GCST New Voices No. 5

New Voices Series
No. 5, August 2010
Spheres of Military Autonomy under Democratic Rule: Implications and Prospects for Security Sector Transformation (SST) in the Philippines
Aries Arugay
Arugay, A. (2010). Spheres of Military Autonomy under Democratic Rule: Implications and Prospects for Security Sector Transformation (SST) in the Philippines, New Voices Series, no. 5, August, Global Consortium on Security Transformation (GCST). Available at: http://www.securitytransformation.org/gc_publications.php
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Spheres of Military Autonomy under Democratic Rule: Implications and Prospects for Security Sector Transformation (SST) in the Philippines
Aries Ayuson Arugay
Contents
1. 2. 3. 4. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 4 6 7 8 10 12 14 15 19 21 22
Military Autonomy: Insights from Civil-Military Relations (CMR) Theory . . . . . . . . . Reforming and Transforming the Security Sector: SST as a Political Project . . . . . . . . The Philippine Security Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.1. The Philippine Military: Evolution and Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2. The Philippine Military in the Post-Authoritarian Period 5. 6. Military Autonomy during the Arroyo Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Spheres of Military Autonomy in the Philippines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.1. Security Policy: High Level of Military Autonomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2. Human Rights: Moderate Level of Military Autonomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3. Defense Budgeting: Low Level of Military Autonomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7. Conclusion: Challenges and Prospects for Security Sector Transformation . . . . . . . . .
Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of the Philippines-Diliman and Fellow, Institute for Strategic and Development Studies, Inc (ISDS Philippines).
Spheres of Military Autonomy under Democratic Rule: Implications and Prospects for Security Sector Transformation (SST) in the Philippines A. Arugay
1.
Introduction
The establishment and maintenance of democratic civilian control is one of the most impor-
tant indicators of successful democratization among countries of the developing world, particularly those that had experience with military rule. Democratizing civil-military relations (CMR) is a necessary component of the transformation of any country's security sector. Basically, this reconguration of power relations between the security forces, civilian political institutions, and social groups that signicantly shapes post-transition democratization and institution-building is the essence of security sector transformation (SST). However, any project that seeks to transform the military and the security sector conducive to democratic rule is a gradual, complicated, and dicult endeavor. It is a political process that would inevitably result in a redenition of institutional roles, functions, and mandates. Moreover, it also entails being subjected to democratic norms and principles such as accountability, responsiveness, and respect for human rights, constitutionalism, and the rule of law, among others. Under a democracy, it is expected that the military will be under the management of democratic institutions and assumes roles appropriate to the security needs of the country. Thus, SST could be dened as the transformation of the security system which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions, so that it is manages and operated in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework (OECD, 2003, p. 30). Unfortunately, this aspiration has not been realized in most democratizing countries. On the contrary, the security sector has resurfaced into the political scene and remains to be a signicant political actor. Instead of being disengaged from politics, post-transition politics in several democracies have been dened by new forms of military intervention beyond the classic coup d'tat and more complex forms of political involvement (McCoy, 2006; Prez-Lin, 2007). What democratizing regimes face is not the overt threat of military rule but exercises of prerogatives and the enjoyment of spheres of autonomy that do not coincide with democratic CMR (Pion-Berlin, 1992). There is an extant body of literature that examines the military's role in post-transition democratization (Alagappa, 2001; Fitch, 1998; Pion-Berlin, 2001). This paper focus is the military's political autonomy which is dened as the military's aversion towards or even deance of civilian control. The degree of political autonomy is a measure of the military's determination to strip civilians of their political prerogatives and claim these for itself (PionBerlin, 1992: 85). High degrees of autonomy in these spheres imply the weakness of the civilian government, its inability to assert civilian control, or its failure to be independent from partisan interests.
This paper is interested in explaining the persistence and steady expansion of the sphere of military autonomy in spite of democratization and how it aects security sector transformation (SST). It argues that SST processes will be constrained, limited, and even undermined so long as the military enjoys signicant degrees of political autonomy in three ways. First, a relatively autonomous military will likely dene and dominate the framework of SST in a given country. This implies that programs that will reform the military will likely not produce the intended results of democratic civilian control. Second, any gains or positive outcomes generated by trans-
CMR theorists argue that the greatest display of political autonomy is staging a coup d'tat.
GCST, New Voices Series, no. 5, August 2010
forming the security sector will likely be jeopardized by the military since they have the power to stie or undermine these reforms. Finally, military autonomy in certain areas such as human rights and security policy hinders the participation of other actors, notably civil society in being able to inuence and contribute to SST initiatives. Using the case of the Philippines, this study seeks to examine these three causal mechanisms that link military autonomy with the space or opportunities for governments to implement programs and policies that could transform the security sector. There are multiple reasons why the case of the Philippines is appropriate in examining how the extent of political autonomy enjoyed by the military could aect the chances of transforming security sector governance. First, just like the rest of the developing world, the Philippines take no exception as a country where challenges related to the nexus of security, democracy, and development continue to exist. For this country, a transformed security sector would cause an improvement in the quality of its democratic regime. As the security sector also comprises the institutions tasked to oversee and manage security forces such as the executive bureaucracy, legislatures, and courts, the pursuit of SST is also in conjunction with much of the task of institution-building necessary for democratic consolidation. Moreover, there is an understanding on the importance of the security sector in conict prevention and peace-building (HDN, 2005). Being in the forefront of lingering internal conicts a communist insurgency and a separatist movement in the southern part of the country a democratically managed and professional security sector is an indispensable component of any peace program. Finally, the security sector occupies a substantial portion of its government. If successfully carried out, SST will hugely contribute to good governance of a country that has often been perceived as one of the most corrupt countries in the world (TI, 2004). Thus, the country could be a good case which could represent the same challenges in similarly-situated countries. Setting aside the possible commonalities it shares with other countries, there are developments in the country's history and politics as well as the presence of certain context-specic factors that justies why a study about the Philippines could help us shed light on the ways the military could resist pressures for SST. It is a country that has returned to democratic rule in 1986 after fourteen years of authoritarianism. However, more than two decades have passed but it remains to struggle in consolidating its democratic regime. One of the main reasons for this is the inability to implement democratic civilian control over the military (Hernandez, 2007). While there have been eorts to transform the security sector (Arugay, 2008), it remains to be severely limited and dependent on the political will of the government to carry out this project but more importantly, the willingness of the military to be reformed.
2 What makes the Philippines a relevant case is
that its panoply of democratic institutions exists side by side with the steady increase in the level and expansion of the extent of political autonomy possessed by the military? As will be further elaborated in the subsequent sessions of this paper, this arrangement has not made civilian government vulnerable to military intervention in politics, it also casts doubt on the quality of its democratic regime (Hutchcroft, 2008). Following good practices from the literature on qualitative research (Brady and Collier, 2004; George and Bennett, 2005), a single case study could still reveal interesting variations in the
A recent study of the ISDS Philippines concluded that transforming the security sector in the country would
also entail the reform and empowerment of civilian oversight institutions (ISDS 2009).
outcome one is trying to explain. With respect to the possibilities for SST to be implemented, I look at three areas where the Philippine military's political autonomy could be analyzed. These are: peace and security policy (particularly counterinsurgency policy), defense expenditures, and human rights. In countries where democratic civilian control is eectively imposed, these three policy areas are managed and overseen by the civilian government with inputs from the security sector (Trinkunas, 2005). However, in countries where the security sector has yet to undergo reform and transformation, there are disparities with the extent by which civilian authorities are able to control the military and conversely whether the armed forces are able to exercise a great degree of inuence. This variation in political autonomy depends on three factors the legitimacy of the existing civilian political leadership; the relationship between members of the armed forces with the president; and the strength or quality of civilian political institutions. This paper argues that since the restoration of formal democratic rule in 1986, it is in the area of counterinsurgency policy that the military has exercised the greatest level of political autonomy. The area of human rights shows a moderate level of political autonomy. While human rights have generally been respected and observed in the majority of the post-authoritarian governments until recently, the military's has not been held accountable over alleged violations during the martial law period. It is also argue that the level of political autonomy in this area has risen in the latter part of the Arroyo administration (2001-2010). Finally, there is very low military autonomy in the area of defense spending. The Philippines has one of the lowest defense expenditures in Southeast Asia and civilian oversight agencies, particular the legislature, have generally prevented the military from receiving higher budgets over the years. While this could be laudable, the motives behind such control are motivated by political reasons and not because of objectives related to SST. Finally, a study on the Philippine security sector can contribute to the existing body of literature on SST. One the one hand, a lot of SSR researches have focused on how to build capacity, induce political will, and foster local ownership of these critical processes (Edmunds, 2004). However, there are not enough studies on the veto players or obstacles to SST (Nathan, 2004). By looking at the ways and means by which the military obstructs and limits the impact of SST initiatives, future policies and frameworks can be better informed and hopefully might be made sensitive to these political realities. On the other hand, several scholars have complained about the dearth of theoretical input in a lot of studies on the reform and transformation of the security sector (Egnell and Haldn, 2008). By using concepts from CMR theory, the dynamics behind SST processes could be better understood.
2.
Military Autonomy: Insights from Civil-Military Relations (CMR) Theory

