
112,007
122,237
280,304
6,000

-40
18

Total 1939-45 , __________ , ___________ --

667,684

119

1939 ______________________ _
1940___________ : __________ _
194L ______~ _____________ _
1942 ______________________ _

1943 ______________________ _

318,546

75, 749

9,379 -------- _._-9,898

1,546
9, 540
2,865
14,848
13, 100
28,280
15,089
130,462
33,382
2,000
3,000
107,327

166, 062

Total number brought into Jap&D. Number of Kor~ leaving Japan or transferring from previously assigned industry not available.

New conscripts

Cumulative

For the year

total

850
53,542
311,734
623,383
1,323, III

24,279
6,042
35,431
8,069
32,099
8,988
74,576
9,483
65,208
13,660
85, 953
30,507
1,000 ------------

Source: Labor Bureau, Welfare Department.

C-7.-Labor con8cription into e88ential indu8trie8, Japan proper, 1999-19.t,5'

850
62,692
258, 192
311,649
699,728

Metal mining

I Fiseal iear beglns on Apr_l and ends Mar. 31 offollowing year.

, Estimated for lIrst quarter of fIBcal year (April through lune).

a Includes apparel.

For the year

I-----~------I~?~l=:..:: 3~~:1':c~:;
Coal mining

1939 ________
~-----------------------------1940 ________________________________________
1941 ________________________________________
1942 ________________________________________
1943 ________________________________________
1944 ________________________________________
1945' __________________ ____________________

Source: Labor Bureau, Ministry of Welfare.

New conscripts

Total number

-33

-1

; i:gl~~~ ~~~~l~~t=~~~~~ft'~~e~~~~~i:l~~=c:~ber than technicians.

ApPENDIX TABLE

C-9.-Number of Korean contract workers brought into Japan proper annually by type oj work a8signed.
1939-.t,5

Cumulative

total

1944 ______________________ _
1945 ____________________ _

229, 448
47,771

1,552,559
1,600,330

TotaL _____________ _

I, 600, 330

1,600,330

I Labor conscription, as used here, was confined solely to males who entered essentfal1ndustries because of government compulsion .
Up to 16 August 1946.

Source: Welfare Ministry.

102

103

ApPENDIX TABLE

C-I0.-Survey of Korean and Chine8e worker8 previously introduced in groups and pri80ners of war among
regularly employed worker8 in factories and mines, Japan proper, SO June 1944 1
Total Korean,
Chinese and
POW workers

Toto! regular
workers

ApPENDIX TABLE

C-ll.-Student8 mobilized for work by 8chool tind type of work, Japan proper; October 1944, February 1945,
and July 1945 1 (in thtiusands)-Continued
FEBRUARY 1945

Korean workers

Chinese workers Prisoners of war

Type of work
School and sex

Factory workers_ - - _______ ---- -- --- --- -- ___ -- 7,790,273

__________________________________ _
5,512,896
Female ________________________________ _ , 2,277,377
workers _______________________________ _
633,754
__________________________________ _
527,918
Female ________________________________ _

82,650
80,745
1,905
148,935
148,566
369

~ale

~ine

~ale

105,836

69,119
67,222
1,897
140, 788
140,419
369

3,602
3,594

5,819
5,819

individually beCore the war ace not included. Figures also do not include
day workers.

1 This survey covers only group movements~ or Korean and Chinese

workers into 1apan proper. Koreans and" Chinese who migrated to Japan

Miscellaneous

9,929
9,929

2,328
2,328

Toto!

Source: Cabinet Bllreau of Statistics.

University, technical, and normal schools ______ _

180

139

25

16

------------

__________________________________ _
Felllale ________________________________ _

147
33

112
27

20
5

15
1

-----------------------

~ale

I, 629
1,220
280
129 ----------------1------1---,--1-----1
~ale___________________________________
940
669
165
106 -----------Female ________ _______________________ .
689
551
115
23 ------------

~iddle

schooL _ _ __ _______ ____ ______ ___ ___ ___

ApPENDIX TABLE

C-ll.-Student. mobilized for work by school and type of work, Japan proper; October 1944, February 1945,
..
and July 1945 l(in thou~and.)
OCTOBER 1944

Toto!

1, 297

587

710

------------ ------------

__________________________________ _
Female ________________________________ _

690
607

328
259

362
348

Total ________________________________ _

3, 106

1,946

I, 015

____________________________ _
Female __________________________ _

I, 777
I, 329

I, 109

837

547
468

------------ ----------------------- -----------145 -----------121 -----------24

~ale

Type of work
School and sex

Primary SllbooL ____________________________ _

w:-!:::n Food production

::~~lC:~ro:

MIsceUaneous

~aJe

University, technical, and normal scbools ______ _

126

85

26

12

__________________________________ _
Female ______________ - - ________ - - _- ____ _

99
27

66
19

20
6

11
1

scbool ______________________________ _

1, 149

761

280

108

------------

University, technical, and normal schools ______ _

195

145

31

19

------------

-----------------------

________ " _________________________ _

Female ________________________________ _

156
39

114
31

25
6

17
2

-----------------------

schooL ______ " ______________________ _

I, 603

1,046

342

176

39

__________________________________ _
Female ________________________________ _

883
720

195
147

107
69

14
25

~ale

~iddle

_____________________ ____________ _
Female _______ - _____ - - - _- _- ____ - - _.__ - __ _

638
511

386
375

165
115

87
21

Primary scbooL _________ -_ - _- _________ - ____ _

723

129

560

34 --- .. --------

~ale

__________________________________ _
Female _____________ - __________ -- -- ____ _
~ale

TotaL _____________ - - ________________ _

____________________________ _
Female __________________________ _
~ale

See footnotes at end of table.

(3)
(.)

(3)
(3)

1,998
(.)
(3)

(a)
(3)

----------------------154

866

975
(3)
(3)

(3)
(a)

(3)
(3)

(.)
(3)

3
2
1

JULY 1945

~ale

~iddle

~aJe

567
479

Primary schooL ________________________________ ~~I

Male ____ ~ ____________________ C _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Female. _____________ . _____ ____ __ _______

517
753
211
153
8861-------1---C---.1------1-------304
384
113
85
748
213
369
98
68

3,432 I
I, 126
1,708
1------:-------1------985
604
Male_ - __________
- - ----------_______________
-- --- -----'-----_
1',9 2 5 /
Female
723
1 50 7
522

TotaL _-- ______ -- ________ c -! _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

1 Data in this table represents the degree of mobilization on the successive

-dates shown. Since totals for each date do not represent successive separate
mobilh:ations l they should not be added.
University school students are about 17 years and older. Middle scbool
'Students are from 12 to 16 years of age and students mobilized from primary
~cbools are from 12 to 14 years of age.

104

------------"

406

192

237
169

99
93

Mobilized for medical work.

a Break-down by sex not available.

4

Mobilized for communications and transportation industrY.

Source: Ministry of Education.

10;

TABLE
G--13.-Industrial employment and
productive man-hours in 46 urban area8, Japan proper,
monthly, October 1943-August 1945 1

APPENDIX

C-12.-Inde:!' of employment and earnings'

of factory and mine workers in e8tabli8hment8 not owned by
government, Japan proper, monthly. 1940-1,5

ApPENDIX TABLE

G--12.-Inde:l: of errrployment and earning.

of factory and mine worker8 in establishment8 not owned by
government, Japan proper, monthly, 1940-45-Continued

ApPENDIX TABLE

Factory workers

Employmentl

1940
January __________
February _________
March ______ - - - -ApriL ____________

Actual

~ings'

Employment 1

------------

May ____ - - - - - - - -June _____________

July _____________
August- _____ - - - -September ___ - - --October _____ - - - -November ___ -_ --December ___ - _ - _. -

109. 6
109. 7
109.4
109. 3
108.0
107.4
108.1
108.7
109. 6
109. 6
'110.2
113.7

165.5
168. 5
170.2
171. 6
173.2
175.3
175.5
177.2
180.3
183.3
185.8
185.3

1941
January __________
February _________
March ___________
ApriL ____________
May ________ ----June _____________
July _____________
August- ______ - ___
September ________
October _____ - - - -November ________
December ___ - _ - -

146.0
145.8
145.8
152.5
152.8
152.5
150.8
149.6
150.1
150.7
151. 6
153. 0

148.7
147.8
152.2
147.6
148. 8
149.1
150. 8
151. 9
153.5
155.5
154- 9
161. 4

115.3
117.6
118.3
116.2
115.0
114.0
114-1
115.3
114-3
112.1
112.4
114-1

188. 6
194.1
196.0
193.5
191. 8
193. 4
191. 9
191. 7
193.8
195.2
i96.9
197.7

106

Emp!oymentl.

Actual
earnings!

130.1
130.1
132.2
129.7
130. 6
132.3
134- 6
135.9
136.4
138. 0
140.6
146.8

Actual
earnings'

Employment 1

----

Actual
earnings J

1943
January __________
February _________
March ___________
ApriL ___________
May _____________
June _____________
July _____________
August- __________
September ________
October __________
November ________
December ________

173. 9
175.2
176.3
185.7
187.7
188.5
188. 8
189.5
190.3
193.3
196.3
200.5

184.3
182.3
185.6
181. 1
184.9
185.1
190.8
194.8
197.6
206. 0
210.6
218. 5

123.2
126.1
125.1
122. 2
'22.7
122.2
123.1
122.8
123. 9
124.8
124.7
127.1

218. 0
224.4
224. 1
222.5
222.0
224_ 1
224.4
224. 4
224.3
227. 8
229. 4
231. 8

160.6
160. 3
160. 7
158. 4
158,7
162.0
164- 2
163.2
164.1
168. 7
171. 6
179.2

118.6
119.9
118.2
114.7
114.1
115.0
116.3
117.0
118.1
117.4
118.2
120.6

198. 4
202. 7
202.0
200. 6
201. 1
203. 3
199.2
206. 1
206.8
210.7
213.3
215.2

January __________ 206. 4

February _________ 210.9
March ___________ 213. 3
ApriL ___________ 225.9
May _____________ . 216.2
June _____________ 216.1
July _____________ 214.0
August ___________ 211. 8
September ________ . 209.9
October __________ 209.0
Novemt>er ________ 208. 0
Decemqer ________ 206.9

219.1
220.0
223.5
221. 7
223. 7
234.2
224.0
219.5
228.5
236.0
241. 7
245. 4

130.4
133.2
133.5
134.3
133.4
132.8
133. 1
133.7
137.1
140.9
142.1
144. 1

233. 7
236.1
235. 1
243.8
249.2
257.0
265. 0
271. 6
276.8
276.4
276.3
281. 0

1945
January __________
February _________
March ___________

,.

1944

153. 6
154- 2
155_ 6
165.5
167.6
168. 9
169.7
170.7
171. 7
171. 8
172.4
173.3

Employment

Mine workers

144. 0
143.5
143.7
149.2
149. 3
148.1
146- 8
146.1
146. 4146.2
146.8
146.6

1942
January __________
February _________
March ___________
ApriL ____________
May _____________
June _____________
July _____________
August ___________
~eptember ________
October __________
November ________
December ________

Mine workers

20.t 0
200.7
196.0

245.0
239.9
251. 8

145.1
146. 4
146. 4

286. 7
290.2
294. 7

C-14.-Active strength of the Japanese

armed force8, 1930-45

Year

[In thousands]

[Monthly 8verageI926-100)
Factory workers

ApPENDIX TABLE

1943
October ____ - - _- - - - ____ - - -- - - - - Novernber _____________________
December _ - - - - - ______ - - - _- _- --

1,978
1,973
2,077

317,820
322, 350
329, 370

1944
January _______________________
February _________________ - _- __
March ________________________
ApriL ______ - _____ - ___ - - - - - - - - May ______________ .: __ - __ - - - - -June _________________ - _- - - - - -Ju]y ______ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -August ________________________
September _____________________
October _______________________
November ____________ - - - - - - - _December __________________

2,147
2, 158
2,244
2, 369
2,393
2,392
2,403
2.432
2,443
2,464
2,490
2,497

342,260
352,530
358, 280
382, 870
391,800
382, 150
381, 020
385, 830
391,680
388, 310
394,620
390,900'

1930 _______________
1931 _______________
1932 _______________
1933 _______________
1934 _______________
1935 _______________
1936 _______________
1937 _______________
1938 _______________
1939 _____ ~ _________
1940 _______________
1941 _______________
1942 _______________
1943 _______________
1944 _______________
1945 , _____________

Navy

Army

Total

250,000
308, 430
383, 822
438,968
447,069
448, 896
507,461
634, 013
1, 159, 133
1,620,098
1,723,173
2,411,359
2,829,368
3,808,159
5,365,000
7, 193, 223

50,000
200,000
78,430
230,000
83,822
300,000
88,968
350,000
97,069
350,000
98,896
350,000
107,461
400,000
134,013
500,000
159, 133
1,000,000
180,098
1,440,000
223, 173
1,500,000
311,359
2,100,000
429,368
2,400,000
708, 159
'3, 100,000
4,100,000 1,265,000
5,500,000 1,693,223

1945.
SourceS: Army. Chief, Liaison Committee, War Ministry. Navy, Chief,
Liaison Oommittee. Navy Ministry.
1 Augus~

TABLE C-15.-E8timated movement of farm

labor to industry, July 1937 to February 1944

ApPENDIX

1945
January _______________________
February ______________________
March ________________________
ApriL _________________________
May __________________________
June _________________ - ________
July ___________________________
AugusL _______________________
1

2,484
2,424
2, 401
2,351
2,301
2, 306
2, 121
1,845

373,880
362,850
332, 990
315, 560
309, 850
248,030
220,530
182,340

Includes private and Government-owned plants employing 50 or more

workers. Excludes Nagasaki and Hiroshima.

Source: Data compiled by Urban Areas Division, U. S. S. B. S.

[In thousands)

Period

July 1937 to August 1939 ___

August 1939 to February
1940 ____________________
February 1940 to February
1941 ____________________
February 1941 to February
1942 ____________________

Men

Women

Total

----._--

310

130

440

200

100

300

250

90

340

220

110

330

February 1942 to February

1943 ____________________

240

140

380

February 1943 to February

1944 ____________________

100

80

180

Source: Ministry of AgrJculture and Forestry.

Index of employment is a chain index based on 8 chang1J1g sample.
1 Index ot earnings is 8 fixed index of actual earnings per day (average
I

during month) per worke' based on the total sums of pay, including extrs
allowances and bonuses. Only allowances paid on a amonth or less basis
are included.
Source: Cabinet Bureau of Statistics.

107

ApPENDIX TABLE

13asic Materials Tables

ApPENDIX TABLE

C-16.-Coking coal import. into Japan proper, and percentage by ,ource, 1940-45

Total
Fiscal year and
quarter

North China

Amount I

1,842
1,473

100
100

72

TotaL ____________ - - _________________ _

3, 315

100

80

26
8

18

91

1941

First halL ______ --- ----- -- --_

Second hali _____ - - - - - - - - - - - _____ - ___ - ___ - - - - _

1,654
1,763

100
100

98
95 ___________ _

3, 417

100

96

1
5
3

TotaL:: _____________________ _

1931. ________ _
1932 _________ _
1933_________ _
193L ________ _
1935 _________ _
1936_________ _
1937_________ _
1938 _________ _
I_

1939 _________ _
1940 _________ _
1941:
I ________ _
I L _____ _

IIL _____ _
1942 ..

First half ______ - - - - - - - - - - - - - _- _- - - - - ___ - - - -Second halL ____ - __ - - ____ - - - - ___ - -- - ____ - - - __

2,058
1, 967

100
100

82 ___________ _

Total ________________________________ _

4,025

100

87 ___________ _

13

1, 810
1, 129

100
100

81 ___________ _
89

19

100

84 ___________ _

16

1943

First hali ______________ - - - __ __ ____________ _

Second hali ______ - - - ---------- _____ - - ____ -- __
TotaL ___________ - - - ________________ _

2, 939

1944

First quarter ___________ - - - - - ___ - _______ - _- __

Second q uarteL ________ - - - _____ - ___________ _
Third quarter ___________ - - - _________________ _
Fourth quarter _________ - - - ___ ______ _______ _
TotaL ___________ - -

497
420
317
201

93

11

100
100

81

100

1-----1
1, 435

IV ______ _
TotaL __

18

90 ___________ _
10
25
5
70
12
88
31 ___________ _
69

100
100

1945

116

100

68

Other

Malaya

10

1,727
1,634
1,779
2,312
3,646
4,023
4,313
3,212
4, 949
5,719

100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100

1, 707
1,536
935
880
5,058

100
100
100
100
100

10

9
14
8
7
6
7
11
8
8
9

15
20
21
15

na ___________ _
ns. ___________ _

na

ns. ___________ _

50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50

35
34
32
36
35
31
14

60
60
60
1
1
1

60

60
-60

ns. ___________ _

na

ns. ___________ _

na
60

60
60

5
14
20

60

30
50
67
68
50

61
61
61
61
61

60
60

8
14
13

na
na
na

13
21

na
na

16

na
na
na
na
na

9
3

3
9

53
54
52
38
40
42
38
50
39
36

na
na
na
na
63
63
63
63
63
63

28
34
26
14

na
na
na
na
57
57
57
57
57
57

40
23

63
63
63
63
63

4
2
1
1
2

59
59
59
59
59

8
6

23

3
2

18
10
7

========-:---==~====

1942:
L _______ _
IL ______ _
IIL ____ _
IV. ______ _
TotaL __

63 ___________ _
2
2
63
2
59
63
2
59
2
63
1
59
1
6
63
1
59
2
100
13
====-==========
1,054
1, 250
1,356
1,220
4,880

100
100
100
-100

1,268
940
736
742
3, 686

100
100
100
100
100

692
458
312
206
1,668

100
100
100
100
100

15
16
18

1943:

L _______ _
IL ______ _
IlL _____ _
IV ______ _
TotaL __

5
4
10

12
7

60
51
4
60
51
1
51 ___________ _
51
60
51

79
79
77
91
82

61 ___________ _
61
60
61
1
60
61
1
60
61

51 ___________ _

89
91
89
82
88

59
59
59
59
59

51
51
51
51 ___________ _

4
3
1
6

60
60
-60
60
60

2
2

63 ___________ _
63 ___________ _

63 ___________ _

==============
1944:

L ________ _

I L _____ _

First quarter ___________ - - - - - ___ - ___________ _

Philippines

China'

------1-----------------------------------

Manehukuo

Percent

1940
First halL _____ - -- - - - - -- - - - - -- - -- - -- - - __ - - -_
Second hali _________________________________ _

Manchukuo

Korea.

Amount 1 Percent Percent Pe~c:nt Percent perF~t Percent Pe~~t Percent Per;:nt Percent pe~,:tit Percent Peri:nt

Total
Fiscal year And period

C-17.-Jron ore imports into Japan proper by ,ource, 1931-45

IIL _____ _
IV _ ____ _
TotaL __

32 ___________ _

29
35
45
55

37

54 ___________ _
54
54
54
54

59
59

71
62
55
41
61

58 ____________ - _____ ------ ------ -----60 _______________________ _

58
3
58
58
60 __________________ -----58

thousands ot metric tons.

Source: Compiled from data supplied by Japan Iron & Steel Control Association (TEKKO TOBEI KAr), November 1945.

1 In

"na" Indicates data not available.

In tbousands of metric tons.
Includes Hainan Island.
Source: Compiled from data supplied by Japan Iron & Stee1 Control Association (Tekko Tosei Kai), November 1945.
I

108

109

G--18.-Iron ore, iron sands, and pyrite sinters supply in Japan proper, 1991-45.

ApPENDIX TABLE

ApPENDIX TABLE

G--19.-Pig iron imports into Japan proper and percentage by source, 1991-45

[In thousand. of metric tons]

Tots!
Domestic supply
Fiscal year and quarter

Iron ore productlon

1931 _____________________________
1932 _____________________________
1933_____________________________
1934 _____________________________
1935 __________ __________________
1936_____________________________
1937_______________ ~------------1938 _____________________________
1939 _____________________________
1940 _________ - _- _- _- _- __ --- - - - ___
1941:I ____________________________
~

II ___________________
III __________________________
IV __________________________

~------

Tots.L _____________ - _- _____

1942:I ____________________________
11 ___________________________

III __________________________
IV __________________________
TotaL _____________________

1943:1____________________________

II ___________________________
III __________________________
IV ______________________ , ___
Tots.L _____________________
1944:1____________________________
11 ___________________________

III ___________________ ______

IV __________________________
~

TotaL _____________________
1945, L __________________________

Iron sand
production

Pyrite sinter
deliveries

Total

Imports of
Iron ore

Total

1, 727
1, 634
1,779
2,312
3,646
4,023
4, 313
3,212
4,949
5,719

(1,936)
(1,866)
(2,100)
(2,746)
(4,168)
(4,646)
(4, 910)
(4,049)
(5,851)
(6,846)

ns.
ns.
~"IJ ns.
'I'IlJ.! na
(1,567)

1,707
1-,536
935
880
5,058

ns. ---------DS. ---------na ---------ns. ---------2, 605

(6,625)

(501)
(834)
(578)
(514)
2, 789

1,054
1,250
1,356
1,220
4, 880

(1,555) ---------(2, 084) ---------(1,934) ---------(1,734) ---------7,669

1,399

ns.
ns.
na
DS.
703

(702)
(973)'
(771)
(689)
3,838

1,268
940
736
742
3,686.

(1,970) ---------(1,913) ---------(1,507) ---------(1,431) ---------7,524

792

124
86
80
50
340
45

1,010
1,374
1,076
949
4,409
837

692
458
312
206
1,668
143

208
227
320
432
516
619
584
766
850
993

1
5
1
2
6
4
13
71
52
134

ns.
ns.
ns.
ns.
ns.
ns.
na
ns.
ns.
ns.

ns.
ns.
ns.
ns.
1, 334

ns.
ns.
DS.
DS.
233

na
ns.
nS.
DS.
na

429
709
497
424
2,059

72
125
81
90
368

ns.
ns.
us.
ns.
'362

590
831
669
618
2,708

112
142
102
71
427

756
1, 128
886
817
3, 587
701

130
160
110
82
482
91

(209)
(232)
(321)
(434)
(522)
(623)
(597)
(837)
(902)
(1,127)

,.,.

ns.
na
na
na
3,195
4,362
4,151
4, 228
3, 952
3,812

"t ....

1, 702
1,832
1,388
1,155
6,077
980

Fiscal year

Iron ore stock~

pUe period end

-------------------------------------

672
us.

"na" Indicates data not available.

j,( )" Figures in parentheses Indicate totals for which one or more of the constituent figures are not available.
1 Includes only consumption at Japan Iron Mfg. Co. Yawata plant.
Source: Compiled from data supplied by Iron and Steel Control Association (Tekko Tosei Kai) and reports by individual iron and steel plants, Novem

Ko.....

Amount'

1931 ____________________________ _
1932 ____________.________________ _
1933 ____________________________ _
1934 ____________________________ _
1935 ____________________________ _
1936 ___________________________ _
1937 ____________________________ _
1938 ____________________________ _
1939 ____________________________ _
1940 ____________________________ _
1941 ____________________ _
1942 ____________________________ _
1943 ____________________________ _
1944 ____________________________ _
1945, first quarter ___________ ~ ____ _
1
I

494
650
800
777
1,093
1,095
1, 131
1,072
927
854
784
878
1, 134
942
51

Manchukno

China

British India

Other

Percent

100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100

19 ---------16
30
35
32
18 ---------50 ---------20
22
57 ---------21
53 ---------26 ---------12
31
22
35 ---------34
11
25 ---------30
(.)
12
44
19
25
(2)
29
20
20
31
24
32
38 ---------6
20
50 ---------30 ---------18
10
71
(')
15
4 ---------- ---------81
24
16 ---------- ---------60
26
62
12 ---------- ---------60
39
1 ---------- ----------

In tho1l88D.ds of metric tons.

Less than 0.0 percent.

Souroe: Compiled from dBta supplied by Japan Iron & Steel Control Assoclatlon (Tekko TOIlei Kai), November 1945.
AprENDIX TABLE

G--20.-Scrap steel and iron sup.ply, consu.mption, and stockpiles, Jap~n proper, 1991-45
[In thousands of metric tons]

Fi8C8l year

1931 __________________________
1932 _____________________________
1933 _____________________________
1934 _____________________________
19~5 _____________________________
1936 _____________________________
1937 _____________________________
1938 ________________
-----------1939 _____________________________
1940 _____________________________
1941 ________ --------------------1942 ____________________________
1943 _____________________________
1944 _______
--------------------1945 _____________________________

Imports

296
559
1,013
1,413
1,692
1,497
2,420
1,358
2, 555
1,391
203
39
25
74

Domestic
pUrcbased

800
800
1, 100
1,100
1,100
1,100
1,100
1,100
890
871
1,022
1,251
1, 292
1,317
175

Self.generated

286
360
479
569
681
842
1,894
2,119
2, 185
2,064
2,018
2,118
2,296
1,766
251

Total

1,382
1,719
2,592
3,082
3,473
3,439
5,414
4, 577
5,630
4,326
3, 243
3,408
3,613
3, 157
427

Consumption

1,106
1,302
1,906
2,538
3, 122
?,337
4,394
4,265
4,660
4,405
4,487
4, 7"17

5,275
4, 145
568

Bal&nce

276
417
686
544
351
102
1,020
312
970
-79
-1,244
-1,369
-1,662
-988
-141

Stockpiles

1,389
1,806
2,492
3,036
3,387
3,489
4,509
4,821
5,791
5,712
4,468
3,099
1, 437
449
308

ber 1945.

Source: Compiled from data supplied by Japan Iron &- Steel Control Association (Tekko Tosei KaI), November 1945.

110

111

........

ApPENDIX TABLE

C-21.-Ingot steel production by type, Japan_proper, Korea, and Manchukuo, fiscal years, 1981-45

[In thousands of metric tonsJ

Japan proper
Fiscal year
anQ quarte,t

Honshu

Rokkaldo

Korea.

Kyushu

kuo

Total
OR

OR

193L _________ na . na
1932 __________ na na
1933 __________ na na
1934 __________ na na
1935__________ 77 (.)
1936__________ 65 ____
1937__________ 77 ____
1938__________ 74
2
1939 __________ 81
2
1940__________ 79
2
194L ________ 118
3
1942__________ 252
4
1943:
L ________ 87
2
II _______ -_ 102
3
III. ______ 110
3
IV _______ 126
3
-TotaL 425 11
1944:
L ________ 113
3
II ________ 92
4
III. __ -' ___ 74
4
IV _______ 41
3
TotaL 320 14
1945, L _______ na na

Total

OR

OR

Total

'rotal

OR

- - --- -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - na
849
na
1,019
1,437
na
na
1,904
2,493 2,082
2,858 2,224
3,336 2,300
3,788 2,477
3,990 2,514
4, 153 2,479
4,081 2,470
4,293 2,358

na
na
na
na
51
70
85
120
106
142
165
192

89 717 80 387
105 650 81 379
113 732 86 439
129 727 84 423
436 2,826 331 1, 628

1,184 571 77 648 1,375

1,110 556 72
628 1,308
1,257 590 78
668 1,432
1,234 590 66
656 1,443
4, 785 2,307 293 2,600 5,558

116 663 67 460 1, 190 523 64

587 1,299
96 504 49 410
962 341 45
386 936
78 450 49 423
922 404 66
470 . 928
_ 44 305 32 311
648 346 66
412 692
334 1,921 197 1,604 3, 722 1,614 241 1,855 3,855
na
na na
40
na na
466
296 3435

Total

OR

Total

OR

1,883 ---- - --- -- -----2,398 - ---- - ---- -----3, 198 .rIa - ---5
3,844
na ----60
97
_____
4,703
97
87 _____
5, 217
87
103
5,798 103 -- --6,461 103
3
106
17
111
94
6,693
109
6,855
94
15
49
157
6,837 108
181
7, 099 128
53

na
na

na " ____
na _____

.aa
na
137
344
451
622
562
554
573
724

na _____
4, 696 ---- 5,332 - ---5,917 ---- 6,371
~9
6,309 152
6,187 233
5,964 333
6,179 352

80 466
81 454
86 520
84 492
331 1, 932

1,921
1,843
2,038
2, 019
7,821

47
44
45
44
180

214
199
210
214
837

1,618
1,533
1,669
1,683
6,503

80
484
81
472
86
538
84
510
331 2,004

2, 182
2,086
2,293
2,277
8,838

67 527
49 459
49 493
32 380
197 1,859
3368

1,893
1,444
1,470
1,104
5,911
803

43
44
41
27
155
na

207
72
94
64
437
na

1,534
1,037
1,048
768
4,387
(435)

67
542
49
474
49
508
32
395
197 1,919
(368)

2, 143
1,560
1,605,
1, 195
6,503
(803)

29 18
26 318
27 318
26 318
108
72
28
29
26
12
96
na

15
15
a 15
15
60 ,
na

"OR" Indicates open hearth.

liB" Indicates basic Bessemer.
uE" Indicates electric furnace.
Hna," Indicates data not ave.ilabls.
"( )" Figures in parentheses Indicate totals for which one or more constituent figurel!! are not
available.

-- - - - -- -- -- - - - -- - - - - -

na ----- ,na
1,021
ns. _-. ___
na
1,344
na _____
na
1,684
ns.
_____
1,863
na
2,133 4,462 --- -- 241
2,294 4,901 - - --- 316
2,385 5,363 - ---- 435
2,597 5, 646 ,59 756
2,620 5,653 152 888
2,621 5, 539 233 1,083
,2,635 5,283 333 1,221
2,550 5,327 352 1,420

13
na ... --na
na ____
ns
35
na
____
na
77
77
na ---na
772,303 -- -- 190
652,612 - --- 246
77 2,986 - --- 350
763,095 59 634
83 3,058 152 780
81 2,981 233 939
121 2,695 333 1,053
256 2,717 352 1,224

Total

Grand total

Manchu

I
I

- -

ns. _____

---

na (1,883)
na (2, 398)
na (3, 203)
na (3, 904)
241 4,937
316 5,648
435 6,352
759 7, 189
905 7,366
1,098 7,518
1,270 7,567
1,473 8,004

--

Anshan only. Steel is also made in a few other plants but their output is negligible.
Less than 500 tons.
Estbnated_

Source: Compiled from da.ta supplied by Japan Iron & Steel Control Association (Tekko
Tose! 'Kai), Nov. 1945.

'_.,-,....'It
ApPlDNDIX TABLE

C-22.-Finished steel production, Japan proper, Korea, and Manchukuo, fi8cal years, 1931-45
[In thouoands of metric tons]
J span proper 1

RokkaJdo'

Ronshu

- Kyusbu

Fiscal year and quarter

Ordinary

Ordinary
Specfal

Rolled

1931 ___________________________________
1932 ___________________________________
1933 ________________________________ __
1934 ______________________________ ____
c
1935 ___________________________________
1936 ___________________________________
1937 ___________________________________
1938___________________________________
1939 ___________________________________
1940 _____________ .______________________
1941:
I and 11 ____________________________
III and IV _________________________
TotaL ______ ~ ____________________
1942:
1 __________________________________
II ________________________ ________
111 ________________________________
IV _________________________________
TotaL ___________________________
1943:1 __________________________________
~

11 _________________________________
111 ________________________________
IV _________________________________
TotaL ___________________________
I

------

10
10
5
3,
5
4
2

--------------------------

3
5
8

1?441':__________________________________
15
11 _________________________________
13
111 ________________________________
10
IV _________________________________
-----TotaL ___________________________
38
1945', L _______________________________
4

....
...,....

See footnotes at end of table .

Forged

Special
Rolled

Cast

Total

Forged

Special
Rolled

Cast

Total

Forged

- -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

------

6
7
9
13
35

Cast

Ordinary

Total

2
3
3
4
4
6
6
7
8
6

5
10
16
16
16
19
20
21
25
28

3
6
8
10
7
8
10
16
17
15

10
19
37
40
32
36
41
48
52
49

871
1,046
1,397
1,667
2,254
2,712
3,056
2,985
2,689
2,689

20
30
46
'58
74
84
123
194
222
201

9
16
35
39
37
43
49
68
88
106

7
12
24
29
70
90
166
266
405
411

731
964
1,209
1,437
1,486
1,557
1,619
1,887
1, 985
1,843

na

na
na
24

na
na
20

na 1,173
na 1,164
50 2,337

na
na
253

na
na
116

na
na
na
na
6

na
na
na
na
27

na
na
na
na
34

na
529
na
484
na
554
na
595
75 2,162

na
na
na
na
256

2
2
3
3
10

9
8

11
14
12.
14
51

28
582
31
544
34
575
39
602
132 2,303

20
18
16
13
67
13

47
555
45
376
40
331
23
202
155 1,464
20
125

na,
6

4
3
3
11
2

10

9
36
8
11

11
9
39
1

907
1, 104
1,502
1,793
2,435
2, 929
3,394
3,513
3,404
3,407

9
14
18
22
26
29
33
29
29

3
6
13
16
19
20
28
41
38
39

18
19
27
26
36
46
41
17

na(l, 173)
895
na (1, 164)
921
462 - 3,168 1,816

Ila
na
27

na
na
42

na (895)
na (921)
17 1902

na
na
na
na
115

na
na
na
na
599

(529)
504
(484)
438
464
(554)
(595)
476
3, 132 1,882

na
na
na
na
27

na
na
na
na
33

68
67
76
76
287

32
29
29
31
121

180
171
204
235
790

862
479
811
432
884
435
944
465
3,501 1,811

7
8
8
9
32

12
12
13
14
51

13
511
13
465
15
471
41
529
82 1,976

79
73
75
57
284
42

31
27
26
16
100
9

255
249
240
198
942
120

920
400
725
230
672 . 278
473
222
2,790 1, 130
296
128

10
8
9
7
34
7

12
8
11'
' 8
39
5

462
40
35
281
49
347
285
48
172 1,375
176
36

10

4
10

na
.na
na
na
17

747
990
1,254
1,490
1,554
1,629
1,712
2,007
2,093
1,928

(504)
(438)
(464)
(476)
1,959

........
>I>.

ApPENDIX TABLE C-22.-Finished steel production, Japan proper, Korea, and Manchukuo, fiscal years, 1931-45-Continued
Japan proper 1

Korea

Total
Fiscal year and quarter

1931 _________________
1932 _________________
1933 _________________
1934 _________________
1935 _________________
1936 _________________
1937 _________________
1938 _________________
1939 _________________
1940 _________________
1941:
I snd IL _________
III and IV _______
TotaL _________
1942:

Cast Forged

1,602
2,010
2,616
3,114
3,745
4, 272
4, 680
4,876
4, 676
4, 532

31
43
63
80
100
116
158
234
259
236

2,068 na
2,085 na
4, 153 286

1________________ 1,033 na
11 _______________
922 na
111 ______________ 1,021 na
IV ______________ 1,076 na
TotaL ______ --- 4,052 289
1943:
L ____________ .___ 1,067 77
11 _______________
983 77
111 ______________ 1,019 87
IV ______________ 1,080 88
TotaL _________ 4, 149 329
1944':
1________________
970 93
11 _______________
619 84
111 ______________
619 87
IV ______________
424 65
TotsL _________ 2,632 329
1945', L _____________.
257 51

Special

Total

Roiled

Grand total'

Ordinary

Ordinary

Rolled

Manchukuoi

Ordinary"

Cast Forged

Special

Total

Roiled

Ordinary

Cast Forged

Special

Total

Rolled

Cast Forged

- -

72
82
97
130
151
173

104
124
212
328
463
443

4,021
4, 594
5,147
5,568
5, 549
5,384

57
66
91
76
75

ns
ns
182

na (2, 068)
na (2, 085)
499 5,120

39
46
85

ns
na
11

na
na
2

na
na
14

ns
na
ns
na
175

us (1,033)
ns (922)
na (1,021)
na 0, 076)
650 5,166

24
25
27
27
103

ns
ns
na
ns
12

ns
na
na
na
2

ns
ns
na
na
16

53
49
52
54
208

240
198
231
290
923

1,401
1, 307
1, 389
1, 512
5, 609

26
23
24
22
95

____
____
____
____
_____

--,-- - - --

3
3
3
3
12

51 315
46 302
48 305
33 259
178 1, 181
15 169

1,429
1,051
1,059
781
4,320
492

22 ____
22 ____
16 ____
8 ____
68 ____
21 ____

(39)
(46)
112

na
na
325

na
na
5

ns
ns
na
ns
3 _____

na (2, 107) ns
na(2, 131) ns
333 4,563 302

na
na
187

ns (2,107)
ns (2, 131)
513 5,565

(24)
(25)

na
ns
na
na
13

ns
ns
ns
ns
14

na
na
na
ns
9

. na (1,057) ns
na (947) na
na (1,048) ns
ns (1.103) ns
375 4,494 314

na

(27)
133

ns
na
na
ns
339

na
na
na
191

ns (1, 057)
ns (947)
na (I, 048)
ns (1, 103)
675 5, 674

29
26
27
25
107

ns
na
na
na
542

na
na
na
na
7

na
na
ns

na
na
na
na
9

ns (1,093) (77)
na (1,006) (77)
ns (1,043) (87)
na (1,102) (88)
569 4,786 336

(53)
(49)
(52)
(54)
219

11

na
106 na
na (106)
28 na
na
na (28)
16 na
na (16)
ns
na (79)
79 ns
56
229 '4
244
'5
620 -- -- ----- -- --20

100

(116)
(158)

240
277
238

1,098 (93)
669 (84)
651 (87)
511 (65)
2, 929 333
289 51

~na

(207)
(201)
(234)
(293)
944

s.: : : :

\-'

:f

"" ~;<~~: ""

H"-'!)-4H.

~;<:::r

s.'

(51) (320) (1,562)

(46) (307) (1,106)
(48) (310) (1,096)
(33) (264) (893)
184 1,206 4,652
15 169
524

0:-1"

1-'

......

tC''tCc,oc.oc.o

~~~~~~~

~OCO(XI~~1:.11

HI""'lIoo-IH"

"" ,
:--:
, , :,

,,!'..

1 - ' 1 - ' 1 - ' ............

:f

!:

HH"

~HSD

~ ~ [
e.p..::::
, ...... '
,<:,

1
1

I
I

I
I

I
I

3!

[
~

E.

>-:3

l-

...t!!

'

1-oI ...... h:lt.:>

to.:)
OQO~ococ.n

f .

~~~~~~

~:::::

~~o~~~

~~~~~~

h:I

~ ~ ~

0';1

00

..... OO ..... H::t-.OO

""

h:I .... ~
<.C(J1~

'eeee

.eeee

"".

~~~~~

o~~-~
~~~~~

-..t CO CO co c:o

o;,c.nO';lO)OO
t..:ICJlCl:lpJ;:..O

~~~~~

t.-.:JOh:l

oo~o

~'CI:lt..:lh:lh:lc:".)
O)o;.OO~OOO';l

O';II-I~'lc.o"-l

~o~~~~

I'

I
~

\-' 0

"" 00

'~~~~

~~~~~

(CI

tC

:.'" 0

00....

'"

O~~
-o~

0:1

0)

:::

~~~o~~,

~OO_~~~

t.;I

tv

go
~

00

::

~
~~~g~g:
~;;!::?c;!~
~~~~~
~~~
~~s~~~
~
~I------------------------------------+--

11
?'

~~~~~&3
""~"'?O""

""

t...:Ih:I~01c:11CXl'
O)O)t.;I~tCN

..... cot\oJt.;It.:/Oo)
CDtCt...:>~~C\)

........

VI

-""

t.;I~1oJ:Io.CDcDc.o
C)l

......

t..:),..... ~-t
t..:I~c.ocoo

?'"

:0

"~It:>o~~

::::: ::::: ~:~ ~;~~~~

~ "
" " ~ ~ '" " " '" . . '" '" "'. . I!(i
i "': '" " ,"
~
~::: i
~

t:1

:;:;

'I

'"

is'
..,"'"
[

..

;..

(1,430)
(1,333)
(1,416)
(1,537)
6,285

Estimated.

H}OO-(HH;

~:

'5!.

na

3,938
4,632
5, 163
5,447
5,169
5,040

Source: Compiled from data supplied by the Iron'" Steel Control Association (Tekko Tooei
Kai) and by the Mllitary Atfairs Bureaus of the War and Navy Departments. Such data, insofar
as they include since 1936 produotion in Army and Navy arsenals (which in no year exceeded
22.1,000 tons), are estimated for the years prior to 1940. Cast and forged steel data are limited to
steel cast and forged in iron and steel prodUcing plants.

~~;<:::r:

27 .
27
21
13
88
12

-'"

'"....
P'
1

(Z7)

...

141
- - - -ns (303)
na
ns
ns (417)
2
2
490
4
1
434
3 _____
438

5
- - - -5
- - - -5
- - --5
-- - -20
- - --- -- -- - - - --

"na" indicates data are not available.

"( )"llgures in parentheses indicate totals for which one or more of the constituent llgl,lres are
Dot availablr:.
I Shikoku production, which in no year exceeded 6,000 tons, has been omitted.
I Data. limited to Manchukuo Iron Mfg. Co. production at Ansha.n, except for year 1943.
I Production in Occupied Cbina, which in no year exceeded 500 tons, bas been omitted.
4 "Special Steel Demand and Supply Regulations," 2813n. 1944, broadened the "special" steel
category to include certain high carbon steels formerly termed "ordinary,"

g>

141 - --303 na
417 na
480
6
417 12
433
2

- ---- -- - --

____
- - - -- - - - -____ - - - -- -- --____ - -- -1
6 _____
7
____ - - - -7

- ---- - - -- - ---

17
14 1,664
32
28 2,113
64
50 2,793
71
58 3,345
72 104 4, 214
(82) (124) (4,954)
(97) (212) (5,630)
132 331 6,15(1
155 471 6,072
176 450 5,904

---

52
57
66
92
89
82

Total

-----

- - - - - - -- - - - - - . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 17
14 1,664 - - - - -- - -- - - - -- - - - -- - - -- - - - - -- - - -- - 1, 602 31
- - - -- -----32
28 2,113 - - - - -- - - -- - - --- - - - -- - - - - -- ------ ---- - - --- - - - -- ------ 2,010 43
64
50 2, 793
2, 616 63
- - -- - - - -- -- - -- - - - - -- - ----- - --- -- --- ----- -----22 ____ - -- -- -- - -22 ______ - --- - - --71
58 3,323
, - - - -- ------ 3, 136 80
52 ____
-

Special

~
~
~~~~~ ~~~~~
"'~"''''~

~oooo'"

""aoOO'l 0:1 a.. ""

o)~CI:lOOI4:I-

o:I~CDc.n01
ooO)~~O)

""

---

~e~
"''''0

~~~g~;:!

t.;I~

h:lt.:Ih:lt-.:J,..... .....

.....

~h:lt.;I
<.C>~c:n

""~o""oo""

t.:)~

............

I-'-"""

'-toooo

001:00000000

-~ ........

~'!-"J-'

_~ ..t-!)_t.:J

_~~_~~~_~

.."""

........

_oocoo
.p..oo ..... oo~

cooc:o~

......

........

000(.00
C1....:rt-.:)t.:I~

t.;IO) ..... t.:)Oo)

I-f:lo.t.nco

_00

~~~

(XI~oc.nooo

1:.11000000':lN ......

~~~~tj~

~
~

[.

&;'

~I:

!ci

5:o

g'

a
s

~
R.

-~

~ ~

,R.

..

,
't:l

ci

't:l

-~

"i[
i~

OQ:>~(,Q"

OI:.11I:.11c.nc.n

a:>Orj::o.Ot-.:)

>.;

o)'1h:1t.:)QOo:.

.....

c .nc.nCl:lh:lCI:I
t..:>OO~O:Ic.n

Ii

""

f"

I
1

f
i

....

t;

........

G-24.-Finished steel distribution, Japan proper, fiscal years 1937-45

ApPENDIX TABLE

0\

[In thousand. 01 metric tonsl

1937

Conspmcr category

Oedi-

PerPercent Total steel cent

nary

rolled

Dedi-

4
10
5

cent

33 _______ . --- -

868

616
11} 4, 666 76 {
11
640
13 ________ --- 814
4 ________ --- 130

---- -- - -

Grand totaL ______ 5,858 100

(6,159)

~;I~~;

Per-

cent

steel

~~~I ~
Per

11

19 ______

--- -

688
212

14 ______
4 ______

Ordi
nary

A. Army ground forces _____________________________

B. Navy surface forces _____________________________
Bx. Merchant-ship buiJding ___________________ . _____
D. Airforces ______________________________________
Cx. RaiJroads _____________________________________
C. Industrial facilities ______________________________
C. Public works and construction ____________________
C. Machinery and tools ____________________________
C. Manufactured goods _____ _______________________
C. Exports_. ______________________________________
C. Miscellaneous ______ ~ ___________________________

---

Grand totaL ______________________________ 3, 806

1

- ---,- --

-- --

Ordi-

Per-

Total

Per-

nary

cent

oent

rolled

Per-

cent

steel

570
565
196
250
193

13
745 14
13
804 16
241
5
5
7
6
368
5 ______ - ---

808
821
300
342
215

18 1,046
18 1, 129
372
7
8
483
5 ______

589
140

14 ______
3 ______

436
52

10 ______
---.
1 ______

603
14 2,942 58 { 379
12 ______
386
--- 1 ______ - --185

13}2 425 44
8 '
8 ______ -._4 ______

-- -.

---.

~9

21
7
9

------.

14}

1943

Tota!

Per-

cent

steel

Ordi
nary
folled

1944

Total

Per-

cent

Ordl
nary
rolled

Per-

oent

steel

1945

Tota!
rolled

Per-

cent

Ordi
nary
rolled

Per-

cent

(first quarter)
Tota!
steel

Per-

cent

Per-

oent

- - - - - - - - -- - - - - - --- -- - - - - - - - - - -

-- - - -

595
730
451
307
162
367
52
366
489
203
84

.. 6
5

steel

--.- - - - - - - - -- - - - - - --- -- - - - - -100 5,098 100 5, 728 100 4,306 100 5,1001 100 4, 527 100 5,455 100

100 5, 075

Per-

11
11

607
15
16 }3,850 67 { 615
18 ______
522
- --1 ______ .- -59

- - - - - - - ---

cent

rolled

rolled

IIMI

Total

Percent

nary

cent

630
9
629
10
339
5
280
4
4 ______

759
13
14 }3,420 67 { 789
18 ______ --- 935
3 ______
61
----

Oedi-

Per-

steel

468
499
272
214
201

11M2

Consumer category

1940

Total

rolled

489 10
575 11
6
3!j7
7
4
264
5
4 ______ - ---

368
482
263
208
168

Total

Per-

nary'

rolled

(267)
4
650 11
361
6
1 (215)
3
6 ________ - - --

A. Army ground forces _____

224
B. Navy sU7face forces _____
584
Bx. Merchant-ship buiJding_
309
D. Airforces _______________
193
Cx. RaiJroads _____________
320
C. Industrial faciJities ______
C. Public works and COll- }1' 938
struction.
C. Machinery and tools _____
616
C. Manufactured goods _____
640
C. Exports ________________
785
C. Miscellaneous ___________
249

1939

1938

16
840 17
19 1, 120 23
12
536 11
8
485 10
4 ______ -. -10 ______ - --.
1 ______ - ---

840 20 1,148 21
348 11
598 13
106 15
76 16
822 19 1, 238 22
564 18 1,059 22
15
71
150 20
788 19
920 17 1,178 38 1,324 28
202 43
228 31
357
8
559 10
360 12
961 20
44
9
138 19
4 ______
4 ______
7 ______
159
139
31
--- -.- 2 ______ -- -6 _____ " -- -445 10 ______ .- -11
178
- --2
____
13 ____
------ -- ------- - --- ------ - - -- ------ -- -215
110
12
51
817 17 {
108 15
13 1,901 39 { 379
9J 1,691 30 { 151
18
5 ______
4
______
2
______
I ____ ------ - - - 178
59
- -------2 ______
2 ______ - --1 ______ - --1 ______ - --94
20
3
- ---

:}

1O}

1001~' 882

!}

- - --- -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --- - 100 4,290 100 5,556 100 3, 109 100 4,759 100

Does not include special steel distribution to the Army.

469 100

730 100

General Ordnance and Metals Bureau of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, and by the
Military Affairs Bureaus of the Waf and Navy Departments,

Source: Compiled from data supplied by the Iron and Steel Control Association, by the Air

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to to to to to

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r;:

ApPENDIX TABLE

C-27.-Import8 of ferro-alloy ore8, concentrates, and metals by .ource and type, Japan proper, 1931-45

A.PPENDIX TABLE

C-27.-Imports of fe~i-o-allay ore8, concentrate8, and metals by 80urce and type, Japan proper, 1931-45Continued

[In metric tons!

Cobalt

Chromium

Fiscal year

PhilippInes

(crude ore)

Burma
(crude
ore)

Canada
(crude
ore)

Manganese

Total
(crude

are)

Philippines

India
(crude ore)

(o.rude
ore)

Nickel (continued)

Molybdenum

Total

(crude ore)

Korea

(crude
are)

ManchU.;.

United

kuo (con-

States

centrates) (f~i:sn~

Total

Fiscal year
Crude

ore

Concen_

trates

Total

Unltad
Other
States (metalJio (metallic
lorm)
lorm)

Crude

nB
nB ________
nB __________________________________ _
nB ______________________________________________________________ _
nB _____________________________________ _______________________ ..
nB ______________________________________________________________ _
na
na
nB __________________________________ _
nB
1'0'0, '0'0'0
10'0, '0'0'0 _________________________________ ..
~

1'0'0, '0'0'0
5,7'0'0
105,7'0'0
'(35'0)
23,5'0'0
173,5'0'0
(4GQ)
5,7'0'0
125,7'0'0
na
2'0, '0'0'0
8'0, '0'0'0
na __________ 2'0, '0'0'0
2'0, '0'0'0
1'0'0 __________ 2'0, '0'0'0
2'0, '00'0
1'0'0 __________ ________ __________
nB
nB

10'0, '0'0'0
10'0, '0'0'0
15'0, '0'0'0
12'0,00'0
6'0,00'0

-______ __________ ________ __________

_______ _______
_______ _______
______________
______________
5'0
7'0'0
198
2'0'0
155
9'0'0
25 _______

2'0'0
5'0'0
5,5'0'0
4, '0'0'0
_______ _______
_______ _______
198
155
_______
25

2'0'0
5'0'0
5,5'0'0
4, '0'0'0
5'0
7'0'0
2'0'0
9'0'0

Conoen-

ore

--------------------i-----I-----I------I---- ----.--------193L____ ________

nB
1932_____ ________
nB
1933_____ ________
nB
1934 ____ " ________
na
1935_____ ________
nB
1936_____ ________
nB
1937_____ ________
na
1938_____ ________
nB
1939 _____ 13,5'0'0
nB
35'0
nB
4'0'0
194'0 _____ 37,3'0'0
194L____ 2, '0'0'0
nB _!>_____
1942 _____ 4'0, '0'0'0
DB
1943 _____ 5'0, '0'0'0
1'0'0
1944 _____ 2'0, '0'0'0
1'0'0
1945 2 ___________________ ------_

1931.----157 ---- ____

1932-----15'0 -_______
1933-----37 -_______
1934------ ______ -_______
1935------ 35'0 ________

Titanium

trates

-______
_______
_______
_______
_______

Metallicloem

________
_ _______
________
________
228

(157)
1,47'0
1,654
(2,65'0)
3,752

Straits
Settlements
(crude
ore)

lorm)

Belgium

(metallic
lorm)

Canada
(metallic
lorm)

Celebes

(concen-

trates)

China
(metallic
loem)

France

(metallic

loem)

are)

Man
chukuo
(crude
ore)

United
Peru
States
(crude (coneen
ore)
trates J)

Total
Crude Concen-

ore

trstes

__________________________________________________ _
__________________________________________________ _
__________________________________________________ _
__________________________________________________ _
__________________________________________________ _

:~~~:::::: ~~~_

-'-.100- :::::: ---100

__
}-------- ------- ::::::::}
2, '0'06 ------- ------- ------- ------ {-:::::
1938---- __ ------. '1,432 - ______________ (21, 522) _______ _______ _______ ______
15'0 '2'00
15'0
2'0'0
1939- - -- - - -- - -- 17, 649
5'0'0 '1,50'0
5'0'0 1,5'0'0
194'0 ______ ------ -------- --- ____ 29,795
(458) _______ _______ _______ ______ 5'0'0 68'00
5'0'0
8'0'0
1941. __________________________ 27,674 _________________ 1, '0'00 1, '0'0'0
nB
nB
1942 ____________ ---- ___________ 17,2'02 __________ 1,6'0'0 2, '0'0'0 3, '0'0'0 ______
na
nB
1943 ___________ : _______________ 48,271 _._________ 2, '0'0'0 62,8'0'0 4,800 _____________________________ _
1944 ______ ------ -_______ _______
7,5'01 __________ -______ _______ _______
2'0'0 ______ ______ 2'0'0 _____ _
1945 ,__ _ _ _ ___ __ _ _ _ _ _ ___ _ 1,211' ____________________________________________________________________ _

Tungsten

cfo~8 ?:!~: l!~Wc

centrstes)
form)
-----1--------------------------------Australia
(metallic

are)

Total

~crude

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---

Nickel'
Fiscal 'ear

Thailand
(crude

Vanadium

Germany
(metallic
lorm)

Great Brit-

sin (metal-

lie loem)

Korea

(crude
ore)

1931._ _ ___ _ _ _
fiB
fiB _ _ __ _ ___ _ _ _ ___ _ _ _____ __ _
nB
na
nB __ _ ___ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ _
nIL
1932_________ ________ ________ ________ ________
12'0
10'0
1,100 _______________________ _
1933_________
5
7 ________ ________ ________ ________
5
1,600 _______________________ _
1934_________
34'0
nB
3'0'0 ________ ________ ________
1'0
1,25'0 ________ ________
75'0
8'0'0 _ _ _ __ ___ _ __ _____
2 _ __ __ _ _ _ 1, 8'0'0
228
8'0'0
1935__ _ _ _ ___ _ __ ___ ___ _ _ _ ___ _ _
1936_________ ________ ________
400 ________ ________ ________ ________
1, '05'0 ________ ________
4'0'0
1937. ________________________ '4,11'0 _____________________________
nB _______________________ _
1938 _________________________ " 5,729 ________ ________ ________ ________
nB _______________________ _
1939 _________________________ '9, 819 _ _ ___ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ __ _ _ __ _ _ ____ __ _ _ _ _ __ __ _ 17,649
'432
194'0_________ ________ ________ 458 1'0,432 ________________________________________ 19,363
nB
1941. ______________________________ ~_ 23,4'06 ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ 4,268
1942 _________________________________ 17,2'02 _______________________________________________________ _
1943__ _ __ __ __ __ _ ___ __ _ __ _ ___ _ _ _ __ _ __ _ 48, 271 _______________________________________________________ _
1944 _______ ~_ ________ ________ ________ 7,5'01 _______________________________________________________ _
1945'________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________
1,211 _______________ _
~__

Fiscal year

Burma
(concentrates)

Great

China
(concen-

trates)

Britain

(concen-

trates)

Straits Bettle-

Hong
Kong

India
(coneen-

(~~t:)- trates)

Korea.

(crude
are)

South
ments
America. 1 - - - . - - - 1 Thailand
(concan
(concentrates)
trates)
Crude CancenOTe

trates

Total

1------,,---Crude ore

Concen-

trates

----1---1------.-----------------------1931. _______________________________________________________________________________________________ _
1932 _________ --c----- - ______________________________________________________________________________ _
1933 ________________________________________________________________________________________________ _
1934 ________________________________________________________________________________________________ _
1935 ________________________________________________________________________________________________ _
1936 _________ -------- ---_____ ________ ______ ______ ________ ________
3'0 ______ ________
3'0 _______ _
1937 __________________________________________________________________________ , _____________________ _
1938_________ ________ ________
'6'0'0
2'0'0 ________ ________ ______ ______ ________ ________
8'00_
1939 _________________________ 61,0'0'0 ______________ ,_____
1, '0'0'0 ______ ______ ________ ________
2,0'00
194'0 _________ ---_____
'10'0 '1,2'0'0 ______ -_____ ________ 1, '0'0'0 ______ ______
2'0'0
2,5'0'0
1, '0'0'0
30'0'0
1941.________ ________
615'0
20'0
45'0 ______ ________
1,2'0'0 ______ ______
1942_________ 1, '0'0'0
'5'0'0
500 ______ ________ ________ ______ 2'0'0
1,2'0'0
3' 4'0'0
1943_________ 1,5'0'0
4'0'0
45Q ________ 1, '069 ________ ______ 4'0'0
8'0'0
1, '069
3' 55'0
1944_________
5'0'0
4'00
400
77 ________
2'0'0 ______
4'0'0
277
I: 7'0'0
1945'_____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ _
4'0'0 - _ - _ _ _ __ __ _ _ __ ___ _ _ _ __ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ __ _ _ ___ _ __ _ __ _ __ ___ _ __ __ _ ___ _ _
4'00

See footnotes at end of table.

Una'" Indicates data not available.

"( ) .. Figures in parentheses indi9ate totals [or which ODe or more oC the

constItuent figures are not available.

'30 percent cobalt.
J First quarter.
'Crude ores contained 0.6-1.4 perc~nt nickel; concentrates, 3.26-4.34 per-

cent nickel; metalliC nickel, 98-99 percent Dickel.

. 118

714928-46---9

Calendar year.
Included some ores in 1939 and 1940.

Estimate.

Source: Compiled Crom figures collected by the Bureau of Mines, Ministry

oC Commerce and Industry, from the Finance Ministry, the Mitsubisbi
Economic Research Bureau, the Mitsubishi Trading Company, and the
Mitsui Products Co., October-November 1945 .

119

ApPENDIX TABLE

C---28.-.frodu.ction of ferro-alloys, Japan proper, 1981-45

ApPENDIX TABLE

[In metric t 0 ns]

Fiscal year and

quarter

193L _______
1932 ________
1933 ________
1934 ________
1935 ________
1936 ________
193L ____ ~ __
1938 ________
1939 ________
1940 ________
194L _______
1942 ________

Ferro~

manganese

IFerrosilicon
'
manganese

10, 637
17,985
23,026
29,364
34,710
3, 774
34,922
54, 080
4,352
66, 927
3,377
61,456
6,286
10,440
70,728
51, 323
17,230
16,855
n, 354

4,103
4,883
7,622
11,726
15,571
15,313
11,632
20,513
30,035
36, 877
33, 388
25, 741

[In metric tons]

Ferromolybdenum

Ferro~

Ferrochromium

Ferro-silicon

tungsten

218
1, 126
1,480
2, 280
4,078
6,424
8,597.
15, 141
13,966
14,716
21,222
21,664

32
59
26
232
272
447
804
1,479
2,499
3,274
2,949
2,152

10,
7,
8,
5,

725
440
129
538

1,012
853
755
596

31,832

3,216

Ferrovanadium

Ferrophosphorous

Ferrq.

titanium

21 -------- -- ---------85 ---------- - - -------286 ---------- ---------132 ---------- -- -------188 ---------- ---------13
199 ---------25
31
285
46
45
672
160
578
1,415
213
708
1,802
125
832
988
117
533
546

1943:

L ______
11 ______
IIL __ ~_

IV ______

18, 903
15,843
12,481
8,056

TotaL

55,283

2,698
1,516
2,376
1,274

8,584
6, 521
6,068
2,318

7,864

23,491

69
89
103
104

89
84
95
54

49
75
71
48

365

322

243

ns
ns
ns
ns
us
ns
us
ns
us
2, 745
1,376
1, 547

Fisca.l years

19.38- ---------------___________
3,655
1939-__________________________
13,987
1940___________________________
22,495
1941___________________________
5~ 297
1942___________________________
103,907
1943_ - ----- - -- - -- - - _____ ____ ___
84, 940
4,488
1944___________________________
1945 ______________________________________ _

363
274
374
146

11 ______

IV ______
TotaL

ApPENDIX TABLE

354
168
248
207

3,610
3,407
2,893
2, 745

8,541
8,044
9,114
4, 879

6, 240
5,451
5, 828
2,479

650
481
274
162

118
72
70
77

51
97
52
24

44, 533

12,655

30, 578

19, 998

1,567

337

224

278

977

4,551

4, 273

65

57

31

ns

15,634

581

----------

"ns" Indlcstes data. not available.

Source: Data compiled by Iron and Steel Control Association (Tekko 'I.'asei Kai) and Bureau of Mines, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, November 1945.
ApPENDIX TABLE

------1935 _______________ _
1936 _______________ _
1937 _______________ _
1938 _______________ _
1939 _______________ _
1940 _______________ _
[941 _______________ _
1942 _______________ _
1943 _______________ _
. I

Production of alumina

---------

--------------------------------------------24,316
38,656
53,956
81,837
136,837
212,558
304, 734
190,585
1,621

100
2,424
7,434
13, 167
7, 181
9,618
l1,240
15, 650
15,046
13,623
13, 757
34,626
14,598

"na" Indicates data not available.

1 Includes production Crom aluminous shale, alum-clay, alunite, and scrap.
11942-45 imports obtained Cram Manchuk\lo only.
Sources: For production data., the Light Metals Control Association (Keikiozoku Tosei Kai), with minor adjustments to agree with individual plant

120

3,215 ___________ _
15,947 ___________ _
2,450 ___________ _

24, 762
101,149
220,478
352,458
280, 189
146,711
450, 134
820,534
347,335
1,800

Japan proper

3,690
8;360
21,750
26,750
32,040
37, 000
25,465
23,884
25,811

Korea

Total

3, 950
14,710
19,500
23,474
24,688'

3,690
8,360
21,750
26, 750
35,990
51,710
44,965
47,358
50,499

Period

Japan proper

1944________________
1945:

11~

949

Korea

Total

32,462

147,411'

ApriL__________
8,934, __________
8,934
May____________
25,768
1,188
26,956
June____________
1,724 __________
1,724
JUly _________________________________________ _
August __________ c ____________________________ _
TotaL _______ _

36,426

1, 188

37, 614

Years are tiscaJ.

ApPENDIX TABLE

Fiscal year

1933 ___________________________
1934 ___________________________
1935 ___________________________
1936 ___________________________
1937 ___________________________
1938 ___________________________
1939 ___________________________
1940 ___________________________
1941 ___________________________
1942 ___________________________
1943 ___________________________
1944 ___________________________
1945 _____ -"- - - --

14, 612
26,502
23,049
31,698

Source: Bureau at Mines. Ministry of Commerce and Industry, November 1945.

[In metric tons1

From other than

bauxite I

Total

!In metric tons]

C-29.-Summary of supply of primary aluminum in Japan proper, Korea, and Formosa, 1988-45

From b1i.uxite

958
27,984
76,505
104, 692
62,965
26, 140
55,831
138, 555
55,065

Others

C---31.-Imports of north China aluminous shale into Japan proper and Korea, annually 1985-45, monthly
1942-45

1, 157

14,444
12, 257
II, 757
6,075

[945: I and
11. __ - - --

9, 192
46, 663
117,269
202,081
194,729
58,059
274,449
594, 589
287, 782
1,8[0

Indochina

1 By wet weight 1936-41; by dry weight 1942-45. Moisture content approximately 10 percent.
Source: Bureau ot Mines, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, November 1945.

----69
74
66
69

Malaya (Johore
and Malacca)

Bintan

1944:

III. ____

Palao

1936-------------- ________________________ _
1937 ______________________________________ _

Period 1

L ______

C---30.-Annual imports of bauxite to Japan proper and Formosa, by region of origin: 1985-451

Total alumina

100
~,424

7,434
13, 167
31,497
48,274
65, 196
97,487
151,883
226, 181
318,491
225,211
16,219

Production of
aluminum ingot

Imports

Total aluminum
supply

C---32.-StockB of bauxite, aluminous 8hale, alumina, and primary aluminum ingot in Japan proper,
Form08a and Korea, 1941-45
lIn metric tons]

19
1,002
3, 166
5,707
13,979
20, 736
29,559
40,863
71,740
103,075
141,084
l10,398
6,64'7

3,549
5,227
10,949
10,241
13,701
23,847
36, 701
na
na

2,000
3,000
4,205
1,070

3,568
Date l
6,229
14,115
15,948 1941 December ____
27,680 1942 March _______
June _________
44,583
September ___
66,260

December ____
os
os 19'43 March _______
June _________
105,075
September ___
144,084

114,603
7,717

data obtained from the Bureau oC Mines, Ministry at Commerce and IndUS'
try, November 1945. Import data before 1940 were obtained trom the Ligbt
Metals Control Association, and after 1941 were estimated by the Bureau of
Mines.

1 End

Batui.te ,

254, 740
191, 174
172,620
183, 247
209,427
209,607
206,287
201,648

Alnminous
shale

3,650
6,520
1, 522
8,766
9,572
11,855
13,844
13,635

Alnmina

~f1

5, 500 ------4, 190

7,000
7,293
8,100
2,051 10, 900
3,002 12,500
2,897 10,400
3,005
8,000
22,256
5, 500

at month.

Held in Japan proper and Formosa.

ReId in Japan proper and Korea.
'Includes stocks at all reduction plants and in the hands of the Imperial
I

Date I

Bauxi~~

1943 December ____ 296,981

1944 March _______ 238,471
June _________ 176,241
September ___ 36, 196
December ____
2,651
1945 March _______
5,233

Aluminous
shale I

19,474
20, 692
36, 109
37, 664
32, 061
38, 767
June __________
------- 55, 168
August. _____
--------- 35, 7C5

Alumina

Primary
. ingot f,

---- - - 19, 331

19,525
10,491
11,376
4,227
1,543
998
4, 659

4,800
3, 700
9,700
6,900
4,700
5, 300
5, 700
4, 129

Light Metals Control Company (Teikoku Keiklnroku Tosei Kabusbiki

KlliBha), but excludes stocks held.t fabricating plants,

Source: Light Metals Control Association (Okeiklnzoku Tosei KaO,

November 1945.

121

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I

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ttl

?"m

S:S'

~
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~~~_.J:o._CI:I_o)~_t.j!-,:-:-J'""'
~ ~ ;: ~ g; ~ <;'l ~ ~ g g

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po _'" 5" .!""

g g; ~ ~ ~ g g g
00 ........ '" 00 ... ....

,
II

p.g:~

~~

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tQ

~i
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:b

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g
;
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ApPENDIX TABLE

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'"

-::I

~:e~gg~g~~8g8

S'

g.

r-+ r-+

~.,p...

I--I~"

a--e [a

;i

99:'1.t1".tI"5".!'>.!"".!"".!"".!""

0)
H

1-3

I::

g.~~~

~I

I-'

J-I.

E.'-"p"

~~@
~
a,.,.!";;

~~~

t-j

~~

a : a[ : ,
I(~?
~
\

::'

Oc:nCJt-lOlOOOOOO"

So

~.':;Jag
'0
S- ~.

