SKILL REQUIRED OF A LAWYER

- • “He is liable for the consequences of ignorance or non-observance of the rules of practice of this court; or
the want of care in the preparation of the cause for trial … a lawyer is expected to know the rules of
practice; he is expected to know what is required of him procedurally. Of course no lawyer would need to
know the whole of the law. But the lawyer must know the basics of his trade, & the rules of court can only
be regarded as such.”
- Christopher Lau JC, Guan Ming Hardware [1996] 2 SLR 621
- look at civ pro in lively manner that u can use in court and outside court to help client gain advantage.
Matters acna be settled because other side x afford time and costs to litigate! So using interlocutories to
pressure other side for settlement. May be better than without the interlocutories. Platform for bargaining of
better settm!

ORGANISATION AND JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS

Arrangement of Provisions under the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322)
Part II: The Supreme Court (Sections 3 - 8)
Part III: The High Court (Sections 9 - 28A)
Part IV: The Court of Appeal (Sections 29 - 32)
Part IVA: Civil Jurisdiction of Court of Appeal (Sections 32A - 41)
Part V: Criminal Jurisdiction of Court of Appeal (Sections 42 – 60)

i) SECTION 3 OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE ACT (SCJA)

• CONSTITUTION OF THE SUPREME COURT - S.3 SCJA is the new provision governing the Supreme
Court structure – comprising of the High Court and one Court of Appeal. Judges of Appeal are now full time
judges of appeal; they now play a greater role in judicial development of the law1.

• An amendment in 1993 was passed to reconstitute the CA & CAA into only one Court of Appeal.

• Under S.4 SCJA – the order of precedence is as follows:

a. The Chief Justice
b. Judges of Appeal
c. High Court Judges

(The rank amongst Judges of Appeal & High Court Judges according to date of appointment)

ii) SECTION 3 OF THE SUBORDINATE COURTS ACT (SCA)

Subordinate Courts – comprise several arms

- The following courts all come under the jurisdiction of the Subordinate Courts, which consists of:
a. District Court
b. Magistrate Court
c. Juvenile Court (Children & Young Person’s Act
d. Corner’s Court (Criminal Procedure Code)
e. Small Claims Tribunal (Small Claims Act)
f. Family Court

iii) THE COURT OF APPEAL (SECTIONS 2, 29 – 41 SCJA)

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S.7 SCJA was the old provision which has been repealed. Under the old S.7
SCJA, the Supreme Court comprised of the High Court, the Court of Appeal and
the Criminal Court of Appeal.

1
1) CONSTITUTION OF THE COURT OF APPEAL - We now have a permanent Court of Appeal. S.29(1)
SCJA states that the Court of Appeal shall consist of the Chief Justice, and the Judges of Appeal.
2) S.2 SCJA defines “Judge of Appeal” to include the Chief Justice and a Judge of the High Court sitting as a
judge of the Court of Appeal under S.29(3) SCJA
3) Under S.29(3) SCJA, the CJ may request a Judge of the High Court to sit as a judge of the Court of Appeal,
in which case, such a judge will have all the powers and privileges of a judge of the Court of Appeal.
4) NUMBER OF JUDGES SITTING - S.30(1) SCJA states that the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the Court
of Appeal shall be exercised by 3 or any greater uneven number of Judges at each sitting.
5) DECISION BY MAJORITY - S.31(1) SCJA states that “any appeal or determination of any question before
the Court of Appeal shall be decided in accordance with the opinion of the majority of the members of the
Court hearing the case”.
6) INTERLOCUTORY ORDER etc – Court of Appeal may sit with 2 judges in certain instances. S.31(2) SCJA
the Court of Appeal in the exercise of its civil jurisdiction shall, if it consists of 2 Judges of Appeal, be duly
constituted for the purpose of hearing and determining an appeal against –
an interlocutory order; or
any other order, except a judgment obtained after a trial of an action commenced by writ or after the hearing
of an action or matter commenced by any other originating process.
S.31(2) SCJA states that where an appeal has been heard by the CA consisting of 2 Judges of Appeal, and
the members of the Court are divided, the decision appealed against shall stand, i.e. lower court decision
remains.

Appeals how decided

31. —(1) Subject to subsection (2), any appeal or determination of any question before the Court of Appeal shall
be decided in accordance with the opinion of the majority of the members of the Court hearing the case.
(2) Where an appeal has been heard by the Court of Appeal consisting of 2 Judges of Appeal and the members of
the Court are divided, the decision appealed against shall stand

- In practice - CA matter – want ot fortify amt of security placed with court (at mmt it is 10,000, may want to
apply for 20000 etc). this will made on notice of motion to CA, when filed, will be heard by one judge
sitting as CA. in court, matter will benetitled – CA No… - but will be appearing before HC judge, who will
sit in his cpacity as HC judge. But regardd as interlocutory within the CA hearing. Stimes CA matter may be
heard with other matters, so judge may act for both.

7) Specialist judges in High Court\

a. • Admiralty – Tan Lee Meng J/Judith Prakash J/Belinda Ang J
b. • Intellectual Property –Tay Yong Kwang J
c. • Arbitration – Judith Prakash/ Belinda Ang/ VK Rajah
d. • Construction- Sundaresh Menon JC

8) EXAM: Non-appealable matters to CA

Section 34(1) SCJA

Matters that are non-appealable or appealable only with leave

34. —(1) No appeal shall be brought to the Court of Appeal in any of the following cases:
(a) where a Judge makes an order giving unconditional leave to defend an action or an order setting aside
unconditionally a default judgment;
(b) except if the appellant is the defendant, where a Judge makes an order giving leave to defend on condition
that the defendant pays into court or gives security for the sum claimed or an order setting aside a default
judgment on condition as aforesaid;
(c) subject to any other provision in this section, where a Judge makes an interlocutory order in chambers unless
the Judge has certified, on application within 7 days after the making of the order by any party for further
argument in court, that he requires no further argument;
(d) where the judgment or order is made by consent of the parties; or

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(e) where, by any written law for the time being in force, the judgment or order of the High Court is expressly
declared to be final.
(2) Except with the leave of the Court of Appeal or a Judge, no appeal shall be brought to the Court of Appeal in
any of the following cases:
(a) where the amount or value of the subject-matter at the trial is $250,000 or such other amount as may be
specified by an order made under subsection (3) or less;
(b) where the only issue in the appeal relates to costs or fees for hearing dates;
(c) where a Judge in chambers makes a decision in a summary way on an interpleader summons where the facts
are not in dispute; or
(d) an order refusing to strike out an action or a pleading or a part of a pleading.
(3) The President may, after consulting the Chief Justice, by order published in the Gazette vary the amount
mentioned in subsection (2) (a).

S.34(1) SCJA lists the matters which are not appellable to the Court of Appeal. The rationale of this rule is to
achieve finality:

- Order 14 unconditional leave 34.1.a

- Order 14 conditional leave 34.1.b (Except if the appellant is the defendant – in other words, the Defendant
may appeal)–
 judge thinks that defence is weak but certain factors that cld tilt the balance but court not entirely
with defence. To be fair to plaintiff, sham defence/weak defence broght through. To balance
fairness,s court will grant leave to efend with condition usu that defence pays certain amt into court
or by providing banker’s guarantee for amt of the claim (except the Defendant may appeal)
 stimes even better than judgement! Because defendant may drag out payment even with judgement
 LEAVE: leave to defend means there is issue to defend. CA likely to cont to give leave to defend
against condition imposed
- Order setting aside default judgment unconditionally 34.1.a
 threshold for setting default judgement not that high. Logic similar to unconditional leave
- Order setting aside default judgment with conditions attached (except Defendant may appeal) 34.1.b
- Consent judgment or order 34.1.d– if already consented, then cannot move on, already waived rights
permamently. Usu will not consent to preserve right of appeal. Shld tell judge that it is NOT a consent
judgement. Consent orders are very clearly worded in the judgement itself. If not, those words will not be
there. Will just be ‘on hearing counsel for plaintiff and defendant…’
- Written law declaring that judgment or order of High Court is final 34.1.e
- Section 34(1) SCJA: • If there is an appeal to the Court of Appeal from interlocutory order
 Appellant is obliged to write in to the High Court Judge within 7 days for further arguments
 Practice direction on how to write further arguments.
 When no more to argue, counsel will request court to certify that no further arg are required.
 Rule is that you MUST write in. HC has no discretion in this matter.
 High Court Judge could either change verdict, or affirm verdict, or certify that it does not wish to
hear further arguments
 Some cases, Counsel have no further arguments and will just request Court to certify no further
arguments required
 Note : There is a Practice Direction on format of further arguments.

9) Matters Appellable to Court of Appeal with Leave of Court – Section 34(2) SCJA

S.34(2) SCJA provides for the cases which an appeal may be brought to the Court of Appeal where leave has
been given:

a) Amount in dispute is $250,000 or less (as of Nov 1998) - “where the amount or value of the subject matter
at the trial is $250,000 … or less”: S.34(2)(a) SCJA(previous amount pre-1998 was S$30,000 – too small
an amt to restrict appeal) -

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 i. The rationale is that cases where the amount in dispute is $250,000 and less come under the jurisdiction
of the subordinate courts, therefore, there should not be an automatic appeal to the Court of Appeal.

b) Only issue is legal costs or hearing fees - “where the only issue in the appeal relates to costs or fees for
hearing dates”: S.34(2)(b) SCJA

c) Summary decision on interpleader summons where facts not in dispute – “where a Judge in chambers makes
a decision in a summary way on an interpleader summons where the facts are not in dispute”: S.34(2)(c)
SCJA –
i. An interpleader summons is a case where innocent parties holding on to property is not sure who to
give the property to when faced with 2 or more claims.

d) Order refusing to strike out action or pleading - “an order refusing to strike out an action or a pleading or a
part of a pleading”: S.34(2)(d) SCJA

- for sub court, usually only recourse is up to HC. In practice, very difficult when fall under these
categories. Almost non appealable.

10) Introduction of New Evidence in the Court of Appeal

a) Matters / facts arising only after the decision which is being appealed against may be introduced without
leave – S.37(2) SCJA provides the Court of Appeal with the power to receiver further evidence by oral
examination in court, by affidavit or by deposition.
b) Interlocutory orders, new evidence may be introduced without leave of court – S.37(3) SCJA states that
“Such further evidence may be given without leave on interlocutory applications, or in any case as to
matters which have occurred after the date of the decision from which the appeal is brought.”
c) Appeals on judgment after trial or hearing of any cause or matter on merits, need special grounds and
leave of Court of Appeal – S.37(4) SCJA states that “Upon appeals from a judgment, after trial or hearing
of any cause or matter upon the merits, such further evidence, except as to matters subsequent as specified in
subsection (3), shall be admitted on special grounds only, and without leave of the Court of Appeal. Special
grds very difficult to satisfy, court will need very strong reasons to introd new evidence, •even if allowed,
may be penalised with costs for late introduction of evidence

Hearing of appeals
37. —(1) Appeals to the Court of Appeal shall be by way of rehearing.
(2) In relation to such appeals, the Court of Appeal shall have all the powers and duties, as to amendment or
otherwise, of the High Court, together with full discretionary power to receive further evidence by oral
examination in court, by affidavit, or by deposition taken before an examiner or a commissioner.
(3) Such further evidence may be given without leave on interlocutory applications, or in any case as to matters
which have occurred after the date of the decision from which the appeal is brought.
(4) Upon appeals from a judgment, after trial or hearing of any cause or matter upon the merits, such further
evidence, except as to matters subsequent as specified in subsection (3), shall be admitted on special grounds
only, and not without leave of the Court of Appeal.
(5) The Court of Appeal may draw inferences of facts, and give any judgment, and make any order which ought
to have been given or made, and make such further or other orders as the case requires.
(6) The powers in this section may be exercised notwithstanding that the notice of appeal relates only to part of
the decision, and such powers may also be exercised in favour of all or any of the respondents or parties,
although the respondents or parties have not appealed from or complained of the decision

d) The Court of Appeal may order costs of appeal and costs of hearing below – S.38 SCJA states that “The
Court of Appeal may make such order as to the whole or any part of the costs of appeal or in the court below
as is just.” [Hence the CA may penalise for late introduction of evidence].