CMR theory is concerned with the dynamics between the military, the civilian government,
and to a certain extent, society. But for the purposes of the paper, it focuses on the concept of military autonomy from the civilian government. Pion-Berlin stated that even if it is part of the government, it is the nature of the military to be a distinct (but not completely separate) organization within the state. This is based from the mandate of military and its professional membership requirements. Their special status as experts in the management of violence, their
restricted entrance, rigorous training, hierarchy, and rules of conduct distinguish them from those outside their eld (1992, p. 84). This propensity of the military profession for exclusivity exposes an apparent paradox that is relevant to the concept of military autonomy. On the one hand, invoking professional autonomy on its internal matters , the military often despises any intrusion from the government and society which they interpret as undue interference. On the other hand, the military could also claim political autonomy from the civilian government. This could range from dominance in security policymaking and the possession of political prerogatives to the outright removal of the political leadership and regime control. In the end, military autonomy has something to do with balancing the corporate interests of a military and the ability of the government to impose civilian control. The literature on CMR does not categorically deny that democratic regimes should deny the military establishment with spheres of autonomy. In fact, it is often best practice for the armed forces to be allowed to make decisions in some of its professional spheres such as promotions, training and strategies. It is the political spheres such as: (1) defense budgets, (2) internal security policy, (3) human rights; (4) the legitimacy of civilian governments; and (4) reform processes where autonomy becomes problematic.
3 High degrees of autonomy in these spheres imply the
weakness of the civilian government, its inability to assert civilian control, or its failure to be independent from partisan interests.
Research in the developing world, particularly in Latin America, showed that one way to determine the extent of the military's political autonomy is the breadth and depth of its political prerogatives . They refer to the military's "acquired right or privilege, formal or informal, to exercise eective control over its internal governance, to play a role within extra-military areas within the state apparatus, or even to structure relationships between the state and political or civil society" (Stepan, 1988, p. 9). The literature on democratization claims that these reserved domains of power possessed by the military are often the by-product of its role during the authoritarian period as well as given to them as part of the transition pact (Diamint and Tedesco, 2009; Zaverucha, 1993). Some scholars trace the military's political autonomy much earlier than its transition form authoritarian rule. For example, Loveman argued that the role of the militaries in the struggle for independence of most Latin American nations from Spanish colonial rule have caused they to acquire much more power and autonomy than they should have. By predating the nation, they became its permanent custodians equating its own corporate interest to that of the state. In this vein, threats to public order, territorial integrity, and sovereignty of any state are interpreted as threats to the military institution itself. Loveman found evidence that this belief found their way in the constitutional mission of the armed forces in Latin American states. For example, militaries are given unorthodox functions such as maintaining internal order, law enforcement, supervision of elections, and economic functions. Conspicuously, there is also constitutional ambiguity when civilian leaders betrayed public trust or governments face constitutional crises that might result to public disorder. In such a scenario, it is this historical role of the military that warrants political intervention in their exercise of what is called judicial review with bayonets (2001, pp. 260-262).
3 4
Other sphere of military autonomy include: senior and junior level personnel decisions, force levels, military CMR theorists argue that the greatest display of political autonomy is staging a coup d'tat.
education and doctrine, reform, intelligence gathering and human rights (Pion-Berlin 1992: 87-90).
There has yet to be research on the military's political autonomy in other countries that belonged to the so-called third wave of democratization (Huntington, 1991). This paper seeks to address this gap using insights from Latin American countries of which the Philippines shares several similarities.
3.
Reforming and Transforming the Security Sector: SST as a Political Project

SST is innately a political project that must be treated with sensitivity (Wulf, 2004, p. 20).
As such, understanding the political dynamics and relations among dierent political actors is important to starting the SST process. A reformist leader or coalition with a resolve on making the security sector subject to democratic principles may need to perform a dangerous balancing act appeasing those who want a reduction in the political powers of the security sector and those who want to maintain the status quo (Tanner, 2000). Thus, it is highly probable that SST projects could be held hostage by partisan politics, accommodation, or worse aborted by the armed forces that pose a threat to democracy. Because of its highly political nature, improving security sector governance cannot be addressed by purely technical measures. It is necessary to understand critical political relationships among key actors, how and why decisions are made, and the incentives and disincentives for change. Strategies are needed to be developed for supporting reforms and minimizing the impact of spoilers (Ball, 2004, p. 48). Just like any type of democratic reform, there is no linear progress as regards SST. There will always be the possibility of backsliding, as previous gains and achievements could be lost due to lack of sustainability and due diligence to remain on the path of reform. Experts argue that a transformation of the security sector will entail changes in the means and ends of security in a country. New or reformed institutions of security are concerned not only with the security of the state but of every individual in society, particularly those usually that fall victims to insecurity, conict, and violence (Narayan et al. 2000). Policies not only bring about better security but are formulated in a participatory, consultative, and even deliberative manner. The provision of ecient and eective security while an end-in-itself must contribute to people-centered development, sustainable peace, and the quality of democracy. It is assumed that successful reform will bring about the transformation of the security sector into one that is not only eective in providing security but steeped into the principles of democratic governance. The Philippines could be an example of a country that undertakes certain reforms but does not necessarily produce a transformation in security. To the contrary, it could be argued that the Philippines could even be a case where reform programs further empowers the security sector, guarantees the relative privilege it enjoys, expands its scope of autonomy, and provides an escape from democratic accountability and civilian control. In a country where the formal usually does not correspond to what is actually in existence, SSR might not capture real conditions and therefore address the problems and challenges of the security sector. Thus, any SST program in the Philippines must take into account into the informal processes that work their way in the governance of the security sector. This includes the informal norms, prevailing practices, and attitudes displayed by both the security sector, other institutions of the state, and even civil society.
This paper argues that SST becomes a gargantuan task because it is a deeply politicized process as it may erode some of the security sector's spheres of autonomy whether in the performance of functions, denition of critical concepts such as security, defense, peace, or in their budgets, appointments, education. This is also extended in the latitude they are given in formulating reform programs and initiatives. Moreover, as SST challenges the status quo, it will signicantly recongure existing power relations that might even cause insecurity, political instability, and violence (Nathan, 2007). The delineation between formal or technical SSR and actual security sector transformation has made scholars to address it through a two-step process. In particular, scholars have dierentiated between rst generation and second generation SSR. The former originated from the insights of the literature on civil-military relations as it concerns the establishment of new constitutional and legal frameworks, institutions, structures, clear lines of responsibility and accountability for the security sector (Fitz-Gerald, 2003). The more challenging and dicult part are the reforms associated with the second generation. This encompasses the consolidation of the rst generation reforms as well as ensuring the eective operation of institutions, development of expertise and knowledge, the diusion of reform commitments from lower-level ocials and other actors, and the engagement with non-state actors on SSR issues such as civil society (Edmunds, 2004, pp. 50-53; Yusu, 2003, pp. 5-6).
4.
The Philippine Security Sector