~~

1--4~1--I

erD~(I!:
"1.~;

~
z

!(ag.
p.

c:.n

'll.e.l::e

'"d

Seg,

:fs-

~~
~ ~~i

~a: s.... '8::

~~

s::

~~~~
hi! C"

~
~

~~i
~
Po ~~ [I:>

<:+

...0

Po

h:)

...h:)
C';l

...

...... ...... CI!I

5 JJ
t-.:)

_00

......

!oI:Io
_CJ1

t.:) 0

~~g~

......
CI!I 0) CI!I CI3

_co ~ ...Ct ~

&;

...... co 00

~~~~

----

_00

.....:r

h:) to..:)

t-.:I

to..:)

~ ;-J .f- $J
O";l

s-'2

e-,

....

Ct ......

~~Sf8

C-35.-Summary of copper refining capacity, and of supply in Japan proper, fiscal year. 1935-45
(In metdc ton,)
Ore (copper content)

Refining

Blister copper

Electrolytic copper

Old

capaclty 1

Period

end of
(year)
(1)

1935 ______________
1936 ______________
1937 ______________
1938 ______________
1939 ________ ~----1940 ______________
1941 ______________
1942 ______________
1943 ______________
1944 ______________
1945 (first que.rter) __

(78,240)
(78,240)
(84,240)
(84,240)
(87,600)
(134,000)
(135,000)
(135,000)
(150,600)
(150,600)
(150,600)

Produc
tion I

Imports

Total

(2+3)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Produc-tiona

Imports~

(5)

(6)

(5+6)

Productiona

Imports'

(8+9)

scrap 7
(copper
content)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

Total

--- - ----

(38,414)
ne. (38,414) (50,772) 1,409 (52,181)
ne. (37, 702) (49,088) 2,518 (51,606)
(37,702)
ne. (36,778) (54,796) 3,005 (57,801)
(36,778)
(37, 533)
ne. (37,533) (61,136) 3, 587 (65,723)
(36,742)
ne. (36, 742 (61,389) 6, 542 (67,931)
73,866
ne. (73,866) 92,011 7,997 100,008
76,504 11(11,670) (88, 174) 91,674 5,352 97,026
11,378 92,446 97,302 4,511 101,813
81,068
94,575
11,508 106, 083 110,608 4,619 115,227
81,433
5, 503 86, 936 87, 172 5,106 92,278
(6,213) ---------- (6,213) (14,721) 554 (15,275)

Total

Stocks S
(electrolytic)

Exports'

(14)

(12)

(10+11-12)
(13)

--(54,422)
(59,170)
(63,836)
(69, 999)
(70,142)
108,216
103,387
105, 137
122,860
99,205
(16,556)

(60,897)
(51,709)
(72,278)
(102,306)
(120,251)
(119,392)
(38,486)
(690)
(2)
3,910

---------

(115,319)
(110,879)
(136,114)
(172,305)
(190,393)
(227,608)
(141,873)
(105,827)
(122,862)
103, 115
(16,556)

Total aVailable 10

----

ne.
ne. 18,052 (97,267)
ne.
ne. 12, 758 (98,121)
ne.
ne. 12,941 (123,173)
ne.
ne. 7,026 (165,279)
ne.
ne. 8,675 (181, 718)
26, 725
ne. 7, 765 (246,578)
27,869 105,018 4, 649 (164,913)
14, 789 53,086 2,537 (118,079)
12,000 58,234
996 (133,866)
8,923 31,554 1,374 110,664
ne. .. 31,071
25 (16,531)
-

Una" Indicates data not 8vailablert

Of ( ) " .Figures in parentheses indicate 8. total for. which one or more of the constituent figures
are not available.
1 Inlormation on all major plants not available until 1943. 1943-45 figures exclude only the
capacity of plants producing electrolytic copper as a secondary product.
I Information 1935-39 and 1945 avai1able only for 11 mines, contributing approximately 50
percent to the total product.
S Data on all companies available only for 1943-44. Estimates for 2 plants included in 1940-42
figures. 1945 figure excludes 1 plant for Which data is not available and includes two plants whose
data probably contains July and August production.
4 Production 01 the Cbinnampo smelter in Korea which was shipped immediately to the
Saganoseki refinery in Kyushu. No other information on imported blister available.
a Data available on al1 major plants for 1942-44 only. Production estimates included in 1940-41
data. Data prior to 1942 excludes scrap renned on to11 for the army and navy. 1942-44 on tn
determinant part at such scrap is excluded. 1945 data includes 2 plants whose figures probably
includeluly and August production .

....

Imports 1935-41 adjusted to flscal from calendar year data.

., Source: Mining Control Association (Kazan Tosei Kai). Includes only scrap suitable for
direct use by foundry or rolling mills.
Includes Metals Distribution Control Co. (Kinzoku Haikyu Tosei Kaisha), army, and navy
stocks. Army and navy ftgures are estimated. Metals Distribution Control Company figure
for end of year 1941 is as of 1 February 1942.
t Exports purport to be all shapes and fabricated products sent to points outside Japan proper.
The 1942-44 planned allocations for export are much hIgher.
10 Excludes stocks and an indeterminant part of production on toll for the army and navy
which was not reported.
11 Information available on imports from Formosa and China. were for the fourth quarter only.
11 Stocks on hand 15 August 1945.
Sources: Company reports; Bureau of Mines, Ministry of Industry and Commerce; Bur~au
of Taxation, Ministry of Finance; Metals Distribution Control Company (Kinzoku Haikyu
Tosei Kaisba)j Mining Control Association (Kazan Tosei Kai). November 194t1.

ApPENDIX TABLE

C-36.-lmports of Copper ore and ore concentrates by country of origin, Japan proper, fiscal years 1941-44
[In metric tons of copper content]

Country of origin

1941

Philippines _____________________________________________ _
Forrnosa ________________________________________________ _
China __________________________________________________ _
South Arnerica __________________________________________ _
Canada _______________ " ________________________________ _

1944

2,336
3,391
6,614
1,213
1 (436)
4, 537
4, 780
4, 236
1 (12)
52
114
54
5,307
3,398 ______________________ _
3,579 ________________________ - __________ _

Total ____________________________________________ .
.. ( )" Figures in parentheses indic~ totals for which one of more of the
constituent figures are not available.

1943

1942

(11,670)

11,508

11,378

oSo8ooo~
~OOOOOC\1

~1O~1"""tC\lm

o-ocLi~-.:tI-""""
...-I

1"""t "-"....-I......t

~~

~~~~~~~~~~~
~lC-.::tt~C\1"""
ri t6

5,503

r,o- ,-;"'

d" c

.................. C"IC'I

Source: Bureau of Mines, Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Novem.

ber 1945.

Data includes only the lourth quarter 01 the fiscal year.

ApPENDIX TABLE

C-37.-Stocks of refined copper, Japan proper, 1941-45

[In metric tons]

31
1942 __________________________________ _
1943 __________________________________ _
31
1944 ____ . _. ___________________________ _
31
31
1945 __________________________________ _
15 August 1945 __________________________________ _
~arch

~arch

~larch

Navy

Army

"''""''''
c

Total

42,500
34, 500
30,500
27,000
27, 378

20,000
10,000

'42,518
8,586
27,734
5,554
3, 693

~arch

1 Metals

~~~~~~~~~!;;

Metals Distribution
Control Company

Date

105,018
53,086 ,
58,234
32,554
31,071

ClSa!oSaSas~Q)C:OCO~CO

"'''''''''''''".,''''''0
.... ''c:o ...... cot--~C't)
......- ..0

~-

C'I- ~- C\1-

,...-.(,....., ...... C\1 ...... __

~

Distribution Control Company as of 1 February 1942.

Source: Reports from Metals'Distribution Control Company (Kinzoku Haikyu Tosei Kaisha), army, and navy, November 1945. Army and navy figures
were estimates.
ApPENDIX TABLE

C-38.-Imports of electrolytic copper by country of orig-in, Japan proper, fiscal years 1935-44'
[In metric tons]
Country of origin

Year
America

1935_______________
59,753
1936 ______________
47,902
1937_______________
54,221
1938_______________
72,049
1939_______________117, 204
1940_______________
104,908
194L______________
21,153
1942_______________
152
1943_______________ ____________
1944_______________ ____________

Manchukuo

na
na
na
na
75
122
251
416

na
1

na
na
na
na
na
na
na

57
31
122
122
93
31

na

Total

Others

na
na
na
na

1,087
3, 776
17,935
30, 135

2,879
14,331
17,082

na
11a
na
na

122 ------------ -----------na ------------ -----------3, 90~ ------------ ------------

"na" Indicates data not avaIlable.

U( )" Figures in parentheses indicate totals for which one or more of the
constituent figures are not available.

124

ChUe

Canada

China

2
5

(60,897)
(51,709)
(72,278)
(102,306)
(120,251)
(119,392)
(38,486)
(690)
(2)

3,910

88888888888
coo.
cO
C'tO"J~C't~'0:t4'0:t4'0:t4C()oooo

'o:t4- 0) (J)- (J)- 0)

...

CfJ-

?"""tH~crqcrq~~CfJlQlQ1Q

"-'''-'''-'''-'''-'''-'

........

Years 1935-41 adjusted to fiscal from calendar year data.

Source: Bureau of Mines, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Novem-

ber 1945.

125

ApPENDIX TABLE

---...-...--...-...---...r.. .....
C'l':tC'l':tC'l':t~~q:)aoooO)
ao~CQC'l':tooCQCQo)

o o .....

aoI:COO~C'lU')I:'-o"4'lCO.-40

...: 0"

U')-

eO

~- r:- ~ 0- ~ ..: "4'1-

-~~~~~eeee--

C-40.-Summary of Japanese zinc capacity and supply, fiscal years 1935-45

[In metric tons]

Capacity 1

Supply

Japan proper

~~~~~~~~~~gj
oot--lr.>~O

..q;-

eO ~...

--_

0)

Japan proper

Ores and concentrates (zinc contents)

Fiscal year

~ ~

Distilled 1

C'\IC't~C'I':Ir:

Electrolytic I

Rorea
Electrolytic

Total (1+2+3)

(2)

(3)

(4)

..................

(I)

-1935_______________

~~~~~~~~~~~

34,200
34,200
40,200
41, 100
44, 100
46,100
46,400
47,800
51,800
51,800
51,800

1936 _______________
1937_______________
1938_______________
1939________._______
1940_______________
1941 _______________
1942_______________
1943 _______________
1944_______________
1945 _____ c _________

(10,000,
13,000
19,000
19,000
22,600
22,600
22,600
25,900
38,500
43,000
43,000

C't- .....C'I

(44,200)
47,200
59,200
60, 100
66,700
68,700
77,400
82, 100
98,700
103,200
103, 200

------------------------------------------------.--------

------------

8,400
8,400
8,400
8,400
8, 400

Production a

Imports 4

(5)

(6)

Total (5+6)
(7)

(12,913)
(12,079)
(4,970)
(4, 162)
(3,525)
(8,400)
(6,815)
(6,082)
8, 641
7, 187
(2,527)

(18,536)
(25,710)
(30,353)
(34,284)
(30,901)
56,679
63, 785
85, 305
94, 105
74,939
(10,829)

(31,449)
(37,789)
(35,323)
(38,446)
(34,426)
(65,079)
(70,600)
(91, 387)
102, 746
82, 126
10 (13,356)

Supply-Continued
Japan proper-Continued

~~~~~~~;;;l:;~~
<O<OC'I
~~-C'l-

Total slab
zinc produc

SIabzinc

Flsoal year
Production

--...--....-.......-......-...---....-...

Distilled I

CXlet:l<:OC"ICO~.-4~~O':I~
r:~~OOOO'.:lC'lC'l';)U')C"IC"I

(8)

Electr~

Rorea slab
zinc production,7 electro-

Old scrap

year end

(13)

(14)

Total
(8+9+10)

lytle

Import
(IO)

(11)

(12)

32, 763
42,030
37,086
28,012
58,220
23,473
6,319
3,409
3,441
671
ns

(62,970)
(78,998)
(86,872)
(82,215)
(109,476)
83, 576
68,211
64,782
65,775
61,628
( 11,-913)

-------------------------------------------------------

Stocks at
B

Totalim

tion, Japan
proper and

ports to

Korea
(8+9+12)

(6+IO)

(15)

(16)

(l7)

(45,676)
(54,109)
(42,056)
(32,174)
(61,745)
(31,873)
(13,134)
(9,491)
12,082
7,858
(2,527)

(62, 970)
(78,998)
(86,872)
(82,215)
(109,476)
83,576
70, 314
71, 615
74,859
67,923
(13,533)

Japan
proper

Total zinc
available 0

(11+12+13)

lytle'
(9)

C'I:I.-I.-4~t-.C'llQNet:lC"Ic:D

------ ...........
.....- c6 co- aQ

r-: 0- 0" 00 00 co- .........

~~

-~~

1935 _____________ 26, 295 (3, 912)

1936 _____________
29,049 (7,919)
1937 _____________ 38, 137 (11,649)
1938 _____________
41,312 (12,891)
1939 _____________ 39, 926 (11,330)
1940 _____________ 48,341 11,762
1941 _____________ 48, 548 13, 344
1942 _____________ 47,577 13, 796
1943 _____________
44,827 17,507
1944 __________ " __ 43,284 17, 673
1945 _____________ 11(8,966) 1l(2,947)

4lna" Indicates data not available.

u( )" Figures in parentheses indicate totals for which one or more of the
constituent figures are not avaUa.ble.
1 Some zinc capacity in lead and copper smelters not included, but quan
titles are very small.
J The Hibi refinery was purchased from the Showa Mining Co. by the
Mitsui Mining Co. in 1M3. Capacity and production data for prior years
Is Incomplete. Rerer to appendix tables 83 and 85.
J Prior to 1940 only production of Hosokura and Kamioka mines reported.
Production from other mines, which was appreclable,'not available.
Prior to 1943 only Imports of Mitsui Mining Co. are Included, but these
represent more than 76 percent of total Imports.
I Prior to 1942 small quantities produced a.t.lead and copper smelters not

Included.
After 1940 principally from French Indo China. Exports of 269 tons In
19 and 35 tons In 1945 have been disregarded.

126

714928-46----10

2, 103
6,833
7,452
5,475
111,527
7

ns
ns
ns
-------ns
-------ns
-------ns
--------------- 26,285
-------- (11,450)
1,632 36, 797
820 33,614
93 "42,975
---------------

(30,207)
(36,968)
(49,786)
(54,203)
(51,256)
60, 103
63, 995
68, 206
69, 786
66,432
(13,440)

EstImated from Japan Mining Co. information for years 1941. 1942, an'tl

1945.
Stocks held by Metals Distribution Control Co. and by Japanese Army
and Navy. Refer to appendix table 90.
, Stocks not included.
10 First quarter of fiscal year only.
11 First and second quarters of ft.scal year except that production of certain
smelters for certain months in second quarter not included. Refer to appen ..
dIx tables 85 and 89.
11 At end of fiscal year except for 1945 which was 15 August .
I

Source: Japan proper data mainly from Bureau of Mines, Ministry of

Commerce and Industry, November 1945. Korea data from Japan Mining
Co., November 1945. Stock data from Metals Distribution Control Co.
(Kinzoku Ha.ikyu Tosei Kaisha), Japanese Army, and Japanese Navy,
November 1945. For other specific sources, refer to the appendix tables 83,
M. 85, 89, and 90, giving further details of above data.

127

ApPENDIX TABLE C-4l.-Summary oj total Japane8e tin-producing capacity and 8upply, fi8cal years 1935-J,5

ApPENDIX TABLE C-43.-Coal production, fiscal years 1938-44

[In metric tons of metal content1

[In thoU8lUlds of metric tons]

Capacity

'_.

Supply (production, imports, sorap. and stock piles)

Year

Oro and concentrates

Fiscal year

Smelter I Refinery ,
(2)

(1)

--.
1935 _____
1936 _____
1937 _____
1938 _____
1939 _____
1940 _____
194L ____
1942 _____
1943 _____
1944 _____
1945 11 ___

Reflned tin
Total

Production

Iniports

(3+4)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Crude tin
production a

(6)

- - ---nB
nB
nB
no.
na
(2,400)
(3, 600)
(3,600)
(3,600)
(3, 600)
(3,600)

(2,400)
(2,400)
(2,400)
(3,000)
(3,000)
(3,000)
(3, 000)
(3, 000)
(3,000)
(1,000)
(I,OQO)

na
(920)
, (1,516)
na
, (1,605)
na
na
(1,517)
na
(1,423)
na
'(1,463)
(1,277) 1,636
1,917
996
1, 120
586
380 ------- (49) --------

(920)
(1,516)
(1,605)
(1,517)
(1,423)
(1,463)
(2,913)
2,913
1,706
380
(49)

na
nB

no.
no.
no.
2,039
4,079
3, 626
1,787
536
66

Scrap pro-

Total
Production
(7)

; Imports
(8)

-duetioD'

(7 +8)
(9)

(10)

' (2,095) 74,251 (6,346)

, (1,770) 74,718 (6,488)
'(1,600) 74,331 (5,931)
'(1,523) 78,744 (10,267)
'(1,398) 77,964 (9,362)
'(1,453) 710,868 (12,321)
' (1,911) 75,480 (7,391)
3,816 11,055 14,871
1,815 26, 766 28,581
772 16,965 17, 737
(61) 3,007 (3,068)

Stock

piles

(ll)

----

no.
nil
no.
nil
no.
nil
na
nil
na
nil
na
nil
na
nil
87,322
na
134 . 9, 316
95 10 13,053
na 1'10,155

H( )" Indicates 8- total that Is incomplete because not all constituent figures
are available.
1 This represents only the lkuno swelter of the Mitsubisbi Mining Company, which is the only signiflcant tin smelter in Japan.
2 This represents only the Mitsubishi Copper Refinery at Osaka, which is
the only large tin refinery in Japan.
a Includes small amounts of low grade refined tin.
4 Old scrap estimated by the Japanese Bureau of Mines to be allocated as
scrap on the estimate that 30 percent of total scrap is refined again.
5 Sum of the refined metal stocks held by the Metals Distribution Control

Company (Kinzoku Haikyo Tosei Kaisha), Army, and Navy. The army

and Davy figures are estimated by those organlzations. The stock for Feb.
ruary 1942 includes Bemy and navy figures for Mar. 31, 1942.
o Includes only the Akenobe mine estimated at two~third.s total production.
7 Calendar year. No imports of refined. metal January-Maroh 1942.
8 As of February 1942.

As 01 Mar. 31, 1943.

10 As of Mar. 31, 1944.
11 April I-August 15 except for capacity which is annual.
" As 01 Aug. 8, 1945.
Source: Bureau of Mines, Ministry of Commerce and Industry; Mitsu
bishi Minillg Company; Metals Dlstribution Control Company (Kinzoku
Haikyu Tosei R:aisha), November 1945.

ApPENDIX TABLE C-42.-Summary of the coal position in Japan proper, fiscal years 1931-45
[In thousands of metric tonsl

1931 ___________________________
1932 ___________________________
1933 ___________________________
1934 ___________________________
1935 ___________________________
1936 ___________________________
1937 ___________________________
1938 ___________________________
1939 ___________________________
194O _________ _________________
c
___________________________
1942 ___ . _______________________
1943 ___________________________
1944 __________ ________________
1~41

1945:1 __________________________
11 _________________________

Production

Imports

Exports

-----27, ~87
28,053
32,524
35,925
37, 762
41,80il
45,258
48,684 .
52,409
57,309
55,602
54, 178
55, 538
49,335

3,110
3, 271
4,275
5,072
5,381
6, 163
6,360
6,493
8,285
10, 123
9, 585
8,748
6,029
3, 135

1,983
1,847
2, 128
1,676
1,765
1,988
1,904
1,725
1,689
1,491
1,739
1,596
1,100
714

10,877
62
188
5, 238 ------------ ------------

Production plus
net imports
minus exports

Consumption

Stooks at end 01
year

-----

29,114
29,477
34, 671
39,321
41, 378
45,978
49,714
53, 452
59,005
65,941
63,448
61,330
60,467
51,756

nB
na
' 31,466
35,168
42, 707
47,245
51, 157
55,313
61,254
66,542
63,055
61,992
59,740
50,471

1,376
1,237
944
657
698
1,128
1,038
1, 145
1,473
1,762
3,326
3, 159
~, 816
4,031

11,003
5,238

9, 536
5,050

4,036
3,731

Attention iH"1IalIed to the fact that the figures in the above table do not

obvious discrepancies existing in the data, the officials stated that the figure'

balance and that in some years the amount consumed is actu&lly greater
than the supply avallable. The data used were furnished by two ditferent

on consumption undoubtedly overstated the amounts of coal actually used.

J Coal consumed at coal mines not included.

lapanese agencies, the Coal Control Association and the lapan Coal Com
pany, which, in turn, secured their statistics from many dUferent sources.
Although several interviews with responsible officials failed to reconcile the

128

1938-- ________________
1939--- _______________
1940- _________________
1941---- ______________
1942 __________________
1943 __________________
1944 __________________

fl

48, 684
52,409
57,309
55,602
54,178
55,538
49,335

Korea

Karafuto

3,435
4,993
6,465
6,471
(910
4,979
2,678

Manchulruo

3, 419
5,171
6,096
6,803
6, 645
6, 574
7,037

Formosa

15,988
19,496
21, 132
24,141
24, 169
25,390
25,627

na" Indicates data not available.

2, 199
2,608
2,827
2, 770
2,311
2,324
1,653

North ChinaInner Mongolla

Central
China

na
na
469
795
929
878
874

9,959
15, 272
17,966
23,968
24,878
21, 735
20,333

Total

na
na
112,264
120, 556
118,020
P7,418
107, 537

areas oompiled from data submitted by the lapan-Manchulruo Trading

Company (Nichiman 8hoJi Kabushikl Kaisha) , the lapan, Manchulruo,
China Coal Federation (Nichl. Manshl Sekitan Remmel), and the Greater
East Asia Ministry (Dai Toa 8ho), November 1945.

Sources: Figures for Japan proper compiled from data submitted by the Coal
Oontro] Association (Sekitan Tosei Kai); tlgures for production in other

ApPENDIX TABLE C-44.-Coal imports into Japan proper, by source, fiscal year8 1939--J,5
[In thousands 01 metric tons]

"na" Indicates data not ava.ila.ble.

Years

Japan proper

Sources: Compiled from data submltted by the Coal Control Association

(Sekitan To..i Kai) and the lapan Coal Company (N!hon Sekitan Kaisha),

Year

Ka.rafuto

Korea

Manchukuo

North China
Inner Mongolia
a

Formosa

Indochina,
etc.

1939 ______________ _
1940 ______________ _
194L _____________ _
1942 ______________ _

2,5\2
3,328
3,310
2, 198

1,011
1,467
1,078
910

1943:
First halL _____ _
Second haIL ___ _

1,414
236

319
177

293
5
121 ------------

1,967
75
1,422 ------------

TotaL ______ _

1,650

496

414

3,389

28
41
27
30
14
16
15
26
10
12
18
15

50
69
54
45
37
53
56
39
49
55
41
13

1944:
ApriL ____________________ _
11ay___________
104
June _______ .___
314
J111y___________
348
August_________
35
September______
6
October ___________________ _
November _________________ _
December _________________ _
JBnuary ___________________ _
February __________________ _
11arcli ____________________ _
TotaL ______ _

255
263
39
175

848
773
687
642

----------------------------------

_____ r

_____

------------

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

3,042
3,800
4, 120
4,539

185
185
193
174
128
123
156
127
92
84
34
34

587
492
351
284

75

Total

8,285
10, 123
9, 585
8,748
4,073
1,956
6,029

-----------------------------------------------_._-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

263
399
588
597
214
198
227
192
151
151
93
62

252

561 ------------

1,515 ------------

3,135

1945:
ApriL ____________________ _
11ay ______________________ _
June ______________________ _

15
12
5

12 -----------16 -----------8 ------------

53 -----------35 -----------32 ------------

80
63
45

TotaL __________________ _

32

36 ------------

120 ------------

188

807

8ouroo: Compiled by the lapan Coal Company (Nlhon Sekitan Kaisba), November 1945.

November 1945.

129

ApPENDIX TABLE

C-45.-Con8umption of coal in Japan proper, by industries, excluding consumption by coal mines, fiscal
years 1933--1,Q
[In thousands ot metric tons]

1933

Industry

TotaL ______ - -- - - - -Shipbuilding _____ - - - - - - - - -Machinery manufacture_ - -Metal mining and refining ___
Gas and coke ______________
Electric power _____________
Chemical industry - - - - - - - -Ceramics, including cement_ ..
Fibre and textiles __________
Foodstuffs __ - - -- - -'- - - - - - -Sait ______________________

1937

1938

1939

1940

1941

1942

.1943

1944

1945
(Apr.1uly)

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --- - - - - - -

l ron and steel:

For coke_ - - - - - - - - - - - -For fueL ______________

1936

1935

3,089
975

4, 130 4,339 4,941 5,573 6,718 7, 997 8,972 8,424 7, 938 6,190 1,255
1,129 1,790 1,698 2,413 3,339 3,442 4, 199 4,891 5, 764 5,051 1, 165

104
345
197
1., 881
1,881
2, 673
2,871
3,274
2,09'8
776
3,408

408
517
2,214
2,876
2,506
3,686
5,449
1,370
753
3, 722

-- ------ ------ - - - - - - - - - --- - - - - - - - - - -13,315

13, 702 11,241 2,420
4,064 5,259 6, 129 6,639 7, 986 10,057 11,439 13, 171
---=
r
=
=
=
=
=
=
446
148
281
230
193
190
166
167
164
128
120

Railroads. _______ ---------Liquid fueL _______________ --------

~~:i:;;,;;I
-h;';";;, -;;'-1
cooking _________________
Government factories and
miscellaneous ___ - - _- _- - -Army _______ - - - -- - - - - - - - -Navy _______ - - - - - -- - -'- - - -Ship bunkering ____________

rm

1,780
857
3,945
5,898
7, 150
4,665
6, 724
1,503
625
5, 568
387
64
1,367 1,430 1,527 1, 6p6 2,206

570
606
2,342
3,206
3,295
3,949
6,384
1,528
731
4,008

699
725
2,564
3,747
3, 958
4,287
6,968
1,428
702
4, 126

1, 111
881
3,219
4,329
4, 770
4,261
6,919
1,437
579
4,442

1,514
664
3, 685
6,200
6,417
4,114
6,420
1,541
718
5,076

1,931
952
4,080
4,202
6,572
3,779
4,926
1,527
355
5, 105
603
1.780

1,966
778
3,946
5,261
5,803
3,457
3,080
1,218
374
6,300
1,012
1,358

2,178
714
3,804
5,077
6, 158
2, 929
2,109
958
362
6,960
1,234
1,035

472
2,179
157
603
506
3,358
3,705
588
4,715 1,057
50 7
2,029
26 o
l,026
187
684
331
83
8,086 2,716
543
1,573
88
439

3,781 4,043 4,075 3, 648 3,103 3,225 3,361 2,416 2,152 2,026

3,859

56 4

37 7
374 1,090 1,366 1,327 2,005 1,482 1, 135
43o
1,731 1,368
e,931
887 1,279 1,879 2, 290 3,325 1,830 1,833 1,480
726
659
36o
241
4,r,35 4,498 4,487 4,701 4,454 3, 722 3,804 2,951 2,517 2, OlD 1,047
-------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --- Tota1 _______ - _- - - - -- 31,466 39,687 43,955 47,508 51,383 58,096 63, 622 60, 140 58, 797 56,709 47,471 11,70 4
514

523

408

Source: Complied by the1.pan Coal Company (Nihon Sekltan Kalsha), November 1945.

,,, ,,,

,,,
,,
,,,
,,

,,
,,,
,,
,,
,

, ,

:, :,
:, :,
.:...;
:
.,., :,
.s~]
"''''......
....
"0
~~~

,,

s:l

~
130

131

\'1I

ApPENDIX TABLE

G-47.-Interisland movement of coal to Honshu, by source and type of transportation, fiscal years 1941-J,Ij

APPENDIX TABLE

G-48.-Coat mini'i

[In thousands 01 metrio tons]

From Hokkaido

labor force, production, and output per employee per year, in Japan Proper,' Great
Britain,. and the United State8,' 1941-45

Grand total

From Kyushu

1941

Year
Water

Rail

--1941 __________________________
1942______ - -- - -- --- - - - - - - - - --1943:

I __________________________
-~--------------------11
111 _______________________
IV ________________________
TotaL _____ - _- __________

Rail

Total

7,329
8, 188

13,379
12,056

444
1,.860

13,823
13,916

20, 695
20, 127

1,569
1, 142
1,595
1,886

117
120
129
236

1,686
1,262
1,724
2, 122

2,811
2,565
2,394
2, 366

866
913
1, 268
1,355

3,677
3,478
3,662
3, 721

4,380
3, 707
3,989
4,252

6,794

10,136

4,402

14,538

602

=
. 668
348
180
193
410
340
378
449
407
336
326
446

---- ---- ----=

77
125
118
124
157
140
135
141
110
83
86
138

745
473
298
317
567
480
513
590
517
419
412
584

762
624
568
557
513
504
567
647
572
414
463
447

446
489
487
460
427
459
427
461
487
488
459
447

1,208
1,113
1,055
1,017
940
963
994
1,108
1,059
902
922
894

457
1,977

21, 152
22,104

983
1,033
1,397
1, 591

5,363
4,740
5,386
5,843

1,434

5,915

6,638

5,537

12, 175

576
595
397
350
240

367
260
191
189
86

416
467
393
311
120

---1,692

466

2, 158

1,093

1,707

21,332

Employees (1,000)
Japan:
Japanese workers ____________ _
Korea.ns anq others ___________ _
TotaL ____________________ _
Great Britain ____________________ _
United States ____________________ _

Annual production (in thou8ands of

1942

1943

"---------

279
60

273
102

----------

339

~75

----------

698
457

1944

1945

265
128

266
150

261
151

393

416

412

709
462

7,08
416

710
393

na
na

55. 6
209. 6
466.4

54. 2
206.9
528. 7

55.5
197.6
535.5

49.3
191. 0
562.1

32.2

164
300
1,021

144
292
1,144

141
279
1,287

119
269
1,430

~---------

----------

,:tric tons)

=~

523
614
605
584
584
599
562
602
597
571
545
585

1,953
1,586
1,353
1,334
1,507
1, 443
1,507
1,698
1, 576
1,321
1,334
1,478

783
727
584
500
206

825
720
450
464
326

534
602
531
386
120

1,359
1,322
981
850
446

2,800

2, 785

2, 173

4,958

=-=- =

458
118
460
135
138
259
275
75
.240 --------

5,004

--1,430
972
748
750
923
844
945
1,096
979
750
789
893

-------4,481

16, 328

1945:

Total ___________________

Total

--------- - -

13
117

6, 192

~:~~~~====::::::~===~==:=

ApriL _____________ . ______

May ___________ - -- - _______
June ___ . __________________
July ______________ - _______
August ____________________

Rail

- - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ----

June ______________________
July _________ -_ - __________
August ____________________
September _________________
October _______________ c ___
November _________________
December _________________
January ___________________
February __________________
March _________ - - - - _______
TotaL ________ -- - _______

Water

7,316
8,071

1944:

Total

Water

---- - - - - - - 11,119
6,971
18,090
---- = =

Japan __________________________ _
Great Britain ____________________ _
United States ____________________ _

----------------------------

na
na

Output per employee per year (in m "ic tons)

Japan ___________________________ _
Great Britain ______________ ~ _____ _
United States ____________________ _

-----------------

---------

" na" Indicates data not avallable.

Coal Control Association (Sekitan T 'i Kai), November 1945.
F1scal years. InclUdes aU employees engaged in nal mintng, as of end of
fiscal year, except 19461s as of April 30. Product 1 figures for 1945 are conversions to annual rate of production in first 6 mo hs.
I Source: "Statistical Digest, Ministry of Fue1 ~ t Power" J London 19.
Calendar years. Employment figures represent ,'erage number 01 wage.
1 Source:

78
na
na

earners on colliery books. Includes .saleable mined coal only. and omits
government strip-mining operations. ProdUction figures for 1944 are conversions to annual rate of prodUction in :first 6 months.
J Source. "Bituminous Coal. in 1944, including Lignite", United States
Bureau 01 Mines 1945. Calendar years. Employment figures represent
average number of men employed at active mines. Includes bttuminOU8
and lignite mining only, omitting antbracito.

- - - - ---- - - - - - - - -- - -

Sources: Compiled !rom data submitted by tbe Coal Control Association (Sekitan Tosei Kai) and tbe Japan Coal Company (Nibon Sekltan Kaisha),
November 1941i.
.

132

133

ApPENDIX

Oil and Chemical Tables

ApPENDIX TABLE

C-49.-Production, conBumption,' and imports of liquid fuels and lubricating oil, inner zone, 1931-194fj
[Thousands of barrels]

Production

Fiscal year, quarter

Total of 1m.
ported and
Relined stocks
refined
Imported Refined stocks Refined stocks Substitute
stocks
synthetic fueis (alcohol,
from crude fromplants
benzol, etc.)

1931 _____________________________
1932 ___________________________ ,_
1933 _____________________________
1934_____________________________
1935 _____________________________
1936 _____________________________
1937____ ________________________
1938_____________________________
1939_. ___________________________
194G_~ __________________~ ________
~

1941:
April to June _________________
July to September _____________
October to December __________
January to March _____________
1942:
April to June _________________
July to September _____________
October to December __________
January to March _____________
1943:
April to June _________________
July to September_____________
October to December - - - - - - - - -Jalluary to March _____________
1944:
April to June _________________
July to September_____________
October to December __________
January to March _____________
1945:
April to June _________________
July to September_____________

13,306
14,868
15,0.77
17, 181
20.,633
. 18,739
16,651
14,0.44
11,818
15, 110.

4,675
6,245
7,275
8, 955
10.,0.0.6
10.,337
12, 323
12,809
11,247
9,352'

2,645
1,041
1,0.52
50.4

3, 180.
3,619
3,850.
3,465

ning ot period

31
69
133
146

52
53
75
97
127
115
219
264
60.1
1,30.8

18,0.30.
21, 166
22,427
26,233
30.,766
29, 191
29,224
27,186
23,799
25,916

14, 930.
18,276
19,422
22,665
28, 592
27,699
29,927
27,951
25,261
28, 558

17,527
20.,586
23, 60.3
26,609
28,919
31,0.95
32,595
31,891
31, 156
29,680.

255
248
345
316

170.
140.
123
286

6,250.
5,0.48
5,3704,571

6,174
4,580.
5,248
6,646

28,0.36
28,0.14
28,348
28, 204

5,765
6,396
6, 742
6,891

25,883
24,315
22, 495
20.,371

-------------------

-------------------------------------

265
393
899
821

3,593
3,570.
3,223
3,60.7

289
372
384
358

310.
347
327
294

4,457
4,682
4,833
5,0.80.

885
1, 164
1,105
1,498

3,764
3, 869
3, 663
2,845

288
30.0.
130.
163

236
299
346
264

5,173
5,632
5,244
4, 770.

6,420.
7,861
6,937
6,562

18,488
17,0.67
14, 725
12,924
11,462
9,533
7, 683
5,944
4,751
2,836

893
881
799
761

-------------------

Fiscal year and quarter

1931 ______________________
1932 ______________________
1933 ______________________
1934 ______________________
1935 ______________________
1936 ______________________
1937 ______________________
1938 __________________ " ___
1939 ______________________
1940. _________________ - ____
1941:
April to June ___________
July to September ______
October to December ___
January to .March ______
1942:
April to June ___________

Imports
6,391
9,136.
10., 179
11,953
12,829
15, 996
20., 231
18,40.4
18,843
22,0.50.

2, 330.
2,140.
1,764
1,30.3

345
324
281
166

191
217
296
258

3, 759
3, 562
3, 140.
2,488

80.2
239

138
31

50.1
222

1,441
492

2,953
1,629

Indigenous Inventories
production ~
1,923
1,594
1,419
1,785
2,214
2,458
2,470.
2,465
2, 332
2,0.63

4,919
3, 699
3, 976
4,0.40.
3,845
5,0.0.1
10.,467
12,465
20.,242
19,901

126

518
492
478
453

20.,857
18,0.78
14, 650.
14,492

1, 133

430

12,346

3,0.0.4
---------------

Fiscal year and quarter

Imports

es
Indigenous Inventor!
production (beginning
of period)

--1942-Continued.
July to September ______ t," 861
October to December ___ 3,0.93
January to March ______ 2, 0.59
1943:
April to June ___________ 3,712
July to September ______ 2,264
October to December ___ - 2,546
January to March ______ 1,326
1944:
April to June ___________
994
July to September ______
224
October to December ___
423
January to March ______ -------1945:
April to June ___________ ------- July to September ______ ------

40.7
400
453

10,390.
8,748
7, 677

441
. 442
446
465

6,839
5, 55 7
4,83 9
3,51 2

419
386
379
40.1

2,35 4
1, 240.
59 4
49(}

406
40.3

195
193

Source: Japanese ArmY~Navy Oil Committee.

ApPENDIX TABLE

C-51.-Japanese import8 of crude and refined oils,' inner zone, 1931-44

[Thousands 01 barralsl

Fiscal.year and month

Crude 011

Aviation
gasoline

1931 _____________________________
6,391 ---------1932 _____________________________
9, 136 ---------1933 _____________________________
10, 179 --.-------1934_____________________________
11,953 ---------1935 _____________________________
12,829 ---------1936 __________
_______________
15,996 ---------1937 _____________________________
20.,231 ---------1938____________
18,40.4 ------------------------1939 ______ ______________________
18,843
440.
1940._ -----------.--------------22,0.50.
1,447
1941:
April to June _________________
346
3, 0.0.4
July to September _____________ -------._30.2
October to December __________ ---------566
January to March _____________
126
315
1942:
April to June _________________
1, 133
63
July to September _____________
1,861
63
October to December __________
3,0.93
377
January to March _____________
220.
2,0.59
1943:
April to June _________________
3, 712
252
July to September ________ . ____
465
2,264
October to December __________
40.9
2,546
January to March _____________
1,326
849
1944:
April to June ___________ _____
994
440.
July to September _____________
224
535
October to December __________
423
472
January t.o March ________ . ______________
440.
~--

5, 685
5,316
4, 723
3,677

1 Includes the following: A viat10n gasoline, motor gasoline, Diesel fuel, fuel oil and lubricating oil.

Source: Japanese Army-Navy Oil Committee.

Consumption

Totallnven
torles begin

TABLEG-5G.-JapaneBe importB, production and inventories of crude oil---inner zone, 1931-1,1;

. [Thousands of borrels)

Kerosene, gas oil, and misOBllaneous products are not included.

Souroe: Japanese ArmyNavy Oil C=lttee.

Motor

gasoline
2,640.
2,90.8
3,0.41
3,670.
3,988
4, 218
4, GIl
3,0.20.
1,966
4,279
364
366
30.9
10.1
20.2
261
258
258

Diesel fuel
7,275
8, 589
8,737
10, 748
13,859
12,0.93
10.,80.9
8, 634
7,760.
7,839

Fuel oil
3, 145
3,145
3,145
2,516
2,516
1,877
1,573
2,20.2
1,258
50.4

1,670. ---------126 - ---- - - -.-

---------- ------------------- ----------

Lubricating
011

243
226
154
247
270.
551
258
188
394
1,0.41

19,694
24,0.0.4
25,256
29, 134
33,462
34,735
36,882
32,448
30.,661
37,160.

265
247
177
88

5,649
1,0.41
1,0.52
630.

138 ---------138 ----------

1,398
2,254
3,992
2,880.

---------- ---------- ---------69 ------------------126

~G5

Total

158
227
163
13.1

267
220.
294
292

20.8
252
239
226

-------------------------------------

4,597
3,428
3,651
2,824

44
63
63
50.

94
126
126

315
157
138
271

-------------------------------------

1,887
1,10.5
1,222
761

----------

134

135

ApPENDIX TABLE C-52.-Japanese consumption of liquid fuels and lubricants--inner zone, 1931-45-Continued

ApPENDIX TABLE C-52.-Japanese consumption of liquid fuels and lubricants-inner zone, 1931-1,5
[TboU88llds of barrels]

Fiscal year and quarter

1931 _________________________
1932 _________________________
1933. ___________________ ____
1934_________________________
~

1935 __________ ~-------------1936 _________________________

1937_________________________
1938_____________ - - - ---- --- -1939_________________________
1940_________________________

Army

I Navy

145
151
189
189
201
252
315
472
566
572

Civilian

Total

38
44
63
94
94
126
126
189
189
377

189
315
315
315
377
377
440
440
503
566

7, 525
8,680
9,013
11,375
14, 622
13,036
12,080
11, 125
8,970
9, 252

7,752
9,039
9,391
11,784
15,093
13,539
12, 646
11,754
9,662
10, 195

905
895
755
633

94
126
126
201

189 2,434
220 1,024
220- 1,144
315
816

2,717
1,370
1,490
1,332

200
264
324
282

609
673
701
659

201
264
201
201

220
283
252
252

574
865
915
890

995
1,412
1,368
1,343

126
126
94
101

277
293
300
179

680
683
639
525

302
302
296
233

283
315
315
220

925
963
949
911

1,510
1,580
I, 560
1,364

252
252
233
170

63
63
63
63

99
70
47
41

414
.a85
343
274

252
252
239
126

157
157
157
126

579
482
281
118

988
891
677
370

283
94

63
31

50
56

396
181

113
38

126
94

113
94

352
226

Navy

145
157
189
189
208
283
377
472
503
629

6
296
377
6
314
629
692
9
387
13
391
755
428
19
881
22
557 1,006
22
714 I, 132
25
Q69 1,258
25 1,094 1,258
86 1,287 1,258

94
126
126
189
189
220
220
252
252
283

157
157
409
421

126
126
377
377

19
19
19
16

302
302
805
814

315
315
'315
315

428
447
509
566

377
409
503
535

15
820
15
871
9 1,021
13 1,114

Total

Fiscal year and quarter

Diesel fuel
Navy

Army

Civilian

Total

Army

3,628
4,701
4,795
4,629
6.464
6,015
7,522
6,326
4,595
6,,323

4,099
5,456
5,613
5, 573
7,534
7, 241
8,874
7,836
6,105
7,864

94
94
63
94

496
486
377
224

315
315
283
283

94
94
94
94

579
654
667
749

566
629
629
692

I, 154
1,292
1,300
1,444

277
264
245
245

755
679
'591
359

2 1,512
755
692 ------ 1,371
566 ------ I, 157
377 ------ 736
604
214

Civilian

- -- - - -- -- -- -- - - - -- -

1941:

April to June _____________

July to September ____ - -"'- October to December__ - ___
January to March _________

1942:

April to June _____________

July to September ________
October to December. _____
January to March _________

1943:

April to June _____________

July to September ________
October to December ______
January to March _________

9
9
4
3

1944:

April to June, ____________

July to September ________
October to December ______
January to March _________

1945:

April to June _____________

July to September ________

239
101

365 -----113 ------

136

Lubrlcatin6 00

Fueloll
Motor gasoline

Aviation gasoline

.
1931 _____________________________ ,
1932 ______________________________
1933 ______________________________
1934 ______________________________
1935 ______________________________
1936 ______________________________
1937 ______________________________
1938 ______________________________
1939 ______________________________
1940 ______________________________

Army

Navy

CivOIan

Total

Army

Navy

Civilian

Total

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
101

1,573
2,076
2,390
2,705
2, 956
3, 145
3, 522
3,837
4,403
5,221

124
109
225
492
552
1,191
1,994
1,492
1,064
1,405

1,697
2, 185
2,615
3,197
3,508
4,336
5,516
5,329
5,467
6,727

40
42
46
54
62
70
78
86
86
106

41
55
60
66
72
72
79
84
96
109

1,005
I, 185
1,310
1,600
1,895
1,884
2,020
1,893
2, 751
2,270

1,086
1,282
1,416
1,720
2,029
2,026
2,177
2,063
2,933
2,485

38
31
25
31

1,132
I, 132
I, 258
3,019

269
166
291
177

1,439
1,329
1,574
3,227

26
27
27
32

24
25
25
53

761
632
572
555

811
684
624
640

25
25
25
25

2, 516
2, 579
2,830,
2,893

292
276
247
423

2,833
2,880
3, 102
3,341

33
32
30
38

40
43
50
55

435
485
470
341

508
560
550
434

25
25
25
25

2,076
2,893
2,264
2, 139

451
855
576
520

2,552
-3,773
2,865
2,684

45
48
47
49

35
52
42
33

444
433
484
467

524
533
573
549

0
0
0
0

1,950
1,950
1,950
1,824

440
398
314
252

2, 390
2,348
2,264
2, 076

50
48
46
38

33
33
33
33

298
240
203
150

381
321
282
221

0
0

1,069
755

312
58

1,381
813

26
10

28
19

166
166

220
195

1941:

April to June ___________________

July to September ______________
October to December ____________
January to March ______________

1942:

April to June ___________________

July to September. _____________
October to December ____________
January to March ______________

1943:

April to June,. __________________

July to September ______________
October to December___________
January to March ______________

1944:

April to June ___________________

July to September ______________
October to December____________
January to March ______________

1945:

April to June ___________________

July to September ______________

"

Source: Japanese Army-Navy

on CommIttee.

137

ApPENDIX TABLE C-53.-Japane8e inventories oj liquid Juel, and lubricantB--inner zone,

ApPENDIX TABLE C-53.-Japane8e in~entorie8 oj liquid Juel8 and lubricant_inner zone, 191J1-45
[ThOU8&Ilds of bam>ls]

Date of inventory

Army

Diesel fuel

Motor gasoline

Aviation gasoline

1931-45-Continued
Lubricating 011

Fuel 011
Navy

Total

Civillim

Army

Navy

Civilian

Total

Da.te of inventory

Army
Apr.
Apr.
Apr.
Apr.
Apr.
Apr.
Apr.
Apr.
Apr.
Apr.
Apr.

July
Oct.
Jan.
Apr.

July
Oct.
Jan.
Apr.

July
Oct.
Jan.
Apr.

July
Oct.
Jan.
Apr.

July
Oct.

1, 193L _____
1,1932______
1, 1933 ______
1,1934______
1,1935 ______
1, 1936 ______
1, 1937______
1, 1938______
1, 1939 ___ - -1, 1940 ______
1, 194L _____
1, 194L _____
1, 194L _____
1, 1942 ______
1, 1942___ - -1, 1942~ _____
1,1942 ______
1, 1943 ______
I, 1943 ______
1, 1943 ______
1, 1943 ______
1,1944_" ____
1,1944 ______
1, 1944 ______
1, 1944 ______
1, 1945 __ . ___
1, 1945 ______
1, 1945 __ - - -1, 1945 ______

272
268
286
291
281
278
288

274
240
323
972
1,200
1,507
1,700
1,672
1, 603
1,595
1, 581
1,501
1,436
1,347
1, 125
1,107
1,013
716
682
830
704
635

Navy

Clvillan

Total

Army

Navy

Civillim

--- - - - - - - - - - - - -- - 430
443
455
551
630
656
625
614
601
945
1,995
2,200
a, 393
2, 551
2,539
2,476
2,228
2, 157
2,030
1,611
1,398
1,245
1,227
771
748
640
707
452
376

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
3
3
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
2
3
2

1
1
1
1
1

703
712
742
843
912
935
914
889
842
1,269
2,969
3,402
3,903
4,254
4,213
4,081
3,825
3, 741
3, 534
3,050
2,.748
2,372
2, 337
1, 786
1,465
1,323
1,538
1,157
1,012

126
126
126
126
126
189
189
189
232
252
315
377
503
629
692
818
912
944
1,006
1,038
1,069
1,101
1,126
989
868
723
660
315
196

94
101
94
94
88
94
107
107
101
107
94
94
88
88
88
82
63
63
50
50
44
38
31
31
25
25
19
19
13

172
191
212
248
306
342
620
418
428
413
352
333
320
320
252
201
138
75
113
126
109
94
97
75
50
47
40
31
23

:roW
392
418
432
468
520
625
916
714
781
772
761
804
911
1,037
1,032
1, 101
1,113
1,082
1, 169
1,214
1, 222
1,233
1,254
1,095
943
795
719
365
232

Army

Navy

Civilian

- - -- - -- - ---------:----------

-----------------------------------------_.
-------------------

------63
126
220
352
283
252
252
239
239
226
220
214
101

-- -----

315
315
315
315
377
377
377
377
440
440
503
516
516
440
315
283 .
252
189
126
126
94
94
82
63
57
44
31
19
13

31
31
61
96
168
220
504
464
220
189
176
170
182
179
164
170
182
195
192
182
189
176
170
145
126
94
63
53
30

Total

-346
346
376
411
545
597
881
841
660
629
679
686
698
619
479
516
560
604
670
591
535
522
491
447
409
358
308
173
43

1, 193L _______________________
1, 1932 ________________________
1,1933 ________________________
1, 1934 ________________________
1, 1935 ________________________
1, 1936 ________________________
1, 1937 ________________________
1,19'38________________________
1, 1939 ________________________
1, 1940 ________________________
1, 194L _______________________
July 1, 194L ____________ __________
Oct. 1, 194L _______________________
Jan. 1,1942 ________________________
apr. 1, 1942 ________________________
July 1, 1942 ________________________
Oct. 1, 1942 ________________________
Jan. 1, 1942 ________________________
apr. 1,1943 ________________________
July 1, 1943 ________________________
Oct. 1, 1943 ________________________
Jan. 1,1943 ________________________
apr. 1, 1944 ________________________
July 1, 1944 ________________________
Oct. 1, 1944 ________________________
Jan. 1, 1944 ________________________
Apr. 1, 1945 ________________________
July 1, 1945 ________________________
Oct. 1, 1945 ________________________
apr.
apr.
apt.
apr.
apr.
apr.
apr.
apr.
apr.
apr.
apr.

-------- 15,929
-------- 18,954
-------- 21; 841

11
8-

-------- 28,582
---_._--- 26,674

22
25
31
36
69
75
71
98

23,208
22,711
22,285
21,717
19,585
18,062
16,424
14,384
12,559
11,678
9,672
8,259
6,863
5,736
4,412
3,054
1,817
794
57

66
87
44
55
50
54
53
43
43
40
41
33
31
32
33
23
19
16

-------- 24,653

-------- 26,688
-------- 28,669

-------- 29,543

-------- 29,068

--------

---------------

--------------------------------------------------

--------------------------------------------------

73

15,940
18,962
21,863
24,678
26,719
28,705
29,612
29, 143
28, 653
26,772
23,281
22,777
22,372
21,761
19,640
18,112
16,478
14,437
12,602
11,721
9,712
8,300
6,896
5,767
4,444
3,087
1,840
813
- 73

126
126
252
315
302
289
277
258
239
214
201
189
170
151
132
107
82
84

63
63
63
75
82
82
82
82
94
126
126
126
126
126
132
141
148
157
167
176
18ti
195
207
186
167
145
139
134
130

83
85
127
134
141
151
190
222
126
112
94
93
86
92
85
75
94
92
107
101
121
113
107
101
123
129
125
110
50

146
148
190
209
223
233
272 .
304
220
238
346
345
464
533
519
505
519
507
513
491
508
497
48:4
438
422
381
346
328
180

Source: Japan... ArmyNavy Oil Committee.

139
138

ApPENDIX TABLE C-54 (In 3 part8).-Japanese production oj refined oils, by type--lnner Zone, 1931-45
[ThoUS&llds of barrelsl
PART 1

Fiscal year and quarter

From
crude
oil

Total

From

crude
oil

Fiscal year and quarter

synthetic Imports
oil

140

305
344
488
459
451
536
689
921
1, 521
2, 658
3, 531
2, 942
4,050
3, 916
289

1,485
2,437
2,608
3,213
3, 649
3,314
4, 624
4, 744
3,891
3,261
1,871
1,437
1, 645
369
120

6
13
21
26
152
179
167
152
29

735
801
1,156
838

432
534
497
408

38
36
41
37

31
63
220
252
262
194
60
12
5

4, 125
5,345
5,649
6,883
7, 637
7,532
8,672
7,840
6,098
7,818
3,425
2,789
2, 551
753
154

364
366
309
101

79
69
66
48

913
1,005
913
594

60
55
48
31

684
690
667
748

2,640
2,908
3,041
3, 670
3,988
4, 218
4,011
3,020
1,966
4, 279
1, 140
979
679
220

623
612
930
777

390
335
305
407

32
39
56
52

791
986
919
1,354

452
397
422
374

55.
44
34
34

158
227
163
131

21
19
14
6

686
687
633
545

44
63
63
50

4
3
2
3

192
235
194
132

3
2

105
49

93
122
97
57

51
47
32
22

221
68

80
40

22
7

From
oil

synthetic

Imports

Miscel-

laneous

Total

From
crude
oil

From
synthetic
oil

Miscel-

Imports

laneous

including
shale oil

Total

- - - - - -- - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - -

Total

Misc.

202
261
258
258

945
1,026
1,004
941

From
crude
oil

From

Fuel oil

Diesel tuel

- - -- - -- - -- - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - 1931 ___________________________
305 ------- ------- ------1932 ___________________________
344 ------- ------- ------1933 ___________________________
488 ------- ------- ------1934 ___________________________
459 ------- ------- ------1935 ___________________________
451 ------- ------- ------1936 ___________________________
536 ------- ------- ------1937 ___________________________
689 ------- ------- ------1938 ___________________________
921 ------- ------1939 ___________________________ 1,081
440
1,447
1940 ____ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -" - - -- 1,211
1941 ________ __________________ 2,001
1.4 1,529
1942 ___________________________ 2, 218
723
1.5
2.8 1,975
1943 _____ - -- . - - -- - - - - - - - - - -- --- 2,073
1944 ___________________________ 1,699
329
1.2 1,887
194
94
1.3
1945 (April to September) - - - - - - -1941:
346
.4
389
April to June __ - - -'-- - ---- - --302
.6
499
July to September. - - - --- - --October to December _________
.2
566
590
.2
315
523
January to March_ - - - - - ----1942:
April to June ___ .. ____________
.4
63
560
63
.1
549
July to September - - - - - - -- --377
.6
552
October to December ____ - - --220
.4
557
January to March __ --------1943:
April to June ________________
252
.5
539
July to September ___________
465
521
October to December _________
409
1.3
509
January to March ___________
849
1.0
504
1944:
April to June ________________
1
440
.3
504
35
535
,July to September ___________
.7
455
126
October to December _________
472
406
January to March ___________
167
440
.2
334
1945:
1153
1.3
67
April to June ___ - - - - - - -- ----41
27 ------- ------July to September - - - -- -- - ---

PART 2

Motor gasoline

AvI.tlon gasoline
From
gasoline,
From..
synthetic Imports alcohol,
plneroots,
oil
benzol

ApPENDIX TABLE C-54 (In 3 parts).-Japanese production oj refined oils, by type--Inner Zone, 1931-;.5-Continued

1931 _______________________
1932_______________________
1933 ______________________
1934_______________________
1935 _______________________
1936 _______________________
1937 _______________________
1938_______________________
______________________
1940 _______________________
1941 _______________________
1942_______________________
1943 _______________________
1944 _______________________
1945 (April to September) ___
1941:
1939~

476
480
689
1,171
1,286
1,731
1,797
2,952
1,867
1,588
4,559
3,744
3,707
1,687
228

April to June ___________ 1,204

July to September ______ 1, 198
October to December____ 1,375
January to March _______
962

1942:
April to June ___________
797
July to September ______ 1,031
October to December ____
989
January to March _______
927

176
237
945
964
553
503

7,751
9,069
9,421
11,919
15, 145
13,824
12, 606
11,600
9,695
9,671
6,935
6,033
6, 150
3, 146
762

1,574
1,941
2,285
2, 722
2,978
3,356
3,450
2,603
2, 109
1,992
3,707
4,560
4,940
2,785
364

1,670
30
126
68
40 -------205 --------

6
29
6
196

2,730
1,421
1,421
1,363

215 -------273 -------126

273
205
252

209
255
249
232

-------------

-------------------------

-------

7,275
8,589
9, 737
10, 748
13,859
12,093
10,809
8,634
7, 760
7,839
1,796
331
1,073
346

14
68
68
343
1,013
406
560
31 --------

-----.---------------------------------------------------

126
645
52
40
.667 -------209
345 -------925 -------306
404
881 -------108 - -- -- --- --------

4,719
5,086
5,430
5,238
5,494
5,233
5, 048
4, 847
3,537
3, 193
4,414
5,114
6,171
4,070
472

835
874
924
1,074

40
187 -------143 -------- -------264 -------- -------73 . -------- --------

1,062
1,017
1, 188
1,147

1,221
1,559
1,637
1,616

1,266
1,118
869
1,307

41 -------- -------59
69 -------138 -------55
138 -------54

1,307
1,246
1,062
1,499

186
246
296
236

1,523
1,641
1,678
1,308

1,392
1,444
1,149
955

71
73
64
98

208 -------252 -------239 -------226 --------

1,671
1,769
1,452
1,279

115
111
98
80

315 -------157 -------138 -------271 --------

1,264
1,023
898
885

---------------

398
74

-------------------------

-------------

-------------------

1943:

April to June ___________

908
July to September ______
991
October to December____ 1,058
January to March _______
750

162
184
30
30

267
220
294
292

-------------

------------------------25
42

44

3,145
3, 145
3,145
.2,516
2,516
1,877
1,573
2,202
1,258
504

1944:

April to June ___________

July to September ______
October to 'December ____
January to March _______

587
523
372
205

94
179
126
165
126
152
64 --------

165
157
155
,76

1,025
971
805
345

834
755
662
534

156
72

25 -------6 --------

333
170

514
248

308
56

1945:

April to June ___________

July to September ______

90 -------18 --------

141

ApPENDIX TABLE C-54 (In 3 partB).-Japane8e production of refined oil8, by type-Inner Zone, 1931-45-Continued

ApPENDIX TABLE C-55.-Japane8e production of synthetic oil, inner zone, 1937-45

PART 3

[In b..T.ls]
Lubricating oU

Fiscal year and Quarter

1931 _______________________________________ _
1932_______________________________________ _
1933 _______________________________________ _
1934_______________________________________ _
1935_______________________________________ _
1936 _______________________________________ _
1937 _______________________________________ _
1938__________ - -- - - - - - -- - - - --- - - - - - - - -- - - .. -1939_______________________________________ _
1940__________ - - -- - - --- -- - -- --- - -- - - - - - -- --1941 __________________________ ____________ _
r
1942 ______________________ ________________
_
~

1943 __________ - -- - - - -- - ~-- - - - - --- - - - - - - - - - -1944 _______________________________________ _

1945 (April to September) ____________________ _
1941:
April to June ___________________________ _
Juiy to September _______________________ _
October to December ___ --- - -- ____ - - - -- --January to March _____ _________________ _
1942:
April to June ___________________________ _
July to September _____ --- --- - - --- - - -- - --October to December ____________________ _
January to March _______________________ _
1943:
April to June ___________________________ _
JUly to September _______________________ _
October to December ____________________ _
January to March _______________________ _
1944:
April to June ___________________________ _
July to September _____ - -- _______________ _
October to December___ -- _______________ _
January to March _______________________ _
1945:
April to June ___________________________ _
July to September _______________________ _
~

Source: J8paneseArmy.Navy ou Comm,lttee.

From crude oil

Imports

From miscella
DeOU8 including
reeJaJmed oil

Fiscal year and month

From m1sceUa-

,.,"=ts"S/q~

Totsl

gas, etc.

52 -----------53 -----------479
75
423
97
501
127
663
115
683
188
764
201
628
255
749
235
619
180
646
139
424
120
174
68
122
21

1,150
1,322
1,434
1, 734
2, 039
2,066
2, 209
1,978
2,948
2, 576
2,933
2, 173
1,896
1,065
256

45
42
51
42

131
169
155
164

810
803
692
628

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

41
37
30
31

127
169
175
175

621
574
538
440

473
516
525
262 ----. -------

29
34
36
21

103
108
121
92

502
550
561
283

312 -----------285 -----------227 -----------.173 ------------

21
22
13
12

89
47
13
25

333
307
240
185

--------.--------------

12
9

115
7

203
53

855
1,043
1,205
I, 390
1,642
1,400
I, 763
1, 589
2,299
1,300
1,976
2,034
I, 776
997
235
500
514
464
498
580
537
508
409

191
44

243
226
154
247
270
551
258
188
394
1,041
777

--------------------------------------------265
247
177
88

1938 _____ - --- - - ---- -- --- --- - - -- --------.--1939 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- -----------1940-------------------------1941 ____________________________ -----------April ________________ c ______ -----------126
164
May ______ - -- __ -- --- -- - -- -June ________________ " ______
120
July ________ - ___ - - - - - _- - - -157
August ______ - ___ - _- _- _- _- __
447
SepteDlber __________________
-----------October _____ - ___ - _- _- _- _. ___
__________________ -----------113
December _______ - _- _- ______
69
January ___________ . ________
-----------February------------------- -----------164
March __ - --- - - - --- - - -- - - --942:
31
April ____ - - - - - _- - - - - - - - - - - -264
May _______ - - __ --- - --- - ---151
__ ~-------------------June_______________________
July
113
August _____________________
~oveDlber

September~- - - __ ---- - -- - - ---

October ___ - - - ___ - - - _- _- _- __

~oveDlbeL- - - __ -- --- - _. ____
December __ - - ___ -, - _- ______
___________________
February ___________________

---------------------_ ..

188
101
270
340
50
March __ - -- - - -- -- - - - -- - ---- -----------943:
245
April ____ - -- - - __ - - -- --_ - -- __
120
May ______ - - - __ - - - - - - _- - - - June _______________________
88
July ______ . ________________
August _____________________ ----------------------SepteDlber ___ - ___ - __________
-----------October __ -- - - ____ -- ________ -----------ovember _____ .:-____________ .
629
December __ - - ______________
635
January ____________________
59~
February ________________ . __
ndarch _____________________ -----------422
944:
ApriL __________________ : ___
252
May ______ - - ____ -- ______ - __
-----------June ______ - _.. ___ - __________
-----------667
July __ ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - August __________________ " __
September ___ . ______________ ---------------------_ ..
October ____________________
-----------__________________
December __________________ -----------January ___._________________ -----------February ________________ . __ -----------March _____________________ -----------226
January~

~oyeDlber

142

A VlatloD gaaollne

Motor gasoline

Gas oil

5,850 -----------13,084 -----------2,264

20,544
3,824
26,518
2,573
11,975
3,818
12,907
5,233
12,830
5,314
9, 120
1,982
13,680
4,.523
12, 737
4, 190
12,468
1,554
16,914
4,523
12,033
7,328
11,076
8,403
11,781
14,459
8,843

Diesel fuel

Fuel oil

Totsl

68,474
67,749
10,008
10,416
9,950
34,244
17,913
12,208
12,572
12,850
14,299
60,254
94,684
50,880

25,286
42,262
44, 149
51,641
46,018
54,389
86,198
14,278
59,113
69,642
63, 145
98,212
102,804
8,648
12, 203
51,905

31, 136
69,027
135,431
149, 732
70, 700
81,694
114,331
67, 113
93, 135
99, 110
92,375
129, 643
133,728
87,306
127,071
126, 251

-----------13,681

7,258
12,605
12,541
11,365
15,292
12,542
18,015
20,498
17,461
14,964
12,410
24,582

4,404
10,391
6,920
7,417
9,925
10,052
10,535
5,572
7,528
7,058
7,530
10,869

73,838
49,276
91,539
82,997
85,266
104,924
117,712
87,821
67,304
57,352
81,235
113,459

12,901
11,367
17, 178
20,397
25,468
13,342
18,298
13,392
23,237
20,600
10, 706
22,738

98,432
83,903
128, 329
122, 289
135,951
140, 860
164, 748
127,384
115, SOO
100, 314
111,931
171,648

17,814
11,298
25, 538
19,267
12,931.
11,554
13, 128
9,843
10,662
10,127
11,164
12,309

11,553
12,070
62,616
12,443
11,883
7,667
9,083
7,622
8,498
8,561
7,014
8,636

37, 156
106,156
18,900
70,416
104,093
9,271
12,543
9,013
8,825
10,825
8,788
10,157

20, 321
25,285
25,530
25, 600
22, 750
24, 179
18,561
18, 682
27, 129
30, 576
31, 311
36,425

87,089
154, 929
132, 672
127, 726
151,657
52, 671
53, 315
45, 789
55,749
60, 687
58,277
67, 949

16,077
17,462
17,053
18, 543
15, 165
13,574
11,208
9,844
10,498
7,000
.6,522
8,434

12,693
12,404
8,819
10,455
7,422
8,303
8,970
8,296
9,403
6, 164
7,121
11,366

59,856
63,001
56,081
54,036
54, 774
56,685
54, 729
49, 358
47, 873
21,701
17,895
24 255

37,426
31,362
46, 093
34,049
32,751
45,301
24,776
31, 646
41,426
22,964
19,329
37 872

126,304
124,229
128,046
117,750
110,112
123,863
99,683
99,144
109, 200
57,829
50,867
82 153

143

ApPENDIX TABLES G-57.-Production of explosives, Japan proper, 1931-45

[In tonsl

ApPENDIX TABLE G-55.-Japanese production of synthetic oil, inner zone, 1937-45.,....Continued

Aviation gasoline

Fiscal ycar snd month

Motor gasoUne

1945:
ApriL__ ___ ___ _____ ___ _____

962
189
June_______________________
107
July ________________ - _- _- _____________ _
August ______________ - - --- _____________ _

Gas

oil

6,604
3, 144
6,498
3,623
8,283
3, 176
3,736
I, 856
3, 195 ------------

~ay_______________________

Diesel fuel

8,661
10,384
6,277
5,485
390

Fuel oil

31,218
27, 814
30,500
13,637
4,202

Total

50,589
48, 508
48, 343
24,714
7, 787

Source: Imperial Fuel Industry Co.

