Readiness File

Caldebate.
com Readiness Good/Bad
Index
Index........................................................................................................................................................................................................1
*** Readiness Good ***.........................................................................................................................................................................2
Allied Prolif- Generic Scenario (1 of 2)..................................................................................................................................................3
Allied Prolif- Generic Scenario (2 of 2)..................................................................................................................................................4
Allied Prolif- Japan Scenario..................................................................................................................................................................5
Allied Prolif- Japan- Asian Prolif  NW...............................................................................................................................................6
Allied Prolif- Japan- Kashmir !...............................................................................................................................................................7
Allied Prolif- Japan- ↓ Confidence  Re-arm.......................................................................................................................................8
Allied Prolif- Taiwan Scenario (1 of 2)...................................................................................................................................................9
Allied Prolif- Taiwan Scenario (2 of 2).................................................................................................................................................10
Allied Prolif- Interal for Asia Scenarios- Readiness k..........................................................................................................................11
Asian Stability Scenario........................................................................................................................................................................12
Asian Prolif Scenario............................................................................................................................................................................13
Hege Scenario (1 of 2)..........................................................................................................................................................................14
Hege Scenario (2 of 2)..........................................................................................................................................................................15
Hege- Readiness k deterrence/warfighting (1 of 2)..............................................................................................................................16
Hege- Readiness k deterrence/warfighting (2 of 2)..............................................................................................................................17
NK Scenario..........................................................................................................................................................................................18
NK- Readiness k...................................................................................................................................................................................19
Regional Conflicts Scenario (1 of 2).....................................................................................................................................................20
Regional Conflicts Scenario (2 of 2).....................................................................................................................................................21
Regional Conflicts- Perception of Readiness key.................................................................................................................................22
Regional Conflicts- Readiness key (1 of 2)..........................................................................................................................................23
Regional Conflicts- Readiness key (2 of 2)..........................................................................................................................................24
Regional Conflicts- Prolif !...................................................................................................................................................................25
Regional Conflicts- Terrorism ! (1 of 2)...............................................................................................................................................26
Regional Conflicts- Terrorism ! (2 of 2)...............................................................................................................................................27
Regional Conflicts- Laundry list !........................................................................................................................................................28
Regional Conflicts- ! Calc Probability..................................................................................................................................................29
Taiwan Scenario (1 of 2).......................................................................................................................................................................30
Taiwan Scenario (2 of 2).......................................................................................................................................................................31
Taiwan- Readiness key (1 of 2).............................................................................................................................................................32
Taiwan- Readiness key (2 of 2).............................................................................................................................................................33
Terrorism Scenario (1 of 2)...................................................................................................................................................................34
Terrorism Scenario (2 of 2)...................................................................................................................................................................35
Terrorism- Readiness key (1 of 2).........................................................................................................................................................36
Terrorism- Readiness key (2 of 2).........................................................................................................................................................37
Terrorism- Failed States key.................................................................................................................................................................38
AT Intervention Bad- ! t/ Shield (1 of 2)...............................................................................................................................................39
AT Intervention Bad- ! t/ Shield (2 of 2)...............................................................................................................................................40
AT Interventionism- Its Good (1 of 2)..................................................................................................................................................41
AT Interventionism- Its Good (2 of 2)..................................................................................................................................................42
AT Interventionism  Terrorism..........................................................................................................................................................43
AT No specific scenario proves no !.....................................................................................................................................................44
*** Readiness Bad ***.........................................................................................................................................................................45
Counterbalancing Scenario...................................................................................................................................................................46
Intervention/Pre-emption Scenario (1 of 3)..........................................................................................................................................47
Interventionism-  Terrorism (1 of 2).................................................................................................................................................50
Interventionism-  Terrorism (2 of 2).................................................................................................................................................51
Interventionism- AT Inevitable.............................................................................................................................................................52
Interventionism- Won’t deter conflict...................................................................................................................................................53
Readiness unnecessary/won’t collapse.................................................................................................................................................54
No ! (1 of 2)..........................................................................................................................................................................................55
1
Caldebate.com Readiness Good/Bad
No ! (1 of 2)..........................................................................................................................................................................................56
AT Asian Stability.................................................................................................................................................................................57
AT Germany..........................................................................................................................................................................................58
AT Japanese Prolif.................................................................................................................................................................................59
AT Iran..................................................................................................................................................................................................60
AT Israel................................................................................................................................................................................................61
AT Kashmir...........................................................................................................................................................................................62
AT Taiwan war......................................................................................................................................................................................63
AT Taiwanese Prolif (1 of 2).................................................................................................................................................................64
AT Taiwanese Prolif (2 of 2).................................................................................................................................................................65
*** Readiness Good ***
2
Allied Prolif- Generic Scenario (1 of 2)

A. Perception of a decline in U.S. military readiness  allied prolif.
O'Hanlon ‘01
(Michael E.-, Sr. Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies @ the Brookings Institution, Defense Policy Choices: For the Bush
Administration 2001-05, P. 3, http://brookings.nap.edu/books/0815700792/html/; Jacob)
Some observers believe that U.S. defense spending should be drastically reduced. Noting that it now commutes one-third
of global defense outlays, roughly as much as the world's next eight military powers combined, about five times more than either
China's or Russia's defense spending, and about thirty times the sum of Iranian, Iraqi, and North Korean military spending, they
question why America's annual defense budget remains at around $300 billion today 9see tables 1-3 and 1-4).
However such broad arguments are unpersuasive. There are good reasons why the United States should spend far more
than any other country on its military. The United Stares has unique global interests and multiple military
commitments far from its national territory. It maintains worldwide military deployments to keep alliances
credible. It rightly desires a military so unambiguously strong that it can generally deter war and, failing that,
win decisive victories with minimal casualties. Finally, given that its armed forces are not particularly large (constituting
only about 6 percent of global military manpower), it relies on high-quality and thus expensive equipment and manpower
rather than sheer size for its war-fighting edge.
Even if the United States cut its defense spending in half, it would still outspend Ian. Iraq, and North Korea by a
factor of fifteen, and China by more than 2 to 1. Yet it would then have far too small a military to maintain its global
commitments. As a result, potential foes might be tempted to attack U.S. allies in key regions such as the
Persian Gulf and Northeast Asia. Recognizing the potential danger these U.S. allies would be likely to embark
on military buildups, perhaps even pursuing nuclear weapons capabilities, in a manner that could be destabilizing. So
broad defense budge comparisons resolve little, especially when made between courtiers with different types of global military
responsibilities, economies, and political systems.
B. Allied prolif  NW
Millot ‘94
(Marc Dean-, Summer, The Washington Quarterly, “Facing the Emerging Reality of Regional Nuclear Adversaries”, Vol. 17 #3,
Lexis; Jacob)
The lack of credible security assurances will push allies of the United States toward nuclear arsenals of
their own to restore the military equilibrium upset by their local nuclear adversaries or by more general regional
nuclear instabilities. These allies may well see a realization of their virtual nuclear arsenal as the only
alternative to losing all influence over their own national security. This development, however, would lead down a
worrisome path, with dangerous implications for regional stability and ultimately for the security of the United States itself.
One lesson U.S. defense decision makers should take from the growing understanding of U.S.-Soviet crises is
that nuclear stability is not automatic. By the end of the Cold War nuclear stability was practically an institution; in the
beginning it was barely a concept. As historians report their findings on such events as the Cuban missile crisis, it is becoming
3
apparent that the superpowers learned to create stability on the basis of trial and error. n62 Reading the results of this
research it is difficult not conclude that, particularly in the early days of U.S.-Soviet competition, luck played an
uncomfortably significant role in avoidance of nuclear war.
It is possible that the new nuclear powers will learn from the history of U.S.-Soviet nuclear crises, just as they have
learned to take advantage of U.S. technological innovations in the development of their own nuclear weapons programs. Perhaps
the relatively rapid development of a stable regional nuclear balance is feasible. On the other hand, U.S. leaders should be
concerned that nations with widely varying values, thought processes, and cultures may go through the learning
experience without their own good fortune. It is hard to know where any nuclear war might end, or what lessons
onlookers will take away from it.
Allied Prolif- Generic Scenario (2 of 2)

It is doubtful that anyone is eager to run a real world experiment on the universality of the
superpowers' nuclear logic. Indeed the vision of experimental failure on a massive scale has probably influenced U.S. decision
makers to give prevention its privileged role in the national response to the proliferation threat. But now that regional
adversaries of the United States are going nuclear, the experiment will begin if U.S. allies follow suit. As
perhaps several of these experiments play themselves out, the odds increase that one will lead to nuclear war.
When U.S. leaders come to recognize that these experiments are out of their hands, they will face the
question of what to do with the remaining forward presence of their forces on allied territories. If they stay, the
United States runs the risk of being sucked into nuclear wars that are not of its making against its will. If they leave,
the United States will lose any hope of regional influence, but may at the same time precipitate a crisis that may
itself increase the risk of nuclear conflict. Neither choice is appealing; both hold grave risks for U.S. national security.
Preventing the need of future leaders to confront that choice should be the goal of U.S. policy.
4
Allied Prolif- Japan Scenario

A. ↓ readiness  Japanese prolif, arms races, and NW
Tellis ‘00
(Ashley J.-, Sr. Policy Analyst @ the RAND Corporation, April 1, Heritage Foundation Policy Review, “Smoke, Fire, and What to
Do in Asia; Militarization of Asia and its affect on the U.S.”, Lexis; Jacob)
The third critical interest consists of ensuring the survival of American allies. The first and most obvious reason
for this objective is that the United States has treaty obligations to three important Asian states -- Japan, South Korea, and
Australia -- and political commitments to another, namely Taiwan. While meeting these obligations is certainly important to
maintain the credibility of the United States in the international arena, it is also consequential for directly substantive
reasons that go right to the heart of Bracken's book: controlling the leakage of disruptive technologies in Asia.
In at least two of these three instances, the assurance of U.S. protection has resulted in important implicit
bargains that are indispensable to the American conception of stable international order. Thanks to American
security guarantees, South Korea and Japan have both enjoyed the luxury of eschewing nuclear weapons as
guarantors of security. Should American protective pledges be seen as weakening, the temptation to resurrect
the nuclear option on the part of both states will increase -- to the consequent detriment of America's global
antiproliferation policy. Equally significant, however, is that Japan, and possibly South Korea as well, would of necessity
have to embark on a significant conventional buildup, especially of missile, maritime and air forces. The resulting force
posture would in practice be indistinguishable from a long-range power projection capability possessing an
offensive orientation. Even if such forces are developed primarily for defensive purposes, they will certainly
give rise to new security dilemmas region-wide -- which, in turn, would lead to an intense arms race, growing
suspicions, and possibly war.
B. The impact is the whole world blowing up.
Kennedy & Irie ‘00

(Prof. Paul-, Prof. Akira-, Daily Yomiuri, Jan. 10, “21st Century--Dialogues on the Future/ Globalization's sway in evolution of
states put in focus”, Lexis; Jacob)
Kennedy: Over the past two or three decades, many Asian nations have increased their defense budgets, while
European countries have done otherwise. During this time, there have been many flash points in Asia, such North
Korea, Taiwan and Kashmir. Some Asian countries have developed nuclear weapons, as contrasted with few
Europeans who even want nuclear power stations today.
We have good reason to feel worried that Asia could become a tinderbox should there be any conflict in
disputed territories like the Spratly Islands and an autistic North Korean regime that does not bother to understand the
outside world. Taiwan is often rash to provoke Beijing, while the Kashmir conflict could grow into an India-
Pakistan war.
5
There is great concern about how we should ensure that bitter rivalries in the Asian part of the globe will not
bring down a system that is emerging in the world now. We do not want a repeat of 1914. I am concerned that an
armed conflict might arise in South or East Asia in 2008, for example, and bring down the credit, financial flow
and capital in the region.
Irie: I share Prof. Kennedy's sense of pessimism about some serious problems facing the world today. There are many
more sovereign nations today, and the majority of them are newly independent states. Therefore, they are even more nationalistic.
Nationalism has often served as the only symbol of national unity for some African, Asian and Middle Eastern countries that have
been grated in their regions without national traditions comparable to those of European countries. This has made matters even
worse. Nationalism is all that can keep a country together. It is essential to ensure that local conflicts will be kept from
blowing up the entire world.
Allied Prolif- Japan- Asian Prolif  NW
The impact is world-wide proliferation and nuclear war
Cirincione ‘00
(Joseph-, March 22, Foreign Policy, “The Asian Nuclear Reaction Chain”, P. 120, Lexis; Jacob)
The blocks would fall quickest and hardest in Asia, where proliferation pressures are already building
more quickly than anywhere else in the world. If a nuclear breakout takes place in Asia, then the international
arms control agreements that have been painstakingly negotiated over the past 40 years will crumble. Moreover, the United
States could find itself embroiled in its fourth war on the Asian continent in six decades--a costly rebuke to those who seek the
safety of Fortress America by hiding behind national missile defenses.
Consider what is already happening: North Korea continues to play guessing games with its nuclear and
missile programs; South Korea wants its own missiles to match Pyongyang's; India and Pakistan shoot across
borders while running a slow-motion nuclear arms race; China modernizes its nuclear arsenal amid tensions
with Taiwan and the United States; Japan's vice defense minister is forced to resign after extolling the benefits of nuclear
weapons; and Russia--whose Far East nuclear deployments alone make it the largest Asian nuclear power--struggles to maintain
territorial coherence.
Five of these states have nuclear weapons; the others are capable of constructing them. Like neutrons firing from a
split atom, one nation's actions can trigger reactions throughout the region, which in turn, stimulate additional
actions. These nations form an interlocking Asian nuclear reaction chain that vibrates dangerously with each
new development.
If the frequency and intensity of this reaction cycle increase, critical decisions taken by any one of these
governments could cascade into the second great wave of nuclear-weapon proliferation, bringing regional and
global economic and political instability and, perhaps, the first combat use of a nuclear weapon since 1945.
6
Allied Prolif- Japan- Kashmir !