The study and analysis of the Philippine security sector has received signicant attention
from both academic and policymaking circles. However, a few preliminary observations could be made. First, the bulk of the literature is biased towards a minimalist conception of what constituted the security sector in the country, partly due to the dominance of the traditional (military) security paradigm. Second, the concept of SST is very novel in the Philippines. From a survey of the existing scholarship, the nearest approximation to it would be the study of civilmilitary relations. Lastly, with notable exceptions, most studies on the Philippine security sector have no linked it with broader themes such as democratization, the ongoing peace process in the country and conict resolution, and good governance.
As much as there is no common denition of SST, there is no consensual idea of what comprises the security sector. A narrow or minimalist view simply denes it as the military and the police. However, the governance perspective states that the security sector involves all institutions and groups that aect and are aected by decisions or actions made related to issues of security and defense (Hnggi, 2005, pp. 24-25). Applying to the Philippines, the composition of the security sector could be as follows:
An example of these would be Hernandez (1997; 2005; 2007).
Core Security Forces
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Philippine National Police (PNP) Intelligence Agencies (National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, National Security Council) Paramilitary Organizations (Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Unit)
Security management and oversight bodies
President, National Security Council (NSC) Congressional Committees, Executive Depart-
ments (Department of National Defense, Department of Interior and Local Government, National Police Commission) Constitutional Commissions (Commission on Human Rights, Commission on Audit).
Justice and law enforcement institutions
Ombudsman, Sandiganbayan (anti-graft court).
Nonstate groups
Civil Society Organizations (human rights groups, peace advocates) Media Academe
4.1.
The Philippine Military: Evolution and Organization
National defense in the Philippines is historically entrusted upon a standing military whose duty is to defend the country. The regular armed force (known as the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the AFP) is divided into several service branches army, air force, navy and up until 1990, constabulary. The Philippine Army (PA), Philippine Air Force (PAF), and Philippine Navy (PN) are responsible for national land, sea and air defense, respectively. The Philippine Constabulary (PC) is primarily for the enforcement of law and order and for defense in rear areas during emergencies. In 1991, the PC was abolished and replaced by the Philippine National Police (PNP). In addition to the regular armed forces, paramilitary units exist such as the Citizen Armed Force Geographical Unit (CAFGU) drawn primarily from local communities (Arcala, 2002, p. 144-145). Thus, the military was and remains to be regarded as the biggest component of the Philippine security sector. The Philippine military could trace its origin as far back as the pre-colonial period although the semblance of a citizen's armed force could be found during the country's struggle for independence against Spain. Military historians particularly note the active role of armed and organized
Filipinos ghting against the American and Japanese occupation (Pobre, 2000). However, the modern-day Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) was patterned after the United States (US) model. The inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth in 1935 paved the way for a formulation of a defense program for the country. Commonwealth Act No. 1, otherwise known as the National Defense Act formally established the Philippine Army. The 1935 Constitution made the President the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and where the military's contact with the President passed through a civilian defense secretary. The legislature exercised oversight functions over the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) through its powers of conrmation of military appointments and promotions, over the defense budget, and investigation in aid of legislation that usually unearthed wrongdoing in the military. Other civilian oversight institutions were the judiciary, the free press, and civil liberties associations (Hernandez, 1984). However, the US did not limit itself in just inuencing the structure of the military. It also had the determining power of assigning its roles and functions. Given that the US assumed the provision of external defense for the country, this inevitably caused the AFP to concentrate on internal defense and peace and order . This, to a large extent, shaped its size, training, equipment, and supplies (Final Report, 1990, p.29). Thus, while the military was socialized to have an external defense orientation, it was believed that the entire armed forces would perform only internal security operations. This could be attributed to the defense shield provided by the US bases in the country through the 1947 Military Bases Agreement. They also became indispensable as internal security became an umbrella term encompassing all threats to the government, whether communist or separatist, armed or unarmed (Arcala, 2002). Coming from a postcolonial perspective, Hedman supported this by concluding that in the end, neither national interests of security nor the political dynamics of reconstruction dictated the organization of the Philippine armed forces (2001, p. 170). The internal orientation of the AFP was rst demonstrated with the emergence of the Hukbalahap
6 insurgency. Under the direction of Defense Secretary Ramon Magsaysay, the AFP develo-
ped a two-pronged approach to the Huk rebellion: to engage them militarily in a more organized and ecient way and to show the disaected populace that the government has their interests in mind and that the military can be trusted to protect and take care of them (Hernandez 1979). The latter came in the form of socioeconomic activities, as Danguilan stated: Military troops went on medical missions and provided emergency treatment and care and distributed relief goods to civilians caught in the crossre of combat. They built temporary bridges and roads linking civilians to military camps which had become distributing points for medical and food supplies. They also constructed makeshift [schoolhouses] and drilled water wells in villages which the military declared free from the inuence of the Huks (1999, p. 13). This incremental acquisition of developmental roles associated with counter-insurgency since the 1950s saw its institutionalization during the Marcos period. The relentless internal conicts from two fronts: communist insurgency and Moro secessionism have made the civilian government
Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon later renamed as Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (HMB) or Army of
National Liberation. Originally a peasant movement, it is a group of guerrilla ghters that fought the Japanese invaders but rose arms against the government because of their exclusion in the postwar political order.
dependent on the military for national security. The AFP even became the apparatus of Marcos to implement martial law as a partner in national development . Martial law paved the way for the destruction of the civilian political institutions of democratic governance from the legislature to the political parties and the judiciary. Moreover, other changes include the continuous enlargement of military functions to include non-traditional military roles, the institution of structural changes that `merged' the police with the military through the single leadership of the PC and the Integrated National Police within the AFP, and the suppression of civil liberties, including elections, freedom of expression and association. Thus, role expansion resulted in a heightened sense political awareness for the military institution as the principal wielders of power over a highly personalized authoritarian regime (Hernandez, 1985, 1997; Miranda, 1992). As the most important state machinery in the country, Marcos did not hesitate to increase the military's budget. According to Crisol (1980), Marcos infused some 3.5 billion pesos into the AFP from 1973 to 1975. This was a 700 per cent increase in the AFP's pre-martial law budget, the highest for any state within the Southeast Asian region (Miranda, 1985). The AFP also recruited several thousands more into their ranks swelling the number of regulars from 70,000 to 275,000.Apart from this, Marcos appointed military ocers to key civilian posts such as some of the government-owned and controlled corporations. It is the crucial powers of appointments and promotions that enabled Marcos to keep the armed forces under his control. His employment what Huntington called subjective civilian control of presidential prerogatives frequently transgressed the formal chain of command by the retention of generals loyal to him beyond the retirement age, and favoring his own choices over the more qualied (Hernandez, 1979). This inevitably had increasing implications on the professionalism of the military. Thus, it was not a surprise that there would be discontent among the junior ocers. In time, they would hatch the plot to oust Marcos within the context of the snap presidential elections of February 1986. Led by Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and the Vice Chief of Sta General Fidel V. Ramos, the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) broke away from the AFP chain of command and joined the rest of the masses of anti-Marcos groups already protesting against the dictatorship, particularly since the assassination of his principal political rival, Senator Benigno Ninoy Aquino, Jr.
4.2.
The Philippine Military in the Post-Authoritarian Period
The so-called restoration of democracy after the 1986 People Power Revolt had tremendous implications for the country's security sector. Given its tremendous role in maintaining the dictatorship, the forces that made the democratic transition in the country possible realized that it was pivotal that civilian control is imposed and the military's role is claried. The adoption of the 1987 Constitution reasserted and installed the supremacy of civilian authority over the military and provided for institutions of oversight mechanisms over the AFP, such as the legislative power over the budget and conrmation of military appointments and promotion, as well as the participation of the Philippine Commission on Human Rights in military appointments and promotions. Another reform was the provision for the formation of a police force independent from the military. With the separation of the national police from the military, the roles and jurisdiction of both forces were redened.
7 The Philippine National Police (PNP)
This separation required the abolition of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) from the AFP. Used to be the
10
assumed from the AFP the primary role of preserving internal security including the suppression of insurgency (after a period of transition), leaving to the AFP its primary role of ensuring external security. However, the AFP assumed the primary role in situations of serious threats to internal security with the PNP playing a supportive role in this regard. As such, due to the serious nature of the communist insurgency and Moro separatist movement, the AFP remained in charge of ghting these two groups. This situation warranted the continuing frontline function of the military in counterinsurgency operations (Arcala, 2002; Hernandez and Ubarra, 1999). Given the volatile and accommodationist nature of democratic transitions, the military became a strong veto player in the Aquino administration whose spheres of autonomy were either consolidated or multiplied. or. Hernandez, for example, observed the adoption of policies that enhanced military privileges such as increases in pay, the removal of cabinet ocials perceived as left-leaning or hostile to the military, holding back on the prosecution of military ocers and personnel accused of human rights violations, and the suppression of internal conicts through a military-preferred approach (1997, pp. 46-47). However, as most transitions were the military was instrumental have shown, the Philippines also became vulnerable to military adventurism. The Aquino administration was subjected to seven coup attempts from politicized and disgruntled junior ocers, some of whom were the leaders of the putsch that led to the 1986 People Power Revolt. Several factors are to be attributed for the failure of the coups to capture state power. Among them is the lack of popular support, the senior command remained loyal to the civilian government, and the latent US support to the regime (Final Report, 1990, p. 495). The last coup attempt forced the government to create a body that conducted an investigation. The investigative body, more known as the Davide Commission,
8 conducted an intensive
probe on all the issues that surrounded not only on the December 1989 coup attempt but also systematically study the military as a political institution in the Philippines. The nal report of the Commission contained relevant ndings and recommendations crucial to reforming the military and imposing democratic civilian control. It also revealed the lingering problems internal to the armed forces including inadequate pay and benets, lack of logistical support and services to soldiers in the eld, favoritism in promotions, and prevalent corruption. In the end, the probe not only emphasized the importance of military reform, it also stressed the need for the civilian government to get its act together, fulll the promises of democratization and popular empowerment, and work for genuine national development (Hernandez, 1997).
Several more reforms were instituted in light of the several coups against the civilian government. Established in 1990, the Oce of Ethical Standards and Public Accountability (OESPA) was given exclusive jurisdiction over active AFP personnel involved in major graft and corruption cases. Moreover, a Code of Ethics for the AFP was adopted that serves as the guideline of behavior for all uniformed men (Hernandez and Ubarra, 1999). But beyond these measures, a majority of the recommendations of the Davide Commission, particularly those that will promote good security sector governance and pertaining to the civilian institutions and other political actors were not implemented.
fourth major service, there are only three that remained: the Philippine Army, the Philippine Air Force, and the Philippine Navy.
8 9
The commission was named after its Chair, former Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. For an excellent discussion on this, see Hernandez (1997).
11
There is also the alternative claim that democratic civilian control over the military produced dire consequences for the institution. Analyzing the dynamics behind the formulation and implementation of the military's modernization program, de Castro (1997) argued that being subject to democratic procedures did not produce the optimal outcome in terms of improving the defense capability of the armed forces. However, this study glossed over the fact that Philippine military has an experience of politicization and role expansion that inevitably has implications on the defense and security policymaking. The study also did not make a distinction in whether the legislature had the capacity, resources, and information to be able to perform its oversight functions. It also fails to consider the dominant view in democratizing civil-military relations that while the armed forces should have relative autonomy on its own aairs, it has no monopoly over security policy in a democratic polity. Another practice in security sector governance in the Philippines is the appointment of retired ocials from the armed forces into the country's bureaucracy. Gloria concluded that the appointment to strategic positions such as the country's defense and foreign aairs departments could be attributed to two factors: the soldier's socialization and the nature of the regime. Military role expansion such as community development and counterinsurgency enabled them to assume civilian functions that served as the training ground for eventual appointment to the bureaucracy, an indication of the failure on the part of the country's civilian political institutions. Moreover, the study also argued that the regimes which followed the 1986 People Power Revolt also accepted, and/or at most encouraged, the inuence and participation of the military in running the country's state aairs (2003, p. 33). This argument can be extended to the Arroyo administration (2001-2010) since it has the highest number of retired ocials from the core security forces to be appointed to high-ranking political positions. Some analysts argue that this is often a reward given for political loyalty to the current leadership.
10
5.
Military Autonomy during the Arroyo Administration