Costs of appeal
38. The Court of Appeal may make such order as to the whole or any part of the costs of appeal or in the court
below as is just.

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11) Stay of execution

Section 41 SCJA – An appeal to the Court of Appeal shall not operate as a stay of execution unless the High
Court or Court of Appeal so orders.

Appeal not to operate as stay of execution

41. —(1) An appeal shall not operate as a stay of execution or of proceedings under the decision appealed from
unless the court below or the Court of Appeal so orders.
(2) No intermediate act or proceeding shall be invalidated except so far as the Court of Appeal may direct.

1. It is a fundamental rule that when an appeal is lodged, the appeal does not operate as a stay of execution –
unless the High Court or Court of Appeal orders otherwise.

2. The losing party will usually apply for a stay of execution on the spot (i.e.: Erinford injunction / oral
application)
3. -> need to react immediately.
i. Erinford v erinford – usu if have matter where injn sought and granted at hearing, and to
comply means that client will be in position where irreversibly prejudiced (eg surrender
of confidential items).
ii. To preserve position and not comply with injn, cannot wait because client in meantime
will be in contempt of court.
iii. So apply for erinford injn – orally done immediately. Test is tt if comply will be
irreversibly prejudiced.
iv. If no such prob eg only paying out money, then must apply separately for stay on
judgment. Can do so immediately but usu parties will see whether execution is taken
immediately. Stimes amt may be too small. Exercise judgement!

4. Alternatively, the losing party may apply separately for a stay after judgment (i.e.: either on his own
initiative, or in reaction to execution proceedings)
 losing party apply for stay after judgment separately (on own initiative or in reaction to execution
proceedings

iv) POWERS OF THE HIGH COURT: S.18 AND FIRST SCHEDULE SCJA

Jurisdiction of High Court

- • Section 16 SCJA
- • Defendant is served with Writ (Singapore or overseas)
- • Defendant submits to jurisdiction
- • Written law confers jurisdiction
 forum non conveniens – court albeit has juris but not the most approp forum to listen to juris. In
practice, juris easily achieved, fight is usu whether it is appropriate. Us courts have concept of long
arm juris – cases where juris taken simply because defence steps in US for short while. Now
diluted because courts realize lack juris.
- Note: Under S.16 SCJA, it is now simpler and prima facie easy to obtain jurisdiction – but the Defendant
is at liberty to apply for stay of proceedings on grounds of forum non conveniens. In practice, the issue of
jurisdiction is not a problem because of S.16 SCJA

Original Jurisdiction of High Court: S.16 – 18 SCJA, and First Schedule:

Civil jurisdiction — general
16. —(1) The High Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and try any action in personam where —
(a) the defendant is served with a writ or other originating process —
(i) in Singapore in the manner prescribed by Rules of Court; or
(ii) outside Singapore in the circumstances authorised by and in the manner prescribed by Rules of Court; or
(b) the defendant submits to the jurisdiction of the High Court.
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), the High Court shall have such jurisdiction as is vested
in it by any other written law.

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Civil jurisdiction — specific
17. Without prejudice to the generality of section 16, the civil jurisdiction of the High Court shall include —
(a) jurisdiction under any written law relating to divorce and matrimonial causes;
(b) jurisdiction under any written law relating to matters of admiralty;
(c) jurisdiction under any written law relating to bankruptcy or to companies;
(d) jurisdiction to appoint and control guardians of infants and generally over the persons and property of infants;
(e) jurisdiction to appoint and control guardians and keepers of the persons and estates of idiots, mentally
disordered persons and persons of unsound mind; and
(f) jurisdiction to grant probates of wills and testaments, letters of administration of the estates of deceased
persons and to alter or revoke such grants.

Civil jurisdiction — concurrent jurisdiction with Syariah Court in certain matters

17A. —(1) Notwithstanding sections 16 and 17, the High Court shall have no jurisdiction to hear and try any
civil proceedings involving matters which come within the jurisdiction of the Syariah Court under section 35 (2)
(a), (b) or (c) of the Administration of Muslim Law Act (Cap. 3) in which all the parties are Muslims or where
the parties were married under the provisions of the Muslim law.
(2) Notwithstanding that such matters come within the jurisdiction of the Syariah Court under section 35 (2) (d)
or (e), 51 or 52 (3) (c) or (d) of the Administration of Muslim Law Act (Cap. 3), the High Court shall have
jurisdiction as is vested in it by any written law to hear and try any civil proceedings involving matters relating to
—
(a) maintenance for any wife or child;
(b) custody of any child; and
(c) disposition or division of property on divorce.
(3) Where civil proceedings involving any matter referred to in subsection (2) (b) or (c) and involving parties
who are Muslims or were married under the provisions of the Muslim law are commenced in the High Court, the
High Court shall stay the civil proceedings —
(a) involving any matter referred to in subsection (2) (b) or (c), if the civil proceedings are commenced on or
after the commencement of proceedings for divorce in the Syariah Court or after the making of a decree or order
for divorce by the Syariah Court or on or after the registration of any divorce under section 102 of the
Administration of Muslim Law Act between the same parties, unless a Syariah Court commencement certificate
in respect of the civil proceedings has been filed with the High Court;
(b) involving any matter referred to in subsection (2) (b), if proceedings for divorce are commenced in the
Syariah Court or a decree or order for divorce is made by the Syariah Court or a divorce is registered under
section 102 of the Administration of Muslim Law Act between the same parties after the commencement of the
civil proceedings, unless a Syariah Court continuation certificate in respect of the civil proceedings has been filed
with the High Court.
(4) For the purposes of subsection (3), where the proceedings in the Syariah Court are commenced on the same
day as the civil proceedings in the High Court, the proceedings in the Syariah Court shall be deemed to have
been commenced before the civil proceedings.
(5) Subsection (3) (a) shall not apply if the civil proceedings referred to therein are commenced in the High
Court by the consent of the parties to the proceedings and the certificates of attendance of the parties issued
under section 35A (7) of the Administration of Muslim Law Act (Cap. 3) have been filed in accordance with
Rules of Court.
(6) Subsection (3) (b) shall not apply if the civil proceedings referred to therein are continued by the consent of
the parties to the proceedings and the certificates of attendance of the parties issued under section 35A (7) of the
Administration of Muslim Law Act have been filed in accordance with Rules of Court.
(7) For the avoidance of any doubt, the High Court, in exercising its jurisdiction or powers under subsection (2),
shall apply the civil law.
(8) Notwithstanding section 3 (2) of the Women’s Charter (Cap. 353), section 112 of that Act shall apply to the
High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction or powers under subsection (2) (c).
(9) In this section —
"Syariah Court" means the Syariah Court constituted under the Administration of Muslim Law Act;
"Syariah Court commencement certificate" means a commencement certificate issued by the Syariah Court under
section 35A (4) of the Administration of Muslim Law Act;
"Syariah Court continuation certificate" means a continuation certificate issued by the Syariah Court under
section 35A (4) of the Administration of Muslim Law Act.

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Powers of High Court
18. —(1) The High Court shall have such powers as are vested in it by any written law for the time being in force
in Singapore.
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), the High Court shall have the powers set out in the First
Schedule.
(3) The powers referred to in subsection (2) shall be exercised in accordance with any written law or Rules of
Court relating to them.
Current law relating to the Civil Jurisdiction of the High Court – S.16 SCJA states that the High Court shall have
jurisdiction to hear and try any action in personam where –

Under the previous law – the civil jurisdiction of the High Court used to be:
a. Cause of action arose in Singapore
b. Defendant had property or resides in Singapore
c. Facts occurred in Singapore
d. Land in dispute is in Singapore

- Lost on juris because court felt that could not enforce injn over someone overseas
- But on CA – each one can nominate one director. Right to remove him belongs to the peron who
nominated. German party by taking steps in proceedings had already submitted go sg juris.

Teo Choon Mong v Wilh Schulz [1998] 2 SLR 529

- Facts :
 Joint venture agreement - application for injunction by Teo to restrain German corporation from
removing Teo as director. JV agreement between Teo and German Company to set up a factory
through the vehicle of a company. A shareholder agreement provided that Teo and the German
company were each entitled to nominate a director to the board of the JV’s company. German
company sought to remove Teo as director of the JV’s company. Teo sought an injunction
restraining the German company from doing so.
- HC held:
 Nothing in shareholder agreement required unanimous agreement to remove director. Teo could
protect his interests as shareholder without being director. Injunction useless because it cannot
be enforced against German corporation
 injunction was useless against a German company. The High Court dismissed Teo’s application for
an injunction. Teo appealed.
- CA held :
 On interpretation of shareholder agreement, each party entitled to nominate one director and
remove same. Right to remove director belonged to appointor.
 Wilh Schulz by taking steps in these proceedings had submitted to the Court’s jurisdiction.
They have also agreed to the Singapore court’s jurisdiction under the shareholder agreement.
 Injunction can be enforced in personam against representatives of Wilh Schulz
 =>lengthening of sg court juris. Did not even need to disturb general rules on juris.

Powers of the High Court

- S.18(1) SCJA states that the High Court shall have such powers as are vested in it by any written law for
the time being in force in Singapore.
- S.18(2) SCJA states that the High Court shall have the powers set out in the First Schedule ‘Additional
Powers of the High Court’:
- Highlights of the First Schedule (attached in full immediately below):
a) Power to issue prerogative writs – paragraph 1 (i.e.: certiorari, mandamus, habeas corpus etc)
b) Power to preserve assets for satisfaction of judgment which has been or may be entered – paragraph 5(c)
c) Power to dismiss or stay proceedings on the basis of res judicata, multiplicity of proceedings or forum non
conveniens (paragraph 9)
d) Power to award remedies in equity, including damages in addition or in lieu of an injunction (paragraph 14)