ApPENDIX TABLE G-56.-Production of lubricating oil from rubber, Japan proper, 1943-44
[In barrels]
Nippon Oil Co.

Showa Oil Co.

Fiscal year and month

"
1943:
Septexnber _________________ _
October ___________________ _
Novexnber ____ .. ____________ _
Decexnber _________________ _
January ___________ . _______ _
February __________________ _
____________________ _
~arch

1944:
April ______________________ _
______________________ _
June ______________________ _
July ______________________ _
August ____________________ _
SepteDlber _________________ _
October ___________________ _
NoveDlber _________________ _
DeceDlber _________________ _
~ay

Janua~--------------------

February __________________ _
____________________ _
~arch

Source: Imperial Fuel Industry Co.

(Akita)

(Nllgata)

Kawasaki

Tos Fuel Indus-

try Co., Shimizu

Imperial Fuel
Indu.'ry Co.,
Uhe

Total

Fiscal year and month

1931 ________________
1932 ________________
1933 ________________
1934 ________________
1935 ________________
1936 ________________
1937 ________________
1938 ________________
1939 ________________
1940 ________________
1941 ________________
1942 ________________
1943 ________________
1944:
ApriL ___________
____________
~ay

315
195
1,296
742
988
1,415
1, 793

642 ------------ ------------ - --2,371

466 ------------ -----------2,069
799 ------------ -----------2,308
755 ------------ -----------201
2,227
1,635
943
635
2,233
371
717
1,340
3,585
1,082
6, 604

956
3,032
4, 164
3,805
5,994
5,371
14,404

1,874
1,264
4,648
2,679
2,390
1,899
1,629
3,277
2,566
2,554

3,598
4,000
4,460
2,711
2,767
2,868
3,460
2,963
3,252
2,516
1,887
2,220

912
7, 680
I, 289
9,643
1,837
6,422
2,271
7,435
2,057
7, 504
1,271
7,454
2, 107
2,069
1,818
1,132
1,032
1,214
1,371 -----------2,459 -----------2, 158 ------------

15,045
18,379
18,581
15,725
16,794
15, 769
10,473
10, 121
8, 523
6,441
4,906
5,768

868

981
2, 183
1,214
629
2,076
2,277
1,208
931
459
0
56g
522

Smokeless
powder

Organic high

Explosives

explosives

624
1,188
1,332
I, 764
1,824
2, 148
5,232
12,252
12,768
13,632
14,208
18,408
20,952

1,932
3,576
4, 308
5,112
4,320
4,116
14,688
31,524
:;14,828
26,328
36,756
43,656
44,880

FIscal year and month

Smokeless
powder

1944-Continued
June ____________
July __ ~ _________
August __________
SepteDlber_______
October _________
Novexnber _______
Decexnber _______
January _________
February ________
__________
1945:
April ____________
____________
June ____________
July ____________

2,556
4.,764
5,640
6,876
6, 144
6,264
19,920
43, 776
37,596
39,960
50,964
62,064
65,832

~arch

~ay

1,808
1,813

3,257
3,362

5,065
5,175

Organic high

Explosives

explosives

1,800
I, 957
1,966
2,050
2,077
2,201
2,088
2,277
2,344
2,256

3,441
3,391
3,596
3,336
3,921
3,910
3,858
4, 100
4,022
4,279

5, 241
5,348
5,562
5,386
5,998
6,111
5,946
6, 377
6,366
6,535

1,526
1,731
1,805
1,369

2,570
2,579
2,292
1,720

4,096
4, 310
4,097
3,089

Source: Ohemfca.l Industry Oontrol ASSdciations, War and Navy Ministries.

ApPENDIX TABLE C-58.-Organic high-explosives production in Japan and the United States, 1940-45.
[Thousands of tonsl
Japan
1940 ______________________ _
194L _____________________ _
194.2 ______________________ _

United States
26
37
44

21
103
625

United States

Japan

1943 ______________________ _
1944 ______________________ _
1945 (4 Dlonths) ___________ _

45
44

I, 143

551

978

Source: Japan-Chemical Industry Control Association, War and Navy Ministries; U. B.-War Production Board.
ApPENDIX TABLE G-59.-Proce8s efficiency in explosives production in Japan and the United States-1944
Pomt yield Obs. of
product per 100 Ibs. of
starting material)
Japan

United
States

Time of cycle

Japan

United States

Japan

United
States

Japan

United
States

-------1-----------1-----------1------------------------Single base sxnokeless powder ____________________________________________ _

185
208 11 hours ______ 40 Dlinutes __ _
TNT______________________
TetryL____________________
200
210 32 hours ______ 2Y. hours ____ _
116 Continuous ________________ _
Hexogen___________________
100

8,800 140,000
4,400 120,000
166
7,500
2, 200 30,000

1,012

I, 2721
178
1,025

5.5
10
67
20

Source: Japan-Chemical Industry Control Association; U. S.-War Production Board.

144

145

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0-62.-Nitrogen balance, Japan proper, 1940--45

[In tonsl
Production of nitrogen

Fiscal year and quarter

Percent

Calcium
cyanamide

Percent

Byprod~ct

BDlIDODla

Percent

Total

Imports
Percent

- - - - - -- - 1940... ___ .... c. ___ . ______ .. _____ ._ .. ___

1941 ________ . ________ ._. __ ._ ... _________
1942_. _______ .. ____ . ____________________
1943 _____________ '.___ . _______________ . __
1944 ____ ._ .. ____ . __ . __ . _________________
1945 through June ______________________ ._
1940:

309, 516
341,016
306,275
269,902
198,400
24,685

76. 0
79.5
80. 5
84. 3
81. 0
73. 9

49, 163
52,690
44,312
35, 714
34,281
6,393

12. 1
12.3
11. 7
11. 1
14.0
19. 1

April to June_. ___ . __ . ________ .. _____

july to September _______ . ____________
OctOber to December _______ . ____ . ____
January to March_. ____ .____________ ._

76, 673
72,306
79,250
81, 287

69.7.
74. 8
79. 5
80. 5

15,102
10,803
11,574
11,684

13.7
11. 2
11.6
11. 6

5,
5,
5,
5,

90,099
82,383
85,888
82,646

77.1
79. 9
80.9
80. 3

16,204
12,787
13,117
10, 582

82,539
73,580
80, 154
70,002

77.6
79.8
82. 0
83.4

78,112
64, 566
66,586
60, 638
68,
47,
45,
37,
24,

22,216
22,856
22,436
14, 784
12,098
2,324

ammonium
sulfate only

Percent

Total

5.4
5.3
5.9
4.6
4.9
7.0

380, 895
416, 562
373,023
320,400
244, 779
33,402

93.5
97.1
98. 1
10.0
99.9
100.0

26,482
12,464
7,176
0
213
0

6.5
2.9
1.9
0.0
O. 1
0.0

407,378
429,026
380, 199
320,40.0
244,992
33,402

q54
554
554
554

5.0
5.8
5. 6
5.5

97,329
88, 663
96,378
98, 525

88. 4
91. 8
96.7
97.6

12,803
7, ,932
3, 283
2,465

11. 6
8.2
3. 3
2.4

110,132
96,595
99,661
100,990

13.9
12.4
12. 4
10. 3

5,714
5,714
5,714
5,714

4.9
5.5
5.4
5.5

112,017
100,884
104,719
98, 942

95.9
97.8
98. 7
96.1

4,820
2,266
1,392
3,986

4.1
2.2
1.3
3.9

116,837
103, 150
106,111
102,928

14, 991
12, 125
9, 700
7,496

14. -1
13.2
9.9
8. 9

5,609
5, 609
5,609
5,609

5.3
6.1
5. 7
6.7

103, 139
91,314
95,463
83, 107

97.0
99.1
97.6
99.0

3, 145
852
2,339
840

3. 0
0.9
2.4
1.0

106,284
92, 166
97,802
83,947

84. 5
83.2
84.6
84. 6

10,582
9, 370
8,377
7, 385

11. 5
12.0
10.7
10. 3

3, 696
3,696 .
3,696
3,696

4.0
4. 8
4.7
5. 1

92,390
77, 632
78, 659
71,719

100.0
100. 0
100.0
100.0

0
0
0
0

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

92,390
77,632
78,659
71,719

81. 8
79.1
78. 5
85. 3
73.9

12,456
9, 149
8, 818
3,858
6, 393

14.9
15.3
15.2
8. 9
19. 1

2,791
3,334
3,439
2,534
2, 324

3.3
5.6
5.9
5.8
7.0

83,774
59, 583
57, 887
43, 535
33,402

100.0
100.0
99.6
100.0
100.0

0
0
213
0
0

0.0
0.0
0.4
0.0
O. 0

83,774
59,583
58, 100
43,535
33,402

1941: .

1942:
April to June ___ . ________ .. ___ . ____ ._
july to September ____________________
October to DecembeL ________________
January to March ________ . ___________

...,

g,~SO

jof:I..jof:I..

~....:rI-l..p...

OOOt ..... ooooco-.:rc,..,-.:rc.n.

..... OQ)~t.:)coo:.OOt
.......
......
...

April to June ___________________ . ____

July to SeptembeL ________________ . __
October to DeoembeL __________ . __ . __
January to March .. _. ____ .... ________

Z
~

,,

Synthetic
ammonia

to

CD

co~
cc-.:rc,..,c.n(Oc.nOc.nCl:lt-.:JQ)01-.:rOOO~

ApPENDIX TABLE

...;.-

: S-

,.

r~

CD

I
I

"'-00

'0"

g.S~:

I
I

.....

000000000

~.

~.

9lSJ:J~!XJ!"",_00)9l'"""

0'"

~o

~~(tP;
e;~~:

g.S~:

I
I

000000000

;!

88888888
00000000

'1j

o~~~ooO)O:'(.Ijco .................... - -

:;;.

iii'

"

[~

'0"

E::~S-~
~~g.:

ggggggggggg888gg

50 9 $J ...0) :--t . t..:>

.

OO~...:,cn-..JCOOt..:>

g.a~:

0"
',CD

I
I

~c+o~~

50

~;:,

...0)

~I

'0"

~~lt~
~g~:

O'c+

~~o~~

'" '"
88
,

-~

g-~
~:

~~S~
t...::I"1
0

$Jl5J1
'"""""
'"

!:.

............... .....

'0"

c+S~'-t

~gt~
t..(l"1
0

tt'O
S~

"0'<;:::

'"
;:!

t.nOOc:oO,)~cnc:.n

~~S~o
t..o::I"'1

"0'<;:::

~oo....:rO)

5' ~

S;o

"0'<;:::

m>'

I-lt-.:Jtv

S' ~
~

t..:>C11C11~OOt..:>""'OCOOO-.Jo)C11~OOt.:)

~g.E.~

~ ...OO,!- ~ ...o _~

~~~~~~~~O,)OOOo)OOOo)Oo)\),)Oo)Oo)

~
Ii-8

~~E.~

"

l>-

................................................................................ .....

coco co co co co co co co coco eo co co co coco

~'g.g.~

~'-t

go

00

E.~

!!l. .~
SO

co

C-..t>'-tO'-t>C-..tO'-t>'-tO'-t> ............
'<~.

co

en

!'~

.....

.....

co

1943:
April to June __ .... ___ . ______________
July to SeptembeL. __________________
October to DecembeL ________________
January to ~larch ___ . _______ . ______ ._

1944:

April to June _______________ . ____ . ___

July to September_. ____________ ._ .. __
October to December ______ . __________
January to March ____________________
1945: April to June _______________________

...

""

......

527
100
630
143
685

........00

ApPENDIX TABLE G-62.-Nitrogen balance, Japan proper,

194o-45-Contin~ed .

Domestic consumption of nitrogen

Fiscal year and quarter

Nitric add
Nitric acid I
Armycivilian Percent Navy
pro Percent
production
duction

Ammonium

sulfate

Exports.
percent

neaus'
nitrogen

Nitric,
percent

Acid only

Total

- - -- - - - -- - -- - - - - - - -

- - -- 1940 _______________________________
1941 ______________ " ________________
1942_______________________________
1943 _______________________________
1944 _______________________________
1945 through June ___________________
1940:

Miscella-

Calcium Percent
Percent cyanamide

18,426
20,395
24,308
26,718
23,026
2, 730

4.5
4.8
6.4
8.3
9.4
8. 1

1,349
2, 165
2,506
2,355
2, 767
470

O. 3
0.5
0.7
0.7
1. 1
1.4

257,983
283,348
246,995
210,420
140,255
15,658

63.3
66.2
65. 0
65.8
57.2
46.9

48,502 11. 9
51,148 12.0
42, 217 11.1
37,587 .,11. 7
27,778 11. 2
6,173 18. 5

80, 738
71,922
64,060
43,220
51, 166
8,371

19. 9
16.5
16.8
13.5
21. 1
25. 1

O. 1 407,37 8
380
48 ------ 429,02 6
12 ------ 380,0~ 8
100 ------ 320,40 o
0.0 244,99 2
0
0.0
33,40
0

4, 606
4,607
4,606
4,607

4.2
4.8
4. 6
4.6

337
337
337
338

O. 3
0.3
0.3
O. 3

65,440
59,610
65,327
67,606

59.4
61. 8
65.6
66.9

10, 141
i2, 787
12, 787
12,787

9.2
13.2
12.8
12.7

29,423
19, 196
16,501
15,618

26.7
19. 8
16.6
15. 4

185
58
103
34

4,942
4, 765
5,057
5, 631

4.2
4.6
4. 8
5.5

536
542
544
543

0.5
O. 5
0.5
0.5

75.573
67,795
70,888
69,092

64. 6
65.8
66. 9
67.2

12, 787
12, 787
12, 787
12,787

10.9
12.4
12.3
12.4

22,972
17,246
16, 833
14,871

19.7
16.7
15.5
14. 4

6,289
5,784
6,435
5,800

5.9
6.3
6.6
6.9

617
639
638
612

0.6
0.7
O. 7
O. 7

68, 500
59,248
65,283
53, 964

64. 8
64. 3
66.7
64. 2

12,787
9,810
9,810
9, 810

12.2
10.6
10.0
11.7

18,089
16,681
15, 632
13, 758

16.5
18. 1
16.0
16.5

6,479
6, 143
6,673
7,423

7.0
7.9
8.5
10.3

517
551
527
760

0.6
0.7
0.7
1. 1

63,013
50,232
52,042
45, 133

68.1
64.7'
66.1
62.9

9,810
9,259
9,259
9, 259

10.6
11.9
11.8
12.9

12,482
11,444
10, 150
9, 144

13.6
14. 8
12. 9
12.8

7,083
5,665
5,521
4,757
2, 730

8.4
9. 5
9.5
10.9
8.1

675
733
680
679
470

0.8
1.2
1.2
1.6
1.4

52, 699
32, 850
30,406
24,300
15,658

62. 9
55.1
52.3
55.8
46.9

9,259
6, 173
6,173
6,173
6, 173

11. 1
10.4
10.6
14. 2
18.5

14,058
14,162
15,320
7,626
8, 371

16. 8
23. 8
26.4
17.5
25.1

April to June ___________________

July to September _______________
October to DecembeL ____ _______
January to March _______________

110,13 2
96, 59 5
99,66
100, 99'0

0.2
0.1
O. 1
0.1

1941:

April to June ___________________

July to September _______________
October to DecembcT ____________
January to March _______________

27
0.1 116,83 7
15 ------ 103, 15o
2 ______ 106,11
4 ______ 102,92 8

1942:

April to June ___________________

July to September _______________
October to December ____________
January to March ______ ~ ________

2
4
4
2

1943:

April to June __ ~ ________________

July to September _______________
October to DecembeT ____________
January to March _______________

______ 106,28
______ 92, 16
______ 97,80
______ 83, 94

0.1
89
3 ______
8 ______
O. 0
0

92,39
77,63
78, 65
71,71

1944:

April to June _________________ ~_

July to SeptembeL ______________
October to December ____________
January to March _______________
1945: April to June __________________

83,77
59,58
58, 10
43,53
33,40

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

0
0
0
0
0

----

!i:1~ifa:g!Ur:cY~J:s=:1~n~~!~~aR'u~: ~t~n~rJ~~t ~~v::fer;r~~~~ ~\~~renor to 98- percent acid.

acid, and as other uses of ammonia.

The side reaction loss of ab&ut

ld peroont when ammonia is converted to nitric

SoW.... : OlWmlClII IndllStrr Coqtrol AsSOcl.tlon.

~
~
~

00

~
~
~

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

~
~
~

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
~~~~~~o~oo~~~~~~~

~ S;:"':ll;<t:I:Z0gZ'Z's;:>" S;:"':ll;<t:lZOgz<z<:S:>"l;<0z<>"l;<0z<>'"
O~~I:I(t)og.~~_I:S~~

~~t;j~og.~C:_I:j~~

~g.~~a8~8~:

g.;~S8g"S~:

g."'1"'1c:g<O&~~(t)'4::l""

i :
!!:.

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g- g:-' [[::
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"'1"'1C:{i)<O&~'-<(tI,-<_.

: : ~ ';< g g ~ g::
~:--

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~g"S-c+-

~ ;:

OJ

oo~

s::t::I(DCD
~ g: 8:

g,

"'1

...
~

III

0"

g..S~:

C"',
CD

;-t

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c:o'-<I:!:

~g"S-c+-

~;:. OJ~
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>1
~:
8":

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~:
I

;D

8:

III

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CD

0"

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g.S~:
I

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.................

...~ ...~ _'" ...'" ...co ...~ _00

..... t.:a~~~

...~

.!"""'" ...~ ...~ ...00

~o,,""'COc::,Y.Ioo""'~oo~~~

~~~~~oge!~~:;~

------------

~~h'Jh'Jh'Jh'Jh'J~h'JCI.)c,..,OJ

_0:> ...~

r . Ch
. sYJ _en _CJ1 _OJ sYJ r

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~8~~~~*ggg~~

~'-v--''-v--'

ooe.oooo

...CJ1 ...~_c.c_o

......

~~~

O~CTtH:o-

0000

......................

0000

.9 _~ ...o_co
io/:lo.w;:.. .....

c.n

~.-.c:.n~

ClenenCJ1

~~~~~e,..:J~~t-::It.:I

............ 1-'
~~t.:I-.f"""~c,~o....:rOCJ1G1:1 .....

_00 ,..00 ...h'J _~ ...CTt _c, ........ _OJ ...c.n _~ ...h'J _l\;I ...~

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~~
0.=
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8;~~~8~gg~~g~~~

;!

R.
R.
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..

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_t-,j ...Ch

'Ow;:.. ...0 ...CTt ...0:. ...crJ

";:!;:!

:l"

>-l

c,..,.,J:r..01('Jt01.,J:r..c:.n.,J:r..~OJt-::It-,j

~!!.

..

9 ...

81
'1
"

O-Ch"'t-,:,t-,:, ...... COooco ...... t-,:,C'!oo

g;;82l~8~~:!;:!;g~:!;82l

:-

!'"

!""

!""

!""

!""

,.,

<0

...
!""

!""

...

!""

...
!""

...

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""
!'"

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...

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...

!""

!""'!""'!""'!"'"

:-"~~!"""

a>

~.;:....;:a....;:a..

01 OJ 1-'0

oo~oo~t-.:)co:

!""
a>

.-. .................. 011

..... t.:) ...... 0 0 0 'I

coc:ccoco

OO-.J-Ja"

0 . 0 00

co

-4 0:> :

\0

co

P'

<0

;-l
a>

co

<0

<0

tI'-

;-l

;-l

a>

0>

0>

<0

iJ'

....

<0

iJ'

a0.

e-~

0>

,,

~.

~~~90

c:OCOCO(O(O<:C1

g~
~..:.

....:rOt-.:ljoJ::o.

t-.:)!-Pro- w;:.. -.t .... <:11:1

"~

P'

COCO c:O

00

-.:(""-.:(~

(0

;!

'iii

.."

'tl

g:>

OOO:!~-4CXlaol

Q;:>c:Oc:OCO
:-l:---t~~

<0

{l

:,<I

....
....

.".....

__

e,..:J-4CJ1 ..... O)t-::Ic:Clt-::l(Jl ..... OJCh ..... oo('Jt

CoI) _t.:I ...o
_~_t-::I_Clt ...CT.> ....... ...t-::!_GI:I _"' ...
00

~.

;!

~.

~g

....:r~w;:..CT.>w;:..OOooCOOGl:lCO(J.jOO~

Ot.:)GI:I('JtCht-::lCol)";:"ooOOCI:I"""OJ
00000000000000

0-

I "

pq8.
~~

...... .-. ................ ~ ................. I-'I-'

OJt-.:IOJw;:..w;:..CJ1~c.n(J.jt.:l
ooo::~

...w;:.. _~ _00 _0:> ...crJ ...00 ....;...

...
~

til

In'

f~
rE~

~g
~a
~

"8

g:

"...
"
""
R.

'tl

>1

..
-"
~

'<0

....<eI

....
'"

ApPENDIX TABLE C-63.-Production and di8tribution of ammonia, Japan proper and Korea, 1931-45-Continued

ApPENDIX TABLE G-64.-Production and di8tribution of nitric acid, Japan proper, Korea, and Manchuria, 1931-45-Con.
[In tonsl

Allocated diBtrlbution ~rcent of production

Production in

Fiscal year and month

home islands

Production in
Korea

in home ISlands

Total production

98

Army, percent Navy, percent Civi~S:l per-

Production in home tslands

Fiscal yem- and month

1945:
ApriL ___________________________ _
May _______ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - __ _
June ____________________________ _

1~: ~m

------------------------

Army I

1.0

.8

No imports or exports of ammonia from 1931 to 1945. Inventories always very low.
l Includes total amount converted by civilian plants to nitric acid. Amount of civilian ammonia consumption going to nonmilitary explosives never ex-.
ceeded 30 tons per month.

Sources: Mlnl8try of Commerce and Industry (Mr. Tsuda) and Chemical Industry Control Association (Mr. Katsura).
ApPENDIX TABLE G-64.-Production and distribution of nitric acid, Japan proper, Korea, and Manchuria, 1931-45
[In tonsl
98

Production in home islands

nitric acid

Fiscal year and month

Exports

Total

Allocated distribution of the

civilian production

Produc--

tion in

Army!

Civilian

Army.

Total

percent

Navy,
percent

Civilian,
percent

Korea.

Produc-

tion In
Man
churfs.

Total

productiOD

50 nitric

~~\

production

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --- - - - - - 1,620 7, 056 8, 676 ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- 8,676
1,819 10,696 12,515 ------- ------- - - - - - -- ------- ------- ------- ------- 12,5i5
2, 149 16, 364 18,513 ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- --- - - -- 18, 513
2,480 22,918 25, 398 ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- 25,398 _
2, 563 25, 761 28,324 ------- ------- - - - - -- ------- ------- ------- ------- 28,324 _
50 _______ 36,217 89,726
3, 142 33, 025 36, 167 ------- ------- ------- ------- ------181 ------- 51,203 131,533
3, 224 47, 798 51,022 ------- ------- - - - - - -- ------- - - -- - -47 84,116 202, 097
551
3, 621 79,897 83, 518 ------- ------- ------- ------- ------101 89,505 205, 082
662
4, 018 84, 724 88, 742 ------- ------- - - - - - -- -------

1931. _________ - -1932 _____________

1933 ____________ .
1934 _____________
1935 _____________
1936 _____________
1937 _____________
1938 _____________
1939 _____________
1940 _____________ 4,712 84,575 89, 287
1941 _____ -------- 8, 361 90,024 98, 385
1942 ____ ~ ________ 9, 759 100, 707 110,466
1943 ____ " ________ 8, 598 117,370 125, 968
1944 _____________ 10, 055 102,245 112,300
1945: April to
August_________ 2, 194 13,614 15, 808
1941:
ApriL _______
689 7, 387 8,076
May ________
689 7,387 8, 076
June ________
689 7, 387 8, 076
July _________
697 7, 141 7, 838
August. _____
697 7,141 7, 838
September ___
697 7, 141 7, 838
October ______
701 7,648 8,349
November ___
701 7,648 8,349
December ____ .
701 7,648 8, 349
January _____
700 7,832 8, 532
February ____
700 7,832 8, 532
March _______
700 7,832 8, 532
"1942:
ApriL _______
810 8,269 9, 079
May ________
810 8,269 9,079
June ________
810 8 269 9 079

----~--

2, 185 87, 102

224 98, 161
57110,409
451 125,517
7112,393

31. 8
33. 3
40.1
43.4
42. 2

29. 5
29.9
39.2
43.3
42. 1

38.7
797
36.8 2,474
20.7 2,828
13.3 2, 942
15.7 2,368

0 15,808 ------- ------- ------39

23
63
48
0
20
3
2
4
17
1
4

8,037 f
8,053
8,013
7,790 }
7,838
7,818
8,346 }
8,347
8,345
8,515 }
8,531
8,528

0
10
0

9,079
9,069
9,079

832

32. 9

30.2

36.9

611

33.4

29.9

36. 7

536

32.3

29.7

38.0

620

34.6

29.7

35. 7

707

36.5

35.2

28. 3

679

73 90, 157 182,928

251 101,110 227, 736
391 113, 685 244, 565
834 129, 742 284, 185
847 115, 514 227, 998
333 16,973 iO, 159

18,881
48 24, 887 { 18,674
17,532
18, 758
56 24, 106 { 18,602
18,954
19,105
68 25, 735 19, 100
{
19,753
19,484
79 26, 382 19, 211
{ 19,682

1942:-Continued
July _________
August. _____
September ___
October ______
November __ ~
Decemher ____
January _____
February _. ___
March _______
1943:
ApriL _______
May ________
June ________
JUly _________
August ______
September ___
October ______
November ___
December ____
January _____
February ____
March _______
1944:
ApriL _______
May ________
June ________
July _________
August ______
September ___
October ______
November ___
December ____
January _____
February ____
March _______
1945:
ApriL _______
May ____ - -June ________
July _________
August. _____
1
I

Army,
percent

Total

828 7,464
828 7,464
828 7,464
827 8,779
827 8, 779
827 8, 779
788 9,057
788 9,057
788 9,057
639
639
639
645
645
645
617
617
617
964
965
965

9, 920
9,218
9,523
9, 108
8, 065
8,249
9,146
10, 130
10,487
11,092
10,461
11,971

8,292
8,292
8,292
9,606
9,606
9,606
9,845
9, 845
9,845

7
2
10
7
11
0
2
0
8

10,559
9,857
10, 162
9,753
8,710
8,894
9,763
10, 747
11,104
12,057
11,426
12,936

396
0
1
0
0
17
10
0
27
0
0
0

8,285 }
8, 290
39.3
8,282
9,599 }
9, 595
41.0
9,606
9,843 }
9, 845
43.0
9, 837
10, 163}
9,857
10, 161
9,753 }
8,710
8, 877
9,753 }
10, 740
11,077
12,057 }
11,426
12, 936

816 11,256 12, 072

816 11,055 11,871
816 8,592 .9,408
894 8,322 9,216
895 8, 154 9,049
895 9,342 10,237
827 7,875 8,702
827 8,644 9,471
827 8,299 9,126
814 8, 085 8,899
814 6,197 7,011
814 6,424 7,238

0 12,072 }
7 11,864
C 9, 408
0 9,216 }
0 9,049
0 10,237
0 8,702 }
0 9,471
0 9, 126
0 8,899 }
()
7,011
0 7,238

504 5, 609
504 3,857
503 2,481
683 1,513
0
154

0
0
0
0
0

6,113
4,361
2, 984
2,196
154

Navy,
percent

Civilian,

percent

p..ooucUon In
Korea

37.4

23. 3

658

39.4

-19.6

. 753

44. 1

12.9

738

41. 9

41. 5

16.6

780

42. 8

43. 0

14. 2

703

43.8

43.5

12.7

666

45. 0

44. 9

10. 1

793

43.9

43.8

12.3

586

41. 8

41. 9

16.3

632

41. 2

40. 5

18. 3

600

41. 2

41. 5

17.3

550

6, 113 }
4,361
44. 8
45. 3
9.9
2,984
2, 196
------- - -- - - -154

No imports during periods shown. Inventories were always very low.

Tokyo No.2 army arsenal for own use. Navy production negligible.

.\rmy use of civilian production Is In eddltlon to use of its own production.

21,097
98 38, 014 21, 047
{ 20, 632

civilian production

Production in

5(}

Total

Man

churia

}------

500
332

nitric

~~\

produotion

- - - - - -- - - - - - --------- ------

98. 2

Civilian

Allocated distribution of the

Total

Exports

nitric acid

production

r"r

88 25, 622 19,033

19,898
20,66 9
123 29,694 21,01 8
20,96 8
9 o
,802
82 30, 355 20,06
20, 90 1
{lO,863
132 10, 161
10,466
{lO,033
138 8, 990
9,174
10,073
266 11,058
11,414
12,421
298 11,789
13,300

22, 86 3
22, 078
23,69 7
23,08 3
22,09 7
22, 471
22, 90 4
24, 281
23,82 2
25,8() 6
25,382
25, 701

2
,350
249 12, 149
9,686
[ 9,493
198 9, 325
10, 514
[ 8,968
200 9, 738
9, 393
{ 9, 148
200 7,261
7,489

20,36 7
21,85 3
20,191
19,677
18,616
18,841
17,221
19,367
18, 706
19, 105
15,508
18, 546

6, 346 11,876
200 { 4, 395 9,51 o
3,217 8,63 3
2,761 6,68 9
133{
387 3,451

Calculated from reports of all producing companies.

'Assumed. No data available.

Sources: Ministry of Commerce and Industry and Chemical Industry

Control AaaocIatlon.

See footnotes at end of table.

150

7141128-47-11

151

ApPENDIX TABLE

C-65.-Consumption of prude rubber in Japan, 1931-1,5

ApPENDIX TABLE

C-66.-Synthetic rubber production in Japan proper, 191,1-45

(In tonsl

[In tons[

Imports

Consumption

Calend8l'

Calendar year and quar'ter

By civilill.D.
age.llcles

By army and
Davy

Total

Military

Civilian

Export

Other'

22,000

1944:
January to March __
April to June ______ _
J u[y to September _ October to DecembeL ____________ _

27,600

8, 600
8,000
9, 600

8, 600
8, 000
9, 600

6, 500

6, 500

12, 900
9,600
13, 200

12,900
9, 600
13,200

4, 000
1942:
January to March~_
17,600
Aprtl to June ______ _
9,000
. July to September - 10,900
October to December _______ . _______________ _
1943:
January to March __
April to June ______ _
July to September._
October to December _____________ _

5,600

4,000
7, 700
7, 700
7,700

25, 300
16, 700
18, 600

7, 700

7, 700

9,400
7, 500
9,800

11,600
11,600
11,600

21,000
19, 100
21,400

10,700

11,600

22,300

26, 600
5, 300
400

5,500
5, 500
5,500

32, 100
10, 800
5,900

Kanegafuchi
Industry
(HYOgo)

CO,1

c~vrro:or!::a)

Total

Total

193L _________________
.48,500
(.)
48,500
2,800
53,000
1,900
1,200
58,900
1932_________________
62,800
(3)
62,800
2,800
53,000
1,900
1,200
58,900
1933__________________
77,200
(3)
77,200
2,800
53,000
1.. 900
1,200
58,900
1934 _____ - - - - - - - - - - - -.
79,400
(3)
79,400
2,800
53,000
1,900
1,200
58,900
1935 _____ - -- - - - - - - - - 66, 100
(.)
66, 100
3,300
66, 100
2, 200
1,700
73, 300
1936 __________________
70,500
(3)
70,500
4,400
68,300
2,200
1,700
76,600
1937. ____ - _- - - - - - - - - - 70, 500
(8)
70, 500
4, 400
66, 100
3, 300
3, 300
77, 100
1938 ___ - - - - - -. - - - - - - - 45,200
(.)
45,200
5,500
27, 600
3,900
3,300
40, 300
J939 __________________
52,900
(')
52,900
7,700
26;500
5,000
4,400
43,600
1940 ______ ---------32,700
(3)
32,700
11,000
25,400
3,300
5,500
45,200
194L ____ - - - - - - - - - - - - 39,700
(.)
39,700
16,500
24,300
1, 100
5, 500
47,400
1942 _____ - - - - - - - - - - - - 37, 500
30,800
68, 300
22,000
23, 100
1, 100
5,500
51, 700
1943 _____ - _- - - - - -- - - - '37,400
46,400
83,800
27,600
18,700
1, 100
5,500
52, 900
1944 _____ -- __________
33,000
22,000
55,000
29,800
13,200
1,100
.4,400
"8,500
1945 _______ - - - - - - - - - - - '_. __________________________________________________________________________ _
1945: January to September. ____ - - - - - - - - 1940:
January to March __
. April to June ______ _
July to September __
October to December _____ - -- -- - - - --1941:
January to March __
Amil to June ______ _
July to September -October to December ____________ .

Mitsui Chemical Mitsublsh18yn NiP~3u~~id.

Sumitomo
Industry Co.
Chemical Indus(Milke)
g'~~~'il~=) Co. (Uozu) try Co. (NIlhama)

1941 _______________
1942 _______________
1943 _______________

3.4
6. 7
9. 3

0
0
15.8

0
0
3.2

0
0
3.4

0
0
2.2

0
3.9
5.3

3.4
10. 6
39.2

1944:
January________
2.3
8.3
2.8
1.2
1.1
.4
16.1
February_______
2.5
8.4
1.4
1.2
1.1
.4
15.0
March_________
11. 0
8.1
2.8
.2
1. 7
.4
24.2
ApriL_________
9.4
7.1
1.6'
1.6
1.7
.4
21.8
May___________
11. 0
8. 8
1. 7
1. 5
2.8
.4
26.2
June___________
4.9
62
3.9
1.1
1.7
.4
18.2
July ___________
10.2
6.7
2.0
1.8
1.6
.4
.22.7
August ____________________________________________________________________________________________ _
September_____ _
7.2
6.0
4.5
.7
1. 6
.4
20.4
October________
5.7
4.1
2.4
.7
1.1
.4
14.4
November _____ ..
6.5
8. 9
4.5
-.8
1.1
.4
22.2
December_____ _
12.4
9.1
.9
.6
1.1
.4
24.5
1945:
January ________
11. 7
5.3
2.9
.4
1. 1
.2
21. 6
February _______
10.0
3.0
0
.3
.3
13.6

0
March _________
10.8
3.0
0
.3
0
.3
14.4
ApriL _________
8.4
4. 8
0
.9
0
.3
14. 4
May __________
2.6
9. 1
.5
.6
.2
.2
13.2
June ___________
1.0
2.9
4.3
.2
0
.3
.8. 7
July ___________
0
3.6
3.2
.2
0
.3
18.0
August. ________
0
.3
1.3
.1
0
.3
2.0
September ______
0
0
1.2
0
0
.2
1.4

:
I

K~nega!uchi IndJlStry Co. also built plant at Tor~ai, Osaka, which produced 0.7 ton in July 1945 only. This is inclUded in July total.
~~~~d:ire Co. also had a ?lant under constructIOn at Kurume WhIch was destroyed by bombing before completion.

Source: Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

700
5, 500
6,200 - - - - - ----- - - - - - - - _ . - ----- ---- - -------- --- --,---1945:
January W March__
21,500
2,800
24,300 ________________________. _________________________ _
April to June ____ - - 500
2,800
3,300 ___ . _____ ______________________. _________________ _
July to September _________________________________________________________________. ________________ _

}I'oe manulacture of goods {or export .

Includes crude rubber for electric wire covering, and crude rubher exported to Manchuria, Kwantung. and Ohina.
a No imports.

Source: Rubber Control Association.

152 ,

153

ApPENDIX TABLE

C-67.-Production and consumption of calcium carbide in Japan proper, 1930-1,5

C-68.-Production and consumption of

8uperphosphates in Japan proper, 1940-45

ApPENDIX TABLE

(In tons]

Fiscal year and Quarter

1930 ___________________ . _______________________________ _

1931 ___________________________________________________ _
1932_. _________________________________________________ _
1933 __________________________________________ ________ _
1934 ___________________________________________________ _
1935 ________________ : __________________________________ _
1936 ___________________________________________________ _
1937 ___________________________________________________ _
1938 _______________ : ___________________________________ _
1939 ___________________________________________________ _
1940c __________________________________________________ _
1941 ___________________________________________________ _
1942 ___________________________________________________ _
1943 _____________________ _____________________________ _
1944 ____________________. _______________________________ _
1945, April to September _________________________________ _
1941:
~

April to June_. _____________________________________ _

JUly to SeptembeL __________________________________ _
October to DecembeL _______________________________ _
January to March ____________________________________

Inventories
(at beginning
of perIod)

Consumption

(I)
(I)

(at end of
period)

(2)
(')
(')
(2)
(')
(')
(')
(2)
(')
(2)
(2)

330, 400
188,200
257, 800
239,200
280, 200
428, 700
467,000
488, 500
459, 700

13,845
14,020
14,351
17,563
20,243'

397,136
337,732
331,950
321,731
77,890

396,961
337,401
328, 738
319,051
72,647

14, 020
14,351
17,563
20, 243
25, 486

13,845
19,852
18,035
14,976

149, 144
106, 675
82, 541
58, 776

143,137
108,492
85,600
59, 732

19,852
18,035
14,976
14,020

14,020
20,028
16,699
14, 663

138, 766
80,555
83,051
35, 360

132, 759
83,884
85,087
35,672

20,028
16,699
14,663
14,351

14,351
47,855
59,855
63,419

123, 463
89,873
84,928
33,686

89,959
77,873
81,364
79,542

47,855
59, 855
63,419
17,563

(2)
(')

(')
(')

l')
(')
(')
(')
(')
(')
(.)

(')
(')
(')
(')
(')
(2)
(')
(')
(')
(')
(2)

1942:

April to June _______________________________________ _

July to September ___________________________________ _
October to DecembeL __ -- ___________________________ _
January to March ___________________________________ _

1943:

April to June _______________________________________ _

July to September ___________________________________ _
October to December _ -- - - ___________________________ _
January to March ___________________________________ _

1944,

April to June ________________________________________ _

July to SeptembeL __________________________________ _
October to December ____________________________.____ _
January to March ___________________________________ _

17, 563
50,388
- 49,911
36, 703

133,377
83,415
69,058
35,881

100,552
83,892
82,266
52,341

50, 388
49,911
36,703
20, 243

20, 243
25,037

63, 973
13,917

59, 179
13,468

25,037
25,486

1945:

April to June _______________________________________ _

July to SeptembeL __________________________________ _

[In tons]

Inventories

Production

C-69.-Production and consumption of

carbon disulfide in Japan proper, 1940-45

ApPENDIX TABLE

Fiscal year BOd Quarter

[1,000 poundo]

Production Exp~rts 1

Cti~p-.

1940____ ~ ___________ " _____ 1, 846, 80041, 700 I, 288, 600

194L _____________________ 1,058,800 8,800 776,000
1942______________________ 671,900 6,500 745,200
1943-------------- _______ ~ 515,700 2,700 440,900
1944______________________
56,800
0
15,400
. 1945, April to August_______
8,200 (2) ________ _
1940:
April to June ___________ _ 503, 60028,400 ________ _
July to September _______ _ 417,100 2,500 ________ _
October to December ____ _ 480, 500 2, 000 ________ _
January to March _______ _ 445, 600 8, 800 ________ _
1941 :
April to June ___________ . 362, 800 3,100 ________ _
July to September _______ _ 296,600
100 ________ _
October to December ____ _ 275,200 1,300 ________ _
January to March _______ _ 124,200 4,300 ________ _
1942:
April to June ___________ _ 137, 400
-0 ________ _
July to September _______ _ 163,600 2,500 ________ _
October to December ____ _ 201,100 3,200 ________ _
800 ________ _
January to March _______ _ 169, 800
1943:
100 ________ _
April to June ___________ _ 154;800
700 ________ _
July to Septemb~r _______ _ 144,400
500 ________ _
October to December ____ _ 149,000
J anuar), to March _______ _
67, 500 1,400 c _______ _
1944:
0 ________ _
April to June ___________ _
53, 100
0 ________ _
July to September _______ _
2, 500
October to December ____ _
January to March _______ _

0 ________ _

900

300

(2)

1945:

April to June ___________ _

July to August _____ -' ____ _

4,800 (')
3,400 - (2)

~ ~~xcf~~" do not include shipments

to Korea and Formosa.

Inventory

Fiscal year sod Quarter

1940 _________________
1941 _________________
-1942 _________________
1943 _________________
1944 _________________
1945, April to June ____
1940:

(begInning 01
period)

Produc. Consump Inventory

(end 01
tiOD
tion
period)

5,300 191,200 130,200 66,300

66,300 154,700 103, 000 118,000
118,000 96,800 71, 700 143, 100
143,100 64,500 64,900 142, 700
142,700 40,700 32, 100 151, 300
151,300 5,600 5,500 151,400

April to June ________ 5, 300 42, 700

JUly to September ___ 15, 800 45,000
October to December_ 30, 100 51,400
January to March ___ 47,800 52,100

1941:
April to June ________
July to September ___
October to December_
January to March ___

32,200
30,700
33, 700
33,600

15,800
30, 100
47,800
66, 300

66,300
83, 100
97,600
109, 800

50,500
41,600
36, 600
26,000

33, 700 83, 100

27,200 97,600
24,400 109, 800
17,700 118, 100

118, 100
127,000
135, 100
143, 100

26, 800
25, 700
24,200
20,100

17,900 127,000
17,600 135, 100
16,200 143, 100
20, 100 143, 100

143, 100
143, 300
143,200
143, 000

17,900
16,800
16,800
13,000

17,700 143, 300

16, 900 143, 200
17,000 143,000
13,300 142,700

1942:
April to June ________
July to September _"_
October to December_
January to March ___

1943:
April to June ________
JUly to September ___
October to December_
January to March ___

1944:

April to June ________

July to September ___
October to December_
January to March ___
1945, April to June ____

142, 700 12,800 11,600 143,900

143, 900 11,300 11,300 143, 900
143, 900 10,300 3, 100 151, 100
151, 100 6,300 6, 100 151,300
151,300 5, 600 5, 500 151,400

Source: Chemical Industry Control Association.

.

Source: Production: Cbemical Industry Control Association. Exports:

Import-Export Bureau.

Including exports which were always under 1 peroont 01 total.

No data.
Souroe: Chem1calIndnstry Control Assoclatlon.

I
I

154

155-

G-70.-Japanese production, exports and

import. of refined naphthalene, 1940-45

ApPENDIX TABLE

April to June _____ - _ - _- __

July to September _______ _
October to December ____ _
January to March _______ _

Production 1

Imports

7,800
6, 550
11,720
13,240

930
1,350
1,420
670

8, 810
5,230
7,510
8,680

460
1,000
1,370

6,690
3,490
3, 160
2, 570

G-72.-Production and imports of butanol

in Japan proper, 1940-45

Fiscal year and quarter

Exports

Production

C-72.-Production and imports of butanol

in Japan proper, 1940-45-Continued
-

ApPENDIX TABLE

ApPEN DIX TABLE

[ThousandS of poundsl

(Thousands of poundsl

(Thousands of poundsl
Fiscal year and quarter

G-71.-Production, imports and export.

of acetone in Japan proper, 1940-45

ApPENDIX TABLE

Imports

Fiscal year and quarter

p~~:c-

Fiscal year and quarter

Exports

Imports

-----------------I---~----------

11
4
9

n~~:.":~frro~m,ce~~.&,~uo~~~e~~~~~tr);:~tYri1:~r"~p~~~,;

was made by taking 85 percent of the crude naphtbalene production of the

Yawata plant of JaPBIl Iron Mfg. Co., Ltd. (Nihon Seitet&u K. K.) which
supplied all the crud. naphthalene requirements of Kyushu Kagaku Co.
Sources: Production ligures are from Chemical Industry Control Association and plant records. Import and export ligures are from Import-Export

2, 730
1940______________________ 4,530
570
1941______________________ 5,600
1942 ______________________ 14,130 -------1943 ______________________ 11,830
1944____ _____________ _____ 6,350
1945 ______________________ -------- -------1940:
April to June ___________ _ 1,150
540
July to September _______ _ 1, 190
1,420
440
October to December ____ _ 1, 250
January to March _______ _
330
940
1941:
April to June ___________ _ 1, 250
570
July to September _______ _ 1,430
October to December ____ _ 1,420
January to Marcb _______ _ 1, 500
1942:
April to June ___________ _ 3, 180
July to September _______ _ 3, 280
October to December ____ _ 3, 590
January to March _______ _ 4,080
1943:
April to June ___________ _ 2,880
July to September_~ _____ _ 2,870
October to Decjlmber ____ _ 2,990
January to March _______ _ 3,090
1944:
April to June ___________ _ 1,720
July to September _______ _ 1,350
October to December __.__ _ 1,720
January to March _______ _ 1, 560

_______ _
_______ _
------ __
8
-------_

1940 _____________________________ _
78IT
1941. _________________ , _________ _ 3,910
1942 _____________________________ _
7,690
1943 _____________________________ _ 13,210
1944 _____________________________ _ 1,570
1945 _____________________________ _
(')
1940:
April to June ____________________ _
J40
July to September _______________ _
150
October to December ____________ _
220
January to March __ " _____________ _
270
1941:
April to June _______ . ____________ _
710
July to September _______________ _
740
October to December ____________ _
790
January to March _______________ _ 1,670
1942:
April to June ____________________ _ 1, 560
July to September _______________ _ 2,010
October to December ____________ _ 2, 030
January to March _______________ _ 2,090
1943:
April to June ____________________ _ 4,000
July to September _______________ _ 3, 270
October to December ____________ _ 2,880
January to March _______________ _ 3,060
ApPENDIX TABLE

Sources: Production: Chemical Industry Control Association. Imports

and Exports: Import-Export Bureau.

1944:

1,050
660

April to June ____________________ _

July to September _______________ _
October to December ____________ _
January to March _______________ _

o
7

o
o
o

340
530
430
270

INo date.
Sources: Production: Chemical Industry Control Association. Imports:
Import-Export Bureau.
-

o
o
o

ApPENDIX

1,050

TABLE
C-73.-Production and imports of
glycerine in Japan proper, 1940-45

Thousands of pounds]

490

110
60

o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Calandar year

Produc-

1940 _____________________________ _
1941 _____________________________ _
1942 _____________________________ _
1943 _____________________________ _
1944 , ____________________________ _
1945: January to Sel?tember __ _

14,820
15, 780
11,950
13,050
8,520
2, 920

tion

Imports

220
3,635
2,935
895
65,500
None

1416,000 pounds were exported in 1944.

Sources: Production: Chemical Industry Control Associationj Imports and
Exports: ImportExport Bureau,

G-74.-Japanese imports of phosphorite, by source, 1935-44[Thousands of tonsl

Source

South Pacific Islands:

Ocean Nauru _______
Christmas __________
Makatea ___________
Angaur ____________
Others _____________

Bureau.

SubtotaL ________
Percent of totaL __
Other:
Florida ____________
Indochina __________
Raichow ___________
Kossier ____________
Safaga ____________ ._
Gafsa _____________
Morocco ___________
Others _____________
SubtotaL ________
Percent of totaL __
TotaL __________

1935

1936

1938

1937

1939

1940

11141

1942

1943

11144

----------------------------- - -

43
125
123
86
79

45
131
123
98
121

60
132
154
100
36

44
115
101
115
110

4,5
140
151
158
153

168
205
172
134
140

0
87
150
148
172

0
0
0
140
186

0
4
0
108
84 -

0
0
0
29
13

456

518

482

485

647

819

557

326

196

42

267
0
0
152
142
0
26
0

290
0
-0
215
117
0
40
0

313

283
0
0
160
88
0
28
11

252
0
21
3
7
0
0
20

132
23
71
0
0
0
3
1

0
76
83
0
0
0

0
223
128
23
54
0

180
0
0
111
99
10
22
1

30

75
0
0
0
0
24

0
3
77
0
0
0
0
39

741

423

570

303

230

189

171

119

367

161

- - - ---- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---------------------------- ------=

73
44
53
71
63
54
53
26
44
39
=
----=
------------=
=
=
=

72

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --=

587
56

1,043

=
=

662
56

1,180

--------=
=
47
47
61
--------=
=
1,223

908

1,217

27
1,122

----=
29
---- =
787

37
515

----==
46
74
----=

Source. Fertllker Section, Pertl1lzer and Agriculture Bnreau.

156

157

ApPENDIX TABLE

ApPENDIX TABLE

C-75.-Production, imports and exports of ammonium 8ulfate and calcium cyanamide, Japan proper,

G-76.-Production, consumption, exports and imports of caustic soda, Japan proper, 1931-45

1940-1,5

[In tonsl

[In tonsl

Ammonium

Sulfate 1

pro~uction

imports

FlBcaI year quarter

1940 __________________________________________________ ---1941 __________________________________________________ ---1942 __________________________________________________ ---1943

~-------;------------------------------1944 ______________
__________________________________________________
---1945; April to August_ - -- - - --- - - - - -- - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - -1940:
April to June ___ - - - - --- - - - .' - -- - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -July to September - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - -- -- - - - - - - -October to December - - - -- - -- - -- -- --- - - - ---- - - -- - - -- - - -Ja';uary to March ___ - - - - - - - - - -- -- - - - - -- - -- - - -- - -- - - - - --

1941:

..

April to June_ - - - - -.- - - - - - - --- -- - -- - - - - - - -- - - - --- - - - - - -JUly to September --- - - --- --- - -- - - - -- - --- -- - ----- - - - - - -October to December - - - - - - - - --- - - - - - - - - - -- - -- --- -- - - - -Janu'ary to March_ -- - - ---- - - - -- - - ---- - - - -- - - - - - - -- - - - --

1942:
April to June_ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ,. - - - - -JUly to September - -- - - - -- - -- - --- - - -- - -- - - - - -- -- -- - - -- -October to December - - - - - - - - - -- - - - -- - - - - - - - - - -- - --- - - -January to March ___ -- - - - --- -'-- -- --- - - - - -- - -- -, -- - - - - --

1943:
April to June_ - - - --- --- - - - -- - --- - - -- - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - -- -July to September _____________________________________ _
October to December - - - -- - - - --- - - - - - ---- --- -- - - - - - - - --January to March_ - - - - - -- - -- - - -- - - - - - -- - - - - -- - - - - - - -- --

1944:
April to June ___ - - - - - - - -- - -- - -- - - - - - - -- - - -- - - - - - - - - - - -July to September - -- - - - -- - --- -- -- - - - - ------ -- - - - -- - ---October to December. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -January to March _____________________________________ _

1945:
-April to June_ - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - -- - -- - -- ------ --- -- -- - - - -July to August __ - - - -- -- - - - ----- - -- -- ------- -- - - -- - - - - --

Cyanamide

FlBcaI year-month

Production

bycausticiZStiOD

production

Production
by electrolyslB

Imports

Total prodnctionand
imports

ConsumJr
tion, home
islands

Exports to

COIisumption-actUal

foreign

countries

Army

Navy

Civilian
(including)
aircraft)

------I-----j------- ----- - - - - ----- - - - -

exports

7
0

1,252,400
1,374,000
1,189,300
1,021,400
680,900
92, 100

128,554
6O,5ll
34,834
0
1,034
0

233,487
250, 779
2ll,488
169, 823
163,451
40,809

317,700
289,400
317, 100
328

62, 152
38, 503
15,935
ll,964

71,202
51,410
55,360
55, 515

0
1
0

366,800
329, 100
324, 700
335,400

23,402
ll,OOl
6,757
19,351

77,291
50, 703
62, 607
50,178

0
0
0
0

332,500
287,600
307,200
262,000

15, 267
4,134
ll,354
4,079

71,442
57,747
46,442
35,857

0
1
0
0

305, 900
243,800
252,600
219, 100

0
0
0
0

50,435
44,807
39, 661
34, 920

0
0
0
0

255,800
159,500
147, 600
ll8,000

0
0
1,034

0
0
0

(.)

59,360
43, 727
41,812
18, 552

(2)

76,000
16, 100

(2)
(.)

30, 192
10, 617

(.)
(2)

Includes byproduct ammonium sulfate.

'No data.
Source; Production-ChemJcal Industry Control Association Imports and Exports-Impart-Export Bureau.

Calcium

0
0

----------

1931 ____________________ _
1932____________________ _
1933 ____________________ _
1934____________________ _
1935 ____________________ _
1936____________________ _
1937 __________________ - - _
1938 ____________________ _
1939 __________________ - -1940 ____________________ _
1941 ____________________ _
1942 ____________________ _
1943 ____________________ _
1944 ____________________ _
1945 through August _____ _
1941:
ApriL ______________ _
May ________ - _____ --June ________________ _
July ________ - _____ - - August ______ - _______ _
September _________ - -October _____________ _
November" __________ _
December ___________ _
January _____________ _
February ____________ _
March ______________ _

45,851
31,.068
13,650
10,922
21,975
12, 772
30,235
293
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

95,214
109,691
131,457
193,272
257, 115
303,038
405,866
486, 143
582,555
455,492
305,774
246,303
239,369
154,971
28,368

18, 192
21, 132
20, 837
13, 369
16, 547
11,668
12,290
12,545
11, 719
12, 072
11,562
.1 1,739

12,911
13,025
11,725
11,422
10, 176
10,872
11,892
11,437
11,092
10, 126
8, 317
9, 107

------------------------_.
--------------------------------------------------------------------- ... _--

31, 103
34, 157
32,562
24,791
26,723
22,540
24, 182
23, 982
22,811
22, 198
19,879
20, 846

11,210
10, 793
9, 816
10,301
9, 122
6,721
9, 815
10,538
12, 003
10,417
9, 195
10,687

9,533
10, 179
9,719
10,898
10, 963
11, 111
11, 702
11, 226
11, 146
10, 126
9,054
9,978

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

20, 793 _._------- --------------20, 972 --------- -------- -------- -------19, 535 --------- -------- - -.- - ---- -------21, 199 --------- -------- -------- -------20; 085 --------- -------- -------- -..------17, 832 --------- -------- -------- -------21, 517 --------- -------- -------- -------21,764 --------- -------- -------- -------23, 149 ---------------- -------20, 543 --------- -------- .------- -------18,249 --------- -------- -------- -------20, 665 --------- ----- ...... - ""------- --------

8,046
12, 120
10,846
10,627
9,888
8, 938
19,704
9,087
10,515
8, 946
6, 382
6,847

11,274 --------12, 243 --------11,741 --------11,388 --------10,346 --------9,433 --------10,609 --------10,287 --------10, 258 ---.-- - - - ...
10, 121 --------9, 162 --------9, 661 ---------

1943:

ApriL ______________ _
May ____ '____________ _
June ________________ _
July ________________ _
August ______________ _
September ___________ _
October _____________ _
November ___________ _
December ___________ _
January _____________ _
February ____________ _
March ______________ _

12
3, 503
5, 593
13,524
19,286
26,357
6, 134
12,803
26, 768
13, 389
8, 619
4,949
6,372
638
6

40,851
46, 143
57, 627
61, 936
86,030
95, 628
116,075
149,245
194, 561
154, 743
132, 102
125,685
126, 523
106, 062
21, 543

1942:

ApriL _________ - ___ -May ________ - ______ -_

June ________________ _
July _______________ -August ______________ _
September ___________ _
October _____________ _
November ___________ _
December ___________ _
January _____________ _
February ____________ _
March ___ : __________ _

99,340
106,372
125, 662
179,675
236;443
313,053
399, 789
487,217
443,059
540, 127
318,342
265,264
249,025
,142,250
15,000

8,512
32,480
60, 180
120,414
149, 110
194, 638
259,556
336,605
387,994
300, 749
173,672
120,618
112,846
48,909
6,825

1. 9
2. 8
6. 3
17. 7
7. 5
13. 6
20. 1
10.4
12. 5
12.4

98.
97.
93.
82.
78.
69.
75.

1
2
7
3
9
5
1

--------- -------- -------- -------- ---------------- -------- -------- -------- ---------------- -------- -------- -------- ---------------- -------- -------- -------- ---------------- -------- -------- -------- ---------------- -------- -------- -------- ---------------- -------- -------- -------- ---------------- -------- -------- -------- - -- ---------- -------- -------- -------- ---------------- -------- -------- -------- ---------------- -------- -------- --- ... ---- ---------------- -------- -------- -------- --------

__ J

19,320
24, 363
22,587
22,015
20, 234
18, 371
21, 313
19,374
20, 773
19,067
15, 544
16, 508

-------- -------- --------------- -------- --------------- -------- --------------- -------- --------------- -------- --------------- ---------- -------- --------------- -------- --------

_____

----------------------

--------

------------------------------------------ .
._----- .

------- .

--------- -------- -------- -------- ---------------- -------- -------- ---------------- - - - - - - -- -------- -------- ---------------- -------- -------- -------- ------- .
--------- -------- -------- -------- ----------------------- -------- ---------------- -------- -------- -------- ------- .
--------- -------- -------- -------- ------- .
--------- -------- -------- -------- ------ .
--------- -------- -------- -------- -- - -- --oo
--------- -------- -------- -------- ---------------- -------- -------- --------

See footnotes at end of table.

158

714928-47--12

159

ApPENDIX TABLE G-76.-Production, cOn8umption, exports and imports of caustic soda, Japan proper, 1931-1,5-Con.
Fiscal

Production
by causticlz&tion

year~montb

Production
byelectrolysis

Total pro-

Consump-

Exports to

d~~pO~:d ti~~~~;ne co~~~ t

Import8

Consumption-actual
Army

Navy

ApPENDIX TABLE C-77.-Production and consumption of chlorine in Japan proper, 1931-45-Continued

Civilian)

(~~g

Planned allocation
Fiscal year and month

Production

____________~I-----I-----I----I---- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

1944:
ApriL ________
May __________
June _______ . - - - - - --July ____ - - - - - - - - - - - -AugusL ____ --- ---- - -September ____________
October _________ 0 ____
NovembeL __ - _- - - - - -,December __ - - - - - -- --January ______________
February _____________
March _______ - - - - - - -1945:
ApriL ____ - _- - - - - - - - May __________ - - - - - - June __________ - _- - - -July ____________ - - --August ________ - - - - - --

~,942

10,729 --------- 17, 671 __________________ - - - - - - 11,325 --------- 17,088 _________________________

10, 639 --------- 15, 859 ________________ - - - - - - - - 9,695 --------- 13, 943 ________________ - - - - - - - - 9, 109 --------- 12,273 _________________ -------7,900 --------- _11,497 _________________________
8,880 --------- 12, 869 ________________ - __ - - - - - 8,393 --------- 11,823 ____________________ ----7, 654 --------- 11, 703 ___________________ - - - -- 8,525 --------- 11, 812 _____________________ - - - 9,039 ____________________ - - - - 6,241 --------9,394 __________________ -------6,972 ---------

5,863
5, 220
4,248
3, 164
3,597
3,989
3,430
4,049
3,287
2,798
2,422
2,663
1,843
1,688
631
0

5,006 --------5,926 --------5, 111 --------3, 729 --------1,771 ---------

7, 669
7, 769
6, 799
4,360
1,771

- - - -- - - - - - - - -- - -_
-------- -------_
------- - ------- _
- -- - - - - - - - - - - - - --------,--------------- -------------- - --------------- -------- - - - - - - - - -- - - - - -------- -------- -- -- - - - - ---- ---------- --------

-- -- --- --1- ------------ --------- ------ -'---

) Does not include about 5,000 tons per year exported to Korea. and a.n unmown quantity to Taiwan.
Source: Data are from Chemical Industry Control ASSOciation (Mr. Endo).

ApPENDIX TABLE G-77.-Production and consumption of chlorine in Japan proper, 1931-45

[In tonsl
F:'unctional break-down of total consumption-

Planned allocation
Production

Consump~

tion

Army
percent

Navy
percent .2

Aircraft
percent 8

Civilian
percent

to bleaching
powder

to liquid
to hydro~ to unclassi~
chlorine chlodc acid fled U8(>S 4

-------1----1----- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

1931 ______________ _
1932 ______________ _
1933 ________ ------1934 ______________ _
1935 ___________ - __ _
1936 ___________ '___ _
1937 ______________ _
1938 ______________ _
1939 _________ - __ - - 1940 ______________ _
1941 ______________ _
1942 ______________ _
1943 ______________ _
1944 ______________ _

36,235
40,930
51,115
54,938
76,309
84,822
102,959
132, 380
173, 554
126, 235
117,174
111,483
112,224
94,076
1945: Ap~il to August_ 19, 110
1941:
April ________ ~ __
May __________ _
June __________ _
July ___________ _
AugusL_c-:. ____ _
September ______ _
October _________ _
November _____ _
December ______ _

~t :~~.

16,990
19,559
21,225
23, 149
31, 579
32,742
39,311

36, 190
40,680
50,398
54,982
~6,365

84,038
102, 245
132,380
173, 554
126,235
117,174
111,483
112,224
94,076
19,110

160

2, 741
3,966
5, 316
9,213
13,413
18,785
21,230

16,459
17, 155
23,857
22,620
31,373
32,511
41,704

o
o
o

-------- -------- -------- --------

3. 8

11:7
11.5
8.1
5.0

5.4
5.4
4.1

4.3
3.8

}-------- ----------------------

96.2
88. 3
83. 1
82.2
87. 1

33, 165
27,476
24,776
14,750
2, 296

24,748
20, 590
23,314
18,384
2,056

51,661
48, 251
52, 357
34,926
4,3.98

7, 690
15, 166
10, 777
26,016
10,360

8, 146

7,031

10,346 --------

8,207

4, 651

17,245

- --- 11,007

7,272

14,855 --------

}________________________________
~~: H~ }------- ---------------- -------- --1~: ~!~

See footnote. at end ot table_

p;:::e~ , ~cr::ta

~~:;;t

---------~------

Fiscal year and month

Consumption I

1941-Con.
January _______ _
February ______ _
March _________ _
1942:
April __________ _
May __________ _
June __________ _
July _________ _
August- _______ _
September _____ _
October ________ _
November _____ _
December _____ _
January _______ _
February ______ _
March _________ _
1943:
ApriL _________ _
May __________ _
June __________ _
July ___________ _
August- _______ _
September _____ _
October ________ _
November ___ " __
December ______ _
January _______ _
February ______ _
March _________ _
1944:
ApriL _________ _
May, _________ _
June __________ _
July __________ _
August ________ _
September _____ _
October ________ _
November _____ _
December ______ _
January _______ _
February ______ _
March _________ _
1945:
ApriL _________ _
May __________ _
June __________ _
July ___________ _
August ________ _

Functional break-down of total consumption-

~!;=~ to ~~=;ng ~:~~~~ c~ro~~d~d t~~;~a:sl-------------------

8.982
7,378 } - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _____
8,078

5, 805

8, 501
9,029 } - - - - - - - - - - - -- -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ - - __ . __ _ 6, 262
8, 621
9,667
9, 723 }------- - -------- -----.--- -------- --______ 7,490
9, 856
10, 379
9, 957
7, 582
-------- -------.
9,887
8,982
8,031
8,850

}------}-------------------------------- - ------{2~: !i~

10,000
10, 860 }-------- -------- ------- --- ---_ --______
10,413
10, 101
9, 177 }-------- -------- -------- -------_ --______
8,368
9,409
9, 124 }-------- -------- -------- ------_ ..
9,028
8,977

8,128
8,569

9,215 --------

4; 597

11,465 --------

5,530

12,972 --------

5,410

13,925

5,053
20,590

9,889
48,251

6,895

5,935

13, 546 --_. ----

7,080

6,975

14, 366 --------

5,957

13,438

5,447
24,314

11,007
52,357

~------- 5,669
}-------- ---- --- -------- ----- -- -------- {2~: ~~~

9,516
10,045 } - - - - - - - - -- - - -" - - - - - -- --- - - -- __ __ ______ __
9,437
8,599
8,079 } - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ ________
7,007
7,877
7,445 } - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - ___ ._. ____
6, 789
7,562
5, 536
6, 184

5,794

--"'i-----

4, 793

5,587

10, 797 --------

4, 949

5,774

10,057 - - - _.. - --

2, 812

3,385

8,119

F:------ ----- --- -------- -------- ----- ~-- {I!: ~!~

3,638
18,384

5,593
34, 926

2,296

2,056

4,398

4,440
5,257
4,534
3,308
1,571

----~---

1 Stocks, exports and imports were negligible or nonexistent.

:a Prior to 1944 requirements for aviation undustry came out of civilian
allocation.
. '
'Data are from Chemical Industry Control Association (Mr. Endo).

4 "Unclass1.fl.ed uses" are almost entirely direct orders from the army and
navy to the chlorine manufacturers for chlorine compounds made at the
plants. Data on .uob dealings were not reported to the C. I. C. A. This
practice asststed In undermining Its etrectivensss, because these orders were
over and above the planned allocations obtained tbrough the C. I. C. A.

161

ApPENDIX TABLE C-78.-Production of 8ulfuric acid, Japan proper, 1931-45

ApPENDIX TABLE C-78.-Production of sulfuric acid, Japan proper, 1931-45

[In tons of 100 HjSOj 1]
Fiscal year and month

. Chamber acid

100 percent H,sO.

~~:~~ gf:~

Total contact
acid

Fiscal year and month

Total acid

1931. ___________________________________________________________________________ -----------767,000

1932________________________________________ ____________ ____________ ____________ ____________
961,000
1933________________________________________ ____________ ____________ ____________ ____________
1,176,000
1,281,000
1934________________________________________ ____________ ____________ ____________ ____________
1935 ______________________________________________________________________________ - - - - - --- - I, 507, 000
1936 _________________________________________________________ .. _____________________ - __ - - - - - 1,882, 000
1937 ______________________________________________________________________________ --- - - - - - - 2,507, 000
1938________________________________________ ____________ _____________ ____________ ____________
2,240,000
1939 ________________________________________ -:---------- ------------ ------------ ------------ -----------1940 _________________________________________________ ~ __________________________ -----------2,493,000
194L ________________________________________ ------------ ---------.--- ------------ ------------ -----------1942___________ ______________________________ 1,110,800
753,000
60,100
813,100
1,923,900
1943________________________________________
739,200
814,500
61,600
876,100
1,615,300
432,000
607,000
60,600
667,600
1,099,600
1944_: ____________________'\_________________
1945: April to August________ _______________
59,000 ____________ ____________
1I8,800
177,800
1942:
68,300
166, 200
5, 100
63,200
97,900
April ______ ~-----.---------------------May ____________________________________
70,200
170,800
5,000
65,200
100,600
162, 200
63,000
4,900
58,100
99,200
June ____ --- - - -- -- -- -- ----- - -- ---- -- - - -162, 200
68,600
5,600
63,000
93,600
July ____ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _- - - - - - - - - - - - 66,300
158,000
5, 100
61,200
91, 700
August _____ - - ___ -- - --- - - --- --- __ - - - - - -September _________ -- ____________________
60,400
147,000
4,800
55,600
86, 600
October _________________________________
66,800
164, 100
5,600
61,200
97,300
_______________________________
161, 200
66,300
71,500
4,800
94,900
Ilecember _______________________________
73,700
170,900
4, 100
97,200
69, 600
January _________________________________
68,300
155,000
4,500
86,700
68,800
February ________________________________
64,300
143,000
4, 500
78, 700
59,800
March __________________________________
76,900
163, 300
6, 100
70,800
86,400
1943:
April ___________________________________
153, 900
81,900
4,900
77,000
72,000
May _____________________________________
148, 200
79,200
4,000
69, 100
75,200
. June _____________ - ______________________
74,600
144, 600
69,100
5,500
70,300
72, 500
134, 200
4,400
68,100
61, 700
July _____ - - - - - - - _; - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - August __________________________________
67,500
130,200
5,200
62,300
62,700
September _______________________________
119,100
5~, 100
5,500
52,600
61,000
October ______ - __________________________
63,100
124, 300
5,800
57,300
61,200
_______________________________
73, 300
134, 500
5,400
67,900
61,200
Ilecember _______________________________
79,000
141,600
5, 500
73,500
62,700
January _________________________________
81,400
140,000
76,200
5,200
58,600
February ____________________________ : ___
70,500
5,000
1I8,800
48,300
65,500
March ___________________________ .- ______
_5,200
75,000
125, 900
69,800
50,900
1944:
ApriL ___________________________________
75,000
125, "500
5,500
50,500
69,500
May ____________________________________
74.,900
125,400
5,300
50,500
69,600
June ____________________________________
67,700
1I6,600
4,200
48,900
63,500
July __________ -___________________________
56,800
98, 500
5,500
41, 700
51,300
August __________________________________
54,900
87, 600
5, 700
49,200
32,700
September _________________ ._____________
50,500
4,400
79, 600
29,100
56, 100
October _________________________________
5,600
52,000
84,800
46,400
32,800
~ovembet----- - _- -- - _- - - _________________
5,900
55,500
88, 300
32,800
49,600
Ilecember _______________________________
5, 100
51,000
84, 100
33, 100
45,900
January _________________________________
49,900
4,200
80,400
45, 700
30, 500
February ________________________________
4,000
38, 700
62,800
24,200
34,700
March __________________________________
.5,200
40, 700
66,000
35,500
25, 300
See footnotes at end of tahle.
~ovember

~ovember

Chamber acid

100 percent HsSO.