A. Japanese rearm would be rapid and cause India/Pakistan arms races
Kunii ‘03
(Irene M.-, Jan. 20, Business Week, “Why Japan Just Might Build Nukes”, Number 3816, P. 22, Lexis; Jacob)
If Japan could get beyond the hurdles, it likely wouldn't need long to develop a bomb. It has five tons of
plutonium stored in the nuclear research center of Tokai-mura, north of Tokyo, and its scientists know how to convert it to
weapons-grade material. Hideyuki Ban, director of the nonprofit Citizens' Nuclear Information Center, says Japan
could build a nuclear bomb within months. And its civilian rocket and satellite launching system could easily
be converted to military use. Japan also has superbly equipped land, sea, and air forces that could deliver medium-range
nukes to North Korea.
But if Japan decides to build its own nukes, get ready for an Asian arms race. China would likely want to boost
its arsenal, which would prompt India to develop more nuclear weapons, which would spur Pakistan to do the
same -- and on and on into an ever more perilous future.
B. The ! is nuclear winter.
Washington Times ‘01

(July 8, “The most dangerous place”, Lexis; Jacob)
The foreign policy of the United States in South Asia should move from the lackadaisical and distant (with India crowned
with a unilateral veto power) to aggressive involvement at the vortex.
The most dangerous place on the planet is Kashmir, a disputed territory convulsed and illegally occupied for
more than 53 years and sandwiched between nuclear-capable India and Pakistan. It has ignited two wars between
the estranged South Asian rivals in 1948 and 1965, and a third could trigger nuclear volleys and a nuclear winter
threatening the entire globe. The United States would enjoy no sanctuary.
This apocalyptic vision is no idiosyncratic view. The director of central intelligence, the Defense Department, and
world experts generally place Kashmir at the peak of their nuclear worries. Both India and Pakistan are racing
like thoroughbreds to bolster their nuclear arsenals and advanced delivery vehicles. Their defense budgets are
climbing despite widespread misery amongst their populations. Neither country has initialed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, or indicated an inclination to ratify an impending Fissile Material/Cut-off Convention.
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Allied Prolif- Japan- ↓ Confidence  Re-arm

Japan would go nuclear in a crisis.
Campbell ‘02
(Kurt M.-, Senior Vice Prez and Kissinger Chair in National Security @ CSIS, Winter, Washington Quarterly, “Nuclear
Proliferation beyond Rogues”, Vol. 26 #1, Lexis; Jacob)
States in decline often suffer from a kind of societal insecurity over future economic and security shortfalls.
Such anxiety could well trigger national consideration of nuclear options to forestall the heightened
vulnerability that naturally accompanies decline. Just as failing or slipping states have historically
sought to wage preventive war against rising and competitive states in the international system, declining states may
well consider the nuclear option as a relatively cost-effective and technically achievable equalizer that could
prevent the state's descent into oblivion or trial by rising regional rivals. This complex societal dynamic of "regime
pessimism" is currently in play among virtually all the states in the Middle East, and some might even argue in Japan as
well. Countries that once aspired to international greatness or at least a level of prominence but that now fear irrelevance or
worse might regard nuclear weapons as a way to provide not only a psychological hedge but potentially a
strategic one.
8
Allied Prolif- Taiwan Scenario (1 of 2)

A. ↓ military readiness in Asia  perception of imminent U.S. withdrawal.
Bersia ‘93
(John C.-, Staff Writer, Nov. 14, Orlando Sentinel, “In Asia, Opportunity Knocks Clinton at the Door: Bigger Role for the U.S.”,
Lexis; Jacob)
Just because the Cold War is over, the United States' security concerns in the Asia-Pacific region haven't
evaporated.
This national interest was summed up by the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy:
"Today the United States is widely viewed in the region as an essential balancing force, a guarantor of peace
and stability in a part of the world where territorial disputes, nuclear proliferation, civil war and other risks of
military adventurism warrant U.S. vigilance and readiness."
China offers a good example of the challenges, because of a massive military, nuclear weapons, a propensity
to sell destabilizing military equipment, problems with Taiwan, testiness over the planned reintegration of
Hong Kong in 1997, and territorial disputes with Russia and some other former Soviet republics, Vietnam, India,
Bhutan, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei.
Ironically, a perception courses through much of Asia that the United States could be contemplating
withdrawal from the region. That perception is fed by the forced closing last year of huge U.S. military installations in
the Philippines, by powerful political influences in the United States that seek to focus national attention inward
and by American budgetary constraints.
In part, those fears may have been laid to rest by Clinton's stated security priorities for the region. They include a
continued U.S. military commitment, stronger efforts against weapons of mass destruction, new regional dialogues on
security challenges and support for democracy.
The most prominent examples of the U.S. security commitment to Asia are bases in Japan and South Korea. They
help to keep peace in the region and provide a specific counterweight to potential aggression from North Korea.
That's a central concern, many analysts agree.
B. That perception will scare Taiwan into nuclearizing.
Campbell ‘02
(Kurt M.-, Sr. V.P. & Kissinger Chair in National Security @ CSIS, Winter, The Washington Quarterly, “Nuclear Proliferation
beyond Rogues”, Lexis; Jacob)
Currently, the increasingly militarized relationship between China and Taiwan across the Taiwan Strait
has sparked similar concerns. China's seemingly inexorable buildup of a conventional arsenal of fighter planes, medium-range
ballistic missiles, naval assets, and expeditionary forces suggests a worrisome trend. Many fear that, at some point in the future,
absent external assistance, Taiwan could become vulnerable to a conventional onslaught by the mainland.
For this reason, Taiwan has considered a nuclear alternative at points in the past but was dissuaded through
9
quiet pressure from Washington. An increasing conventional imbalance and any sense of alienation or lack of
support from Washington could cause Taiwan's leaders to reconsider such an approach.
C. The ! is nuclear war.
Sieff ‘06
(Martin-, Jan. 19, U.P.I., “BMD Focus: The Missiles of Taiwan”, Lexis; Jacob)
Taiwan's decision to produce no less than 500 cruise missiles capable of threatening southern China dramatically escalates
its missile arms race with the People's Republic of China and may tempt China toward taking preemptive military action in the
2008-2010 period.
Allied Prolif- Taiwan Scenario (2 of 2)
As previously reported in our companion BMD Watch column, the respected British journal Jane's Defense Weekly
reported earlier this month that Taiwan has highly ambitiously plans produce at least 50 of its own Hsiung Feng, or Brave Wind, 2E
cruise missiles by 2010 and eventually it plans to produce and deploy no less than 500 of them. The Taiwanese Defense Ministry
has stayed silent on the report. It strikingly has not denied it.
JDW also reported that Taiwan has already home-produced three prototypes of the weapon.
This single report should sound alarms in the Pentagon and for defense strategists and governments in the United States
and throughout East Asia and the Pacific Rim. For it is the clearest signal yet that a possible military confrontation between Taiwan
and Mainland China that could easily drag in the United States may now be only a matter of time.
Even with only conventional warheads, a massive cruise missile force deployed on Taiwan could pose a very serious
national security threat to China: The reported 360-mile range of the Hsiung Feng would put the Hong Kong and Shanghai, the
financial hub of China, within its range.
Also, Taiwan's cruise missile force might not stay merely conventionally armed. Taiwan's advanced industrial economy
already has nuclear reactors and, like Japan, South Korea and many other advanced industrial nations, Taiwan has capability to
develop its own nuclear weaponry probably within only a few months if its leaders thought it faced an overwhelming national
emergency
Furthermore, although cruise missiles are far slower than ballistic missiles, they can be far harder for state-of-the-art anti-
ballistic missile interceptors to shoot down. Cruise missiles are programmed to hug the ground and regularly change course by
hugging the contours of the landscape. This means it is vastly more difficult, if not impossible for ground-based radar systems to
lock on to them. Israel's superb Arrow ABM interceptor for example, last year successfully shot down an intermediate range
ballistic missile configured to fly like an Iranian Shahib-3. But Israel would have to rely on its air force aircraft -- qualitatively
about the best in the world -- and airborne AWACS radar aircraft to detect and shoot down any of the dozen cruise missiles that
Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko has acknowledged were secretly sold to Iran under the regime of his predecessor Leonid
Kuchma.
Also, it is far easier to hide cruise missiles or to make them road mobile than it is for much larger ballistic missiles. They
are far smaller and easier to handle. The forerunner of the cruise missile, the German V-1, or Flying Bomb, showed this capability
in 1944. Enormous massed bombing raids by Britain's Royal Air Force Bomber Command and the U.S. Eighth Air Force were
unable prevent the Luftwaffe from running up new launching ramps for them to bombard London within a matter of hours. Modern
cruise missiles are equally easy and flexible in their launching requirements. And Jane's reported that the Hsiung Fengs are already
designed to be mobile.'
That means that if Taiwan builds and deploys a nuclear-capable cruise missile force of even 50 weapons as it plans to do
by 2010 -- let alone the huge 500-weapon force it ultimately envisages -- China would almost certainly react by planning an
overwhelming preemptive strike by the enormous force of 700 ballistic missiles it has already assembled to threaten Taiwan and
deter the United States from operating its nuclear aircraft carrier strike forces in the Taiwan Strait.
If China did that, Taiwan in turn would most likely respond by putting its own cruise missile force on hair trigger alert.
Consequently, the dangers of a full-scale missile war being set off by miscalculation, or at a far earlier stage in any crisis, would be
greatly increased.
Taiwan even has plans to improve on the current Hsuing-Feng design to give later models a range of 600 miles. The
island's military-run Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology, the developer of the cruise missile, is planning to extend its
range to 600 miles, JDW said.
However, "This would require the acquisition of specialized engine components from the United States that Washington
has so far refused to allow, perhaps linked to provisions under the Missile Technology Control Regime, Jane's said.
The cruise missile program appears designed to become the centerpiece of Taiwan's "active defense" policy, which aims to
counter any aggression before it reaches Taiwanese territory, JDW said.
10
However, the problem with that kind of "active defense" is that it could instead rapidly provoke the kind of "active attack"
it is meant to prevent. Would China sit back and allow Taiwan to effectively guarantee its perpetual de facto independence for the
foreseeable future by deploying the kind of missile capability that, it could be argued, would be comparable to the one the Soviet
Union tried to place in Cuba in the early 1960s to threaten the United States from close at hand?
President John F, Kennedy did not sit back and allow the Soviets and their communist Cuban allies. Instead, he risked a full-scale
nuclear war in the Cuban Missile crisis of 1962 to force the withdrawal of the missiles. Will China's President Hu Jintao go as far
as JFK did in dealing with the missiles of Taiwan? Or might he even go further?
• Miscalc resulting from keeping weapons on hair-trigger alert

• Chinese First Strike
Allied Prolif- Interal for Asia Scenarios- Readiness k

High readiness is the only way to assure U.S. allies in Asia of its commitment to
deterring conflict.
Waldron ‘96
(Arthur N.-, Prof. of Strategy & Policy @ U.S. Naval War College, March 20, Testimony before the House National Security
Committee, “Security Challenges- China”, Lexis; Jacob)
But military preparation is best thought of as insurance; somehow we like it the best if in face we never need
to use it. The next several years will be an important test for the United States in Asia, China, Russia, India,
and other states—including our allies and friends—will be sizing us up, to see whether we have the resolve to
face threats and deter them, and the diplomatic skill in peacetime to manage friendships and alliances having complex
political and economic, as well as security dimensions. If the answers are yes, and our alliances remain strong, then we
may move in Asia, as we did in the European Cold War, from the equivalent today of the hair-raising Berlin Crises
of the 1950s and 1960s, to some future equivalents of Ostpolitik and Detente, capped off, perhaps, by genuine
liberalization in China. But if we flinch, then Asia will become a security free-for- all, like Europe in the first
half of this century, with every state arming, none truly allied, and none able to find the way to peace.
*NOTE- Card also appears elsewhere (the internal for Asian prolif)*
11
Asian Stability Scenario

A. Strong U.S. military readiness is key to Asian stability- 3 scenarios.
Stump ‘02
(Bob.-, Rep. (R-AZ), March 20, House Armed Services Committee Hearing, “FY ’03 Defense Budget Request”, Lexis; Jacob)
As we undertake this campaign to combat terrorism in the Asia- Pacific region, the critical missions
endure which we were dealing with before 9/11 and which are still there. The Taiwan Strait military balance, a North
Korea which is starving its population while selling missiles, and continued tensions between nuclear neighbors India
and Pakistan: all of these still keep me awake at night and continually keep the U.S. Pacific Command extremely
busy maintaining deterrence through readiness and through theater security cooperation.
B. The impact is the whole world blowing up.
Kennedy & Irie ‘00

(Prof. Paul-, Prof. Akira-, Daily Yomiuri, Jan. 10, “21st Century--Dialogues on the Future/ Globalization's sway in evolution of
states put in focus”, Lexis; Jacob)
Kennedy: Over the past two or three decades, many Asian nations have increased their defense budgets, while
European countries have done otherwise. During this time, there have been many flash points in Asia, such North
Korea, Taiwan and Kashmir. Some Asian countries have developed nuclear weapons, as contrasted with few
Europeans who even want nuclear power stations today.
We have good reason to feel worried that Asia could become a tinderbox should there be any conflict in
disputed territories like the Spratly Islands and an autistic North Korean regime that does not bother to understand the
outside world. Taiwan is often rash to provoke Beijing, while the Kashmir conflict could grow into an India-
Pakistan war.
There is great concern about how we should ensure that bitter rivalries in the Asian part of the globe will not
bring down a system that is emerging in the world now. We do not want a repeat of 1914. I am concerned that an
armed conflict might arise in South or East Asia in 2008, for example, and bring down the credit, financial flow
and capital in the region.
Irie: I share Prof. Kennedy's sense of pessimism about some serious problems facing the world today. There are many
more sovereign nations today, and the majority of them are newly independent states. Therefore, they are even more nationalistic.
Nationalism has often served as the only symbol of national unity for some African, Asian and Middle Eastern countries
that have been grated in their regions without national traditions comparable to those of European countries. This has made matters
even worse. Nationalism is all that can keep a country together. It is essential to ensure that local conflicts will be kept
from blowing up the entire world.
12
Asian Prolif Scenario

A. Decline in readiness  Asian prolif & war
Waldron ‘96
(Arthur N.-, Prof. of Strategy & Policy @ U.S. Naval War College, March 20, Testimony before the House National Security
Committee, “Security Challenges- China”, Lexis; Jacob)
But military preparation is best thought of as insurance; somehow we like it the best if in face we never need
to use it. The next several years will be an important test for the United States in Asia, China, Russia, India,
and other states—including our allies and friends—will be sizing us up, to see whether we have the resolve to
face threats and deter them, and the diplomatic skill in peacetime to manage friendships and alliances having complex
political and economic, as well as security dimensions. If the answers are yes, and our alliances remain strong, then we
may move in Asia, as we did in the European Cold War, from the equivalent today of the hair-raising Berlin Crises
of the 1950s and 1960s, to some future equivalents of Ostpolitik and Detente, capped off, perhaps, by genuine
liberalization in China. But if we flinch, then Asia will become a security free-for- all, like Europe in the first
half of this century, with every state arming, none truly allied, and none able to find the way to peace.
B. The ! is worldwide prolif & nuclear war.
Cirincione ‘00
(Joseph-, March 22, Foreign Policy, “The Asian Nuclear Reaction Chain”, P. 120, Lexis; Jacob)
The blocks would fall quickest and hardest in Asia, where proliferation pressures are already building
more quickly than anywhere else in the world. If a nuclear breakout takes place in Asia, then the
international arms control agreements that have been painstakingly negotiated over the past 40 years will
crumble. Moreover, the United States could find itself embroiled in its fourth war on the Asian continent in six decades--
a costly rebuke to those who seek the safety of Fortress America by hiding behind national missile defenses.
Consider what is already happening: North Korea continues to play guessing games with its nuclear and
missile programs; South Korea wants its own missiles to match Pyongyang's; India and Pakistan shoot across
borders while running a slow-motion nuclear arms race; China modernizes its nuclear arsenal amid tensions
with Taiwan and the United States; Japan's vice defense minister is forced to resign after extolling the benefits of nuclear
weapons; and Russia--whose Far East nuclear deployments alone make it the largest Asian nuclear power--struggles to maintain
territorial coherence.
Five of these states have nuclear weapons; the others are capable of constructing them. Like neutrons firing from a
split atom, one nation's actions can trigger reactions throughout the region, which in turn, stimulate additional
actions. These nations form an interlocking Asian nuclear reaction chain that vibrates dangerously with each
new development.
13
If the frequency and intensity of this reaction cycle increase, critical decisions taken by any one of
these governments could cascade into the second great wave of nuclear-weapon proliferation, bringing regional
and global economic and political instability and, perhaps, the first combat use of a nuclear weapon since 1945.
Hege Scenario (1 of 2)
A. Readiness is the backbone of U.S. leadership-deters counterbalancing.
Khalilzad ‘95
(Zalmay-, Spring, Washington Quarterly, “Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War”, Vol. 18, # 2,
Lexis; Jacob)
A global rival to the United States could emerge for several reasons. Because the
main deterrent to the rise of
another global rival is the military power of the United States, an inadequate level of U.S. military capability
could facilitate such an event. This capability should be measured not only in terms of the strength of other countries,
but also in terms of the U.S. ability to carry out the strategy outlined here. U.S. tradition makes the prospect of defense
cuts below this level a serious possibility: historically, the United States has made this error on several occasions by
downsizing excessively. It faces the same danger again for the longer term.
The issue is not only what levels of resources are spent on defense but also on what, for what, and how they are
spent. For the United States to maintain its military preeminence, in addition to meeting possible major regional
contingencies (MRCs), it needs specific capability in three areas.
First, besides maintaining a robust nuclear deterrent capability because of concerns with Russian and Chinese existing or potential nuclear postures, the
United States needs to acquire increased capability to deter, prevent, and defend against the use of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons in major conflicts in
critical regions. The regional deterrence requirements might well be different from those with regard to the Soviet Union during the Cold War because of the
character and motivations of different regional powers. U.S. ability to prevent and defend against use is currently very limited. In the near term, therefore, to deter
use of WMD against its forces and allies, the United States may have to threaten nuclear retaliation.To counter the spread of WMD and their means of delivery
(especially ballistic and cruise missiles), the United States should seek to develop the capability to promptly locate and destroy even well-protected facilities related
to biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. Equally important will be the ability to defend against the use of these weapons, including
both active and passive defense. Deploying robust, multilayered ballistic missile defenses is vital for protecting U.S. forwarddeployed forces and extending
protection to U.S. allies, thus gaining their participation and cooperation in defeating aggression in critical regions.
Second, the United States needs
improved capability for decisive impact in lesser regional crises (LRCs)
-- internal conflicts, small wars, humanitarian relief, peacekeeping or peacemaking operations, punitive
strikes, restoration of civil order, evacuation of noncombatant Americans, safeguarding of security zones, and
monitoring and enforcement of sanctions. Given the end of the Cold War, the United States can be more selective in
deciding when to become involved militarily. It has not been selective enough during the past three years. Getting involved in
LRCs can erode U.S. capabilities for dealing with bigger and more important conflicts. Nevertheless, some crises may occur
in areas of vital importance to the United States -- e.g., in Mexico, Cuba, South Africa, or Saudi Arabia -- and others
might so challenge American values as to produce U.S. military involvement. The United States might also
consider participating with allies in some LRCs because of a desire either to extend the zone of peace or to
prevent chaos from spreading to a critical region and thereby threatening the security of members of the zone
of peace.
14
B. The ! is nuclear war
Khalilzad ‘95
(Zalmay-, Badass, Spring, Washington Quarterly, “Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War”, Vol.
18 #2, P. 84, Lexis; Jacob)
Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for
the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in
itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First,
the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the
rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major
problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level
conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the
United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including
a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a
multipolar balance of power system.
Hege Scenario (2 of 2)
C. Independent of the strength of U.S. hegemony c/b  NW & extinction
Nye ‘91
(Joseph-, Dean of Kennedy School of Gov. @ Harvard, Bound to Lead, P. 17)
Perceptions of change in the relative power of nations are of critical importance to understanding the
relationship between decline and war. One of the oldest generalizations about international politics attributes the onset
of major wars to shifts in power among the leading nations. Thus Thucydides accounted for the onset of the
Peloponnesian War which destroyed the power of ancient Athens. The history of the interstate system since 1500 is punctuated by
severe wars in which one country struggled to surpass another as the leading state. If, as Robert Gilpin argues, "international
politics has not changed fundamentally over the millennia," the implications for the future are bleak .45 And if
fears about shifting power precipitate a major war in a world with 50,000 nuclear weapons, history as we
know it may end.
15
Hege- Readiness k deterrence/warfighting (1 of 2)