FIRST SCHEDULE
ADDITIONAL POWERS OF THE HIGH COURT

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Prerogative writs
1. Power to issue to any person or authority directions, orders or writs, including writs of the nature of habeas
corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any others, for the enforcement of any of the
rights conferred by any written law or for any purpose.
Partition and sale in lieu of partition
2. Power to partition land and to direct a sale instead of partition in any action for partition of land; and in any
cause or matter relating to land, where it appears necessary or expedient, to order the land or any part of it to be
sold, and to give all necessary and consequential directions.
Charge or mortgage in lieu of sale of land
3. Power to order land to be charged or mortgaged, as the case may be, in any case in which there is jurisdiction
to order a sale.
Interpleader
4. Power to grant relief by way of interpleader —
(a) where the person seeking relief is under liability for any debt, money, or goods or chattels, for or in respect of
which he has been or expects to be, sued by 2 or more parties making adverse claims thereon; and
(b) where a Sheriff, bailiff or other officer of court is charged with the execution of process of court, and claim is
made to any money or goods or chattels taken or intended to be taken in execution under any process, or to the
proceeds or value of any such goods or chattels by any person other than the person against whom the process is
issued,
and to order the sale of any property subject to interpleader proceedings.
Preservation of subject-matter, evidence and assets to satisfy judgment
5. Power before or after any proceedings are commenced to provide for —
(a) the interim preservation of property which is the subject-matter of the proceedings by sale or by injunction or
the appointment of receiver or the registration of a caveat or a lis pendens or in any manner whatsoever;
(b) the preservation of evidence by seizure, detention, inspection, photographing, the taking of samples, the
conduct of experiments or in any manner; and
(c) the preservation of assets for the satisfaction of any judgment which has been or may be made.
Interest
6. Power to direct interest to be paid on damages, or debts (whether the debts are paid before or after
commencement of proceedings) or judgment debts, or on sums found due on taking accounts between parties, or
on sums found due and unpaid by receivers or other persons liable to account to the court.
Time
7. Power to enlarge or abridge the time prescribed by any written law for doing any act or taking any proceeding,
whether the application therefor is made before or after the expiration of the time prescribed, but this provision
shall be without prejudice to any written law relating to limitation.
Enforcement of judgment
8. Power to enforce a judgment of the court in any manner which may be prescribed by any written law or by
Rules of Court made under this Act.
Stay of proceedings
9. Power to dismiss or stay proceedings where the matter in question is res judicata between the parties, or where
by reason of multiplicity of proceedings in any court or courts or by reason of a court in Singapore not being the
appropriate forum the proceedings ought not to be continued.
Transfer of proceedings
10. Power to transfer any proceedings to any other court or to or from any subordinate court, and in the case of
transfer to or from a subordinate court to give any directions as to the further conduct thereof, except that this
power shall be exercised in such manner as may be prescribed by Rules of Court.
Set-off
11. Power to allow a defence of set-off.
Discovery and interrogatories.
12. Power before or after any proceedings are commenced to order discovery of facts or documents by any party
to the proceedings or by any other person in such manner as may be prescribed by Rules of Court.
Costs
13. Power to award costs.
Reliefs and remedies
14. Power to grant all reliefs and remedies at law and in equity, including damages in addition to, or in
substitution for, an injunction or specific performance.
Interim payment
15. Power to order a party in a pending proceeding to make interim payments to another party or to a stakeholder

8
or into court on account of any damages, debt or other sum, excluding costs, which he may subsequently in the
proceeding be adjudged to be liable to pay.
Provisional damages for personal injuries
16. Power to award in any action for damages for personal injuries, provisional damages assessed on the
assumption that a contingency will not happen and further damages at a future date if the contingency happens.
Periodic payments
17. Power to order damages assessed in any action for personal injuries to be paid in periodic instalments rather
than as a lump sum.
Attaching deposits
18. Power to attach deposits with a financial institution whether or not the deposits have matured and
notwithstanding any restriction as to the mode of withdrawal.
Ordering medical examination
19. Power to order medical examination of a person who is a party to any proceedings where the physical or
mental condition of the person is relevant to any matter in question in the proceedings.

Appellate jurisdiction of HC S.19 – 22 SCJA

- Restricted powers
- High Court hears appeals from Subordinate Courts

- S.20 SCJA states that the appellate civil jurisdiction of the High Court shall consist of
1. The hearing of appeals from District Courts
2. The hearing of appeals from the District Courts and Magistrates’ Courts when exercising jurisdiction of a
quasi-criminal or civil nature; and
3. The hearing of appeals from other tribunals as may from time to time be prescribed by any written law.

Therefore, the High Court acts in its appellate capacity when it hears appeals from the Subordinate Courts.

Appellate civil jurisdiction

20. The appellate civil jurisdiction of the High Court shall consist of —
(a) the hearing of appeals from District Courts;
(b) the hearing of appeals from District Courts and Magistrates’ Courts when exercising jurisdiction of a quasi-
criminal or civil nature; and
(c) the hearing of appeals from other tribunals as may from time to time be prescribed by any written law.

- S.21(1) SCJA states that the Right to Appeal from District Court and Magistrates’ Court exists if:
1. It is a suit or action for the recovery of immovable property; or
2. Where the amount in dispute or the value of the subject matter exceeds $50,000 (amended with effect from
Nov 1998); or
3. With the leave of a District Court, a Magistrate’s Court or the High Court if the amount in dispute or the
value of the subject matter is less than $50,000.

Appeals from District and Magistrates’ Courts

21. —(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act or any other written law, an appeal shall lie to the High Court
from a decision of a District Court or Magistrate’s Court in any suit or action for the recovery of immovable
property or in any civil cause or matter where the amount in dispute or the value of the subject-matter exceeds
$50,000 or such other amount as may be specified by an order made under subsection (3) or with the leave of a
District Court, a Magistrate’s Court or the High Court if under that amount.
(2) Such appeals may be heard before one Judge provided that the Judge, if he thinks fit, may reserve any appeal
for the decision of a court consisting of 3 Judges, and in such case the appeal shall be decided in accordance
with the opinion of the majority of the Judges composing the High Court.
(3) The President may, after consulting the Chief Justice, by order published in the Gazette vary the amount
mentioned in subsection (1).

Case Law on S.21 SCJA

Abdul Rahman v Abdul Salim [1999] 4 SLR 716

- Facts:

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  Plaintiff awarded sum of $50,000 by District Court plus statutory interest at 6% and costs.
Defendant applied for leave to appeal to High Court. So do you count interest?
- Argument : Amount in dispute includes interest ($4,000) and costs. Therefore above $50,000 and no leave
required
 Alternatively, asking for leave to appeal.
- Held : Tay Yong Kwang JC
 the “amount in dispute or the value of the subject matter” under S.21(1) SCJA did not include the
non-contractual interests or costs elements of a claim for a contractual amount or damages. These
would be awarded generally, but were discretionary and could fluctuate.
 Amount in dispute does not include non contractual interest or costs. Such amounts fluctuate and
would lead to uncertainty in determining courts’ jurisdiction.
 if interest and costs were to be included in the computation of the “amount in dispute or the value
of the subject matter” under S.21(1) SCJA – this would lead to unnecessary uncertainty. Further,
any appeals to the High Court would have to await the outcome of taxation and review thereon if
costs were included, leading to further confusion.
 The applicant’s appeal was against an award of $50,000 and nothing more. It did not exceed the
minimum prescribed by S.21(1) SCJA, and was therefore not appealable as of right. On the facts,
the court refused to grant leave to appeal because the issue was simply one of fact. The issue at
trial was simply a factual one and any appeal would therefore have involved purely factual
findings – hence leave to appeal was not granted.
 Tay JC said that leave of court to appeal could be granted where the applicant was able:
 (a) to demonstrate a prima facie case of error of law that had a bearing on the decision of
the trial court;
 (b) to show that there was a Question of law to be decided for the first time, or
 (c) to show a Question of law of importance upon which a decision of a higher tribunal
would have been to the public advantage; or
 (d) to show a Question of law on which there was a conflict of judicial authority and a
pronouncement from a higher court was desirable.
 Leave of court should not be granted where there were mere questions of fact to be considered.
 Note: The effect of this decision is that if the amount in dispute is less than $50,000, it is unlikely
(except only in special cases) that that court will grant leave to appeal.
 may have contractual interest clause. If ir also fluctuates, then same prob. but if no fluctuation,
then ok. But here, ironic. If wld not change if CJ did not change it. Based on interest rates.
 No leave to appeal granted because issue was simply one of fact.

Principle - S.21(1) SCJA’s $50,000 limit did not apply where a statute provides that leave to appeal was not
required:

Zaleha bte Rahman v. Chaytor [2001] 1 SLR 459 (Emphasis not on amt but nature of application)
- Facts: Complainant took out a summons against the respondent, under ss 69(1) and 69(2) of the Women’s
Charter (Cap 535), applying for maintenance for herself and her child. District Judge ordered the
respondent to pay a monthly maintenance of $1,500 to the wife and $1,000 for the child.
- Complainant filed an application seeking leave to appeal to High Court. Her notice of appeal was rejected
on the grounds that she had no right of appeal by and that leave of court to appeal was required pursuant to
S.21(1) SCJA ($50,000 limit). As amount in dispute was less than $50,000, leave to appeal would be
refused.
- On appeal, held : GP Selvam J
o Appeal should be allowed to proceed as of right. Leave of appeal against maintenance orders
was not required.
o S.77 of the Women’s Charter conferred unrestricted appellate power to the High Court.
o The power of the High Court to entertain appeals against maintenance orders (family
matters) was unaffected by s 21(1) of the SCJA.
o Accordingly, the $50,000 requirement and the rules relating to it did not apply to appeals
under s77 of the Women’s Charter.

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 o Held that the power of the High Court to entertain appeals against maintenance orders was not
affected by S.21(1) SCJA. The Rules of Court cannot cut down the power of the High Court to
entertain appeals under S.77 of the Women’s Charter. The $50,000 requirement and the ROC
relating to Order 55C and 55D did not apply to appeals under S.77 of the Women’s Charter.

Eng Poh Su v. Yap Ah Ho [2001] 2 SLR 367

- Facts: The respondent applied for and obtained an interim maintenance order pursuant to Ss.113 & 127 of
the Women’s Charter. The petitioner appealed against the decision, but was advised that leave of court was
required under S.21 SCJA. When leave of court to appeal was refused, the petitioner took out an OS to
determine whether S.21 SCJA applied to appeals arising from matrimonial matters under the Part X of the
Women’s Charter.
- Held: S.137 of the Women’s Charter could be construed as conferring a right of appeal independently of
and unaffected by S.21 SCJA.

Overseas Union Insurance Ltd v Home [2002] 2 SLR 497

Facts:
o The plaintiffs’ claim almost S$140,000 against the defendants was dismissed by the district court. The trial
judge sitting as a deputy registrar taxed the costs and allowed some $93,000, excluding the court fees. The
deputy registrar’s decision was affirmed by District Judge at a review.
o The plaintiffs sought leave to appeal as the amount of costs in dispute was less than the minimum specified
in s 21 of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act. The DJ heard the application and refused the plaintiffs such
leave.
o The plaintiffs filed an appeal against the decision, together with an alternative application for leave to appeal
if leave was necessary.
o The defendants filed an application to strike out the appeal. The defendants argued that under O 55C r 2 of
the Rules of Court, leave to appeal under s 21 SCJA must be obtained by filing an application to the DJ
within seven days of the order and, in the event leave was refused by the DJ, by filing an application to the
High Court within seven days of the refusal.
o Accordingly, the plaintiffs ought not to have appealed but should have applied to the High Court by way of
originating summons for leave to appeal. The matter was therefore before the High Court through the wrong
procedure and was also filed out of time.
o The plaintiffs contended that leave was not required as the 'amount in dispute' relating to the substantive
claim in the district court action was more than $50,000. This was canvassed before the DJ who disagreed
with them and they could therefore appeal against such a finding.
Held, inter alia, dismissing both the def’s and plaintiff’s moves:
o Section 21 SCJA made no mention of the time for applying for leave to the DJ or to the High Court. If the
SCJA was silent as to time, the period of time for making an application under the SCJA would be computed
according to the Rules of Court. The period of seven days in O 55C r 2 must therefore be reckoned in
accordance with O 3 r 2(5) and not the Interpretation Act. The RA, serving as an application to the High
Court for leave, was thus filed within the stipulated period of time.
o The ‘amount in dispute’ here was $10,619.65. That was clearly below the prescribed minimum in s 21 SCJA
and leave to appeal was therefore necessary

v) DISTRICT COURT (Ss. 19 – 49 Subordinate Courts Act)

Jurisdiction
- S.19(3) SCA
o This provision is the equivalent of S.16 SCJA. It provides for the jurisdiction of the Subordinate
Court: A District Court shall have the jurisdiction … where – (a) the defendant is served a writ or
other originating process in S’pore or Outside Singapore; or (b) the defendant submits to the
jurisdiction of a District Court.