~~~~~~ ~i!n25

Continued
Total contact

------------------------------1-------1945:
April-_______________________________ ~ __ _
May ___________________________________ _
June ___________________________________ _
July __________ ________________________ _
August ________________________________ _
Postwar:
September _____________________________ _
October ___ _

18, 100
22,030
4,900
8,200
5,800

31,600
31,800
21,500

4,600
4, 100
3,300

3,300
4,500

1 Production was. nearly equal to consumption because there were no 1m

portsj exports were never over 2 percent of production, and inventories
amounted to only 2 or 3 weeks' supply.

Total acid

acid

36,200
35,900
24,800
15, 700
6,200

54, 300
57,900
29, 700
23,900
12, 000

1,600
1,900

4,900
6,400

Source: Data for 1940 through 1945 are from the Japan Sulfuric and Nitric
Acids Controlling Co., 8 section of the Chemical Industry Control Association. Data for 1931 through 1938 are from Foreign Economic Administra~
tion (U, S,) Report J8-28.

ApPENDIX TABLE C-79.-Production of tetraethyllead. in Japan, 1940-45

[Pounds of tetraethyllead]
Production year and month

Army

1940 ________________
35, 200
1941 ________________ 426,600
1942 _______________ _ 1,599,300
1943 _______________ _ 2,923,000
1944 ________________
3,671,200
1945 (5 monthsl ______ 635, 900
1940:
Septllmber _______ ---------October _________
5, 600
~ovember _______
5, 900
Ilecember ______'_
7, 300
January _________
8, 300
. February _____ ~ __
5,500
March __________
2,600
1941:
ApriL ___________
9, 500
May ____________
26,100
June ____________
15, 300
Ju]y ____________
16,400
August __________
24, 800
September _______
36, 400
October _________
37,900
~ovember _______
40,900
Ilecember _______
54,600
January _________
48,400
February ________
53,400
March __________
62,900
1942:
ApriL ___________
68,200
May ____________
84,900
June ____________
90,100
July ____________
77,500
August __________ 109, 300
September- ______ 118,900
October _________ 156, 600
~ovembe,- ______
161,200
Ilecember _______ 200, 800

Total

Production year and month

49,900
398,600
2,036,100
3,295,400
3,353,200
475,700

85, 100
825,200
3,635,400
6,218,400
7,024,400
1,111,600

14,000
4,900
4,900
6", 700
7,200
5, 500
6, 700

14,000
10,500
10, 800
14,000
15,500
11,000
9,300

7, 700
5, 700
5,800
15, 200
23,300
36,200
35,300
42,400
46,200
50, 100
59, 700
71,000

17,200
31,800
21,100
31,600
48,100
72,600
:73,200
83,300
100,800
98,500
1I3,100
133,900

81,300
101, 100
102,000
108,600
138,000
175,000
242,300
225,600
215, 500

149, 500
186,000
192,100
186, 100
247,300
293,900
398,900
386,800
416,300

1942-Continued
January _______ February ________
March __________
1943:
ApriL ___________
May ____________
June ____________
July ____________
August __________
September _______
October _________
~ovember _______
Ilecember _______
January _________
February ____ - -March __________
1944:
ApriL __________
May ____________
June ____________
July ____________
August __________
September _______
Oqtober _________
~ovember _______
Ilecember _______
January _________
February ________
March __________
1945:
ApriL __________
May ----------June ____________
.July ____________
AugusL _________

Navy

Army

Navy

165,600
169,500
196,700

188,800
217,000
240,900

354,400
386, 500
437,600

179,000
178,900
186,600
200,300
198,500
221,500
233, 100
269, 800
301,800
283, 700
289,800
380,000

226,900
256,500
217,300
210,100
223,000.
263, 700
285, 800
323,600
309,500
308, 7(}0
289,400
380, 900

405,900
435, 400
403,900
410,400
421, 500
485, 200
518,900
593,400
61I,300
592,400
579,200
760, 900_

423, 100
303,200
323,400
305,400
337, 600
464, 700
334, 200
360, 800
292,500
240, 900
125, 700
159,700

350,600
397,100
310,300
298,000
323,100
369, 500
287, 700
261,100
299,600
219,000
140,800
96,400

773, 700
700, 300
633, 700
603, 400
660,700
834,200
621,900
621,900
592, 100
459,900
266, 500
256,100

106, 600
163,000
196, 700
1I0,600
59,000

67,900
87, 900
132, 200
136,400
51, 300

174,500
250,900
328,900
247,000'
110,300

Total

Source. Records Crom producing plants.

162

163

ApPENDIX TABLE G-80.-Production and di8tribution of toluol, Japan proper, 1931-J,5-Continued

AN'ENDIX TABLE G-80.-Production and di8tlibution of toluol, Japan proper, 1931-J,5

[Thousands or gallons]

=~(~re

Fiscal year and month

1931 ___________________________
1932 ___________________________
1933 -------------------------1934 ___________________________
1935 ___________________________
1936_. __________________ . _____ c
1937 ____________________ . ______
1938 ___________________________
1939 ___________________________
1940 _______ - - - _- - - -- - - - - - - - - - -1941 ___________________________
1942 ___________________________
1943_ ------------------------1944 _______ - _- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1945 to August 15 -------------1941:
ApriL ___________ ,_______ - ___
May _________________ - - - - -J une _________________ -'- - - -July ________________ - - - --August _______________ - - - ___
September ____________ - - - - __
October __ ----------------November ----------------December ____________ - _____
January ____________________
February -----------------March ____ ----------------1942:
April ______________________
May ______ ._________________
June ----~----------------July ____ ------------------August _____________________
September ___ . ______________
October --- ------- ---.-----November _________________ .
December __________________
January ___________________ ._
February ___________________
March --------------------1943:
April_ --------------------May ___________ ._--------June _______________________
July_. _____________________
August _______ ~ ______ . ______
September_ c__________ c _____
October. ___________________
November _________ -------December"" .. ________________
January _____ ~_ - - - - - - - - - - -February ______ - - - - - - - - - - - -March ________ ------------1944:
April __ : ___ . _____ . __________
May _______________________

See footnotes at end of table.

164

Production

304
523
621
593
417

154
241
363
486
615
696
840
1,414
1, 595
1,869
2, 257
2,330
2, 776
Z; 156
355

304
304
312
337
341
362
398
412
92
414
416
473

(')
(2)
(')
(2)
(2)
(I)
(.)
(')
(I)
(2)

~I:~/::re

Fiscal year and month

Manchuria

(I)
(I)
(I)
(2)
(I)
(')
(.)
(2)
(I)
(I)

Imports from
total

Consumption

(')
(I)

(')
(')
(I)
(2)
(I)
(.)
(')
(')
(')
(.)

e)
(I)
(')
(')
(')

Production

Imports from

Manchuria

total

Consumption

End of period

End of period

(I)
(I)
(2)
(')
(I)
(')
(.)
(2)
(2)

218
146
275
25
0

2,779
2,999
3,672
2,774
772

2,200
3,050
2, 100
2,256
2,378
. 3,079
2,357
620

198
224
178
211
202
153
165
168
195
176
162
225

42
21
0
0
34
40
2
16
37
0
13
13

544
549
490
548
577
555
565
596
624
590
591
711

240
237
153,
207
215
157
153
204
210
174
118
188

304
312
337
341
362
398
412
392
414
416
473
523

523
524
647
633
584
601
601
681
742
725
692
660

213
204
188
200
201
187
198
170
205
177
187
209

0
27
0
10
18
26
0
4
20
0
31

736
755
835
843
803
814
799
855
967
902
889
891

212
108
202
259
202
213
118
113
242
210
229
270

.524
647
633
584
601
601
681
742
725
692
660
621

621
565
487
376
420
363
437
435
512
563
586
559

214
180
220
209
203
183
231
271
250
268
259
288

0
15
0
0
92
0
68
0
31
0
0
69

835
760
707
585
715
546
736
706
793
831
845
916

270
273
331
165
352
109
301
194
230
245
286
323

565
487
376
420
363
437
435
512
563
586
559
593

593
614

280
220

0
25

873
859

259
251

614
608

304
523
621
593
417
152

1944-Con.
June ____ -----------------July. ______________________
August _____________________
September __________________
October ____________________
November __________________
December __ .________________
January_. __________________
February ___________________
March _____________________
1945:
April _______________________
May ____ .. __________________
June ___________ c ___________
July _______________________
Aug. 1 to Aug. 15 ____________

608
527
500
453
451
481
511
491
534
479

221
191
160
176
172
171
140
178
114.
133

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

829
718
660
629
623
652
651
669
648
612

302
218
207
118
142
141
160
135
169
195

527
500
453
451
481
511
491
534
479
417

417
379
262
203
178

109
103
84
53
6

0
0
0
0
0

526
482
346
256
184

147
220
143
78
32

379
262
203
178
152

Allocated distribution,

&!~~t

of production in home

Fiscal year and month

Army,' percent

1941.. _______________________ .______ ~ ________ ~ ________________________ _

1942_ ________________________________ _______ ._______________________ _
1943_ _____________________________________________________________ _
1944_______________________________________________________________ _
1945 ________ . _______________________________________________________ _

53.0
53.0
53.0
64.0
73. 0

Navy, percent

Civilian, percent

28.0
33.0
32.0
29:0
21. 0 ,

19.0
14. 0
15.0
7.0
6.0

There were no exports in recent years.

No data.
Includes Air Force.
Source: Data received November 24, 1945, from Mr. Fukuzawa. of the Coke Oven Products Control Co. (Teisabura Kuga, president), a section ot the Chemical Industry Control Association.
1

ApPENDIX TABLE G-81.-Production and consumption oj organic glass in Japan, 1937-46

10

[In pounds]
Fiscal year and month

Inventorybeginning
of period

II Production

Consumption

In

ventor~-

end of penod

Factory labor 1
Male

Female

Total

--------1---------------------1937 ___________________________________________________________________ _
110
100
210
1938 ______________ ._______ ______ __________ 139,600 __________
39,700
180
150
330
1939_____________________________
39,700
608,700
522,100
126,300
1940________________ .____________ 126,300
472,400
518,000
80,700
1941.. ________ . ___________________
80,700
788,900
786,300
83,300
1942 _________________________ .__
83,300 1,290,600 1,298,200
75,700
1943_____________________________
75,700 1,843,900 1,778,700
140,900
1944 _______________ .______
140,900 2,256,000 2,188,900
208,000
1945: April to July ___________ ._____ 208,000
540,700
427,600
321,100
1940:
April. ____ . _________________ _ 126,300
51,700
45,100
132,900
210
162
372
May __________________ .. _____ _ 132,900
65,700
51, 100
147,500
342
180
522
June ______________ . _________ _ 147, 500
47, 800
59,700
345
135, 600
180
525
July ______________ . _________ _ 135, 600
47, 200
48,500
350
134,300
180
530
August __________________ . ___ _ 134, 300
44, 100
39,500
341
182
138,900
523
September.. __________________ _ 138,900
30,300
342
37,600
183
131,600
525
October _____________________ _ 131, 600
27,400
45,200
322
183
113,800
505
November ___________________ _ 113, 800
31, 600
22,600
104,800
320
185505
December ___________ . _______ _ 104, 800
28,900
38,800
321
94,900
185
506
January ____________________ _
94,900
23,400
322
33,000
185
85,300
507
February ____________________ _
45,000
44,000
85, 300
325
188
513
86,300
March ______ ._____ . __ . _____ .
38,300
43,900
86,300
327
80, 700
189
516

---------------------------I--~----

See footnotes at end ot table.

165

ApPENDIX TABLE C-82.-Production and di8tribution of methanol in Japan proper and Korea, 1931-45

ApPENDIX TABLE C-81.-Production and con8umption of organic glas8 in Japan, 1937-45-Continued

Inventory-

Fiscal year and month

~=J

1941:
April __________ ~------------May ______ - ------ - - -- - - --- - __
June ____ -- - -- - --- -- -- ---- - -_,_
July __ . - - - - -" - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - August ______ - ___ - _- - - _- - - ____
SepteDlber-------------------October ______________________
__________ _________
!)eceDlber ____________________
January _________
~oveDlber

------------

February __ - - - _- - - - - - - _- - - _- __
March __ -- --- - - -- -- --- - - - - - -_

Froduction

Consumption end of period

July ____ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -August _____ -- ____ - - - - - --- -- __

Sepj.embeL ___ ~_ ------ ---- - - __
October ______________________
~ ovembeL - - - _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - __
I>eceDlber ____________________
January ______________________

February _____ - - ---- - - --_----March ____ - - - _- - - - - - - - - - - - - __

July ____ - - - - - - - - - -- - --- - - ---August _______________ c _______

September ----_ - - - - - - - - - - - -- -October __ - - - - -- ---- - -- - -- - ',-____________________
I>ecernber ____________________
January ______________________
~overnber

February ____ --7-- - - -- -- - - -- -March _____ -._ - -- - - - -- - - - ____

October ____ - - - - -- - - - - -., - --- -____________________

I>ecernber ___ .'_____________ c __
January ______________________
February _____________________
~overnber

March _____ - - - - - -- - -. - - - _. --

46,800
42,400
37,900
61, 100
43,900
37,800
' 67,200
63,500
96,900
76,200
116, 700
95,900

71, 100
75, 100
78,700
65,800
77,000
98,200
90,600
96,200
77,400
94,900
71, 100
83, 300

329
330
330
340
344
352
345
350
361
372
367
365

83,300
77,900
94,200
74,700
71,800
74,400
108,600
67,500
47,600
72,800
69, 100
63,500

98,300
112, 100
123,900
110,900
97,000
90, 600
102, 600
104,300
11"5,000
103, 700
102,700
129,500

103, 700
95,800
143,400
113,800
94,400
56,400
143, 700
124,2QO
89,800
107,400
108,300
117,300

77,900
94,200
74,700
71,800
74,400
108, 600
67,500
47, 600
72,800
69, 100
63, 500
75, 700

370
373
380
395
395
400
401
410
415
419
425
430

284
287
292
291
296
284
302
306
308
310
313
322

75,700
85, 300
81,000
75, 100
67, 100
75,400
93,300
103,500
126,000
132,300
145, 500
138,600

125,900
123,400
131,300
131,300
136, 100
140, 600
139, 700
173,800
171,500
183,900
194,100
192,300

116,300
127,700
137,200
139,300
127,800
122,700
129,500
151,300
165,200
170, 700
201,000
190,000

85,300
81,000
75, 100
67, 100
75,400
93,300
103, 500
126,000
132, 300
145, 500
138,600
140,900

435
439
452
460
475
485
492
500
532
556
591
611

337
339
351
359
373
384
387
395
420
435
465B
483

772
778
803
819
848
869
879
895
952
991
1,056
1,094

140,900
138,200
97,200
84,000
65,800
75,700
76,400
129,000
183,500
154,100
136,600
193,900

197,300
201,500
205,200
170,700
199,000
194,900
197,300
170,800
237,200
154,100
157,800
170,200

200,000
242, 500
218,400
188, 900
189, 100
194, 200
144, 700
116,300
266, 600
171, 600
100, 500
156, 100

138,200
97,200
84,000
65,800
75,700
76,400
129,000
183,500
154, 100
136,600
193,900
208,000

631
627
624
630
637
630
625
618
607
605
587
562

500
530
534
533
530
535
523
515
510
500
487
441

130
130
130
130
130
270
270
270
270
290
290
290

1, 261
1,287
1, 288
1,293
1,297
1,435
1,418
1,403
1,387
1,395
1,364
1,293

208,000
229,800
340,300
322,800
321, 100

162,300
140, 500
229,800
340,300
180,000
69,500
322,800
115,900
133,400
321, 100
82,500
84,200
15,400 --_.-.---- ----------

549
455
435
495
416

410
377
350
339
340

290
290
290
290
290

1,249
1, 122
1,075
1, 124
1,046

1945:
----- - -' - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -ApriL ____
May ____ . -- - - ------ -- -------June ____ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -July ____ .--- .---------------August ____ - - .,
---.--- ...

_-

I Does not include constructIOn workers.

166

Total

37,200
46,400
41, 500
48,200
55,100
59,000
59, 600
69, 100
78. 100
93;700
92,900
108, 100

1944:
ApriL ___ - - - -- - - - - - - --- - - -- -May ____ --- - -- -- --- - - - - - - ---June ____ - -- - --- - - -- - -- - - --- -July ___ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - August _____ - -- - -- -- - - -- - - -- -Septernber ____________________

Female

80, 700
71, 100
75,100
78,700
65,800
77,000
98, 200
90,600
96,200
77,400
94,900
71,100

1943:
April _______ - -" - - - - --- - - - -- -May ____ - --- - - --- -- - -- -- - --'-June ___________________ ,_____ .

Male

189
194
197
208
208
214
217
221
242
270
272
280

1942:
ApriL ____ - - - - - - - - - - -, - - - - - - __
May ____ - -- - - - ---- --- - - - - - --June __________________ ______

[In thousands of United States gallons]

Factory labor 1

Inventory-

s January, 1938.

J aonary, 1939.

518
524
527
548
552
566
562
571
603
642
639
645
654
660
672
686
691
684
703
716
723
729
738
752

Fiscal year and month

Home islands
Inventories
(start of
period) Produc- Imports
tion

Total

Con-

mmptiOD 1

Allocated distribution for home islands

(percent)

loven- Korea
Total
t.ories
produc(end of production
tion
period)

Army

Navy

Aviation
munitions

Fuel

Civilian

---- ----- ---- ------- - - - ---

193L ________ -------- - - - - -326 3744

1932 __________________
'19 '1,378
- - - - -1933 __________________
- - - - -- ' 18 1,411
1934 __________________ - -- - -- 3697
865
1935 __________________
745
16 1, 149
1936 __________________
0 1,453
807
1937 __________________
48 2,203 1,659
1938 __________________
168 3, 251
3
1939 __________________
215 3, 671 2,014
1940 _________ - --- - - - -123 4, 252
932
1941 __________________
34
150 6,609
1942 __________________
0
294 6, 749
1943 __________________
0
354 7,598 .
1944 __________________
591 6,432
0
211 1,222
0
1945: April to AUgHsL_
1941:
April ______________
12
150
440
May ______________
219
506
0
June ______________
422
463
22
July ______________
328
525
0
August ____________
269
562
0
September ______ --298
577
0
October ___________
300
580
0
~ovember _________
274
583
0
I>ecernber _________
335
613
0
January ___________
688
574
0
February __________
657
624
0
March ____________
{)
466
562
1942:
ApriL _____________
294
492
0
May ______________
290
561
0
June ______________
267
581
0
July ______________
295
0
598
August ____________
235
505
0
Septernber _________
198
524
0
October ___________
220
549
0
~ovember _________
251
537
0
I>ecember _________
316
623
0
January ___________
411
600
0
February __________
423
572
0
March ____________
394
607
0
1943:
April ______________
354
572
0
May ______________
282
607
0
June ______________
254
576
0
July_~ ____________
347
585
0
August- ___________
340
605
0
Septernber ______ : __
231
584
0
October ___________
313
607
0
_________
62]
409
0
I>ecernber ______ : __
384
640
0
~ovember

770
1,397
1,429
1,562
1,910
2,260
3,910
3,422
5,900
5,307
6, 793
7,043
7,952
7,023
1,433

26 - - - --- ------ ------ ------ - - - - -770 ------ -----19 ______ - - - - -1,397 ------ ------ -- - -- --- - -- -----18 ______ - - - --- -----1,429 ------ ----------- - - - - -1, 562 - - - - -- -- - - -697 ------ - -- - - - - -- - -- - -- - - - - -1,910
308 1,457 ------ --- - -- - -- - -- - - - --- - - -0
2,212
48
474 1,927 ------ --- - -- .--_.- - - - --- - - - - -3, 742
168
531 2,734 - - - - -- - - - - -- - - - - -- -- - --- -----3, 207
215
520 3,771 - - - - -- - - - - -- ------ ------ - - - - -123
554 4,225 - - --- ------ ------ ------ - - - - -5, 777
5, 157
479 4,731 ------ ------ - - - --- - - - --- -----150
294
471 7,080 - - - --- - -. --- ------ ------ -----6,,497
354
6,689
506 7,255 ------ --._.- ------ - -- - -- --_.-0 ______ 26.4
7,361
591 2,137 9, 735 26.6 47. 0
6,812
211 4,328 10, 760 20,4 27.5 34. 5 ------ 17.6
1,433 - -- --- -- - --- 1, 222 17.6 20. 4 32.4 21. 3
8.3
- -

- -

602
725
907
851
831
875
880
857
948
1,262
1,281
1,028

383
303
581
582
533
575
606
521
260
605
8'15
734

219
422
326
269
298
300
274
335
688
657
466
294

43
29
44
36
25
33
29
48
55
43
43
43

483 -----535 - - - - -507 -- - - -561 - -- - -587 .----610 - - - - -609 - - - --631 - - - - _.

668 - - - - -617 - - - -667 - - - - -605 ------

786
851
848
893
740
722
769
788
939
1,011
995
1,001

495
584
553
658
542
502
518
472
528
588
601
647

290
267
295
235
198
220
251
316
411
423
394
354

50
50
47
36
39
39
46
37
36
43
43
40

542 - - - - -- ------ ------ ------ -----611 - -- - -- _._. _. --._-- ---- .. -----628 - - - --- - - - - -- . -- - -- ------ - - - - -634 - - - - -- - - -- ------ ------ -----544 - - - - -- --- --- - -- - -- ------ - - - - -563 - - - - -- ------ --- - -- -- - - -- - - - - -595 - - - - -- - - ----.- - - - --- - - _. -574 - - - - -- - - - --- -- - - -- - .... - - -- -----659 - - - - -- ------ -- - --- ------ - - - --643 - - -- - - - - -- -- - - -- ------ _._--615 - - - - -- - -- --- ------ - - --.- ----_.
647 - - - --- - - - --- -- -- -- - - - - -- - - - - --

926
889
830
932
945
815
920
1,030
1,024

644
635
483
592
714
502
511
646
620

282
254
347
340
231
313
409
384
404

42
37
-?2
34
32
31
199
371
325

---.-- ------ ------ - - - -------- ------ ------ ------ -. --- - - - --- - - - - -- -----.
------ ------ ------ - - - - ------- ------ - - _ . - . - - - - --- - - -- ------ ------ --.---

------ ------ ------_._-- ------ ----------- - - - - -- ------ -- - -- ----.- ----------- ------ ------

-._---

- - - - ------- - - - -------

- -- --- ------ - - - --- - - - - --

_.

---

_.

614 }

26.4
608
619 }
637 26.2
615
644

806 }
992 26. 2
965

47.0

o ______

26.6

46.4

0 ______

27.4

4l6.4

0 ______

27.4

See footnotes at end of bible.

Source: MunitIOns Ministry AVlation Chemical Department .

167

ApPENDIX TABLE C-82.-Production and d;stribution of methanol in Japan proper and Korea, 1931-45-00ntinued
Home islands
Inventories
(start of
period) Produc- Imports
tioD

Fiscal year Bnd month

ApPENDIX TABLE C-83.-Production and consumption of ethyl-alcohol in Japan, 1941-45-Continued.

CONSUMPTION

AlloCBted distribution tor home islands

sump-

Total

(percent)

Inven-

Con-

tlon 1

Korea
Total
toriM
(end of produc- productiOD
tioD
period)

MlIltary
Fuel

mun!tiona

Civilian

- - - - - - - - - - _ . - - - ---- - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---1943-00n.
January ___________
February __________
March ____________
1944:
ApriL ___________ -_
May ______________
June ______ - ___ -- -July ______________
August ________ - - -_
September _________
October ____ . ______
November _____ . ___
December ________
January ___________
February __________
March ____________

404
517
584

717
697
787

0 1, 121
0 1,214
0 1,371

604
630
780

517
584
591

306 1,023
369 1,066 } 28. 0
359 1, 146

591
620
664
685
268
330
210
189
153
190
195

735
761
694
542
495
480
508
586
405
427
413
386

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1,326
1,381
1, 358
1,227
763
810
718
813
594
580
603
581

706
717
673
959
433
600
491
624
441
390
408
370

620
664
685
268
330
210
227
189
153
190
195
211

513 1,248 }
440 1,201 1"6.9
265
959
391
933 }
236
731 19. 3
406
886
459
967
412
998 } 26_ 7
397
802
312
739
241
654 } 20. 5
642
256

211
156
210
277
59

354
337
288
185
58

0
0
0
0
0

565
493
498
462
117

409
283
221
403
117

156
210
277
59
0

354
156 } 15.0
288
185 l 20_ 8
58 J

0 ______

48.2

~7

1945:
ApriL. ____________
May ______________
June ______________
July ______________
August ____________

I From FEA report J8-28.

2 Production prior to 1934 was by wood distillation alone.
From 1934 on,
principal production was by synthesis.
I During the period 1940-43 about 6,000 ga.llons oC methanol were expected.

- - - -- - - - -- - - ---

______
______

30.0

23. 8

31. 5 -- - - -35.1 ------

22. 2

Inventory I
(beginning
of period)

Navy'

1-

1, 190
2, 220
1, 670
1,870
1, 720

17,810
17,970
16,060
25, 100
7, 660

---------- ------------------- ------------------- ---------5,810

6,630

4, 760
6,370

17,810
17,970
16,060
35,670
20,660

----------

10,990
8, 140
2,510
530
790

980
1,480
1,060
260
130

Total

22, 540
21,750
10,440
4, 120
3, 170

26,240
33,060
29,200
44,250
22,060

From Formosa, South Sea Islands, and S&khalln.

Source: Fermentation Industry Section Fuel Bureau, Ministry of Coma

meree and Industry.
1

,:n Japan proper, 1935-45

------

14.3

24.3

38.0 ------

17_ 2

- - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - ----------1---- ---------

Fiscal year and quarter

18. 4

33. 3

25. 8

8. 3

22_9

31. 3

16.7

8.3

Total

Consumption

Inventory
(end of
period)

----- ------9,460
14, 530
13, 340
8,430

I Civilian only.
, Civilian plants bullt to produce butanol, but shifted to produce ethyl
alcohol under the direction of the Army and Navy.

10,570
12, 130
6,870
3,330
2,250

Miscellaneous

35_ 3

Source: Data were obtained from Mr. K. Tersakl, organic 8YJ;ltbesis section oC Chemical Industry Control Association, Nov. 20, 1945.

Total

3,700
11,310
18, 760
40, 130
18,890

Fuel

23. 7

Imports!
Army

1,850
4,600
S, 190
21,660
10,440

Industrial

[In tons]

Production
Civilian

1,850
6,-710
10, 570
18,470
8, 450

Total

ApPENDIX TABLE C-84.-Production and consumption of 80da ash

[In thousands of United States gallons]

1941. _______
1942 ______ r _
1943 ________
1944 ________
1945 ________

1941 __________________
1942 __________________
1943 __________________
1944 __________________

Navy!

15.6

ApPENDIX TABLE C-83.-Production and consumption of ethyl-alcohol in Japan, 1941-45

Fiscal year

Total
Army'

1945, April to August 15_

29.4

Civnlan

Fiscal year

Aviation

Navy

Army

28, 460
34, 720
31,070
45, 970
22,380

26,240
33,050
29,200
44, 250
22,060

2,220
1,670
1,870
1,720
32o

1935 ___________________ 218,600 _________________ _

1936 __________________ 237, 200 _________________ _
1937 ___ .. _________ .. ______ 255, 300 __________________ _
1938_ __ _ _ __ _ _ _ __ _ _ ____ 256, 700 __________________ _
1939 ____________________ 280,000 __________________ _
1940 ___________________ 244, 700 17, 900 1,300261,400
1941. ___________________ 178,40010,200 ______ 188,600
1942 ___________________ 166, 100 4,400
600170,000
194iL __________________ 139,700 2,600 1,200141,000
1944 ___________________ 110,200 _____ . 500109, 7.00
1945: April to September__ 26,500 __________________ _
1940:
April to June __________ 54,600 _________________ _
Ju]y to September ______ 62,200 _________________ _
October to December. __ 72,900 _________________ _
January to March_ ___ _ _ 55, 000 _ _ __ _ _ _ __________ _
1941:
April to June _________ 47,500 _________________ _
July to September ______ 47,300 __________________ _
October to December ___ 46,100 ----- .1 ______ ---.---January to March ____ 37,500 __________________ _

Fiscal year and Quarter

1942:
April to June __ .. _______
July to September_ .. ____
October to December ___
January to March ______
1943:
April to June _ _ _ _ _ _ __ __
July to September ______
October to December ___
Jamlary to March ______
1944:
April to June _____ . _. _ __
July to September .. _____
October to December ___
January to March _____
1945:
April to June _________
July to September .. _____

p~~~,,= Imports Exports Cft:up -

29,200
29,700
58,000
49,200

__________ _
__________________ _
_________________ _
________________ _

39, 900
-33,400
37,500
28,900

_ _ _ _____ . ________ _
_________ _
___ . _____________ _
__________________ _

32, 000
23,300
26,700
28,200

_ _ ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ ______ _
__________________ _
___________ _
___________ . ______ _

23,000 __ . _______________ _
3,500 ______________ ~ ___ _

1 Does not include soda ash converted to caustic soda.

Source: Chemical Industry Control Association.

See footnotes at end of table.

168

169

ApPENDIX TABLE

G-85.-Production, imports, and exports of vegetables and animal fats and oils for Japan, 1938-45

ApPENDIX TABLE

C-87.-Production and distribution of benzol, Japan proper, 1940-45

[Tho1l8&Ilds of poundsl
Year

Production

Imports

Exports

[In thousands 01 gallonsl

Year

Production

Imports

Exports

Stocks (be-

Fiscal year and quarter

1938' ____________________________ _
1939 , ____________________________ _
1940_ _____ _____ ____ __ _____ 403,671
1941 ______________________ 447,788
1

5,864 111,042
8,114 112,376
5,991 128, 290
54,_078 68,948

1942 ______________________ 448,039 69,665 21,667

1943 ______________________ 298,028 102,182
4,076
1944-__ __________ ____ __ ___ 204, 854 18,989
24
1945: April-Se~tember------- 30,108 _______________ _

Includes production from copra, oil seeds, etc. imported into Japan.
Calendar year: Others are fiscal yea.rs-----Apr.l to Mar. 31.

Source: Production: Teikoku Oil and Oil Seeds Distributing Co.; Imports and exports: Import..export bureau.

ApPENDIX TABDE

C-86.-Production and consumption of sodium cyanide in Japan proper, 1940-45

[Thousands of poundsl

Inventories 1
Fiscal year and quarter

(beginning

01 period)

Produc-

tion

1940 __________________ ~ ____

5,637
1941 ______________________ -------243
9,216
1942 ____ .---------------525
8, 563
1943 ______________________
86 10,436
1944 ______________________
185
7,071
1945: April to August _______
196
1,495
1940:
April to June ____________ - - - - - - - 966
July to September ________
201
646
October to December _____
55
2,081
January to March __ - - - - 425
I, 944
1941:
April to June _____________
243
2, 623
July to September ________
399
2, 216
October to DecembeL ____
723
2,108
January to March ________
606
2,269
1942:
April to June _____________
525
2,004

Consumption

5,083
9,018
8, 956
10,217
7,420
1,556
765
791
1,457
2,070
2, 546
1, 896
2, 149
2,427
2,452

Inventories 1
Fiscal year and quarter

1942:
July to September ___ -:._ - -October to Decem ber _____
January to March __ - - - - 1943:
April to June ___________ July to SeptembeL _______
October to December _____
January to March ________
1944:
April to June __ .--------,July to September ________
October to December _____
January to March ________
1945:
April to June ______________
July ____________________
September _______________

(beginning

of period)

71

Produc-

tion

Consump.
tioD

-----

324

2,086
2, 277
2, 196

2, 167
1,903
2, 434

86
412
306
507

2, 778
2,264
2,698
2,696

2, 452
2, 249
2, 421
3,095

185
538
761
421

2, 549
1,713
1,806
1,003

2,114
1, 975
2,083
I, 248

196
227
139

I, 166
245
84

1, 146
291
119

--------

t Some of the inventory and production figures are incomplete because many of the plant documents were destroyed by fires.
approximately balanced over the period covered, and were minor in volume.

g=~~)Of

1940 ____ -________ - ___ - - _-__ -- - - - - - - -- ---- -- -1941 ______________________________ " ________
1942 _______________________________________
1943 _______________________________________
1944 ___________________________ : ___________
1945: April to September _____________________
1940:
April to June _________________________ - _
July to SeptembeL ______________________
October to December ____________________
January to March _______________________
1941:
April to June ___________________________
July to September _______________________
October to December _______________ - - - -January to March ___________________ - - -1942:
April to June ____________________________
July to September _______________________
October to December ____________________
January to March _______________________
1943:
April to June ___________________________
July to SeptembeL _______ ---------r---October to December ____________________
January to March _______________________
1944:
April to June ____________________________
July to September _______________________
October to December ____________________
January to March _______________________
1945:
April to June ______ c _____________________
July to September _______________________

Production

Imports

3,210
8,441
9,077
3,061
2, 199
9,102
1,228
10,317
604
7,437
1,281 ----------

577
1,674
2,283
2,413
1,668
1,013

Total

Consumption

Stocks (end
of period)

12,228
13,812
13,584
13,958
9,709
2,294

10, 554
11,529
11,171
12,290
8, 696
1,354

1,674
2,283
2,413
1,668
1,013
940

577
1,055
1,018
1,618

1,806
2,107
2, 136
2,392

965
681
976
588

3,348
3,843
4, 130
4,598

2,293
2,825
2,512
2,924

1,055
1,018
1,618
1,674

1,674
2,485
2,780
2,571

2,766
2,291
2,009
2,011

1,373
783
184
721

5, 813
5,559
4,973
5,303

3,328
2, 779
2,402
3,020

2,485
2, 780
2,571
2, 283

2,283
2,165
2,244
2,558

2,397
2, 136
2,297
2,272

588
329
718
564

5,268
4,630
5,259
5,394

3,103
2,386
2, 701
2,981

2, 165
2, 244
2, 558
2,413

2,413
2, 193
2, 156
2, 196

2,440
2,303
2,682
2,892

263
280
419
266

5,116
4, 776
5,257
5,354

2,923
2,620
3,061
3, 686

2,193
2,156
2,196
1,668

1,668
1,520
1,172
1,105

382
2,330
104
1,808
118
1,871
1,428 ----------

4,380
3,432
3,161
2,533

2,860
2,260
2,056
1,520

1,520
I, 172
1,105
1,013

1,013
890

1,041 ---------240 ----------

2,054
1,130

I, 164
190

890
940

Imports and exports

Sources: Imports, Import-Export Bureau; all others, Chemical Industry Control Association.

Source: Chemical Industry Control Association.

ApPENDIX TABLE

G-88.-Production of rayon pulp in Japan proper, 1930-44

[In tonsl

Calendar year

1930 ___________
1931. __________
1932 ___________
1933 ___________
1934___________
1935 ___________
1936 ___________
1937 ___________
I

Production l

16
155
2,600
9,500
19,600
39, 100
56,400
62, 700

Imports

'fatal

ConsumptiOD for
fiber production 2

28,000
33,60(}
44,800
67,200
100,800'
141,500
189,400
325,400

28,016
33, 755
47,400
76,700
120,400
180,600
245,800
388, 100

22,500
29,200
40,200
56,500
811,100
125,600
163, 600
308,300

Calendar year

1938___________
1939 ___________
1940___________
1941. __________
1942 ___________
1943 ___________
1944 ___________

Production (

Imports

Total

111,700
157, 500
204,400
275,800
220,700
124,400
54,600

127, 800
157, 600
156, 800
37,900
800
0
0

239, 500
315,100
361, 200
313, 700
221, 500
124,400
54, 600

Consumption for
fiber produetton'

348,500
323,900
296,600
274,00o
158,60o
96,60 o
65,400

Includes Korea, Formosa, and Karaluto.

Both staple and rayon.

Source: Textile Association.

170

171

ApPENDIX TAIl

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~_IIn-l
Fiscal year and quarter

Pio'

G-89.-Production

01

~PPENDIX TABLE

oxygen in Japan proper, 19412-45

msands of cubic feet and thousands DC cubic feet per month]

etion

Monthly
production
rate

1942_________________________
1943 __________________ -______
1944_________________________

1,6 },800
I,!) 3,400
2,0 l,900

135, 500
162, 700
170, 200

1945 April to August__________

1943:
April to June_____________

4 i,700

97, 500

4 J,300
4 J,100

153,400
156,700
175,000
165, 700

Production

Fiscal year and quarter

1944:
April to June ______________
July to September ________
Ootober to Deoember ______
January to MarciL ________

Monthly
production
rate

539,600
506,600
553,900
441,800

179,900
168,900
184, 600
147,300

350,000
137, 700

116,700
68, 900

1945:

July to September_ _ _ _ ____

Ootober to Deoember __ ____
January to Maroh_____ ____

5 l,900
4 7,100

April to June _____________

July to August ___________

Source: Oxygen Carbide Department, Chemic. Industry Control AssocmtlOD.

..

ApPENDIX TABLE

Electric Power Tables

G-90.-Electric

ower generation by public utility and railway plants, Japan proper, 1914-45
(In 1,000 kwhJ

Year starting

Irill

1~14------------------ __________ _
1915 _____________________________ _
1916 _____________________________ _
1917______________________________ _
1918 _____________________________ _
1919 _____________________________ _
1920_____________________________ _
1921 _____________________________ _
1922 _____________________________ _
1923_____________________________ _
1924_____________________________ _
1925 _____________________________ _
1926 _____________________________ _
1927______________________________ _
1928 _____________________________ _
1929 __________________________ __ _
1930____________________________ _
1931 _____________________________ _
___ _______________________ _
~

1932~

~933-----------------------------1934 ______________________________ _

1935______________________________ _
1936 __ ___________________________ _
1937 ______________________________ _
1938 ______________________________ _
1939 _____________________________ _
1940 _____________________________ _
1941 ______________________________ _
~

~~:~~~~~~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~~~ ~~ ~~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~-1944 ______________________________ _

1945 (first haJf) ____________________ _
I

Prior to 11132 does not Include energy supplied ) publio utIlIties by private plants.
Source: Electric Power Bureau, Ministry of C( 'lmeree and Industry.

172

Hydro-electric

Thermal electric

Total

1,257,950
1,599,900
1,862,850
2, 208, 140
2,615,640
2,868,150
3,165,810
3,588,710

199,320
211,000
290,290
421,804
490,020
646,870
648,900
660,440

1,457,270
1,810,900
2, 153, 140
2,629,944
3, 105,660
3,515,020
3, 814, 710
4,249,150

4, 245, 760
5,832,290
6,741,810
8,083,800
9,290,500
10,771,300
11, 561,"500
12,524,990
12,977,670
14,196,710
15,774, 780
16,233,120
18,453,760
-19, 553, 740
21,729,400
23,263,540
22,539,290
23,645,500
28,545, pO
26,472,410
28,641,670
28, 505, 000
10,025,000

789,280
824,330
993,060
1,007,410
1,221,400
1,187,200
1, 750, 4001, 508, 700
1,318,150
1,533,340
2, 248:020
3,469,630
3,700,880
4, 579, 130
4,853,170
5,374,000
7, 603, 880
6,957,000
5,227,6115
7,147,090
6,193,640
3,735,000
482, 700

5,035,040
6,656,620
7,734,870
9,091,210
10,511,900
11,958,500
13,311,900
14,033,690
14,295,820
15,730,050
18,022,800
19,702,750
22, 154, 640
24, 132, 870
26, 582, 570
28,637,540
30, 143, 170
30, 602, 500
33, 772, 720
33, 619, 500
34,835,310
32,240,000
10,507,700

G-91.-Japan home i8land8 electric generating capacity

lIn kilowatts ']

Publ!cutiJity
y .....

Hydroelectric

1903 ________
1904 ________
1905 ________
1906 ________
1907 ________
1908 ______ 1909 ________
1910 ________
1911. _______
1912 ________
1913 ________
1914 ________
1915 ________
1916 ________
1917 ________
1918 ________
1919 ________
1920 ________
1921. _______
1922 ________
1923 ________
1924 ________
1925 ________
1926 _______
1927 ________
1928________
1929 _______
1930 ________
1931. _______
1932________
1933 ______ -1934 ________
1935 ________
1936 ________
1937 ________
1938' _______
1939 ________
1940 ________
1941. _______
1942________
1943 ________
1944________

9,442
11,347
11,963
13,925
25,691
44, 341
57,126
79,-271
116,331
199, 180
285, 752
376,936
395, 156
420,271
454, 333
512, 344
576, 259
658,726
759, 141
914,457
I, 136,089
1,295,858
1,562,959
I, 670, 340
1, 791, 918
I, 887, 016
2,061,077
2,271,040
2,368,420
3,013,728
3,086,312
3,170,615
3,309,437
3,6_51,547
3,851,615
4,166,000
4,555,000
4,997,000
5,222,000
5,480,000
5,650,000
5,819,000

Thermal
electric I

20,478
28,941
40,011
44,819
48, 728
58,451
61,895
87,037
107,896
146, 557
173, 363
177,939
179, 139
177, 756
198, 829
204,437
221, 918
294, 744
329,036
426, 175
443, 532
473, 630
606,925
829,324
895,891
1,087,470
1, 127, 375
1,081,990
1,084,961
1,261,471
1,426,492
1,568,297
1,828,121
2,142,425
2,331,430
2,454,000
2,695,000
2,885,000
2,968,000
3,011,000
3,006,000
2,964,000

Total

Hydroelectric

Thermal
electric S

I
I

Total

Total all installations

Hydroelectric

Thermal
electric J

Total

44,252
31,128
13, 124
10,650
14,332
3,682
29,920
58,972
42,563
16,049
18,684
13,622
5,062
40,288
74,374
18,547
55,827
22,400
15,816
6, 584
51, 974
91,296
66, 101
25, 195
32,552
21,282
11,270
58, 744
114,910
38,622
76,288
40,491
_ 12,931
27,560
74,419
154,732
60, 121
94,611
51,940
36,160
15,780
102,792
182,216
108,709
73,507
63, 195
46, 814
16,381
119,021
257,537
144,605
112,932
91,229
57,568
33,661
166,308
321,564
177,733
143,831
97,337
69,837
27,500
224,227
462,203
228,864
233,339
116,466
82,307
34,159
345,737
596,856
275, 260
321,596
137,741
101,897
35,844
459,115
715,969
299,383
416,586
121,444
161,094
39, 650
554,875
771,584
322,364
449,220
197,289
143,225
54,064
574,295
805,289
469,634
335, 655
207,262
157,899
49,363
598,027
875,563
364,473
511,090
222,401
165,644
56, 757
653, 162
983,966
386,842
597, 124
267, 185
182,405
84, 780
716,781
422,314 1,133,243
710, 929
200,396
335,066
134, 670
798,177
552, 159 1,377,546
825, 387
424,076
257,415
166,661
953, 470
611,974 1,526,718
914,744
438,541
282, 938
1,088,177 1, 155,603
709,113 1,779,173
438,541 1,070,060
~82, 938
155,603
I, 340, 632
755,079 2, 062, 785
311,547
483;164 1,307,706
171,617
1,579,621
763, 146 2,297,503
289,516
468,015 1,474,357
178;499
1,769,488
954, 633 2,768,141
347, 708
598,257 1,813,508
250, 549
2,169,884
702,950 1,965,970 I, 236, 644 3,202,614
407, 320
295,630
2,499,664
779,322 2, 111,087 1,356,044 3,467, 131
460, 153
319, 169
2,687,809
874,568 2, 290, 351 1,531,703 3,822,054
444,233
403, 335
2,974,486
484,299 1,005,171 2, 581, 949 1,611,674 4, 193,623
3, 188,452- 520,872
519,687 1,046,284 2, 797, 637 1,601,677 4,399,314
526,597
3,353,030
514,627 I, 203, 143 3,056,936 1,599,588 4,656,524
688,516
3,453,381
657,862 3, 105,930 1,827, 131 4,933,061
565, 660
92,202
4, 275, 199
567,938 3,168,705 1,912,037 5,080,742
485,545
82,393
4,512,804
753,035 3,268,834 2,223, 113 5,491,947
654, 816
98,219
4, 738, 912
909,011 3,407,997 2, 638, 572 6,046,569
810,451
98,560
5,137,558
893,450 3, 759, 334 3,018,088 6,777,422
875,663
107,787
5,793,972
967, 803 1,093,784 3,977,596 3,299,233 7,276,829
125,981
6,183,045
861,000
940,000 4,245,000 3,315,000 7,560,000
79,000
6,620,000
942,000 1,064,000 4,677,000 3,637,000 8,314,000
122,000
7,250;000
130,000 1,075,000 1,205,000 5,127,000 3,960,000 9,087,000
7,882,000
146,000 I, 122, 000 1,268,000 5,368,000 4,090,000 9,458,000
8,190,000
172,000 1,145,000 1,317,000 5,652,000 4,156,000 9,808,000
8,491,000
236,000 1,110,000 1,346,000 5,886,000 4,116,000 10,002,000
8,656,000
238, 000 1,099,000 1,_ 337,000 6,057,000 4,063,000 10,120,000
8,783,000

1 Capacities reported are based on the load carrying abiUties oC plants, not
Dame plate ratings.
, Thermal electric includes Diesel (approximately 100,000 kw in 19).

ApPENDIX TABLE

Private

CJaBSlftcation between public utility and private plants changed In 1938_

Source: Electric Power Bureau annual reports.

Transportation Tables
C-92.-Length 01 Japanese Government railroad lines as 01 Oct.

11, 1945

Route mileage _____ - - - -- - - - - _- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -" . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- 12,080.6

Main track mileage__ ________
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - -- -- 14, 118
5, 850
Siding track mileage - - _______ - - - - - - - - - - - - - ------------ ----- ---------

173

ApPENDIX TABLE

ApPENDIX TABLE

C-93.-Private railway and tramway companies, October 1.945

Private r&ilway companies ____ - - -- _- - ________________________________________________________ - - - -- - __ __

145
Tramway companies ___ -- - -- - - - --- - - - - _____________________________________________________ - - - - -_ ___ __
67
Total ________________ : _________________________________________________~ ____________________ ~
Of this total, 14 companies have suspended operation.

Operating kilometers
Private r&ilway ____________________________________________________________________________________ 6,040. 9
Tramway _________________________________________________________________________________________ 1,778. 1
Total __ --- ---- -'- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _- - - -- ___________ - - - ____________________________ -- - -- --- -

~----------------

Fiscal

(1,000 tonmiles)

(1,000 tons)

1936 ______________________ _
1937 ______________________ _
1938 ______________________ _
1939 ______________________ _
1940 ______________________ _

Ton-miles

Tonnage

Fiscal year

--7.8i9.0

Locomotives:
Rolling stock
Steam _________________________________________________________________________
432
Electric ____________________________________________________________
161
Internal combustion _____________________________________________________________________________ _
34
Electric motor cars __________________________________________________________________________________ _ 8, 141
Electric tr&ilers ________________________________________________________________________________ . ____ _
596
Passenger cars ______________________________________________________________________________________ _
990
Internal combustion motor cars _______________________________________________________________________ _
428
Electric motor _____________ ________________________________________________________________________ _
298
VVagons ____________________________________________________________________________________________ _
Freight cars _____________ - - -- ________________________________________________________________________ 8,656

C-96.- Tonnage and ton-miles of the Japanese railroads

107, 584
117,340
130, 131
144,863
160, 656

n, 162,419
12,614,639
15,005,408
17, 319, 331
l!J, 142, 733

year

Tonnage

Ton-mUes

(1,000 tons)

1941 ______________________ _
1942 ______________________ _
1943 ______________________ _
1944 ______________________ _
1945 ______________________ _

(1,000 ton'miles)

167,212
174,201
193,975
184,504
178,041

20,460,536
23,250,994
29,185,846
29,597,146
11,534,183

April through October.

Source: Imperial Government Ra.ilways.

0_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

ApPENDTX TABLE

[In 1,000 metric tons]

Commodities

1.435 meter
1.372 meter
1.067 llleter
1.000 llleter
0.914 meter
0.762 meter
0.666111eter
0.609 meter

Track
Km.
gage ____________________________________________________________________________________ _
1,32f
gage ________________________________________________________ ___________________________ _
422
gage ____________________________________________________________________________________ _
5,163
gage ____________________________________________________________________________________ _
1
gage __ - - - -- -- - - -- - - -- - - - - - - - - -- --- - 7 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
11
gage _________________________________________ : __________________________________________ _
815
gage ____________________________________________________________________________________ _
14
gage ___________________________________________ ~ ________________________________________ _
72
7,819
ApPENDIX TABLE C-94.-Freight cars of the Japanese railroads
~

Fiscal Year

Previous
fiscal
year

Built

Obsolete
and ex~

and pur-

chased

Total

ported

Previous
fiscal
year

Fisoalyear

- - -- - 1937 __________________
1938 __________________
1939 __________________
1940 __________________
1941 __________________
I

72, 579
74, 673
79,763
86, 830
96, 429

4,640
7,117
7,911
9,742
5, 269

2, 546 74,673
2,027 79, 763
844 86,830
143 96, 429
1,013 100, {;85

Not available.

Built
and pur-

chased

OblOlete

and exported

Total

- - -- - -- - - - - 1942 __________________
1943 __________________
1944 __________________
March 1945 __________

100,685
105, 299
111,943
118,449

4, 761
7,024
7,561
(1)

147 105,299
380 111,943
1,055 118,449
(1)
120, 747

Previous
fiscal
year

Built and
purchased

ported

Total

Pri;!IUS
year

~ource:

Bullt and
purcbased

Obsolete

Total

1Air ~ald damage,

174

3,963
3, 964
4, 161
4,451
4,797
4,880
5, 034
5, 343
5,746

217
353
337
361
196
162
349
458
None

216
156
47
15
113
8
40
55
1185

3,964
4, 161
4,451
4,797
4,880
5,034
5, 343
5, 746
5,561

169
178
183
186
200
226
239
261
292

1943

1944

quarter
only)

11
9
3
16
26
13
24
31

2
4
2

2
15

178
183
186
200
226
239
261
292
287'

4, 142
4,344
4, 637
4,997
5, 106
5,273
5,604
6,038
5,848

--------

Imperial Government Railways.

Grand
total

I ---------------------------1,--------1937 __________________________
1938 __________________________
1939 ______ ___________________
1940 _________ ....________________
1941 __________________________
1942 __________________________
1943 _________________ .. ________
1944 ___________________
August 1945 ___________________

1942

56,519.8 70, 951. Y8, 337. 6 86, 718. 7 92,095.5 89, 770. 9 90, 739. 8 118,695.7 111,45307

Electric

~do~~t:

1945 (first
1941

- - -- - - ---- - - - - - - - - -- - ----- - - - - - - - -

C-95.-Locomotives of the Japanese railroads

Steam

Fiscal year

I 1939
1940
1938
I 1937
---------------1936

Rice ________________ 3,547.5 3,540.7 3,950.3 4,373.1 3,593.0 3,934.8 4,393.0 4,593.8 4,239.7
916.9
Grain ____________0__
261. 0
984.6 1,189.4 1,341. 2 1,698.5 1,537.2 1,197.,5 1,538.8 1,276.7 1,497,0
Soybeans ___________
357. 4
772.2
282.9
300. 1
214.7
513.2
967.9
507. 1
258.0
360. 1
'Potatoes ____________
585.2
650.1
830.0 1,020.8 1,235.3 1,230,5
175.2
420. 0
481. 3
410. 4
LUlllber _____________ 8,008.9 8,529.9 10, 425. 1 12, 223. 7 13, 336. 2 13, 363. 2 12,453.4 20,540.6 18,841. 5 4,359.1
Firewood and charcoaL _____________ 1, 661. 6 1,599.2 1,810.1 2, 152. 8 3,233.2 3, 299. 6 3,633. 0 3,700.6 3,211.7
831. 6
CoaL ______________ 31,460.7 33,370.1 36,219.3 39,346.1 41,944.0 38,670.4 38,566.2 48,799.2 44,621. 8 10,423.5
Coke _______________
817.9 1, 147. 9 1, 319. 6 1,804.4 1,928.8 1,861.8
514. 7
63:!. 2
351.7
424. 5
Ore ________________
2,273.0 2,535.2 2,982.0 2,994.2 3,055.3 3,466.0 4,576.3 6,176.9 6,101. 9 1,334.3
Limestone __________ 1,925.3 2,169.9 2, 161. 9 2,115.0 2, 393. 2 2,651. 0 3, 131. 0 3,457.3 3,256,3
715.3
Ballask ____________ 2,590.3 2,256.1 2,663.7 3, 116. 0 4,071.4 4,963.6 4,813.1 9,982.0 9, 986. 3 1, 931. 0
Iron and steeL ______
241. 4 2, 123. 0 2,395.4 2,607.0 1,947.4 2,090.7 2,581.2 4,058. 3 5,969.6 1,175.6
OiL _______________
425.7
840.6
658.0 1,632.2 1,625.4
265.6 1,172,1 1, 181. 0 1, 114. 8 1,037.2
Fish ______________' __
941. 3
345.9
254. 8 1,2'36. 4 1,451. 4 1,586.0 1,639.4 1,744.9 1, 313. 7 1,434. 1
Salt ____________ , ___
882.4
280.5
647.8
730.8
758. 9
83& 9 1,017.9 1,262.7 1,029.4
95. 6
Fertilizer ___________ 1, 100. 1 4,262,3 4,352.9 5, 105. 1 5,264.2 4,281. 3 3,854.4 2,845.9 1,967.8
357.7
Fiber and fiber products ______________
820. 9
820.9
966.4
501. 4
308. 1 1,815.0 1,772.6 1,844. 8 1,700.0 1,556.9
Cement _____________
438.8
398.2 2,052.4 2, 136. 8 2,461. 1 2,894.9 2,902.9 2,410.7 2,695.2 2,279.8
Paper and paper
products __________
216.8
281. 9 1,34.6 1;365.7 1, 461. 1 1,468. 4 1,604.3 1,494,3 1,488.0 1,003. 1

Source: Imperial Government Railways.

ApPENDIX TABLE

C-97.-Tonnage of the principal commodities carried on the Japanese railroads, 1988-45

ApPENDIX TABLE

C-98.-Average length of haul and freight train miles

Freight train miles
(1,000 miles)

Fiscal year

1936 _______________________
1937 _______________________
1938 _____ _________________
1939 _______________________
1940 _______________________

103.7
107.5
115.3
115.6
119.2

131,256
144,477
167, 647
181,422
195,362

Fiscal year

1941 ______________________ _
1942 ______________________ _
1943 ______________________ _
1944 ______________________ _
1945 ______________________ _

Length 01 haul
(miles)

Freighttrainmlles
(1,000 miles)

122.8
133.5
151. 3
160.5

198, 202
212,058
247,112
269,798

(I)

(1)

1 Figures for 1945 not 8va1lable.

Source: Imperial Government Railways.

Source: Imperial Government Railways.

175

........

ApPENDIX TABLE G-99.-Japane8e merpr,ant marine (excluding tanker8) during the war .

(Combined army, navy, civilian fleets)

0\

Ohanges during the month

Situation as of first of month

~onth

'I

Total tonnage
afloat

I service
UA" shipsthe
in I service
UB"
01

army

ships in
01 the
navy

"0" ships shipping control asso-elation

Atloat

1941: December __________ 5,421,143

I Serviceable

ABO consolidated lleet

Inner zone,

serviceable

unservlce1 Oaptured
off in
southern
area

a.ble or cut or salvaged

2,150,000

1,556,600

1,714,543

1,513,600

_ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1'_

--------

96, 101

5,464,992
5,503,083
5,540,051
5,544,877
5,591,077
5,534,248
5,569,169
5,547,609
5,507,167
5,524,025
5,390,402
5,252,201

2,109,176
2,108,020
2,092,523
2,051,044

1,745,522
1, 797, 156
1,840,254
1,910,119
2,067,512'
2,298,049
2,496,079
2,767,359
2,8,22,147
2,861,245
2, 798, 630
2,619,636

1,518,604
1,595,875
1,612,063
1,659,893
1,788,398
1,957,938
2, 111,683
2,305,210
2,370,603
2,466,393
2,387,231
2,260,746

----------- --------

89,468

1,715,403
1,550,856
1,275,958
1,220,549
1,199,717
1, 156, 789
1,223,523

1,610,294
1,597,907
1,607,274
1,573,714
1,564,555
1,530,796
1,522,234
1,504,292
1,464,471
1,463,063
1,434,983
1,409,042

5,219,547
5,087,659
4,990,454
4,944,600
4,862,046
4,763,634
4,702,449
4,648, 216
4,598,417
4,475,490
4,392,732
4,170,825

1,414,695
1,342,832
1,376,614
1,380,477
1,168, -525
1,152,767
1,173,323
1,188,966
1,161,378
1,160,438
1,112,941
1,019, 164

1,462,243
1,434,604
1,400,253
1,383,160
1,339,364
1,286,364
1,274,552
1,310,485
1,270,765
1,261,192
1,272,526
1,212,194

2,342,609
2, 310, 223
2,213,587
2, 180, 963
2,354,157
2,324,503
2,254,574
2, 148, 765
2,166,274
2,053,860
2,007,265
1,939,467

1, 953, 736
1, 993, 722
1,846,132
1,803,656
1,963,367
1,971,179
1,839,'732
1,742,648
1,789,342
I, 682, 111
1,607,819
1,545,755

194~:

January _____________
February _______ - ____
March ______________
ApriL ______________
May ________________
June ________________
July ________________
August ______________
September ___________
October _____________
November ___________
December ___________

1,95~,010

1943:

January _____________
FebruBry ____________
March ______________
ApriL ______' ________
May ________________
June ________________
July __________ - _____
August ______________
September___________
October _____________
November ___________
December ___________

1944:

January _____________
February ____________
March ______________
April _______________
May __ : _____________
June ________________
July ________________
August ______________

4,074,745' 1,004,454
3,884,120
911,916
3,560,295
825:977
3,558,407
835,946
3,509,605
874,050
3,353,961
795,437
3,204;,385
705, 154
3,049,965
625,131

September ___________
October_____________
November ___________
December ___________

2,874,564
2,601,675
2,256,873
1,978,572

603,810
483,033
399, 137
260,568

TotaL _____ c ______

...

.....
.....