Readiness dissuades enemy buildup
Policy Papers ‘02

(Sept., “The national security strategy of the United States of America”, Lexis; Jacob)
It is time to reaffirm the essential role of American military strength. We must build and maintain our defenses beyond
challenge. Our military's highest priority is to defend the United States. To do so effectively, our military must:
* assure our allies and friends;
* dissuade future military competition;
* deter threats against U.S. interests, allies, and friends; and
* decisively defeat any adversary if deterrence fails.
The unparalleled strength of the United States armed forces, and their forward presence, have maintained the peace in
some of the world's most strategically vital regions. However, the threats and enemies we must confront have changed, and so must
our forces. A military structured to deter massive Cold War-era armies must be transformed to focus more on how an adversary
might fight rather than where and when a war might occur. We will channel our energies to overcome a host of operational
challenges.
The presence of American forces overseas is one of the most profound symbols of the U.S. commitments to allies and
friends. Through our willingness to use force in our own defense and in defense of others, the United States demonstrates its
resolve to maintain a balance of power that favors freedom. To contend with uncertainty and to meet the many security challenges
we face, the United States will require bases and stations within and beyond Western Europe and Northeast Asia, as well as
temporary access arrangements for the long-distance deployment of U.S. forces.
Before the war in Afghanistan, that area was low on the list of major planning contingencies. Yet, in a very short time, we
had to operate across the length and breadth of that remote nation, using every branch of the armed forces. We must prepare for
more such deployments by developing assets such as advanced remote sensing, long-range precision strike capabilities, and
transformed maneuver and expeditionary forces. This broad portfolio of military capabilities must also include the ability to defend
the homeland, conduct information operations, ensure U.S. access to distant theaters, and protect critical U.S. infrastructure and
assets in outer space.
Innovation within the armed forces will rest on experimentation with new approaches to warfare, strengthening joint
operations, exploiting U.S. intelligence advantages, and taking full advantage of science and technology. We must also transform
the way the Department of Defense is run, especially in financial management and recruitment and retention. Finally, while
maintaining near-term readiness and the ability to fight the war on terrorism, the goal must be to provide the President with a wider
range of military options to discourage aggression or any form of coercion against the United States, our allies, and our friends.
We know from history that deterrence can fail; and we know from experience that some enemies cannot be deterred. The
United States must and will maintain the capability to defeat any attempt by an enemy--whether a state or non-state actor--to
impose its will on the United States, our allies, or our friends. We will maintain the forces sufficient to support our obligations, and
16
to defend freedom. Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of
surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States.
Hege- Readiness k deterrence/warfighting (2 of 2)

Readiness key U.S. ability to deter war
Kitfield ‘00
(James-, Winter, The National Interest, “The Folk Who Live on the Hill”, Lexis; Jacob)
Certainly there is ample evidence to suggest that America's military is nearing a critical phase as it enters the
twenty-first century. In recent years the armed services have suffered chronic shortfalls in the areas of recruiting, military
readiness, and equipment modernization and acquisition. At the same time, the rate of overseas deployments has
increased more than 300 percent over the Cold War average. Lately, for example, the U.S. military has been entangled in
stressful and draining conflicts in, among other places, Yugoslavia, Bosnia, Iraq, Haiti and Somalia. Despite this expanding
catalogue of missions, the armed forces still have as their primary responsibility deterring, and if necessary fighting
and winning, two major theater wars, a task that requires the maintenance of forward-deployed, combat-ready
forces in Asia and the Middle East.
Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-Tex.), a member of the Armed Forces Committee, says,
"We are stretching our forces so thin today that we have a crisis in military readiness, retention and recruitment. . . .
We've so dissipated our resources and energies by getting involved in regional conflicts and misguided peacekeeping operations
that our allies and others could do as well as the United States, that we've threatened our core capability to accomplish
those missions that only a superpower can do."
17
NK Scenario
A. Readiness k deter North Korean attack
Laporte ‘04
(Leon J.-, General U.N. Command, April 29, Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony, Senate Appropriations
Committee: Subcommittee on Military Construction, Lexis; Jacob)
Combined Forces Command ensures the security of the people of the Republic of Korea. Combined Forces Command
provides the military force that deters external aggression and stands ready to defeat any external provocation
against the Republic of Korea. Combined Forces Command, composed of air, ground, naval, marine, and special operations
component, conducts combined training exercises and readiness inspections to maintain the warfighting readiness that
is essential to deterrence. The Combined Forces Command headquarters is a fully integrated staff, manned by Republic of
Korea and United States military officers. This thoroughly integrated headquarters coordinates the operations that deter external
aggression. In 2002, Combined Forces Command assisted with the successful United Nations Command salvage operation in the
West Sea and military security support to the World Cup and Asian Games.
B. The ! is an apocalyptic firestorm.
Fungamwango ‘99
(Pat-, Oct. 25, Africa News, “Africa-at-Large; Third world war: Watch the Koreas”, Lexis; Jacob)
If there is one place today where the much-dreaded Third World War could easily erupt and probably
reduce earth to a huge smouldering cinder it is the Korean Peninsula in Far East Asia.
Ever since the end of the savage three-year Korean war in the early 1950s, military tension between the hard-
line communist north and the American backed South Korea has remained dangerously high. In fact the
Koreas are technically still at war.
A foreign visitor to either Pyongyong in the North or Seoul in South Korea will quickly notice that the divided country is
always on maximum alert for any eventuality. North Korea or the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has never
forgiven the US for coming to the aid of South Korea during the Korean war.
She still regards the US as an occupation force in South Korea and wholly to blame for the non-reunification of the
country. North Korean media constantly churns out a tirade of attacks on "imperialist" America and its "running dog" South Korea.
18
The DPRK is one of the most secretive countries in the world where a visitor is given the impression that the people's
hatred for the US is absolute while the love for their government is total. Whether this is really so, it is extremely difficult to
conclude.
In the DPRK, a visitor is never given a chance to speak to ordinary Koreans about the politics of their country. No visitor
moves around alone without government escort.
The American government argues that its presence in South Korea was because of the constant danger of an invasion from
the north. America has vast economic interests in South Korea.
She points out that the north has dug numerous tunnels along the demilitarised zone as part of the
invasion plans. She also accuses the north of violating South Korean territorial waters.
Early this year, a small North Korean submarine was caught in South Korean waters after getting entangled in fishing nets.
Both the Americans and South Koreans claim the submarine was on a military spying mission.
However, the intension of the alleged intrusion will probably never be known because the craft's crew were all found with
fatal gunshot wounds to their heads in what has been described as suicide pact to hide the truth of the mission. The US
mistrust of the north's intentions is so deep that it is no secret that today Washington has the largest
concentration of soldiers and weaponry of all descriptions in south Korea than anywhere else in the World,
apart from America itself.
Some of the armada that was deployed in the recent bombing of Iraq and in Operation Desert Storm against the same
country following its invasion of Kuwait was from the fleet permanently stationed on the Korean Peninsula. It is true too that at
the moment the North/South Korean border is the most fortified in the world.
NK- Readiness k
Readiness k deter war with NK
Fargo ‘05
(Thomas B.-, Commander U.S. Pacific Command, April 1, Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing, “Defense Authorization
Request for the Fiscal Year ‘05”, Lexis; Jacob)
I have the honor to represent thousands of men and women -- active, guard, reserve, and civilians, and of course, their
family members -- for providing superior service to the nation in the Asia and Pacific Region and, indeed, around the world. Their
high readiness and effectiveness can be directly attributed to the generous support to this esteemed body and of the
American people as a whole.
Today I'd like to survey our primary security concerns in the region, and then I look forward to answering your questions.
And I appreciate you placing my statement into the record, Mr. Chairman.
Dramatic events in Southwest Asia, for which the Pacific Command continues to be a primary force provider, have not
eclipsed the importance of the Asian-Pacific threats to global security, nor our attention to them.
First and foremost, we are keenly focused on the Korean Peninsula. General LaPorte and I carefully monitor indications of
North Korean military readiness. And frankly, I don't think that war is any more likely today than it was 18 months or 24 months
ago, but clearly the stakes would be very high if war occurred on the peninsula. Millions of South Koreans live
within range of North Korea's artillery. And the stakes, of course, would be even higher if North Korea continues to
pursue a nuclear capability.
But North Korea's ability to threaten peace is not limited to the peninsula. The world's largest proliferator of
ballistic missiles already has demonstrated the ability to deliver missile payloads beyond even Japan. And the
reach of its illicit activities, such as narcotics, extends as far as Australia, as was demonstrated just last summer.
Now, of course, North Korea's highly enriched uranium program, along with its plutonium reprocessing program, raise
the specter of nuclear weapons either in armed conflict or proliferated into the hands of terrorist groups, perhaps our
biggest fear, and one that clearly would threaten all nations.
President Bush repeatedly has stated our commitment to a peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear
issue. A diplomatic initiative is moving forward to the six-party talks, and our role at the Pacific Command
has been to ensure that diplomacy is backed by a viable military capability. And we continue to do just that,
posturing our forces not to provoke but to deter conflict.
19
Regional Conflicts Scenario (1 of 2)

A. Decline in U.S. military readiness emboldens aggression causing massive
regional conflicts and collapsing American leadership.
Moore ‘97
(Thomas-, Dpt. Director of Fo.Po. & Defense Studies @ the Heritage Foundation, Feb., Heritage Foundation Reports, Mandate for
Leadership IV; Turing Ideas into Actions, “Maintaining an Effective Military in a Budget Straitjacket”, P. 477, Lexis; Jacob)
Today, this historic pattern of a lack of vigilance and concern about foreign policy and defense is being repeated, even in Congress and among those for
whom such concerns used to be paramount. The unifying and clarifying threat of the former Soviet Union is gone -- even though a variety of other lesser threats
continues to grow. But the strong-defense community is not vocal or persuasive enough to overcome the force of this historical pattern. The downward spiral of
defense spending cuts continues for the time being, and the choice between Democrats and Republicans is simply one of how steep and how fast the downward
spiral will go. In fact, congressional Democrats have pointed out -- correctly, one must add -- that the Republicans' "front-loaded" defense budget may spend more
in the near term, but actually provides less in future years than the planned Clinton budget for the same period. Furthermore, the 105th Congress may be tempted to
The result: Today, the United States has too few forces to fight two nearly
cut defense even more to pay for promised tax cuts.
simultaneous regional conflicts, and too little money to pay for the inadequate forces.
There is, however, more to the historical pattern than neglect and turning inward. The lack of vigilance abroad after
winning a war always has encouraged new aggression for which the United States was unprepared. It is safe
to predict that today's Age of Chaos will be no exception. Greed, passion, and folly are immutable parts of
human character; and somewhere, someday, a new dictator, having observed the lack of U.S. military
preparedness, will embark upon some mad venture that threatens America's vital interests or its allies.
Sooner or later, there will be another major conflict -- or multiple conflicts -- that will draw in the United
States. In fact, the forces of conflict already are building up steadily around the world -- great power
competition, unbridled nationalism, ethnic strife, religious fanaticism, and hunger for newly discovered or
diminishing natural resources.
When the inevitable crisis -- whether a single event or a succession of converging regional crises --
erupts again in the world, the historic pattern shows the American people will rally and do what is needed. Today's apathy and
lack of interest in national security will evaporate overnight. But the American people rely on their elected leaders to
maintain the tools they will need to do the job. If they find the neglected military instrument rusty and brittle
in their hands, they will hold accountable those who let our defenses decline. The blood of their sons, brothers,
20
husbands, and fathers who die unnecessarily will demand it. This is where the strong-defense community can
-- and must -- play a vital role. If experts from this community cannot stop or reverse the historic pattern of postwar neglect, at
least they can concentrate their efforts on preserving a military that will remain relatively effective even while wearing a
budget straitjacket. … evidence continues …
Policymakers on Capitol Hill who support defense must learn to think more like military strategists. The misjudgments,
missed opportunities, and follies of the Clinton Administration's foreign and defense policies over the past four years have
seriously weakened U.S. influence and credibility abroad. Unless Congress and its concerned allies can become
more effective, the Clinton failures will lead inevitably to the decline of the United States as a great power,
without the means or the will to defend its values and interests.
For the United States, the choice is either to lead or be led. The first choice leads to freedom, security,
and greatness; the second, to weakness and submission. For its own well-being, and for that of the entire world,
the credibility of the United States as a global power must be restored. Without the credibility that comes
from a strong military force, the United States will be reduced to making empty warnings and impotent
demarches in times of crisis. Forfeiting national credibility -- and moral authority -- means possibly having to
resort to force when credibility and an image of steadfast resolve could have prevented conflict. But when
that moment of crisis comes, the United States may find itself without a military force able to meet the
demands of conflict. If the Administration cannot or will not provide this leadership, then Congress, with the active aid of a
defense policy community that wants to make America strong again, must hold it publicly and politically accountable. Then,
insofar as the Constitution and good public policy allow, they must step into the leadership void to safeguard U.S. national security.
Regional Conflicts Scenario (2 of 2)