(3) A District Court shall have the jurisdiction in sections 20, 21, 25, 26 and 29 where —
(a) the defendant is served with a writ or other originating process —
(i) in Singapore in the manner prescribed by Rules of Court; or
(ii) outside Singapore in the circumstances authorised by and in the manner prescribed by Rules of Court; or

11
(b) the defendant submits to the jurisdiction of a District Court

- S.20(1) SCA
o This provision provides for the District Court’s jurisdiction in actions of contract and tort to be
subject to a monetary limit. This monetary limit is $250,000 – increased from $100,000 on
1/8/1997

Jurisdiction in actions of contract and tort

20. —(1) A District Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and try any action founded on contract or tort where —
(a) the debt, demand or damage claimed does not exceed the District Court limit, whether on balance of account
or otherwise; or
(b) there is no claim for money, and the remedy or relief sought in the action is in respect of a subject-matter the
value of which does not exceed the District Court limit.

Two ways to maintain claim even where money exceeds amt allowed:

1.S.22(1)
- This provision provides for the Plaintiff to abandon part of claim in order for the District Court to have
jurisdiction where the claim amount exceeds $250k:

Abandonment of part of claim to give District Court jurisdiction

22. —(1) Where a plaintiff has a cause of action which exceeds the District Court limit in which, if it did not
exceed the District Court limit, a District Court would have jurisdiction under section 20 (1) (a) or (2) or 21, the
plaintiff may abandon the excess and thereupon a District Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and try the
action, provided that the plaintiff shall not recover in the action an amount exceeding the District Court limit.

2. S.23 SCA
- The parties can agree, by a memorandum signed by them or their respective solicitors, for the District Court
to have jurisdiction even though sum is in excess of monetary jurisdiction. (must be action founded on
contract or tort)

Jurisdiction by agreement in certain actions

23. Where the parties to an action agree, by a memorandum signed by them or their respective solicitors, a
District Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and try any action founded on contract or tort notwithstanding that
the debt, demand or damage claimed exceeds the District Court limit.

3. S 28A SCJA - CJ may allocate civil proceedings in HC to the DC (matrimonial matters).

Allocation of proceedings to District Court

28A. —(1) The Chief Justice may, where he considers it necessary or expedient to improve efficiency in the
administration of justice and to provide for more speedy disposal of proceedings commenced in the High Court,
by order direct such class or classes or description of proceedings as may be specified in the order to be heard
and determined by the District Court.
(2) Notwithstanding any other written law, any order under subsection (1) —
(a) may confer jurisdiction on a District Court to hear and determine —
(i) any proceedings specified in the order which, but for the order, the District Court would not have jurisdiction
to hear and determine by reason only of the fact that the amount involved exceeds the monetary limit of its
jurisdiction; or
(ii) any proceedings relating to any of the matters referred to in section 17 (a) to (e);
(b) may make such provision governing appeals relating to proceedings transferred to the District Court
(including provisions restricting the right of appeal) as the Chief Justice thinks fit; and
(c) may make such incidental provision for the transfer of the proceedings to the District Court (including matters
relating to procedure and costs) as the Chief Justice thinks fit.

4. S.54(A-G): transfer of civil proceedings to different courts

5. S.25 – S.31

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- Sections 25 – 31 SCA are the general provisions setting out the areas where the District Court has
jurisdiction:
o S.25 – Jurisdiction in actions for recovery of immovable property
o S.26 – Equity jurisdiction (relief in equity)
o S.27 – Jurisdiction in grant probate
o S.28 – Jurisdiction to issue distress
o S.29 – Jurisdiction to grant relief by interpleader
o S.30 – Variation of District Court limit
o S.31 – Powers of District Court same as High Court

6. S.32
Powers of District Judge in chambers
32. A District Judge shall have jurisdiction in any civil proceeding pending in a District Court to make any order
or to exercise any authority or jurisdiction which, if it related to a proceeding pending in the High Court, might
be made or exercised by a Judge of the High Court in chambers.

Costs
S.39
- Provides for costs of certain actions commenced in High Court, which could have been commenced in a
subordinate court. The effect of S.39 SCA is:
- The provision provides that the Plaintiff shall now be entitled to more costs than what the District Court will
allow.
- If the Plaintiff recovers less than $60,000 (i.e. MC’s limit), he shall not recover more costs than what a
Magistrate Court suit would permit.
- If recover less than 250000?
o If between $60,000 and $250,000 – not allowed to recover more costs than DC scale.
o If less than $60,000 - not allowed to recover more costs than MC scale.
- Shld ssek order for csots to be reduced.

Costs of certain actions commenced in High Court which could have been commenced in a subordinate
court
39. —(1) Where an action founded on contract or tort or any written law to recover a sum of money is
commenced in the High Court which could have been commenced in a subordinate court, then, subject to
subsections (3) and (4), the plaintiff —
(a) if he recovers a sum not exceeding the District Court limit, shall not be entitled to any more costs of the
action than those to which he would have been entitled if the action had been brought in a District Court; and
(b) if he recovers a sum not exceeding the Magistrate’s Court limit, shall not be entitled to any more costs of the
action than those to which he would have been entitled if the action had been brought in a Magistrate’s Court.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) (a) and (b), a plaintiff shall be treated as recovering the full amount
recoverable in respect of his claim without regard to any deduction made in respect of contributory negligence on
his part or otherwise in respect of matters not falling to be taken into account in determining whether the action
could have been commenced in a subordinate court.
(3) Where a plaintiff is entitled to costs on the subordinate courts scale only, the Registrar of the Supreme Court
shall have the same power of allowing any items of costs as a District Judge or Magistrate would have had if the
action had been brought in a subordinate court.
(4) In any action, the High Court, if satisfied —
(a) that there was sufficient reason for bringing the action in the High Court; or
(b) that the defendant or one of the defendants objected to the transfer of the action to a subordinate court,
may make an order allowing the costs or any part of the costs thereof on the High Court scale or on the
subordinate courts scale as it may direct.
(5) This section shall not apply in the case of any proceedings by the Government.
(6) This section shall not affect any question as to costs if it appears to the High Court that there was reasonable
ground for supposing the amount recoverable in respect of the plaintiff’s claim to be in excess of the amount
recoverable in an action commenced in a subordinate court.

S.41

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- The Chief Justice may, where he considers it necessary or expedient to improve efficiency in the
administration of justice, direct cases in the District Court to be heard in the High Court. But such order has
to relate to a “class or cases” or “description of proceedings”.

Allocation of proceedings to High Court

41. —(1) The Chief Justice may, where he considers it necessary or expedient to improve efficiency in the
administration of justice and to provide for more speedy disposal of proceedings commenced in the District
Courts, by order direct such class or classes or description of proceedings as may be specified in the order to be
heard and determined by the High Court.
(2) Any order under subsection (1) may make such incidental provision for the transfer of the proceedings to the
High Court (including matters relating to procedure and costs) as the Chief Justice thinks fit.

S.48
- Agreement not to appeal - No appeal from judgment of District Court is allowed if both parties consent in
writing prior to outcome of case (ie: judgment or order) that there shall be no appeal to the High Court.

Agreement not to appeal

48. No appeal shall lie from any judgment or order of a District Court exercising civil jurisdiction if, before the
judgment or order is given or made, the parties agree in writing signed by them or their solicitors that it shall be
final.

vi) Magistrates’ Court

- • Sections 52 - 54 SCA
- • Same jurisdiction as DC except that monetary limit is $60,000. Increased from $30,000 in August 1999.

Civil jurisdiction of Magistrates’ Courts

52. —(1) Subject to Rules of Court, a Magistrate’s Court shall have the jurisdiction and powers conferred on a
District Court by sections 20 (except 20 (1) (b)), 21, 29, 31 (1), 32 and 43 in any proceedings where the amount
claimed or the value of the subject-matter in dispute does not exceed the Magistrate’s Court limit.
(2) In exercising its jurisdiction under subsection (1), a Magistrate’s Court shall be subject to the same
limitations and provisions as are applicable to a District Court under this Act.
(3) The President may, after consulting the Chief Justice, by order vary the Magistrate’s Court limit.

53. Repealed by Act 26/2005, wef 01/01/2006.

Judgments and orders of Magistrates’ Courts

54. Every judgment or order of a Magistrate’s Court in the exercise of its civil jurisdiction shall have the same
effect (for purposes of appeal or otherwise) and shall be enforced in the same manner as if it were given or made
by a District Court.

(vii) REFERENCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION TO HIGH COURT (S.56A SCA)

- • Court may stay proceedings pending decision of HC on constitutional question

S.56A(1)
Where in any proceedings in a subordinate court, a question as to the interpretation or effect of any provision of
the Constitution arises, the court may stay proceedings to await the decision of the question on the reference to
the High Court.
Reference of constitutional question to High Court
56A. —(1) Where in any proceedings in a subordinate court a question arises as to the interpretation or effect of
any provision of the Constitution, the court hearing the proceedings may stay the proceedings on such terms as
may be just to await the decision of the question on the reference to the High Court.

- • Sub Ct will state question for reference to HC

S.56A(3)
The Court will state the question for reference to the High Court - “Where an order for stay of proceedings has
been made under this section, the court shall state the question which in its opinion has arisen as to the
interpretation or effect of the Constitution in the form of a special case which so far as may be possible shall state
the question in a form which shall permit of an answer being given in the affirmative or the negative”.

14
- • AG will be notified and will have right to be heard
S.56A(5)
The AG shall be notified and will have the right to be heard

- • Procedures in section 56A of SCA and Order 58A Rules of Court

The Procedure is found in Order 58A of the Rules of Court.

vii) Registrar of Supreme Court

- Under S.2 SCJA (Interpretation Clause), Registrar" means the Registrar of the Supreme Court and includes
the Deputy Registrar and the Assistant Registrars
- S.62 SCJA states that “The Registrar, the Deputy Registrar and the Assistant Registrars shall, subject to this
Act or any other written law, have such jurisdiction, powers and duties as may be prescribed by Rules of
Court”.
o • S 62 SCJA - Registrar has same jurisdiction powers and duties as registrars and masters in
England
- Oxford Dictionary defines :
o “deputy” - acting in place of another
o “assistant” - subordinate worker
o Note: English rules of practice are applicable – the Registrar has the same jurisdiction, powers and
duties as the registrars and masters in England, in addition to those in Rules of Court.
- Order 32, r. 9 Rules of Court – Registrar of Supreme and Sub Cts has same authority and jurisdiction as
Judge in Chambers. Order 32 relates to proceedings in Chambers.