1,925,436
253,638
1,789,097
243,255
1,908,236
254,638
1,902,734 . 232,372
1,924,799
223,449
1,857,926
197,952
1,733,627
175,320
1,587,236
150,000
1,547,418 -----------

-----------

-------- 54,243

-------- 54,489

-------- 77, 722

--------------- - - - - - -- - - - - - --

~~~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~I~ ~~ ~ -~~ ~

-------.----

-------- 15, 845

----------- --------

----------- - - - - - ------------- ------------------ ------------------ --------

----------- ------------------------------------------------

-----------

34,598
38,867
39,424
19, 778
56,490
12,722
16,218
19,091

--------

-------------------------_. --

7"889
5,976
14,612
8,498
14,518
5,969
3,888
1,893
10,835
4, 828
8,080

1, 151,233 1,919,058, 1,508,380 ----.!------ -------- 6, 675

1,089,918 1,882,286 1,487,006 ----------- -------- -------'918,436 1,815,882 1,454,521 ----------- -------- 4, 394
897,493 1,824,968 1,412,525 ----------- -------- 4,281
895,112 1,740,443 1,300,110 ----------- -------830
843,985 1,714,539 1,275,617 ----------- -------- -------743,086 1,756,145 1,280,230 ----------- -------- -------689,426 1,735,408 1,270,319 ___________________ 4,303

664,953
590, 192
499, 736
406,017

1,605,801
1,528,450
1,358,000
1,311,987

1945:

January _____________
February ____________
March ______________
ApriL ______________
May ________________
June ________________
JUly ________________
August ______________
August 15 ____________

-------------------------------------------------------------

386,455
367,831
374,333
325,333
302,417
293, 163
272,284
255, 737

1,285,343
1,178,011
1,279,265
1,345,029
1,398,933
1,366,811
1,286,023
1,181,499

1,167,417
1, 181, 492
995,414
896,087

Built

23,894
16,638
21,250
5,,896
16,242
23,081
12,895
33,958
22,879
21, 779
7, 753
33,478
7,309
29,945
9i, 778
16,838
14,238
31, 322
32,095
47,118
45,417
54,913
47,857
95, 328

892,028 ___________________ -----_.-845,812 ----------- 5,880

908,278 ___________________ ._------934, 795 1,217,706 ________ -------935,886 1,198,378 ________ -------892,528 1,139,292 ________ -------923,905 ________ -------733,033
594,294
743,286 956,558 -------590,860 ________

82,404
99,642
112,823
33, 707
66,454
22,481
44,337
12,064

----------- ----------- -----------

-_._------- ----------- ----------- -------"--- ----------- ----------- --------

,________ , ________
_______________

--------

--------

--------

--------

4,000 -------5,000 --------

--------

--------

--------

--------

t5,OOO --------

--------,-------12,000

30,000
4Q,000
20,000
5,000
5,000

--------

--------------- --------

-------- --------------- --------------- --------_._----- --------

________________

72,342 ________ 1 ________

84,053 ________________
178,419
4,000
73,075
3,000
95,852
3,000
93,322
4,000
51, 184
8,000
73,200 40,000

103,497
75,520
87,536
86,913

--------

4,929 ,________

9,082
___________________
-------___________________ -------___________________

----------- -

ItoOonverted
I ve~o
Recon
tankers
~

60,000
30,000
30,000
--------

-------30,000
55,000
15,000
89,000
71,000
40,000
18,000

-------- ----------------- --------1--------

747,487 2,307,655

(1)

....

ApPENDIX TABLE C-99.-Japanese merchant marine (ezcluding tanker,) during the war.

.....

(Combined army, navy, civilian fleets)-Continued

00

Changes during the month

Month

IRequlsitionod
I Relarmy
.....d by
of army and
and
navy

navy

Principal war developments affecting shipping

I
Total weight
oCammunt

Sunk

ti~; "u~i!,~ed I

Allied action

Japanese action

StalRs~nst

shippmg

------

64, 936 1

973

January _____________
February ____________
March ______________
ApriL ______________

26,343
26,172
6,838
4,605

544

May ________________
June ________________
July ________________

7,905
11,225
23,543

1941: December----------1
1942:

57,181,

221_ - - ---- ---- - - --- -- - - - -- - -- - ---- - .

---I

Pearl Harbor, oacupation of Manila,

Hongkong, Singapore, etc., capture
" o f much foreign ship tonnage.

973
85, 157

75,271
33;913
70,913
37,418

26
42
56
29 ------------------------------------ Condition of "Operations of the First

202,233
152,539
263,618

97, 669
33,027
68,879

71 Battle of the Coral 8ea ________ .. ___.. __ Army begins to release ships.
27 Battle of Midway __________________._ Japs take Kiska and Attu.
32 ------------------------------------ Navy takes over merchant shipbuild-

----------

Period."

ing.
August ______________
September ___________
October ________._____
November ___________
December ___________

51,965
31,997
18,592 ---------10,420
30,467
192,170
17,111
292,201 ----------

94, 178
47,511
168, 124
162,172
73,223

80 Guadalcanallanding _________________
48 -----------------------------------102 -- ______ .---------------------------1 Attempts to reinforce Guadalcanal.
248
286

125,042

280 ____________________________________ 1 Concentration on reinforcement,

1943:

January _____________

18,519

February ____________
March ______________
April ________________

4,422
67,407
87,997 ---------181, 321
525

95,039
123,608
109,004

211 --------------------------180 "Battle of the Bismarck Sea"

291 -- __________________________________ \ Ceiling of 1,150,000 tons set on army

May ________________
---------June ________________ ---------77,390 ---------July ________________
96,144 ---------August ______________
28, 337
24,,199
September ___________
4,394
89, 890
October ____________
53, 334 ---------November___________
45,668 ---------December ___________
10,262
50,621

116,148
107,025
92,297
100,805
170,237
148,506
274,592
199,488

121 Reconquest of Attu __________________

198
387
289
3041 Submarine offensive stepped up _______
416 ____________________________________ 1 Beginning of Singapore convoys.
517
691

269,642
407,878
180,701
123, 158
249,326

848
6891 Carrier raid on Truk _________________ j Peak of cargo ship deliveries.
688 Carrier rBJd on Palau ________________ Reinforcement of inner defense.
789
316

..534

southern area.

shipping.

1944:

January _____________
February ____________
March ______________
April ________________
May _____________. ___

60,046
81,434
152,890.
126, 940
57,071

1,361
993
3,044
3, 576
I, 522

--

June _____________ _
July_

19,492
23,301

509 I l38,898
197,604
5, 289

579
707

AugusL ____________ _
September __________ _

51, 750
19,087

7,961

212,904
325,468

441
997

October ____________ _
November __________ _
December_

5, 131
11,051)
47,000

2,274
9,905
5,935

390,322
335, 837
140,049

1,616
1,411
402

January ____________ _
February ___________ _
March _____________ _
April _______________ _

50,531
28,861
12,271
3,084

88?

248,743
41,383
133,325
100,642

962
256
2,068
1,333

May _____________ ~ __
June _______________ _
July _______________ _
AugusL ____________ _

1,746

204,327
186, 780
208, 728
51,882

3,052
3,222
3,747
1,958

Invasion of the Marianas _____________ 1 Conversion of cargo ships to tankers.

Reinforcement of Philippines, Formosa, and South China.
Pre-invasion carrier raids around Phil- 200,000 tons civilian shipping diippines.
verted to Philippines.
Carrier support of Leyte landings ____ _
Carrier screen of Philippines __________ 1 Attempted reinforcement o( Leyte.

1945:

4,879
547
12,361

August 15 __________ _
TotaL ___________ _

Carrier raid, South China Sea________ _

Iwo Jima landing ___ _
Large scale city raids _______________ _
B-29 minelaying campaign Okinawa
landing.
Navy privateer planes Korean waters __
Submarines in the sea of Japan _______ _
Carrier raids Japanese home waters ___ _
Atom bombs, Russia in war, complete
air cover.

6,928,867
I

Estimates.

Column 1. Beginning with a figure representing USSBS appraisal of the Japanese merchant
:fleet on Pearl Harbor Day, subsequent monthly figures are arrived at by adding algebraically
oolumns 8, 9~ 10, 11, and 14.
Column 2. Beginning with tonnage known to be in service of the Army on Pearl Harbor Day,

this oolumn Is arrived at by adding and subtracting known requisitions, rele..... and losses
by the Army. adjusted slightly to reconcile differences in information.
Column 3. Same for the Navy.

Col= 4. Column 1 mtuus oolumns 2 and 3.

Column o. Column 4 minus a figure for tonnage under repair or out of service and in need
of repair computed by USSBS from various Japanese sources.
Column 6. Beginning with the known situation at war's end from Japanese sources, working
backward from USSBS sources or ship damage, an approximate reconstruction of totaJ tonnage.
Column 7. USSBS compilation of situation sa of war's end.
Oolumn 8. USSBS compilation of information from various sources. Where exact date of
recommissioning unknown (about 20 percent) ships were apportioned in proportion to known
dates oC recommissioning oC other Ships.

Column 9. USSBS Military Supplies Division, Shipbuilding Section. Included are only
cargo, cargo-passenger. p&sseng6l", and some Cew special types. Fishing vessels and tugs and

barges are not included.

Column 10. Estimates based on changes in the tanker situation.
Column 11. Same source.
Column 12. Sum of Japanese Army and Na.vy reports oC ships requisItioned.
Column 13. Sum of Japanese Army and Navy reports ot ships released to civilians.

....
.....

\0

Column 14. USSBS Ship Sinking List expanded by 2 percent to reconcile discrepancy between
Pearl Harbor tonnage, war's end tonnage, and other contributing factors, together with belief that

Ship Sinking List Is only somewhere between 95 and 98 percent oompleto.

. ColWDll 15. TotaJ tonnf,lge of .bombs, mines, and torpedoes from Appendix o.

Recon version of tankers to cargo.

Termination of Singapore convoys.
Concentration of food imports.
Consolidation of AB&C shipping.
Ship repair difficulties.
Paralysis of shipping.
Surrender.

ApPENDIX TABLE C-100.-Annua! construction of 4 main categories of steel merchant ships in Japanese shipyards, 1991-1,1
[In

Year

passen- PaateDgercargo
gor

Cargo

gross tonsl

[.

Total

Tankers

Passen- P....nger
cargo
gor

Year

Cargo

Tankers

294, 235
214, 145
194,418
156,596

42, 540
56, 531
13, 500
13,380

Total

~Al'PENDIX

TABLE C-102.-J apane8e merchant ship construction during the war (monthly deliveries in gross ton8) -Con.
Car~if=~:~s and

Tankers

Total

Month and year

No. ships

Tonnage

No. ships

Tonnage

No. ships

Tonnage

---------'--------------------11---1-----1--------

1931- ______
1932 _______
1933 _______
1934 _______
1935 _______
1936 _______
1937 _______

1,038
4,558
937
1,112
3,071
2,472
1,475

98,090
38,843
61, 163
136,034
139,914
220,864
373,901

67,384 29,366
236
15,955
46,627 ------93,839 19,283
98,389 17,972
126,031 56, 739
271,696 36,877

302
18,094
13,599
15,800
20,482
35,622
63,853

1938 _______
1939 _______
1940 _______
1941 _______

1,781 11,223

------ 49,790

.3,500 82, 194

.--_.- 40,397

349,
320,
293,
210,

779
466
612
373

---

ApPENDIX TABLE C-I01.-Japanese merchant fleet as of Pearl Harbor Day

Small ships

Kisen (over 500 tons)

Tons

.Cargo,

Tankers
No.

Psgr.misc.ORT

_ _ _ _ _,______

No.

~ _____________ _
December ____________________ _

10

7, 753
33,478

TotaL ______________________________ _

70

239,743

1943:
January ________ . _____________________ _
February ____ : ___ . ____________________ _
March ________________________________ _
ApriL __________ . _________ ~ _____ . _____ _
May ____________ . _______________ . _____ _
June ________________ ._____________ _
July ____________________________ _
August. ___ . ______________ . ____________ _
September ______________________ . _____ _
October ______ . ________________________ _
November ________________________ _
December ___ _ _____ ___________________ _

5
12
24
8
5
14
12
19
19
23
22
37

7,309
29,945
91,778
16,838
14,238
31,322
32,095
47, 118
45,417
54,913
47,857
95,328

200

514, 158

54

45
39
67
31
40
38
33
36
44
42
43
41

72, 342
84,053
178,419
73,075
95,852
93, 322
51, 184
73,200
103,497
75,520
87, 536
86,913

499

1,074,913

TotaL_ 25,944 351,356 1, 579, 3151286, 424 2,242,039

Source: Individual shipyards (98 percent coverage).

I 1942-Continued
November ______

GRT

GRT

Kfsen

I_~

Kihsn
sen NQ.

GRT

~_1 _ _ _ _1_ _ _ _ _ _ _

i~~~~::~~~~~~ ~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~-~ ~~~~~~~~~J~~~-~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~ --841- --203~512- 1~: ~~~
500-1,000------1,000-3,000_____
3,000-6,000_____

264
527
486

198,036
1,055,224
2,330,577

20
10
13

12,770
15,740
61,379

284
537
499

6,000-10,000____
Over 10,000_____

219
19

1,603,219
234,087

32
19

253,458
232,117

251
38

TotaL ____ 1, 515

5,421,143

94

575, 464 1, 609

~!;: i~~

210,806 ______ __________

3
1,710
1,070,964 ______ __________
5
10,543
2,391,956 ________ c _______ I ___________ c _____ _
1,856,677 -_-__-_--_-__--_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_II-_-_~~~~~~I~~--~~~~~~~
466,204

5,996,607

841

1--;;'-~118, 7891~~;;~~

BOUIC'C: Shipping Control Association.

ApPENDIX TABLE C-I02.-J apancse merchant ship construction during the war (monthly deliveries in gross tons)
[Ships over 500 tonsl
Cargo. passenger, a.nd
miscellaneou.s

Total

Tankers

TotaL _________ _
1944:
January _________________ _
February _____ ______ . ________ ________ _
March ________________________________ _
AprIL _________ _______________________ _
May __________________________________ _
June __________________________________ _
July __________________________________ _
August ________________________________ _
September _____________________________ _
October _______________________________ _
November _____________________________ _
December ___ _________________ __

Month and year

No. ships

1941: December --- - - - - --- - -TotaL __ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - -1942~

January _________ ---- -- -- -- ----- -- - --- -February _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -March __ - - - - - - - - - - -- - -- - --- - - - - - -- - - - -ApriL ____ - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - --;
May __ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -. - - -J une __ - _- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -' - - -July ____...... _- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - August. _- - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -' - - -September _- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - -- - - - - - - - -October _- - - - - - - - - - - -. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --

l'SO

Tonnage

Tonnage

No. ships

No./iliips

Tonnage

5, 904

4, 929

975'

4,929

975

5,904

4
7
8
4
6
6
5
7
8
6

23, 894
16,638
21, 250
7, 082
16,242
23,081
12,895
40, 374
22, 879
22,351

4
7
8
3
6
6
5
5
8
5

23,894 .------- -----------16,638

-----------21,250 .------- -----------1, 186
5,896
16, 242 -------- -----------23,081 -------- -----------12,895
33,958
22,879
1
572
21, 779

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~ ~

------

TotaL ____________ . __________ _

[945:
January ________ . ___________________ . __
February __________________ ___________ _
March ________________________________ _
ApriL ________________________________ ._
May ______ ___________________________ _
June __________________________________ _
July __________________________________ _
August _______________________________ _

13
5

7, 753
45,620

20, 316

77

260,059

6
16
28
8
9
17
15
22
27
27
31
48

12,549
42,954
108,444
16,838
31,315
48,000
63,966
62,483
88,805
80,412
87,278
126,041

254,927

264

769,085

10
14
22
4
23
18
17
18
22
18
21
17

35,874
40, 849
78,031
10, 108
66,387
49,060
55,428
28,688
81, 724
69, 155
62, 295
46,691

55
53
89
35
63
56
50
54
66
60
64
58

108,216
124,902
256,450
83,183
162,239
142,382
106,612
101,888
185,221
144,675
149,831
133,604

204

624,290

703

------------

5,240
13,009
16,666
-------- -----------17,077
4
3
16,678
31,871
3
3
15,365
43, 388
8
25,499
4.
9
39,421'
11
30,713
1
4
4

14
31, 015
82,404
99, 642
11
40,730
112, 823
3
13, 906
33,707 -------- -----------66, 454 - -- - - - _.. -----------22, 481 -------- -----------44,337 -------- -----------12, 064
------------

TotaL _______________ . _______________

160

Grand totaL __________________________

932 [ 2, 307, 655 [

L Source:

13

---- -----

33
35
34
14
21

12, 142

--------

473, 912

-----1,699,203

47
46
37
14
21
5
13
5

113,419
140,372
126,729
33, 707
66,454
22,481
44,337
12,064

28

85,651

188

559,563

294 [

986, 159

1,226

3,293,814

Individual shipyards (95 percent coverage).

lSl

Construction of Kihansen during the war 1

70-160 GiT

No.

ApPENDIX TABLE

No.

GfT

No.

GfT

Tonnage

GfT

Month

a1ioat

first of

month

1943:
April___________________________________

1
1

100
70

~ay----------------------------------June___________________________________

5
4

460
420

1
1

250
250

July- ---------------------------------August_________________________________
September______________________________
October________________________________
November______________________________
December _ _ _ __ __ ____ ________ ___________

22
46
85
96
100
86

1,990
4,150
8,690
9,510
10,240
9,480

9
4
9
1
14

2,250
1,000
2,150
250
3,450

~arch_________________________________

TotaL ______________________________ _

1944:
January-------------------------------February------------------------------________________________.________ _
April_ . ________________________________ _
May __________________________________ _
June __________________________________ _
July _____________ - - __ - _____ - _________ -_
August ________________________________ _
September _____________________________ _
October _______________________________ _
November _____________________________ _
December _____________________________ _
~arch

-------1----------1-----446
45, 110
39
=====/;========/====.=
51
80
65
52
153
320
236
83
75
78
65
61

5, 170
7,130
4,760
5,090
17, 160
34,100
26,240
9,460
8,650
9,210
7, 390
7, 310

7
20
44
7
35
103
88
38
35
27
30
30

-------1----------1-----1945:
January-------------------------------February------~-----------------------~arch_ - _ - -- - -- - -- - 0 - - - - - - - - - - - - . - - - - - -

April _______________ ~------------------May----------------------------------June

__________________________________ _
Ju1y---------------------------------~August
________________________________ _

TotaL _______________ ._______________ _

1
1
5
5
23
55
89
105
101
100

100
70
460
670
2,240
6,400
9, 690
11,660
10,490
12,930

485
54,710
9, 600
--- ----- -----==
1,750
4,650
9, 200
1,750
8,750
25,050
21,800
9, 350
8, 750
6,750
7,550
7, 500

58
100
109
59
188
423
324
121
110
105
95
91

6, 920
11,780
13, 960
6,840
25,910
59, 150
48,040
. 18,810
17,400
15,960
14,940
14,810

1,319

141,670

464

112,850

I, 783

254, 520

37
36
69
456
24
32
21

16
27
35
22

4,600
4,550
7,740
7,300
2,720
3,850
2,370
900

17
16
3

4;000
6, 750
8,650
5,500
4, 250
4,300
4,000
750

53
63
104
478
40
49
37
9

8,600
11,300
16,390
12,800
6,970
8, 150
6,370
1,650

681

34,030

152

38, 200

833

72,230

160,650

3, 101

381,460

Hi

======,~========='I======

Grand total -------------------------1

2,446

Kihansen are the Japanese variety of oriental junk, built of wood,

equipped with power and seldom exoeedlng 160 ton.. They are to be di.tln-

'1-

220,810

655

C-103.-Wartime history of JapaneBe tanker fteet

Total

200-500 GfT

gui.hed Cram the Klsen which are E!",opean style steamship' usually
over 500 GfT.

In serviceable
condition-

first

Importing oil

into

Japan

Servicing

the
armyOVprseas

SerVicing
the navy

(not

counting

deet
oilers)

In local

use

around
Japan

In need
of re-

pairs, repairing

or con-

verting

Converted

Built

Captured

month!

month

salvaged

during

during

or

Sunlc

during
month

Tonnage
afi08t at
end of
month

(estimate)
-----------1------ --------- ---- - - - _________
. _____________

1941: December ___ 575, 464510,464

o 13, 480 160, 000 336, 984 65, 000 _______ _
975 10,806 _______ 587, 245
1942:
January----- 587, 245516,116
013,480160,000342,636 71,129 _______ " _______ 10,778------_ 598,023
February - - - - 598, 023539, 070
0 13, 480 160, 000365, ,590 58,953 __ ____ __ __ _____ 8,014 _______ 606, 037
~arch---- ___ 606,037560,647
013,480160,000387,16745,390------- ________ 7,601 8,653604,985
ApriL - - - - - - - 604, 985556, 976
0 13, 480 160, 000383, 496 48, 009 ______ __ I, 186 I, 15B- ______ 607, 329
May - - - - -- - - 607, 329579, 285256, 140 13,.480 160, 000149, 665 28, 044- __ _____ ____ ___ ___ __ __
904606, 425
June_ - - - -- - - 606, 425554, 170256, 14013,480160,000124, 550 52,255 + 4, 000 __ __ ___ 1,458 _______ 611, 883
July -- - - - - - - - 611, 883552, 793272, 313 13, 480 160, 000 107, 000 59, 090 +5, 000 _ ___ ___ 7, 98i
624, 864
AugusL _____ 624,864554, 117294,63713,480160,000 86,000 70,747------ __ 6,416
---- ___ 631,280
September - - - 631, 280544, 828306, 348 13, 480 160, 000 65, 000 86, 452 + 15, 000 ____ ___ 2, 088 _______ 648, 368
572 13,416 _______ /662, 356
October____ - - 648, 368618, 560402, 080 13, 480 160, 000 43, 000 29,808 ___ _____
NovembeL - - 662, 356594, 895402, 080 13, 480 160, 000 19, 335 67, 461
_______ 662, 356
DecembeL---662,356622,335428,85513,480160,ooO 20,000 40,021+12,000 12,142
.. -----__ 686,498
1943:
January - - - - - 686, 498 650, 029 444, 549 13, 480 172, 000
February - - - - 727, 935677,210471,73013,480172,000
March _____ -- 780,944728,972534,49213,480161,000
ApriL __ - - --- 788, 162740,783533, 833 12, 950 174, 000
May--------768,197701,921493,97112,950175,OOO
June_ - - - -- -- 772, 670712, 185501, 235 12, 950 178, 000
July _________ 785,151747,285536,33512,950178,000
August_ - -- -- 817, 022756,300551, 350 12, 950172,000
September - - - 832,387753, 131547, 181 12,950173, 000
October ____ -- 844, 706770,560563, 610 12, 950 174, 000
November ___ 870,205815,491614,54112,950168,000
December --- - 863, 953811, 220606, 270 12, 950 172, 000
1944:

20, 000
20,000
20,000
20, 000
20,000
20, 000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20, 000
20,000
20, 000

36, 469 + 30, 000 5, 240 6, 197 _______ 727, 935

50,725 +40, 000 13,009 ______________ 780, 944
51,972 + 20, 000 16,666 _____ __ 29, 448788, 162
47,379 +5,000 ___ ____ __ ___ __ 24,965768, 197
66,276 +5,000 17,071---- ___ 17,604772,670
60,485 __ ___ __ 16,678 __ ____ _ 4, 197785, 151
37,866 _______ 31,871---- __________ 817, 022
60,722 ____ .. __ 15,365 ______________ 832, 387
79,256 _____ __ 43,388 __ ____ _ 31,069 844,706
74, 146-_ ___ ___ 25,499
_______ 870, 20&
54,714 ________ 39,421
45,673 1863,953
52, 733 ________ 30, 713
21, 596873,
070
1

January----- 873, 070753, 769558, 81912, 950162, 000

February - - - - 839, 576787, 497 594, 547 12, 9501160, 000
March--- ____ 760,507728,146588, 19612,950107,000
ApriL _______ 793, 833767, 539643, 58912, 950 91,000
May - - - -- - - - 798,8227'68,625644, 675 12, 950 91,000
June--------835,358770,647627,69712,950110,OOO
July---------837,326766,127633,17712,950100,OOO
August_ - - -- - 852,735777,957645, 007 12, 950100, 000
SeptembeL - - 835, 882 762, 640640, 690 12, 950 89, 000
October _____ - 872,333806,533693,58312,950 80,000
NovembeL_ - 838,947759,881667,241 2,640 70,000
December ___ - 868,962803,019716, 379 2, 640 64,000
1945:

20,000119,301---- ____ 35,874 6,079 75,447839,576

20, 000 52, 079 ____ ____ 40, 849 _______ 119, 918760, 507
20,000 32,361 +4,00078,031--- ____ 48;705793,833
20,000 26,294 +3,000 10,IQ8 _______ 8,119798,822
20,000 30, 197 +3, 000 66,381-_ _____ 32,.851835,358
20,000 64,711 +4,00049,060 _______ 51,092837,326
20,000 71,199 +8,000 55,428--- ____ 48,019852,735
20, 000 74, 778 +40, 000 28, 688 __ _____ 85, 541835,882
20, 000 73, 242 + 60, 000 81, 724 _______ 105, 273872, 333
20,000 65,800 +30, 000 69, 155- ______ 132,541838,947
20,000 79,066 +30, 000 62,295 _______ 62,280868,962
20,000 65,943 _______ _ 46,691-- __ ___ 54, 682860,971

January - - - - - 860,971 787, 911 700, 000 2, 640 60, 000 25,271 73,060 -30, 000 31,015 _______ 182,002679,984
February - - - - 679, 984 541, 245388, 605 2, 640 50, 000 100, 000 138, 739 - 55, 000 40, 730 _______ 46, 966618, 748
Ma.rch _______ 618,748522,606150,000 2,640 35,000334,966 96,142 -15, 000 13,906---- ___ 55,518562,136
ApriL_ - - - -- - 562, 136441,028100, 000 2, 640 30, 000308,388121, 108 - 89,000 _____ __ ___ ____ 13, 059460,077
May - - - - - - - - 460,077 351, 758 2 70,000 2, 640 27,000252, 118 108, 319 -71, 000 ___ ____ _______ 11, 237377,840
June_ - - - - - - - 377,840255,893 2 65, 000 2, 640 27,000161, 253 121, !M7 -40, 000 ___________ . __ 13, 058324,782
July --- - - - -- - 324,782204,247 2 50,000 2, 640 25,000126,607 120,535 -18, 000 ___ __ __ ____ ___ 31, 257 275, 525
August_ - _c - - 275,525101, 196 2 35, 000 2, 640 25,000 38,556 174, 329 _ ___ ___ _ __ ___ __ _______ 8, 577 266, 948
15 August ____ 266,948 86,287225,000 _____________________________________________________________ _

or

Source: Transport ministry.

Estimate.
2 Cut off in the Southern Area.
Source: Shipping Section, Transportation Division, U8BBS.

182

714928-46--13

183

ApPENDIX TABLE 0-104.-Japane8e merchant marine at the end of the war (Ki8ken)-Continued

ApPENDIX TABLE 0-104 -Japanese merchant marine at the end of the war (Kisken)

Location and condition

Numbero!
ships

Location and condition

Tonnage

Numbero!
ships

Inner zone (north of Shanghai) :

Damaged and bear.hed ______ -------- ---------267
Damaged heavily ___________
1
Damaged slightly (but un150
1
serviceable) - - -- - - - - - - - - -Damaged (extent unknown
4, 336
16
but unserviceable) - - - - - - -Total damaged _______________
Total serviceable---- ---- ------ - --

18
141

4, 753
38, 781

..

159

43, 534

Outer zone (south of Shanghai) :

Damaged and beached ______ -------- ---------494
1
Damaged heavily - - - - - - - - - -Damaged slightly (but unserviceable) - -- - - - - - -- - - -- -------- ---------Damaged (extent unknown
632
2
but unserviceable) - - - - - - --

--- -----

NumberO!
ships

Tonnage

47
37

40,880
31,435

47

41, 193

128

109,431

Tonnage

Number of
ships

259
193

222,939
160,295

Tonnage

-.

35
22

67,094
44,486

7
4

26,084
14,228

25

52, 336

26,581

26

58,210

18,526

222, 126
136,543

22
20

85,419
73,689

186

358, 669

42

159, 108

---------

Total doat ______________

6,000-10,000

3,OOIHl,OOO tons

1,()()()-,'l,OOO tons

~I,OOOtons

I()(Hj()() tons

108
78

-----

452

383,234

1
2

835
1,755

1
3

1,398
8,097

873

4,817 - -

3,528

11,242
25, 554
31, 519

5
5

-----

---------3,252
1

- -------

---

--- ---------4

21,655

--- - - - - -

24,907
19,419

Total damaged--------------Total serviceable-------- ----- - - --

3
14

1,126
4, 341

8
28

6,991
22,054

12
17

Total doat _______________

17

5,467

36

29,045

29

57,073

10

Grand total:
Total damaged-------------Total serviceable-------------

21
155

5,879
43, 122

267
221

229, 930
182, 349

120
95

247,680
168,062

27
25

no, 326

Total afloat_______________

176

49,001

488

412,279

215

415, 742

52

203,434

-----

Inner zone (north of Shanghai) :

Damaged and beached _________________
Damaged heavily _____________________
Damaged slightly (but unserviceable) ____
Damaged (extent unknown but unserviceable) ____________________________

Number of
. shipe

Tonnage

Total

Over 10,000

Numbero!
shipe

Tonnage

Numbero!
shipe

Tonnage t

Percent

212,089
254,229
261,289

12.5
14. 9
15.2

288,6l1

16.9

100,270
41,711

470 1,016,218
469
691,078

59.5
40. 5

141,981

939 1,707,296

100.. 0
6. 8
27.8
3.1

9
20
15

67,790
143, 163
102, 174

1
2
3

10,241
20,650.
38,855

99
86
98

10

67,584

30,524

187

Total damaged ___________________________

Total serviceable ____________________________

54
33

380,711
240,059

9
4

Total afloat __________________________

87

620, 770

13

-.---- - - -

Outer zone (south of Shanghai) :

Damaged and beached _________________ -------- ---------1
10,240
Damaged heavily ______________________
37,361 -------- ---------5
Damaged slightly (but unserviceable) ____ -------- ---------- -------- ---------Damaged (extent unknown but unserviceable) ____________________________
-------------------

3
12
3

12,473
50,959
5,690

16

37,057

Total damaged _____________________

Total serviceable ______________________,______

34

64

106, 179
77,333

57.9
42. 1

98

183,512

100.0

Total afloat ___________________________

- - - ------ - - 5
0

37,361
0

1
0

10,240

37,361

10,240

--- ----

20.2

---

"----

44,326

93, 108

Grand total:
Total damaged ________________________
Total serviceable _______________________

59
33

418,072
240,059

10
4

110,510
41,711

504 1,122,397
533
768,411

59.4
40.6

Total afloat __________________________

92

658,131

14

152,221

1,037 1,890,808

100.0

t Add Klhsnsen being operated by the Shipping Control Council as ot 15 ADgUBt 1945: 3,105 v....ls-!Ul,(13 gross tons.
Source: Shipping Division, USSBS.

185
184

ApPENDIX TABLE

G-105.-Foreign trade oj Japan, 1900-1943

000

doo

[In 1,000 yen]

Year

1900 __________
190L _________
1902 __________
1903_._________
1904 __________
1905 __________
1906 __________
1907 __________
1908 __________
1909 __________
1910 ________ 191L ______ . __
1912 __________
1913 __________
1914 __________
1915 __________
1916 __________
1911- _________
1918 __________
1919 __________
1920 __________
192L _________

Exports

204,429
252, 349
258,303
289, 502
319,260
321,533
423, 754
432,412
378,245
413, 112
458,428
447,433
526,98,1
632,460
591,
703,306
1,127,468
1,603,005
1,962,100
2,098, 872
1,948,394
1,252,837

lOr

Imports

287, 261
255,816
271,731
317, 135
371,360
488,538
418, 784
494,467
436,257
394, 198
464,233
513,805
618,992
729,431
595, 735
532, 449
756,427
1,035,811
1,668,143
2,173,459
2,336, 174
1, 614, 154

Total

491,690
508, 165
530,034
606,637
690,620
810,071
842, 538
926,879
814, 502
807, :no
922,661
961,238
1,145,973
1,361,891
1,186,836
1,235,755
1,883,895
2, 638, 816
3,630,243
4,272,331
4,284,568
2,866,991

000
............

Year

1922 __________
1923 .. _________
1924 __________
1925 __________
1926 __________
1927 __________
1928 __________
1929 __________
1930 __________
193L _________
1932 __________
1933 __________
1934 __________
1935 __________
1936 __________
1937 __________
1938 __________
1939 __________
1940 __________
194L _________
'1942 ________ '__
1943 __________

Exports

1,637,451
1,447,750
1,807,034
2,305,589
2,004,727
1,992,317
1,971,955
2, 148,618
1,469,852
1,146,981
1,409,992
1, 861, 045
2, 171,924
2,499,072
2,692,976
3,175,418
2,689,000
3,576,370
3, 655, 850
2,650,865
1,792,547
1,627,350

Imports

1,890,308
1,982,230
2,453,402
2,572,657
2,377,484
2,179,153
2,196,314
2,216,240
1,546,070
1,235,675
1,431,461
1,917,219
2,282,601
2,472,235
2,763,681
3, 783, 177
2,663,440
2,917,666
3,452,725
2,898,565
1, 751, 637
1,924,350

Total
------

3,527,759
3,429,980
4,260,436
4,878,246
4,382,211
4,171,470
4, 168, 269
4,364,858
3,015,922
2,382,656
2,841,453
3, 778, 264
4,454,525
4,971,307
5,456,657
6,958,595
5,352,440
6,494,036
7,108,575
5,549,430
3, 544, 184
3,551,700

000

000

,
, ,, ,,

000
............

ggggg~gggggggggg
oooooootr,)'f""4(CJI"""I,t......t--OOC'lCClQ
CQ- ~ 1'-- 1"""1- (0- c6'
t:'I:)lt:l ..... Q:)C'l1"'"'lC\l

lO

co"

CC'f""4~O

C'I-cq-

~- 1'-- ~- "111- 00 cO co'" '1"""1ooOO\X)OOC'lOOOCt:l

cqO)CQt--t-~

.,....j..

000

doo

:=!S;=:

~~~~
......- as

Q)-

J:-....

C't:)- ~-

r:6

OOO)O<:b~C'lC'l

I"""4C\1O)Q)

10- -.:fI-

0"

......

ce"

,t.....-

t6'

-.:tl-

If;)-

0'" eq-

CQCQC'lOQ)CQ~~

C'I~"d'ICt:)lf;)"I""'It-

......-

....i

000

~~

,
"

Source: "Diamond" Yearbook, Japan Yearbook, Orient Yearbook.

,,
,,

186

j
187

....

C-I07.-Quantity and value of Japanese impor(3 of selected commoditie8, 1936-43

ApPENDIX TABLE

00
00

Quantity
and valne
in units

Commodity

Rice and paddy _______________ Picul 1_

729,441 20,815,523 24,014,888
557,622
378,275
923,237
Yen ___
6,286,329 196,006,260 265,481,235
2,807,791
4,032,976
5,098,071
8,576,096
Beans and peas _______________ Picul___ 12,445,184 12,321,144 13,884,618 13,727,012
8,120,562
yen ____ 62,601,112 92,547,363 102,175,975 123,575,994 112,756,842 119,489,724
3,977,730
2,564,990
2,660,999
Seeds, oil-yielding ____ ~ ________ Picul ___
4,792,176
3,167,080
5,413,458
yen ____ 44,873,079 43,612,048 28,790,494 31,981,686 44,317,128 59,234,406
Salt _______________ _________ Picul ___ 22,039,941 28,148,491 23,805,966 31,408,378 28,578,090 24,142,090
yen ____ 17,761,167 28,910,743 30,290,099 41, 515, 318 63, 861,' 315 52,988,267
Hides and skins _______________ PicuL __
624,334
"504,125
507,473
489,473
687,.511
512,714
yen ____ 24,835,752 44,571,498 27,826,209 30,573,244 32,759,036 43,595,919
Oil, hydrocarbon ______________ Picul ___
------------ ----------------------- ---~-------- -----------yen ____ -----------253,625,063 352,460,219 336,247,149
-------- .. --- -----------Cotton, raw __________________ Picul ___ 15,211,168 13,764,913
5,967,811
7,758,441
9,378,454 10,093,418
yen ____ 850, 451, 600 851,162,644 436,834,585 462,006,980 504,070,899 392,261,861
906,924
Wool, sheep's _________________ PicuL __
770,089
801, 688
881,889
1,953,835
1,640,636
yen ____ 200,898,493 298,406,862 94,425,569 72,590,259 105,251,143 124,066,572
938,531
1,433,331
Fiber, vegetable _______________ PicuL __
1,415,946
1,261,597
1,866,653
2, 158, 219
yen ____ 37,300,\137 40,994,972 27,305,564 38,266,314 40, 688, 364 27,756,899
211,927
243,694
Fiber, waste of old ____________ PicuL __
296, 186
277,435
288,226
332, 141
yen ____
6,371,001 12,073,929 13,187,995 16,973,272
7,835,781
8,130,911
958, 133
Pulp ______________ - - _- - - _- ___ Picul ___
2, 933, 167
2,834,939
2,434,819
7,901,727
5,528,532
yen ____ 67,107,057 116,719,852 42,131,502 56,537,329 16,107,816 23,717,784
6, 608, 702
9,402,824 13,049,847 11,840,882
Phosphorite __________ - _- - - - -- PicuL __ 13,830,204 15,371,942
yen ____ 22,392,699 30,810,382 19,281,443 25,411,705 41,867,628 21,983,387
Coal _________________________ L. ton __
5, 187, 771
5,085,013
3,794,710
3,682,531
4,356,465
4,134,352
yen ____ 51,055,577 59,224,254 67,217,482 78,363,522 116, 731, 648 143,025,556
7,223,182
6,295,345
Dolomite and magnesite _______ Picul ___
6,498,341
4,501,293
3,588,032
2,564,224
yen ____
9,711,790 18,818,151 19, 846, 654
3,484,491
6,067,067
2,349,204
Ores _________________ -- - -- - -- M. ton_
------------ --- .. -------- 5,228,274 5,'584,189 5,572,895
yen ____ -----------374,891,804 901,130,824 661, 894, 693 158, 715, 007 204,044,034 197,029,434
Iron _________________________ PicuL __ 49,529,815 76,517,602 45,448,162 59,679,967 42,461,185 17,013,195
Ye~ ____
192,039,892 563,840,508 321,294,638 380,659,437 385, 780, 864 157,930,662
Lead ________________________ Picul ___
1,308,865
1,534,834
1,683,350
1,013, 149
1,645,410
1,598,533
yen ____ 26,873,028 41,975,913 17,618,496 29,140,404 32,417,539 29,783,117
91,342
181, 147
132,738
Tin ____________________ - - _- -- Picul ___
114,163
145, 753
115
yen ____
15,425 27,228,830 29, 165, 741 30, 579, 243 47, 102,041 25, 315, 783
105,315
391,223
PicuL __
1,012,457
Zinc __________
778, 165
1,080,164
1,029,569
yen ____ 16,427,760 24,569,452 16,061,772 17,137,561 12,604,929
4,738,083
Amures ______________________ PicuL __ 10,085,783
7, 675, 591
7,765,088
9,545,378 11,638,347 -----------yen ____ 44,02~, 171 48,120,841 62,712,748 108,095,527 76,864,554 66,994,509
Other______________ - - - - - _-- -- yen ____ 694,549,738 554,042,056 663,166,579 950,819,724 985,025,366 770,105,050
Total imports ___ - ------ yen ____ 2,763,681,477 3,783,222, 290 2,663,439,448 2,917,666,365 3,402,723,771 2,898,565,323
~

------------

00 _ _ _ -

-- _

1943

1942

1941

1940

1939

1933

1937

1936

--

23,034,184 12,539,152
242,625,231 126,347,776
4,645,449
10,812,637
154; 150, 813 126,505,302
2,357,928
1, 645, 688
29,255,471 127,973,191
23,245,452 20,087,966
55,162,243 50,877,282
264,065
485,402
38,373,939 22,212,363
361, 183 -----------23,988,918 83,959,966
2,029,709 .1,544,678
224,305,572 266,300,592
58,863
142,006
7,211,811
25,883,717
876,227
645,814
27, 525, 194 38,813,750
138,290
142,996
9,305,869
18,667,778
31, 134
167,234
708,813
3,797,357
1,862,528
1,741,499
5,894; 184
5,042,850
4,416,636
5,162,826
159, 556, 151 162,386,289
6,042,582
6, 561, 126
26,455,408
22,436~397
4,568,187
8,840,605
126,082,883 143, 147, 966
8,149,471
15,037,040
161,841,452 118, 172,591
53,010
12,006
2,449,666
423,051
161, 756
37
33,363 41,419,905
57,358
56,811
4,058,414
3,562,988
5,087,682
8, 768, 196
81,139,368 68,439,442
347,782,254 491,709,647
1,751,636,990 1,924,350,227

picul is eqll&! to 60 kilograms or 1321bs.

Source: Shipping Control ASsociation, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Transport Ministry, control associations for each commodity, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.

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~ i3 s ~

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~
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....
"gog.

-;

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: 881 8

-..J':
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t.:)

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ttl

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ii?.~~ ~ I
G<.ct

~~ot-.:)

oil.
_""
:

~ .
8'
...f!, ogo

_~

-'" I -""

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1=1

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.....

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g 1:1
(':I

...,

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.....

....,
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:t::I~

_O_tO_C11 ..0

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~t-..:)o

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.;..

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.....
H::o-OOI-'

L..:1

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CIt;

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I

::::

ggg g
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::::

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I

ApPENDIX TABLE

ApPENDIX TABLE

C-llO.-Japanese imports of bauxite, 191,0-45

C-U2.-Japanese Import. of Scrap Iron, 191,0-1,5

Quantity

Quantity

---Metric
tons

Per
oont

Metric
tons

Percent

Metric
tons

Metric
tons

Percent

194.\

1944

1943

1942

1941

1940

Country of origin

Percent

Metric
tons

Per-

cent

Metric
tons

- - - - - - - - ---- - - - - - - - - ---- - - - - - - ---

Total, southern
area co un tries - - 1275,000 100.0 1150,000 100.0 305,000 100. 0 909,000 100. 0 376,000 100.0
----

----

-- - - - - -

- ----- - -=

- -- - - - - -

Metric
tons

Percent

Metric
tons

Percent

Metric
tons

Percent

0.8

Metric
tons

Hong Kong ___________ _

Netherland East Indies_

Percent

Metric

tons

13,000
62,000

3.5

49,000 19.9

38,000 76.0

Percent

Metric
tons

Percent

Metric
tons

Percent

19,000 44- 2

18,000 85.7

12,000 100. 0

10,000 20.0
8,000 18.6
5,000 23.8
2,000 16.7
1,000 2.3
1,000 4.8 ____________ _
1,000 2.0
25,000 50. 0 lO, 000 23. 3 12, 000 57. 1 10, 000 83. 3
2,000 4.0 ________ 25.6 _________________________ _
9,000 18.0

0.6 _________________________ _
2. 9 49,000 19. 9
9,000 18. 0

Percent

Metric
tons

Per-

cent

16,000 37.2 _________________________ _

3,000

5,000 11. 6 _________________________ _

11,000 ______________________________ _

6.0

8,000 18.6

3,000 14.3 ____________ _

ApPENDIX TABLE

782,000 71. 3
2, 000 0.2
250,000 22.8
63,000 5.7

80,000 47.1
2,000 1.2
50,000 29.4
38,000 22. 3

- -= =- -

Grand totaL _- - _ 621,000 100.0 921,000 100.0 993,000 100.0 977,000 100. 0 1,097,0001 100. 0 170,000

50,000100.0 43,000 100.0

21,000100.0

12,000 100.0

Source: Iron and Steel Control Association, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Transport Ministry.

------- ----- -

---- - -

-=

6.5

Grand totaL ____ 2, 124,000100.0 246,000100.0

1945

1944

___________ 450,000 72. 5 780,000 84.7 830,000 83.6 542,000 55.5

1,000 O. 1 14,000 1.4
1,000 0.1
1,000 0.1
Kwantung __ --- -- ----Korea ______ - -- _- - -- -- 170,000 27.4 140,000 15.2 130,000 13. 1 270,000 27.6
China _______ - __ - - - - - - - ---.---- - - .-- .------- -. - -- 32,000 3. 2 151,000 15.5
~anchukuo

==

Metric
tons

-------------------------------

Total, inner zone.

countries ______ 621,000 100. 0 921,000 100. 0 993,000 100.0 977,000 100. 0 1,097,000 100. 0 170,000 100. 0

Percent

1=====----======--===

- - ----- ------ -----

----

16,000

Total, other _____ 2, 012, 000 95. 6 181, 000 73. 6

1943

1942

1941

75,000
I--~-

C-lll.-Japanese imports of iron and steel, 191,0-1,5.

1940

17,000

Total, southern
area countries_

Quantity
Country of origin

Metric
tons

1945

15,500 100. 0

No break-down available on prewar imports.

Source: Shipping Control Association, Transport Ministry, Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

..

Percent

~anchukuo___________
10,000 0.5 10,000 4- 1
Kwantung ______________________________________ _
China __________________________________________ _
Formosa_ __ ___ _ __ __ ___
7,000 O. 3
6,000 2. 4

ApPENDIX TABLE

Metric
tons

1944

15,500 100.0

Netherland East Indies __ -------- - ---- ------.- - - - -- 211,000 69.2 803,000 88. 3 357,000 94. 9 15, 500 100.0
Palau _______ - --'- - - - - - -- ------.- - - -.- -------- - - - -- 94,000 30. 8 106,000 11.7 19,000 5. 1 -------- - --.Grand totaL __ - -- 275,000 100.0 150,000 100.0 305,000 100.0 909,000 100. 0 376, 000 100. 0

Percent

1943

---------I------I---I------------~---------------

Total, inner zone

countries _____ _

- - ---- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Metric
tons

1942

1941

1940

Country of origin

Percent

C-1l3.-Japanese imports of lead, 191,0-45

Quantity

I---------r--------~-----

Country of origin

1941

1940

1942

1943

1944

1945

------------

Metric

Per-

Metric

Per-

Metric

Per-

Metric

Per-

Metric

Per-

Metric

Per-

-------------1--------------------------------Total, inner zone

countries ______ _

8,080

8.1

8,670 10.0

8,720 79. 4

Source: Iron and Steel Control Assoriation, Transport Ministry. Ministryof Commerce fmd Industry.
~an.chukuo-----------80 0.1
650 0.7
570 5.2
Kwantung_____________ ________ _____ ________ _____
150 1.4
Korea_________________
8,000 8.0
8,000 9.2
8,000 72.8
China_________________ ________ _____
20 0.1 ____________ _

16, 190 65. 9

16, 590 98. 7

4,000100.0

2,920 11. 9
1,180 7.0 ____________ _
240 1. 0 _________________________ _
13, 000 . 52. 9
30 0.1

14, 000 83. 3

4, 000 100. 0
1,410 8.4 ____________ _

===============
Total, southern
area countries __

7,880

7.8

Singapore _____________ _
Burma ________________ _

510
7,370

0.5 ________ _____ ________ _____

8,390 34.1
220 1. 3 ____________ _
7.3
9,270 10.7
2,270 20.6 ______________________________________ _

Total,others_____
Grand totaL ____

84,140 84- 1

9,270 '10.7

2,270 20.6

8,390 34. 1

220

1. 3 ____________ _

68,590 79.3 ___________________________________________________ _

~;;;~;;; ~OO~ -;;~;;; ~OO~-~~;~. 0 -~~;~OO. 0l-~~~ 7'00. 0 =~~;;;;~OO. 0

Source: Light Metals Control Association. Transport Ministry, Ministry of Commerce and Indnstry.

190

714928--46--H

191

G-1l4.-Japanese imports of tin, 1940-45

ApPENDIX TABLE

ApPENDIX TABLE

G-116.--Japanese imports of phosphorite and phosphate, 1940-45

Quantity
Country of origin

19(()

Metric

tons

Tota.l, southern
&rea countries __
Netherla.nd East Indies
and Malaya __________
Grand total ______

1941

Per-

cent

Metric

tons

Quantity
IIl4i1

1942

Percent

Metric

Peroent

tons

Metria

tons

1944

Peroent

Metric

tons

1945

Percent

19(()

Oountry of origin .

Metric

Per.

tons

Metric

cent

-Per-

tons

- -- - - - - - - - - - - - ---- - - ---- - - - - - - - -

1941

Metric
tons

1942

-Per-

'5,500 100.0

3,800 100. 0

23,500 100. 0

26,800 100. 0

----- ----- - - ----- - - - - 10, 500 100.0

----- -=
10,500 100.0

5, 500 ]00.0

- -=

5,500 100.0

,.A.PPENDIX TABLE

3,800 100.0

26,800 100.0

-- ---- - -

23,500 100.0

- ------ - =

3,SOO 100.0

26,800 100.0

3, 600 100.0

3,600 100.0

Metric
tons

_Per-

Metric
tons

1945

_Per-

Metric
tons

_Per-

--------_._-----!-----------

1940

Country of origin

23,500 100.0

3,600 100.0

Metric

tons

Per-

cent

Metric

tons

IIl4i1

1942

Percent

Metric

tons

Percent

Metria

tons

1944

Percent

Metric

tons

16,700

2. 4

54,900 13. 8' 56,000 16.4

China_________________ 16,700 2.4 54,900 13.8 56,000

Manchukuo _______________________________________________________________ _

66, 100 73. 8

23,000100. 0

63,300 70.7
2,800 3. 1

20,000 87.0
3,000 13.0

======-====.=.=.=-====---======-==.====

Total, southern
area ___________ 117,900 16.6

80,000 20.2 285,600 83.5 180,800 76.4

Straits Settlements______ 82,900 11. 7 47,600 12.0 ____________ _

French Indochina._______ 20,000 2.8 22,400 5.7 55,000 16.1
Malaya________________ 15,000 2.1 10,000 2.5 ____________ _
Pacific osmnda __________ - _________________________ 230,600 67.4
1945

Total, other ______

Metric
tons

Percent

23,500 26.2 __________ .. __

3,500

1.5

48, 300 20. 4

4, 100 1.7
124, 900 52.8

2,000 2.2 ________ ._ .. __

4,500 5.0 ________ .. _ .. __
4,000 4.5 __________ .. __
13,000 14.5 ____________ _

~~~~=~;;;;~ ======~==== ==~

Grand totaL -----.710,400100.0 396,5001100.0 342,

------_._-- - - - ------------------ ------- - - - - - - Total, inner zone

countries. __________________ _

55,900 23. 6

------------.---_.-----16.4 55,900 23.6

- - - - - - - ----------------------------

G-1l5.-Japanese import8 of zinc, 1940-45

1941

countries ____ - - -

- - - - - -- -

Quantity

100~

236,700 100.0

89,600100.0

23,000100.0

Source: Chemical Industry Control ASSOCiation, Shipping Control Association, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Transport Ministry.

1,600 20.2

5,100 60.0

6,500 65.0

5,500 90.2

2,500100.0

---------------1----1--------------Korea_________________ ________ _____

1,600 20.2
5,100 60.0
6,500 65.0
China ____________________________________________________________________ _

.
Total, southern
area countries __

1====1===1====

==I~===I=======I===I===~I====

22, 700 96. 6

3,300 41. 8
1
23, 500 =10=0=.=0 ==7=,9=0=0'1=1=00=.=0

100

1.2

500

ApPENDIX TABLE

G-117.-Japane88 imports of dolomite and magnesite, 1940-45

5, 400 88. 5
2, 500 100. 0
100 1 7 ____________ _

600 9.8 ____________ _

800 3. 4 3 , 000 38. 0
3,300 38.8
3,000 30.0
------1---1---------------------600 9.8 ____________ _
French Indochina ______ _
800 3.4
3, 000 38. 0
3, 300 38. 8
3,000 30.0

Grand totaL _ ___ _

_Per-

1944

Total, inner zone

10,500 100. 0

Souroe: Light Metals Control Association, Transport Ministry, Shipping Control Association, Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

Total, other ___ __ _

Metric
tons

IIl4i1

5.0 ________ - ____ - _______ ___ _

8, 5001100. 0 =1=0=,0=0=01=1=00=.=0'1==6=,=1=00=1=10='0=.0

Source: Light Metals Control Association, Shipping Control Association, Transport Ministry, Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

2, 500 100. 0

Quantity
1940

Country of or!gin

Metric

tons

1941

Percent

1942

Metric

Percent

tons

Metric
tons

1943

Percent

1944

Metric

Per~

tons

cent

Metric

1945
Per~

Metric

cent
tons
- - - - - ----- - - - - - - - - -tons
--- -----

Total, inner zone

countries _______ 409, 600 100.0
506,300 100.0 468,700 100. 0 437,500
---------Manchukuo ____________ 247, 300
60.4 189,000 37.3 191,700 40.9 189, 900
Kwantung _____________ 130, 300
31. 8 244,300 48. 3 202,000 43.1 172,600
Korea _________________
32,000 7.8 73,000 14.4 75,000 16.0 75,000

- - ---- --

--

100.0 287,100 100.0

43.4 112,500 39.2
39.5 119,600 41. 7
17.1 55,000 19.1

--Grand total ______ 409,600 100.0 506,300

100. 0 468,700 100. 01437, 500 100.0 287,100 100.0

Percent

--

65,900 100. 0

----- 39,500 59.9

9,400 14. 3
17,000 25.8

---- =

65, 900 100.0

Source. Chamlcal Industry Control ASSOCiation, MlDlStry of Commerce and Industry, Shipping Control. Association, Transport MiniStry

192

193

ApPENDIX TABLE

C-118.-Japanese imports of 8alt, 1940-45

ApPENDIX TABLE

C-120.-Japanese imports of 80ybeans, 1940-45

Quantity
1940

Country of origin

Metric tons

1941

Percent

Metric tons

Quantity

Percent

1944

1943

1942

Percent

Metric tons

Metric
tons

Per-

Metric tons

cent

1945

Percent

Metric
tons

---- - - - - -

Country of origin

Per.
cent

--

Total, inner
zone countries _________ 1,269,800 73.5 1,341,600 93. 2 1,476,600 98.5 1,394,100 97.8 989,300 99.9 386,900 100. 0
~anchukuo

----- - ---- -- ---- - - - - - - - - - - -- - --- - __________

Kwantung ___________
China _______________
Formosa _____________
Totzl, southern
area _________

40,600 2. 4
501,300 29.0
674,200 39.0
53, 700 3.1

119,900 8. 3
389, 900 27. 1
779,400 54. 2
52,400 3. 6

-----=
19,600

1.1

.5

31,000

2. 2

400

0.1 -------

- - --- --------- -- --- --------- - - ----------19,600 1. 1

31, 000

2.2

400

0.1 --.-._- --- -.

27,000

1.9

6, 900

Total, others ___

27, 000

438, 900 25. 4

70,300

1.9

4.9

--. -.

------- - - - - - - - - - - - - -

s'

Philippines ___________
French Indochina _____

115,900 8.1 91,300 9.2 29,300 7. 6

354,900 24.9 333,300 33.7 158,800 41. 0
799, 500 56. 1 496,600 50.1 195,800 50. 6
123, 800 8.7 68, 100 8.7 3,000 0.8

89,000 6.0
313,400 20. 9
969,000 64.6
105,200 7.0

6,900

-----

16,300

0.5 --------1.0 --------- - - - --

1940

1942

1941

1943

--------1-----------------------------Total, inner zone

countries _______ 642,900 99.1 572,400 100. 0 698,800100.0 590,600 100.0 667,000 91. 5 606,900 100.0

- - - - - --------- - - ----------- ---------

~anchukuo ________ ~ ___

464, 600 71. 6 492,800 86. 1 614,200 87. 9 524, 700 88.8 628,900 86.3 596,100 98.2
Kwantung _____________
2,800 0.4
I, 200 0.2
1,000 0.1
600 0.1
600 O. 1 -------- - ---China _________________
14,200 2.2 20,600 3.6 33, 600 4.8 23,400 4.0
4,000 O. 5 -------- - -- -FormoS3 _______________
I, 300 0.2
3, 600 0.6 -------- - ---- -------- - ---- -------- -- --- -------- - - - -]{orea _________________

160,000 24.7

54, 200

9.5

50, 000

7.2

41,900

7.1

-------- ----- -._---- --- -- -- - - - -

33, 500

4.6

60, 000

8. 2 ____________ _

10,800

1.8

============

Total, southern
area __ - - - ---- -- - --- - -- - - ____ - -- _____ ___ __ ______ __ ____ _ ___ __ ___ ____ _

------------ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

French Indochina ________ -_______ _____ ________ _____ ________ _____ ________ __ __

60,000

8.2 ____________ _

=
==
==-----==
=
5,600
0.9 _________________________________
____
_ =====
Tota.l, other _____ _
1,800

- - -- -

1945

1944

Metric tons Percent Metric tons Percent Metric tons Percent Metric tons Percent Metric tons Percent Metric tons Percent

0.3 ____________ _

======-===============

Grand tota.l ______ 648,500100.0 572,400100.0 698,800100.0 590,600100.0 728,800 100.0 606,900100.0

Grand totaL ___ 1,728,300 100.0 1,438,900 100.0 1,499,800 100. 0 1,425, 100 100. 0 989, 700 100.0 386, 900 100.0

Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. Shipping Control Association.

Source: Shipping Control Association, Transport Ministry, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.
ApPENDIX TABLE

ApPENDIX TABLE

Quantity

-----------------------------

Quantity
Country of origin

1940

1941

1942

Country of origin
1945

1944

1943

------------

Metric

Per-

C-121.-Japane8e imports of rice and paddy, 1940-1,5

C-119.-Japane8e imports of soybean cake, 1940-45

Metric

Per-

Metric

Per-

Metric

Per-

Metric

Per-

Metric

Total, inner zone.

countries_______ 333,900 100.0 337,700100.0 449,500100.0 304,500100.0 384,700100.0 163,400100.0
Manchukuo ________ : ___ 317,000 94.9 305,600 90.5 341,900 76.1 258,700 85.0 367,900 95.6 160,300 98.0
Kwantung_____________
6000.2
7,000 2.1 56,60012.6 17,400 5.7
7,7002.0
1,600 1.0
Chios_ _ ______________ 16,300 4.9 25,100 7.4 51,000 11. 3 28,400 9.3
9,100 2.4
1,600 1. 0

Source: Ministry 01 Agriculture and Forestry, Shipping Control Association.

~OO. 01304, 500 100. 0

- 1941

1942

1943

- - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Metric tons

Per-

cent

Metric tons

Pt>r-

cent

Metric tons

Percont

Per-

- - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - -~----- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Grand totaL __ ___ 333, 900 ~oo. 0 337, 700 100. 01449, 500

1940

384, 700 100. 0 163, 400 100. 0

Total,
innerzone
countries _________
Formosa _____________
]{orea _______________

445, 100 26.3

791,800 35. 5 I, 101,500 41. 9

---- - - - - - 385, 100 22.7

60, 000 3.6

271,800 12.2
520,000 23.3

261,500 9.9
840, 000 32.0

Tota.l,
southern ares _____ 1,144,200 67.5 1,435,500 64.3 1,527,700 58. 1
French Indochina _____
Burma _______________
Siam ________________
Total, other____

439,300 25.9
420, 900 24.8
284,000 16.8
104,700

6.2

562, 600 25.2

437, 500 19.6
435,400 19.5
5,400

973, 100 37.0

46,600 1.8
508,000 19.3

O. 2 --------- - - - --

Grand totaL ___ 1,694,000100.012,232,7001100.012,629, 2001100.

Source: Ministry

194

Metric tons

Per-

cent

1944

1945

Metric
tons

Per-

cent

Metric
tons

Percent

----- - -- - - --- ---- - 279,200 24.6 709,300 90.6 151,000 99. 9

- - - - - -- - - - - - - - - 207,200 18.3 149, 800 19. 1 9,000 6.0

72,000 6.3 559, 500 71.5 142,000 93.9

856, 600 75.4 73,900

9.4

200

0.1

176,500 15. 5 35,500

4. 5

200

O. 1

- - - --- - - - - 662,100 58. 3 38,400 4.9 ------- --- -18, 000 1.6 ------- ----- - -- -- -- - ---- - -- ---=
--------- - ---- - - - -- -- - - - -- ------- - - --- - -- -

0l~ 135,8001100.0 783, 2001100. 0 151,200 100.0

ForEStry, Shipping Control Association.

or Agriculture and

195

Capital Goods Tables

ApPENDIX TABLE C-122.-Japanese imports of other grains and flours, 1940--45

ApPENDIX TABLE C--124.- 'roduction of electrical equipment, Japan proper, 1935-45 (1938 prices)

Quantity
100)

Country of origin

Metric

tons

IMI

Percent

Metric

tons

1M2

Percent

Metric

tons

Percent

Metric

tons

Percent

Metric

tons

[In millions of yen]

IM5

11144

1943

Peroent

Metric

tons

Percent

Total pro~
duction

Fiscal year

---------1----1'----------------------------Tota.!, inner zone

countries_______

43,800 16.3

Formosa _______________
500 0.2
Irorea _________________
3, 300 1.2
China _________________
.------- - ---____________ 40,000 14.9
~anchukuo

53,000 20.0 676,100 82.1 111,000 14."& 151,800 30.0 231,400100.0

1, 000 0.4
J,OOO 0.1
1,000 0.4 600,000 72.9
1,000 O. 4
2,300 0.3
50, 000 18.8 72,800 8.8

100 0.1 -------- - - --300 0.1

25,200 3.3 25,200 4.1 15,000 6. 5
4,500 0.9
3,000 1.3
5,000 0.7
80,500 10. 7 122,000 24. 0 213,400 92. 2

Total, Southern
areacountries __ 225,500 83.7 214,400 80.0 147,200 17.9639,100 85.2 355,000 70.0 ____________ _

1935 _______________ _
1936 _______________ _
1937 _______________ _
1938 _______________ _
1939 _______________ _
1940 _______________ _

ApPENDIX TABLE C-123.-Japanese imports of raw rubber, 1940--45

Quantity
100)

Country of origio

1941

1M2

11144

1M3

IM5

Metric tons Percent Metric tons Percent Metric tons Percent Metric tons Percent Metric tons Percent Metric tons Percent

- - - - - - - -- - - -- -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Total, southern area_

_____________
Siam __________________

27, 500 100. 0

Netherland East Indies __

French Indochina _______
Total,other ______

67,600 100. 0

29,700 94.6

- - - - ------ ----14,300 52.0

2, 700 9. 8
10,500 38.2

~alaya---

--------

- - - --

Grand totaL _____ 127,500 100.0 167,6001100.0

5.4

31,400 100. 0

2,000

4.8

42,100 100.0

No information on imports from sources outside Asia.

Source: Rubber Control Association, Shipping Control Association, Greater EllSt Asia Ministry.

28,100 89. 2

16,500 92. 2

54. 6
----20.6
14. 0

Ptoduet

31,500 100.0

1941 ________________
1942 ________________
1943 ________________
1944 ________________
1945 _______________

899
1,021
1,272
1,754
650

172
261
374
772
250

Electric
machinery

462
487
491
542
200

Projected for entire year based on first 5 months.

Source: Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

lIIa7

Tota.! ______________________ _

1938

lIIa9

100)

26,614
19,887
7,774
1,958
3,330
3,233
2,299
14,747
1,164
1,144
14,747

34, 764
25, 806
7,302
3, 128
3,757
3,999
4, 200
17, 744
857
1,356
17,747

41,262
24,457
11,126
3,996
5,017
3,851
6,269
21,622
1,029
1, 193
20,085

1941

1M2

46, 508
13,699
7, 937
4, 654
5, 715
2, 686
5, 613
16, 364
784
1,424
16,364

50, 121
14,975
4, 644
4,083
4,385
2,657
3,960
15,798
73
825
15, 797

34, 134
8,336
2,868
2,770
4,133
2,068
8, 130
11,267
200
1,237
11,267

96,897 120,658 139,907 121, 748 117,318

86,410

- - - -- - - - - - - - - - - -

1. Power and lighting equipmenL ___ _ ----------- 15, 774

2. Insulated wire and cable _________ _ ----------- 15,232
3. Telephones _____________________ _
----------- 4,086
4. Telegraph instruments __________ _
625
----------5. ~edical instruments _____________ . ----------- 3,391
6. Storage batteries _______________ _
----------- 2,262
7. Radios (standard types) _________ _
2, 577
----------- 21,950
8. Electric light parts ______________ _
----------9. Signa.! equipment _______________ _
689
10. Electric fans __________________ _ ----------710
----------11. Electric lamps _________________ _ -_._-------- 10,645

-------- -- - --------- - - - --------- - - - -- - - -- - =

-1,400

167
206
214
285
383
354

Communications equipment

[1,000 yen]

16, 500 92.2

3,400 10. 8

45
67
68
101
143
154

Total.!'roductlOn

Fiscal year

ApPENDiX TABLE C--125.- O]xports of electrical equipment, Japan proper, 1937-43 (current price8)

- - - - - - - - - -- -

1,400 2. 1 14,000 44.6 25,000 59.4 17,200

23,800 35.2 .------- -_ .. -- -------- - - - -- -------6,500
20,500 30.3 12,300 39.2 15,000 35.6
21,900 32.4
4,400
3,400 10.8
100 0.2

- -- - - - - I, 700
.------- --- -- -------- - -------- -=
- ----=

40, 100 95. 2

-- - - - -

Electric
machinery

1 Corrected for price changes by the following ill x: 1936-100, 1937-109,

1938=123; 1939-137, 100)=160, IMI-167, 1942-180.J43-100, 1944-214.

French Indochina _______ 14!!,600 55.2 135,200 50.5 124,900 15.2 634,100 84.5 355,000 70.0 ____________ _
Netherla.nd East Indies __ 76,900 28.5 79,200129.5 22,300 2.7
5,000 0.7 ____________ _
==
-=======
Grand tota.! ______ .269, 300 100. 0 267, 400 100. 0 823, 300 100. 0 750, 100 100. 0 506, 800 100. 0 231, 400 100. 0
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Shipping Control Association.

373
447
578
678
813
842

uunica-equip.ent

--_.--------

-----------

77,941

1943

Source: Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

ApPENDIX TABLE C-126.- 'mports of electrical equipment, Japan prope', 1937-43 (current prices)

7. 8

[1.000 yen]

-17,900 100. 0

Product

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

------

~otors and generators __________ _

----------Transformers ___________________ . ----------Insulated wire and cable _________ _ ----------Telephone and parts ____________ _
----------Telegraph and parts _____________ _ ----------~edicru equipment and parts ____ _
Batteries ______________________ _ --------------------~eters_ - - - - - - - ________ - - - - - - __ ------------

Tota.! ___________________ .. ___ _

-----------

1937

1938

lIIa9

100)

1941

1942

1,670
171
148
1,815
124
249
92
3,263

2,589
177
38
1,883
1, .594
129
45
1,694

2,089
96
47
1,258
529
161
26
2,129

2,920
504
65
685
3,716
135
56
1,811

736
969
133
159
6
124
11
1,432

534
33
60
37
2,213
32
5
130

7,532

8, 149

6, 335

9,892

3,570

3,044

- - --------- ------_.

1943

431
7
52
821

--------

40

--------

417

1,768

Source: Ministry of Oommerce and Industry.

196

197

ApPENDIX TABLE

C-127.-E8timated con8truction volume in Japan proper, 1937-1,5

C-130.-E8timated volume of nonmilitary

con8truction 1 in Japan proper, 1987-1,5

ApPI!iNDIX TABLE

[In m!llions 01 yen-current prices]

[In mUlfons
Armyl

Navy'

Total

Direct

Indirect

Total

Direct

Indirect

Civilian total

(I)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

1937 __________________
1938 __________________
1939 __________________
1940 __________________
1941 __________________
1942 ___________________
1943 __________________
i944- _________________
1945 , _________________
TotaL ___________

80
211
261
221
900
1,145
1,181
1,935
1,595

na
na
na

10
14
22
38
322
545

80
211
261
211
886
I, 123
1,143
1,613
1,050

8
90
141
240
603
913
1,038
1,515
1,658

1
18
28
50
100
180
243
450
600

6, 578

6,206

1,670

---------- -----

7,529

951

Including Korea, Formosa, and KaraCuto.

Excluding Korea, Formosa, and Karaluto.
, Approximately first 7 months only.
ns Not available but presumably negligible.
1

Source: For columns (1)-(3), War Ministry; for columns (4)-(6), Navy
Ministry.

Since no annual figures were available for Japan Proper trom the Navy
Ministry. the cumulative figure of 6,206 million yen for Japan proper (this is
the difference between the totalllgure of 9,669 and the overseas figure of 3,463
mDlion yen in appendix table A-lI) lor tbe period 1937--45 was distributed
over the years 1940-45 in the same ratio as average quarterly employment [or
Jspan proper.

Since the amount of construction for the Navy outside Japan Proper
Korea, Formosa and Karafuto was probably negligible in the years 1937-39,
the volume figures for these three years were repeated from table 3 and the

ApPENDIX

TABLE

C-128.-Volume of Japanese Army

con8truction, 1937-1,5

Current prices

---------

Over-

seas

Total

----23,408

Japan
proper II

Over-

seas

80
45
125
80
211
149
360
21\
261
208
469
261
221
296
517
221
900
319 1,219
900
1, 145
427 1,572
954
1,181
645 1,826
845
1,9;l5 1,106 3,041 1,210
1,595 2;800 4,395
798

45
149
208
296
319
357
461
346
225

--------- --- - - - ---

""

Based on the following indices of unit costs estimated by War Ministry

officials: 100 in 1937-41, 120 in 1942, 140 in 1943, 160 in 1944, and nJ in 1945.
a Including Korea, Formosa, and KaraCuto.
S Partially estimated.
, First 6 months only.
Source: War Ministry, Tokyo.

198

1940 ________________
194L _______________
1942 ________________
1943 ________________
1944 ________________
1945 , ____ - - - -- -

1,662
2, 810
3,390
5,330
7,000
5,170

1,429
2,291
2,550.
3,736
4,500
3, 080

C-129.-Estimated volume of Japane8e

Navy con8truction in Japan proper and overseas, 1937-1,5

ApPENDIX TABLE

Current

value

Adjusted
:value

------

1937 ____ " ____________________ _

1938 _________________________ _
1939 _________________________ _
1940 _________________________ _
1941 _________________________ _
1942 _________________________ _
1943 _________________________ _
1944 _________________ _______ _
c
1945 , ________________________ _
Total __________________ _

8
90
141
248
656
1, 130
1,947
3, 145
'2,304

8
90
141
248
656
1,130
1,500
2, 100
1,540

9,669

7,413

- - - - - -----

capacity

tors

796
1,306
1,449
2, 162
2,840
2, 160

194L _________________________________ _
1942__________________________________.__
1943 _______________________________ " __ _
1944 __________________________________ _
1945 __________________________________ _

6, 855, 700
6, 403, 200
5, 221, 800
4,209,000
2, 077, 500

I Formerly plant capacity was rated on the basis of kiln capacity alone,
but in 1941 the Cement Control Association rerated capacity in more realistic terms, taking into consideration all plant facilities, snch as exca.vating,
drying, crushing equipment, storage, etc., as well as kiln capacity. As an
example of the difference resulting Cram the two methods of rating capaCity,
take 1943; by the old method, capacity was rated as 7,908,500 metric tons,
as compared with the adjusted rating of 5,221,800 tons.

Source: Cement Control Association, Tokyo.

Source: Ministry of Commerce and Indmtry, and Japanese Architectural

Industry Control Association, Tokyo.

C-13l.-Production of principal building

materials in Japan Proper, 1937-1,5

ApPENDIX TABLE

TABLE C-133.-E8timated
consumption of
cement by principal recipient8 in Japan proper, 191,0--1,5

ApPENDIX

[Jndex numbers based on 1937=I00J

[In thousand metric tons]

Structural

Cement
Year

Thou-

sand

metric
tons

1937 ______________
1938 ______________
1939 ______________
1940_ -----------194L _____________
1942 ______________
1943 ______________
1944 ______________
1945 , _____________

steel

759
862
727
612
447
395
169

Lumber
Calendar ye&r

Index

Thou- I In- Million Insa.nd

dex
dex
num metric num- board
feet 3 Dumber
ber

tons

Total

50
57
48
40
29
26
11

728 100 8,555 100

644 88 9,587 112
574 7911,344 133
635 8711,091 130
578 7911,560 135
576 7910,748 126
479 6612,029 141
277 3812,795 150
na na 8,209 96
114
134
55
54
33
na
na

Military I

Industrial

NoninShipdustria.l' building

- - - - - - ---- ----

ber

- - - - - - - - - - --

6, 069 100
5,846 96
6, 161 102
6, 002 99
5,604 92
4,237 70
3, 721 61
2,960 49
1,011 17

Quarter:'
1944 Jan.-J'vIar ___
Apr.~June ___
J uly-Sept ___
Oct.-Dec ____
1945 Jan.-J'vIar ___
Apr.-June___
J uly-Sept ___

63
74
30
30
18

4,419
2,972
2, 744
2,800
4,279

207
139
128
131
200

(Annually)

1940_______________
194L _____________
1942_______________
1943 _______________
1944 _______________
1945 , ______________

4,934
4, 900
4,039
3, 605
3,150
980

1, 151 1,650 2, 016

1,103 1,853 1,814
1,439 1,378 1,092
1,799
949
698
1,754
696
563
156
566
199

117
130
130
160
137
59

(Quarterly)

1944:
Jan.-J'vIar ______
Apr.-June ______
July-Sept ______
Oct.-Dec. ______

773
971
743
665

480
475
386
414

138
284
150
125

125
181
158
99

30
31
49
27

428
400
152

243
255
68

79
55
22

78
66
55

28
24
7

1945:
Jan.-J'vIar ______
Apr.-June ______
July-Sept. ______

na }3, 930 { na
na
na

Includes army, navy, and aircraft consumers.

Includes railway, air defense, general civil use, emergency reserve, and
miscellaneous.
I First nine months.
1

Data. for cement based on calendar years, and for steel and lumber an

fiscal years beginning April 1.

I Based on the following index of unit costs estimated by Navy Paymastelli
Office representative: 100 Cor 1937-42, 130 for 1943, 150 Cor 1944-45.
t Including about m million yen paid to contractors lor compensation
at end oC war.
3 First 7 months Gnly.
Source: Navy Ministry, Tokyo.

Adjusted

Year

13y 40-odd

large contrac

1 Nonmilitary construction excludes work done by Army or Navy with

its own forces, but includes work done for Army and Navy by Civilian CODtractors and their employees.
2 Approximately first 8 months.
ne Not estimated.

Since nearly all the basic figures for the above t~ble were originally estimated by the 1apanese themselves, the additional estimates made herein to
present a complete picture of the construction industry's activity are subject
to proportionately larger errors in variation.

TotaL ___ 7,529 5,995 13, 524 5,480 2,406 7, 886

I

By all contractors

-----------------1--------1---------------1937 ________________
ne
942
791
1938________________
ne
908
998
1939 ________________
ne
1, 747
1,502

totals from the grand total.

Total

125
360
469
517
1,219
1,311
1,306
I, 556
1,023

[In metrIc tons]

For columns (7) and (8), the grand total Is the sum of columns (2) and (5)

---- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1937 _______

1938 _______
1939 ________
1940 ________
194L _______
1942 ________
1943 ________
1944 ________
1945 , _______

792
926
I, 530
1,299
2,405
2, 752
4,017
5,462
4,225

[In millions of yen]

Adjusted prices

ed to all

contractors

above plus column (2) of table 5 in the text. The purely civilian figure in
colUmn (7) above Is then obtained by subtracting the Army and Navy

Fiscal year
JapWl
proper 2

9, 673

4, 536

Calendar year
(8)

estimates for the remaining years 1940-45 were reduced in direct proportion
to their size by the total of the 3 earlier years. The portion oC total Navy
construction which was accomplished by the Navy's own forces (referred to
herein as "direct Navy") was estimated on the basis 01 employment of Naval
officers, enlisted personnel, and 8 reasonable proportion of laborers (this last
being based on estimates supplied by interrogation of Navy civil engineering
officers). The difference between total Navy and direct Navy was allotted
to indirect Navy.

(In millions of yen1

Fiscal year

704
625
1,128
838
902
694
I, 798
2,012
972

7
72
113
190
503
733
795
1,065
1,058

yen-current value]

Value of construction com

Value 01 conpleted
tracts award- I-------'--~---

Grand total

Year

01

TABLE C-132.-Adjusted capacity rating of

cement mi1l8 1 in Japan proper, 1941-45

ApPENDIX

t Data includes shapes only.

I Converted on the basis 01 1 koku-l2J board feet. Data supplied in log
volume.
First 9 months oC calendar year only.
a Index numbers based on one-fourth of 1937 figures.
na Not available.

Source: Cement Control Association, Tokyo.

Source: Cement Control ASSociation, Iron and Steel Control Association,

and Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.

199

C-136.--0rdinary rolled steel consumed

by army and navy for construction purposes 1 in Japan
proper, 1937-45-Continued
'

ApPENDIX TABLE

C-134.-Production of cement in principal overseas areas under Japanese control, annually,

1937-44

ApPENDIX TABI,E

[In thousand metric tons]

Army

Formosa

Total

Year

1937 _____________
1938 __________ c __
1939 ___________ "_
1940 _____________
1941 _____________
1942 _____________
1943 _____________
1944 _____________

----

1,601
2,222
2,361
2,386
2,591
2,942
3,002
2,386

Korea
-~~-

148
142
221
226
212
228
309
245

ground
forces

Total

Fiscal pear

Manchuria

----

665
1,055
1,096
1, 143
1,215
1, 182
1,190
1,003

1944______
1945 , _____

788
1, 025
1,044
1,017
1,164
1,532
1, 503
1, 138

45.2
10.4

294.5
42. 6

Merchant

Navy
surface
forces

---87. 7
15.2

53.0
6. 0

108.6
11.

Data include structural steel as well as other types of rolled steel.

I Includes steel consumed in construction of yards, docks, and associated
structures, but excludes steel used in shipbuilding.
, First 3 months only.
ns Not available.
Source: Iron and Steel Control Association.

C-137.-Production, imports, and exports

of lumber in Japan proper, 1937-44

ApPENDIX TABLE

[In million board feet-log volume]

ApPENDIX T-ABLE

C-135.-A'xports of Japanese Cement,

1940-45

Production

Fiscal year

1937 _____________
1938 _____________
1939 _____________
1940 _____________
1941 _____________
1942. ____________
1943 _____________
1944 _____________

Cement
exported

Calendar year

1940_______________________________________
973
1941_______________________________________
692
1942_______________________________________
168
1943_______________________________________
126
1944_______________________________________
32
1945 _______________________________________ --------

Exports

Imports

----

[In thousand metric tons]