As already discussed, the path to reforming the Philippine security sector has already been
started by President Aquino and continued by subsequent administrations. The Ramos administration adopted a more pragmatic approach by opening its arms to unication and reconciliation from all adversarial groups whether they be communist insurgents, Moro secessionists, and even the military rebels that staged the various coups against the civilian government. He succeeded in two instances: in forging a peace agreement with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in 1996 and by granting unconditional amnesty to the rebel military, many of whom returned to the AFP and redeemed themselves with loyal and distinguished service to the state. While it painted a desirable picture with regard to the sincerity of the government to pursue unity for development, there are those that expressed their fears with regard to such a general policy (Hernandez, 1997). The rise to power of President Arroyo was extraordinary but not without precedent in Philippine political history. The impeachment trial of then president Joseph Estrada was aborted due to manipulation of proceedings by his allies in the Senate. This caused a massive, civil society led mobilization in the streets of Manila and other urban centers in the country. In the face of po-
10
An updated list of all retired military ocials appointed to dierent political positions could be found in the
database of Newsbreak,
www.newsbreak.com.ph
12
pular pressures and the withdrawal of the leadership of the armed forces and the police, Estrada was forced to vacate the presidency. By virtue of being the country's vice-president constitutional successor, Arroyo became president in January 2001. Some observers believed that the role that the military played in helping resolve this crisis was critical and made it a vital pillar to the survival of her government until the 2004 elections (Doronila, 2001). Others predicted that the military's participation would like lead to future interventions (Hernandez, 2002). Like a self-fullling prophecy, military adventurism would again rear its ugly head as the Magdalo, a group of junior military ocers, attempted to capture state power through a coup in July 2003 against President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo who was installed through a peaceful nonviolent revolt after the aborted impeachment proceedings against Estrada. The failed coup was known as the Oakwood Mutiny, named after the hotel establishment which the Magdalo staged their attempt. After a careful investigation into the root causes and the issues that surrounded the mutiny, the Feliciano Commission, the body concluded that the mutiny was caused by several factors that included widespread corruption in the military and government, the poor plight of soldiers in combat, and rampant favoritism and politicization of the military (The Report, 2003). However, it also highlighted that the failure of the previous administration to re-impose democratic civilian control and implement the recommendations of the Davide Commission, particularly the enforcement of law against previous oenders. The recommendations it produced seek to address the legitimate grievances of the soldiers, to improve welfare, to professionalize the military, and to avert future military adventurism. Hernandez (2004), argued that not only did the mutiny put a setback to democratizing civilmilitary relations in the Philippines, it seems that the same conditions remained the same: an enlarged military role, including against armed threats to the government and national development roles, questions about the political legitimacy of the incumbent, weak civilian oversight institutions, poor socio-economic conditions, and the external US factor. Arroyo was quick to react to the implications of the failed revolt by implementing some of the recommendations made by the investigative body. Among the steps that the Arroyo administration has undertaken is the improvement of the remuneration packages for ocers and enlisted personnel of the AFP and the appointment of credible and reform-oriented personnel to strategic positions within the country's defense and security establishments. An example is the appointment of an undersecretary for Internal Control at the Department of National Defense (DND) in order to ensure transparency and good governance generally in the defense's and military's nancial and procurement systems, a special adviser to personally monitor the implementation of the recommendations of the Feliciano Commission, and a civilian secretary of the DND (Hernandez, 2005, pp. 3-4).
11
The creation of a mechanism to monitor the implementation of the recommendations as well as the swift action made by the executive created the momentum for reforming the military in the Philippines.
12 For example, the civilian defense secretary ensured that the current defense
reform program of the government will be tied with implementing the recommendations of the two previous investigative commissions. In the short-term, this could be construed as indicative of the sincerity of the government to implement SSR in the Philippines, though only limited to
11 12
It is only the second time at the secretary of the DND was drawn from the civilian sector. It has been the For a discussion on the implementation of some recommendations, see Hernandez (2007).
norm that this post is reserved to high-ranking retired military ocers.
13
the military. However, it is noticeable that some of the recommendations made by the Feliciano Commission were not implemented by the relevant institutions whether the executive, legislative, or the military and defense establishments. It is not surprising that these measures are those that would infuse more transparency and accountability in the security sector. For example, there was very little action to create an external grievance mechanism for soldiers. Also, a major recommendation to streamline the government's intelligence service also did not receive enough support from the executive and the legislative.
13 There was also a lack of a multi-sectoral constituency for SSR
that could push the government to implement these reform measures. Civil society groups, for example, have unfortunately not carried the SSR agenda in their advocacies. Part of this could be the lack of awareness and knowledge on the signicance of SSR. One example would be the support given by some civil society organizations to the call of the political opposition to give amnesty to the Oakwood mutineers. A major blow to the continued implementation of some SST measures as contained in the Feliciano Commission report was the appointment of a new defense secretary who came again from the security forces. A retired general, this time around of the Philippine police, there is no doubt that he has deep military ties. This act did not only go against the recommendations but it was a regression to what seemed to be a best practice in security sector governance.
14
In the end, it was a palpable violation of the recommendations made by the Commission but more importantly, it has questioned the sincerity of the government in pursuing the reform of the military.
15
In the end, some of recommendations of the Feliciano Commission were faithfully implemented that caused a reform of the military. It is another matter whether such reforms were able to foster a security transformation or promote good security sector governance. At best, they were able to increase the operational eectiveness of the military, address some of the welfare issues of soldiers, and lay down best practices that should be sustained. Unfortunately, there was a lack of commitment, ownership, and wherewithal to continue this path of reform.
6.
Spheres of Military Autonomy in the Philippines