Jurisdiction of Registrar (O. 32, r. 9)

9. —(1) The Registrar of the Supreme Court shall have power to transact all such business and exercise all such
authority and jurisdiction under the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Chapter 322) or these Rules as may be
transacted and exercised by a Judge in Chambers except such business, authority and jurisdiction as the Chief
Justice may from time to time direct to be transacted or exercised by a Judge in person or as may by any of these
Rules be expressly directed to be transacted or exercised by a Judge in person.
(2) Rule 1 shall apply in relation to the jurisdiction of the Registrar of the Subordinate Courts but with the
following modifications:
(a) the reference to the Registrar of the Supreme Court shall be construed as a reference to the Registrar of the
Subordinate Courts;
(b) the reference to the Supreme Court of Judicature Act shall be construed as a reference to the Subordinate
Courts Act (Chapter 321); and
(c) the reference to directions which the Chief Justice may make shall be construed as a reference to directions
which the Senior District Judge may, with the concurrence of the Chief Justice, make.

viii) Registrar of Subordinate Courts

- Under S.2 SCA (Interpretation Clause), the term “registrar” means the registrar of the subordinate courts
and includes a deputy registrar.
- Order 32 rule 9(2) Rules of Court – the Registrar has the same authority and jurisdiction as Judge in
Chambers
 he hears matter as if HC judge in chambers. And matter goes on appeal to him as if a re-hearing. There
are cases when both parties definitely appeal. So temptation to write in – since both parties will appeal,
can we skip and go straight to appeal? As matter of rule and practice, this is not allowed. Registrar
serves as filter first. Grds may persuade either party not to appeal.

ix) Small Claims Tribunal

Jurisdiction of tribunal
5. —(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, a tribunal shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine —
(a) any claim relating to a dispute arising from any contract for the sale of goods or the provision of services;
(b) any claim in tort in respect of damage caused to any property; and

15
 (c) any claim relating to a dispute arising from any contract for the lease of residential premises that does not
exceed 2 years.
(2) The jurisdiction of a tribunal shall not extend to a claim —
(a) in respect of damage caused to any property by an accident arising out of or in connection with the use of a
motor vehicle; or
(b) which the subordinate courts have no jurisdiction to hear and determine.
(3) Except where this Act expressly provides otherwise, the jurisdiction of a tribunal shall not extend to a claim
—
(a) which exceeds the prescribed limit; or
(b) after the expiration of one year from the date on which the cause of action accrued.
(4) A tribunal shall, subject to subsections (1) and (2), have jurisdiction to hear and determine any claim the
value of which exceeds the prescribed limit but does not exceed $20,000 or such other sum as the Minister may,
after consultation with the Chief Justice, by order published in the Gazette, substitute therefor, if the parties to the
claim so agree by a memorandum signed by them.
(5) Where a tribunal is of the opinion that a claim lodged with it pursuant to section 15 (1) is beyond its
jurisdiction, the tribunal shall discontinue the proceedings and advise the claimant and respondent accordingly.

- S2 SCTA: "prescribed limit" means $10,000 or such other sum as the Minister may, after consultation with
the Chief Justice, by order published in the Gazette, substitute therefor;
o Monetary limit $10,000 - where both parties consent in writing the jurisdiction can be raised to
$20,000
- • Claims limited to
o - contracts for provision of goods and services,
o tort for damage to property or
o Claims arising any contract relating to a lease of residential premises not exceeding 2 years.
o • Does not cover landlord/tenant disputes and also not applicable to lawyers’ bills
- Limitation Period – 1 year.

Tribunal Rules
- • All claims must be lodged or filed at the Small Claims Tribunals within one year (time bar) from the date
on which the cause of action accrued. - s 5(3)(b) Small Claims Tribunal Act. But not time barred. Can still
go on and file claim.
- • Separate procedure under Small Claims
o • No legal representation allowed
o • Informal rules and procedure
- see 2005 small claims tribunals act and small claims tribunmals amendment rules 2006

Case Law on determining Monetary Jurisdiction of the Small Claims Tribunal:

Mohammed Akhtar v. Scheider [1997] 1 SLR 150

- Facts: The respondent bought a carpet from the appellants at $10,000. The respondent bought the carpet in
reliance to certain assurances by the appellants. The respondents later stopped payment for the carpet when
he discovered certain defects in the carpet. He lodged a claim with the Small Claims Tribunal, seeking to
return the carpet and to claim back $5,000 which he had paid by the first cheque. The referee accepted that a
case of misrepresentation had been made out. He ordered the sellers to return the $5,000 paid, and the
purchaser to return the carpet. The appellants contended the SCT had no jurisdiction to entertain the claim,
as the invoice was for $10,000.
- SCT ordered accordingly.
- Argument : As carpet is valued at $10,000, and monetary limit then was $5,000, SCT has no jurisdiction.
- Held (allowing the appeal):
o The claim was in the nature of a claim for rescission of the contract on the ground of the
appellants’ misrepresentation. Although the sum of money sought to be returned was $5,000, the
return of the money was merely a consequence of the claim for rescission. Unless the contract was
held to be rescinded, there would be no question of upholding the claim for the return of the

16
 money. So, the value of the claim was not $5,000, but $10,000 – the latter amount being the value
of the contract sought to be impugned.
o The monetary jurisdiction of the SCT would be determined by the quantum of the claim, and not
by the value of the underlying contract - if the claim did not involve a dispute about the underlying
contract. In this case, there was a dispute about the contract. So, it was the value of the claim in
that dispute which should be taken as the value of the claim for the purpose of considering the
question of jurisdiction of the SCT.
o The claim here is for rescission of contract on misrepresentation. Although sum sought to be
returned was $5,000, the value of the claim was not $5,000 but $10,000. SCT had exceeded
jurisdiction.

x) Singapore Mediation Centre

- • Voluntary process
- • Mediation Agreement. Shld not be trial run for trial! To negotiate deal that can work for both parties.
- • Court encourages mediation
- • Short waiting periods: 2 to 3 days OR 1 to 2 weeks
- • Mediators are senior lawyers or other professionals
- • Parties submit statements of facts and not bundles
- of documents
- • Lawyers and litigants must be present
- • Admin fee - $250
- • Mediators’ fee
– Up to $250,000 - $900 per party/day
– $250,000 to $1 m - $1,800 per party/day
– $1 m to $5 m - $2,400 per party/day
– Above $5 m - $2,400 per party/day +0.05% of excess above $5 m
– (Discounted rate where 2 mediators)
– (Fees increased after August 2002)

SOURCES OF PROCEDURAL LAW

Substance v Procedure
• Substantive law is to define, create, confer substantive legal rights or legal status or to impose or define the
nature and extent of legal duties.
• Procedural law is to provide the machinery in which legal rights or status or duties may be enforced or
recognised by the courts

- • Statute
– Statutes are helpful because they also contain procedure.
– Eg Evidence Act (procedure to examine witnesses)
– Eg Limitation Act (procedure to calculate time)

- Section 19(c) Interpretation Act

General provisions with respect to power given to any authority to make subsidiary legislation
19. When any Act confers powers on any authority to make subsidiary legislation, the following provisions shall,
unless the contrary intention appears, have effect with reference to the making and operation of the subsidiary
legislation:
(a) subsidiary legislation may at any time be amended, varied, rescinded or revoked by the same authority and in
the same manner by and in which it was made subject to the following provisions:
(i) where any Act is to come into operation on a date to be fixed by subsidiary legislation, the power to make the
subsidiary legislation shall not include the power of amending, revoking or suspending the same; and
(ii) where the authority has been replaced wholly or partially by another authority, the power conferred herein
upon the original authority may be exercised by the replacing authority concerning all matters or things within its
jurisdiction as if it were the original authority;

17
(b) when any Act confers powers on any authority to make subsidiary legislation for any general purpose, and
also for any special purpose incidental thereto, the enumeration of the special purposes shall not be deemed to
derogate from the generality of the powers conferred with reference to the general purpose; and
(c) no subsidiary legislation made under an Act shall be inconsistent with the provisions of any Act.

- • Rules – not enough, subject to practice directions and precedents and experience.
– Rules of Court
- • Merged RSC and SCR in January 1996
- • SCJA and SCA confer power to make rules for procedure.
- • Rules cannot vary statutes or substantive law

- • Section 80 SCJA confers power on Rules Committee

– • Section 69 SCA empowers Rules Committee to make rules for Sub Ct
– Composition of Rules Committee
- Section 80(3) and (4) of SCJA
- Chief Justice
- Attorney General
- Not more than 5 High Court Judges to be appointed by the Chief Justice for such period
as he may specify in writing
- Senior District Judge
- 1 District Judge to be appointed by the Chief Justice for such period as he may specify in
writing
- 2 practising advocates and solicitors to be appointed by the Chief Justice for such period
as he may specify in writing
- Quorum 5, majority decision, with CJ having veto power
- • Subsidiary legislation cannot be inconsistent with statute
o • Re Grosvenor Hotel [1965] Ch 1233
o • Ward v James [1966] 1 QB 273
o • These two cases are examples of successfulchallenges. Rules held ultra vires for
varying substantive law. -> ROC must be consistent with statute
- • Singapore example - charging orders versus Writ of Seizure and Sale under Land Titles Act.

- • Judicial precedent
– Many cases on procedure for Order 14, Mareva Injunction, Anton Piller, Discovery etc.
– Rules formerly in force
– Section 82, SCJA, old rules still applicable if they do not conflict with present rules.
– No example.

- • Practice Directions
– Contains details not found in Rules
– Supplement Rules of Court
– Supreme Court and Subordinate Courts have PDs
– Order 92 rule 2A - PD must be complied with
– Order 92 rule 3 - Failure to comply with PD may lead to rejection of document
– Order 59 rule 7 - may also lead to solicitor being penalised for costs

Compliance with Court Practice Directions (O. 92, r. 2A)

2A. Every document must comply with such requirements and contain such information and particulars of parties
or other persons as may be laid down by or specified in any practice directions for the time being issued by the
Registrar.

Rejection of earlier documents (O. 92, r. 3)

3. —(1) The Registrar, or any officer charged with the duty of receiving and filing any document, may reject it if
it does not comply with these Rules or with any practice directions issued.
(2) A document rejected under paragraph (1) shall be treated as having been filed only on the date on which it is
subsequently accepted for filing by the Registrar, or any officer charged with the duty of receiving and filing any
document, and not before

18
Costs arising from misconduct or neglect (O. 59, r. 7)
7. —(1) Where it appears to the Court in any proceedings that any thing has been done, or that any omission has
been made, unreasonably or improperly by or on behalf of any party, the Court may order that the costs of that
party in respect of the act or omission, as the case may be, shall not be allowed and that any costs occasioned by
it to any other party shall be paid by him to that other party.
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of paragraph (1), the Court shall for the purpose of that paragraph have
regard in particular to the following matters:
(a) the omission to do any thing the doing of which would have been calculated to save costs;
(b) the doing of any thing calculated to occasion, or in a manner or at a time calculated to occasion unnecessary
costs; and
(c) any unnecessary delay in the proceedings.
(3) The Court may, instead of giving a direction under paragraph (1) in relation to anything done or omission
made, direct the Registrar to inquire into it and, if it appears to him that such a direction should have been given
in relation to it to act as if the appropriate direction had been given.
(4) The Registrar shall, in relation to anything done or omission made in the court of taxation and in relation to
any failure to procure taxation have the same power to disallow or to award costs as the Court has under
paragraph (1) to direct that costs shall be disallowed to or paid by any party.
(5) Where a party entitled to costs fails to procure or fails to proceed with taxation, the Registrar in order to
prevent any other parties being prejudiced by that failure, may allow the party so entitled a nominal or other sum
for costs or may certify the failure and the costs of the other parties

- Registrar’s circulars
– Appendix A to Practice Directions of Court
– More informative and for guidance
– Enhancement of security in Court
– Urgent applications before Judge need to seek permission through Duty Registrar
– Appointment of SAR
– Launch and implementation of EFS

- Practice circulars
– Law Society PD and Rulings 1989 still exist to the extent that they are not inconsistent with
the Professional Conduct Rules.
– Rule 55 - solicitor shall avoid unnecessary adjournments
– Rule 58(b) - Discovery of documents
– Rule 60 - cannot make allegation against witness in closing submission unless that point is put
to that witness in cross-exam
– Rule 70 - No default judgment unless 48 hours notice if solicitor is on record

- • Forms
– Forms in Appendix of Rules
– • Order 1 rule 7, forms may be modified to suit the case. NOTE!!!
– Forms (O. 1, r. 7)
- 7. The Forms in Appendix A to these Rules shall be used where applicable with such
variations as the circumstances of the particular case require.

- • Practice of court

- English Practice
- Section 62(1) SCJA - registrars have the same jurisdiction as registrars and masters of courts in
England.
- English practice may be adopted if Singapore rules silent.
- Prior to PD on Anton Piller and Mareva Injunctions - Singapore courts did recgnise English PD on this.