B. Nuclear war
Dean ‘95
(Jonathan- Advisor on I Security to Union of Concerned Scientists, worked with U.N. PKers in the field and in D of State, March,
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, “A stronger U.N. strengthens America”, No. 2, Vol. 51, Lexis; Jacob)
Experts throughout the world expect growing population pressures and increasing environmental stress to
develop over the coming decades into intense, far-reaching social unrest and regional conflict. Economic
development is the solution, however slow and uncertain it may be in coming. But the world also needs effective regional
conflict-prevention procedures. Left on its own, regional violence can lead to confrontation and even war
between the great powers, including the United States, as might occur, for example, in the event of conflict between
Ukraine and Russia or between China and its neighbors.
In the final analysis, unchecked regional violence and the fear of further violence will lead more states to
develop nuclear weapons. In past decades, this process occurred in Israel, South Africa, India, Pakistan, Iraq,
and presumably, in North Korea. A world with 20 or 30 nuclear weapon states would not only make a more
effective global security system impossible, it would lead the present nuclear weapon states to modernize and
increase their weapons - and it would markedly increase the vulnerability of the United States to direct attack.
Instead of shrugging at human fallibility, accepting war as inevitable, and, reacting after it happens, U.S. policy should
aim at establishing an international peacekeeping system that can head off an increasing number of conflicts.
21
Regional Conflicts- Perception of Readiness key

Even the perception of a decline in readiness  conflict
Spencer ‘00
(Jack-, Sr. Policy Analyst for Defense & National Security @ the Institute for International Studies @ the Heritage Foundation,
Sept. 15, Backgrounder, “The Facts About Military Readiness” #1394, http://www.heritage.org/Research/MissileDefense/
BG1394.cfm ; Jacob)
Military readiness is vital because declines in America's military readiness signal to the rest of the
world that the United States is not prepared to defend its interests. Therefore, potentially hostile nations will be
more likely to lash out against American allies and interests, inevitably leading to U.S. involvement in
combat. A high state of military readiness is more likely to deter potentially hostile nations from acting
aggressively in regions of vital national interest, thereby preserving peace.
22
Regional Conflicts- Readiness key (1 of 2)

Strong U.S. military readiness k deter multiple regional wars.
Spencer ‘03
March 21, Backgrounder, “Focusing Defense Resources to Meet National Security Requirements” #1638, http://www.
heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/bg1638.cfm; Jacob)
Due to the emerging gap between capabilities and strategy caused by the ongoing war against
terrorism and the increasing need to present credible fighting forces for the Middle East and Korea, the nation's
national security concerns must be prioritized. Specifically, America's armed forces must, at a minimum, be prepared for
four missions:
1. Fight the immediate war on terrorism. Due to the severity of the threat and the stakes at risk, the war on
terrorism must be America's top priority. As President Bush has described numerous times, most recently in his State
of the Union Address,6 this war is multifaceted. The nation must harness its resources to engage the terrorists and
their state sponsors financially, politically, diplomatically, and militarily. This global mission currently includes the
operation in Afghanistan, resolving the Iraqi crisis, and smaller deployments to nations like Yemen,
Jordan, and the Philippines.
2. Be prepared to fight with little or no warning in unanticipated places. The emergence of global
communications, advances in technology, and the globalization of terrorism provide many opportunities
for surprise attacks against the United States and its interests. Maintaining the ability to fight and win wars
in diverse situations and environments can discourage many of America's enemies from hostile acts.
3. Maintain adequate capability to deter aggression against America's allies. America faces enduring threats beyond
terrorism, as demonstrated by North Korea's nuclear weapons program. There are nations in every region of
the world that threaten America's vital interests in the near term. Assuring stability in those regions and
protecting U.S. interests requires the ability to defeat any nation or group that threatens America's allies,
which itself provides effective deterrence against large-scale aggression. This should include both conventional
forces and other capabilities such as an effective ballistic missile defense and reliable nuclear forces. The Administration
23
should take every step to strengthen its important alliances and be ready to respond forcefully and immediately to
aggression against America's allies.
4. Contribute to homeland defense. The armed services must counter threats to the homeland as they evolve abroad and play a
secondary role as that threat emerges within U.S. borders. Although the Pentagon is not the primary federal agent of homeland
security, it does have a vital role to play and must dedicate a portion of its resources to that mission. The active U.S. military
should be primarily responsible for defending Americans from aggression and preventing attacks on the homeland. Once an
attack occurs, however, National Guard units should take over the military activities while other government agencies and
private entities shoulder the rest of the burden.7
The missions necessary for the military to fulfill its responsibilities include deterrence, intelligence
gathering, preemptive strikes against entities posing imminent threats, missile defense, and research and development of
countermeasures and systems to defend against threats to the homeland. Protecting the military from expending its
resources on homeland security programs that are better handled by others will be increasingly important in future
years. This is particularly true as the new Department of Homeland Security comes on-line and acquires mandated capabilities
(particularly in research and development) that would be redundant to existing DOD programs.
Regional Conflicts- Readiness key (2 of 2)

Without string military readiness the U.S. can’t hope to deter conflict.
Balisle ‘02
(Rear Admiral Phillip-, Director of the Surface Warfare Davison of the U.S. Navy, April 9, House Congressional Testimony, “Navy
and Marine Corps Operational Requirments for the 21st Century”, Lexis; Jacob)
Forward deployed combat forces provide this nation with speed of response to an emerging crisis from
forces that can be immediately employed from within a region. Before the most recent action in Afghanistan,
Naval forces had provided the same type of timely response on 86 occasions in the last decade alone, including
11 different combat operations. In fact, even before the events of September 11th , the last 10 Navy carrier battlegroups to deploy, a
span that began in 1998, have engaged in combat as part of Operation Allied Force in Southeastern Europe and/or operations in the
Middle East. Additionally, in that time span, naval forces conducted non-combatant evacuation operations, conducted thousands of
boardings in support of U.S. drug policy and United Nations sanctions, and participated in numerous humanitarian assistance
operations. During crisis or conflict, forward-deployed and forward-based naval forces are positioned for
timely response. The Navy-Marine Corps team stands ready, at the "tip of the spear," to assure access and to
project joint and combined power in support of National policy.
Strategic Environment and Navy Transformation
The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) sets clear goals to assure allies and friends that the United States is a
reliable security partner, to dissuade future military competition from potential adversaries, to deter threats and
coercion against U.S. interests and decisively defeat any adversaries who have not been deterred from
attempting to impose their will on the U.S., its allies or its friends. The QDR requires that we restore and then
improve current readiness while transforming to address the circumstances of the 21 st Century. To support
these goals, our sovereign naval forces must be able to enhance deterrence and, should that fail, assure sea-based Joint force access
to project offensive and defensive power ashore to defeat all adversaries.
New challenges, including the threat of cyberwar, weapons of mass destruction, continued
international terrorism and the havoc wrought by failed states, define a most unpredictable future. These and
other emerging threats will call for new deterrence options spanning the full range of threats facing our nation.
24
Regional Conflicts- Prolif !

Failure of the U.S. to peacekeep globally  prolif.
Woollacott ‘93
(Martin-, July 14, The Guardian, “Odd Games Nations Play with their Nuclear Weapons”, Lexis; Jacob)
The connection between conventional forces and nuclear weapons preoccupied a generation of scholars. How did
conventional forces condition the threat of nuclear war? The old answer lay in flexible response, which was supposed to lessen the
possibility of nuclear war by ensuring that states would not have to resort to nuclear weapons in the face of a minor challenge.
Flexible response was always an uncertain concept. Now the connection between the proper use of conventional forces and the
threat of nuclear war is in a way clearer. That is why the failures of peacekeeping - the failure in Bosnia and the failure that
may come in Somalia - are relevant to the nuclear issue. What may persuade nuclear states, whether they are
established nuclear states, covert holders of nuclear weapons, or new seekers after nuclear devices, to think
again is a stable world of rules, penalties, and rewards.
Prolif  NW
Utgoff ‘02
(Victor-, Deputy Director for the Strategy, Forces, & Resources Division of the Institute for Defense Analysis, Summer, Survival,
Vol. 44 #2, P. 87-90)
In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-
outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear
proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not
all, nations wearing nuclear 'six-shooters' on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in
a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.
25
Regional Conflicts- Terrorism ! (1 of 2)

Failed states/ instability  terror
Lobe ‘04
(Jim-, Jun. 8, Inter Press Service, “Politics: ‘Failed States’ Seen as a Threat to U.S. Security”, Lexis; Jacob)
Almost three years after the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and the Pentagon, the United States is still falling
short in its ability to deal with weak, failing or failed states, which increasingly threaten U.S. national security, says a major report
released here Tuesday by a bipartisan commission.
Washington must do far more both to prevent countries from collapsing and to help them, hopefully in concert with other
powers, to stabilise and recover, according to the 76-page report, 'On the Brink: Weak States and U.S. National Security'.
"Terrorist organisations, transnational crime networks, disease and violence flourish in these countries," said the
commission's co-chair, former Republican Representative John Edward Porter, who called the 9/11 attacks a "wake-up call" to the
new realities of international threats to the United States.
"Not only do the citizens of these nations suffer, but the world community is imperilled by this general instability and the
opportunity for safe haven it provides for those who wish to destabilise other fledgling democracies and the industrialised world,"
he added.
The report, whose recommendations stress the importance of prevention through sound development policies, upgrading
U.S. expertise in quickly stabilising and reconstructing countries; and enhancing international co-operation in peacekeeping and
nation-building, was produced over nine months and signed by nearly 30 commission members.
It appeared designed to re-frame the debate over how best to carry out the "war on terrorism" in ways that encourage
policy makers to stress the importance of economic development as opposed to the military and security approach taken by
President George W Bush.
"It is news to no one that the U.S. is vulnerable", said Nancy Birdsall, president of the Centre for Global Development
(CGD), which organised the commission.
"The flash is that the 'sleeping giant' of threats exists in the form of countries like Bolivia, Indonesia, Nigeria and Kenya --
places which ... for various reasons now find themselves weakened to the point where their instability threatens to derail political
and economic progress and, in some cases, they have become attractive to the entities, some known, others unknown, who would
wish to see harm visited on the United States and other nations of the developed world."
The commission included two former U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) administrators -- J. Brian
Atwood, who served under former President Bill Clinton and M Peter McPherson, who worked with President Ronald Reagan.
26
"For far too long, the United States has allowed weak states -- such as Afghanistan, Haiti and Somalia -- to be on the
periphery of U.S. foreign policy concerns," said Stuart Eizenstat, another commission co-chair, who served in top economic
positions under Clinton and Jimmy Carter (1977-81). "As a result, we have had to ultimately engage in military intervention and
costly 'nation-building' activities."
"The U.S. needs a fresh strategy that identifies weak states before they fail, organises the U.S. government to address the
challenges and opportunities these weak states pose, and utilises on a sustained basis the entire panoply of development,
diplomatic, and political tools necessary to succeed," he added.
The report said three gaps distinguish troubled or weak states from those that are simply poor. If a state cannot control its own
territory or protect its citizens from internal or external threats, it suffers a security gap that can easily be filled by terrorists,
criminal groups or insurgents.
The impact is extinction.
Alexander ‘03
(Yonah-, Prof. & Director @ Inter-University for Terrorism Studies, August 28, Washington Times, “Terrorism Myths and
Realities”, Lexis; Jacob)
Last week's brutal suicide bombings in Baghdad and Jerusalem have once again illustrated dramatically that the
international community failed, thus far at least, to understand the magnitude and implications of the terrorist
threats to the very survival of civilization itself.
Even the United States and Israel have for decades tended to regard terrorism as a mere tactical nuisance or irritant rather
than a critical strategic challenge to their national security concerns.
It is not surprising, therefore, that on September 11, 2001, Americans were stunned by the unprecedented tragedy of 19 al
Qaeda terrorists striking a devastating blow at the center of the nation's commercial and military powers.
Regional Conflicts- Terrorism ! (2 of 2)
Likewise, Israel and its citizens, despite the collapse of the Oslo Agreements of 1993 and numerous acts of terrorism
triggered by the second intifada that began almost three years ago, are still "shocked" by each suicide attack at a time of intensive
diplomatic efforts to revive the moribund peace process through the now revoked cease-fire arrangements [hudna].
Why are the United States and Israel, as well as scores of other countries affected by the universal nightmare of modern
terrorism surprised by new terrorist "surprises"?
There are many reasons, including misunderstanding of the manifold specific factors that contribute to terrorism's
expansion, such as lack of a universal definition of terrorism, the religionization of politics, double standards of morality, weak
punishment of terrorists, and the exploitation of the media by terrorist propaganda and psychological warfare.
Unlike their historical counterparts, contemporary terrorists have introduced a new scale of violence in
terms of conventional and unconventional threats and impact.
The internationalization and brutalization of current and future terrorism make it clear we have
entered an Age of Super Terrorism [e.g. biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear and cyber] with its serious
implications concerning national, regional and global security concerns.
Two myths in particular must be debunked immediately if an effective counterterrorism "best practices" strategy
can be developed [e.g., strengthening international cooperation].
The first illusion is that terrorism can be greatly reduced, if not eliminated completely, provided the root causes of
conflicts - political, social and economic - are addressed.
The conventional illusion is that terrorism must be justified by oppressed people seeking to achieve their goals and
consequently the argument advanced by "freedom fighters" anywhere, "give me liberty and I will give you death," should be
tolerated if not glorified.
This traditional rationalization of "sacred" violence often conceals that the real purpose of terrorist groups is to gain
political power through the barrel of the gun, in violation of fundamental human rights of the noncombatant segment of societies.
For instance, Palestinians religious movements [e.g., Hamas, Islamic Jihad] and secular entities [such as Fatah's Tanzim and Aqsa
Martyr Brigades]] wish not only to resolve national grievances [such as Jewish settlements, right of return, Jerusalem] but primarily
to destroy the Jewish state.
Similarly, Osama bin Laden's international network not only opposes the presence of American military in the Arabian
Peninsula and Iraq, but its stated objective is to "unite all Muslims and establish a government that follows the rule of the Caliphs."
27
The second myth is that strong action against terrorist infrastructure [leaders, recruitment, funding,
propaganda, training, weapons, operational command and control] will only increase terrorism. The argument here is that law-
enforcement efforts and military retaliation inevitably will fuel more brutal acts of violent revenge.
Clearly, if this perception continues to prevail, particularly in democratic societies, there is the danger it will paralyze
governments and thereby encourage further terrorist attacks.
In sum, past experience provides useful lessons for a realistic future strategy. The prudent application of force has
been demonstrated to be an effective tool for short- and long-term deterrence of terrorism. For example, Israel's
targeted killing of Mohammed Sider, the Hebron commander of the Islamic Jihad, defused a "ticking bomb." The assassination
of Ismail Abu Shanab - a top Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip who was directly responsible for several suicide
bombings including the latest bus attack in Jerusalem - disrupted potential terrorist operations. Similarly, the U.S.
military operation in Iraq eliminated Saddam Hussein's regime as a state sponsor of terror.
Thus, it behooves those countries victimized by terrorism to understand a cardinal message communicated by
Winston Churchill to the House of Commons on May 13, 1940: "Victory at all costs, victory in spite of terror, victory however
long and hard the road may be: For without victory, there is no survival."
Regional Conflicts- Laundry list !