The adverse fate of the Feliciano Commission recommendations should be analyzed side
by side with the increased political autonomy of the military in several areas of politics and policymaking in the Philippines. While these recommendations form a vital part of what is considered as SST, the DND, together with AFP did not incorporate them as well as previous recommendations in their version of reforming the Philippine security sector. Labeled as the Philippine Defense Reform Program (PDRP) and completed in 2003, it is what the military believed to be their idea of what reforms should take place. A product of a systematic and meticulous assessment of the country's defense and military establishment, it is the general framework for guiding the reform of the AFP, it aims to implement a transformation process to
13
This is very important as the current intelligence service of the country remains militarized . There is little
doubt that the most powerful intelligence body in the country remains to be the Intelligence Service of the AFP (ISAFP).
14
Many has lauded the performance of the past civilian secretary of defense as not only was he able to display a
degree of autonomy from the military, he also pushed a reform program that was sensitive to the recommendations of the Feliciano Commission.
15
A new civilian secretary of defense was appointed in June 2007.
14
re-engineer systems and re-tool personnel.
16 Composed of ten (10) key areas of improvement,
the PDRP focuses entirely on capability building of the military institution to be able to perform what it conceives as its roles in the provision of defense and security. In particular, it attempts to improve defense planning systems, operational and training capacity, logistics provision, sta development, personnel management, nancial controls, and strategic communications. By focusing on defense, the PDRP has not suciently covered the entire scope of SSR. While it may be unfair to force the Philippine military and defense establishment to incorporate principles SSR, it has lost a critical opportunity to truly adapt to the new security environment and realities at the domestic and international frontier. Defense is still construed in the traditional sense, with a heavily statist and military tone. Its ultimate objective is to improve the operational eectiveness and to a lesser extent, the eciency in the provision of security. However, what is problematic is the fact that the government and military seems to be more than contented to view reform as implementing the PDRP. For example, the government has not even touched signicant SST issues such as weak and ineective civilian oversight agencies, undemocratic and limited participation in security policymaking, and the implications of the war on terror and the counterinsurgency campaign. By monopolizing the discourse on reform, the military and other militarized institutions such as the DND have displayed a signicant degree of political autonomy. This myopic version of reform is a far cry from what is considered best practice in other parts of the world. The PDRP could be considered as the country's latest defense white paper. Countries like Greece and South Africa have published their white papers (or books) on defense on a regular basis often with the input of civilian agencies and more importantly, civil society organizations. This document may also be a source of accountability as it often contains details on the plans and reform programs of the security sector (Ball and Brzoska, 2002). Finally, it could also signal its reform intentions to the international community where there could be potential partners for its SST eorts.
6.1.
Security Policy: High Level of Military Autonomy
If democratizing civil-military relations is one crucial component of security sector reform, addressing the country's peace problem is another signicant issue. The literature has been consistent in asserting that the country's security sector has been the one of the primary, (if not the primary actor) in the resolution of armed conicts in the Philippines. As the only country in Southeast Asia with a resilient communist insurgency paired with a secessionist movement from the ethnic Muslim minority, the government has highly depended on a military approach in addressing them (Nemenzo, 1985; Tan, 1993). Although there were certain exceptions, a more holistic perspective in addressing the conict has yet to be implemented from both the military and civilian sectors of government. The 2005 Philippine Human Development Report (PHDR) has recognized the impact of low human development in both the occurrence and persistence of armed conict. While it can be observed that poverty is extensive throughout the country, it is claimed that the general feeling of deprivation that breeds discontent with the existing status quo. More often than not, these groups resort to violent means in order to change it. It is therefore not surprising that the PHDR
16
This assessment has been assisted by the government of the United States through the Joint Defense Assess-
ment (JDA).
15
reported that the state of unpeace could be found in the poorest areas in the country, most of whom are found in the southern part of the country. It is established that conict is a costly state of aairs aecting lives, property, cultural identity, social cohesion, and human dignity. This is notwithstanding its spillover eects, whether economic (foregone investment and lost output), political (loss of political stability and legitimacy) or social (prevalence of prejudice, socio-cultural tension, and crime).
17
To a great extent, the military is the primary institution in dealing with armed conicts in the Philippines. As the only country in Southeast Asia with a resilient communist insurgency paired with a secessionist movement from the ethnic Muslim minority, the government remains highly dependent on an overly military approach in addressing them (Nemenzo, 1985; Tan, 1993). Although there were certain exceptions, a more holistic perspective in addressing the conict has yet to be fully implemented from both the military and civilian sectors of government. Conspicuously, the police has not been a major actor in the implementation of any approach to armed conict adopted by the government. Understandably, its nascent character (the Philippine National Police was established in 1991) makes it relatively ill-equipped, weak, and decient despite the resolve to implement a transformative set of reforms. Ideally, it is the police that should be at the forefront in combating insurgency as it is an internal security matter. It is also surprising that there has not been commensurate attention, political will, and resources invested in this civilian institution by post-martial law administrations. Lacking a tradition of instigating coups (Tanner, 2000, p. 110) and not being able to penetrate political institutions unlike their military counterparts (Gloria, 2003), advocates of police reform (internal and external to the institution) do not have the same voice and power to argue, lobby, and pressure for its improvement as an institution. In her assessment of the performance of the military approach to achieving peace in the Philippines, Hernandez (2005) argued that not only did it strengthened the position of the military vis--vis the civilian government in handling the task of conict resolution, it also fanned the ames that ignited the twin insurgencies. The vulnerable position of the Aquino transition regime also took its toll as the military was given much leeway in counterinsurgency operations (Arcala, 2002). The approach of the Ramos administration was more sensitive of the embedded issues of uneven development and economic discontent as root causes of the resilience of the insurgent movements by pursuing a combination of military action and socio-economic programs. This policy was unfortunately discontinued under the short-lived Estrada administration. It saw the rise in the strength both of the communist insurgency and the Moro Islamic Liberation Fromt (MILF). Failing in a negotiated settlement, he went for an all-out war against the MILF, taking its main stronghold Camp Abubakar. As the CPP and NPA have been included in the US government's list of foreign terrorist organizations, the military and the government of President Arroyo saw this as an opportunity to increase it eorts to quell the insurgency in the far ung provinces of the country. One major policy in which the military had a huge role in its formulation has been the country's anti-
17
The 2005 PHDR has underscored SSR as one of the key reforms to be undertaken in the current peace eorts
in the country. This entails orienting the military and the police to recognize the peace policy of the government. SSR includes strengthening civilian control, professionalization, insulation from partisan politics, and curbing corruption. Also noteworthy is the Report's stress that SSR contains measures that will improve the rule of law, human rights, and cultural sensitivity among the security sector (HDN 2005: 50).
16
terrorism law, euphemistically called the Human Security Act of 2007.
18
As early as 2003, the Macapagal-Arroyo administration has promised to enact legislation that will help curb terrorism. What became a surprise is how Republic Act No. 9372 signed on 6 March 2007 was able to be named as the Human Security Act of 2007 . By being an An Act to Secure the State and Protect our People from Terrorism , this law provides not only the weapons for the government in general and the security forces in particular in order to sanction acts of terrorism, it also allows the possible suppression of previously respect rights and intrusion into the lives and activities of the Filipino people. With the exception of its title, this statute has never again used or mentioned the term human security . Furthermore, it conspicuously did not provide a denition of security. However, it is noteworthy that it stated some principles that are connected to the human security framework. For example, it recognizes that the terrorism requires a comprehensive approach. . . including conict management and post-conict peace-building. This even includes improving state capacity and promoting equitable economic development. Finally, the anti-terrorism law also categorically stated that it shall not prejudice respect for human rights.
19 For civil society
advocates and academics, the title of the law is not just a misnomer but also casts the concept of human security in a negative light. It is very evident that the incorporation of human security in a law that signicantly arms the state to combat terrorism has negative implications on the attempt to mainstream this concept. In the end, it also has repercussions on security sector governance in the Philippines. The law did not elaborate on how the government can address the root causes of terrorism and conict in the country. What the law was very clear is the substantial role given to the security sector in implementing the law and curbing terrorism. While it explicitly stated that it is the police that would be the main implementing institution, this is irreconcilable to existing realities in the Philippines. Internal security remains to be the purview of the military with the police often playing a secondary or supporting role as it continues to suer from institutional and resource deciencies. Among others, this could be seen in the involvement of both the agencies within the AFP and the DND in the Anti-Terrorism Council, the primary body created by the law to implement anti-terrorism policy. Analysts are also bothered on the power given to the government, particularly the executive branch, in labeling possible organizations as terrorist or conspiring with terrorists (Hilbay, 2007). Such labeling is dangerous on two fronts. On the one hand, the current administration (and probably future ones) can use this to stie dissent, suppress political opponents, or intimidate legitimate organizations. On the other hand, this power to label will open the gate to violation or disrespect for certain rights. The institutional challenges and problems currently faced by the Philippine National Police (PNP) bolsters this argument. One could also imagine that the military would denitely implement the law in areas where the police does not even fully control the peace and order situation such as areas controlled by communist insurgents and Muslim separatist movements in Mindanao. Finally, while the law provides for a grievance mechanism and an oversight body in the implementation of the law, it is observed that there is a noteworthy absence of civil society par-
18 19
,accessed12July2010
For a full text of this law, see
http://jlp-law.com/blog/ra-9327-human-security-act-of-2007-full-text/
Republic Act No. 9372, Human Security Act of 2007 , Section 2.
17
ticipation or involvement. These functions are totally given to government institutions such as the Ombudsman and Congress. Given the similar institutional challenges, decits, and transparency gaps of these oversight institutions over the security forces, one can question their ability to perform eective and strict oversight. The law could have been more inclusive by creating a grievance board, oversight agency, and an evaluation or review mechanism that has a broader composition that includes civil society, media, and the academe.
20
Another manifestation has been the government's framework for counterinsurgency, called the National Internal Security Plan (NISP). The NISP is conceived as the government's ultimate strategy to defeat insurgency and armed challenges to the Philippine state. It is composed of four main components: (1) political, legal, and diplomatic; (2) socioeconomic/psychological; (3) information; and (4) peace and order/security.
21 Adopted in 2001, this plan seeks the coopera-
tion and allows the coordination of agencies and institutions within the executive branch, both uniformed and civilian. As having a comprehensive and holistic perspective, it seeks to address security threats through the promotion of good governance, alleviation of poverty, peace advocacy, and combat operations. This is based on the realization that insurgency as a source of insecurity and under- or uneven development in the country necessitates a multi-dimensional approach (Esperon, 2006). Guided by the NISP, the military launched a ve-year counterinsurgency program involving both the military and civilian agencies of the government in 2002. Called Bantay Laya, this Internal Security Operation plan is based on the National Internal Security Plan (NISP) formulated by the DND as well as the National Military Strategy developed and adopted by the AFP. Bantay Laya's strategic goal is to decisively defeat the insurgents' armed groups in order to obtain and maintain peace for national development . It applies to the CPP-NPA, the ASG, and the Southern Philippine Separatist Groups (SPSGs referring to the MNLF, the Misuari Breakaway Group or MBG, and the MILF).This goal reects the victory and institutional positions rolled into one, with the logic that victory is necessary for national development to take place (Hernandez, 2005, p. 15). According to Hernandez (2005), this approach in implementing ISOs was initiated in 2002 under the name Bantay Laya [Freedom Watch]. What are noteworthy about this new approach are: (1) its strategy of holistic approach seeking the full cooperation of local government units, civil society, and ordinary citizens while keeping in mind the government's six paths to peace; (2) its emphasis on innovative plans and programs to eradicate the so-called roots of insurgency such as poverty alleviation to be implemented through collaborative eorts among dierent government agencies; (3) its priority on the role of information in promoting peace and public condence in government through interpersonal and face to face approaches particularly in countering insurgent propaganda; (4) its attention to conict resolution and maintenance of peace and order by mobilizing the police and local government. The other half of the strategy deals with the measures aimed at maintaining the areas that were one and held over by the military. Formerly known as the consolidate and develop