- Books
– • Jeffrey Pinsler “Civil Practice in Singapore & Malaysia”
– • Jeffrey Pinsler – Singapore Court Practice
– • Ng Peng Hong “Singapore Court Forms and Precedents”
– • White Book

19
 – • Bullen & Leake
– • Atkin’s Court Forms
– • Halsbury’s Volume 37 Practice & Procedure

- Inherent jurisdiction

o • Order 92 rule 4
Inherent powers of Court (O. 92, r. 4)
4. For the removal of doubt it is hereby declared that nothing in these Rules shall be deemed to limit or affect the
inherent powers of the Court to make any order as may be necessary to prevent injustice or to prevent an abuse of
the process of the Court.

o Pinsler, The Inherent Powers of the Court [1997] 0 SJLS 1

This article examines the source, nature and scope of the inherent powers of the court, as well as the relationship
between these powers and the court's procedural mechanism. It has often been the view that the inherent
jurisdiction of the English court is applicable in Singapore without qualification. This assumption must be
considered in the light of the jurisdictional developments which have occurred since the 1960's. The article also
focuses on the willingness of the court to use its inherent powers to ensure a fair and effective process of
litigation, and the justification of such a role in the absence, or even in the face, of statutory provision.

Sir Jack Jacob—The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court

- “reserve of powers, residual source of powers, which the court may draw upon where it is just and equitable
to do so, to ensure the due observance of the law, to prevent improper, vexatious or oppressive conduct, to
do justice between the parties and to secure a fair trial between them”
- Jurisdiction not derived from statute or rules
- But from very nature of court as superior court of law - therefore inherent
- Essential character of superior court that it should have the power to maintain its authority and prevent its
process from being abused
- without such power, courts will have form but lack substance

Heng Joo See v Ho Pol Ling [1993] 3 SLR 850

- • Order 92 rule 4 does not confer inherent jurisdiction. It merely states that the rules will not limit inherent
jurisdiction. Inherent jurisdiction are common law powers.
o – Punch Coomaraswamy J
- The court’s inherent common law powers to make any order necessary to prevent injustice or abuse of the
process of the courts was not limited by Order 92 r 4 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1990 (RSC).
- This inherent power could be used in: (a) proceedings involving a deception on the court, or are fictitious or
constitute a mere sham; (b) proceedings where the process of the court was not being fairly or honestly used
but employed for some ulterior or improper purpose or in an improper way; (c) proceedings which were
manifestly groundless or without foundation or which serve no useful purpose; and (d) multiple or
successive proceedings which caused or were likely to cause improper vexation or oppression.

Burgess v Stafford Hotel Ltd [1990] 3 All ER 222

- Court held that it had inherent jurisdiction to strike out Notice of Appeal on same grounds under Order 18
rule 19 even though the Notice of Appeal is not a pleading within the definition of the Order.
- Appellate court exercising inherent jurisdiction

Implications for Singapore

 Sir Jack Jacob refers to superior courts, Does this apply therefore to subordinate courts?
 Order 92 rule 4 assumes same treatment for both High Court and Sub Cts
 O 1 r 4(2) defines court as “the High Court or any one or more Judges thereof or a District Court or
District Judge, whether sitting in Court or in Chambers, and includes, in cases where he is empowered to
act, a Magistrate or the Registrar; but the foregoing provision shall not be taken as affecting any provision
of these Rules and, in particular, Order 32, Rule 9, by virtue of which the authority and jurisdiction of the
Registrar is defined and regulated”
 Local courts have long recognised the inherent jurisdiction of courts. Especially in striking out pleadings
under Order 18 rule 19 and inherent jurisdiction

20
Can Court disregard rules?
- Query : Is inherent jurisdiction limited to only matters not covered by rules?
- E.g. - Order 29 r 2 refers to preservation of property but makes no provision for ex-parte relief. Yet Anton
Piller orders are accepted.

The Siskina [1979] AC 210

 Issue :
 Whether facts came within Order 11 for service out of jurisdiction? To do so, court would have to exercise
inherent jurisdiction.
 Lord Denning had to decide whether to do justice by applying inherent jurisdiction or apply the rules rigidly
 Lord Denning
o “It was suggested that [applying inherent jurisdiction is a course]… not open as the law should be
left to be amended by the Rules Committee. But to wait for the Committee would be to shut the
stable door after the steed had been stolen. And who knows, there may never be another horse in
the stable. I ask, why should the judges wait for the Rules Committee. The judges have an inherent
jurisdiction to lay down the practice and procedure.
o To the timorous souls I would say in the words of William Cowper :
“Ye fearful judges (saints), fresh courage take
The clouds ye so much dread
Are big with justice (mercy) and shall break
In blessings on your heads.”
 Lord Hailsham
o House of Lords disagreed with Lord Denning.
o HL said that the jurisdiction of the Rules Committee is statutory and the judges cannot usurp the
function of the legislature. Rules Committee is far more than suitable than court of three judges, no
matter how eminent, deciding on an individual case.

Harrison v Tew [1990] 1 All ER 321

- Court has no inherent jurisdiction if statute clearly sets out the parameters
- In this case, court had no inherent jurisdiction to tax solicitors’ bill as the statute states that court cannot
order taxation after period of 12 months from payment of bill.

- RULES OF COURT – ORDERS 1 and 2

(i) Order 1 rule 2(4)

- Rules of Court do not apply to :
 Bankruptcy
 Winding-Up
 Criminal proceedings
 Matrimonial proceedings
 Judicial Management

(4) These Rules shall not apply to proceedings of the kind specified in the first column of the following Table
(being proceedings in respect of which rules may be made under the written law specified in the second column
of that Table), except for the provisions specified in the third column of that Table:
Proceedings Written Law Applicable Provisions
1. Bankruptcy proceedings. Bankruptcy Act (Chapter 20), Order 63A and items 71D to 71I
s.166. and 75 of Appendix B.
2. O. 1, r. 2Proceedings relating to Companies Act (Chapter 50), (a) Order 63A and items 71D to
the winding up of companies. s.410. 71I and 75 of Appendix B; and
(b) Order 88, Rule 2 (5).
3. Proceedings under Part IV of the Parliamentary Elections Act, s.100. Order 63A and items 71D to 71I
Parliamentary Elections Act and 75 of Appendix B.
(Chapter 218).
4. Proceedings under Part I of the Mental Disorders and Treatment Order 63A and items 71D to 71I

21
Mental Disorders and Treatment
Act (Chapter 178).
5. Proceedings under Part X of the
Women’s Charter (Chapter 353)
(except appeals to the Court of
Appeal).
6. Criminal Proceedings.
7. Proceedings relating to the
winding up of limited liability
partnerships.
Act, s.62.
Women’s Charter, s.139.
Criminal Procedure Code (Chapter
68).
Limited Liability Partnerships Act
2005 (Act 5 of 2005), s.57.
and 75 of Appendix B.
Order 63A and items 70B, 71,
71D to 71I and 79 of Appendix B.
(a) Order 63A and items 71D to
71I and 75 of Appendix B; and
(b) Order 96, Rule 3 (2).

(ii) Order 1 rule 2(5)

(5) In the case of the proceedings mentioned in paragraph (4), nothing in that paragraph shall be taken as
affecting any provision of any rules (whether made under the Act or any other written law) by virtue of which
these Rules or any provisions thereof are applied in relation to any of those proceedings.

(iii) Order 2
•Order 2 deals with non-compliance with the ROC
•Effect of non-compliance
•If too rigid adherence to rules, may unjustly deprive party of rights
•If too flexible, leads to abuse, confusion and uncertainty.
•Order 2 rule 1, renders proceedings irregular, not null and void. Court then has discretion to make appropriate
order.
•See Metroinvest Anstalt (case way, way below) for excellent summary of what Order 2 ought to be regarded as
Non-compliance with Rules (O. 2, r. 1)
1. —(1) Where, in beginning or purporting to begin any proceedings or at any stage in the course of or in
connection with any proceedings, there has, by reason of anything done or left undone, been a failure to comply
with the requirements of these Rules, whether in respect of time, place, manner, form or content or in any other
respect, thetaken in the proceedings, or any document, judgment or order therein.
(2) Subject to paragraph (3), the Court may, on the ground that there has been such a failure as is mentioned in
paragraph (1), and on such terms as to costs or otherwise as it thinks just, set aside either wholly or in part the
proceedings in which the failure occurred, any step taken in those proceedings or any document, judgment or
order therein or exercise its powers under these Rules to allow such amendments (if any) to be made and to make
such order (if any) dealing with the proceedings generally as it thinks fit.
(3) The Court shall not wholly set aside any proceedings or the writ or other originating process by which they
were begun on the ground that the proceedings were required by any of these Rules to be begun by an originating
process other than the one employed

Golden Ocean v Martin [1990] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 215 CA

 Facts: Pf failed to serve Writ on one of the many defendants but sent an acknowledgement of service.
 Held
• Df aware of issuance of writ.
• Service of a form of acknowledgment by plaintiffs was plainly an attempt to take a step in the
proceedings i.e. to serve the writ but it failed to comply with the requirements of the rules as to
what should be served.
• However, by virtue of O 2, r 1 this failure was to be treated as an irregularity and did not nullify
the service
• As to the exercise of discretion: there was no evidence that the defendants had suffered any
prejudice as a result of the process server's error; the discretion of the court would be exercised
against setting aside the service on the defendants

22
 Dissent – one dissenting judge:
• too serious to be irregularity; df never even received writ at all, and this is an omission so serious
that it cannot be regarded as a failure to comply with the requirements of the Rules by reason of
something left undone. More accurately described as doing nothing.
• Regarding discretion: the defect in service was very serious, so serious, indeed, that an experienced
Commercial Judge [in the lower court] regarded it as no service at all. Secondly, conduct of the
plaintiffs excites little sympathy. They left it until the last moment of the second renewal of the
writ before seeking to effect service. If they had served a little sooner, they could have re-served
without difficulty.
• Comment : Innocent mistake – several defendants who instructed same solicitor - no prejudice; impt emphasis
on innocent mistake AND seriousness of non compliance

Roberts v Applied Bioscience International (Unreported, 11 October 2000, CA)

- Proceedings issued on last day of six-year limitation period against such actions
- Service of writ was made some days before the expiry of the writ, on someone else with same name, but no
connection at all with defendant, who had moved its registered offices elsewhere
- Held: no service within the period of the validity of the writ. The writ was served on some completely
different party. There was an error, for which the claimant must be held responsible, as between himself and
the defendants. The circumstances were such that the court, effectively, is bound to say that that service
should be regarded as having had no effect because in fact it had no effect.

Bondy v Lloyds Bank (Times, 13th March, 1991 CA)

•Facts : Failed to attach acknowledgement of service with Writ
•Held : Mere irregularity. No prejudice. Service was on an experienced solicitor who knew what to do (ie : to
send the acknowledgement)
•Comment : Equivalent in Singapore to missing out words on the Writ that informs Df what to do if he wishes to
defend action.

Leal v Dunlop [1984] 2 All ER 207

•Facts: Failure to apply for leave to issue out of jurisdiction and failure to apply for leave to serve out of
jurisdiction.
•Pf proceeded to serve out of jurisdiction before the expiry of the writ but after expiry of the limitation period.
Df applied to strike out Writ. Pf applied to extend time to serve Writ and also to retroactively validate issuance
and service of Writ overseas.
•Held: Ct has power to retroactively grant leave. Court will not allow Pf to enter the back door if he would not
have ordinarily been allowed to enter the front door. Here, he would have normally been allowed to extend time
to serve Writ.
•However, failure to obtain leave to issue and serve Writ overseas is serious. O. 11 (regarding service of writ out
of jurisdiction) being an order which is an “exceptional enlargement” of the jurisdiction of the courts, the courts
must restrain any misuse of it. Would therefore require serious circumstances to validate such leave retroactively.