~~~

1,290
8,555
483
9,587
489
11,344
545
11,097
291
11,560
154
10, 748
17
12, 029
12, 795 --------

722
1,136
2,100
1,463
810
528
162
197

9, 123
8, 934
9,733
10,179
11,041
10, 374
11,884
12, 598

TABLE
C-138.-Consumption of lumber by
principal use8 in Japan proper, 1943-44
[In million board feet-log volume]

C-136.-0rdinary rolled steel 'consumed

by army and navy for construction purposes 1 in Japan
proper, 1937-45
lIn thousand metric tons]

ApPENDIX TABLE

Army
Fiscal year
--~~

1937 ______
1938 ______
1939 ______
1940______
194L _____
1942 ______
1943 ______

Total

ground
forces

Navy
surface
forces

Merchant
shipbuild- Air forces
ing'

- - - - ---- - - - - - - - na

na

188. 4
213.0
234. 3
340. 5
310. I)
398. 0

49.3
69. 0
80.8
111.7
.94.5
122.8

77.0
64. 2
66. 6
75.3
109.5
97.3
109.4

30.9
19.7
20.4
14.7
22. 5
33. 8
59.1

~---

57.7
55.2
57.0
63.5
96.8
85. 0
106. 7

Use

1943

1936 _______ " ___________________

1937 ___________________________
1938 ___________________________
1939 ___________________________
1940 ___________________________
194L __________________________
1942___________________________
1943 ___________________________
1944____________________ c ______
1945 2__________________________

1944

ApPENDIX TABLE

15,000
21,888
67,260
66,830
58,088
46,025
50,997
60, 134
53,844
7, 242

8,916
1,063
1,393
222
88
472
79
562

TotaL ______________________ 12,029

12,795

2,000
2,934
3,034
4,108
5,388
6,891
8,412
10,026
13,434
17,575

30,668
50, 199
204,085
274,597
312, 979
317, 175
428,997
602, 913
723,378
127, 284

';~~!c;~:~
(1,OOO)

Indea of total
value of
machinery
production

33
48
146
146
126
100
111
130
117
(63i

9.8
16
64
87
98
100
135
189
228
(160)

1,609,000
2,380,000
3, 589, 000
3,792,308
3,256,833
3,685,714
4,889,473
4,976,165
5,113,252

43. 7
64. 5
97.4
lOa.

88. 3
100. 0
132.6
135.0
138.7

------------ ----------

Source: Yen value annually for production machinery based on sample of

industry by the Production Machinery Control Association. Unit production of machine tools is taken from the records of the Precision Machinery
CODtrol Association.

C-140.-0utput, import, export, and dome8tic sales of machine tools and productive machinery
[In 1000 Yon]

Fi.'imlyea,r

1933 ________________
1934 ________________
1935 ________________
1936 ________________
1937 ________________
1938 ________________
1939 ________________
1940 ________________
1941 ________________
1942 ________________
1943 ________________
______________
1945 ___ -- --- _---

----I

Productive machinery

Total output

Import

Export

Domestic sales

(1)

(2)

(3)

(1+2-3)

Total output

Import

Export

Domestic sales

20,774
805,000 ---------- ---------- ---------565
10,000
11,339
14,485
1,189
29,296
1,082,000 ---------- --------- ---------16,000
26,807
1,581,000 ---------- ---------- .--------1,941
9,998
18,750
42,300
1,609,000 ---------- ---------- ---------16,539
4,907
30,668
5,799
86,912
50, 199
42, 512
2,380,000
165,800
66,033 2,479,767
286,252
204,085
91,738
9,571
3,589,000
248,968
101,384 3,736,584
274,597
157, 166
23,985
407,778 '3,792,308
52, 170
122, 670 3,721,808
312,979
22,698
368, 781 23,256,833
45, 203
78, 500
169,351 3, 132, 685
317,175 340,363
18,749
3, 685, 714
338,789
23, 753
158,996 3,550,471
11,724 . 138,053 4, 763, 144
13,782
428,997 16,375
431,590
4,889,473
602,913
4,976,165
10,970
608,509
6, 193
148, 336 4,833,995
' 16,566
723,378 ---------720,378- , 5, 113, 252. ---------- ---------- ---------3,000
127,284 ---------- ---------- -_. ------- ------------ ------------------- ----------

Estimated on basis of 25 percent of production.

Estimated on basis of 33.3 percent of production.
a Includes woodworking machines.
4. Estima.ted for 1944 on basis of first quarter-l, 27g,ala yen.

Sources: Output 1933--40, Ministry of Industry and Commerce. Output

1941-45. Precision Machinery and Production Machinery Control Associa-

t
I

ApPENDIX TABLE

Fiscal year

tioruf. Imports and exports: Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

C-141.-Expansion of Japanese machine-tool industry, Japan proper, 1940-45

Productive floor
space (square
feet)

Increase in floor
space (~u&l'e
feet)

Index of floor
space

1940___________________________ c _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ __ 6,588,000 __ ____ ______

87
194L_______________________________________ 7,560,000
972,000
100
1942________________________________________ 10,368,000
2,808,000
137
1943 ________________________________________ 11,562,948
1,194,948
153
1944________________________________________ 13,107,600
1,544,652
173
1945 ___________________________________________________________________________ _
1 Productive capacity estimated by precision machinery control association. Estimates based on 10-hour l-ebift day, except In 1944 when based on
2 shifts.
I Based on yen value of yearly output.

200

of total
of unit Index
Average price Index
value of
production macblne
tools

Machine tools

1944_~

8,470
1,205
1,259
261
86
504
157
87

Public works and construction_ - - - - -Shipbuilding and cartwright_ - - - ----Mine timber __________ -- - --- - - ----Railroad ties __________ - - - - - - - - - - --Telegraph poles ________ - - - - - - - - - - -pulpwood _____________ -- - -- - - - - --Veneer and plywobd ______ -- -- --- --Other ____________________________ _

Source: Japan Lumber Company, Tokyo.

Value (1,000
)

t Estimated on basis ot yen value of 1936 production and 1937 average pnee
per unit.
First quarter only (of fiscal year).

Net a.v8il~
able

ApPENDIX

Number of
machine tools

Fiscal y....

----

Source: Ministry of Forestry and Agriculture.

Source: Cement Control Association, Tokyo.

C-139 -Japan machine-building industry-annual production Japan proper, 1936-45

Shir:gUJld~ Air forces

Source: Cement Control Associa.tion, Tokyo.

TABLE

Index of produG- Index of produGtive capacity 1

tion 2

84
100
116
197
'335.5
170

98
100
135
189
228
160

Two shilts. (lI!dex of capacity on single shift in 1944 was 218.4. For
Japanese definition of "capacity" see p. 20 of UBSBB "Machine-BuDding
IndU8try" Report.)

201

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Military Supplies Tahles

C-143.-Japanes8 munitions output

ApPENDIX TABLE

{Computed in terms of 1945 prices, 1941--4.5, by months (1,000,000 yen)1

FISCAL YEAR 1941

April

Merchant ships ______

Navy ships __________
Navy ordnance ______
Army ordnance ______
Motor vehicles ______
Aircraft _____________
TotaL _______

. May

June

July

August

September

October

November December

January

February

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - ---- - - - - - -- - -

March

Total

Percent

35. 4
83.8
71.6
60. 3
43.7
61. 9

32.2
82.9
73.1
68.3
.46.5
70. 2

31. 1
87. 3
71. 4
73.1
57.4
72.1

30.9
88. 1
71.7
73. 0
51. 5
70.5

33. 8
85.9
73.4
71. 1
55.3
77.6

31. 5
84. 7
75.2
78. 9
58. 0
84.3

31.3
82. 4
77.9
79. 8
64.7
92. 4

31. 7
83.7
84.4
83. 7
73. 4
92. 4

34. 4
84.0
91.7
92: 6
76.9
113.2

35.4
82. 1
87. 4
87.8
58.6
112.7

37.2
82.9
89.'8
89. 1
54. 8
110.0

37.6
86.2
104. 8
98.8
50.6
123.3

402.5
1,014. 0
972.4
956.5
691. 4
1,080.6

356. 7

373.2

392.4

385.7

397.1

412.6

428. 5

449. 3

492.8

464. 0

463. 8

501. 3

5,117.4 ------

- - - - - -- - -- - -- - -- - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - -

7. 9
19.8
19.0
18. 7
13.5
21. 1

------

FISCAL YEAR 1942

Merchant ships ______

Navy ships __________
Navy ordnance ______
ArDlY ordnance ______
Motor vehicles ______
AircrafL ____________
TotaL ________

38. 1
35.7
89.0
89.7
109.2
117.2
74.7 . 73. 0
36.9
35.4
123.1
129.0

---

---

468. 6

482.4

38. 8
87.4
120.4
101.8
36.5
114.5

39.2
90. 7
112.1
96.4
40. 3
128. 0

37.5
91. 4
118.1
97.6
32.1
115.3

36.1
86. 6
129.6
112.7
42. 2
137.0

37.9
91. 7
137.7
110.7
44. 2
152. 9

45.1
92.9
128. 9
109. 6
32.2
168.2

51. 5
96.2
133.5
123.9
38. 0
184.7

54.7
97.1
137.2
105. 0
28. 8
187.1

63.2
100.1
141.5
117.5
24. 1
191. 4

67.0
99.6
154. 3
139.0
35.. 9
211. 5

8.1
16.5
22.9
18. 8
6.3
27.4

499.4

506. 7

492.0

544. 2

575. 1

576.9

627.8

609.9

637.8

707.3

6,728. 1 - - - - --

139.6
133.2
254.8
152.6
21. 1
406. 6

170.3
136.1
247.1
149.3
22. 9
354. 9

162.3
147.1
291. 3
149.7
24.3
372.1

160. 0
137.0
312. 2
151.3
32. 2
408. 5

544. 8
1,112.4
1,539.7
1,261.9
426. 6
1,842.7
_0
_
_- - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - -- - -- - -- - - - - -

--

FISCAL YEAR 1943

Merchant ships ______

Navy ships __________
Navy ordnance ______
ArDlY ordnance ______
Motor vehicles ______
AircrafL ____________
TotaL ________

U>

64. 0
107. 8
133.4
102.6
28. 8
214. 0

79.4
111.2
150.0
116.2
27.2
224. 2

91. 5
113.2
156.9
128'0 0
22.0
229. 4

97.7
115.2
167.6
117.9
30. 3
239.6

103. 0
112.5
187.7
121.3
27.5
268. 3

107. 2
115.0
205. 6
125.3
28. 6
302.3

115.0
118.4
214.7
132.7
23.6
312. 8

121. 2
129.7
229.3
139. 1
20.3
354. 2

650. 6

708. 2

741. 0

768.3

820.3

883.9

917.2

993.8 1, 107. 9

- - -- - -- - -- - -- - -- - -- - - - - - - - -

1,411. 2
1,476.4
2, 550. 6
1,586.0
308. 8
3,686.8

12.8
13.4
23.1
14. 4
2.8
33.5

- - - - - - - - -- -

1,080.6 1,146.8 1,201. 2 11,019.8

------

;" ApPENDIX TABLE

It)Ct)CI')~t--OOI

JI

~,.....

~,....;cQi.....(a.r.S

C'I':)

...-IC\? .....

[Average 1941 montb-l00j

co

FISCAL YEAR 1941

at5odcx5"":o-.:ti

COOtOf'""'I~O

.....-~'"

~-

cq-

~o:Croiu)~
to)cqOf'""lOO
HC'OC'-l
C'Q

cooC'O

lOC'I:I '1""'4

.....'"

.....-

,.....0q4r-t~

lli

COOOC'O~tO~

April

at5~d~c:CcO

tOCDC'OOtOC"t

06..;< ..... 06.,;..;<

Q)~~.....t...-lO
"""C'C\I
co

.....

'"...........

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o Lt":It--,..... ..... OO
,..... ..... COC"'l
co

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"'""'

.....

"0:11,.....

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,..... ...... ~-

.....
~

It:I
C'O

......

,,
,.

i ! ! ! !I i

II
'"

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I.QCDC"'It--C"'ILQ
,.....,.....~.....t

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...-I

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~ ..... "H"."
-.::t'

I~

......

~I
~I

cioOcioiu-:iu:i

I.QOC OOCl?C"t co
, ,.....
...... co.....
~

ber

January

February

March

94. 0
100.2
92.8
99.0
100. 7
92. 6

93.4
97. 5
96.2
100. 1
112.3
102. 5

94.5
99.1
104. 2
105.0
127.4
103. 2

102.5
99.4
113.2
116.2
133.5
126. 0

105.4
97.2
107. 9
110.1
101. 7
123.6'

110.8
98. 1
110.9
111.8
95.1
121. 8

112.0
102. 0
129.4
123. 9
87.8
141. 1

TotaL ______

87. 5

92.0

90.4

93.1

96.7

100. 4

105. 3

115.5

108. 8

108.7

117.5

107.3
102.5
150.0
141. 4
73.2
159.2

112.5
108. 5
170.0
138.9
76.7
177. 5

132.9
109.9
159. 0
137.5
55.9
199. 0

150.4
113.8
164. 8
155.4
65. 9
213. 8

156.7
114.9
169.4
131. 7
50.0
216.6

179.2
118.5
174.7
147.4
41. 8
222.4

186.4
117.9
190.5
174.4
62.3
244.0

127.5

134. 8

135.1

146. 9

142.5

148.8

164. 7

--- - - - --- --------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 83.6

FISCAL YEAR 1942

Merchant ship _____

Navy ships ________
Navy ordnance ____
'Army ordnance ____
Motor vehicles _____
Aircraft ___________

106. 6
105. 3
134. 8
93. 7
64. 0
136.9

113.5
106.2
144. 7
91. 6
61. 4
146. 1

115.8
103.4
148. 6
127.7
63.3
129.4

116.9
107. 3
138. 4
120. 9
69.9
145.6

111.6
108. 2
145.8
122. 4
55.7
130.5

TotaL ______ 109. 8

113.1

117.1

118.8

115. 3-

- - - - - - - - - - - - ------ ---

174.4
127.6
164. 7
128. 7
50.0
247.4

217.3
131.6
185.2
145.8
57.2
258. 4

248. 6
134. 0
193.7
160.6
38.2
261. 9

265.6
136.3
206.9
147.9
52.6
272. 8

277.9
133. 1
231. 7
152.2
47.7
309. 8

280.0
136.1
253.8
157.'2
49. 6
349.7

289.6
140.1
265. 0
166.5
41. 0
361. 1

301. 2
153.5
283. 0
174.5
35.2
415.. 3

353.7
157.6
314.5
191. 4
36. 6
472.4

444. 6
161. 1
305.0
187. 3
39. 7
464. 1

417.9
174. 1
359.6
187.8
42.2
478. 4

410.1
162.1
385.4
189.8
55. 9
529.5

TotaL _____ 151. 2

164.5

171. 8

178.1

190. 0

204.1

210.8

228.2

254. 8

248.3

263. 6

276.3

--- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --- --- - - - - - - - - - - - -

I'"
,. . ;

co
co

......
O':It--C\llQt--t--

Decem-

100. 6
101. 7
90: 6
89.2
96.0
86.1

Merchant ships ____

Navy ships ________
Navy ordnance ____
Army ordnance ____
Motor vehicles _____
AircrafL __________

,....; .qi"lciC':ioC'i

I.QCDCD~C"'I<o:tI

ber

FISCAL YEAR 1943

~
-.:tf
......

COQ)...-4c;:t1C\1C\1
-.:ti

,..... ...... C\I .....

Novem~

92.3
104.3
88.5
91. 5
89. 4
76. 5

- - -- - -- - -- - --

.......... ""111...-1

'"
Oro

October

92.8
103. 3
88.1
91. 7
99.6
80.4

00"''''"''<0'''1
~

Se~-

95.9
98. 1
90. 2
85.7
80.7
78. 6

,.....,

""d'f

......

~&i~~~~
,.....,.....-.:tt .....

August

July

Merchant ship _____ 105.6

Navy ship ________ 99.2
Navy ordnance ____ 88. 4
Army ordnance ____
75.6
Motor vehicles _____ 75.8
Aircraft ___________ 67.6

,,

!!j iI

'"......

June

- - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - r--- - - -

I '~"

II
I
""
II
I
jl ::: :~:;;"I ~
il ~~~~:: I ~

May

C'I

.-<

OOCDI"'"'4C'QO

C-144.-l\{onthly indices of Japanese munitions produdion, ba8ed on 1945 prices, 1941-45 (fi8cal year8)

CDQ:lC""Ico ...... t---1

dC';)c3et:i~""';

,..... ......

I~

t--cc~

.....

oc4~""';~lci
""'0)
. . . 0 C\I

"'

ooco~

.....

.....

'"

~oo

~06.qioiioi
C'OO':ICO ......
t--

"'

.....

'<0"

O':II.Q

FISCAL YEAR 1944

0;

<0

I. .

'" ~

Merchant shipi!. ___

Navy ships ________
Navy ordnance ____
Army ordnance ____
Motor vehicles _____
Aircraft ___________

424. 0
207.2
431.7
170.0
41. 3
550. 3

422.7
216.8
456. 4
178. 4
63.7
514. 9

413.0
223.3
489.4
175.0
44. 6
580.3

408.6
229. 8
490.2
185.2
47.9
577. 8

440. 7
233. 3
512.4
241. 9
35.2
556. 9

353.8
232.8
528. 5
224.4
34.9
628. 2

364.1
215.3
525. 0
212.6
44. 4
614. 3

337.7
204.5
514. 7
215.4
48. 9
603. 7

304.0
204. 9
501. 5
244. 8
31. 1
565.7

251. 0
186.4
463.3
266. 8
22.4
463. 6

227. 4
170.4
422.0
273.6
26.6
366. 3

151. 4
161. 9
399. 1
255.2
27.0
457.7

TotaL ______ 291.2

295. 4

315.8

315.3

326.6

332.5

330. 9

328. 4

314. 9

291.9

261. 3

263.1

- - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - -- - - - - - - - - --- - - - - - -

~I

FISCAL YEAR 1945

.,,
.,,
,,

,,
,,
,,
,,

Merchant ships ___ _

Navy ships" ______ _
Navy ordnance ___ _
Army ordnance ___ _
Motor vehicles ____ _
. AircrafL _________ _

62.6 ____ . __________________________________________ _

153.3
130.9
411.6
150.3
15.8
434. 0

125.5
121. 2
391. 6
144.0
32.3
418.5

98. 3
116.7
326. 4
149.5
5.9
334. 9

88. 6
109.6
264. 7
126.8
8.5
271. 4

Total _______ 231. 2

221. 6

187.1

156.6 ______________________________________________________ _

118.3 _______________________________________________ _

119.0 _______________________________________________ _

Source: Military SuppUes Division, USSBS.

204

205

ApPENDIX TABLE

C-I45.-Merchant ship yen value input ( 1,000), 1941-45

0\

FISOAL YEAR 1941

Ship type

April

May

June

July

August

October

November December

12,901
1,373
1,562
3,037
715
904
794
863

13,002
1,699
1,562
2, 701
714
904
794
574

13,377 13,483
1,699
3,697
2,088
2,088
2,701
2, 701
715
714
747,.
694
419
393
574
538

13,388 12,502 12, 262 165,72 9

5,137
5,137
6,742
33,37 5
2,436
2,436
2,436
16,17 o
2,701
2,701
2, 157
36,5e
715 -------- -------4,28
694
694
694
9,52 2
7,ge
393
500
533
622
2,825
1,443
12,7e

22, 149
9,393

21, 950
9,393

22,315
9,393

24,308
10,091

26,086
9,276

26, 795
10,365

31,343

31, 708

34,339

35,362

37,160

September

- - -- - Cargo _______( ______________ 18,246 15,811 14,055 13,257 13,445

Tanker _____________________ 1,410
1,203
1, 701
1,865
1,712
Ore carrier ____________ ._____
1,562
-------- ---------------------Passenger __________________ 3,827
3,254
3,254
3,634
3,893
Ferry _________ ._____________ -------- -------- -------- -------714
Fisher ______________________
929
994
490
879
904
Tug _______________________
660
923
923
834
794
Miscellaneous ___ .____________
991
951
1,095
940
1,345

January

February

Moreh

Total

- - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - -

- - -- - -- - - - - - - - -- - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Total, new construction __ 26,023

Repair and conversion _______ 9,393

22, 776
9,393

21,752
9,393

21,575
9,393

24,369
9,393

Grand total _____________ 35,416

32, 169

31, 145

30,968

33,762

31,540

.-.

--

26,267
11,298

286, 36 5
116, 17

---

37,565 .402,53

FISO,l.L YEAR 1942

Cargo ______________________ 11,061 12,118 13,782 13,209 12,562 12,945 13,464 15,855 20,087 22,070 25,300 24, 135 196,58 8
Tanker_____________________ 6,659
7,203
6,052
5,793
6,052
5, 124
5, 902 10,094 10,696 11,911 12,853. 16,234 104,57
Ore carrier _________________ 3,029
3,029
2,555
2, 845
3,006
3,993
3,655
3,307
2,715
4,742
7,284
7, 273
47,43
Passenger __________________ 1,828
1,828
2,287
2,287
2,287
2,287
2, 145
2,041
2,145
1, 661
1,084
1,730
23,61
Ferry ______________________
-------- -------- -------- -------- -"------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- ------Fisher _____________________
278
622
636
636
622
217
217
201
149
149
225
331
4,28 3
Tug _______________________
722
517
699
699
699
1,016
535
337
911
983
1,077
1,283
9,47 8
Miscellaneous _______________
271
394
533
424
424
615
1,192
2,447
2,995
2, 193
2, 193
1,434
15,11
- - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - ----Total, new construction __ 24, 183 25,937 26,421 26, 131 24,976 25, 716 26, 912 35,065 39,594 43,709 50,016 52,420 401,08o
Repair and conversion _______ 11,563 12,135 12,412 13,087 12,475 10,292 10,819
9,502 10,859
8,870 10,114 10,118 132,24

---

38,072

38,833

39,218

---

- - - - - -- - - - - - =

---

Grand total ____________ 35,746

---

37,451

36,008

37, 731

44,567

--

-_.-

50,453

52, 579

60,130

---

- - -- - 62, 538

533,32 6

91,480 88,115 88,931

38,665" 38, 185 36, 544
4,634
1,150 -------3,032
3,032
1,103
1, 504
470
1,052
1,372
888
1,618

633,8 9
353, 324
75, 1 4
24, 129
12,e ,2
8,e 5

--

FISOAL YEAR 1943

Cargo _____________________ 21,413 26,874 31,818

Tanker ____________________ 18,798 22,426 25,960
Ore carrier ________________ 5,535
6,266
6,814
Passenger _________________ 1,730
1, 730
1, 798
Ferry _____________________
687
-------Flsher ____________________ -------411
411
411

Tug ______________________ 1
Miscellaneous______________

7861
749

7861
6,441

5351
6,557

36,679
27,938
8, 733
1,798
687
411

39, 127
31,619
9,811
1, 798
1,157
515

5721
3,334

43,628
27,750
9,828
1, 798
1, 157
563

671 1
430

. Total, new construction. 49, 422164, 934174, 580 180, 152185, 128
Repairandconversion ______ 9,086
7,961
8,829
8,939
8,115

697
315
85, 736
8,183

46,024
27,707
8,498
1,410
2,192
598

806 1
231

53,522
28,841
6, 151
1,410
2, 192
598

7571
365

66, 148
28,891
7,684
3,490
1,504
829

594
365

560
365

599
.418

315
334

7,678
19,904

87,466193,8361109, 505 1141, 128 133, 341 129,897 1, 135, 125

9,680
7,211
9;15518,028
6,832
7,668
99,687

=========

Grand totaL ______ . ___ 58,508172,895183,409189,091 193,243

93,919197,1461101, 0471n8, 660 1149,1561140,173 137,56511,234,812

FISOAL YEAR 1944

Cargo _____________________ 80,044 72,386 66,597 65,830 75,712 73, 198 78, 779 81,118
Tanker ____________________ 47,527 52, 679 55,246 56,249 55, 778 54, 263 52,832 38,421
Ore carrieL _______________
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 1,443
Passenger _________________ 1,408
2,489
2, 509
2, 203
3, 284
3, 592
3,592
2;509
Ferry _____________________ 1,052
1, 544
1, 544
702
842
1,894
1,894
702
Fisher ____________________ 1,754
1, 123
1,080
963
1,451
1,421
1,356
1,689
Tug ______________________
291
291
291
265
315
265
265
291
Miscellaneous ______________
250
457
457
637
637
637
520
520

77, 903
26,876
1,443
2,489
1,543
1,192
265
314

71,228
11,829
1,443
1,388
2,056
807
265
314

69,592
5, 282
124
1, 388
1, 513
793
265
133

Total, new construction_ 132,350 131,879 128,419 127,473 138,602 134, 605 137,679 126,08i 112,025
Repair and con version ______ 9,874
9, 608
9,222
7, 826
8,911
9,849 10,341
9,934 10, 131

89,330
11,703

79,090
12,442

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - -- - -- - -- - -- - -

Grand totaL ___________ 142,224 141, ~1~1138, 551

..

137~_0821147' 824

142, 43~.146, 590 i35,931 122,2681101,034

43, 647
820
124
1, 388
1,513
622
235
133

856,034
457,802
4,577
28, 239
16,299
14,251
3,304
5,009

48,482 1,385,515
12,472
122,313
91,53.1160,954 1,508,332

FISOAL YEAR 1945

Cargo _____________________ 32,949 25,333 17,910 16,535 10,090

Tanker ____________________
797
797
797
797
797
Ore carrier ________________
124
124
124
124
124
Passenger ____________ " ____
307
307
307
307
307
Ferry _____________________ 1,513
671
671
671
671
Fisher ____________________
'389
316
316
389
389
Tug ______________________
167
232
188
189
196
Miscellaneous ______________
133
80
133
133
133
----,----,----,----,----,----,----,----,----,----,----,
Total, new construction_ 36,408 27,986 2'519119'072112'5521--------1-------- -------- --------1--------[--------[-------Repairandconversion ______ 15,024 14,100 --=:.~ 10,659 ~~~~~~~~
Grand totaL __________ 51,432
Source:

'-l

~ilitary

Supplies Division, ,(;SSBS.

42,086

32,966129,731 121,

102,817
3, 985
620
1,535
4, 197
1, 799
972
612
116,537
60, 680

0021==~1~~~1~~~1=-=1=7=7=,2=1=7

I\)

ApPENDIX TABLE

C-146.-Japane8e merchant ahip index of yen value input (1941=100),1941-45

OD

FISCAL YEAR 1941

Ship type

April

May

June

July

ISeptember I October INovember IDecember I January I February I

August

March

Total

88. 8
242.4
180.8
70. 8

100.0
100. 0
100.0
100. 0
100.0
100.0
100. 0
100.0

- - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - 1 - - - 1 - - - 1 - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -___, , - _
/
Cargo _______________________
132.1
50.7

114.5
43.3
-------- -.,.-----125.6
106.8

Tanker_____________ c- - -- - --Ore camer __________________

Passenger _________ _________
c
Ferry _______________________
Fmher ______________________
Tug ________________________
Miscellaneous ________________

101. 8
61. 2

-------- -------106. 8

-------- -------- -------117.1

99.5
89.4

New construction totaLi

61. 7
139.2
103. 0

96. 0
67.1

110.7
139.2
88. 4

119.3

--------

125. 2
125. 8
93.2

97.4
61. 6
115.9
127.8
200. 0
113.9
119.7
126.5

93.4
49.4
115.9
99.7
200.0
113.9
119.7
81. 1

94. 1
61.1
115.9
88.6
200.0
113.9
119.7
54. 0

96. 9
61. 1
155.0
88. 6
200.0
~3. 5
63.2
54. 0

97.6
132.9
155.0
88.6
200.0
87.4
59.3
50.6

96. 9
184.7
180.8
88. 6
200.0
84. 4
59.8
58.5

90. 5
184.7
180. 8
88.6

-------- -------87.4
75.4
265.6

87.4
80. 4
135.7

-'---,----,----,----,----,----,----,----,----,----,----,----,--91. 2
109. l'
95.5
90.4 1 102. 1
92.8
92.0
93. 5 1 101. 9 1 109. 3 1 112. 3 1 110. 1 I 100. 0

'=1=1=1=1=1=1=1=1=1=1=1=1=

~~oa~;n a~~P:~;~~~i~~~ ~ ~~~ ~ ~I- --97.-0 -1---97.-0-1---97.-0-1---97.-0-1- --97.-0-1---97." 0-1- --97~ 0-1--- 94.- 0-1- -i04.- 2-1---95.- 8-1--i07.-i-1- -ii6.-7-1--ioo.-0
Grand totaL__________

105.6

95.9

92.8

92.3

100.6

94.0

93.4

94.5

102.5

105.4

110.8

112.0

100.0

97.5
212.2
271. 3
70. 4

114. 8
363.0
245. 4
70.4

145. 4
384.6
201. 5
67.0

159.8
428. 3
352.0
54. 5

.183.2
462. 1
540. 6
35. 6

174.8
583. 8
539.8
56.8

118.
313.
293.
64.

FISCAL YEAR 1942

Cargo _______________________
Tanker _____________________
Ore carrier __________________
Passenger ___________________
Ferry _______________________
Fisher ______________________
Tug ________________________
Miscellaneous ______________ -_
Wooden ships ________________

80. 1
239.5
224. 8
60. 0

-------80.1
105. 4
25.5

87.7
259.0
224. 8
60.0

99. 8
217. 6
159.6
75.1

-------- --------

80.1
105.4
39.9

78. 4
105.4
39. 9

-------- -------- -------101.4

New construction totaL

108.7

110.7

- - -=
=
Repair and conversion ________ 119.4
128. 2
125.4
Grand totaL __________

106. 6

113.5

115.8

95.6
217. 6
211.2
75.1

91. 0
208.3
223.1
75. 1

-------78.4
108.9
37.0
.4

93. 7
184. 3
296.4
75.1

--------

35.0
78.0
50. 1
.6

27.3
80.7
57. 8
3.3

104. 7

27.3
50.8
112.1
5.8

25.3
153.2
230.1
21. 5

18. 8
137.4
,281. 6
40.7

108.1

113.4

149. 3

- - - - - - - - - - - -- - - =
135.2
116.9

128.9
111.7

-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -----18.8

148. 2
206.2
81. 1

28.4
162.4
206.2
117.4

41.7
193.5
134.8
168. 3

192.1

222.6

238.3

- - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

109. 6

3
4

106.3
107. 6

111.7
112.9'

98. 2
134.5

170.4

- - -=

112.2
153.6

91. 6
163.1

104. 5
188. 5

-45.
119.
118.
36.

-144.

=
113. 8
135. 4

104. 5
199.7

---

FISCAL YEAR 1943

Cargo _______________________
Tanker______________________
Ore camer __________________
'Passenger ___________________
Ferry _____________________ "_
Fisher ______________________
Tug ________________________

155.1
676.0
410. 8
56. 8
"'--------

51. 8
118.5

Miscellaneous ________________
Wooden ships ________________
TotaL ________________
Repair and con version ________
Grand totaL __________

194.6
806.4
465.1
56.8
--------

51. 8
118.5

230.4
283.3
265.6
933.5 1,004.7 1,137.0
648. 2
728.2
505.7
59.0
59.0
59.0
192.3
192.3
323. 8
51. 8
51. 8
64.9
60. 7
101.8
86.3

315.9
997. 9
129. 4
59.0
323. 8
70.9
105. 1

333.3
387.6
479.0
662.4
638. 0
382. 5
643. 9
996. 3 1,037.1 1, 038. 9 1,390.4 1,373.1 1,314. 1 1,058. 6
630.7
456. 5
570. 3
343. 9
85. 4 -------- 464. 5
46.3
46.3
114.5
99.5
99.5
36.2
66. o
613.5
421. 0
613.5
421. 0
131. 6
294. 5
294. o
75.3
75.3
104.5
111.9
172.9
203.9
90. 6
121.5
114.2
89.6
84. 4
90.3
47.5
96.

70.4
209.7

605.6
246.0

616.6
305.1

313. 5
326.8

40.4
369.9

29.6
503.1

21.7
675.0

230. 3

303. 5

346.3

372.0

397.7

414. 9

441. 2

34. 3
764. 0

34. 3
792.7

477.7

546. 6

34.3
801.9

39.3
838. 5

31. 4
850. 0

156. o
556. 9

680. 1

651. 5

638.4

458.

- - -- - - - - -- - - - - -- - - - - -- - - - - -- - -- - -- - -- -

- - -- - - - - -- - - - - - - - - =
93.9

82.2

91. 2

92.3

83. 8

84. 5

100. 0

- - -=
74.5

94. 6

- - - - - - - - -- - - - - -- - -- - - - - 190.9

236.6

272. 6

291. 3

' 307.0

319.5

342. 7

- - -- - - =

82.9

70.6

79.2

85. 8

350. 5

- - -- - - - - - - -

361. 3

416.1

507.7

483.8

476.9

Cargo _______________________ 579.6

524. 1
482.2
476.7
548.2
530.0
570.4
587.4
Tanker______________________ 1,709.1 1,894. 3 1,986.6 2,022.8
2,005.8 1, 951. 3 1,899.8 1,381.6
Ore carrier ___________________ -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 107.1
Passenger ___________________
46.2
82.3
82.3
72.3
107. 8
117.9
117.9
81.7
Ferry _______________________
530.1
530.1
235.7
432.2
432. 2
196.5
294. 5
196.5
Fisher ______________________
221. 0
212.8
182.8
182.8
170.9
136.1
121. 3
141. 5
Tug ________________________
4'3.9
43.9
47.5
40. 0
40.0
43.9
43.9
40. 0
Miscellaneous _______________ ~
23. 5
43.0
43.0
59.9
59.9
59.9
48. 9
48.9
Wooden ships ________________ 840. 2
503. 1
857.0
809. 6
638.9
459.2
423.7
376.0

564. 1
966.5
107.1
81. 7
431.9
150.2
40.0
29.5
327.7

515.8
425.4
107.1
45.6
575.5
101.7
40. 0
29.5
277.2

503.9
189.9
9. 2
45.6
423.5
99.9
40.0
12.5
245. 2

516.5
316.0
29. 5 1,371.6
28.3
8. 2
77.2
45.6
391. 9
423. 5
149. 6
78. 4
41. 6
35.4
39.3
12.5
496. 7
203. 2

128. 5

128. 8

FISCAL YEAR 1944

- - -- - - - - 358. 6
225. 7
538. 9
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --Repair and conversion ________
TotaL ________________

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - -- - 647.6

. 647.4-

627.7

604. 9

102. 0

102.6

104. 7

99.3

490.0

490.1

614.9

623.9

570.0

505.7

405.0

95. 3

80. 8

92.1

101.7

106.8

120. 9

105.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - -

- - -- - Grand total ________ " ___

636. 5

476. 7

458.9

480. 2

460.7

470. 3

434. 8

390.5

323.0

292. 1

413.7

197.7

FISCAL YEAR 19411

Cargo ______________________ _
Tanker _____________________ _
Ore carrier ___ : _____________ _
Passenger __________________ _
Ferry ______________________ _
Fisher _____________________ _
Tug _______________________ _
Miscellaneous _______________ _
Wooden ships _______________ _

73.1
28.6
9.2
10.1
196.6
39. 8
25 2
7. 5
14.7

93. 6

84.2

54. 2

129.7
28.6

16.83 I 127.8

9. 2
10.1
443. 3
49.0
29.6
12.5
142. 2

TotaL _______________ -I

10.1
196.6
49.9
28.5
12.5
68. 7

119.7
28.6
9.2
10.1
196.6
39.8
28. 5
12.5
38.4

183. 4
28. 6
9.2
10.1
196.6
49.0
35.0
12.5
94.6

238. 6
28. 6

9. 2

_ _______ r ________ J _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1 __ - . _ _ _ _

Grand total ___________ -I

155.21

145.71

128.6,1

164. 5 I 132.9 I 103.7

_ ..... _,- - I -

.. -

1_1

1_1

1_1=1=

110.1

87. 3 1_______ -1 _______ -1 _______ -1 _______ -1 _______ -1 _______ -1 _______ -I

91. 6

63. 8 1_______ -1 _______ -1 _______ -1 _______ -1 _______ -1 _______ -1 ________

I\)

\0

1- -

I_______ -I _______ -I _______ -I ___ c ___ -I _______ -I _______ -I _______ .I 105.6

=1=1=1=1-1

Repair and conversion _______ -'