20 21
This exclusion of civil society, media, and academe in the formulation of this legislation does not prevent Just recently, Secretary Norberto Gonzales, the National Security Adviser (NSA), presented a revised NISP
them from exercising social accountability and informal oversight. that includes the legal or judicial component. This will allow the government to use all legal means to bring insurgents within the fold of the law. The passage of the Human Security Act of 2007 is a vital weapon to implement this component.
18
phases in the (Clear-Hold-Consolidate-Develop strategy), this is called the support phase. The crucial change lies on the secondary role now played by the armed forces on this part of any ISO. Unlike previous experience wherein the military had to perform functions that were the responsibility of civilian agencies, Hernandez stated that Bantay Laya seeks to correct this as the AFP's role (also constrained by the limits of its capability) would be to strengthen government control and authority in the contested barangays and help develop local government capability during consolidation, and play a supportive role to the civilian government agencies during the development sub-phases (2005).
22
The NISP is a document that was not subject to extensive consultation from all security stakeholders. Added to this democratic decit , there is even a diculty in being able to secure a copy of the said plan. While the security sector often invokes the NISP as the guiding framework in addressing the security issues of the country, discussions are often clouded with secrecy and ambiguity. If indeed the NISP is an equivalent of a defense white paper or similar security documents and framework, it does not conform to a document of which most SSR programs were guided, for example in South Africa, Sierra Leone, and Indonesia. To a certain extent, Bantay Laya is an internal security operation campaign that acknowledges the complex nature of insecurity in the country, particularly in areas where there is armed conict. It actively solicits the help of other government institutions and even other members of the security sector. Tangentially, it pursues some components of program that promote good security sector governance. However, when the AFP or other members of core security forces assume responsibilities that are mandated to be performed by civilian institutions executive agencies and local governments this becomes dangerous to SST. By taking up these functions, the security sector veers away from its supposed role and may undermine its professionalism and role. For example, this campaign allows the military to carry out developmental functions and take on non-combat roles which are supposed to be the job of the civilian government. Moreover, this campaign also gives the military a free hand in organizing cooperatives a major source of nontraditional revenue that makes it an economic actor. The experience of countries like Thailand and Indonesia has underscored the hazards of a military with vested economic interests.
6.2.
Human Rights: Moderate Level of Military Autonomy
It is both sad and unfortunate that the real picture of the Philippines in terms of its human rights and democracy records are not at all rosy and nice. Human rights while formally (legally) provided are not fully observed given certain political, economic, and social obstacles. Democratization is also formally in place but there leaves much to be desired in terms of its quality. Based on its 2007 Report, Freedom House, an independent freedom and democracy watchdog, downgraded the Philippine standing from free to partly free for the past three years. Among others, what informed this assessment is the string of corruption scandals hurled against the current administration as well as the increasing trend of human rights violations (Puddington, 2008). Given this, it should not be a surprise that the Philippines will fall into the prey of the ebb of human rights and democracy imposed by the imperatives of national security.
22
With the departure of the military, the strategy aims to utilize the so-called Civilian Armed Force geographical
Units Active Auxiliary (CAA, a carry over of the CAFGU concept), civilian volunteer organizations (CVOs), and other anti-communist barangay-based organizations.
19
The retreat of freedom in the Philippines became more conspicuous after 2001. Whether this is mainly because of the post 9/11 context is debatable but most experts will agree that the decisions and actions incumbent government greatly contributes to the country's present human rights record. For example, it is the Macapagal-Arroyo administration that declared an all-out war against the communist insurgents and some of the Moro separatist movements. This is very much related to the fact that both of them have been linked with terrorist groups. Like other countries, it was not dicult for the Philippines to equate insurgents that could be deemed to have legitimate issues or demands with terrorists that need to be crushed. The greatest human rights problem in the Philippines has something to do with the spate of the so-called extra-judicial killings of left-leaning or militant activists, progressive civil society leaders, and journalists. This crackdown has caught international attention and even compelled the UN to send a special rapporteur (Mr. Philip Alston) to visit the country and conduct a factnding mission. Other transnational human rights nongovernmental organizations also followed suit (Human Rights Watch, 2007; Human Rights Now, 2008). Other international actors such as the European Union (EU) also expressed concern over the persecution of members of the press and civil society and the impunity that perpetrators seem to enjoy. It was in the year 2006 that the height of extra-judicial killings or involuntary executions was witnessed. Depending on who is counting, the number could range from 250-835 people.
23 Also,
there are individuals that have been abducted or involuntarily disappeared while performing their line of work as activists of journalists. Both the report of the UN special rapporteur as well as the independent commission formed by the government
24 all concluded that the government,
particularly the military is responsible for the great number of these incidents. On the role of the military, the Commission's report states that at the very least, it neither has the willingness nor the motivation to prevent their occurrence: However, there is certainly evidence pointing the nger of suspicion at some elements and personalities in the armed forces, in particular General Palparan, as responsible for an undetermined number of killings, by allowing, tolerating, and even encouraging the killings (Melo, 2007, p. 50). Not only was this welcomed with denial and discontent from the country's armed forces, the government is also being made accountable for its inability to bring the perpetrators of these deaths and disappearances under the fold of the law. Not included in the extrajudicial killings is also a related trend in the Philippines that pertains to the murder of a large number of journalists and media personnel. Whether as news reporters or political commentators, members of the press have been killed in increasing frequency. Reports estimate that from 2003-2006, the number ranged from 7-10 each year.
25 Similarly, perpetrators
of these executions enjoy a great degree of impunity. In a recent study of the CPJ, the Philippines was ranked sixth in its Impunity Index which calculates the unsolved murders of journalists as a percentage of the country's population (CPJ, 2008).
26
23
The lack of consensus on the actual number of victims is due to that limits posed by the denition provided
by each group that provides the gure. Government accuses some civil society organizations of exaggerating the number of actual extrajudicial killings.
24 25 26
This was headed by former Supreme Court Justice Augusto Melo. Actual gures could be drawn from the websites of the Center for Media Freedom and Responsibility (CMFR), Interestingly, the countries that received higher ranks are Sri Lanka, Colombia, Somalia, Sierra Leone, and
the National Union of Journalists in the Philippines (NJP), and the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ).
20
The quality of the country's institutions specically those that perform functions related to law enforcement and the rule of law also is a factor on why some literally gets away with murder. As a country struggling to consolidate its democratic regime, it was palpable that democratic institutions in the Philippines were not able to perform adequately to ensure the protection of human rights. Scholars have observed that this democratic recession across a so-called third wave democracies is manifested by the struggle to secure freedom and uphold the rule of law. Countries where widespread human rights violations occur often are blighted by multiple problems of bad governance abusive security forces, corrupt and constrained judiciaries, and clientelistic parties. Most likely, the root of this phenomena lies on the decits of its institutions of accountability and the rule of law (Diamond, 2008). According to observers both domestic and international, this partnership with the armed forces could be the strongest explanation why they escape from accountability to the majority of extrajudicial killings and other human rights violations. They remain untouched and untarnished by the deplorable executions of political dissidents and media personnel. Not only do they deny that they have a hand in them, they also propagate the belief that these killings are products of internal purges within the communist movement. However, a recent report of the International Crisis Group (ICG) did not recognize this view of the government. It expressed concern over the inability to dierentiate between insurgents and terrorists.
27 By not having enough sensitivity
to the critical distinctions, it is likely that insurgent movements which have legitimate political demands are reduced to terrorists that must be crushed immediately. Not only would this approach fail, but it will also increase the collateral damage of such a policy by contributing to more violations of human rights in conict-torn communities in the country.
6.3.
Defense Budgeting: Low Level of Military Autonomy
While the Philippine military is able to assert its political autonomy in matters such as security policy and human rights, it is not able to extend it to defense spending or military expenditures. Scholars have argued that armed forces that are more politicized, autonomous from the civilian government, and inuential in policymaking tend to also have powers in controlling how much resources the government is able to give them (Bowman, 2002). It is a great source of power for militaries in Latin America (Pion-Berlin, 2001) and Asia (Alagappa, 2001). For example, the military in Indonesia are able to have control over certain state enterprises such as petroleum and other natural resources while the Thai military has a specic mandate on economic development and management of the communications industry (Honna, 2003; Ockey, 2001). These are not applicable to the case of the Philippines. Table 2 contains the defense spending of the Philippine government from 1986-2009. Even if one does not look at comparable data from other countries, these absolute numbers reveal two points. First, while the actual budget has grown, it is by a very small percentage which is problematic since the budget takes into consideration ination, the acquisition of newer, and therefore more expensive equipment, and the increase in the total population. The two other indicators reveal a downward trend whether one measures military expenditures as a percentage
27 For the full report, see http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/philippines/ 152_counterinsurgency_vs_counter_terrorism_in_mindanao.ashx,accessed12July2010.
Iraq.
21
of the national government budget or as a share of the country's gross domestic product.
Philippine Defense Expenditures, 1986-2007
Year 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
US$(Millions) 515 725 788 753 745 682 688 744 794 885 927 828 818 807 853 794 833 920 857 865 880 1034
% of gov't budget n.d n.d n.d n.d 8 8 8 n.d n.d n.d n.d n.d n.d n.d 6 n.d n.d 5 5 5 5 n.d
% of GDP n.d n.d 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1 1 1 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
Source: SIPRI Military Expenditures database and World Development Indicators
Earlier scholars argued that the presence of US military bases and other installations have provided a defense shield on the country that prevented the military from requesting for higher defense expenditures. Moreover, its inability to defeat the communist insurgency and the separatist movement in Mindanao from acquiring enough prestige and standing that its counterparts in Southeast Asia possessed. A manifestation of this has been its failed modernization program campaign blamed by some to the excessive civilian control of the government. In this particular case, the military was not able to convince the legislature to pass a law that will give the military the resources necessary to acquire new equipment and weaponry. The Senate, in particular, was not convinced to allow the military to receive multi-year funding as their proposed bill indicated. It also did not help that the campaign did not avoid being embroiled in politics as majority of the senators belong to the political opposition. While then President Ramos and the DND gave their full support, there was no other strong lobby to back the modernization program (de Castro, 1999). Subsequent administrations were not able to revive the AFP modernization campaign.
7.
Conclusion: Challenges and Prospects for Security Sector Transformation