Political disorder  terror, WMD use, refugee flows, disease, civil war, and prolif
Fearon & Laitin ‘04

(James D.-, Prof. of Poli. Sci. @ Stanford, David D.-, Prof. of Poli. Sci. @ Stanford, Spring, International Security, “Neotrusteeship
and the Problem of Weak States”, Lexis; Jacob)
Increasingly, however, the major powers must worry about bad "externalities" that result from the combination of the
scientific revolution and political disorder, economic collapse, and anger in the third world. These externalities include risks of
catastrophic terrorism using WMD, refugee flows, health threats, enhanced drug smuggling networks, and disruption of oil
supplies. Major powers can also suffer from destabilizing consequences of protracted civil wars for whole regions, as neighboring
states are weakened or regional incentives for weapons acquisition and proliferation increase. Finally, the major powers have faced
significant and justified pressures for intervention on humanitarian grounds as well.
These diffuse threats create a classic collective action problem for the major powers. Given the dangers posed by
collapsed states and rogue regimes in a world with WMD, open economies, and easy international travel, all would benefit from
political order and responsible (if possible, democratic) governments in the periphery. But the costs to provide effective support for
political order and democracy after a state collapses often exceed the expected benefits for any one power. The logic of this
situation creates an incentive for burden sharing. Affected states have an incentive to share the costs to mitigate the public bads of
state collapse and rogue regimes at an acceptable price for each one.n22
The structure of the collective action problem can be represented as follows: Let b > 0 be the expected long-run cost of a
state collapse to each major power, and let c > b be the total expected cost of remedying it. If there are n states with these
preferences and if c < nb, they would all be better off to strike a deal in which they jointly contribute a total of c to the
reconstruction effort, with each one contributing no more than b. Of course, there is a possibly intense bargaining problem over
who will contribute how much. See James D. Fearon, "Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation," International
Organization, Vol. 52, No. 2 (Spring 1998), pp. 269-306.
In sum, in the time of classical imperialism the great powers threatened each other while facing no serious, autonomous
threats from Africa, the Middle East, or most of Asia. Today, by contrast, the strongest and richest states face no serious military
threats from one another, but various security threats from a third world that, as Figure 1 illustrates, is suffering from a great deal of
political violence and chaos. Because the costs of addressing the implications of state collapse or the dangers posed by rogue
28
regimes are concentrated while the benefits are often diffuse, the major powers now confront a collective action problem whose
internal logic should favor a multilateral response.
Regional Conflicts- ! Calc Probability
Here’s comparative evidence- failed state collapse is a greater and more probable
threat than great power war
Fearon & Laitin ‘04

(James D.-, Prof. of Poli. Sci. @ Stanford, David D.-, Prof. of Poli. Sci. @ Stanford, Spring, International Security, “Neotrusteeship
and the Problem of Weak States”, Lexis; Jacob)
Major international interventions to prop up and rebuild failed states are not a temporary aberration in the course of
international politics. Rather, they reflect more durable, even structural characteristics of the present international system. Since the
end of World War II, there has been a steady growth in the number of (mainly postcolonial) states rendered dysfunctional by years
of rural guerrilla war, corrupt rule, or both. For the major powers and many other states, the biggest external threats now derive not
from the risk of strong states wanting to conquer and annex territory, but from diverse security, economic, and even health
consequences emerging from political conflict, state collapse, and misrule in the third world. Moreover, independent of the various
threats posed to the North, persistent civil war and lack of economic development in the South are two of the greatest sources of
human suffering on the planet.
29
Taiwan Scenario (1 of 2)
Low U.S. military readiness emboldens China- they’ll think they can safely invade
Taiwan.
Christenson ‘01
(Thomas, Assoc. Prof. of Poli. Sci. @ MIT, International Security, “Posing Problems Without Catching Up: China's Rise and
Challenges for U.S. Security Policy”, Vol. 25, P. 20)
Chinese analysts sometimes emphasize the political geography not only of East Asia, but also of the globe as
another advantage that China has in settling problems such as Taiwan by force. The United States as the sole
superpower often finds its military assets tied down elsewhere. So one strategy for addressing the Taiwan
problem would be to wait until the United States is politically and militarily distracted in another part of the
world. This, some Chinese analysts believe, would reduce both America's capability and willingness to
intervene against China in a meaningful way. In the early 1990s, Chinese military analysts recognized this weakness
when they observed that many Asia-based assets were used to defeat Saddam Hussein in the distant Persian Gulf.
In June 2000, two civilian analysts made a similar argument to me, stating that the United States cannot handle the
burden of two simultaneous military engagements in separate parts of the world. 30 Niu Jun argues that if the United
States is in an intense conflict elsewhere and a war breaks out across the strait, it might then "give up on
implementing military intervention in Taiwan.... Though American power is great, its power has limits." He
describes American "strategic lines" as "too long" and its power as "scattered" (fensan). 31
That perception makes miscalculation and major war inevtible
Ching ‘04
(Frank-, June 3, New Straits Times, “Taiwan won't accept surrender call”, Lexis; Jacob)
30
At this point, none

of the three parties - China, Taiwan and the US - wants to see war break out. China is
focusing on the development of its economy, and needs a stable political environment. Taiwan would be
devastated by any outbreak of hostilities and the US has its hands full militarily with Iraq, Afghanistan and
the war on terror.
However, in the absence of dialogue between Beijing and Taipei, misunderstandings can easily arise. If hard-liners in
Beijing believe they can resolve the Taiwan problem with a quick strike before the US can intervene, then
there is a real danger of miscalculation and a major war that nobody wants may erupt.
Taiwan Scenario (2 of 2)
The impact is nuclear Armageddon.
Strait Times ‘00

(June 25, “Regional Fallout: No one gains in war over Taiwan”, Lexis; Jacob)
THE DOOMSDAY SCENARIO

THE high-intensity scenario postulates a
cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and
China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a
full-scale war becomes unavoidable.
Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -- horror of horrors -- raise the
possibility of a nuclear war.
Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to
any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation.
In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore.
If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire.
And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the
existing world order.
With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of
power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq.
In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could
enter a new and dangerous phase.
Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war?
According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the
Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US
from military defeat.
31
In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on
future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -- truce or a broadened war, which
could have led to the use of nuclear weapons.
If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar
capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons.
The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities.
Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option.
A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use"
principle regarding nuclear weapons.
Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the
Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there
were strong pressures from the military to drop it.
He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked
dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention.
Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilization.
There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armageddon over Taiwan might
seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else.
Taiwan- Readiness key (1 of 2)

Chinese perception of high U.S. readiness k deter invasion of Taiwan.
Ross ‘02
(Robert S.-, Prof. of Poli Sci @ Boston College, Associate of the John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Studies @ Harvard,
Fall, International Security, “Navigating the Taiwan Strait; Deterrence, Escalation Dominance, and U.S.-China Relations”, Lexis;
Jacob)
Chinese civilian and military analysts understand that U.S. domestic politics increases the likelihood of U.S. intervention in defense
of Taiwan. Domestic political opposition toward China and political support for Taiwan in the United States are at their highest
levels since the late 1960s. U.S. domestic politics has encouraged the growth in U.S. arms sales to Taiwan since the early 1990s,
and it will constrain the administration's options during a mainland-Taiwan conflict. Chinese military and civilian analysts
also grasp the extent of Washington's strategic commitment to Taiwan. They acknowledge that the March 1996
deployment of two U.S. carriers was a "strong military signal" of U.S. readiness to intervene in a possible
war over Taiwan. n58 Moreover, the carrier deployment firmly coupled the U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan with
the credibility of its security commitments to its allies in East Asia. Since then, Chinese leaders have assumed
that a war with Taiwan means a war with the United States. As one observer has noted, "What many, many people
realize is that the effectiveness of [U.S.] deterrence . . . must markedly exceed that of 1996, so that the
likelihood of U.S. military intervention is even more notable, with a likely corresponding escalation in the
deterrence dynamics." n59 Another analyst has warned that the possibility of U.S. intervention means that any
Chinese action could encounter "unexpectedly serious consequences."n60
Readiness k prevent war over Taiwan
Asian Political News ‘05

(Feb. 22, the dude being quoted has quals, “Pacific Command chief nominee calls for close watch on China”, Lexis; Jacob)
32
U.S. Pacific Command Commander nominee Adm. William Fallon said Tuesday the United States must
closely watch China's ''unprecedented'' growth in military spending and maintain a ''credible'' deterrence
against North Korea to facilitate the six-party nuclear talks.
In his Senate confirmation hearing, Fallon said the planned U.S. military global realignment will not affect the capabilities
to defend South Korea and Japan and to deal with a possible crisis in the Taiwan Strait.
''Although the economic relationship between the United States and China is expanding, we must gain greater insight into
China's growth in military spending, its intentions toward Taiwan, and its regional strategy in Asia and the Pacific,''
Fallon said in his prepared response to questions given in advance by the Senate Arms Services Committee.
''It is in the U.S. interest to prevent miscalculation and to maintain a steady signal of deterrence with
ready, credible forces,'' he said, adding that Washington ''opposes any attempt by either side to unilaterally change the status
quo.''
Taiwan- Readiness key (2 of 2)

Chinese perception of low U.S. military readiness  invasion of Taiwan
Center for Security Policy ‘01

(June 1, Decision Brief, “Welcome to World War IV”, # 4,http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/index.jsp?section=
papers&code=04-D_25; Jacob)
Unfortunately, the Associated Press reported on May 30 that a new Defense Department report perceives an ominous
Chinese interest in waging war swiftly and decisively against the United States. For some years, party and military
leaders have used a term that translates into English roughly as "Assassin?s Mace." The wire service quotes the Pentagon analysis
as saying this "concept appears to include a range of weapon systems and technologies related to information
warfare, ballistic and anti-ship cruise missiles, advanced fighters and submarines, counterspace system and
air defense." There is reason to fear that the Chinese believe some such capabilities could be successfully
employed, possibly in the relatively near-term, with little warning while the U.S. is tied down elsewhere
to attack Taiwan and assert Chinese hegemony in East Asia.
Readiness k deter taiwan war
Hall & Karl ‘00

(Andria-, Jonathan-, Oct. 21, CNN Worldview, “Gore Attacks Bush's Plans to Reduce U.S. Military Peace-keeping Efforts”, Lexis;
Jacob)
Rice told the "Times," quote, "The United States is the only power that can handle a showdown in the Gulf, mount
the kind of force that is needed to protect Saudi Arabia and deter a crisis in the Taiwan Straits. And extending peace-keeping
detracts from our readiness for these kinds of global missions.
33
Terrorism Scenario (1 of 2)
Readiness k WOT- only way to deal with failed states
Westphal ‘03
(David-, August 5, Scripps Howard News Service, “Military promotes U.S. will”, Lexis; Jacob)
"Every nation now knows that we cannot accept - and we will not accept - states that harbor, finance, train or
equip the agents of terror," Bush said in a speech on terrorism.
For that reason, the Pentagon is busy trying to expand the military's ability to reach any region of the
world quickly.
From the start of the Bush administration, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has been pushing the sometimes reluctant
armed services to focus on quick-response battlefield strategies. Now, with the successful Afghanistan and Iraqi
campaigns as catalysts, the pace has quickened.
Leading the way is a major repositioning of U.S. troops and bases around the world. Already U.S. forces have pulled out of Saudi Arabia, one of the
major objectives of the Iraq war. A reduction in the 60,000 American troops in Germany is under review, and 18,000 U.S. soldiers stationed on the demilitarized
zone between North and South Korea may be repositioned.
Meanwhile, Pentagon strategists are negotiating new basing agreements with countries from Africa to Eastern Europe to Central and Southeast Asia - all
with the objective of broadening the United States' global jurisdiction.
Africa is the latest, and perhaps most interesting, example of the United States' new basing strategy.
Bush came to office using the continent as an example of where the American military generally ought not to intervene. But last year the Pentagon
shipped 1,800 troops to the tiny East African nation of Djibouti as a way of dealing with terrorist groups believed to be operating in Somalia, Sudan and other
neighboring countries.
And increasingly, the Pentagon is becoming interested in the multiple civil rebellions occurring in West Africa, whose vast oil reserves may someday
make up a significant portion of American energy imports. Bush recently ordered 2,300 Marines to position themselves off the coast of Liberia for an undetermined
role in quelling that country's rebellion.
In many other places - Bulgaria and Romania in Eastern Europe; Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in Central Asia; Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and
Oman in the Middle East - the United States is establishing new footholds designed to give the military immediate access to some of the world's biggest trouble
spots.
"Speed is a necessary quality of our military capabilities, given the types of challenges we may face,"
Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz told Congress recently.
34
Barnett, the Naval War College researcher, says this new approach is needed because the United States'
primary security threat today comes from dozens of failed or failing states that can serve as breeding grounds for
terrorism.
Barnett describes an arc across the middle of the planet that includes parts of South America, all of Africa, the Middle
East, and portions of Central and Southeast Asia, all of which he says demand the attention of the U.S. military.
Why? Because American troops are the only ones that can do it, he says.
"Show me the places where there is plenty of stability," he told a Washington audience earlier this year, "and I'll show you
long-term security relationships between the United States and that part of the world."
Alexander ‘03
Even the United States and Israel have for decades tended to regard terrorism as a mere tactical nuisance or irritant rather
than a critical strategic challenge to their national security concerns.
It is not surprising, therefore, that on September 11, 2001, Americans were stunned by the unprecedented tragedy of 19 al
Qaeda terrorists striking a devastating blow at the center of the nation's commercial and military powers.
Terrorism Scenario (2 of 2)
Likewise, Israel and its citizens, despite the collapse of the Oslo Agreements of 1993 and numerous acts of terrorism
triggered by the second intifada that began almost three years ago, are still "shocked" by each suicide attack at a time of intensive
diplomatic efforts to revive the moribund peace process through the now revoked cease-fire arrangements [hudna].
Why are the United States and Israel, as well as scores of other countries affected by the universal nightmare of modern
terrorism surprised by new terrorist "surprises"?
There are many reasons, including misunderstanding of the manifold specific factors that contribute to terrorism's
expansion, such as lack of a universal definition of terrorism, the religionization of politics, double standards of morality, weak
punishment of terrorists, and the exploitation of the media by terrorist propaganda and psychological warfare.
Unlike their historical counterparts, contemporary terrorists have introduced a new scale of violence in
The first illusion is that terrorism can be greatly reduced, if not eliminated completely, provided the root causes of
conflicts - political, social and economic - are addressed.
The conventional illusion is that terrorism must be justified by oppressed people seeking to achieve their goals and
consequently the argument advanced by "freedom fighters" anywhere, "give me liberty and I will give you death," should be
tolerated if not glorified.
This traditional rationalization of "sacred" violence often conceals that the real purpose of terrorist groups is to gain
political power through the barrel of the gun, in violation of fundamental human rights of the noncombatant segment of societies.
For instance, Palestinians religious movements [e.g., Hamas, Islamic Jihad] and secular entities [such as Fatah's Tanzim and Aqsa
Martyr Brigades]] wish not only to resolve national grievances [such as Jewish settlements, right of return, Jerusalem] but primarily
to destroy the Jewish state.
Similarly, Osama bin Laden's international network not only opposes the presence of American military in the Arabian
Peninsula and Iraq, but its stated objective is to "unite all Muslims and establish a government that follows the rule of the Caliphs."
35
Terrorism- Readiness key (1 of 2)

Readiness k WOT
Spencer ‘03
March 21, Backgrounder, “Focusing Defense Resources to Meet National Security Requirements” #1638, http://www.
heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/bg1638.cfm; Jacob)
Due to the emerging gap between capabilities and strategy caused by the ongoing war against
terrorism and the increasing need to present credible fighting forces for the Middle East and Korea, the nation's
national security concerns must be prioritized. Specifically, America's armed forces must, at a minimum, be prepared for
four missions:
5. Fight the immediate war on terrorism. Due to the severity of the threat and the stakes at risk, the war on
terrorism must be America's top priority. As President Bush has described numerous times, most recently in his State
of the Union Address,6 this war is multifaceted. The nation must harness its resources to engage the terrorists and
their state sponsors financially, politically, diplomatically, and militarily. This global mission currently includes the
operation in Afghanistan, resolving the Iraqi crisis, and smaller deployments to nations like Yemen,
Jordan, and the Philippines.
6. Be prepared to fight with little or no warning in unanticipated places. The emergence of global
communications, advances in technology, and the globalization of terrorism provide many opportunities
for surprise attacks against the United States and its interests. Maintaining the ability to fight and win wars
in diverse situations and environments can discourage many of America's enemies from hostile acts.
7. Maintain adequate capability to deter aggression against America's allies. America faces enduring threats beyond
terrorism, as demonstrated by North Korea's nuclear weapons program. There are nations in every region of
the world that threaten America's vital interests in the near term. Assuring stability in those regions and
36
protecting U.S. interests requires the ability to defeat any nation or group that threatens America's allies,
which itself provides effective deterrence against large-scale aggression. This should include both conventional
forces and other capabilities such as an effective ballistic missile defense and reliable nuclear forces. The Administration
should take every step to strengthen its important alliances and be ready to respond forcefully and immediately to
aggression against America's allies.
8. Contribute to homeland defense. The armed services must counter threats to the homeland as they evolve abroad and play a
secondary role as that threat emerges within U.S. borders. Although the Pentagon is not the primary federal agent of homeland
security, it does have a vital role to play and must dedicate a portion of its resources to that mission. The active U.S. military
should be primarily responsible for defending Americans from aggression and preventing attacks on the homeland. Once an
attack occurs, however, National Guard units should take over the military activities while other government agencies and
private entities shoulder the rest of the burden.7
The missions necessary for the military to fulfill its responsibilities include deterrence, intelligence gathering,
preemptive strikes against entities posing imminent threats, missile defense, and research and development of countermeasures and
systems to defend against threats to the homeland. Protecting the military from expending its resources on homeland
security programs that are better handled by others will be increasingly important in future years. This is particularly
true as the new Department of Homeland Security comes on-line and acquires mandated capabilities (particularly in research and
development) that would be redundant to existing DOD programs.
Terrorism- Readiness key (2 of 2)