1_ - - - _._ - -

148. 9
28. 6
9.2
10.1
234. 8
45.4
29 3
11. 5
71.7

~~~r~.:~:.~rir~!~a~!t:~~~:~!d number of ships, see this appendix, section on Transportation.

125.4
111. 3

ApPENDIX TABLE C-147- Value of Japanese aircraft production, monthly, 1941-1945, in 1945 prices (I,OOO,OOO)

ApPENDIX TABLE G-148.- Value of Japanese naval vessels production, monthly, by fi8cal year, 1941-45-Continued

COMPLETED AIRCRAFT

FISCAL YEAR 1943

Year

April

-___
1941-

46.5
1942 ____ 94. 2
1943 ____ 170.2
1944 ____ 314. 8
1945 - 361. 2

May

June

July

54.1
100.5
177.8
307.5
350. 1

55. 3
89.0
180.2
341. 9
279.8

52. 6
100.2
187.7
339.1
225. 8

August September October November December January

59.2
89.8
213. 1
316. 1

63.7
109.5
240.6
361. 6

- -- --

- - -- -

70.5
122.1
248. 4
356.1

- - --

February

March

83. 8
153.0
283.1
252. 0

97.1
167.9
3Q3. 0
314. 9

110.0
191. 4
372. 1
304. 0

123.3
21l. 5
408.5
382. 4

- - - - - -- - -- - - - - 71. 0
136.9
285.7
363.1

86. 7
147.1
325.0
337.8

- - - - - --

85.0
149.0
270.0
318.9

-- -- - -

61.9
123.1
214.0
416.0
361. 2

70. 2
129.0
224. 2
386. 8
350.1

72.1
114.5
229. 4
~65. 7
279. 8

70. 5
128. 0
239.6
441. 5
225. 5

77.6
115.3
268.3
422. 7

84. 3
137. 0
302.2
452.2

92.4
152.9
312.8
462. 9

- -- - - -- --- - - Sourre. Air Ordnance Bureau, MunItion MUlistry, War and Navy Ministeries.
Note.-For actual n~ber of Sircraft produced, see this Appendix, section on aircraft.

92.4
168.. 2
354. 2
475.4

113.2
184.7
406. 6
428. 7

- - -- - - --

112.7
187.1
354. 9
385. 8
-

- -- - - -

Total

825 5
1,4592
2,8848
3,9238
-- - - - - - - 1,216.6

COMPLETED AIRCRAFT AND SPARE PARTS

1941- ___
1942 ____
1943 ____
1944- ___
1945 ____

---

- -

-- --

Type

April

May

June

Total

Julf

-----------------1-----

Carriers _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ 19. 49 20. 68 22. 48 26. 67 25. 58 25. 58 25. 58 25. 29 23. 63 22. 85 22. 85 21. 39 282. 07
Cruisers_____________ 5.19 5.19 5.19 3.31 3.31 3.19 1. 70 1.70 1.70 1. 70 1. 70 1. 70
35.58
Mine layers__________
.42
.42
.42
.42 ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______
1. 68
pestroyers ___________ 10.82 9.80 9.84 9.76 8.65 9.80 10.07 10.83 10.63 12.31 19.20 17.95 139.66
Mine sweepers _ _ _ _ _ __ 1. 77 1. 71 1. 68 1. 40 1. 18 . 1. 89 1. 79 1. 58 2. 66 3. 11 2. 54 2. 42
23. 73
1,090:-6 Coast defense________ 5.72 5.83 6.48 6.03 6.06 6.87 13.59 23.37 25.93 28.25 33.11 26.62 187.86
1,842. 7 Transports___________ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______
.09 1. 11 1. 99 2.83 5.17 5.10
16.29
3,686. 8 Submarines __________ 33.51 36.07 35.39 35.84 36.18 36.15 34.08 34.26 36.08 34.21 32.44 32.62 419.53
5,024.1 Subchasers___________ 4.25 4. 89 5.17 5.22 4.90 4.96 4.96 5.00 3.94 4.21 3.51 2.65
53.66
1,216.6 Landing craft________
1. 47 1. 47 1.47 1. 47 1. 47 1. 47 1. 47 1. 47 1.47 1.47 1. 47 1. 47
17.64
Special attack _______________________________________________________.________________________________ _
Auxiliaries ___________ 10.32 10.32 10.32 10.32 10.32 10.32 10.32 10.32 10.32 10.32 10.32 10.32 123.84

ApPENDIX TABLE G-148.- Value of Japanese naval vesBels production, monthly, by fiscal year, 1941-45

,.
April

TotaL ________ 92.96 96.38 98.44100.44 97.65100.23103.65114.93118.35121.26132.31122.241,298.84

[I ,000,0001>1

FISCAL YEAR 1941

May

June

July

August Seh:m~ October Nb~~m- Dt:.m~ January F:~;u-

March

FISCAL YEAR 1944

Total

-------------- ------------ . -------------- --------Battleships__________ 5.40 5.40 5.40 5.40 5.40 5.40 5.40 5.40 4.00 2.60 2.60 2.60
55.00
Carriers _____________ 23.11 23.11 23.11 23.11 21. 83 18.52 16.62 16.35 15.56 15.56 15.56 15.56 228. 00
Cruisers_____________ 4. 27 4.27 4.27 3.57 2.86 4.74 4.74. 5. !II 6.36 6.36 6.36 6.36
59.97
Seaplane carriers ___ - _ 1. 94 1. 94 I. 94 I. 94 1. 94 1. 94 1. 94 1. 94 1. 94 1. 94 1. 89 1. 01
22. 30
MiDe layers ___ - - - - _- _ 3.40 3. 40 3. 40 3. 62 3. 77 3. 77 3. 42 2. 85 2. 20 1. 92 1. 92 1. 45
35. 12
Destroyers ________ ~ __ 8.42 7.06 8.49 7.75 8.04 8.18 7.85 9.05 10.4 10.78 10.33 11.76 108.37
Mine sweepers _ - ___ - _ l. 01 1. 01
. 49
. 49
. 65
. 65 1. 32 1. 46 1. 17
. 92 1. 23 1. 29
11. 64
Coast defense _______________________________________________________________________________________ _
Transports _____________________________________ " ____________________________________________________ _
Submarines __________ 11.36 11. 71 13.81 15.08 15.14 15.60 15.75 15.08 16.13 17.01 17.05 17.71 181. 43
Subchasers___________ 3.58 3.68 5.12 5.89 4.99 4.62 4.10 4.52 4.88 3.69 3.90 5.32
54.29
Landing craft _______________________________________________________________________________________ _
Special attack ______________________________________________________________________________________ _
Auxilliary_; _________ 11.08 l1.08 11.08 11.08 11.08 11.08 11.08 11.08 11.08 11.08 11.08 11.08 132.96

Carriers _____________ 20.91 20.9120.9120.9116.62 15.03 13.50 7. 28 3. 56 3. 56 3.56 3.02

Cruisers_ _ _ _ __ _ _ __ _ __ 1. 70 1. 70 1. 70 1. 70 1. 70 1. 70 1. 70 1. 70 ____________ _
.28
.86
Mine layerB- _________________________ .__ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______
Destroyers ___________ 17.73 19.48 20.36 20.58 20.05.20.94 18.22 21.67 25.67 19.59 17.08 14.21
Mine sweepers _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 2. 42 2. 35
. 64 . 24 ________________________________________ ._______ _
Coast defense ________ 24.67 30.37 38.15 43.72 48.93 57.06 51. 30 47.65 53.00 48.47 39.36 33.45
Transports_c _________ 6.33 7.55 8.62 9.58 10.93 9.08 6.48 5.28 3.98 1.70 1.44 1.91
Submarines __________ 32.46 32.03 29.59 29.66 28.53 25.16 22:9121.77 19.43 16.74 14.86 15.85
Subchasers___________
1. 36 1. 36 1. 28
.31
.31
.31
.28 _____________________________ _
Landing craft_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 9. 03 9. 03 9. 03 9. 03 9. 03 9. 03 9. 03 9. 03 9. 03 9. 03 9. 03 9. 03
8pecial attacL _______ 17.15 17.15 17.15 17.15 17.15 17.15 17.15 17.15 17.15 17.15 17.15 17.15
Auxiliaries ___________ 20.19 20.19 20.19 20.19 20.19 20.'19 20.19 20.19 20.19 20.19 20.19 20.19

149. 77
13.60
1.14
235. 58
5.65
516.13
72.88
288. 98
5.21
108. 36
205. 80
242. 28

TotaL ________ 153.95162.12167.' 62173.07173. 44175. 64160. 76151. 72152. 01136. 43122. 95115. 671, 845.38

------------~------------------------

TotaL - - - - - - -- 73. 57 72. 66 77. 11 77. 93 75. 70 74. 70 72. 22 73 49 73. 78 71. 86 72. 67 76. 00
FISCAL YEAR 1942

Battieships__________ 2.60 2.60 2.60 2.60 0.44 ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______
10.84
Carriers _____________ 15.84 14. 86 13.28 13.28 14.48 14. 48 16.83 16.65 17.48 18.24 18.24 18.24 191. 90
Cruisers_____________ 6.36 6.36 6.36 6.36 6.36 6.36 6.36 5.74 6.87 6.87 6.87 5.19
76.06
S~aplane carriers_____
.97 ______ ----- 1______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______
.97
Mine layers__________
1. 11
.80
.80
.94 1.22
.85
.85
.63
.42
.42
.42
.42
8.86
Destroyer~ ___________ 12.19 12.78 11. 07 11.89 12.59 10.22 11. 47 11. 47 11. 25 10.68 10.97 11. 35
137.93
Mine sweepers_ - ___ - - 1. 57 2. 27 3. 02 2. 64 2. 20 2. 20 2. 20 2. 58 2. 78 2. 90 2. 89 2. 82
30. 07
Coast Defense________
1. 86 2.25 2.43 2.86 3.07 3.07 3.50 4.59 4.62 4.62 5.07 5.59
43.53
Transports ___________________________________________ ._______________________________________________ _
Submarine ___________ 20.69 22.12 22.77 25.32 26.43 25.29 26.48 28.31 29.88 30.23 32.12 32.96 322.60
SubchaseL __________ 6.10 5.73.5.37 5.10 4.88 4.43 4.28 3.19 3.16 3.40 3.86 3.34
52.84
Landing craft _____________________ ~ _________________________________________________________________ _
Special attack _______________________________________________________________________________________ _
AuxiIiary _____ ::-:. _____

II. 12 11. 12 11.12 11. 12 11. 12 11.12 11. 12 11. 12 11. 12 11. 12 11.12 11. 12

FISCAL YEAR 1946

891. 49
Carriers _ __ _ __ _ __ __ _ _ O. 08 - - - - - - '- - - - __
Mine layers__________
.86 0.86 0.86
Destroyers___________ 8.48 5.40 2.10
Mine sweepers_______ ______ ______ ______
Coast defense ________ 20.53 15.81 12.83
Transports ___________ 1.53 1.10
.66
Submarines_______
'17.48 17.50 20.53
Landing crafL_______ 3. ~1
3.91 3.91
Special attack_ __ _ _ _ __ 23. 92 23. 92 23. 92
Auxiliaries ____ ~______ 1. 80 1. 80 1. 80

-----0.86
-----______
9.69
.33
20.12
3.91
23. 92
1. 80

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ - ____ - _______ .. _ __ _ _ _ __ _ _
O. 08 .
0.42 ------ ------ - _____ --____ ______ ______
3.86
------ ------ --- ___ ---- __ -_____ ______ ______
16.08
______ ______ ______ ____ _ ______ ____
_____________ _
4.39 ------ ------ -_____ ______ ______ ______
63.25
______ ------ ------ ______ -_____ ______ ____
3.62
8.78 ------ ----__ ______ ______ ______ ______
84.41
1. 87 ------ ------ ____ ,_____ "__ ______ ______ ______
17.51
11. 96 _________________________________________________ _
.90 ---- __ -- __________ -_____ ___ __ ______ ______
8.10

- - ---- - - - -------- - - - - - - ----------

TotaL _____ _ _ 78. 59 70. 40 66. 61 60. 63 28. 32 _________________________ _

---'

--- - - 304.55

Source: Navy Ministry.

133.44

---------------------------------------TotaL ________ 80.39 81. 08 78.77 82.11 82.77 78.00 83.08 84.28 87.57 88.48 91.55 91. 021, 009.11
Source: Navy Ministry.

210

211

ApPENDIX TABLE C-149.-Monthly indices of Japanese naval.hip production, by jiscalyear, 191,1-1,15

ApPENDIX TABLE C-149.-Monthly indices of Japanese naval ship production, by jiscalyear, 191,1-1,5-Contillued

[Average month in 1941=100]

FISCAL YEAR 1944

FISCAL YEAR 1941

Type

April

May

June

July

August

I Se~;:m-

October

~m-

N'l,..

D:'rm-

Type

January February March

--'-------1----------------------------------_
Battleships- _______
Carriers ___________
Cruisers __________
Seaplane carriers ___
Mine layers _______
Destroyers ________
Mine sweepers _____
Coast defense ______
Transports-------Submarines_______
Subchasers________
Landing craft ______
Special attack _____
Auxiliaries ________

118
122
85
104
116
93
104

57
57
82
82
127
127
104
55
66
49
117
130
127
133
15
51
------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------------- ------__________________________________________________________________________________ _
75
78
91
100
100
103
103
100
107
113
113
117
79
81
113
130
110
102
91
100
108
82
86
118
-- ________________________________________________________________________________ _
-- _______________________________________ ________________________________________ _
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
118
I\!2
85
104
116
78
104

118
122
li5
104
116
94
51

118
122
71
104
124
86
51

118
115
57
104
129
89
67

118
97
95
104
1'39
91
67

118
87
95
104
117
87
136

87
82
127
104
75
116
120

118
86
116
104
97
100
145

57
82
127
104
66
119
95

April

May

June

July

-------1--- -------------------------------~,Battleships-------- _____________________ --- ____

'Carriers __ -'________ 110
110
110
110
34
34
34
34
icruisers__________
',:Mine layers ___________________________________
:pestroyers________ 196
'216
225
228
f:Mine sweepers_____ 249
242
66
24
.Coast defense______ 680
838 1,052 1,205
Transports-------- 195
232
266
296
Submarines_______ 215
212
196
196
Subchasers________
30
30
28
7
Landing craft______ 614
614
614
614
Special attack.____ 100
100
100
100
Auxiliaries ________ 182
182
182
182

------87
34
------222
_______
1,349
337
189
7
614
100
182

------79
34
------232
------1,573
280
167
7
614
100
182

------71
34
------202
------1,414
200
152
6
614
100
182

------38
34
------240
------1,314
163
144
----- __
614
100
182

------19
------------284
------1,461
123
129
------614
100
182

------19
------------217
------1,337
52
111
------614
100
182

246.4

241.8

213.3

194..9

188.7

161. 7

------19
------------189
------1,085
44
98
------614
100
182

-----16
----------157
-----925
59
105
-----614
100
182

TotaL _____ 105.0

107.2/107.2

104.1

Total_______

203.5

218.6

231.0

~I~~~~~~

242.0

145.2 137.6

FISCAL YEAR 1945

FISCAL YEAR 1942

57
10
57
57
Battleships-------- 57
Carriers___________ 83
76 .
92
89
92
78
76
88
70
70
92
92
Crusiers __________ 127
127
127
115
138
127
138
138
104
127
127
127
Seaplane carriers___ 52
Mine layers_______ 38
14
42
14
27
14
27
29
29
22
14
~2
Destroyers ________ 135
127
127
142
123
126
118
121
113
139
125
132
227
227
227
267
286
234
291
311
299
298
Mine sweepers----- 162
273
Coast defense______ 51
140
127
85
85
96
127
127
62
154
79
67
Transports-------- _____________________________ , ____________________________________________________ _
Submarines _______ 137
146
151
168
175
167
175
187
198
200
213
218
Subchasers ________ 135
129
119
113
108
98
95
70
70
75
85
74
Landing crafL ______________________________________ ____________________________________ -- __________ _
Special attack _____ ------- ____________________________ -- _____ -- _____ -- _____ ------- ------- ------- --- __ _
Auxiliaries ________ 101
101
101
101
101
101
101
101
101
101
101
101
~

TotaL_____

99.0

98.2

94.6

97.7

94.6

88.8

95.6

96.7

100.5

101.7

104.4

103.5

.BattleshiJ?s ______________________ ------- ------- ------- ------- -.----- ------- ------- ------Carriers __________
4
_____________________ ------- ------- ------- .------ ------Cruisers ___________________ . _~ _________ ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------Mine layers_______
29
29
29
29
14 -_. ____ ------- ------- ------- ------Destroyers._______
94
61
23 ______________ ------- ------- ------- ------- ------Mine
____________________________________________________________________ c_
Coast defense______ 566
436
354
267
121 --- ___________ ------- ------- ------Transports-------47
34
20
10 ______________ -- ____________ ------- ------Submarines_______ 116
116
136
133
58 -- ____________ ----- __ - ______ - ______
Subchasers ______________________ --- ____ ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------Landing craft______ 266
266
266
266
127 _____________________ -- ____________
Special attack_____ 139
139
139
139
70 _____________________ - ______ - ______
Auxiliaries._______
16
16
16
16
8 --- ____ - ______ ------- ------- ------sweepers~.---

Total______ _

77.3

Source: Military SuppU.. Dh'Won,

65.6

58.0

49.7

-------------------------------

-----.---------------------

--. - - - - - - - - - -

--------------------------------- ____
-------

--------------------- ____ _
-- ___ _
------

22.2 _______________________________________________ _

USSB~.

FISCAL YEAR 1943

Battleships ________ ------- ------- ------- ------- ------Carriers ___________ 103

135
109
118
133
Cruisers __________ 104
104
66
66
104
Mine layers ______
14
14
14 ------14.
Destroyers ________ 120
109
110
108
96
Mine sweepers _____ 182
122
177
174
145
167
Coast defense ___ J_" 158
179
166
161
Transports- _______ ------- ------- ------- ------- ------Subma.rines _______ 222
246
239
234
237
Subchasers ________
108
94
108
114
115
Landing craft"'____ 100
100
100
100
100
Special attack _____ ------- ------- ------- ------- ------Auxiliaries ________
93
93
93
93
93

-------

------- -------

135
133
135
'34
34
64
-- ._--- ------- ------111
120
109
185
163
195
644
190
375
3
34
------226
227
239
111
110
110
100
100
100
------- ------- ------113
93
93

------- - 124
34

---- -------

120
34

120
31

------- -------

118
274
715
61
239
87
100

136
321
779
87
227
93
100

-------

-------

93

93

147.1

154. 2

213
262
913
160
215
78
100

-----113
34

-----199
249
577
157
216
59
100

------- -----93

93

---- - -------- - -- - -- - -- - -- - ------- -Total_______

107.8

212

111.2

114.7

116.5

115.2

118.1

123.2

140.7

178.4 158. I)

213

ApPENDIX TABLE G-150.-Delivered tonnage and number of ships, Japanese navy, by fiscal year 1991-45-Con.

ApPENDIX TA.BLE C-150.-Delivered tonnage and number of ships, Japanese navy, by fiscal year 1991-45

Fiscal years
Class

Fiscal years
TotfJKior 1 - -_ _-,.._ _ _, -_ _- ,_ _ _, -_ _-,_-=-_,-_ _ _...._ __
1931

1932

1933

1934

1936

1935

1937

1938

- - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - 1 - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ .1- - - -1- - Battleships ___________ tons __ 298, 000

19, 500
numbeL_
9
1
Carriers ______________ tons__ 92,500 -------- -------- 7, 400 -------- -------- -------10,050
27,000
1
number__
5 -------- -------3
1 -------- -------- -------Cruisers ______________ tons __ 149,000
17,000
8,500
9,850 29,'550 -------- -------- 17,000
- - - - -2
2 -------1
number__
25
1
3 -------- -------Destroyers ____________ tons __ 86,050
17,340
1; 500
6,840
5,472
8,500
2, 736
5, 100
12
1
5
2
4
number__
73
3
5
Submarines ___________ tons __ 48,450
4,755
4,755
700
1,400
6,855
6,869
1
3
3
numoer __
35
1
5
4
Coast defense _________ tons __ .43,090 ________ --- _____ -------- -------, -------- -------- ---------- --------numbeL _
5 ________________________________ - ___ - - __ - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --- - - -Transports ____________ tons __ -------- -------- ----- --- -------- -------- -------- -------- ---------- --------number _____________________________________________ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Minelayers ____________ tons.... 1,840
1,135
443
886
4,400 __________
720,
number__
3
1
1
2
1 __________
1
Mine sweepers ________ tons__ 3,69Q ________ ________
984
984
492
492 __________
1,260
number__
6 ________ ________
2
2
1 __________
2
Sub chasers ___________ tons__ ________ ________ ________
600 ________ ________
270 __________
1,450
number_ _ __ ______ ________ __ _____ _
2 _____ ___ ________
1 ________ - _
5
Gun boats ____________ tons_ _ 3,400 ______ : _ - ___ - - _- - - ---- - - - - -- - - - - -- - ---- - - -- - - - - - - - -- - - - -- - -'--- - - - -number__
9 ________________________________ -------_ -------- ---------- --------Torpedo boats ________ tons__ ________ ________ ________ 1,581
527 ________ 2,380
2,380 --------numbeL _ ________ ________ _ _______
3
1 ____ ____
4
4 _- - - - - - - Landirig craft _________ tons __________________ - - -- - -- - - -- - - - - - - -- - -- - - - - --- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- -- - - - - - - - -- - - -number __________________________ - __ -- - -- - ---- - - - - - -- - - -- - - - - - - - - - - ---- ~ - - - - - - -- - --Special attack , ____,____ tons __________________________ -------- ----- :-- -------- -------- ---------- --------number ____________________________ - - __ - - - -- - -- - - - - -- - --- - - - - - - - - - -- - -- - -- - - - - -- - - -Auxiliaries. ____ : ______ tons __ 203,920 ,7,600
7,750 17,675
7,500
7,800
8,912
7,890
18,404
----------------------1-----1---63, 589
55, 360
Grand total all classes_ 929, 940 22,550 73,304 31,419 16,,769 32, 147 28,049

.-

See footnotes at end of table.

1_ _ _- ._ _ _, -_ _- , -_ _ _. , - -_ _- ,_ _ _. . -_ _ _ 1

Class
1939

194()

1941

1942

1943

1944

194.\ (AprU-

Total by class Grand total

1931-45
by class

July)

---------1----------------------------

Battleships ___________ tons _________________ _ 64,000 64,000 -------- --------------number _________________ _

1 -------- -------- -------1
Carriers ______________ tons __ 10,050
9,500 74,000 86, 050 60,360 114,500
nuinbet __
1
1
3
4
5
6
Cruisers __.: ___________ tons__ 8, 500 11, 600
8,000
5,800 14, 500 16,000
number __ ,
1
2
2
1
2
1
Destroyers ___ c ________ tons __ 13,000 16,000 18,160 21,660 30,360 45,600
9,000
number__
7
8
15
31
9
9
6
Submarines ___________ tons_ _ 2, 180 12, 640 21,930 26,676 49,016 53,560 14,930
number__
1
6
22
40
37
22
11
Coast defense _________ tons__ ________ 3,440
3, 760 26,730 87, 730 14,400
,
number __ ___ ____ _
4
32
4
111
1.8
Transports ____________ tons__ ________ ________
890
6,840 61, 100
6,_280
number__ ________ ________
1
7
57
5
Mine layers _______ " ___ tons__ 3,040
3,760
7,760
2,880
720 -------- -------number__
4
4
5
4
1 -------- -------Mine sweepers ________ tons_ _ 1, 260
1, 260
3, 150
3, 780
2, 520
number__
2
2
5
6
4
Sub chasers ___________ tons__ 1,160
1,320
5,720
6,600
7,040
1,320
number__
4
3
13
15
16
3
Gun boats ____________ tons__
320
1,310
990 ___________,____________________ _
number__
1
2
1 _______________________________ _
Torpedo boats _________ tons _________________________________________________________ _
,
number _________________________________________________________ _
Landing craft _________ tons__ ________ ________ ________ ________ 6,280 38,655 10,420
number__ ________ ________ ________ ________
24
1,464
617
Special attack , ________ tons _____________________ c ____________________ 10,508
9,162
number__ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ 5,121
1,733
Auxiliaries' ___________ tons __ 18,738 35,135 24,649 24,716 22,940 44,909
2,500

147, 500
3
398, 910
25
146,300
18
201, 268
117
206,266
156
136,060
169
75,110
70
25, 744
24
16,182
27
25,480
62
2, 620
4
6,868
12
55,355
2, 105
19, ~70
6,854
257,118

445,500
12
491,410
30
295,300
43
287,318
190
254, 716
191
179, 150
174
75,110
70
27,584
27
19,872
33
25,480
62
6,020
13
6,868
12
55,355
2,105
19,670
6,854
461,038

------------~------+----I----

Grand total all classes_ 58,248

94,705 225,159

, Speclal attack vessels include sulclde bost, 5- and 2-man submarines, and
the "human" torpedo. All special attack vessels were classifled under naval
ammnnltlon-not ships-by the Japanese Navy. Fnrther details included
in this report.

253, 992230,066 468, 402

66, 692 1,720,451 2,650, 391

Figures for auxlliary deliveries are estimated.

Source: Over-all table prepared from Information received from 1apanese

Navy Ministry and Japanese Navy Technical Bureau.

ApPENDIX TABLE G-151.-Co18tr'Uclion of important Japanese fleet units

Type oi ship

Battleship ______________________________________________ _
Carriers ________________________________________________ _
])0 ________________________________________________ _
])0 ________________________________________________ _

, Cruiser _______ - - __ - _____________________________________ _

Destroyers ______________________________________________ _
])0 ________________________________________________ _
])0 ________________________________________________ _

Submarines ____ - __ -- ____________________________________ _

])0------ __________________________________________ _
])0 ________________________________________________ _
])0 ________ -------- ________________________________ _
])0 ___ --- __________________________________________ _

Coast Defense ________ - __________________________________ _

])0 ________________________ _

Tonnage

Average yen cost

per ton

Average time,
Average time,
keel to launch launch to delivery
Dar.

64, 000
9,000
17,500
19,000
8,000
2,040
1,260
2,700
429
965
1, 500
1,950
2,200
750
940

2,140
3, 1i95
3,895

3,e95
5, 151
3,522
3,522
3, 522
8,317
8,317
8,317
8,317
8,317
5,575
5, 575

1,007
364
421
828
349
248
161
227
' 164
273
319
490
480
93
105

Dap.

793
338
315
311
379
120
80
97
210
259
372
494
634
56
101

Source: Navy Ministry.

714928-46--15

214

215

....

ApPENDIX TABLE C-152.- Value of Japanese Army and Navy ammunition produGtion, monthly, 1941-45 in 1945 prices

0\

[Millions of yen]
Month

Year

Total

_1-

10

12

11

- - ---------------------------------------

194L __________ ______ ____

1942 _______________________ 1
~

..

1944 _______________________
1945 _______________________

,---------------_:_-----,

68. 0
93.6
101. 5
211.5
148. 6

69.0
98.0
113.9
207.2
146.6

67.3
103.3
116.4
194.7
117.3

67. 8
95.9
121. 2
208.5
87.6

67.5
100. 8
. 126.2
210.4

70. 5
108. 5
140.8
216.6

70. 7
117.1
137.3

76. 5
110.4
149.0

--:~~'-~ -1--:~~~~-

82. 2
112.2
156.1
200.0

79. 4
113.3
153.6
191. 8

80. 8
116.9
172.4
181. 1

69. 4
126.3
184. 2
176. 3

869.
1,296. 9
1,572. 6
2,426.
500.

1944

1945

Sources: Japanese Army arsenals and Navy Ministry.

ApPENDIX TABLE C-153.---Japanese Army ordnance production by years, 1931-45

[Values in thousands or yenl
1931

1932

1933

1934

1935

1937

1936

1938

1939

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - -- - -

Small arms _______________

Aircraft arms ____________ ~
Artillery __________________
Ground and AA ammunition ____________________
Air corps ammunition ______
ComQat and tracked vehicles __________________
Optical equipment _________
Radio and communication
equipment ______________
Marine transport __________
Miscellaneous _____________
Balloon bombs ____________

1940

1941

1942

1943

1,228 1,820 4, 552 3, 556 5, 899 6,349 '10,624 33,512 52,680 80,670 94,888
647 1,256 1,101 1,026 2,088 3,066 5,491 8, 520 18, 359
391
639
3,048 4, 528 11,655 11,536 12,087 21,404 23,840 24, 151 40,982 69, 705 97,419

132,906
48,888
124,115

181,859
93,059
164,770

179,537 46, 943

206,258 73,903
135,039 29,231

13,297 14,931 26,254 29,339 34, 775 35, 743 76,679 242, 192 259,645 289,489 313, 761
382 3,249 3, 820 4,117 5, 120 17,236 47,240 37, 927 36, 510 50, 282
210

376,910
111,321

365,346
144,262

327,957 59,246
273,573 64, 729

580
400
820
580
900 2, 385
1,085 1,426 1,831 2,347 3, 916 5, 081

3,015 18,739 52, 196 118,273 247,487

6,372 10,256 11,188 14, 817 44, 140

307,485
38, 988

280,112
61,238

232, 147 54,817

100,536 17,774

484
774 1,225 1,490 1, 781 2,063
T----- ------ ------ ------ ------ -----487
387
527 1,200 1, 230 1,436

2, 773 3,594 4,315 4,980 19, 224

7,285 15,120 18,715 18,085 34, 595
3,731
940 1,809 26,875 36,310

38,841
36,863
45, 625

164,518
94,704
36,059

243,342 43,370
247,669 55,460
15,662 8, 794
--------- 146,223

--------- ---------

------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - -

Total ______________ 2~ 67026, 52051, ~2355, 36064, 96379, 658 153, 643398, 810484, 948667, 924956, 4621, 261, 9421, 585, 927 2,108,093 454, 767
1

Source: Japanese Army arsenals.

c~.'::~\ "'~,,~;'t;Al1!

ApPENDIX TABLE C-154.-Japanese Army ordnance production by years 1931-45

[Index numbers based on 1941 Year!), totals]
1931

Small arms __________ . ______________

AC arms ___________________________
Artillery ______________________ . _____
Ground and AA ammunition __________
Aircraft ammunition _________________
Combat and tracked vehicles _________
Optical ecjuipment ___________________
Radio and communication equipment._
Marine transportation _______________

1.3
2.1
3.1
4.2
.4
.2
2.5
2.5

1932

1.9
3.5
4.7
4.8
.8
.3
3.2
4. 0

1933

4.8
3.5
12.0
8. 4
6.5
.2
4.1
6. 4

~1~3~
3. 7
6. 8
11.9
9. 4
7. 6
.2
5. 3
7.7

4.2
6.0
12.4
11. 1
8.2
.4
8.8
9. 3

1936

1937

1938

1939

1940

6.7
5.6
22.0
11. 4
10.2
1.0
11.5
10.7

11. 2 35. 3 55. 6 85.2

11. 4 16.7 29.9 46.5
24. 5 24.7 42.1 71. 9
24.6 70. 8 82. 8 92. 5
34. 3 93.8 75. 3 72.5
1.2
7.6 21. 0 47.8
14.4 23.4 25.6 33. 5
14.4 18. 7 22.5 25.9
------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ 21. 1 43. 8 54.1 52.3
--- --- ---- - - - - -- TotaL _______________________
2.2
2.8
5.5
5. 8
6.8
8.4 16. 1 41. 9 51. 0 70. 2

SOURe.: Japanese Army arsenals.

....N

......

1941

1942

100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100

140.1
266. 7
127.4
120.3
221. 5
124. 2
88.4
204. 2
106.7

I------

~1132.5

1943

1944

1945

191. 6
189. 2
148.4
507.5 1,123.3 1,202.7
169. 1
138.8
90. 2
116.4
104.7
57. 1
287.0
544.0
386.0
113.8
93.6
64. 4
139.1
226. 6
120.7
855. 7 1,265.6
728.7
273.7
715.8
480. 8

---- - ---166.5

221. 3

143.3

ApPENDIX TABLE C-155.-Japanese naval ordnance-over-all indices of output, 1931-1,5

ApPENDIX TABLE C-155.-Japanese naval qrdnance-over-all indice. oj output, 1931-I,5-Continued

[1941=1001

Year or month

Total

Guns

Plans

Actual
Ammunl Bombs,
mines,
tion torpedoes

Optical
and

naviga-

tioual

Radio
and
electrical
equip.
ment

Year OT month

1940_~----------1941
______________
1942 _____________
1943 ______________
1944 ______________
1945 ______________

1941:
ApriL ________
May _________
June _________
July __________
August _______
September ____
October _______
November ____
December_____
January ______
February _____
March ________
1942:
ApriL ________
May _________
June _________
July __________
August _______
September ____
October _______
November ____
December _____
January ______
February _____
March ________
1943:
ApriL _______
May _________
June _________
July __________
August_ ~ ____
September ____
October _______
November ____
December _____
January ____ ._

218

19
10
15
19
21
24
32
40
45
61
100
157
267
523
285

..

19
18
19
21
21
29
32
37
47
60
100
190
.570
1,508
783

Total

Guns

6 ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- -----8 ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- -----15 ------- ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ -----22 ------ ------ ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- -----25 ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- --- --- - ------- ------- -----29 ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- -----38 ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- -----48 ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- -----50 ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------70
62
38
38 ------------- ---.---- -----------102
100
83
119
138
100
100
100
109
136
151
174
150
192
158
158
178
201
193
220
221
213
268
457
311
450
785
278
351
419
649
345
310
464
641
782 1,774
474
654 1,031
182
276
226
404 ------- ------- '464
743
753

88
90
88
89
91
93
96
104
113
108
111
123

74
83
80
88
87
94
96
109
128
104
125
131-

99
97
91
92
91
. 94
96
104
109
104
106
118

72
74
79
80.
86
83
85
99
125.
135
129
162

67
77
87
86
89
96
103
107
134
105
120
131

134
144
148
138
145
159
169
158
164
168
174
189

133
145
160
147
153
172
180
199
190
222
276
298

137
141
139
129
135
156
172
147
150
161
166
181

121
121
.121
139
155
155
173
i73
173
190
190
190

168
189
198
212
237
260
271
290
322
312

281
310
333
358
507
497
512
552
769
760

130
153
163
176
192
225
222
246
264
262

164
181
177
183
199
190
205
230
214
236

95
97
106
107
103
99
103
147

103
101
98
101
103
105
107
110
116
117
121
128

64
68
67
73
78
80
80
85
92
96
105
109

99
96
89
94
96
98
100
104
109
108
108
120

106
106
107
107
108
108
113
113
114
134
148
148

115
116
119
123
123
132
135
140
142
149
154
154

131
131
131
133
136
136
136
137
137
139
140
140

114
118
140
134
130
139
157
164
179
152
181
197

140
165
151
156
167
161
161
161
177
147
139
157

159
161
164
158
167
182
193
179
181
192
200
205

144
150
158
112
164
177
188
196
201
233
279
300

142
146
147
139
146
168
181
153
156
168
174
179

171
172
177
198
198
199
211
215
217
218
220
217

155
157
169
171
176
177
206
211
214
224
225
226

216
216
216
216
219
220
220
221
221
224
225
228

180
208
222
243
257
282
301
316
333
337

227
255
261
278
275
309
366
348
363
304

382
394
403
421
428
438
450
465
480
499

399
505
557
664
683
754
789
875
914
1,098

430
435
444
448
451
455
459
464
469
475

233
230
231
250
257
257
286
288
309
325

252
257
278
301
312
344
364
377
405
422

371
371
375
377
387
390
398
422
454
481

79
89
91
84

Total

Radio
and _
and
Ammunl- lJombs,
mines,
electricai
tion torpedoes naviga- equip.
tioual
ment
Optical

--- - - - --- - - -- - - - - - --- --- - - - --1931 ____________ .

1932 _____________
1933 ______________
1934 _____________
1935 _____________
1936 _____________
1937 _____________
1938 _____________
1939______________

Actual
Guns

Plans

Ammunl Bombs,
mines,
tion torpedoes

Optical
and

Ilsvfga-

tional

Redio

and

. electrical
equipment

Total

Guns

Ammunl
tion

Bombs,
mines,

torpedoes

Optical

Radio

navlga

electrical
equipment

and

tioual

and

--- - - - - - -- - -- - - - - -- - -- - -- - - 1943-Continued
February _____
March ________
1944:
ApriL _______ :
May ______ --June _________
Ju1y __________
August _______
September ____
October _______
November ____
December _____
January ______
February _____
March ________
1945:
ApriL________
May_________
June_________
Ju1y__________
August_______

268
394

955
1,0.04

301
325

307
347

352
397

336
340

518
532

1,098
1,212

481
486

351
354

447
448

499
499

475
502
528
539
564
581
578
566
552
509
464
439

1,138
1,299
1,439
1,538
1,772
1,735
1,902
1,831
1,6.59
1,541
1,267
973

396
374
333
351
342
364
364
368
335
305
306.
299

396
380
375
386
413
386
358
373
350
326
281
262

373
411
439
511
662
656
568
557
591
505
428
423

481
646
883
803
797
876
800
746
884
833
762
808

680
686
722
747
779
772
813
811
831
831
859
881

1,2261,320
1,447
1; 580
1,716
1,807
2,005
1,835
1,933
1,921
2,091
2,402

574
572
609

425
416
427
439
497
466
502
494
523
514
542
477

487
497
513
574
738
743
731
754
749
683
696
686

1,033
1,038
1,042
1,029
1,022
1,017
1,011
1,014
1,028
1,037
1,044
1,048

389
370
308
250
112

1,105
999
897
686
224

257
267
187
133
67

291
253
203
166
17

213
250
306
293
143

588
522
510
494
290

480
486
454
452
448

669
660
800.
790
797

745
755
753
749
763

~!~E~~~:::= ~'= = =
=======

630.

640
621
656
680
688
694
714
712

_______ _______ _______

_______ _______ _______
_______ _______ _______
__ ____ _______ __
________________ .____

======= ======= ======= ======= ======= =======

~======

======= ======= ======

g;g'---; : : ---:: : ::: :::::: : : : : :-: : : :-:: : ::-:-::---: : : : : :-:: : : : :

219

ApPKNDIX TABLE C-158.-Japanese pla.nned and actual

production of two- and four-ton trucks, 1940-45

ApPENDIX TABLE C-156.-Japanese war ma1eriel em hand,

1941-45

1941

Year

1942

1944

1943

------

1945

94
8
7

94

95

Stocks at end of year - - -- 118 113 113

WEAPONS

Stocks at end of year - - - ~

95 109 117 130 116

15 17 24 22 11
7
1
9 11 36

- - - - - - --

109 117 130 116 120

45
18
19
1

Stocks at end of year _ _ __

81

81
2
15
15
83

83

14
16
81

81
1
11
20
73

73

6
10
69

ApPENDIX TABLE C-157.-J apanese production and imports

of motor vehicles, by type, 1936-41
1937

1938

1939

1940

194~

------ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---Light trucks:

Domestic __ 5,757 12,669 10,988 6,283 4,818 4, 264
0
0
0
0
0
Imports ___
0
2-ton trucks:
Domestic __ I, 180 6, 152 13,771 26,334 30, 687 39,297
0
0
0
Imports ___ 14,476 17,081 13,817
4-ton trucks:
0 I, 325 3,357 2, 551 2,828
0
Domestic __
0
0
.0
0
0
Imports ___
0
Light cars:
464
Domestic __ 1,513 4,856 2,308 1,816 1,496
0
0
0
0
0
Imports ___
0
Standard cars:
995
807 1,396
Domestic __
165 1,437 1,690
0
0
0
Imports ___ 14,329 12,950 4,057
Busses:
528
226
Domestic __
Imports ___ 3,370 2, 908

798 2,711 I, 599

0
0
719

53
0

--- --- --- --- -----

Total:
Domestic __ 'S,841 25, 642 30, 880 41, 308 42, 547 47,901
o
0
0
Imports ___ 32, 175 32, 939 18, 593

--------- ------

Grand
totaL _ 41,016 58,581 49,473 41, 308 42,547 47, 901
Source: Japa.nese Automobile Control AssociatIon.

3,960 2,828
3,240 2,257
3,000 2,013
900
2, 100
63

80a

11

~I

to

!
I
I
I

I
I
I
I
I
I

,......

............

~
eo
......

r-..

CT.IO

~I

II..C')~~

ao co eo

ICDOOCO

': r---

,, .....

...-I...

OOLQO':I
OO...-1f'-.

...... C"t

100

eo......

C'\I"'

Q)

1000CO

: 00 C'I ~
:

...-I...

~I

Source: Japanese Automobile Control ASSOcIatIOn.

, l"'"'4... "'o:t'...I 0)..

,:~"""l"'"'4

~I

Q)

l,...,j

CQ

r...

cO

,.

1000':1
IOCOQ)
<:Q r-.. CD

:,....j... ...-I-

[1,000,000 yen]

Source: Wa.r ministry.

1936

88
77
63
60

64
72
70
67
43

ApPENDIX TABLE C-159.- Value of output of the Japane ...

motor vehicle industry, in 1945 prices, monthly, 1.941-45
(fiscal years)

MOTOR VEHICLES (1,000 Vehicles)

Stocks at beginning of year ____ _

Requisitioned-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -production_ - - - -- - --- - - - - - - - -Consumption _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

83 3, 960 2,551

1940 ________ 36,800 30,687

194L _______ 44,800 39,297
1942 ________ 43,000 33, 129
1943 ________ 34,850 21,987
1944 ________ 32,750 19,546
1945 (Apr.July) ______ 15, 300 1,695

- - - - - - -- - -

Stocks at beginning of yeaL __ -Production_ - - --- - - - - -- -- - - - -Consumption- - ----- - -- -- - - - --

Percent
Percent
of pI aD
Planned Actual of plan Planned Actual obtained
obtained

--------

Stocks at beginning of yeaL - -- 100 118 113 113

Production __ -- - - - - - - -- - - - - --- 19 25 25 20
I
30 25 41
Consumption- --- - - - - - - -- - - ---

oo"'i~g~"~-~~"~-~

4-ton truck production

2-ton truck production

Units: Ammunition-one kaiSenbun for one division.

weapons---equipment for one division.
Motor vehicles-one vehicle.
AMMUNITION

~~gg~~gg~~~
OOOt--C'l~"'I::tICC

OO':l ......

1941

Year

1942

1943

1944

1945

----------1--- ----- - - - -

ApriL ___ - - - - - - - - - - - - May _____ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - June ___________________ _

July ___________________ _
August _____ ------ --- - - -September ______ - - - - - - - -OctobeL_ - - - - - - - - - - - - - -November ------ - - - - - - - -December- -- --- -. - --- - -January _____ - - - - - - --'- - -February ---- - - - -- - - - - - -March ___ : - - - - - - - - --- - --

43. 7
46. 5
57.4
51. 5
,55.3
58.0
64.7
73. 4
76.9
58.6
54.8
50.6

36. 9
35. 4
36.5
40.3
32.1
42.2
44.2
36. 2
38.0
28.8
24.1
35.9

28. 8
27. 2
22.0
30.3
27.5
28.6
23.6
20. 3
21.1
22.9
24.3
32.2

23. 8 9. 1
36. 7 18. 6
25. 7 3. 4
27.6 4.9
20.3 ____ _
20.1.- __ _
25.6 ----28, 2 - - " - 17.9 ____ _
12.9 ____ _
15.3 ____ _
15.6 ____ _

----------

TotaL ____ .. ______ 691. 4430.6308.8269.7 36.0

Source: Japanese Automobile Control Association, Military Supplies
Division, USSBS.

', 0
0
<0 ",
, 0>

'""""

1942

1943

1944

64.0 50.0
61. 4 57.2
63.3.38.2
69.9 52.6
55.7 47.7
73.2 49.6
76.7 41. 0
55.9 35.2
65.9 36.6
50.0 39.7
41. 8 42.2
62.3 55.9

I :

Source: Japanese Automobile Control Association, MlUtary Supplies

Division, USSBS.

00

, "
10

eq

C7:I 0

eo

IC'lO
: ~ Col

I'

. . . ~ [. . . i i
1

I
:

II

j~ ! ::: : : I~
i~ i i

1945

41. 3 15.8
63.7 32.3
44.6 5.9
47.9 8.5
35; 2 ----34.9 ____ _
44.4 __ , __
48.9 ____ _
31. 1 ----22.4 ____ _
26.6 ____ _
27.0 ____ _

,:,....j :" :..qf I'

~:~jjjil~

----------1-----------April _______________ .. ___ 75.8

May ____________________ 80.7
June ____________________ 99.6
July ____________________ 89.4
August __________________ 96.0
September _______________ 100. 7
October ______ L __________ 112. 3
November _______________ 127. 4
December _______________ 133. 5
January _________________ 101. 7
February ________________ 95.1
March __________________ 87.8

c.o

[Average month tn 1941=100]

1941

......

1"""1 CT.I

ApPENDIX TABLE C-160.-Monthly index of value of output

of the Japanese motor vehicle industry, based on 191,5
prices, 1941-45 (fiscal years)
Year

co

:, ......- ......-

j :

i !I i

t
I

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::.l;.:s~;;b;:n:~.'il~r2'
221

220

C-162.-Japanese aircraft production

aU types,' by. months, January 1941 to August 19.t,5

ApPENDIX TABLE

1941

Month

1942
-~-

January ____________
February ___________
_____________
April ______ ---- - ___
_______________
June _______________
July _______________
August _____________
September __________
October _______ ----November ________ -Decemher ___ - ______
~arch

~ay

1943

1944,

TABLE C-163.-Indez numbers of Japanese

aircraft production, airframe weight, and numbers of
aircraft by month~, January 1941 to July 1945-Con;

ApPENDIX

1945

--- ---- -

306
564
339
580
357
687
367
646
420
706
426
639
380
705
435
678
462
804
510
886
514
943
574 1,023

1,010
1,049
1, 147
1,141
1,207
1,217
1,259
1,418
1,573
1,662
1,862
2, 148

2, 122 1,836
2, 199 1,391
2,435 1,713
2,473 .1,567
2,318 1,592
2,541 1,340
2,473 1, 131
2,346 496
2,572 -----2,371 -----2,220 -----2,110 ------

- - - -"-- - - - - - - - - -

TotaL _______ 5,090 8,861 16, 693 28, 180 11,066

b~aT.WJe~c:ae:r;i~~~t!~~8te:~~d=~~~~r~r=f~~~~~~
P~x:~h=:Iih'!rr::~~~ 1944 and March 1945, and 50 in June 1945).
Source: .Air Ordoance Bnreau, Munitions Ministry.

Airframe
weight

1943
January _____________ ________ _
February _____________________ _
_______________________ _
~

~arch

~:~~=::::::::====~===::::::::

June _____________ - - - _ - - - - - - - -July _______________ -- - - - - - - --August _______________________ _

September____________ - -- - -'- --October ______________________ _
November ____ .. ________ - - - - - - -December ____________ --- - -- --1944
January ____________________
February _____________________ _
_______________________ _
~arch

C-163.-Indez numbers of Japanese

aircraft production, airframe weight, and number. of
sircraft by months, January 1941 to JUly 1945

ApPENDIX TABLE

April _________ ---- -- - - - - - --- --~ay _________ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -June _________________________ _

July __________ ______________ _
August _______________________ _
September ____________ ---- -- - -October ______________________ _
November ____________________ _
~

[Average lor

1941~I00l

Airframe

weight

1941
January _______ - - - - - - - - - - - -February _____________________ _
March ___ '________ ---- - -------April _________________________ _
May _________________________ _
June _________________________ _
July _________________________ _
August. ______________ --- - -- --September ____________________ _
October ______________________ _
November ________ -'- ______ ----December __________ c _________ _
1942
January ______________________ _
February ______________ c ______ _
March ____________ - --- - -- -- --ApriL ____________ - - - - - - - - - - - -_________________________ _
June _________
_________ _
JUly ____________ ---- -- - -- - - - -August _______________________ _
September ____________________ _
October ______________________ _
~ay

~-----

November ______ -- - ---- - -- - - - -December ____ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

222

Number of
aircraft

December _______ - -- -- ---- -- - --

56.6
65.0
75.8
87.3
99. 9
100. 5
93.3
104.9
111.8
126.9
126.3
151. 7

72. 2
80.0
84.2
86.1
99. 1
100.5
89. 6
102.6
109.0
120. 3
121. 2
135.4

138.8
139.3
161. 1
155.1
164. 3
142. 5
161. 3
147.0
178. 6
196.4
218. 9
2358.

133.0
, 136.8
162.0
152.4
166. 5
150.7
166.3
159. 9
189.6
209.0
222.4
241. 3

TABLE
C-165.-Percentage di.tribution of
Japanese aircraft production by functional types, by
quarters, 1941-45

TABLE C-164.-Japanese aircraft production

by functional types , by quarters, 1941-45-Continued

ApPENDIX

ApPENDIX

Aircraft Tables

1945
January ______________________ _
February _____________________ _
_______________________ _
~arch

ApriL ______ - --- ---"..--- - - - - --~ay--------------------"----June

_________________________ _
July _______ _

Number of
aircraft

234. 2
239. 7
263. 1
261.4
270.5
273. 5
281.6
314.6
345.1
354.2
402. 6
465. 7

238.2
247.4
270.5
269. 1

447.0
458.2
499. 9
530. 9
499. 2
566.9
569. 7
541. 1
592.8
569.. 7
546. 7
488.3

500. 5
518.6
574.3
583.3
546.7
599.3
583.3
553.3
606.6
559.2
523. 6
497.6

421. 9
324.4
382. 7
353. 2
342.5
274. 3
210.1

433.0
328.1
404.0
369.6
375.5
316.0
266.7

287.0
296.9
334.4
371. 0
392.0
439.2
506.6

TABLE C-164.-Japanese aircraft production

by functional types, by quarter., 1941-45

ApPENDIX

Type of aircraft

Fighter Bomber

Reece

Trainer Other

Total

-----1-----------1941:

1. _____
11. _____
IIL _____
IV ___ .. __

199
210
274
397

;132
340
400
489

126
149
169
195

380
404
331
374

65
108
103
143

1,002
1,211
1,277
1,598

------ - - - - - - - - - ---

TotaL 1,080 1,461

639 1,489

419 5,088

=====

Type 01 aircrsft
Fighter Bomber

Reece

.Trainer

--- ---

Total

-Other'
-- ---

Calendar year

and quarter

1942:

1. _____
507
IL_ .. __
623
IIL _____
764
IV ______ 1,041

541
582
5B2

758

------

TotaL 2, 935 2,433

207
201
229
330

478
517
565
611

1. _____
IL ____
IIL _____
IV ______

827
1,264
973
1,480
1,864 1,098
2, 539 1,291

1941:

L ______

19.9
IL _____ 17.3
IIL ____ 21. 5
IV ______ 24.8
1942:
L ______ 27.7
IL _____ 31. 3
. IIL _____ 34.9
IV ______ 36. 5
1943:
1. ______ 39. 4
IL _____ 41. 5
IIL _____ 43.9
IV ______ 44. 8
1944:
L ______ 45.0
11. ______ 48.0
IIL _____ 50. 8
IV ______ 52.2
1945:
L ______ 47.5
II _______ 52.3
II!' _____ 47.6

---

425
583
462
558
519
684
664 1,046

107
92
85
132

3,206
3, 565
4,250
5, 672

- - - - - - - - -- - - - - -- - 416 16,693
------------------

TotaL 7, 147 4, 189 2,070 2, 871

1944:

1. _____
11.. ____
IIL ____
IV ______

1,331
1,216
1,275
1,278

1. _____ 2,345
11. _____ 2,353
III , ____
776

960
792
182

371 1,135
307
977
411
177

TotaL 5,474 1,934

855 2,523

1945:

633
528
448
538

217
258
343
157

1,532
1,812
1,573
1,230

3,043
3,518
3,752
3,498

,6,756
7,332
7,391
6, 701

- - - - - - --- - - -- - - - - 975 28, 180

TotaL 13,811 5, 100 2,147 6, 147
-----------=
=

129 4,940
68 4,499
81 1,627

- - - - - - ------ - - -- - ..

Percent Percent
Percent Percent Percent
trans- Percent
lacon tra.iners
otherl
lighters bombers naiasance
ports

------ ------------------

1,831
1,991
2, 187
2, 852

98
68
77
112

-. - - -- -355--8,861
967 2,171

---------=

1943:

284. 7

Source: Air Ordnance Bureau, Munitions Ministry.

Calendar year
and quarter

Calendar year
and quarter

23.2
28.1
31. 3
30.6

12.6
12.3
13.2
12.2

37.9
33. 4
25.9
23.4

5.4
7. 7
6.8
7.6

1. 1
1.2
1.3
1.3

29.5
29.2
25. 2
26. 6

11. 3
10.1
10. 5
11. 6

26.1
26.0
25.8
21. 4

3. 9

2.2
2.4
3.1

1.4
1.3
1.1
.9

25.8
27.3
25.8
22.8

13.3
13. 0
12.2
11.7

18. 2
15.6
16. 1
18.4

2. 5
2.2
1.4
1.3

.8
.5
.6
1.0

19. 7
16.6
17.3
1\'). 1

9.4
7. 2
6.1
8.0

22.7
24.7
21. 3
18.4

1.3
1. 1
1.3
1. 0

1.8
2.4
3.4
1.3

19.4
17. 6
11. 2

7. 5
6.8
10.9

23. 0
21. 7
25. 3

1. 1
.7
.7

1.5
.9
4. 3

280 II, 066

1 Others include flying boats, transports, gliders and sWClde aircraft.

July and p ...t 01 August only.
Source: Air Ordoance Bureau, Munitions Ministry.

1 "Others" melude flying boats, gliders and suiCIde aircraft.

July and part 01 August only.

Source: Air Ordnance Bureau, Munitions Ministry.

Civilian Supply Tables

ApPENDIX TABI,E

C-166.-Indezes of quantities of selected goods available for civilian consumption in Japan proper, 1987-45
1944
1945
1943
1942
IIl38
11139
1il4O
1941
1937

Commodity

---- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ----

Cotton cloth _______________ - - -Wool cloth ____________________

Silk cloth ______________________
Synthetic cloth _________________
Wooden clogs __________________
Rubber footwear _______________
Leather shoes __________________ '
Furniture _____________________
Enameled ironware _____________
Aluminumware _________________
Cast ironware __________________
~ats (tatami) _________________
Rice bowls _________________ --'Plates _________________________
Cups. ________________________
Cooking braziers _______________
Soap __________________________
Umbrellas _________ - - __________
Paper products ______________ -

100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100

68
97
65
145
107
86
128
100
68
75
6

61
33
97
135
187
92
84
109
61
63
5

na
na
na
na
na

na
na
na
na
nB

na
na
na
na
na

100
100

94
128

132

na

na

77
na

54
23
99
96
235
89
48
109
26
52
4
100
100
100
100
100
109
63
100

28
25
104
79
320
79
64
109
25
39
3

90
71

69
72
13&
93
53
88

7
16
91
56
236
88
108
96
15
39
1
57
27
28
31
100
35
80
66

4
17
57
31
257
67
60
66
10
39
(1)

44
11
8
10
117
32
90
57

2
1
18
8
75
10
0
23
0
1

4
8
36
16
196
31
16
55
7
19
(1)

(1)

34
5
4
3
67
34
40
31

na
na
na
na
na

4
3
10

os Not available.
1

Less than O.li percen t.

Source: Control888ociatfons; Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

714928-46--16

223

ApPENDIX TABLE ~167.-lndex

of official retail prices

in Tokyo, selected groups of consumer goods, annually
'193(}-99, monthly 1940-45

of official retail prices

in Tokyo, selected groups of consumer goods, annually
193(}-99, monthly 1940-45-Continued

Fuel

Food

and

Ught
ing

Fuel
Cloth
ing

Other

Average

Year

Food

aDd

lighting

--------1930 ...............
1931 ....... ~ .......
1932...............
1933...............
1934...............
1935 .... ~ ..........
1936...............
1937...............
1938........ _......
1939...............
1940 ...............
January ........
February .......
March .........
ApriL .........
May ...........
June ...........
July ...........
August. _.......
September ......
October- .......
November ......
December ......
1941 ...............
January ........
February .......
March .........
ApriL .........
May ...........
June ...........
July ...........
August ........
September- .....
October........
November- _" _.
December ......
1942...............
January ........
February .......
March .........
ApriL .........
May ... _. _.....
June ...... _....

90
78
82
83
85
88
95
100
109
123
146
145
144
144
145
147
146
150
149
147
144
142
143
141
141
141
142
142
142
142
141
141
140
141
141
141
143
141
142
142
142
142
143

99
86
75
84
86
86
90
100
125
128
.J36
132
132
134
134
134
134
134
134
137
137
141
141
142
141
141
141
142
142
142
142
142
142
142
142
142
142
142
142
142
142
141
141

86
70
70
80
83
82
85
100
125
141
163
149
149
160
165
168
169
169
169
164
164
163
163
167
160
160
164
166
168
169
169
169
169
168
168
173
176
174
174
176
176
176
176

86
78
78
85
86
88
88
100
115
129
151
137
143
145
149
152
152
153
153
156
156
155
155
159
155
156
156
156
158
159
159
159
159
159
161
165
166
165
165
165
165
165
165

88. 9
77. 7
78. 5
83. 5

85. 3
86. 9
91. 3
100. o
114. 6
128. 3
149. o
141. 9
143. 8
146. o
148. 8
150. 7
150. 7
152. 9
152. o
151. 7
150. 3
149. 6
149. 8
150. 8
148. 9
148. 9
149. 6
150. 4
151. 3
151. 6
151. 2
151. 2
150. 9
150. 9
15l. 2
153. 5
155. 2
153. 8
154. o
154. 5
154. 4
154.5
154. 9

1942:-Continued
July ...........
August .........
September ......
October ........
November ......
December .... _.
1943 ...............
January ........
February .. _. _..
March .. _... _._
ApriL .........
May ...........
June ... __ ... _..
July ...........
Aug ..... _.....
September ......
October .... ___ .
Novembef' .....
December _____ .
1944...............
January .... _" ..
February .......
March .. _' _' _._
ApriL .... _....
May ....... _...
June ...........
July ...... _... _
August ........
September ......
October ........
November ......
December ......
1945:
January ........
February __ .....
March .........
ApriL ....... _.
May ...........
June ...........
July .... ____ ...
August .........
September .. ~..
Source: Bank of Japan.

224

of consumer good. on the black market, Japan proper, 1943-1945

[Unit: 1 Yen]

[Annuaiaverage 1937-100]

[Annuaiaverage 1937=100]

Year

ApPENDIX TABLE ~168.-:-Price8

ApPENDIX TABLE ~167.-lndex

Prices on the black market

Item
Cloth
ing

Other

!43
144
144
144
144
143
147
145
145
146
146
145
145
145
146
148
149
152
153
166
154
154
156
160
161
161
161
163
174
178
183
183

141
141
141
143
143
143
143
143
143
143
143
143
143
143
143
143
144
144
144
150
144
144
151
151
151
151
151
151
151
151
151
151

176
178
178
178
178
178
181
'178
178
180
180
180
180
182
182
182
.182
182
182
184
182
182
185
185
185
185
185
185
185
185
185
185

166
165
165
165
169
169
188
170
176
179
189
189
192
192
191
193
194
194
194
219
199
199
204
214
214
214
221
222
232
235
239
241

155.1
155. 5
155. 7
155. 9
157.3
156. 8
164. 8
157. 4
159. 8
161. 5
164. 7
164. 1
164. 8
165. o
165.3
166. 8
167. 8
169. 2
169.7
184. 4
171. 9
172. 1
175.1
180. o
180. 6
180. 6
182. 8
184.1
192.1
194. 9
199. 1
199. 7

195
197
199
201
218
21Q
221
235
238

151
182
182
182
182
182
251
253
253

185
192
192
192
192
192
192
192
192

246
248
255
271
280
285
291
291
291

206. 5
211. 6
214. 6
220. 2
231. o
232. 7
241. 1
247. 4
249.1

Official
prIce

Dec.
1943

Average

------

Unit

Mar.
1944

June 1944

Sept. 1944

Nov. 1944

Mar. U145

June 1945

July 1945

Nov. 1945

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - -- - - - - - Rice ...........
GhltinOUS rice ...
Wheat flour ....
SOY bean.......
Red bean ... __ ".
Potato .........
Stone leek. _....
Sweetpotato ... _
Burdock .......
Niso ...........
Soy ........... _
Edible oiL .....
Refined sake ....
Beer ...........
Dried bonito....
Butter. ....... _
fork ....... . . .
Bee!. ... _" _.. _
Hen's egg ..... _
Sugar...........
Salt ....... _...
Salted salmoIl .. _
Cabbage. _' _...
Mad apple __ ...
Saccharin ... _..
Bleachecl cotton.
Cotton toweL ..
Tabi..._ .... _..
Umbrella.......
Shoes (oxhide) ..
ChikatabL_ ....
Socks .... _.....
Meisen .........
Meisen quilt .. _.
Cotton yukata.'.
Soap_ ..........
Match_ ... _....
CharcoaL ____ ..
Firewood .......
Kama........ _.
Nabe. _....... _
Bicycle ........ _

22.0
25.0
28. 0
18.0
35.0
60. 0
14. 0
7.0
1 sho ...... 0.5
3.0
'38.0
30.0
40. 0
50.0
18.0
35.0
10.0
1 sho .... __
6.0
.5
2. 5
30.0
38. 0
40. 0
90.0
22.0
30. 0
35. 0
1 kan ...... 1.5
8.0 12.0
5.5
7.0
10.0
11. 0
12.0
13.3
5.0
5.5.
.4
3.0
1 sho ......
6.0
10.0
11. 0
11. 0
12.0
5. 5
20.0
5. 0
.4
4. 0
1 sho ......
7.0
8.6
12.0
13.0
15.0
3.5
8. 0
3.5
ll;<:an ......
.5
2.5
6. 5
6.5
6.5
10.0
5.5
13. 0
10.0
1 kan ..... _
3.5
.6
2.5
1 kan. _____
6. 0
8.0
8. 5
9. 0
12.0
6.0
8.0
5.0
.4
4.0
7.0
3.0
3.5
8. 0
12.0
5.0
3.0
3.0
1 kan ......
.9
1.5
3.5
20.0
40. 0
30. 0
3.5
3.5
1 kan ..... _ 1.3
3. 5
10.0
3.5
8.0
15.0
35. 0
38. 0
4. 0
5.0
13.0
50.0
1 sho ......
.8
3.0
140. O'
180.0
220.0
170.0
120.0
40.0
90. 0
1 sho ...... 2.9 15.0 20.0
90.0
120.0
160.0
200. 0
200.0
70.0
160.0
1 sho ...... 3.5 15.0 35.0
4.0
10.0
11.0
15. 0
7.5
9.0
9. 5
30.0
2.0
1 btL. .....
.9
150. 0
200. 0
220.0
250.0
350.0
670. 0
520.0
1 kan ...... 14.6 70.0 84. 0
60. 0
60. 0
250.0
Ilb .... __ .. 3.8
30.0
50.0
60.0
60. 0
6.5 10.0
'16.0
17.0
19.0
23.0
27. 0
8. 5
14.0
25.0
3.0
100momme. 1.0
20.0
25.0
28. 0
30.0
25. 0
8.0
13.5
15.0
3.5
100momme. 1.6
2.5
1.0
1.7
3.5
1.6
3. 0
1.0
.1
.3
1.5
1 piece .....
300.0
390. 0
450. 0
530. 0
200.0
260.0
700. 0
1 kan ...... 2.2 50.0 100.0
45. 0
40.0
35. 0
35.0
40.0
48. 0
35.0
1 kan ...... 5.0 30.0 50. 0
30.0
25.0
15. 0
35.0
35.0
1 kan ... _._ 4.4 15.0 30.0
33. 0
33.0
1 kan __ ....
1.0
3. 0 -------- -------- -------- -------.7
2.0
.5
.6
2. 0
3.5
7. 0 -------- -------- -------- -------1 kan_ ..... 1.5
7.0
2. 0
28.0
4. 0
15.0
35.0 -------100 tablets _
5. 0
5. 0
5.0
.5
3. 0
1 tan_ .. _.. 2.5 15.0 30.0
48. 0
120.0
120. 0
130. 0
120. 0
35.0
45.0
2.0
12.0
13.0
15.0
L ... _. ....
3.5
8.0
15.0
.3
1.0
6.0
52.0
60.0
1 pair._ ... _
7.0
10. 0
12.0
20.0
37.0
65.0
.8
3.5
200. 0
200.0
45. 0
155,09 170.0
190. 0
150.0
L ......... 15.0 40.0 40.0
300. 0
350.0
500.0
800.0 1,000.0 1,000.0
500.0
1 pair_ ..... 22.7 100.0 130.0
1 pair_.! ___ 1.7
70.0
18.0
20.0
35.0
50.0
90.0
110.0
5.0 10.0
13.0
16.0
20.0
4.0
5. 0
10. 0
18. 0
.5
2. 5
7. 0
1 pair ......
250.0
140.0
180.0
80. 0
120. 0
160.0
220.0
1 tan ...... 23.0 50.0 70. 0
1 suit_ ..... 44.0 100. 0 150.0 1,000.0 1,200.0 1,000.0 1,100.0 1,000.0 1,300.0 2,000.0
130.0
150.0
60. 0
70.0
90.0
100. 0
180.0
1 tan ..... 3.8 17.0 30.0
20.0
5.0
5.0
6.0
15. 0
20.0
22.0
1 cake._ ...
.1
2.0
3. O.
45.0
60.0
1.2
6.0
30.0
80.0
70.0
1 L. box....
.4
18. 0
1.0
65.0
J bag_ ..... 2.2 10.0 . 25. 0
35.0
40.0
80.0
65. 0
85.0
90.0
6.0
4.5
4. 5
4.5
6.0
8.0
10.0
1 bundle ...
.4
3.5
1. 5.
120.0
180. 0
230.0
270.0
50. 0
60.0
60.0
L ......... 7.6 25.0 45.0
100.0
120.0
135.0
L ..... _...
40.0
50.0
60. 0
90.0
3. 1 15. 0 30.0
600.0
800.0 1, 000. 0 1,300.0 1,500.0 2,000.0 2,000.0
L ..... _... 76.8 225. 0 400.0

Source; Bank of J'ap8Il.

1 sho equals 1.80391lftres. 1 momme eqWlls 3.75 grams. 1 tan equals 9.91736 yards. 1 kwan equals 3.75 kg.

.225

ApPENDIX TABLE C--171.-In<ilJ:l; of workers' living

ApPENDIX TABLE C-169.-Wholesale prices in Tokyo

[J9318verage=I00J
(Oriental Economist Index)

Averagta.for
all items 1

End of-

1943 average ____________________

1944 average ____________________
1944:July ________________________
August _____________________
September __________________
October _______________ - ____
__________________
~ovember

December _ - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - -1945:
January ____________________
February------------------March
___ - -- - - - - - - - - - -- - - -April
____________________
__
1944, April______________________
~

1943 average ____________________

1944 average ____________________
1944:July _______________________
August _____________________
September __________________
October ____________________
__________________
~ovember

December ____ -- - - --- -- -- - -1945:

January __ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - February ___________________
March ___________ - --- - --- --April _______________________
1944, ApriL __ -----------------J January

Other food

Cereals

Textne
materials

Textiles

products

315.1
332.8

259.1
273.7

288. 4
295.8

207.2
226.3

344. 4
344. 0

218.6
242.2

331. 1
337.2
339.3
340.7
344.5
344.5

272.3
277.2
279. 0
280.2
283.3
283.3

298. 7
298.6
298.6
311.3
319.9
319.9

222. 4
228.3
242.5
228.3
242.5
242.5

344.0
344. 0
344. 0
344.0
.344. 0
344. 0

229.2
264.2
264.2
264.2
264.2
264. 2

348.3
358. 7
358.7
360.2
327.3

286.4
295.0
295.0
296.2
269.2

319.9
319.9
319.9
332.9
298. 1

247.4
265. 8
265.8
265.8
222.4

344. 0
363.0
363.0
363.0
344. 0

264.2
264. 2
264.2
264.2
229.2

Metals

EndoC-

.Average for
all items

Industrial

00&1 and
petroleum

Building
materlsls

Fertilizers

cbemicels

MtaceilaneoUB

309.0
308. 4

234.2
236. 7

227. 7
255.4

240.1
240.0

276.5
294. 2

231. 6
258.0

309.9
309.9
309.9
309.9
309.9
309.9

238.2
238. 2
238.2
238.2
238. 2
238. 2

255. 1
255.1
262.9
262. 9
262. 9
262. 9

240.0
240.0
240.0
240.0
240.0
240.0

289.5
289.5
306.7
306.7
306.7
306. 7

265.9
265.9
265,9
265.9
265.9
265.9

309.9
323.7
323.7
323.7
309. 9

238.2
238. 2
238.,2
238. 2
234. 9

289.2
294. 2
294.2
294.2
252. 2

240.0
240. 0
240.0
240.0
240. 0

306.7
306.7
306.7
306.7
'289.5

265.9
274. 8
274. 8
274. fI
249. F

1913=100.

ApPENDIX TABLE C-170.-Index of salaried worker's.living costs in Japan proper, 1937-44[July 1937=I00J
Month

1937

January __________ -- --- ---------February_------------- ---------March _______ - - _____ - -- ---------ApriL ___ - ____ -- - -- --- ---------May __________________
---------June __________________
---------July ____________ - - ----100.0
100. 6
August ______ - - -..... - - - - -September _____________
101.7
October _______________
101.8
~ ovember ______ - _- - - -101.6
102.9
December _____ --- -- --Source: Ceusus Buresn. Cost of Living Section.

1938

104.2
105. 5
106.3
107.5
107. 7
108. 4
111.6
112.7
112.6
112.5
112.1
112.6

1939

113.5
114.6
115.0
116.8
118.4
117.9
119.7
121. 2
122. 7
123.3
126.8
128.5

1940

131. 2
134.6
136.8
140.5
141. 2
142.8
147.2
147.5
144. 4
140.9
141. 1
141. 6

'-1941

142.0
142.7
143.0
144.2
144.8
144.8
145.1
144. 7
144.8
144.6
144. 4
146.8

1942

148. 2
147. 7
148. 4
149.7
150. 8
150.3
151. 2
151. 4
151. 6
151. 4
151. 3
152.5

1943

1944

166.8
153.3
170.7
155.7
172.1
156.7
159.8
17110
181.2
160.7
162. 2 ---------162.9 ---------163. 5 ---------163.2 ---------163.2 ---------165.5 ---------166.8 -~--------

C08t,

Japan proper and Tokyo, 1937-45 1

__.____________- .__________- .___________ ~~~ul~y~I~93~7_-~I00~J~_.-------------c------______~------~All items

Fuel and light
Clothing
Other
Housing
Food
Year and month
=~-----------I-.:.J~aPc:8D~ Tokyo ~ Tokyo
Japan
Tokyo
Japan
Tokyo
Japan
Tokyo
Japan
Tokyo.

1937:
August_______ _______ 97.9
100.2
101. 3
99.2
103.7
September ___________ 104.2
100.0
102.2
98.9
103.9
October ____ : _________ 102.0
100.1
105.9
100.4
104. 0
~ovember. __________ 101.5
100.3
111. 9
101. 0
104.2
Decemtrer____________ 103. 6
100.4
112.2
101.5
104. 5
1938 ______________ 110.3 _______ 103.0 _______ 116.7 _______ 123.1 _______ 104.4 _______
January _____________ 106.4
100.5
112.4
102.5
104.9
February ____________ 107.0
101.0
112.0
109.2
104.6
March _______________ 107.3
101.3
112.3
112.8
105.1
April ________________ 109.7
101. 6
112.3
116.2
105.5
May ________________ 108.3
102.0
113.1
117.9
106.0
June ________________ 108.5
102.4
114.4
121.6
106.5
July _________________ 115.0
102.8
114.6
128. 8
107.4
August ______________ 116.2
102.9
114.6
128.3
107.0
September ___________ 115.2
102.9
114.5
130.2
107.2
October ______________ 113.2
103.0'
114.5
132.9
107.6
~ovember ___________ 111. 5
103.0
114.1
134.6
107.5
December ____________ 112.5
103.1
114.0
134.6
107.6
1939 ______________ 123. i! _______ 107.3 _______ 122.6 _______ 150. 6 ___ ~ ___ 106.9 _______
January _____________ 114.7
103.3
114.1
135.7
108.0
February ____________ 116.0
103.3
114.5
140.0
107.5
March _______________ 115.4
103.6
114.5
140.3
107.7
April ________________ 119.6
103.9
114. T
143.1
108.2
May ________________ 123.0
104.4
114.8
145.5
108.3
June ________________ 120.0
105.0
114.8
146.6
108.:;;
July _________________ 123.4
105.2
115.0
147.8
108.5
August ______________ 126.0
105.5
115.9
148.9
108.4
September ___________ 128.0
106.5
117.1
152.3
108.7
October ______________ 128.2
107.5
118. 3
154.1
109.0
~ovember ___________ 135.6
107.6
123.5
157.4
108. 9
December ____________ 136.9
108.2
124.3
163.0
109.3
1940 ______________ 152.8 152.1 115.3 113.0 139.9 139.2 185.9 191. 0 116.7 119.8
January _ _ _ _ __ 141. 2 142. 6 111. 1 109. 0 130. 9 125. 7 167. Ii 16& 5 110.2 110. 5
February _____ 145.5147.3112.2110.3136.5140.7173.2180.1111.8115.5
March ________ 147.8 148.8 113.2 111. 1 139.1 142.3 177. 3 186.3 113.6 118.1
ApriL ________ 154.4 153.4 114.4 112.2 139.6 140.6 183.9 191. 5 115.0 119.3
May _________ 153.6 149.7 115.4 113.2 140.8 140.8 188. 3 193.1 116.9 121. 1
June _________ 154.7 154.5 116.3 113.9 141. 1 140.6 191. 2 196.0 118.0 121. 2
July __________ 164.1 165.5 116.3 113.8 140.2 140.1 191.0 195.6 118.2 121.6
August. ______ 165.0 164.4 116.6 114.3 140.6 140.1 190.2 194.1 118.4 121. 7
September _ _ _ _ 157. 7 155. 0 116. 7 114. 3 141. 3 140. 4 190. 7 196. 3 119. 6 122. 4
October _______ 149.9 147.7 117.0 114.4 142.4 140.6 191.4 196.5 119.3 122.2
November ____ 149.5 147.1 117.3 114.5 143.2 139.5 192.0 196.9 119.6 122.1
December.__ _ _ 149. 6 149. 3 117. 6 114.4 143. 3 138. 8 193. 6 197.4 120. 1 122. 2
1941. _____________ 152.5 152.9 119.4 116.4 142.3 133.4 202.5 205.7 120.6 122.9
January ______ 150.2 149.3 Its. 1 115.0 141.1 132.2 195.1 198.6 120.1 122.5
February _ _ _ _ _ 151. 1 152. 3 118. 2 115. 3 141. 2 132. 2 196. 3 199. 0 120. 0 122. 1
March_. ______ 151. 5 148.5 118. 5 115.3 141. 0 132.2 198. 3 199.4 120.3 122.2
April _________ 152.9 154.9 118.9 115.9 141. 3 132.2 199.5 200.2 120.3 122.0
May _________ 153.7 155.0 119.1 116.i 141.2 132.2 200.7 202.4 120.7 122.5
June _________ .154.0 154.9 119.5 116.6 141.0 132.2 201.5 203.3 120.8 122.5
July __________ 153.9 154.4.119.6 116.7 141.2 132.2 203.2 206.5 121.2 123.5
August_ _ _ ___ _ 153. 4 154. 7 119. 7 116. 8 140. 9 132. 2 203. 6 206. 9 120. 8 123. 2
September _ _ _ _ 152. 8 152. 7 119. 9 116. 8 142. 5 135.4 205. 0 209. 4 121. 2 123. 2
October_______ 151. 5 149.9 120.0 116.9 145.0 135.6 207.2 213.1 119.6 122.8
~ovember ____ 150.8
150.1 120.0 117.1 145.6 136.1 208.5 213.2 120.6 123.1
December _____ 154. 2 157.8 121. 4 118.1 145.4 135.8 211. 6 216.5 122.2 124. 6
See footnote at end of table.

110.1

121. 2

143.4
133. 3
136.8
139.1
143.4
144.3
145.5
149.6
150.0
147. 2
143.9
143.9
144. 4
147.3
144.8
145.4
146.0
146.8
147.4
147.8
148.1
147. 8
147. 9
147.6
147.6
150.1

99.8
102.5
102.0
102.2
103. 3
-----_
104.7
105.9
106.7
108.3
108.2
109.0
113.0
113.4
113.3
112.8
112.3
112.8
_____ _
114.0
115.0
114.9
117.2
119.2
118.1
119.8
121.2
122.8
123.4
127.3
128.9
142.8
132. 5
138.0
140.3
143.2
142.4
145.0
149.7
149.1
14&. 6
142.5
142.2
143.2
146.1
143.2
144.5
142.9
145.9
146.4
146.6
146.9
147. 1
146.8
146.1
146.3
150.4

227
226

ApPENDIX TABLE C-I71-Index of workers' living cost, Japan proper and Tokyo , 1937-45 1-Continued
Food
Year and month

1942 ______________
January ______
February _____
March ________
ApriL ________
May _________
June _________
July __________
August _______
September ____
October_____ -November ____
December_____
1943 ____ _________
January ______
February ___ - March ________
ApriL ______ -May _________
June _________
July __________
August _______
Septem ber ____
October _______
November ____
December_____
1944 ______________
January ______
February ____ March _____ --ApriL ________
May _______ " _
June _________
July __________
August _______
September ____
October _______
, November ____
December _____
1 ThlS index IS

Japan

156.3
155.7
154. 5
155.3
156.8
157.6
155.7
157.2
157.0
156.9
155.9
155.4
157.7
170.9
158.9
164.0
164.2
171. 1
172.3
17& 0
173.7
174.6
173.2
171. 6
176.6
177.9
200. 0
181. 6
182. 4
183. 7
195. 6
198. 3
199.5
198. 7
199.7
210.2
212.9
214. 8
216.8

pre.~ented

Honslng

Fuel and light

Tokyo

Japan

157.7
157.8
156.9
156.9
158.8
158.0
154. 3
156.2
157.9
159.7
158.3
157. 4
160. 2
172.9
160. 0
!li6.3
167. 0
174.6
174.8
174.6
176.9
177.2
176.7
172.5
176.8
178.0

124. 4 119.2 147.5 . 136. 7

122.6 118.5 145.4 135.5
122.7 118.6 145. 2 135.7
122.8 118.6 145.5 136.0
123. 4 118.8 145.8 136.2
124.0 118.9 145.9 136.2
124.3 119.0 147. 5 136. 1
124.8 119.1 147.5 136.1
125.0 119.2 147.6 136.1
125.3 119.5 147.8 136. 3
125.7 119.7 150.2 138. 4
126.0 119.9 150.5 138. 7
126,5 120. 0 151. 5 138.6
132.3 123.3 154.2 141. 3
127.4 121. 2 152.0 139.7
128. 0 122. 1 152.1 139.7
129.4 122.1 152. 8 lAO. 7
130.1 122.3 153. 4 141.0
131. 0 123.0 153.7 141. 0
131. 6 123.2 153.7 140. 9
132.9 124. 3 153.7 140.9
133. 0 124.0 153.7 140.9
134.8 124.1 153. 8 140.9
136.1 124.1 156.1 142. 9
136.5 124. 3 156.5 143.0
137.1 124.8 158. 5 143.7
142. 0 ------- 172.0 ------137.4 124. 9 158.8 143.7
138. 0 125.1 159.0 148. 2
138. 5 125.1 167.0 148. 2
141. 9 125.2 171. 3 152.9
140.7 125.2 172.5 154. 5
141. 2 125.2 172.8 154.8
141.'7 125.5 173.0 154.8
143. 7 - - - - - -- 173.4 ------143.9 ------- 177.0 - - - -- -144.0 ------- 177.6 ------144. 3 ------- 178.9 ------144. 3 ------- 179.0 -----" _I

Tokyo

Japan

Tokyo

Clothing

Other

~apan

Tokyo

Japan

Tokyo

216. 5
213.0
213. 5
214. 3
215.1
216.2
217.0
217.9
217. 9
217.8
218.1
218.2
218. 8
228.3
219.2
219. 6
224. 5
226. 8
227.8
228. 6
229.6
230.5
231. 5
233. 2
233.7
234.4
243. 0
234. 9
238.2
242. 3
242.7
243. 2
243. 7
242.4
243.2
243. 6
244.8
245.5
246.0

221. 8
217.4
218. 9
220. 5
221. 1
222. 4
222. 8
222.7
222.9
222.8
222.9
223.2
224. 0
232.1
223.8
224.0
228.6
230. 0
231. 7
231. 3
232.8
234. 2
234. 6
237.3
238.3
238.2

129. 1
124. 7
124.9
125.7
127.1
128. 9
129.3
130. 0
130.4
131.2
131. 8
132. 4
132.7
137.9
133. 0
132.5
133. 7
134.5
135. 4
139. 4
139. 7
140.1
140.1
140.6
142.1
143.2
162.0
143.9
146. 5
149. 4
158. 3
161. 2
161. 8
162. 4
165.8
167. 4
175.3
179.3
180.6

130.8
125.6
126.2
126.4
126. 9
132. 0
'132.1
132. 5
132. 4
133.1
134.1
134. 2
133. 8
140. 0
133. 8
133. 6
134.1
134.5
134. 8
143. 4
143.3
143. 7
143. 8
144.1
145. 1
145.6

All items

Japan

-------

181. 2
184.2
185.9
195.2
198.7
198.5
197. 8
- - - - - _.-------------------

- -- - - --

239. 3
244.1
244. 1
243.9
244. 7
244.4
244. 3
- - - - - --------------

-------

- - - - ---

145. 7
152.7
152.7
165. 2
169.4
168. 9
170.6
- - - - - -------------- --- - --

152.5
150.8
150.7
151. 1
152.1
152.9
151. 4
152. 3
153.0
154.0
153.8
153. 5
154. 7
163.2
154.9
157.8
158.8
162. 4
162.8
164. 4
165.8
166.1
166.0
164. 7
166.9
167.7

-----169. 2
170.8
173.6
180.0
182.4
182.4
182.3
185.6
191. 3
196.9
197.7
198.7

--_ .. _-- - - - - -Source: Cabmet Bureau DC StatIstICS.

merely as an offiCial Japanese estimate of the cost of livmg durmg the war.
-------

ApPENDIX TABLE C-172.-Monthly index of factory workers' wages, Japan proper, 1937-44
Annual average 1937-100J
Month
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
-------------I-.-.::.:._=_:_::_ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - January _ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ _ _____ _ __ __ __ __ _
96
104
117
135
154
163
188
218
February __ __ ____ ____ _ _ _ _ ___ ______ __ _ _
99
106
119
132
150
166
185
218
March _______________________________.__
101
108
123
135
154
165
188
223
ApriL__________________________ ______
99
107
120
134
152
165
184
222
May __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ _ _ ___ _ _ __ _
99
107
120
134
151
165
188
223
June _____________________ . _ __ _ ___ __ __ _
100
109
.122
137
152
165
188
231
July___________________________________
100
110
123
138
152
168
193
na
August. _______, _ _ _ ___ _ _ __ _ __ ___ ___ __
100
109
122
139
154
166
196
na
September __________________________ , __
100
110
122
139
155
166
199
na
October._ __ ________ __ _____ ___ _ __ ____ __
102
112
123
142
157
173
205
na
November.____________________________
103
114
126
145
157
176
210
na
December_________________________ ____
107
120
132
149
163
na
216
na
Average ____ -- ---- ---- - na Not available.

228

----wo --w9----m-~_u5 --r671--ws-m

Source. Cabmet Bureau oC StatistIcs.

1937

Month

Tokyo

--- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -----153.7
151. 6
151. 2
151. 9
153.2
154. 0
153.5
154. 5
154.5
154. 7
154.6
154.6
155.9
165. 1
156.7
159.0
160. 3
164.0
165. 0
166.3
167.0
167.0
167.5
167.5
170.1
171. 2
187.5
173.1
174.6
176.8
184.6
186.3
187.1
186. 8
188.3
193.6
196.6
200. 7
201. 7

APPENDIX TABLE C-l73.-Monthly index of transport workers' wages, Japan proper, 1937-44
[July 1937-100J

January _______________________________
February ______________________________
March _________________________________
ApriL _________________________________
May __________________________________
June __________________________________
July ______ . ____________________________
August ________________________________
September _____________________________
October _______________________________
November _____________________________
December ______________________________
Average _________________________

1938

1939

1940

1941

1iU2

- - - - - - - - -- - -

1943

1944

na
na
na
na
100
na
na
na
na
na

na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na

na
na
na
na
na
na
104
101
103
104
105
111

105
105
108
108
108
110
110
107
108
111
110
118

111
111
114
116
114
115
117
117
118
121
118
127

118
119
123
125
126
131
131
131
131
129
133
na

140
132
139
150
149
151
150
150
152
155
157
158

158
161
160
172
175
163
na
na
na
na
na
na

na

na

105

109

117

127

149

165

na
nil.

- - -- - - - - - - - -

na Not available.

Source: Cabinet Bureau of Statistics.

ApPENDIX TABLE C-174.-c-Monthly index of miners' wages, Japan proper, 1937-44

[July 1937-IOOJ
1937

Mooth

January _______________________________
February ______________________________
March _________________________________
ApriL _________________________________
May __________________________________
June __________________________________
July ____________________ . ______________
August. _______________________________
September _____________________________
October ____ ~ __________________________
November _____________________________
December ______________________________
Average _________________________

92
94
98
98
98
99
100
100
101
103
105
107

1938

1939

1941

1940

1942

- - - - - - - - -- - 107
109
110
113
114
115
117
118
119
122
124
125

125
126
130
130
131
133
133
133
136
138
140
141

142
144
146
148
149
151
152
153
156
158
159
160

163
166
167
166
165
167
165
165
167
167
169
171

1943

1944

169
172
172
172.
174
175
174
177
177
181
184
na

184
189
189
189
189
191
193
191
191
194
196
199

199
199
196
205
218
226
na
na
na
na
na
na

175

191

207

- - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - -

99

116

f33

na Not available.

152

167

Source: Cabinet Bureau oC Statistics.

ApPENDIX TABLE C-175.-Consumption oj staple/ood by coal miners and their families and its effect upon coal output, Japan
proper, 1931 - 45
1931

1932

1933

1934

1935

1936

1937

1938

1939

1940

Cons~~ption of staple f;;-od-per worker per day

(grams) ________________ 1, 400 1,400 1,300 1, 300 1, 300 1, 200 1, 200 1, 200
1,000 1,000
Percentage of rice and barley in staple food ________
100 100 100 100 . 100 100 100 100 100 100
Percentage of supplementary food supplied ___ .____
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Coal output per ma.n per
month (tons) ___________
18
21
26
30
29
28
23
24
21
23
Consumption of sta.ple food
by adult members of
workers' family, per man
per day (grams) _________ 1,026 1,026 1, 026 1,026 955 900 900 900 800 800
Note. From 1938 other foods were included
Source: MitsubiShi Mining Company.

ill

~I~

1943 1944 1945 Nov.

1945

700 700 700 700 700 705

100

90

80

80

60

50

100 100

80

60

40

30

19

12

17

16

325 325 325 325 290 325

the staple tood ration with rice. Before 1938 the staple tood ration was only nce.

229

ABLE G-176.-Import3 of major textile raw

materials, Japan proper, 1935-45

ApPENDIX

'

G-179.-r Jduction, imports, export. and

8tock8 on hand of raw sil Japan proper, 1935-45 1

ApPENDIX TABLE

(1000 pounds]
Wool

ear

1935 _____ _
1936 _____ _ ----------------------1937. ____ _ ._----------1938 _____ _ .----------1939 _____ _
1940 _____ _ ----------------------1941. ____ _ ------------1942 _____ _
-----------1943 _____ _
1944 _____ _ -----------------------1945 (Janu, -y to August)_

243,009
216,569
257,045
116,251
105,392
101,652
119,714
18,882
7,824
4,428
1,766

(1,000

Cotton

SUk

1,641,000
2,033,000
1,850,000
1,254,000
1,348,000
866,000
651,000
154,000
100,000
31,000
23,000

1,566
1,022
826
4, 160
2,807
3,980
6,600
3, 960
660
99
0

Source: Japu 56 Textile Control Association, Japan Yearbook, 1943-44.

Orient Year B ,k, 1942-43.
-ABLE C-177.-Civilian production, import8,
exports (1 ,I amounts of text'ltle cloth available for consumption Japan Proper, 1935-44

ApPENDIX

Year

Tot;!
imports

96,413
93,315
92,317
97,128
93,335
94,644
71,218
62,170
40,777
18,982
15,960

Exports

Total
exports

Net supply ,

73,017
66,446
62,485
63,026
50,956
39,061
18,974
1,087
1,664
1,363
0

26,880
21,480
17,520
15,200
16, 316
42,600
47, 452
38,495
34,621
4, 826
na

ssociation, Ja.pan Yearbook, '1943-44,

Source: Ja.panese Textile Control

1944-45, Orient Yearbook, 1942-43.

G-180.-F oduction, imports, export8 and

stock on hand of silk clot, Japan proper, 1935-45

________________~(~I,~~~S~q _re~y~ar~d_s~)-________~-----I oduction

Imports

m~~~~y~J~ )1=~~'t::t~~;~SlmPorts minus exports, without adjust

Source: Jap: ese Textile Oontrol Association, Japan Yearbook, 1943-44.
Orient Yearbo '::, 1942-43.

1944-45, Orient Yearbook, 194H3.

['ABLE

C-178.-Production of cloth, Japan

proper, 1935-45

Yea

1935_____
1936_____
1937 _ ____
1938_____
1939_____
1940____
194L ___ _
1942_____
1943_____
1944_____
1945 (Jan l
AUl(ust)

Wool

Cotton

SUk

---

466,762
745,41 3
804,63 2
- - - - -- 248,914 4,826,000 475,273
------ 242,648 3,297,000 309,628 1,164,878
- - - -- 81,840 2,951,000 461,255 1,086,442
--- - -- 57, 753 2,624,000 472,013 771,485
632, 781
- - - --- 62,481 1,329,000 494, 752
-- - - -- 39,086 349,000 432,313, 448,31 0
252, 128
- - ---- 43,072 200,000 272,999
19,317 180,274 172,145 131,523
--~--

:1ry to
--

I, 171

na

na

na

I Includes Tn un and Staple FIber.

JEsUmate.
a Not Bvaila .12'.
Source: Jap. ,ese TextUe Oontrol Association, Japan Yearbook, 1943-44.
Orient Yearbo ';:,1942-43.

230

ApPENDIX

Exports

G-181.- :Viscellaneous 8ilk 8tati8ttcs,

Japan pro er, 1935-45

Number of
looms

Production
of cocoons

290,912
1935
1936 __
____________________ no, 359
1937 ___________________ _ 294,292
1938___________________ _ :304; 932
1939____________________
na
29, 185
25,907
1942____________________ ! 19,802
1943 ____________________ 1 22,805
1944 _____________ -- -- - - -' 12,605
na
1945 (January to August) - _

334,845
369,319
379,214
391,286

681,114
688,003
713,567
624,624
753,631
726, 631
579, 746
463,563
448,200

Year

==~=1

~~!~====================l
1

b~~ ~d
of year

Iodex of
imports

1944~

1,-641
2, 033
1, 850
1, 254
1,348
866
651
154
100
31
23

NegligibJe _____ _
_____ do ________ _
_____ do ________ _
_____ do ________ _
_____ do ________ _
_____ do ________ _
_____ do ________ _
_____ do~ _______ _
_____ do ________ _

_____ do ________ _
____ ;do ________ _

307
489
248

223
245.

252
234
98
51
32
12

100
124
113
76
82
53
40
9
6
2
1

1 Imports of raw cotton tor domestic consumption before the war account tor 50 percent ot all textiles.
Source: Japan.... Textile Control Association, Japan Yearbook, 1943-44, Orient Yearbook, 1942-43.

G-l83.-Production, impoAs, exports and

stocks on "hand of cotton cloth, Japan proper, 1935-45_

ApPENDIX TABLE

(1,000 square yards)'

Year

Production

rm

ports

Exports

Stocks

--------

1935 ______________ 4,499,000 1,530 2,725,109 1161, 088

1936 ______________ 3,496,000 1,423
2,709,000 1162,848
1937 ______________ 4,826,000 960 2,643,000 164, 204
1938 ______________ 3,297,000 265
2,180,000 161,500
1939 ______________ 2,951,000
34 2,445,000 345,236
1940 ______________ 2,624,000
39 1,854,000 718,288
1941 ______________ 1,329,000 127
1,018,797 854, 188
1942 ______________ 349,000
89 166,612
(')
1943 ______________ 1240,000
51 189,043
(')
1944 ______________ 180,274 (.)
5,665
(')
1945 (January to
August) _________
(2)
(2)
0
(')

TABLE

;wnber of
workers 1

Synthetic'

- -

available.
Source: Japanese Textile Control cssociation, Japan Yearbook, 1943-44

-- - - -- 297,359 4,499,000 561,395

------ 284,583 3,496,000 418, 281

1 Not

----------~~~

(I 000 square yards)

1935____ ____________ ________ ____ __________ __ Negligible _____ _

1936 _____________________________________________ do ________ _
1937 _____________________________________________ do ________ _
1938 _____________________________________________ do ________ _
1939 _____________________________________________ do ________ _
1940 _____________________________________ . _______ do ________ _
1941. ____________________________________________ do ________ _
1942_____________________________________________ do _________
1943_____________________________________________ do ________ _
____________________________________________ do ________ _
1945 (January to August) _________________________ do ________ _

Exports

1935 ___________________ _ ,61,395 Negligible _ 131,000

1936 ___________________ _ ,18,281 ___ do ______ 121,000
1937 ___________________ _ ~75, 273 ___ do ______ 122,000
1938 ___________________ _ :09,628 ___ do ______ 91,000
,61, 255. __ do_ _ _ _ _ _ 60, 000
~939-------------------1940 ___ " __________ - -- - -- !72, 013 ___ do ______ 31,554
1941. _______________ - --- [94,752 ___ do ______ 25,409
1942 ___________________ _ 132,313 ___ do ______ 12,841
1943 ____________________ !72,999 ___ do ______ 13,040
1944 ___________________ _' !72, 145 ___ do______ 3,784
1 na ___ do______
ns
1945 (January to August)_ 1

ApPENDIX

Imports

----------------------------'-------1-------1----------1------1----1,566
1,022
826
4, 160
2,807
3,960
6,600
3,960
660
99
0

3,300,000 pounds of raw silk is ( lSldered mdlSpensable Cor industrial

p~~~~~~~ supplies, and sewi: threods.

Year

__ 5, 824, 516 1,885,575 3,309,727 4,400,364

__ 4, 944, 277 2,250,591 3,396,098 3,798,770
__ 6,354,819 2,107,871 3,302,912 5,159,778
__ 5,014,154 1,374,411 2,693,709 3,694,856
__ 4, 580, 537 1,456,199 2,893,422 3,143,314
__ 3, 925, 251 971,612 2,139,385 2,757, 418
__ 2, 519, 014 777,314 1,174,526 2,121,802
__ 1, 268, 709 176,842 232,064 1,213,487
- - 768, 199 108,484 265, 183 611,500
35, 527
70, 770 387,742
- - 422,985

Production of raw
cotton

Year

of cloth

1935 _____ _
1936 _____ _
1937 _____ _
1938 _____ _
1939 _____ _
1940 _____ _
194L ____ _
1942 ____ _
1943 _____ _
1944 ____ _

[1 mllllon poundsJ

Stocks on
band

ApPENDIX TABLE

(I 000 square yards]

Total
civilian
production

1935 _____________
1936 _____________
1937 _____________
1938 _____________
1939_ ___ __ ____ ___
1940 _____________
194L ____________
1942 _____________
1943_ _________ ___
1944 _____________
1945 _____________

G-182.-Production, import8,' exports and 8tocks on hand of raw cotton, Japan proper, 1935-45

unds]
Imports

Year

ApPENDIX TABLE

------ - - - - - -------

1 Estimated.
, Not available.

Source': The Japanese Textile Control AssOCiation, Japan Yearbook,

1943-44, 1944-45, Orlent Yearbook,l942-43_

l,tXJO lb

na
na
na

341,250
127,420
117,707
100,707

na
na

A 11 workers in silk industry.

Not available.
These figures are only for U Spun ilk industry."
Source: Japanese Textile Control .\.ssociatioD, Japan Yearbook,I943-44,
Orient Yearbook, 1942-43.
I
3

231

ApPENDIX TAB'LE

G-184.-Production, imports, exports and stocks on hand of raw wool, Japan proper, 1935-45

1935 ____________________________ - - -- - - - - - - - - Negligible_ - -- -1936 _____________________________________________ do ________ _

1937 _____________________ .' ______ - - - - - - - - - - - - --- - _do __ - - - - - -1938 _____________________________________________ do ________ _
1939 _____ _______________________________________ do ___ _
1940 ______________________________ - - - - - - - -- - --- __ do _______ -194L ______________ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . - - c- - - _ - - - _do ___ - ,. - - -1942 _____________________________ -- ---- ----- : ____ do ___ -- ---1943 ______________________________________ - - --- - _do __ - ---- -1944 _______ . ____________________ - --- - - --- - -- - ____ do _______ -1945 (January to August) __________________________ do ________ _

Exports

243,009
216,569
257,045
116,251
105,392
101,652
119,714
18,882
7,824
4,428
1, 766

Negligible _____ _
_____ do ________ _
_____ do ________ _
_____ do ________ _
_____ do ________ _
_~---do---------

_ __ _ _do ____ - - - -_____ do ____ . ---_____ do ________ _

_ __ _ _do _____ - - -_____ do ________ _

Stocks on
hand and
of

year

42,843
25, 185
35,958
25,005
9,525
na
30,490
10,260
3,517
1, 365
na

Available
for consumption
Year, month,
or quarter

na
234,227
246,272
127,204
117,872
na
na
29,112
14,567
6, 580
na

Includes tops, raw wool, goQ,j;, and camel hair.

2 Not available.
Source: Japanese Textile Control Association, Japan Yearbook, 1943-44, 1944-45, Orient Yearbook, 1942-43.
1

G-185.-Civilian stocks, production and

consumption of woolen cloth, Japan proper, 1935-45

ApPENDIX TABLE

Civilian

Year

stocks
on hand
(end 01
year) I

Index of
civilian
conCivilian Civilian
produc- consump- sumptioD
tion
tion
(19371(0)

~--~-----~---- -----~---

1934 _________________ _
1935 _____________ ___ _
c
1936 ____ ., - ----- ------1937 __ - - - - - - - - - - -- - - -1938 ___ -- - --------- --1939 _________________ _
1940 __ - - - - -- - - - - - - -- -1941 _________________ _
1942 _________________ _
1943 _________________ _
1944 _________________ _
1945 (January to August)_

39, 620
na
na
50, 234 297, 359 286, 745
44, 334 284, 583 290, 483
46, 193248,914247,055
41,468242, 648247,373
2.5,442 81,840 97,866
21,368 57, 753 61,827
26, 732 . 62, 481 57, 117
13, 438 39, 086 52, 380
12, 332 43, 072 44, 178
12, 558 19,317 19, 543
7,131 1,171 6,598

na
116.0
117.6
100.0
100.1
39.6
25.0
23.1
21. 2

17.9
7.9
2.7

Civilian mills a.nd warehouses.

Not available.
Source: Textile Bureau, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Japanese
Textile Control Association, Japan Yearbook, 1943-44, 1944-45; Orient YearI

[Ton.]

C-186.-Production, imports, exports,

and Btocks on hand of synthetic cloth, Japan proper,
1935-45

ApPENDIX

TABLE

[1,000 square yards]

Year

Production

Imports

Exports

1935____ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ __ __ _ 466, 762 Negligible_ 424, 114

1936___________________ 745,413 ___ do ______ 527, 942
1937.__________________ 804,632 ___ do ______ 501, 882
1938 ___ ~ _______________ 1, 164,878 ___ do ______ 397, 573
1939 ___________________ 1,086,442 ___ do ______ 358, 784
1940___________________ 771,485 ___ do ______ 235, 921
194L__________________ 632, 781 ___ do ______ 118, 107
1942___________________ 448,310 ___ do ______ 48,056
1943___________________ 252,128 ___ do ______ 60,976
1944___________________ 131,523 ___ do ______ 59,803
1945 (January to August)_
(1)
___ do______
0

Rubberized footwear
Wooden - - - - - - - - - - - - Leath
Cgel0tags)
Rubber- Rubber Rubber
All
er
(
ized
shoes
soled rubber shoes

socks

~t

':'.:"

~.!

1935 ________ 33, 700 ~~~~54, 8002, 700

1936 ________ 42,200 __________________ 44,4002,300
1931- _ _ __ _ _ _ 60, 700 __________________ 64, 700 2, 500
1938 ________ 64,900 __________________ 55, 4003, 200
1939 ________ 113, 400 __________________ 59, 300 2, 100
1940 ________ 142, 70022, 481 1, 17733, 684 57, 342 1, 200
1941: _______ 194,400 26, 102 1,33623,36850,8061,600
1942 ________ 183, 500 27, 136 4, 923 24, 303 56, 362 2, 700
1. __________ 46,200 ________________________ ----11. __________ 47,300 ____________ - _____ ------ ----III. ________ 43,800 __________________ ------ ----IV __________ 46,200 ____________ ------ ------ ----1943 ________ 156,200 26,969 4,25613, 04744,2721,500
1. __________ 40,800 __ : _______________ ------ ----II. _ _ _ __ ____ 41, 700 ________________ - - - - - - - - - - - -. IlL____ _____ 39,200 __________________ - -- - - - - -- -IV __________ 34,500 __________________ ------ ----1944 ___ ._____ 118,70010,731 2,550 6,60119,882 400
I. __________ 34,600 __________________ ------ -----

IL--""'<.c7---IIL _________
IV __________
1945 _ _ _ _ _ __ _
January_____
February _ _ _ _
March______
ApriL _____ ~_
May _ _ __ __ _ _
June_ _ __ _ _ _ _
Ju]y_________
August______
~!ll'ce:

34,700 ------ ------ ------ ------ ----28,500 ______ '-- ____ ------ ------ ----20,900 __________________ ------ ----45, 300 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ __ __ _ __ _ _ _ _
0
6,500 __________________ ------ ----6, 100 ________._ __ _ _ __ _ _ _ 3, 600 ____ _
5,800 __________________ ------ ---~5,500 __________________ ------ ----5, 400 _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ 1, 000 ____ 5, 400 __________ - - - - __ - - - - - - - - - - - -5,400 __________________ ------ ----- '
5,200 _____ ______ ____ 2,000 ____ _

For wooden clogs and leather shoes, Consumer Goods Bureau,

hundreds.

WO~ri1bb~~~o:o~:e:,a~~b~~%~~S~UC~;rii~~ti~ri~n

1935 ____________________
627
19p6 ____________________
1,057
1937 ________' ____________ 1,109
1938 ____________________
883
1939 _____
159
--------------1940 ____________________
91
1941. ____
50
--------------1942 .. ___________________
20
1943 ______ ~ _____________
31
1944 ___________________ ..
(1)
(1)
1945 (January to August) __

Leather
goods

Furs

Total

------ --143
148
3
19
3
5
6
1
1

346
602
379
19
24
23
50
6
12

(1)
(1)

(1)
(1)

1,116
1,807
1,491
921
186
119
106
27
44
(1)
(1)

I Not avai18ble.
Source: Hide and Leather ContrOl Association.

ApPENDIX

G-190.-Monthly production of hides

and leather, Japan proper, 1985-45

TABLE

[T on.]

Month

January _____ '_

. February _____
March ________
April _________
May _________
June _________
July __________
August- ______
September ____
October ______
November ____
Decembe~ _____

1940

1942

1941

4,050
4,280
5,620
5,035
5, 100
4,850
4,900
4,335
4,650
4,700
4,015
4, 355

3,900
4, 150
4,350
4,225
4,028
4,180
4,200
4, 105
3,980
4,395
4,350
4,550

3, 250
3, 000
'3,050
2,480
2,560
2, 750
2, 300
2,290
2, 250
2,215
2, 300
2, 1.55

1943

2,100
1,980
2,090
2,028
1,998
1,700
1,680
1,890
1, 945
2,015
2,670
3,000

194,4

1945

---------

1,800 1,520
1,756 1,950
1,650 250
1,890 840
1, 700 400
1,825 340
1,600 a50
1,580 280
1,865 870
1,928 - -1, 629
1,687 - -- --

--------- ------

--

--

TotaL __ 55, 89050,41330,60025,09620,9106,800

.
Source.. Hide and Leather Control ASSOCIatIOn.
TABLE C-191.-Imports and estimated consumption of crude rubber, Japan proper, 1981-45

ApPENDIX

[Metric tonsJ

G-188.-Impmts of furs, hides, skins,

leather and leather goods, Japan proper, 1935-45

Year

[Tons]
Year

Hides
and
skins

Raw Leatb
leather
er
goods

Crude

Total

Crude rubber consumption

rubber - - -

--------~---

imports Military Expor t Civilia.n Other 3

-------- Furs

1935 _____________ " ___ 30, 421 889 - - 5 39731, 712

4 24631,792
1936 __________________ 30, 763 779
1937 __________________ 41,2512,413
7 34944,020
1938 __________________ 29, 363 931
1 98231,277
1939 _________________ 30,448755
13,32534,529
1940 __________________ 30,248 410
0 28530,943
194L _________________ 38, 540 447
0 16239,149
1942 __________________ 29,124
38
0 14329,305
1943 __________________ 15,844
41
0 17716,062
1944__________________
(1)
(1)
(1)
(1)
(1)
1945 (January to August) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ __ _ _ _ (1)
(1)
(1)
(1)
(1)_
I Not available.
Source: Hide &Ild Leather Control Association.

232

Leather

Yoar

ApPENDIX TABLE

Not available.
Source: Japanese Textill:! Control Association, Japan Yearbook, 1943-45,
1944-45i Orient Yearbook, 194:2-43.
1

book,1942-43.

G-189.-Exports of leather, leather goods

and fur, Japan proper, 1985-45

ApPENDIX TABLE

[1,000 pair]

Imports I

Production

Year

C-187.-Quantiti.es of footware produced

for civilian consumption, Japan proper, 1935-45

; ApPENDIX TABLE

[1,000 pounds]

--~

Total

--- - - - - -----

193.5 1________ 60,000 3,000 2,000 53,500 1, 500 60,000

1936 1________ 64,000 3,000 2,000 53, 500 1,500 60,000
1937 1________ 64,000 3, 000 2,000 53, 500 1, 500 60,000
1938 _________ 41,000 5,000 3,500 25,000 3,000 36, 500
1939 _________ 48,000 7,000 4,500 24,000 4, 000
39,500
1940 _________ 30,000 10,000 3,000 23, 000 5,000 41,000
194L ________ 36,000 15,000 1,000 22,000 5,000 43,000
1942 _________ '34,000 20,000 1,000 21, 000 5,000
47,000
1943 _________ 234,000 25,000 1,000 17,000 5,000
48,000
194L ________ 230,000 27,000 1,000 12,000 4, 000 44, 000
I

Figures for 1935, 193G and 19.37 are estimated average

N~~.additiOn to these imports there werE' those ot the 'Japanese Army and
ch~~i;"udes

materials for election insulation and rubber exported to Man-

Source: Rubber Industry Control Association.

233

ApPENDIX TABLE

C-192.-Rubbfr production, Japan proper, 1940--44

1941

1940

Item and unit

Footwear ____________ -- --- -- -- - - - - -- - -- - - - _1,000 pairs __

Rubber shoes and boots _______________ --- - - - - -- - - _do ____
Canvas shoes ______________ -- - -- --- - - ---- - - - -- - - _do ____
Automobile tires_ . _________ - ____ - - - - - - - - - - - _1,000 tires __
Automobile tubes ___________ - _- _- - - - --- - - __ 1,000 tubes __
Bicycle tires _______________ --- - - - - - --- -- - - - _1,000 tires __
Bicycle tubes _____________ - - -- - -- -- - --- -- __ 1,000 tubes __
Conveyor and power transmitting belts _________.---- tons --

ir~:;:~~========================================~~====

Rubber cloth for fisheries _________________________ do ____

Robber cloth for general use ___________ - - - ---:--- __ do~ - --

22,481
I, 177
33,684
378
282
6,971
5,937
3,000
3
430
323
959

26, 102
1,336
23,368
384
331
5,348
3,427
2,553
2
490
308
898

ApPENDIX TABLE

26, 969
4, 256
13,047
264
209
4,638
4, 785
1, 730
112
769
234
486

27, 136
4,923
24,303
406
326
5,522
4,929
2, 735
52
715
388
589

10,731
2, 550
6,601
126
111
2,014
2, 097
1,306
384
650
167
145

[1,000,000 pounds]
l&pan
proper

1935 _____________
1936 __________ " __
1937 _____________
1938 _____________ .
1939 ________ ~ ____
1940 ______________
1941 _____________
1942 ______________
1943 ______________
1944 ______________

2,264
2,428
2,872
2,529
2,900
2,864
2,814
2,201
1,614
867

------------------------------------- - - - - -- ---- - - - -_._--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Production
Exports
Ja.~n

Saghalien

proper

Korea

Formosa

Imports

Total

Domestic
comsump..

1935 ____________________________ 2R
1906 ____ - - - - -- -- - ---- - -- - - - -- --1937 _____________ ______ _______
~

938 ___ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

1939 ____________________________
1940____ - - - - - - - - - - - --- -- - - - - - - -1941 _________________________ c __
1942 ____ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --1943 ____________________________

P
R
P
R
P
R
P
R
P
R
P
R
P
R
P
R
p

1944 ____________________________

R
p

1945, April-June_ - - - - - - -- -- -- -- --

R
P

0
377
0
394
0
434
14
458
49
516
112
518
196
558
180
472
85
434
42
258
7
41

I Data on 8 ftscal year basIS, 1 Apr .-31 Mar.