By using the case of the Philippines, this paper is able to show how the level of military
autonomy aects the state of security sector governance and the pursuit of SST. It is not to say that this is the only factor that has an impact on the trajectory and progress of reforming security institutions. In fact, the existing body of literature on this topic also points to other
22
things such as political will of the government, the historical path of the democratic transition, and the strength of civil society and the capacity of civilian government, among others. By looking at the current eorts in the Philippines on the drive toward SST, the paper exposed the constraints generated by high degrees of political autonomy enjoyed by the military. First, the military was the driving force behind what is considered as the military reform program which solely was concerned with increasing operational eectiveness of the armed forces to combat internal security threats. Not only is this is contradictory to the orthodox mission and role of the military, it also did not contain any of the other SSR principles. Related to this, one can see the lack of attention and progress toward the implementation of some of the reforms associated with increasing transparency, accountability, and responsiveness of the military as stated in the Feliciano Commission recommendations. Moreover, it is clear that the military has the upper hand in the formulation of security policy. While this might also be attributed to lack of civilian experts on defense and security matters among the bureaucracy, it is apparent that the passage of recent legislation, the implementation of the peace policy, and the current framework of anti-terrorism and counterinsurgency all point to the signicant inuence of the military. While there were episodes wherein a more dovish stance was seen, especially in the early years of the Macapagal-Arroyo administration, this was not sustained as a more aggressive policy was eventually adopted. There are indications that the government was guided by the military to adopt this policy shift. What is palpable in the Philippine case is the absence of commitment among all stakeholders to embark on comprehensive SST. This was not only seen in the case of the Davide and Feliciano Commission recommendations but as well as the other reform programs of the current government for the military and the police. The absence of a vision for good security sector governance also could be the reason for the adoption of certain laws and policies inimical to SST principles. Furthermore, there was also no support or pressure from other political actors such as civil society and media. A related challenge is the problem of complexity (Nathan, 2007). Reforming the security sector after many years of operation may require arduous tasks that may have to be done simultaneously and with coordination. Such a project may prove to be taxing even to the most committed and resource endowed country. In the Philippines, while there are existing reform initiatives across these institutions are not all attuned to SST. They remain to be institution specic, not linked with one another, and not oriented towards all the objectives of SST. Coherence is of the essence if ever SST would produce its intended outputs. This entails the appropriate timing, sequencing of reform activities, and coordination in order to ensure their complementarity. The third challenge pertains to the absence of knowledge and expertise on SST. As a concept that is not even two decades old, it is not surprising that only a few could have a complete understanding of the nature of SST. This expertise may include knowledge on defense, security, development, peace, and democratization at the theoretical, empirical, and policy level. It is acknowledged that just like other countries, the Philippines suers from a dearth of civilians with expertise on SST issues. For example, it cannot be prevented that former ocials of security forces gets to be appointed to civilian oversight institutions. The other extreme is the placement of civilians without the necessary expertise could equally be dangerous. One initiative is to tap civil society and develop a capacity for SST advocacy. Scholars have
23
stated that civil society groups can help facilitate SSR in three ways: (1) informal oversight as a watchdog ; (2) reservoir of independent expertise; (3) intermediary organizations between the state and its citizens (Caparini, 2006; Caparini and Fluri, 2006).
28 However, it shared among
other civilians a lack of information on SSR. Relative to other issues pursued by nongovernmental associations such as social development, peace, human rights, and democracy, little attention has been paid on how SST could help realize this basket of advocacies . In hindsight, an explanation could come from the negative relations between the armed forces and civil societies as the former became the implementers of authoritarian rule in the Philippines. Also noteworthy is the fact that not only was civil society became the recipients (or victims) of the iron hand of martial law, but they were also the pivotal force for the democratic transition in the Philippines. For much of the members of civil society, SST is the crucial unknown that may prove to be pivotal in the realization of many of their advocacies. With the advent of democratic security , there is now the need for civil society as intermediary organizations between the state and the people to help dene the mechanisms for this public good to be eectively provided and equitably shared by the entire society. Not only would it jeopardize this package of transformations aimed at generating accountability, transparency, responsiveness, professionalism, and eciency, it would also negatively aect some of the basic advocacies that they are pursuing such as peace, development, and democracy. However, any meaningful state-civil society engagements on SST are a function of existing relations between the two spheres. If there is condence shared by both, then it would be relatively easy to embark on a partnership for SST. But this may prove to be challenging given the contentious state of political relations between the current government and most members of civil society. The lack of expertise of civil society reects the prevailing lack of capacity of most civilians in performing oversight functions. These oversight functions could be categorized into three: (1) conrmation of appointments; (2) budget scrutiny and review; (3) investigations or hearings in aid of legislation. There is substantial information that the civilian oversight institutions have not performed these functions appropriately and with due diligence. Also, the appointment or selection of former military ocials in most of these agencies has further jeopardized any meaningful oversight from being exercised. Just like in other countries, they ended up to be a little more than a cheering block for the interests of the security agencies (Tanner, 2000, p.14) and thereby undermining democratic control (Watts, 2002, p. 53). There is also the challenge of maintaining balance in the implementation of SST. It is observed that much of the attention has been paid to military as far as SSR is concerned sometimes to the detriment of other members of the core security forces. The police and the intelligence services are as important as the military in provision of security in the Philippines. What they unfortunately lack is the tradition or ability to instigate serious challenges to democratic stability. This severely diminishes their power to lobby or argue for capability-building. In the long term, the inability to address the needs of the police in order to perform its mandated functions will also cause stress to the military for they will continue to do tasks not related to its original mission. As long as the police is characterized by ineciency, corruption, and poor training, military deployment to fulll what are supposed to be functions of civilian forces will be necessary.
28
The media is also an important actor of SSR. Given its informational role, it can also contribute by raising
security defense issues in the public agenda and some of them who engage in investigative journalism can also address the secretive nature of the armed forces (Caparini 2004).
24
In order to address the political autonomy of the military aecting the prospects for SST in the Philippines, it is crucial that there is a comprehensive process of consultation that includes all relevant stakeholders (Ball and Brzoska, 2002, p. 11). It is time that the Philippines embark on a re-formulation of its framework for SST which is the mark of local ownership. Genuine reform that will result to transformation is often achieved when it is not monopolized nor dominated by the object of reform. In the meantime, the Philippine is a case wherein the political autonomy of the military might have resulted with the reform of the security sector but not necessarily its transformation.
25
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New Voices Series