Readiness k deterrence and preventing terrorism
White House National Security Strategy ‘00

(Jan. 5, “National Security Strategy for a New Century”, Lexis; Jacob)
Engagement activities must be carefully managed to prevent erosion of our military’s current and long-term readiness. The
Defense Department’s theater engagement planning process, which was approved by the President in 1997, helps ensure that
military engagement activities are prioritized within and across theaters, and balanced against available resources. In short, we
must prioritize military engagement activities to ensure the readiness of our Armed Forces to carry out crisis response
and warfighting missions, as well as to ensure that we can sustain an appropriate level of engagement activities over the long
term. Our ability to deter potential adversaries in peacetime rests on several factors, particularly on our
demonstrated will and ability to uphold our security commitments when they are challenged. We have earned
this reputation through both our declaratory policy, which clearly communicates costs to potential adversaries, and our
credible warfighting capability. This capability is embodied in ready forces and equipment strategically stationed
or deployed forward, in forces in the United States at the appropriate level of readiness to deploy when needed,
in our ability to gain timely access to critical regions and infrastructure overseas, and in our demonstrated ability to form and lead
effective military coalitions. Because terrorist organizations may not be deterred by traditional means, we must
ensure a robust capability to accurately attribute the source of attacks against the United States or its citizens, and to
respond effectively and decisively to protect our national interests.
37
Terrorism- Failed States key

Without state support successful terrorism is impossible.
Gaddis ‘04
(John Lewis-, Feb. 6, Council on Foreign Relations, Interview, “Bush Pre-emption Doctrine The Most Dramatic Policy Shift Since
Cold War”, Interviewer: Bernard Gwertzman, Consulting Editor, http://www.cfr.org/publication/6755/gaddis.html; Jacob)
And if you ask about the overall objectives of the strategy, it seems to me that the picture is better and a good deal
more successful. The logic of the administration’s strategy has been to say that pre-emption is necessary to deal with adversaries
like the 9/11 terrorists because you not only have to find these people themselves, but you also have to either intimidate or, if
necessary, take out those states which might have been supporting such terrorists in the past, the assumption
being that terrorism can’t succeed without some kind of state support
38
AT Intervention Bad- ! t/ Shield (1 of 2)

Intervention inev- high readiness  intervening faster/ with less adverse effects
Kagan & Kristol ‘00

(Robert-, William-, The Neocon Reader, ed. Irwin M. Stelzer, “National Interest and Global Responsibility”, P. 65; Jacob)
It is worth pointing out, though. chat a foreign policy premised on American hegemony and on the blending of principle
with material interest, may in tact mean fewer. nor more. overseas interventions than under the 'vital interest' standard. Had the
[first] Bush administration, for example. realized early on that there was no clear distinction between American moral concerns in
Bosnia and Americas national interest there, the United States, with the enormous credibility earned in the Gulf War, might have
been able to put a stop to Milosevic's ambitions with a well-timed threat of punishing military action. But because the Bush tram
placed Bosnia outside the sphere of 'vital' American interests, the resulting crisis eventually required the deployment of thousands
of troops on the ground.
The same could be said of American interventions in Panama and the Gulf. A passive world-view encouraged American
leaders to ignore troubling developments which eventually metastasized into full-Mown threats to American security. Manuel
Noriega and Saddam Hussein were given reason to believe that the United States did not consider its interests threatened by their
behavior, only to discover chat they had been misled. In each case. a broader and more forward-leaning conception of the national
interest might have made the later, large. and potentially costly interventions unnecessary.
The question, then, is not whether the United States should intervene everywhere or nowhere. The decision Americans
need to make is whether the United States should generally lean forward. as it were, or sit hack. A strategy aimed at preserving
American hegemony should embrace the former stance. being more rather than less inclined to weigh in when crises erupt. and
preferably before they erupt. This is the standard of a global superpower that intends to shape the international environment to its
own advantage. By contrast. the vital interest standard is that of a 'normal' power that awaits a dramatic challenge before it rouses
itself into action.
39
Intervention inev- readiness  intervening faster which is more effective
Haass ‘97
(Richard N.-, Director of Foreign Policy Studies @ the Brookings Institution, The Reluctant Sheriff, P. 59-60; Jacob)
Worse, over time a minimalist foreign policy could end up being more costly. Neglect will prove to be malign. Conflict on
the Korean peninsula, for example, would disrupt trade and economic life throughout the region. There would he no way the United
States could wall itself off from the effects. Successful terrorism against targets in the United States would exact a terrible human
and financial toll. A failed Mexico or other collapsed states in the Western Hemisphere would increase immigration pressures on
American territory. Hostile control of energy resources in the Persian Gulf could lead to higher prices for oil and gas and to
temporary shortages. A posture of isolationism, whatever its near-term savings, could increase the likelihood that critical problems
or threats to vital U.S. interests will emerge. U.S. reluctance to act may well encourage others to fill the perceived void. Arms
proliferation would likely accelerate; aggression would almost certainly become more commonplace. If this occurred, the United
States could well have no choice but to act-hut in a context far less amenable to relatively inexpensive solutions. The notion that
what the United States or any other country does overseas comes at the expense of what it could he doing at home is flawed; in a
deregulated world in which the significance of borders is blurring and that of distance diminishing, foreign and domestic policy are
increasingly two sides of the same coin.
AT Intervention Bad- ! t/ Shield (2 of 2)

U.S. intervention is inevitable- the only question is the effectiveness
Dean ‘95
(Jonathan- Advisor on I Security to Union of Concerned Scientists, worked with U.N. PKers in the field and in D of State, March,
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, “A stronger U.N. strengthens America”, No. 2, Vol. 51, Lexis; Jacob)
In any event, in a world of interconnecting communications and environmental, trade, and financial
links, the United States, a leading industrial trading country that needs access to raw materials and markets, usually
ends up paying in one way or another when a major regional conflict erupts.
In practical terms, it is impossible for the United States to avoid some degree of involvement when major
regional conflicts break out. For 200 years, the United States has been urging liberty, freedom, democracy,
human rights, free market values, voluntary mutual aid and collective security on the outside world. The United States is
the sole surviving world-class power, with military strength and GNP far larger than any other country.
As a result, when large-scale conflict erupts, the United States cannot avoid being called on for help, as
it was in Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, and Haiti. For the United States to seek to stand aside or to respond only
weakly in such cases is to risk damage to its credibility and worldwide influence. President Clinton justified the
NATO bombing of Serbian positions in Bosnia and the U.S. invasion of Haiti by saying that the credibility and
reliability of the U.S. was at stake, as it was. It is true that past administrations used similar arguments to justify
continued U.S. involvement in Vietnam long after it would have been wise to withdraw. Nonetheless, when the
collective disappointment of world opinion over the behavior of the United States (or of any major country) becomes intense and
enduring, it begins to undermine the international prestige and standing of the entire nation.
40
AT Interventionism- Its Good (1 of 2)

Interventionism Good
O'Hanlon ‘01
Administration 2001-05, P. 45-46, http://brookings.nap.edu/books/0815700792/html/; Jacob)
Some Americans see U.S. commitments in the Balkans as an inherent distraction from the military’s main missions and
object to any and all such commitments on principle. Such a dismissive argument is ill advised, however. The alternative to
engagement in the l990s was to stand by and tolerate horrific civil conflict, the worst in Europe since the end of World War II,
including many genocidal acts. That policy of disengagement was attempted and abandoned by the Bush administration in 1992,
when it first kept the United States out of the war in Bosnia but then pledged U.S. military involvement in the event of a conflict in
Kosovo. President Clinton got off to no better a start, failing to find a solution to the Bosnian civil war for more than two years.
Finally, however, with the support and sometimes the prodding of Congress, his administration contributed to ending the Bosnian
civil war.3~ From that point in 1995 on, the death toll from violence in that region was limited to about 10,000, including the
Kosovo war in contrast to the loss of 100,000 or more people in the three preceding years. The victory in Kosovo was an ugly one
attained only after a military campaign that began very poorly- but it did achieve a relatively good outcome compared with what
might have been expected in the absence of NATO intervention.32
However one sees this track record, the United States now finds itself in two peace operations in the Balkans. Late in the
2000 presidential race, Governor Bush and his national security counselor, Condoleezza Rice, made headlines when they declared
that a Bush administration would seek to turn these peace operations over to the European allies. The basis for this argument was
twofold. First, U.S. forces are overcommitted globally and in need of relief. Second, U.S. forces carry out demanding tasks,
up to and including combat, in theaters such as the Persian Gulf and the western Pacific. European countries, with the exception of
Britain and to a lesser extent France, generally do not. This makes it only fair that the wealthy European allies take principal
responsibility for security on their own continent.33
41
That policy may have some promise, but it needs to be adopted very selectively and carefully. First, U.S. abdication of
dangerous security mis-sions in Europe would violate the lesson learned not only in the world wars, but also in Bosnia from 1992
to 1995. Over that period, the United States stayed away from the Bosnian conflict, leaving its allies to founder—and to lose
dozens of soldiers to snipers, mines, and acci-dents in the U.N.’s ill-fated UNPROFOR mission. Virtually aD students of European
security on both sides of the Atlantic have concluded that this type of situation needs to be avoided in the future: in other words, the
United States must participate in future difficult and dangerous security missions in Europe, particularly if it wishes to maintain its
leadership of the NATO alliance. Second, it would be unfortunate to codify a situation in which Europeans do little for security
beyond Europe. The United States should not condone such a territorial division of labor, since most of the worId’s difficult future
security tasks will probably be outside that continent. Encouraging Europe to remain militarily insular would not only be bad for
the cause of equitable defense burden sharing; it could also reinforce existing differences in strategic perspectives between the
United States and Europe on matters such as policy toward Iraq and Iran. Third, the proposed policy raises certain practical
questions. For example, Russian troops in the Balkans serve under U.S. command, and a U.S. departure would put at risk an
important collaborative effort between NATO and Russia.34 Finally, one should not forget that the allies are already contributing
most of the troops in the KFOR mission in Kosovo and the SFOR mission in Bosnia. U.S. troop contributions constitute less
than 20 percent of the total in the Balkans today (see table 2-31.3s
AT Interventionism- Its Good (2 of 2)

Interventionism k hege- allies will backlash against a superpower that doesn’t fight
to stabilize the international order
Kitfield ‘00
(James-, Winter, The National Interest, “The Folk Who Live on the Hill”, Lexis; Jacob)
The strategy advanced by Hutchison goes even further. Under her proposal, the United States would redefine its strategic
role by providing itself and its allies protection under a missile defense umbrella, while maintaining air superiority and strategic lift
capabilities. But the United States would leave the burden of pacifying regional conflicts and the vast majority of peacekeeping
operations to its allies. Hence, in the Fiscal Year 2000 Defense Authorization, Hutchison inserted a provision calling on the
administration to examine where the United States might reduce its global commitments and withdraw its forces from missions
whose time has passed, including those in South Korea and Saudi Arabia.
Given the obvious strains on the military resulting from a frenetic pace of deployments and operations, such a hard-headed
and realistic approach to military intervention is certainly defensible. It is nonetheless difficult to fathom exactly how America is to
retain its superpower status if it eschews all regional crises and insists that its allies shoulder the risks on the ground. For nearly
three years, the Clinton administration adopted such an arms-length policy while Bosnia burned, European allies vacillated, and the
Balkans imploded. The calamitous results of this indifference are by now well known.
ME interventions good
Boot ‘04
(Max-, Sr. Fellow @ the Council on Foreign Relations, May 5, Weekly Standard “What’s Next?”, Lexis)
42
As Iraq Liberalizes, the next task will be to spur the liberalization of its neighbors. How to achieve this goal is now the
subject of intense debate. The familiar cry is already going up from Europe, the United Nations, the Arab world, and National
Public Radio: Restart the "peace process" between Israelis and Palestinians. Alas, there is no reason to imagine that "Oslo II" will
turn out any better than the original. Indeed it's hard to see how any Israeli government could make Yasser Arafat a more generous
offer than the one he rejected at Camp David in 2000. If he turned down 98 percent of the West Bank then, what could Israel
possibly offer him now? The way to achieve peace with the Palestinians--as President Bush has recognized--is to change their
government and liberalize their society. This is not a process that can be completed overnight, and it will not be helped by
premature Israeli concessions that appear to reward terrorism. By hanging tough, Israel seems to be defeating the suicide bombers
and even forcing introspection and reform in the Palestinian Authority. U.S. intervention now would set back this overdue process.
Just as in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, so in the rest of the Middle East: The problem isn't the existence of Israel, the
only democracy in the region. The problem is the existence of so many nondemocratic regimes. Progress requires liberalization.
Democratization alone is not enough, since, as Algeria shows, elections may bring to power Islamist radicals committed to "one
man, one vote, one time." In Iraq, nothing would be more disastrous than to allow foreign-backed religious extremists bent on
establishing a theocracy to take power through the ballot box. Secretary Rumsfeld reiterated the other day that "an Iranian-type
government . . . isn't going to happen." Still, the United States should be doing much more to promote Shiites committed to a
pluralist state (yes, they do exist). It is vital to implement the rule of law, freedom of speech, property rights, and other guarantees
that can act as a safeguard against majoritarian oppression. That should not temper our commitment to democracy; it merely means
that we are committed to liberalism, too.
AT Interventionism  Terrorism
Terrorist resentment inevitable- strong military k minimize the damage
Brooks & Wohlforth ‘02

(Stephen G.-, Assist. Prof. in the Dept. of Gov. @ Dartmouth , William C-, Assoc. Prof. in the Dept. of Gov. @ Dartmouth , July/
August, Foreign Affairs, “American Primacy in Perspective”, Lexis; Jacob)
Some might question the worth of being at the top of a unipolar system if that means serving as a lightning rod for the
world's malcontents. When there was a Soviet Union, after all, it bore the brunt of Osama bin Laden's anger, and only after its
collapse did he shift his focus to the United States (an indicator of the demise of bipolarity that was ignored at the time but looms
larger in retrospect). But terrorism has been a perennial problem in history, and multipolarity did not save the leaders of several
great powers from assassination by anarchists around the turn of the twentieth century. In fact, a slide back toward multipolarity
would actually be the worst of all worlds for the United States. In such a scenario it would continue to lead the pack and serve as a
focal point for resentment and hatred by both state and nonstate actors, but it would have fewer carrots and sticks to use in dealing
with the situation. The threats would remain, but the possibility of effective and coordinated action against them would be reduced.
43
AT No specific scenario proves no !