~~~:~~nluYb~'inCIUa1ng t~8t for chemical and mechanical uscs.

Not available.
Source: Pa.per Control 8Ild Distributing Corpora.tioll.

33
327
54
335
36
379
65
372
81
344
86
334
66
342
21
325
0
233
0
178
0
25

0
17
1
17
21
17
23
17
27
17
33
18
29
18
26
16
6
25
0
19

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
5
0
20
0
35
0
48
0
39
0
28
0
14

na
na

na
na

33
721
55
746
57
830
i02
852
157
897
231
905
291
966
227
852
91
720
42
469
7
66

0
1
0
1
0
3
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
8
0
0
0
0
0
0

126
144
169
157
291
176
114

JlO
141
27
140
33
36
21
0
9
0
0
0
0
0
0

Ap: ;NDIX TABLE

Importe

Exports

Consump-

tion

56
59
61
60
60
34
34
25
23
19

407
386
422
372
395
466
452
428
332
327

7
7

2, 734
2,880
3,355
2,984
3, 392
3,405
3,339
2,680
2,003
1, 234

N.A.

23
37
41
39
26
34
21

314
244
165
45
11

4
1

o
o

3,095
3,096
2,515
1,958
1,223

[1,000 metric tons]

Year of consumpti(

160
863
224
903
348
1,002
217
882
298
922
371
937
327
988
227
854
91
720
42
468
7
66

Total

C-195.-Supply, cDnsumptio.n, and exportation of staple foodB, 1937-45 1

tion

---- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Formosa

Food Tables

fl 000 long tons]

Kind

Korea

'1 Distributing COrPOration.

C-193.-Jilroduction, imports, exports, and domestic consumption of pulp, Japan proper, 1935-45

Year'

Saghallen

------- --------1---1------------------1---

, Less than 0.6.

Sonn;e: PapoCntroIm;

Sourre: Rubber IndustrY Controllmg Associati?n.

ApPENDIX TABLE

C- 94.-Production, imports, exports, and domeBtic conBumption of all types of paper, Japan proper, 1935-45

1944

1943

1942

Carry-over Production In
:from previous previous year

(NOV.-Oct.)

year

1937______________
1938 _______________ ------------1939 ______________ ------------1940______________ ------------1941 ______________ ------------1942 _______________ ------------------------1943 _______________
1944 _______________ -----------1945 ______________ -------------

------------

1,335
1,252
1,416
677
726
1,178
392
435.
384

11,223
11,053
10,978
11,494
10,047
9,082
10,911
10,059
9,366

Foreign

48
25
26
1,331
1,638
1,457
880

-------------------

Formosa

Korea

1,123
1,692
948
66
551
873

---------583
237

Domestic
potatoes

&ad other
grains

Miscellaneous

imported

vest consumed
before Nov. 1

Total

809
829
660
464
328
284
302
217

----------

1,980
2,546
1,634
1,861
2,517
2,614
1, 182
800
237

-------------------------------------

99
218
423
417
467

Ration consumption

Food substituted in ration

Wheat
and
barley

~~~~~tr~:

Importe

Total

Special
reserve
lor
bombing

Total
supply

Farmers

Urban

Military

Total

gra.ins

-:----1----1----------------------1---1937 ______________
1938 ______________
1939 __________ " ___
1940 _______________
1941 _______________
1942 ______________
1943 ______________
1944 ______________ .
1945 ______________
See footnotes nt end

01

- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- --------

393 -------- -------633

43
67
406
512
917
1,243
533
493

393
743
1,835
2,269

245

14,538
14,851
14,028
14,031
13,389
13,486
13, 649
13,535
12, 992

(2)
(2)
(')
(')

(2)
(2)
(2)
(2)

4,058
4,233
4,415
4, 025
3, 792

7,807
8,513
8,296
8,558
8,175

(2)
(2)
(2)
(2)

179
231
374
503
826

13, 178
13,337
13,224
13, 148
12, 044
12,977
13, 085
13, 086
12,793

table.

235

ApPESDIX TABLE

,Year of

(N~8~\~)

C-195.-Supply, cOnllumption, and exportation of staple foods, 1997-45-Continued

Total COD-

Exports

sumption Carry-over Percentage Percentage

of
of substitute
and
Imports
foods
exportation

Total con-

Year of

Carry-over
Exports sumption
and
exportation

~~8~\~)

--------

13,286
13,435
13,352
13,305
12,211

108
99
128
157
167

1,252
-------';1,416 -------- --------677 ---._- -- -------.726
14.0 --------1,178
20.6 ---------

Percentage Percentage
of
or substiimports
tute foods

1942 _______
1943 _______
1944 _______
1945 ______ ..

117
129
75
67

13,094
13, 214
13, 161
12,860

20.6
9.3
10.0
5.9

392
435
384
133

2. 0
5.6
13.9
17. Ii

Carry-over, production, and import flgures apply only to rioo. Substitute foods appear only as that quantity used in the staple ration.
No rationing.
Source: Data submitted to the Japanese Diet at the end of the war by the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry.

ApPENDIX TABLE

C-196.-Domestic production of principal foods, Japan proper, 1991-45

{l,OOO metric tons]

Year

1931. _______
1932 _______
1933 ________
1934 ________
1935 ________
1936 ________
1937 ________
1938 ________
1939 ________
1940 ________
1941. _______
1942 ________
1943 ________
1944 ________
1945 ________

Rice

9,202
10,065
11,604
8,640

---------11,223
11,053
10,972
11,494
10, 146
9,181
11,129
10,481
9, 778
6,600

~heat

889
902
1,098
1,295
1,323
1, 228
1, 369
1,228
1,659
1,794
1,461
1, 386
1,095
1,385
895

Barley

801
813
751
730
7'91
690
747
687
844
817
706
733
572
781
501

Naked barley

904
910
742
855
919
810
827
710
933
869
936
918
732
912
685

Soy beans

Sweet potatoes

357
344
401
309
323
376
406
385
349
314
230
296
307
267
339

2,790
2,898
2, 968
2, 509
2,855
3, 160
3, 243
3, 159
2, 874
2,9lO
3,377
3,079
3,951
4,282
5,572

Potatoes

907
987
1,352
1,249
1,231
1,651
2,033
1,818
1,852
1,618
1,934
1,935
2, 032
1,973
2, 398

Vegetables

6,080
6,331
6, 281
6,329
6, 635
6, 725
6, 668
6, 624
6, 639
6,809
5, 956
5, 940
6, 269
5,831
5, 396

Fruits

955
1,076
1,082
1,045
1,299
1, 124
1,286
1,275
1,416
1,440
1,450
1,492
1,441
1,026
718

Source: Ministry of Agri~lture and Forestry.

ApPENDIX TABLE

C-197.-Expansion and contraction of arable land, Japan proper, 1999-49

[Acre,]

Total land

Year

expansion

Dry fields

I Rice fields

Rice fields

Total land
oontraction

28,814.5
22,605.6
33,077. 2
25,300.4
17,755. 1
15, 900. 5
20,.317.8
21,741. 8
12, 312. 5
16,944.2
10,531.8

71,946.7 44,301. 1
95,534.8 48,803.7
82,420.7 47,309.0
60,830.8 37,800.3
58,492.5 36,184.3
115,095. 1 70,702.3
75,831. 9 48,470.3
84,447.4 52,556.7
112,068.2 81,922.4
141,630.6 109,522.4
163, 613. 9 104,753.7

Dry fields

Total gain or
loss

Dryflelds

75,622.2
25,508.4
50,850.7
63, 937. 4
34,926.7
-35,847.7
1,885.0
-9,314.2
-46,578.7
-70,.985.1
-110,331. 6

74,453.3
49,633.9
52,885.2
61, 667. 5
39,479.8
-7,355.4
8,928.8
834.7
-28,745.4
-55,821. 1
-62,003.2

Rice fields

1933 ________
1934 ________
1935 ________
1936 ________
1937 ________
1938 ________
1939 ________
1940 ________
1941. _______
1942 ________
1943 ________ "Totals ___

147,568.9 118,754.4
121,043.2 98,437.6
133,271. 4 100,194.2
124,768, 2 99,467.8
93,419.2 75, 664. 1
79,247.4 63, 346. 9
77,716,9 57,399. 1
75, 133. 2 53,391. 4
65,489.5 53,177.0
70,645.5 53,701. 3
53,282.3 42, 750. 5

C-198.-Total arable land, acreages in various. crops, and total cuUivated acreage (including double cropping), Japan proper, 1991-44'
[1,000 acresl

PART 1. FOOD CROPS

- - -- - - - - -

- - - - - -- - 1937 _______
1938 _______
1939 _______
1940 _______
1941. ______

ApPENDIX TABLE

27,645.6
46, 731. 1
35,111.7
23,030.5
22,308.2
44,392.8
27,361. 6
31,890.7
30,145.8
32,108. 2
58,860.2

1, 168. 9
-24, 125.5
-2,034.5
2,269.9
-4,553.1
-28,492.3
-7,043.8
-lO, 148. 9
-17,833.3
-15,164.0
-48,328.4

Year

Total ar8~
bleland

RiC'e

Barley

Naked
barley

14,578
14, 678
14,754
14, 780
14, 830
14,890
14, 928
14, 892
14, 894
14,886
14,839
14,769
14,658
13,629

7,963
7, 987
7,767
7,761
7,840
7,865
7,889
7,889
7,816
7,791
7, 796
7, 752
7,620
7, 320

931
931
851
813
838
835
809
876
867
835
876
969
938
1,049

1, 176
1, 176
1,072
1,040
1,077
1,077
1,052
1,016
1,004
992
1, 150
1,247
1, 189
1, 245

Whest

Oats

Sweet-

Soybeans

Potatoes

V~~:!a-

Fruits

Total in

potatoes
food crop
- - - - - - - - - - ---- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ------------

1931 ____________
1932 ____________
1933 ____________
1934 ____________
1935 ____________
1936 ____________
1937____________
1938 ____________
1939 ____________
1940 ____________
1941 ____________
1942 ____________
1943 ____________
1944 , __________

1,225
294
858
1,250
319
833
1,510
314
800
1,589
295
831
1,626
300
822
1,688
308
807
1,775
300
812
1,776
337
808
1,827
303
795
2,061
297
802
2, 023
341
760
2,115
356
777
1,984
332
766
2, 058 - - - - - -- - - - - -- -

637
662
666
657
681
698
708
690
681
675
762
792
804

270 1,348
270 1,397
319 1,450
343 1,463
343 1,491
368 1,489
417 1,461
392 1,427
417 1,440
417 1,424
445 1,378
475 1,338
501 1,276

------- ------- -------

(360) 15,062
(360) 15, 185
(360) 15/109
(360) 15; 158
(360) 15,378
(360) 15,495
(360) 15,583
(360) 15,571
(350) 15,500
(350) 15, 644
335 15,866
345 16, 166
305 15,715
292 -------

FigUres 1D parentheses are estIIDatf>.d.

, Data for 1944 are inoomplete.
Source: Compiled from data fUrnisbed by the MiniBtry of Agriculture and Forestry.

ApPENDIX TABLE

C-198.-Total arable land, acreages in various crops, and total cultivated acreage (including double cropping) Japan proper, 1991-44'

[1,000 acresl

PART 2. NONFOOD CROPS

Year

Mulberry

Miscellaneous
grains

Green

manure
crops

Other

Total cui
tivated
acreage

Percentage
Ratio cuI- offoodcrops

tivated to

to total

arable land cultivated

screage'

1----1----------------------1.93L _________________________ (1,625)

(975)
(590)
(150) (1,200)
(325) 19,927
1. 37
75.6
1932 __________________________ (1,600)
(975)
(600)
(150) (1,200)
(325) 20,035
1. 37
75.8
1933__________________________ 1,568
976
613
(150) 1,208
(325) 19,949
1. 35
75.7
1934__________________________ 1,526
989
657
(150) 1,238
(325) 20,043
1. 35
75.6
1935__________________________ 1,427
954
703
(160) 1,212
(325) 20,159
1. 36
76.3
1936__________________________ 1,387
943
725
(170) 1,221
(325) 20,266
1. 36
76,5
1937__________________________ 1,375
923
720
(175) 1,195
(350) 20,321
1. 36
76.7
1938__________________________ 1,346
901
749
192
1,189
(375) 20,323
1.36
76.6
1939__________________________ 1,307
837
754
223
1,153
(400) 20,174
1. 35
76.8
1940__________________________ 1,308
854
768
247
1,267
(440) 20,528
1. 38
76.2
194L _______________________ "_ 1,211
850
849
205
1,239
480 20,700
1. 39
76.6
1942__________________________ 1,011
821
785
242
1,270
529 20,824
1. 41
77. 6
1943__________________________
892
854
541
276
1,126
649 20,053
1. 37
78. 4
1944' ________________________________________________________________________________________________ _
I

Figures in parentheses are estimatod.

Data for 1944 are incomplete.

Source: Compiled from data furnished by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.

1,041, 585. 7 816,284.3 225,301. 4 1,061, 912. 6 682,326.2 379,586.4 -20,326.9 133,958. 1 -154,285.0

Source: Statistical Annual, Ministry 01 Agriculture and Forestry, 1944.

236

237

[Metric tons per acre]

Wheat

Rice

Year

-------11------------

1931 _____________
1932 _____________
'1933 _____________
1934 _______ - -- --1935 _____________
1936 _____________
1937 ______ : ______
1938 _______ . __ --1939 _____________
1940 _____________
1941 _____________
1942 _____________
1943 _____________
1944 _____ - -- - -'- --

1.16
1. 26
1. 49
1.11
1. 22
1. 43
1. 40
1. 39
1. 47
1. 30
1. 18
1.44
1. 38
1. 34

O. 73
.72
.73
.81
.81
.73
.77
.69
.91
.87
.72
.66
.55
.67

0.86
.88
.88
.91
.94
.83
.92
.78
.97
.98
.81
.76
.61
.74

O. 77
.77
.69
.82
.85
.75
.78
.70
.93
.88
.81
.74
.62
.73

Souree: Ministry of Agriculutre and Forestry.

G-200.-Rice imports from Korea and

Formosa, Japan proper, Nooember 19H-October 1945

ApPENDIX TABLE

[Metric tons]
Month and year

Formosa

Korea

1944:

November _____________________ 22,642

December _____________________ 16,827

1945:

24,582
7,122

'

January ______________________ _ 13, 387

February _____________________ _ 17,788

26,626
31,931
24, 179
27,997
31, 549
12,607
373
September __ - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - -March _______ ------ ---- -- -- --ApriL ___ - _______ - --- - - --- --'--May _________________________ _
June _________________________ _
July _________________________ _
August _______________________ _
October _____ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --

TotaL ______________________ 225, 906

6,661

o
o

2,295

o
o
o
o
o
o

[Metric tonsl

238

G-202.-Food stocks on hand at 8pecified

periods, Japan proper, 1931-45'

ApPENDIX TABLE

818,200
774,000
611,800
654,3bo
874,700
894,500
940,500
841,000

G-204.-Proauction, imports ana consumption of marine products, Japan proper, 1939-45

[Metric tons]
Production

Peroentoge

Total

Year

1939 ____ ______________________ " __ _

1940 _____________________________ _
1941 _________________ ____________ _
1942 ______________ , _______________ _
1943 _________ " ____________________ _
1944 , _______ "______________________ _
1945' _____________________________ _
~

4,626,240
4,351,360
3,616,089
3,200,130
2,891,230
2,450,780
2,062, 5~0

167, 188
137,534
122,449
89,622
81,638
43,872
16,706

Imports

of 1939

Coastal

Overseas

4,793,428
4,488,894
3,738,528
3,289,752
2,972,868
2,494,652
2,079,216

Total supply

100
1,223,805
94
1,060,510
78
786,991
69
42, 139
62
37,649
52 -----------43 ------------

6, 017, 233
5,549,404
4,525,519
3,331,891
3, 010, 517
2,494,652
2,079,216

[MetriC tons]
Other

Rice

grains

Canned
foods

Consumption

Sugar
Year

1 - - - - - . . . , - - - - - - 1 Peroentage

193L _____ --- -- 1,523,374 --------- 25,612 177,437

1932 ___________ 1,484,571
31,236 299,250
1933 ___________ 1, 501, 266 --------- 38,224 180,750
--------1934- __________ 2,738,481
46,955 49,200
1935 ___________ 1,656,023 --------- 52,033 73,620
--------1936 ___________ 1,344,416
57,270
--------- 61,155
1931- __________ 1,251,955
78,953 69, 603
--------1938 ___________ 1,451,550
91, 147 63,631
1939 ___________ 676,900 --------- 102,642 55,381
--------1940 ___________ 726,124 2,642,431 64,721 66,693
194L __________ 1,178,377 2,264,042 73,721 89, 744
1942 ___ -_______ 392,000 1,855,614 47,224 167, 159
1943 ___________ 435,333 1,?43, 092 61,014 '105,956
1944 ___________ 384, 167
50, 128 11,272
1945 ___________ 133,000 --------- -------4,583
---------

[Metric tonsl
11142

1943

1944

Rice ______ ___ --- 230,600 374.300 502,500

Barley ___________ 41,800 23,000 25, 900
Naked barley _____ 139,000 75, 100 90, 100
VVheat ___________
6,900
3,7~0
3, 100
na
100,090
Wheat flour ___ - - -na
Miso __________ --- 28,300 38,750 67,650
Shoyu ____________ 23,050 30,750 56,500

1945

666,600
63,800
130,200
1&, 100
122,900
66, 370
,55,650

1,510,478
1,360,791
544, 770
291,663
141,069
121,110
102,059

100
90
36
19

3,018,234
3,217,817
3,271,795
2,942,937
2,814,116
2,373,673
1,976,776

9
8

100
107
108
98
93
79
65

1,280,050
'1,360,790
1,052,345
1,040,098
855,030
514,833
171,913

100
106
82
81
67
40
13

I 1944 data submitted by Japanese is based on partial estimates.

1940 data based on J a _ estimates,
Frozen, canned, salted and fresh fish.
Source: Data submitted by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry,

ApPENDIX TABLE

G-205.-Proportions of food derived from production and imports, on a caloric basis, Japan proper, 19S140 average; annually, 1941-45
[PeroentagesJ
1931-40 average

------Rice _________________________
Wheat _______________________
Barley _______________________
Naked barley _________________
Soybeans ____________________
Potatoes _____________________
Sweetpotatoes ________________
Vegetables ___________________
Fruits ______ " ________________
Fish , ________________________
Sugar ________________________
Other grains and beans ________
Other foods __________________

---- - - - -

1942

1941

194.

1944

1943

------

Produo- Imports Produc- Imports Produc- Imports Produc- Imports Produc- Imports Produc- Imports
tion
tion
tion
tlon
tfon
tiOD

- - --- - - - - - - --------- - - - - - - - - -- - - - - 83
79
100
100
33
100
100
100
100
96
16
63
95

17
11

0,
0
67
0
0
0
0
4
34
37
5

78
99
100
100
28
100
100
100
100
97
18
48
96

22
1
0
0
72
0
0
0
0
3
82
52
4

81
99
100
100
32
100
100
100
100
97
17
66
97

19
1
0
0
68
0
0
0
0
3
83
34
3

90
99
100
100
34
100
100
100
100
97
21
76
99

10
1
0
0
66
0
0
0
0
3
79
24
1

92
100
100
100
27
100
100
100
100
98
23
54
100

79.7

20, 3

81. 3

18. 7

87. 3

12, 7

87,9

8
0
0
73
0
0
0
0
2
77
46
0

97
100
100
100
29
100
100
100
100
99
44
65
100

3
0
0
0
71
0
0
0
0
1
56
35
0

12, 1

90,6

9, 4

.0

--------- - - - --------- - - - - - - - - -- - - - - -

TotaL _____ '465,85g '545,600 849, 550 1,123,020

na Not available,
1 Does not include wheat flour, if any.

Percentage
of 1939

G-203,-Quantity of foods allotted to the

armed services, Japan proper, 194e-45

Fresh fish ineluded in food

feed

1939____ ________ ___ ___ _____ ___ _ 1,388,252

1940___________________________ ' 1,162,136
1941___________________________
708,972
1942___________________________
97,070
1943___ ______________ _______ __ _
55, 792
1944 , _____________________________________ _
1945 , _____________________________________ _

I Figures Cor rice represent stocks on hand as of 31 October; figures for other
grains represent stocks on hand as of 30 June; figures for canned foods and
sugar represent stocks on hand as of 31 December.
I Barley, naked barley, and wheat.
Since these figures are as ot 30 June
they are not carry--over figures to the next crop year.
Source: Compiled from data furnJshed by the Ministry of Agriculture
and Forestry.

ApPENDIX TABLE

Percentage
of 1939

Food'

of 1939

Fertilizer and

Exports

G-201.-Net imports of 8ugar, Japan

pro,per, 19S1-45

1931 _______________________________________
1932 _______________________________________
1933 ________ ~ _____________________________
1934 _______________________________________
1935 _______________________________________
1936 _______________________________________
1937 _______________________________________
1938_______________________________________

Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.

40,660

Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.

ApPENDIX TABLE

ApPENDIX TABLE

67~000

Naked
barley

Barley

G-201.-Net imports of 8ugar: Japan

proper, 1931-45-Continued
1939_______________________________________ 903,300
'1940 ________________ . ______________________ 811,800
1941 _______________________________________
.1942 _______________________________________ 719,100
-1943 _________________ ~ _____________________ 529,200
1944 _______________________________________ 432,900
1945 ________ ~ ______________________________ 116,000
\.PPENDIX TABLE

G-199.-Per acre yields of rice, wheat,

barley, and naked barley, Japan proper, 19S1-#

ApPENDIX TABLE

Weighted average _______ 81. 0

19.0

Production, coastal fishing, imports, overseas fishing.

Source: Compiled from data furnished by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry,

Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry,

239

Submarine Branch

Abrasives Branch
51
52

The German Abrasive Industry

Mayer and Schmidt, Offenbach on Main, Germany

53

The German Anti-Friction Bearings Industry

54
55
56
57
58

Machine Tools & Machinery as Capital Equipment

Machine Tool Industry in Germany
Herman Kolb Co., Cologne, Germany
Collet and Engelhard, Offenbach, Germany
Naxos Union, Frankfort on Main, Germany

Anti-Friction' Branch
Machine Tools Branch

UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

LIST OF REPORTS
The following is a bibliography of reports resulting from
the Survey's studies of the European and Pacific wars.
Certain of these reports may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents at the Government Printing Office,
Washington, D. C. Permission to examine the remaining
reports may be had by writing to the Headquarters of the
Survey at Gravelly Point, Washington 25, D. C.

21

EuropeaJ,} War

26
'27

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Summary Report (European War)
The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Overa.ll Report (European War)
The Effects of Strategic Bombing on the German
War Economy
AIRCRAFT DIVISION
(By Division and Branch)

4
5

Aircrait Division Industry Report

Inspection Visits to Various Targets (Special Report)
Airframes Branch

7
8
9
10

11

12
13
14

Junkers Aircraft and Aero Engine Works, Dessau,

Germany
ErIa Maschinenwerke G m b H, HeiterbIick, Germany
AT G Maschinenbau, G m b H, Leipzig (Mockau),
Germany
Gothaer Waggonfabrik, A G, Gotha, Germany
Focke Wulf Aircraft Plant, Bremen, Germany
over-a.ll Report
MesserschmittA G,
Part A
Augsburg, Germany { Part B

Appendices I, II, III

Dornier Works, Friedrichshaien & Munich, Germany
Gerhard Fieseler Werke G m b H, Kassel, Germany
Wiener Neustaedter Flugzeugwerke, Wiener Neustadt, Austria
Aero Engines Branch

15
16
17
18
19

Bussing NAG Flugmotorenwerke G m b H, Brunswick, Germany

Mittel-Deutsche Motorenwerke G m b H, Taucha,
Germany
,
Bavarian Motor Works Inc, Eisenach &; Durrerhof,
Germany
Bayerische Motorenwerke A G (BMW) Munich,
GermaB
Henschel Flugmotorenwerke, Kassel, Germany

22
23
24
25

28
29
30

Vereinigte Deutsche Metallwerke, Hildesheim, Germany

MetallgussgeselIschaft G m b H, Leipzig, Germany
Aluminiumwerk G m b H, Plant No, 2, Bitterfeld,
Germany
Gebrueder GiuUni G m b H, Ludwigshafen, Germany
Luftschiffbau, Zeppelin G m b H, Friedrichshafen
on Bodensee, Germany
Wieland Werke A G Ulm, Germany
Rudolph Rautenbach Leichmetallgiessereien, Sollngen, Germany
Lippewerke Vereinigte Aluminiumwerke A G, Lunen,
Germany
Vereinigte DeJltsche Metallwerke, Heddernheim,
Germany.
Duerener Metallwerke A G, Duren Wittenau-Berlin
& Waren, Germany

31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

Area Studies Division Report,

A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing
on Hamburg
A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing
on Wuppertal
A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing
on Dusseldorf
A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing
on Solingen
A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing
on Remscheid
A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing
on Darmstadt
A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing
on Lubeck
A Brief Study of the Effects Of. A:ea Bombing on
Berlin Augsburg Bochum, LeIpZIg, Hagen, Dortmund,' Oberhaus~n, Schweinfurt, and Bremen
'
CIVILIAN DEFENSE DIVISION

40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47

Civilian Defense Division-Final Report

Cologne Field Report
Bonn Field Report
Hanover Field Report
. .
Hamburg Field Report-Vol I, Text; Vol II, ExhIbIts
Bad Oldesloe Field Report
Augsburg Field Report
Reception Areas in Bavaria, Germany
EQUIPMENT DIVISION
Electrical Branch

48
49

German Electrical Equipment Industry Report

Brown Boveri et Cie, Mannheim Kaiertal, Germany
Optical and Precision Instrument Branch

240

Light Metals Industry{Part Ii Aluminum

Part I , Magnesium
of Germany

59
60
61
62

The Defeat of the Gern'Ian Air Force

V-Weapons (Crossbow) Campaign
Air Force Rate of Operation
Weather Factors in Combat Bombardment Operations in the European Theatre
63 Bombing Accuracy, USAAF Heavy and Medium
Bombers in the ETO
64 Description of RAF Bombing
640. The Impact of the Allied Air Effort on German Logistics
MORALE DIVISION
64b The Effects of Strategic Bombing on German Morale
(Vols. I & II)
Medical Branch

AREA STUDIES DIVISION

Ught Metal Branch

20

MILITARY ANALYSIS DIVISION

50

Optical and Precision Instrument Industry Report

65

The Effect of Bombing on Health and Medical Care

in Germany
MUNITIONS DIVISION
Heavy Industry Branch

66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76

The Coking Industry Report on Germany

Coking Plant Report No. I, Sections A, B, C, & D
Gutehoffnungshuette, Oberhausen, Germany
Friedrich-Alfred Huette, Rheinhausen, Germany
Neunkirchen Eisenwerke A G, Neunkirchen, Germany
,
Reichswerke Hermann Goering A G, Hallendorf,
Germany
August Thyssen Huette A G, Hamborn, Germany
Friedrich Krupp A G, Borbeck Plant, Essen, Germany
,
Dortmund Hoerder Huettenverein, A G, Dortmund,
Germany
Hoesch A G Dortmund, Germany
Bochumer "erein fuer Gusstahlfabrikation A G,
Bochum, Germany
Motor Vehicles and Tanks Branch,

77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90

In

92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100

German Submarine Industry Report

Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Nurnberg A G, Augsburg, Germany
Blohm and Voss Shipyards, Hamburg, Germany
Deutschewerke A G, Kiel, Germany
Deutsche Schiff und Maschinenbau, Bremen, Germany
Friedrich Krupp Germaniawerft, Kiel, Germany
Howaldtswerke A G, Hamburg, Germany
Submarine Assembly Shelter, Farge, Germany
Bremer Vulkan, Vegesack, Germany
Ordnance Branch

101 Ordnance Industry Report

102 Friedrich Krupp Grusonwerke A G, Magdeburg
103
104

105
106
107
108

Germany
Bochumer Verein fuer Gusstahlfabrikation A G,
Bochum Germany
Henschel &, Sohn, Kassel, Germany
Rheinmetall-Borsig, Dusseldorf, Germany
Hermann Goering Werke, Braunschweig, Hallendorf,
Germany
Hannoverische Maschinenbau, Hanover, Germany
Gusstahlfabrik Friedrich Krupp, Essen, Germany
OIL DIVISION

109

Oil Division, Final Report

110 Oil Division, Final Report, Appendix
111 Powder, Explosives, Special Rockets and Jet Propellants, War Gases and Smoke Acid (Ministerial
Report #1)
,
112 Underground and Dispersal Plants in Greater Germany
113 The German Oil Industry, Ministerial Report Team

78

114

Ministerial Report on Chemicals

Oil Branch

115
116
117
118
119
120
121

Ammoniakwerke Merseburg G m b H, Leuna, Germany-2 Appendices

Braunkohle Benzin A G, Zeitz and Bohlen, Germany
Wintershall A G, Leutzkendorf, Germany
.
Ludwigshafen-Oppau Works of I G FarbenindustrIe
A G, Ludwigshafen, Germany
Ruhroel Hydrogenation Plant, Bottrop-Boy, Germany, Vol, I, Vol. II
Rhenania Ossag Mineraloelwerke A G, Harburg
Refinery, Hamburg, Germany
Rhenanis. Ossag Mineraloelwerke A G, Grasbrook
Refinery Hamburg, Germany
Rhenania Ossag Mineraloelwerke A G, Wilhelms burg
Refinery, Hamburg, Germany
Gewerkschait Victor, Castrop-Rauxel, Germany, Vol.
I &; Vol. II
Europaeische Tanklager und Transport A G, Hamburg, Germany
Ebano Asphalt Werke A G, Harburg Refinery, Hamburg, Germany
Meerbeck Rheinpreussen Synthetic Oil Plant-Vol. I
& Vol. II

122
German Motor Vehicles Industry Report '
Tank Industry Report
.
Daimler Benz A G, Unterturkheim, Germany
123
Renault Motor Vehicles Plant, Billancourt, Paris
Adam Opel, Russelsheim, Germany

124
Daimler Benz-Gaggenau W orks, Gaggenau~germany
Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Nurnberg, l'1urnberg,
125
Germany
Auto Union A G, 'Chemnitz and Zwickau, Germany
Henschel &; Sohn, Kassel, Germany
Rubber Branch
Maybach Motor Works, Friedrichshafen, Germany
Voigtlander, Maschinenfabrik A G, Plauen, Germany
126
Deutsche Dunlop Gummi Co., Hanau on Main,
Volkswagenwerke, Fallersleben, Germany
Germany
Bussing NAG Brunswick, Germany
.
','
Muehlenbau Industrie A G (Miag) Brunswick, Ger' 127 Continental Gummiwerke, Hanover, Germany
many
128 Huels Synthetic Rubber Plant
Friedrich Krupp Grusonwerke, Magdeburg, Germany
129 Ministerial Report on German Rubber Industry

241

Propellants Branch
130
131

Elektrochemischewerke, Munich, Germany

Schoenebeck Explosive Plant, Lignose S!>rengstoff
Werke G m b H, Bad Salzemen, Germany
Plants of Dynamit A G, Vormal, Alfred Nobel & Co,
Troisdorf, Clausthal, Drummel and Duneberg,
Germany
Deutsche S!>rengchemie G m b H, Kraiburg, Germany

132
133

OVERALL ECONOMIC EFFECTS DIVISION

134

Overall Economic Effects Division Report

GroBS National PrOdUCL ______ }SPeCial papers
Kriegseilberichte_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ which together
Herman Goering Works_______
comprise the
Food and Agriculture_________
above report
134a Industrial Sales Output and Productivity

184
185
186
187
188

Daimler-Benz A G, Mannheim, Germany

Synthetic Oil Plant, Meerbeck-Hamburg, Germany
Gewerkschaft Victor,. Castrop-Rauxel, Germany
Klockner Humboldt Deutz, Ulm. Germany
Ruhroel Hydr<?genation Plant, Bottrop-Boy, Germanv
189 Neukirchen Eisenwerke A G, Neukirchen, Germany
190 Railway Viaduct at Altenbecken, Germany
191 Railway Viaduct at Arnsburg, Germany
192 Deurag-Nerag Refineries, Misburg, Germany
193 Fire Raids on German Cities
194 I G Farbenindustrie, Ludwigshafen, Gepnany, Vol. I
& Vol. II
195 Roundhouse in Marshalling Yar~ Ulm, Germany
196 I G Farbendustrie, Leverkusen, \..termany
197 Chemische-Werke, Huels, Germany
198 Gremberg Marshalling Yard, Gremberg, Germany
199 Locomotive Shops and Bridges at Hamm, Germany

148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183

Physical Damage Division Report (ETO)

Villacoublay Airdrome, Paris, France
Railroad Repair Yards, Malines, Belgium
Railroad Repair Yards, Louvain, Belgium
Railroad Repair Yards, ~elt, Belgium
Railroad Repair Yards, Namur, Belgium
Submarine Pens, Brest, France
Powder Plant, Angouleme, France
Powder Plant, Bergerac, France
Coking Plants, Montigny & Liege, Belgium
Fort St. Blaise Verdun Group, Metz, France
Gnome et Rhone, Limoges, France
Michelin Tire Factory, Clermont-Ferrand, France
Gnome et Rhone Aero Engine Factory, Le Mans,
France
Kugelfischer Bearing Ball Plant, Ebelsbach, Germany
Louis Breguet Aircraft Plant, Toulouse, France
S. N. C. A. S. E. Aircraft Plant, Toulouse, France
A. I. A. Aircraft Plant, Toulouse, France
V Weapons in London
City Area of Krefeld
Public Air Raid Shelters in Germany
Goldenberg Thermal Electric Power Station, Knapsack, Germany
Brauweiler Transformer & Switching Station, Brauweiler, Germany
Storage Depot, Nahdollenbach, Germany
Railway and Road Bridge, Bad Munster, Germany
Railway Bridge, Eller, Germany
Gustloff-Werke Weimar, Weimar, Germany
Henschell & Sohn G m b H, Kassel, Germany
Area Survey at Pirmasens, Germany
Hanomag, Hanover, Germany
MAN Werke Augsburg, Augsburg, Germany
Friedrich Krupp A G, Essen, Germany
Erla Maschinenwerke, G m b H, Heiterblick, Germany
A T G Maschinenbau G m b. H, Mockau, Germany
Erla Maschinenwerke G m b H, Mockau. Germany
Bayerische Motorenwerke, Durrerhof, Germany
Mittel-Deutsche Motorenwerke G m b H, Taucha,
Germany
Submarine Pens Deutsche-Werft, Hamburg, Germany
Multi-Storied Structures, Hamburg, Germany
Continental Gummiwerke, Hanover, Germany
Kassel Marshalling Yards, Kassel, Germany
Ammoniawerke, Merseburg-Leuna, Germany .
Brown Benceri et Cie, Mannheim, Kafertal, Germany
Adam Opel A G, Russelsheim, Germany
Daimler-Benz A G, Unterturkheim, Germany
Valentin Submarine Assembly, Farge, Germany
Volkswaggonwerke, Fallersleben, Germany
Railway Viaduct at Bielefeld, Germany
Ship Yards Howaldtswerke, Hamburg, Germany
Blohm and Voss Shipyards, Hamburg, Germany

201
202
203
204

The Effects of Strategic Bombing on German Transportation

Rail Operations Over the Brenner Pass
Effects of Bombing on Railroad Installations in
Regensburg, Nurnberg and Munich Divisions.
German Locomotive Industry During the War
German Military Railroad Traffic

34

(Airframes and Engines)

Japan Aircraft Underground

17

(Mitsubishi Jukogyo KK)

(Airframes & Engines)
Nakajima Aircraft Company] Ltd.

35

18

. (Nakajima Hikoki KK)

(Airframes & Engines)
Kawanishi Aircraft Comj>any

36

Coal and Metals in Japan's War Economy

Corporation Report No. I

(Kawanishi Kokuki Kabushiki l{aisha)

(Airframes)
Kawasaki Aircraft Industries Company, Inc.

Corporation Report No. IV

(Kawasaki Kokuki Kogyo

Kaisha)
(Airframes & Engines)
Aichi Aircraft Company
.

21

German Electric Utilities Industry Report

1 to 10 in VoL I "Utilities Division Plant Reports"
11 to 20 in VoL II "Utilities. Division Plant Reports"
21 Rheinische-Westfalische Elektrizitaetswerk A G

Pacific War

22

Kabushiki

Capital Goods, Equipment and Construction Division

37
38
39

1
2
3

Summary Report (Pacific War)

Japan's Struggle to End The War
The Effects of Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and
. Nagasaki

(Aichi Kokuki KK)

(Airframes & Engines)
Sumitomo Metal Industries, Propeller Division

Civilian Defense Division

23

24

(Nippon Kokusai Koku Kogyo KK)

(Airframes)
Japan Musical Instrument Manufacturing Company

40
41

25

(Nippon Gakki Seizo KK)

(Propellers)
Tachikawa Aircraft Compan)'

26

(Tachikawa Hikoki KK)

(Airframes)
Fuji Airplane Company

27

(Fuji Hikoki KK)

(Airframes)
Showa Airplane Company

28

(Sbowa Hikoki Kogyo KK)

(Airframes)
Ishikawajima Aircraft Industries Company, Ltd.

~3

The Effects of Bombing on Health and Medical Services in Japan

The Effects of Atomic Bombs on Health and Medical
Services in Hiroshima and Nagasaki
Morale Division

14

The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japanese Morale

Manpower, Food and Civilian SnppHes Division

42

43
44
45
46
47
48

29

49
50
51
52

Corporation Report No. XI

Japanese
Japanese
Japanese
Japanese

War Production Industries

Naval Ordnance
Army Ordnance
Naval Shipbuilding
Jap~nese Motor Vehicle Industry
Japanese Merchant Shipbuilding

Chemicals in Japan's War

Chemicals in Jal'an's War--Appendix
Oil in Japan's War
Oil in Japan's War--Appendix
Overall Economic Effects Division

Corporation Report No. Xll

53

Kogyo

Kabushiki

Corporation Report No. XIV

30

The Japanese Wartime Standard of Living and Utilization of Manpower

Oil and Chemical Division

Corporation Report No. X

Corporation Report No. XIII

(Nippon Hikoki KK)

(Airframes)
Kyushu Airplane Company

The Effects 'of Strategic Bombing on Japan's War

Economy (Including Appendix A: U. S. Economic
Intelligence on Japan-Analysis and Comparison'
Appendix B: Gross National Product on Jap~
and Its Components; Appendix C: Statistical
Sources).
Transportation Division

54

The War Against Japanese Transportation, 19411945

Corporation Report No. XV

Medical Division

~12

Corporation Report No. VIII

(Ishikawajima Koku
(Kaisha)
(Engines)
Nippon Airplane Company

The Electric Power Industry of Japan

The Electric Power Industry of Japan (Plant Reports)
.

Military Supplies Division

Corporation Report No. IX

Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied

Subjects, Tokyo, Japan
5 Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied
Subjects, Nagasaki, Japan
6 Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied
Subjects, Kyoto, Japan
7 Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied
Subjects, Kobe, Japan
8 Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied
Subjects, Osaka, Japan
9 Field' Re}>Ort Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied
Subjects Hiroshima, Japan-No.1
10 Summary Report Covering Air Raid Protection and
Allied Subjects in Japan
11 Fin,al Report Covering Air Raid Protection and
Allied Subjects in Japan

(Sumitomo Kinzoku Kogyo KK, Puropera

Selzosho)
(Propellers)
Hitachi Aircraft Company
(Hitachi Kokuki KK)
(Airframes & Engines)
Japan International Air Industries, Ltd.

CIVILIAN STUDIES

The Japanese Construction Industry

Japanese Electrical Equipment
The Japanese Machine Building Industry
Electric Power Division

Corporation Report No. V

Corporation Report No. VII

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

Report No. XX

Basic Materials Division

Corporation Report No. III

20

Corporation Report No. XIX

Corporation Report No. I

Corporation Report No. VI

/"

242

Corporation Report No. XVIII

The, Japanese Aircraft Industry

Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.

UTILITIES DIVISION
205
206
207
208

Nissan Automobile Company

(Nissan Jidosha KK)
(Engines)
.
Army Air Arsenal & Navy Air Depots

15
16

TRANSPORTATION DIVISION
200

33

Aircraft Division

19

PHYSICAL DAMAGE DIVISION

134b
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147

ECONOMIC STUDIES

31

(Kyushu Hikoki KK)

(Airframes)
Shoda Engineering Company

32

Corporation Report No. XVI

(Shoda Seisakujo)
( Com}>Onents)
Mitaka Aircraft Industries

Corporation R"port No. XVll

(Mitaka Koku Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha)
(Components)

Urban Areas Division

55
56
57
""58
59
60

Effects of Air Attack on Japanese Urban Economy

(Summary Report)
Effects of Air Attack on Urban Complex TokyoKawasaki-Yokohama
Effects of Air Attack on the City of Nagoya
Effects of Air Attack on Osaka-kobe-Kyoto
Effects of Air Attack on the City of Nagasaki
Effects of Air Attack on the City of Hiroshima

243

87 'Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (Enclosure I), Comments and Data on Effectiveness
of Ammunition
88 Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (Enclosure J), Comments and Data on Accuracy of
Firing
89 Reports of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (Enclosure K), Effects .of Surface Bombardments on
Japanese War Potential

MILITARY STUDIES
Military Analysis Division
61

62
63
64
65
66

67

68
69
70
71

Air Forces Allied with the United States in the War

Against Japan
Japanese Air Power
Japanese Air Weapons and Tactics
The Effect of Air Action on Japanese Ground Army
Logistics
Employment of Forces Under the Southwest Pacific
Command
The Strategic Air Operations of Very Heavy Bombardment in the War Against Japan (Twentieth
Air Force)
Air Operations iJ;l China, Burma, India- World War
II
The Air Transport Command in the War Against
Japan
The Thirteenth Air Force in the War Against Japan
The Seventh and Eleventh Air Forces in the War
Against Japan
The Fifth Air Force in the War Against Japan

Physical Damage Division

90
91
92
93
94
95

96

Naval,.Analysis Division
72

73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81

82
83
84

85

86

The' Interrogations of Japanese Officials) Vols. I and

II)
,
Campaigns of the Pacific War
The Reduction of Wake Island
The Allied Campaign Against Rabaul
The American Cam~aign Against Wotje, Maloelap,
Mille, and Jaluit (Vols. I, II and III)
The Reduction of Truk
The Offensive Mine Laying Campaign Against Japan
Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party- Foreword, Introduction, Conclusions, and General
Summary
Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (Enclosure A), Kamaishi Area
'
Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (Enclosure B), Hamamatsu Area
Report of' Ships Bombardment Survey Party (Enclosure C" Hitachi Area
Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (Enclosure D), Hakodate Area
Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (Enclosure E), Muroran Area
Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (Enclosure F), Shimizu Area
Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (Enclosures G and H), Shionomi-Saki and NojimaSaki Areas
'

G-2 Division
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107

108

:j
I.'

244

Effect of the Incendiary Bomb Attacks on Japan (a

Report on Eight Cities)
The Effects of the Ten Thousand Pound Bomb on
Japanese Targets (a Report on Nine Incidents)
Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima, Japan
Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Nagasaki, Japan
.Effects of the Four Thousand Pound Bomb on Japanese Targets (a Report on Five Incidents)
Effects of Two Thousand, One Thousand, and Five
Hundred Pound Bombs on Japanese Targets (a
Report on Eight Incidents)
A Report on Physical Damage in Japan (Summary
Report)

Japanese Military and Naval Intelligence

Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japanese Homeland, Part I, Comprehensive Report
Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japanese Homeland, Part II, Airfields
Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the J apanese Homeland, Part III, Computed Bomb Plotting
Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japanese Homeland, Part IV, Urban Area Analysis
Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japanese Homeland, Part V, Camouflage
Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the J apanese Homeland, Part VI, Shipping
Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japanese Homeland, Part VII, Electronics
Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japanese Homeland, Part VIII, Beach InteUigence
Evaluation of Photographic InteUlgence in the Japanese Homeland, Part IX, Artillery
Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japanese Homeland, Part X, Roads and Railroads
Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japanese Homeland, Part XI, Industrial Analysis