No. 5, August 2010

This publication was co-financed by our donors:

The Global Consortium on Security Transformation (GCST)

Aries Ayuson Arugay

Spheres of Military Autonomy in the Philippines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

GCST, New Voices Series, no. 5, August 2010

2 What makes the Philippines a relevant case is

GCST, New Voices Series, no. 5, August 2010

Military Autonomy: Insights from Civil-Military Relations (CMR) Theory

GCST, New Voices Series, no. 5, August 2010

3 High degrees of autonomy in these spheres imply the

GCST, New Voices Series, no. 5, August 2010

Reforming and Transforming the Security Sector: SST as a Political Project

GCST, New Voices Series, no. 5, August 2010

The Philippine Security Sector

An example of these would be Hernandez (1997; 2005; 2007).

GCST, New Voices Series, no. 5, August 2010

Core Security Forces

Security management and oversight bodies

President, National Security Council (NSC) Congressional Committees, Executive Depart-

Justice and law enforcement institutions

Ombudsman, Sandiganbayan (anti-graft court).

The Philippine Military: Evolution and Organization

GCST, New Voices Series, no. 5, August 2010

GCST, New Voices Series, no. 5, August 2010

The Philippine Military in the Post-Authoritarian Period

7 The Philippine National Police (PNP)

GCST, New Voices Series, no. 5, August 2010

GCST, New Voices Series, no. 5, August 2010

Military Autonomy during the Arroyo Administration

GCST, New Voices Series, no. 5, August 2010

norm that this post is reserved to high-ranking retired military ocers.

GCST, New Voices Series, no. 5, August 2010

13 There was also a lack of a multi-sectoral constituency for SSR

Spheres of Military Autonomy in the Philippines

A new  civilian secretary of defense was appointed in June 2007.

GCST, New Voices Series, no. 5, August 2010

 re-engineer systems and  re-tool personnel.

16 Composed of ten (10) key areas of improvement,

Security Policy: High Level of Military Autonomy

GCST, New Voices Series, no. 5, August 2010

GCST, New Voices Series, no. 5, August 2010

terrorism law, euphemistically called the Human Security Act of 2007.

19 For civil society

For a full text of this law, see

Republic Act No. 9372,  Human Security Act of 2007 , Section 2.

GCST, New Voices Series, no. 5, August 2010

21 Adopted in 2001, this plan seeks the coopera-

GCST, New Voices Series, no. 5, August 2010

Human Rights: Moderate Level of Military Autonomy

GCST, New Voices Series, no. 5, August 2010

24 all concluded that the government,

GCST, New Voices Series, no. 5, August 2010

27 By not having enough sensitivity

Defense Budgeting: Low Level of Military Autonomy

27 For the full report, see http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/philippines/ 152_counterinsurgency_vs_counter_terrorism_in_mindanao.ashx,accessed12July2010.

GCST, New Voices Series, no. 5, August 2010

Source: SIPRI Military Expenditures database and World Development Indicators

Conclusion: Challenges and Prospects for Security Sector Transformation

GCST, New Voices Series, no. 5, August 2010

GCST, New Voices Series, no. 5, August 2010

28 However, it shared among

norm that this post is reserved to high-ranking retired military ocers.

A new civilian secretary of defense was appointed in June 2007.

re-engineer systems and re-tool personnel.

Republic Act No. 9372, Human Security Act of 2007 , Section 2.

Foreign Aairs, March-April.

Security Governance in Post-Conict Peacebuilding. Geneva:

[29] (2004). Rebuilding Democratic Institutions: Civil-Military Relations in Philippine

ges for Conict Transformation.