If only it were that simple- we gotta prepare now for conflicts we can’t predict
Douglas ‘05
(John-, Member of the National Security Council staff during the Reagan administration, Jan. 17, Defense News, “Risky Cuts; U.S.
Rolls the Dice With Defense Investment”, Lexis; Jacob)
Undercutting future military readiness for temporary short-term needs is risky. The last two decades have been a stark
reminder of a defense fact -- it's all but impossible to predict the military needs even five or 10 years into the future. Who would
have wagered that within the span of less than 15 years the biggest U.S. military challenge would move from a nuclear-armed
communist bloc to elusive terrorist cells scattered over the globe?
The programs we invest in today will be the cornerstones of defense for the next 20- 30 years or longer. The threats to our security
in 2030 are likely to be much different than those we see today.
44
*** Readiness Bad ***
45
Counterbalancing Scenario
Increasing force postures makes them look offensive  c/b
Walt ‘00
(Stephen M.-, Robert & Renée Belfer Prof. of Int. Affairs @ the Kennedy School of Gov. @ Harvard, Oct. 11, “Keeping the World
‘Off-Balance’: Self-Restraint and U.S. Foreign Policy”, ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/.../20afada351c3c28485256991005cf05e/$FILE/
Offbalance.doc; Jacob)
Balance of threat theory implies that states will be more likely to balance against the United States if its military
capabilities appear to be heavily oriented towards offense. By contrast, military forces that are designed to protect the U.S. or its
allies will be less dangerous to others and less likely to provoke a balancing response.
As critics of offense-defense theory have noted, distinguishing between offense and defensive weapons and force postures
can be extremely difficultparticularly at the level of individual weapons systems. In general, however, force postures that protect
territory without threatening others, and that lack the capacity to conquer and occupy foreign territory, are likely to be less
threatening than force postures that emphasize offensive conquest.
Independent of the strength of U.S. hegemony c/b  NW & extinction
Nye ‘91
(Joseph-, Dean of Kennedy School of Gov. @ Harvard, Bound to Lead, P. 17)
Perceptions of change in the relative power of nations are of critical importance to understanding the
relationship between decline and war. One of the oldest generalizations about international politics attributes the onset
of major wars to shifts in power among the leading nations. Thus Thucydides accounted for the onset of the
46
Peloponnesian War which destroyed the power of ancient Athens. The history of the interstate system since 1500 is punctuated by
severe wars in which one country struggled to surpass another as the leading state. If, as Robert Gilpin argues, "international
politics has not changed fundamentally over the millennia," the implications for the future are bleak .45 And if
fears about shifting power precipitate a major war in a world with 50,000 nuclear weapons, history as we
know it may end.
Intervention/Pre-emption Scenario (1 of 3)
Readiness  interventionism & pre-emption collapsing hege
Shevtsova ‘03
(Lilia-, with the Moscow Carnegie Center, May 7, Moscow News, “New Danger: Hyperpower on the Loose”, Lexis; Jacob)
The "battle of giants" - State Secretary Powell and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld - has once again come into the open,
gaining new momentum. The former is seeking to reconcile the United States with Europe and bring the United States back into the
Security Council. The latter is trying to legitimize the "Bush Doctrine" - the U.S. right to preemptive strikes and an unlimited use of
military power. You might get the impression that Rumsfeld in effect received carte blanche from Bush and that Washington is
moving toward a tough, forceful policy line.
We should not, however, jump to conclusions: Neo-conservatives are not the sole force in Washington. There are also
moderate elements that are increasingly vociferous in saying: Don't let us go overboard. Heavyweight Sen. Biden argues, with good
reason: In Iraq, we should act together with the international community. The Washington Post points out sarcastically that the
White House deliberately caused widespread damage in Iraq to enable friendly corporations to cash in on the reconstruction
program. In other words, the Americans are still capable of taking a critical view of their administration.
As for Bush himself, he does not behave at all like a triumpher. The reason is clear. Bush needs, first, to find weapons of
mass destruction in Iraq, and second, he needs success with "regime change" in Iraq. Only in this event will the war be justified.
Chances are that the Americans will indeed find weapons of mass destruction - or traces thereof - in Iraq. Democracy
building however could be more of a problem. Over the past century the United States has made 16 attempts to change regimes in
other countries, only two of them successful: namely, democratization of post-war Germany and Japan. But these attempts were
legitimized by the international community and were accompanied not only by huge financial inputs (the Marshall Plan was worth
about one-third of the U.S. national budget) but also by U.S. military presence in both countries. All other attempts at "regime
change" are known to have failed. Afghanistan, where formation of a democratic state has been marking time, is yet another
argument showing that the "Bush Doctrine" should be treated with caution.
47
Furthermore, Bush has yet to translate the military success into support for his domestic policy while all is not so simple
here. In his time, Bush Sr., having won the first Iraq war in 1991, lost the election. Meanwhile, after the war, Bush Sr. had a 89
percent popularity rating, as compared to his son's 66 percent now. This, given that approximately 60 percent of Americans
disagree with his tax policy. In this context, the White House could succumb to the temptation to score new military victories as a
means of mobilizing the nation and winning elections.
Messianism with a Problem
The United States today remains the only Messianically minded country. All other democracies prefer calm to
revolutionary upheavals. America's idealism, backed up by its vast resources, makes it by far the most dynamic society, capable of
systemic shifts on the geopolitical field. Furthermore, the U.S. might dictates a tough and uncompromising line of conduct on the
international arena. As one commentator put it, when you've got a hammer in your hand, all problems begin to look like nails.
The sheer possibility of waging virtually stand-off wars with minimum casualties begets an aspiration to deal with world problems
by striking a hammer. There is no getting away from the fact that the impotence of international institutions, the helplessness of
Europe in military affairs and its obsession with its internal problems of integration do little to encourage the United States to
display collectivist instincts.
Gravitation by the U.S. elite toward forceful policy produces a vicious circle: The use of force is rejected by the rest of the
world, making America more vulnerable, which in its turn leads to further use of force. As a result, the United States risks ending
up as a destabilizing factor in the world.
Meanwhile, the future of a new world order today is in the hands of the United States which can turn it either way. This
puts to the test American society's ability to realistically assess both international threats and its own limitations, but most
importantly, its ability to apply democratic principles in the foreign policy sphere. Nonetheless, this also is a moment of truth for
the rest of the world which should understand that there are threats - above all the danger of proliferation of mass destruction
weapons and international terrorism - that require an immediate and tough response. So there is a need to think about putting in
place a legal groundwork with appropriate new institutions to ensure such a response. This will make it possible to avoid situations
where the United States could once again find itself in isolation, which is dangerous both for itself and for the international
community.
The pre-emption won’t work and risks destroying the world- 3 scenarios.
Hirsh ‘05
(Jorge-, Prof. of Physics @ U.C.S.D., Nov. 1,” The Real Reason for Nuking Iran: Why a nuclear attack is on the neocon agenda”,
http://www.antiwar.com/orig/ hirsch.php?articleid=7861; Jacob)
Yes, you read it right: The U.S. is prepared to break a 60-year-old taboo on the use of nuclear weapons
against non-nuclear countries – not because the survival of the country is at stake, not because the lives of many Americans or allies
are at stake – just to demonstrate that it can do it.
The U.S. has maintained for some time now that it reserves the right to respond with nuclear weapons to
attacks or intended attacks with WMD, and that it intends to use nuclear weapons to destroy underground
enemy facilities. It is argued that such statements have deterrent value, and that maintaining ambiguity as to what might
trigger a U.S. nuclear attack deters countries from pursuing military initiatives that are contrary to U.S.
interests.
Nonsense. Those statements have no deterrent value because no one in his or her right mind would
believe that the greatest democracy in the world would do such a thing.
Unless the U.S. demonstrates, by actually doing it once, that it is indeed prepared to do so.
How do you create the conditions to perform such a demonstration and avoid immediate universal condemnation? …
author continues …
However, the real world does not always follow the script envisioned by U.S. planners, as the Iraq experience
illustrates. So here is a more likely "post-demo" scenario:
48
* Many non-nuclear countries, including those currently friendly to the U.S., will rush to develop a
nuclear deterrent, and many will succeed.
* Terrorist groups sympathetic to Iran will do their utmost to retaliate in-kind against the U.S., and
eventually will succeed.
* With the taboo against the use of nuclear weapons broken, use of them by other countries will
follow in various regional conflicts, and subsequent escalation will lead to global nuclear war.
Bye-bye world, including the United States of America.
Interventionism  WMD terrorism.
Eland ‘98
(Ivan, Director of Defense Policy Studies @ the Cato Institute, May 5, CATO Policy Analysis, “Protecting the Homeland: The Best
Defense Is to Give No Offense”, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-306.html; Jacob)
A study completed for the U.S. Department of Defense notes that historical data show a strong
correlation between U.S. involvement in international situations and terrorist attacks against the United States.
Attacks by terrorist groups could now be catastrophic for the American homeland. Terrorists can obtain the technology for
weapons of mass terror and will have fewer qualms about using them to cause massive casualties. The
assistant secretary of defense for reserve affairs maintains that such catastrophic attacks are almost certain to
occur. It will be extremely difficult to deter, prevent, detect, or mitigate them. As a result, even the weakest
terrorist group can cause massive destruction in the homeland of a superpower. Although the Cold War ended
nearly a decade ago, U.S. foreign policy has remained on autopilot. The United States continues to intervene militarily in
conflicts all over the globe that are irrelevant to American vital interests. To satisfy what should be the first priority of any
security policy--protecting the homeland and its people--the United States should adopt a policy of military
restraint. That policy entails intervening only as a last resort when truly vital interests are at stake. To paraphrase Anthony Zinni,
the commander of U.S. forces in the Middle East, the United States should avoid making enemies but should not be kind to those
that arise.
Alexander ‘03
Even the United States and Israel have for decades tended to regard terrorism as a mere tactical nuisance or irritant rather than a critical strategic
challenge to their national security concerns.
It is not surprising, therefore, that on September 11, 2001, Americans were stunned by the unprecedented tragedy of 19 al Qaeda terrorists striking a
devastating blow at the center of the nation's commercial and military powers.
Likewise, Israel and its citizens, despite the collapse of the Oslo Agreements of 1993 and numerous acts of terrorism triggered by the second intifada that
began almost three years ago, are still "shocked" by each suicide attack at a time of intensive diplomatic efforts to revive the moribund peace process through the
now revoked cease-fire arrangements [hudna].
Why are the United States and Israel, as well as scores of other countries affected by the universal nightmare of modern terrorism surprised by new
terrorist "surprises"?
There are many reasons, including misunderstanding of the manifold specific factors that contribute to terrorism's expansion, such as lack of a universal
definition of terrorism, the religionization of politics, double standards of morality, weak punishment of terrorists, and the exploitation of the media by terrorist
propaganda and psychological warfare.
Unlike their historical counterparts,
contemporary terrorists have introduced a new scale of violence in
49
The first illusion is that terrorism can be greatly reduced, if not eliminated completely, provided the root causes of conflicts - political, social and
economic - are addressed.
The conventional illusion is that terrorism must be justified by oppressed people seeking to achieve their goals and consequently the argument advanced
by "freedom fighters" anywhere, "give me liberty and I will give you death," should be tolerated if not glorified.
This traditional rationalization of "sacred" violence often conceals that the real purpose of terrorist groups is to gain political power through the barrel of
the gun, in violation of fundamental human rights of the noncombatant segment of societies. For instance, Palestinians religious movements [e.g., Hamas, Islamic
Jihad] and secular entities [such as Fatah's Tanzim and Aqsa Martyr Brigades]] wish not only to resolve national grievances [such as Jewish settlements, right of
return, Jerusalem] but primarily to destroy the Jewish state.
Similarly, Osama bin Laden's international network not only opposes the presence of American military in the Arabian Peninsula and Iraq, but its stated
objective is to "unite all Muslims and establish a government that follows the rule of the Caliphs."
Interventionism-  Terrorism (1 of 2)
U.S. interventionism causes WMD terrorism- restraint solves.
Eland ‘02
(Ivan, Director of Defense Policy Studies @ the Cato Institute, Dec. 17, Foreign Policy Briefing “Does U.S. Intervention Overseas
Breed Terrorism”, # 50)
According to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, terrorism is the most important threat the United States
and the world face as the 21”t century begins. High-level U.S. officials have acknowledged that terrorists are
now more likely to be able to obtain and use nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons than ever before. Yet
most attention has been focused on combating terrorism by deterring and disrupting it beforehand and retaliating against it after the
fact. Less attention has been paid to what motivates terrorists to launch attacks. According to the Pentagon’s Defense
Science Board, a strong correlation exists between U.S. involvement in international situations and an
increase in terrorist attacks against the United States. President Clinton has also acknowledged that link. The board,
however, has provided no empirical data to support its conclusion. This paper fills that gap by citing many examples of
terrorist attacks on the United States in retaliation for U.S. intervention overseas. The numerous incidents cataloged
suggest that the United States could reduce the chances of such devastating-and potentially catastrophic—
terrorist attacks by adopting a policy of military restraint overseas.
50
U.S. globocop role provokes WMD terrorism.
Eland ‘02
(Ivan, Director of Defense Policy Studies @ the Cato Institute, Nov. 26, Policy Analysis, “The Empire Strikes Out”, # 459,
http://www.911investigations.net/IMG/pdf/doc-934.pdf; Jacob)
Finally, those who argue that America should emulate the 19th-century British Empire ignore the fact that
today’s world bears little resemblance to the one over which Britain once presided. Two differences should be obvious: First, the
world is far more interconnected today, which makes the consequences of sanctimonious, arrogant, or clumsy
international behavior riskier politically, diplomatically, and economically. Second, the potential costs
associated with making enemies today are far greater than they were for empires past. Indeed, the British and
Romans were the targets of assassinations, arson, and other forms of anti-imperial backlash, but that activity
was typically small-scale and took place far away from the mother country. In contrast, forms of backlash
against the U.S. role as globocop today could be large-scale and long-range and may be directed at America’s
homeland—as shown by the attacks on September 11, which were launched by Osama bin Laden in
retaliation for the U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia, U.S. support for Israel, U.S.-led economic sanctions against Iraq,
and U.S. backing of corrupt regimes in the Middle East. In the future, terrorists retaliating for U.S. actions
overseas could use more powerful weapons against the U.S. homeland—for example, nuclear, biological, and
chemical weapons. Thus, the resentment of U.S. neoimperialism could provoke catastrophic terrorism against
the United States itself—thereby dramatically reducing U.S. security.
Interventionism-  Terrorism (2 of 2)
Intervention is the root cause of terrorism- putting an end to this policy diffuses
tensions.
Journal of Commerce ‘98