Official Receiver v QBE Insurance [1989] 1 MLJ 1, Singapore CA

•Facts: Writs valid for one year. Five years later, the liquidator applied ex parte to renew the validity of the writ
for the five successive 12-month periods. QBE appealed, Registrar set aside writ, and liquidator appealed.
•Held, dismissing the appeal:
 Court set aside Writ for non-compliance with rules. Court applied Leal v Dunlop.
 The court’s power to cure an irregularity under O 2 r 1 could only be exercised if the court could
have properly granted the order for which there was a failure to apply, had there also been an
application made pursuant to the relevant provision of the rules.
 Considering the circumstances of the case as a whole, the court found that the liquidator had no
good reason for extending the validity of the writ of service. The appeal was dismissed with costs.

23
Fielding v Rigby [1993] 4 All ER 294
•Facts: Pf issued Writ for damages for personal injuries. Pf died before it was served. Application with widow
(his personal representative) as Pf but widow did not amend title to action. So writ served with dead plaintiff’s
name. After that the widow applied to have her name substituted in the action. Df opposed on basis that at time
writ served, plaintiff did not even exist (dead) and widow was not named in action.

•Held: CA held that cause of action did not abate with death. As action vested in the estate and devolved upon
the widow (so at no stage of proceedings was the action ever vested in a non-existent party), the failure to amend
the title was a mere irregularity and was not serious. The capacity of the widow to sue was unquestionable.

Cf Dubai Bank v Galadari No 4 (Times, 23 Feb 1990)

•Facts : Defendant argued that Dubai Bank (Plaintiff) had no legal capacity to sue because it did not exist as a
legal entity or corporate body of its incorporation at the time the writ was issued (by the Plaintiff) as it had been
dissolved by failure to comply with certain laws in the country
•Held: Legal capacity to sue could not be cured by Order 2 rule 1. If legal capacity does not exist for either
Plaintiff or Defendant, then the proceedings are a nullity and must be set aside.
•Distinguishable from Fielding v Rigby
The Pacific Wisdom [1998] 3 SLR 705
•Facts: Ship collision. Appellants were owners of the “Pacific Wisdom” and claiming damages in collision
between their ship and respondents’ ship. In the course of action, respondents discovered that ship was let on
bareboat charter. They argued that loss suffered not suffered by owners but by bareboat charter, therefore claim
denied. Appellants then applied to amend the writ to substitute the bareboat charterer’s particulars in place of
their own. By that time, the bareboat charterer’s claim had been time-barred.
•CA held: “Owners” in this case does not include “bareboat charterers”.
•CA rejected argument that amendment of particulars was mere irregularity. CA held that the bareboat charter
was not a party, therefore no irregularity to amend or regularize.
•The court’s power to cure an irregularity under O 2 r 1 of the Rules of Court (RSC) could only be exercised if
the court could have properly granted the order under the relevant rule. Since the bareboat charterers’ claim was
time-barred, they would have had to comply with the conditions set out in O 20 r 5(3) before they could invoke
the court’s power under O 2 r 1 to amend the endorsement on the writ
•CA will not allow Order 2 rule 1 to be used as a “back door”.
(iv) Application To Set Aside Under Order 2, Rule 1 Before Delay, Waiver, Fresh Step

• Order 2 rule 2(1)

- Application to set aside irregularity should be done within reasonable time before other party has taken any
fresh step after becoming aware of the irregularity
- • Application to set aside irregularity should be done
- • within reasonable time
 do no waive your rights or go on to take futhr step in proceedings pending the outcome. What
amounts to fresh step in action.
- • before he has taken any fresh step after becoming aware of the irregularity
Application to set aside for irregularity (O. 2, r. 2)
2. —(1) An application to set aside for irregularity any proceedings, any step taken in any proceedings or any
document, judgment or order therein shall not be allowed unless it is made within a reasonable time and before
the party applying has taken any fresh step after becoming aware of the irregularity.
(2) An application under this Rule may be made by summons and the grounds of objection must be stated in the
summons.

Pontin v Wood [1962] 1 QB 594

•Inaction

24
•Facts: Indorsement of claim was defective in that it failed to describe nature of claim. “Damages for personal
injuries” was not sufficient (and plaintiff’s counsel conceded during trial that it was defective). Four months after
service of writ, Df applied to dismiss action as nullity for failure to comply with rule that requires indorsement to
describe nature of claim•
•Held :
•unreasonable delay. Court took into account the fact that claim was genuine although the Plaintiff was
dilatory. Df was invoking too rigorous a remedy.
•Court reminded Df that Pf had been indulgent in Df’s delay in entering appearance.
•(1) If the writ was a nullity there was no power to cure it; but this writ was not a nullity: it was merely
defective and could be cured by the subsequent delivery of a proper statement of claim (which was done
in this case), albeit delivered after the expiry of the relevant period of limitation. The Limitation Acts
required only that the writ should be issued within the period of limitation.
•(2) An application to set aside a writ which discloses no cause of action is appropriate only where the
indorsement shows that the action is an abuse of the process of the court. The court in the exercise of its
discretion should not set aside a defective writ and thereby destroy the plaintiffs' ability to continue their
action merely because the defect has not been cured within the period of limitation. ROC Order 70 was
directed to curing that which was capable of being cured, and its tenor should not be reversed merely
because the period of limitation had expired.
•(3) The defendant had been neither harmed nor deprived of a defence which would not be available to
him if service were set aside and re-service had to be effected.
•(4) This defendant had by his own delay disentitled himself from asking the court to render the
proceedings void, for he himself had not complied with the mandatory terms of the ROC because of his
own unreasonable delay in entering appearance etc.

Rein v Stein [1892] 66 LT 4942

•Fresh steps
•Facts: Objection on ground of jurisdiction
•Held: Waiver. Defendant had applied for an order for documents and for extension of time to file Defence. He
had taken fresh steps.

Re Orr Ewing [1883] 22 Ch D 456

- Facts : Matter involve 3 Scots men served out of jurisdiction. The Scots Defendants could have argued
forum non conveniens and try matter in Scotland earlier.
- Held : Delay in taking out application plus filing defence. Therefore too late to apply now.
•Inaction
•Facts: Chap in Scotland made a will appointing six trustees. A person resident in England, who was entitled to a
share of a large legacy and also of the residue, brought an action in England to administer the estate.
•Three of the trustees were served in England and the other three in Scotland under the usual order (served “out
of English jurisdiction”). The Scottish trustees entered an appearance without protest, and took no steps to
discharge the order. The Plaintiff moved for judgment for administration of the whole estate, both Scotch and
English. The Scots Defendants could have argued forum non conveniens and try matter in Scotland earlier but
did not do so
•Held: Delay in making objections to the service. The three Defendants who were served in Scotland could have
moved to have the order for service on them discharged, on the ground that they ought to be sued in Scotland, the
country of their residence, and not in England. But they did not. Hence they could not object to judgment at trial
in England now as it was too late. Therefore, the Court at the trial had no discretion, but was bound to give the
Plaintiff a decree.

2
Couldn’t find this case. Saw a case with same name and date, different citation, and judgment was
different from the summary given in lectures, so I’m putting both here.

25
Sheldon v Brown Bayley’s Steel Works Ltd [1953] 2 QB 393
- Waiver
- Plaintiff failed to serve writ within duration of writ
- Defendant entered unconditional appearance but later applied to have writ set aside for nullity because of
irregularity
- Held: Failure to serve writ within duration did not render writ null. In any case, the defendant had waived
the irregularity through his unconditional appearance

Wilkinson v Barking Corporation [1948] 1 KB 721

- Held: By entering unconditional appearance, the defendants had submitted to jurisdiction but that did not
preclude them from challenging the jurisdiction of the court to deal with the claim

Indo Commercial Society v Ebrahim [1992] 2 SLR 1041

•Held, per curiam:
o Submission to jurisdiction did not of itself confer jurisdiction on the High Court unless one of the
conditions in ss 16 or 17 of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act was first satisfied.
o Submission to jurisdiction was not one of the conditions mentioned in any written law in Singapore
and therefore would not by itself confer jurisdiction on the High Court except in the circumstances
envisaged in s 16(2) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act.
o The lower court’s earlier pronouncement at the interlocutory stage of the proceedings, that the
defendants by entering unconditional appearance had unequivocally submitted to the jurisdiction of
the court, was open to question.

Kuwait Oil Tanker v Al Bader [1997] 1 WLR 1410

- Plaintiff needed to serve writs on three defendants in same action. Some of the defendants were out of
jurisdiction, and some were within jurisdiction. Under requisite ROC concerned, plaintiff had to first serve
writ on one defendant (whether within or outside the jurisdiction), before applying for leave to serve on
another defendant. Plaintiff did not do so here.
- Held: If leave was granted without fulfilling that requirement, the court could, approaching the matter with
great care and caution, validate the leave retrospectively if there was good cause or good reason to do so.
No prejudice to the defendant had resulted from the lack of fulfillment of the requirement.

Harrison v Touche Ross [1995] The Times, Feb 14

•Facts: Plaintiff gave instructions to lawyers only on last day of service of writ to serve it. Plaintiff’s solicitors
did not properly serve it on Defendants.
•Lower court refused application to extend validity of writ for service, and refused to treat irregular service on
Defendant as good, but saved the action by treating the writ as being issued and served on the date the
Defendant’s other partners came to know of suit.
•CA held: No good reason given by Plaintiff for failure to serve writ within validity period. No good reason for
giving extension. The irregular attempt to serve did not bring Writ to attention of Defendant.
•Lower court acted without any rule or authority. Even if he did have the power, it represented an impermissible
exercise of discretion, since the effect is to extend the Writ when it ought not to be justified.

Bank of American National Trust and Savings v Chrismas and Others “The Kyriaki” [1994] 1 All ER 401
•Writ amended to substitute new defendant for defendant named in writ. New defendant argued that amendment
not made in time, and since limitation was in effect, he should not be joined in action.
•Lower court made ex parte order extending time for effecting amendment
•Held by Hirst J in Commercial Ct, QB:

26
  In the case of a new defendant an order which permitted service on him outside the limitation
period was bad since it was onIy at the date of service that the claim was effectively brought
against him and that he was effectively joined
 O 15, r 8(4) was directly relevant and applicable; and it would be unjust to join the new party as a
defendant at a time when limitation had run in his favour because to do so would have the effect of
depriving him of a valid defence
 The amendment was bad since it took place outside the limitation period; and the joinder of the
new defendants by service was also bad since it fell outside the limitation period

Metroinvest Anstalt v Commercial Union Assurance [1985] 1 WLR 513

- Where in the course of proceedings there is a failure by a party to comply with the rules which has not been
waived by the other party, either expressly or by implication, the court has a discretion under Or 2r 1(2) to
make such consequential orders dealing with the proceedings as it thinks fit. E.g. to set aside wholly or in
part the proceedings in which the failure occurred (or the relevant step taken in the proceedings or the
relevant document or order), or to make a dispensing order waiving the relevant irregularity, regardless of
whether or not an application to set aside has been made by the other party
- That discretion is to be exercised judicially and the court has to look at all the circumstances of the case,
including the questions: (i) whether the other party has already been prejudiced by the irregularity; (ii) if the
irregularity is one which the court could and should rectify; (iii) whether it can do so without prejudice to
the other party.
- Where a litigant has failed to comply with the rules, the other party is entitled to rely on that failure even
though it is only a technical breach of the rules if in the event of waiver of the breach the rules would
operate to confer a benefit on the party in default which in the circumstances of the case justice requires he
should not receive
- O.2 r 1 is not to be construed as meaning that a failure to comply with the rules is not to be treated as
irregular until the other party successfully applies to the court to set aside the proceedings, and therefore the
non-complying party is not entitled to rely on the proceedings merely because there has been no application
by the other party to set aside the proceedings for irregularity or no action taken by the court on such an
application

Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Cash and Ors [unreported, 25 Nov 1998. CA]
- Respondent (Secretary of State etc.) through solicitors for Treasury tried many times to serve on Cash, the
appellant, but received no response at his only known address, and were repeatedly informed by Cash’s
solicitors that they had no word from him
- Finally they “purported” to serve him by post at his address after several tries at personal service received no
response
- Cash protested that he had not tried to evade service, that he was not aware that service was being effected
upon him, and that he never received the documents served on him by post, and argued irregular service
- Held: Under O. 2, r.1, court would rightly invoke powers to excuse the irregularity of service. No prejudice
caused to Mr. Cash if proceedings were to proceed. (Mostly the court did not believe Cash’s protestations
and allowed proceedings to go ahead)

The "Melati"[2004] 4 SLR

Facts
- The vessel Melati (“the vessel”) suffered a casualty at sea on 24 December 2000 in the course of a laden
voyage and the goods carried onboard had to be salvaged. On 5 March 2002, the respondents commenced in
rem proceedings against the vessel, naming the appellants as the defendants in the writ of summons in
respect of a claim for cargo damage and indemnity for salvage. The writ was served and the appellants
subsequently entered an appearance on 20 March 2002. The salvors commenced arbitration proceedings in
London for their reward. No further step was taken by the respondents until 18 March 2003 when a
Statement of Claim was served on the appellants, who duly objected to the service on the ground that it was
served out of time and without leave of court. The respondents applied for an extension of time to file the
Statement of Claim but the assistant registrar refused the application and ordered that the statement filed on

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 18 March 2003 be struck out. The assistant registrar then treated the matter as having been automatically
discontinued under O 21 r 2(6) of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 1997 Rev Ed) (“the ROC”), which
provided for the automatic discontinuance of an action if no step or proceeding had been taken in an action
for more than one year.
- The respondents appealed to the judge in chambers. The judge held that though the Statement of Claim was
irregular, being filed and served out of time without leave, it was nevertheless a “step” for the purposes of
O 21 r 2(6). Allowing the appeal, the judge proceeded to regularise the Statement of Claim and ordered it to
stand as filed and served. The present appeal was brought.
Held, dismissing the appeal:
- The failure as regards the Statement of Claim filed and served by the respondents on the appellants on
18 March 2003 was in respect of time. Pursuant to O 2 r 1(1) of the ROC, the step taken by the
respondents was accordingly only an irregularity, not a nullity: at [15] to [16].
- The combined effect of O 2 r 1(1) and r 1(2) of the ROC was that a step or proceeding, though taken out of
time, was to be treated as regular unless set aside. There was effectively a presumption of validity in
favour of the irregular step. The Statement of Claim filed and served on 18 March 2003 was within the
period of one year prescribed by O 21 r 2(6). As such, although the period from 20 March 2002 to 18 March
2003 was just two days short of a year, the prescribed condition was nevertheless not satisfied and O 21
r 2(6) was not triggered. An irregular step, unless and until it was set aside, was nonetheless a “step” for the
purposes of O 21 r 2(6): at [20].
- The term “step” was not defined in the ROC. However, there could be no doubt that the filing of a
Statement of Claim with the Registry was a “step” as it was clearly an act to move the action forwards
towards resolution. Here, the explicit words of O 21 r 2(6) provided that the “step” must have been one that
appeared from the records maintained by the court. As was held in Moguntia-Est Epices SA v Sea-Hawk
Freight Pte Ltd [2003] 4 SLR 429, it was therefore the “filing” and not the “service” that ought to be
reckoned with for the purposes of O 21 r 2(6) because the “service” would not be “recorded in the court’s
record”: at [17], [21], [23] to [24].
- The court had sufficient arsenal to deal with a party who abused its processes. A plaintiff who, having filed
his Statement of Claim, delayed in serving it must adequately explain why the pleading was not served at
the time it was filed. If it appeared to the court that the filing without service was just a ploy to buy more
time, it would be entitled to refuse leave to serve the pleading out of time and to strike out the pleadings
already filed: at [24].
- There was no one decisive test in answering the question of whether an extension of time should be
granted. Non-compliance with procedural rules did not necessarily lead to the striking out of a claim or a
defence such that a plaintiff was denied an adjudication of his claim. It would always be a balancing
exercise, involving a consideration of all relevant factors such as the nature of the act which was not
fulfilled, the reason for the failure, the prejudice which an extension would cause and any other extenuating
circumstances. The ultimate decision would depend on all the circumstances of the case and the facts must
be sufficient to persuade the court that granting indulgence to the party in default would not be out of place:
at [34] and [37].
- While it was true that the respondents had been 11½ months late in filing and serving the Statement of
Claim, the delay was not because they had no serious intention to pursue the action. Both the
appellants and the respondents were actively involved in the salvors’ arbitration in London, the outcome of
which had a direct bearing on the respondents’ claim. Although the respondents should have, before the
expiry of the prescribed time, applied for an extension of time to file their Statement of Claim, the
circumstances were such that the judge was not in error in the exercise of her discretion to
retrospectively grant the respondents an extension of time and to regularise the otherwise defective
service: at [29] to [31], [36] to [37].

Lassiter Ann Masters v To Keng Lam (alias Toh Jeanette) [2004] 2 SLR 392
Fact
- The appellant (“the plaintiff”) was the widow of Henry Adolphus Lassiter (“HAL”), a US citizen who died
in a motor accident here in 1994. The respondent (“the defendant”) was the driver of the vehicle that
collided with HAL. The plaintiff made a claim for dependency. The assessment hearing was conducted
before the assistant registrar (“the AR”) in two tranches.

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- Companies belonging to HAL had come under Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the United States. This was not
made known to the defendant. Upon the defendant’s discovery of the Chapter 11 bankruptcy, the plaintiff
sought to have an additional affidavit affirmed by one Baker (“2S-AEIC”) introduced during the second
tranche of the hearing. The AR refused. At the conclusion of the assessment, the AR rejected the loss of
inheritance claim. Both parties appealed to the judge in chambers.
- The plaintiff filed a summons for further directions to have 2S-AEIC, a further affidavit affirmed by Baker
(“3S-AEIC”) as well as a further affidavit affirmed by one Seaman (“4S-AEIC”), admitted into evidence for
the purpose of the appeals. At the hearing, the judge in chambers deferred the consideration of the two
substantive appeals in order to deal with the issues arising from the summons for further directions. She
affirmed the AR’s order in relation to 2S-AEIC, and refused to have 3S-AEIC and 4S-AEIC admitted into
evidence. She also said that the plaintiff should have appealed against the AR’s order on 2S-AEIC.
- Before the Court of Appeal, the plaintiff sought only to have 2S-AEIC and 3S-AEIC admitted into evidence.
In relation to 2S-AEIC, the issue was whether the judge in chambers exercised her discretion correctly in
affirming the AR’s decision. In relation to 3S-AEIC, the issue was whether the judge in chambers was
correct to refuse to admit fresh evidence, and whether the Ladd v Marshall conditions were applicable to an
appeal from an assessment award.
Held dismissing the appeal:
- The judge in chambers’ exercise of discretion could not be shown to be erroneous in relation to 3S-AEIC
since the reason given for its late introduction was hardly meritorious: at [44].
- As the AR had refused to admit 2S-AEIC, this should have been stated in the plaintiff’s Notice of Appeal
against his decision as one of the grounds of appeal. As for 3S-AEIC, the plaintiff ought to have proceeded
by way of a summons in chambers pursuant to O 32 r 1 of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5). Nevertheless,
these were procedural defects which could be treated as irregularities under O 2 r 1: at [46] to [48].
 48 In any event, such procedural errors are matters which the court, in exercise of its
discretionary powers under O 2 r 1(1), may treat as an irregularity. Neither the appellant nor the
respondent would be prejudiced by the court so treating the procedural defects as mere
irregularities. Both parties knew what were the issues they had to address.
- [Observation: In the circumstances of this case, it was quite clear that the plaintiff did not proceed with the
assessment of damages in all good faith. There were clear attempts at suppressing the truth and in preventing
the defendant from discovering the truth. Sufficient opportunities were accorded to the plaintiff to
substantiate her claims and yet she failed to do so. Any party who came to court seeking to play a “cat-and-
mouse” game could not expect sympathy or indulgence: at [49].]

Riduan bin Yusof v Khng Thian Huat and Another [2005] 2 SLR 188

Facts
This appeal arose out of a dispute over a tenancy agreement between the parties. The respondents were the
owners of a certain property that was tenanted by the appellant and his wife from 1995 to 2003. After the
appellant was habitually late in making rental payments, the parties’ relationship rapidly deteriorated and the
respondents commenced proceedings against the appellant.
In the course of the proceedings, both parties agreed, at the court’s suggestion, to abide by the decision of a
court-appointed expert (the “court expert”) on the issue of identifying and quantifying damage caused by the
appellant to the property. The terms of reference for the court expert stated, inter alia, that there shall be no
appeal or revision in respect of the court expert’s decision. At the conclusion of the trial, the judge accepted the
court expert’s findings and allowed the respondents’ claim in part, but dismissed a claim by the respondents for
double rent.
The appellant then filed a notice of appeal against the judge’s decision, stating his intention to appeal against the
judge’s decision on: (a) damages; and (b) costs. The respondents then filed an application to strike out the notice
of appeal, claiming that the notice of appeal was: (a) irregular; and (b) frivolous, vexatious and/or an abuse of
process.
Held, dismissing the application:
(1) The Court of Appeal had the inherent jurisdiction to strike out a notice of appeal where an appeal was
plainly not competent, where the appeal was frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of the process of the court, or if
there was no possibility that the grounds of appeal were capable of argument. A court would only exercise its
power to strike out notices of appeal in clear and obvious cases, and the burden lay on the respondents to show
that the notice of appeal should be struck out: at [17] and [21].
(2) Even if the notice of appeal did not adhere to the prescribed form, the court had the discretion to allow
amendments to the irregularity, if any. In addition, unless the alleged irregularity was so fundamental or serious

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that the court ought not to exercise its discretion, mere irregularities would not render the proceedings void: at
[24].
24 Further, para 57/3/4 of the White Book states clearly that even if the Notice of Appeal did not adhere to the
form (Form 115) prescribed in the Rules which was the respondents’ complaint here, the court has the discretion
under O 2 r 1 of the Rules to allow amendments to remedy the irregularity (if any). In addition, unless the
alleged irregularity was so fundamental or serious that the court ought not to exercise its discretion under O 2
r 1 of the Rules, “mere irregularities” do not render the proceedings void. It would be a different matter if, for
example, the respondents had complained that they had been somehow misled or had suffered damage due to the
alleged “irregularities” (Hong Kim Sui v Malayan Banking Bhd [1971] 1 MLJ 289). Otherwise, the Notice of
Appeal should only be struck out if the breach for non-compliance was so fundamental that “it went to the very
root of the legal process” (Dato Wong Gek Meng v Pathmanathan a/l Mylvaganam [1998] 5 MLJ 560 at 566).
(3) The respondents failed to explain how the supposed irregularity, if any, in
the notice of appeal was so serious as to merit a decision to strike out the notice of appeal. The respondents’
contention that the notice of appeal was irregular was therefore no more than a bare assertion: at [22].

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