(Oct. 7)
Because terrorist attacks using weapons of mass destruction are extremely difficult to prevent or
mitigate, the administration needs to concentrate its efforts on minimizing the motivation for such attacks in
the first place. The United States should resist the temptation to intervene overseas in situations not critical to
its vital interests. This temptation will be especially great when humanitarian arguments are offered for intervention. But even
when it is not a cover for other motives, intervention for humanitarian purposes is usually not perceived as
neutral by all parties to a conflict. Some of those parties may eventually seek revenge for U.S. intervention
they resent. In short, U.S. policy-makers should get back to basics and remember that a nation's security policy should first
protect its own citizens, both overseas and at home. Americans should not have to live in fear of terrorism just so
Washington's foreign policy elite can attempt to achieve amorphous and ephemeral gains on the world
chessboard.
51
Intervention makes the U.S. a lightning rod for terrorism.
Eland ‘02
(Ivan, Director of Defense Policy Studies @ the Cato Institute, Nov. 26, Policy Analysis, “The Empire Strikes Out”, # 459,
http://www.911investigations.net/IMG/pdf/doc-934.pdf; Jacob)
Thus, like the proverbial man who finds himself stuck in a hole, today’s
advocates of empire recommend more digging.
But digging will neither get the man out of the hole nor make the United States safer. America and its citizens
will become an even greater lightning rod for the world’s political malcontents. As former Reagan adviser
and Cato Institute senior fellow Doug Bandow warns: “With the growing ability of small political movements
and countries to kill U.S. citizens and to threaten mass destruction, the risks of foreign entanglements
increase. . . . In coming years, the United States could conceivably lose one or more large cities to demented
or irrational retaliation for American intervention.”100
Intervention nuclear terrorism
Bandow ‘94
(Doug-, Jan./Feb., Cato Institute, Current, P. 29)
Finally, intervention could one day threaten the very national survival of the United States. Biological, chemical, and
nuclear weapons are spreading and ballistic missiles increasingly available. Terrorism has become a fixture of international life.
With the growing ability of even small political movements and countries to kill United States citizens and to threaten mass
destruction, the risks of foreign entanglements increase. No longer are the high costs limited to soldiers in the field. In the coming
years the United States could conceivably lose one or more large cities to irrational retaliation for American intervention. A modest
Strategic Defense Initiative program would reduce these risks, but it would never be able to provide full protection.
Interventionism- AT Inevitable
US won’t be drawn into conflict- empirically proven
Layne ‘97
(Christopher-, Associate Prof in the School of International Studies @ U. of Miami, Winter, International Security)
The argument that the United States invariably is drawn into major overseas conflicts is faulty. Since the United States achieved
independence, great power wars have been waged in Europe in 1792-1802, 1804-15, 1853-55, 1859-60, 1866,A70, 1877-78, 1912
13, 1914-18, and 1939-45. The United States has been involved in three of these wars, but it safely could have remained out of at
least two of the wars in which-it fought. In 1812, hoping to conquer Canada while the British were preoccupied with the
Napoleonic Wars, the United States initiated war with Britain. And as Robert E. Osgood has demonstrated, the United States‘
intervention in World War I was not driven by any tangible threat to its security interests. [90] The United States was not compelled
to enter the Great War; it chose to do so, arguably with disastrous consequences.
Claims that hege prevent war are wrong- U.S. actually exacerbates conflicts
Conry ‘97
(Barbara-, foreign policy analyst @ the Cato Institute, Feb 5, Cato Policy Analysis, “U.S. "Global Leadership": A Euphemism for
World Policeman”, #267, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-267.html; Jacob)
52
Other proponents of U.S. political and military leadership do not point to particular benefits; instead, they warn of near-
certain disaster if the United States relinquishes its leadership role. Christopher paints a bleak picture:
Just consider what the world would be like without American leadership in the last two years alone. We would have four
nuclear states in the former Soviet Union, instead of one, with Russian missiles still targeted at our homes. We would have a full-
throttled nuclear program in North Korea; no GATT agreement and no NAFTA; brutal dictators still terrorizing Haiti; very likely,
Iraqi troops back in Kuwait; and an unresolved Mexican economic crisis, which would threaten stability at our border. [55]
Gingrich has pronounced a future without American leadership "a big mess." [56]And former British prime minister
Margaret Thatcher has warned,
What we are possibly looking at in 2095 [absent U.S. leadership] is an unstable world in which there are more than half a
dozen "great powers," each with its own clients, all vulnerable if they stand alone, all capable of increasing their power and
influence if they form the right kind of alliance, and all engaged willy-nilly in perpetual diplomatic maneuvers to ensure that their
relative positions improve rather than deteriorate. In other words, 2095 might look like 1914 played on a somewhat larger stage.
[57]
In other words, if America abdicates its role as world leader, we are condemned to repeat the biggest mistakes of the 20th
century--or perhaps do something even worse.
Such thinking is seriously flawed, however. First, to assert that U.S. leadership can stave off otherwise inevitable global
chaos vastly overestimates the power of any single country to influence world events. The United States is powerful, but it still can
claim only 5 percent of the world's population and 20 percent of world economic output. Moreover, regardless of the resources
Americans might be willing to devote to leading the world, today's problems often do not lend themselves well to external
solutions. As Maynes has pointed out,
Today, the greatest fear of most states is not external aggression but internal disorder. The United States can do little about
the latter, whereas it used to be able to do a great deal about the former. In other words, the coinage of U.S. power in the world has
been devalued by the change in the international agenda. [58]
Indeed, many of the foreign policy problems that have confounded Washington since the demise of the Soviet Union are
the kinds of problems that are likely to trouble the world well into the next century.
"Failed states," such as Somalia, may not be uncommon. But, as the ill-fated U.S. and UN operations in that country
showed, there is very little that outside powers can do about such problems. External powers usually lack the means to prevent or
end civil wars, such as those in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, unless they are willing to make a tremendous effort to do so.
Yet those types of internecine conflicts are likely to be one of the primary sources of international disorder for the foreseeable
future.
Despite the doomsayers who prophesy global chaos in the absence of U.S. leadership, however, Washington's limited
ability to dampen such conflicts is not cause for panic. Instability is a normal feature of an international system of sovereign states,
which the United States can tolerate and has tolerated for more than two centuries. If vital American interests are not at stake,
instability itself becomes a serious problem only if the United States blunders into it, as it did in Somalia and Bosnia. [59]
Interventionism- Won’t deter conflict

American interventionism doesn’t deters conflict
Stedman ‘93
(Prof. @ John Hopkins School of Advances International Studies, Foreign Affairs, 72 #1)
There are no panaceas for international conflicts. The hope that international intervention in one war will prove a deterrent
elsewhere is simply that—a hope, with little evidence to justify it as a proposition and plenty to suggest that domestic tyrants do not
learn from other cases. Civil wars and ethnic rivalries have histories and dynamics all their own that diminish the effects of
precedents sent elsewhere.
American intervention fails due to contradictory goals- Kosovo proves
Pfaff ‘01
(William-, syndicated columnist for the International Herald Tribune, Jan/Feb., Foreign Affairs)
The United States enjoys a hegemonic position in these first years of the new century, in terms of both its military power
and its economic weight and dynamism. The technological capabilities of the former extend to something resembling a doomsday
53
extermination of civilization, yet the exercise of American power has repeatedly proven in-competently conceptualized and
directed and in significant respects irrelevant to the world’s military and _political challenges.
Examples of such mishandling include not only the Vietnam War, the maladroit Central American and Caribbean interventions, and
the Somalia fiasco, but also the 1999 intervention in Kosovo. There, NATO fought a war that proved to be different from the one
Serbia was fighting, leaving the Serbian army intact while failing to prevent the purge of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo. In the end,
Russian diplomatic intervention was required to produce an outcome that preserved NATO’s reputation. The Kosovo campaign—
well-meant but lacking coherent political direction or geopolitical vision, reliant on technology but_ recoiling from the risk of
casualties—revealed an American approach to the exercise of power that is scarcely one of a determined hegemon. One of France’s
commanders in the Bosnia campaign, General Philippe Morillon, asked at the time, “How can you have soldiers who are ready to
kill, who are not ready to die?”
Readiness unnecessary/won’t collapse

U overwhelms the L- no readiness crisis- and readiness is useless nyways
U.S. Newswire ‘00

(Oct. 17, “New Cato Institute Study: Military Readiness Crisis Is Illusory”, Lexis; Jacob)
But according to a new study from the Cato Institute, the Defense Department doesn’t need more money because the
readiness problem is overstated.
In “A Hollow Debate on Military Readiness,” Director of Defense Policy Studies Ivan Eland points out that U.S. forces
have bone-crushing dominance over any other military on the planet. “The American military is more potent relative to its potential
enemies than were the militaries of any great power in world history,” he says.
Although U.S. defense spending exceeds that of the next seven countries combined—and is 19 times higher than the
combined spending of Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Sudan, Cuba and North Korea—the candidates have launched a bidding war to see
who can throw the most cash at the Pentagon for political gain, according to Eland.
But while the military has “experienced shortages of personnel, spare parts and training, the ‘readiness crisis’ is largely
illusory,” he writes. ... author continues …
But the threat environment has also changed. Since no country comes close to being able to threaten the U.S. militarily,
"U.S. armed forces do not need to be kept in the high states of readiness they were during the Cold War," he says.
54
No ! (1 of 2)
Claims that U.S. military presence prevents war are wrong- U.S. actually exacerbates
conflicts.
Conry ‘97
(Barbara-, foreign policy analyst @ the Cato Institute, Feb 5, Cato Policy Analysis, “U.S. "Global Leadership": A Euphemism for
World Policeman”, #267, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-267.html; Jacob)
Other proponents of U.S. political and military leadership do not point to particular benefits; instead, they warn of near-
certain disaster if the United States relinquishes its leadership role. Christopher paints a bleak picture:
Just consider what the world would be like without American leadership in the last two years alone. We would have four
nuclear states in the former Soviet Union, instead of one, with Russian missiles still targeted at our homes. We would have a full-
throttled nuclear program in North Korea; no GATT agreement and no NAFTA; brutal dictators still terrorizing Haiti; very likely,
Iraqi troops back in Kuwait; and an unresolved Mexican economic crisis, which would threaten stability at our border. [55]
Gingrich has pronounced a future without American leadership "a big mess." [56]And former British prime minister
Margaret Thatcher has warned,
What we are possibly looking at in 2095 [absent U.S. leadership] is an unstable world in which there are more than half a
dozen "great powers," each with its own clients, all vulnerable if they stand alone, all capable of increasing their power and
55
influence if they form the right kind of alliance, and all engaged willy-nilly in perpetual diplomatic maneuvers to ensure that their
relative positions improve rather than deteriorate. In other words, 2095 might look like 1914 played on a somewhat larger stage.
[57]
In other words, if America abdicates its role as world leader, we are condemned to repeat the biggest mistakes of the 20th
century--or perhaps do something even worse.
Such thinking is seriously flawed, however. First, to assert that U.S. leadership can stave off otherwise inevitable global
chaos vastly overestimates the power of any single country to influence world events. The United States is powerful, but it still can
claim only 5 percent of the world's population and 20 percent of world economic output. Moreover, regardless of the resources
Americans might be willing to devote to leading the world, today's problems often do not lend themselves well to external
solutions. As Maynes has pointed out,
Today, the greatest fear of most states is not external aggression but internal disorder. The United States can do little about
the latter, whereas it used to be able to do a great deal about the former. In other words, the coinage of U.S. power in the world has
been devalued by the change in the international agenda. [58]
Indeed, many of the foreign policy problems that have confounded Washington since the demise of the Soviet Union are
the kinds of problems that are likely to trouble the world well into the next century.
"Failed states," such as Somalia, may not be uncommon. But, as the ill-fated U.S. and UN operations in that country
showed, there is very little that outside powers can do about such problems. External powers usually lack the means to prevent or
end civil wars, such as those in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, unless they are willing to make a tremendous effort to do so.
Yet those types of internecine conflicts are likely to be one of the primary sources of international disorder for the foreseeable
future.
Despite the doomsayers who prophesy global chaos in the absence of U.S. leadership, however, Washington's limited ability to
dampen such conflicts is not cause for panic. Instability is a normal feature of an international system of sovereign states, which the
United States can tolerate and has tolerated for more than two centuries. If vital American interests are not at stake, instability itself
becomes a serious problem only if the United States blunders into it, as it did in Somalia and Bosnia. [59]
No ! (1 of 2)
U.S. attempts to deter regional conflicts fail- its enemies always have less to lose and
more to gain
Layne ‘97
(Christopher-, Associate Prof in the School of International Studies @ U. of Miami, Summer, International Security, “From
Preponderance to Offshore Balancing,” Vol. 22 #1)
A crucial factor in weighing the credibility of a defender's extended deterrence commitments is the extent of its interest in
the protected area vi I lad the Soviets contemplated seriously an attack on Western Europe, the risk calculus probably would have
dissuaded them. In a bipolar setting Western Europe's security was a matter of supreme importance to the United States for both
strategic and reputational reasons. In the early twenty-first century, however, the intrinsic value of many of the regions where the
United States may wish to extend deterrence will be doubtful. Indeed, in the post Cold War world 'few imaginable disputes will
engage vital U.S. interests." It thus will be difficult to convince a potential attacker that U S. deterrence commitments are credible.
Moreover, the attenuated nature of US. interests will result in motivational asymmetries favoring potential challengers list is, the
"balance of resolve" will lie with the challenger, not with the United States, because the challenger will have more at stake
It is doubtful that the united States could deter a Russian invasion of the Baltics or Ukraine, or, several decades hence, a
Chin assault on Taiwan. To engage, in such actions, Moscow or Beijing would have to be highly motivated; conversely, the objects
of possible attack are unimportant strategically to the United States, which would cause the challenger to discount U.S. credibility
56
The spring 19% Grids between China and Taiwan suggests the difficulties that U.S. extended deterrence strategy will lace in
coming decades (China pro - voked the crisis by conducting intimidating military exercises in an attempt to influence Taiwan's
presidential elections.) fairing the crisis a Chinese official said that China could use force against Taiwan without fear of U.S.
intervention because American decision makers "care mom about Las Angeles than they do about Taiwan." Although an empty
threat today, as China becomes more powerful militarily and economically in coming decades, threats of this nature from Beijing
will be more potent.
AT Asian Stability
Forward deployment in asia fails- perceptions of success are based on threat con
Johnson ‘00
(Chalmers-, President of the Japan Policy Research Institute, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire, P. 63;
Jacob)
That the forward deployment of American troops brings "stability" to East Asia is, of course, a false syllogism and, as
military strategist Col. Harry Summers Jr. puts it, the equivalent of using elephant bane in New York City. Elephant bane is a
chemical repellent spread by African farmers to keep elephants out of their gardens and orchards. Pentagon theorists, Colonel
Summers suggests, are like the New Yorker who spreads elephant bane around his apartment and then extols its benefits because he
encounters no elephants. The strategy "works" because the threat is illusory
57
AT Germany
Other European powers check German prolif
Mearsheimer ‘01
(John J.-, Sept./Oct., Foreign Affairs, “The future of the American pacifier”, http://it.stlawu.edu/~govt/361F02Mearshimer.html)
Yet even though Germany is likely to become a potential hegemon if it has to provide for its own security, the United States is still
likely to pull its forces out of Europe. Why? Because despite Germany’s significant military potential, other European powers
should be able to keep it from dominating Europe without help from the United States. The United Kingdom, France, Italy, and
Russia together have about three times as many people as Germany does, and their combined wealth is roughly three times greater
than Germany’s. The United Kingdom, France, and Russia all have nuclear weapons, moreover, providing a strong deterrent
against an expansionist Germany even if it does develop its own nuclear option.
Germany can’t re-arm even if it wanted to- structural barriers
Sperling ‘01
(James-, April ,1British Journal of Poli Sci, “Neither Hegemony nor Dominance: Reconsidering German Power in Post Cold-War
Europe; foreign policy and economics analysis”, Lexis; Jacob)
58
German unification in 1989 raised the spectre of German hegemony in post-cold war Europe. In this article, I demonstrate
that Germany lacks the structural power consistent with European hegemony or dominance; that there is little evidence supporting
an appreciable gap between Germany's structural power and foreign policy ambitions; and that apparent symptoms of German
hegemony, particularly the process of institutional emulation in Central and Eastern Europe, reflect other international processes
and incentives emanating from the state system itself. This reassessment and downgrading of Germany's relative and absolute
power resolve the paradox of German structural power and German reluctance identified by others. But this alternative narrative
raises another more important question: why is Germany treated as a potential or even aspiring hegemon in Europe? The answer to
that question is located in the interconnected legacies of Auschwitz and the occupation regime. This joint legacy constitutes an
important par t of the historical context within which we frame our assessments and judgements of German power; explains the
frequently unwarranted exaggeration and suspicion of German power; and demonstrates how the past can function as a powerful
prism though which we interpret the intentions, ambitions and capabilities of a state.
AT Japanese Prolif
Japan will never re-arm
Johnson ‘01
(Chalmers-, May 14, The Nation, “Time to Bring the Troops Home : America's provocative military posture in Asia makes war
with china more likely”, No. 19, Vol. 272; Pg. 20, Lexis; Jacob )
Still another reason why US forces say they must remain in Asia, particularly in Japan, is that Japan itself
may once again become a threat to its neighbors. This argument is increasingly distasteful to Japanese, who point out that
paying for American bases on their own soil as watchdogs is tantamount to paying for their own jailers. The Japanese also argue
that their past history and current demographics (16 percent of the population over 65 and a below-replacement
birthrate) make revived militarism about as likely as revived slavery in the United States.
Japan won’t prolif and even if they did no !
Gholz, Press, & Sapolsky ‘97

(Eugene, Daryl G., doctoral candidates in Poli Sci @ MIT, Harvey-, Prof. of Public Policy & Organization in Poli Sci @ MIT,
Spring, International Security, “Come Home America”, Vol. 21 #4)
59
Despite the favorable Asian conventional balances, some Asian powers might feel pressure at the nuclear level from an
American withdrawal. Japan and South Korea currently enjoy the security of the American nuclear umbrella, and some of their
neighbors, with whom they share a history of conflict, already have nuclear arsenals.' It would not be surprising if South Korea and
Japan wished to replace the American nuclear commitment with their own deterrent forces. On the other hand, they might be
restrained by the chance that proliferation would scare their neighbors; the Japanese are at least officially sensitive to the "fallacy of
the last move."" Fortunately, if they do decide to develop nuclear weapons, Japan and South Korea are good candidates for safe
proliferation's Both countries have the military power to protect their nuclear forces from conventional attack, mitigating fears of
inadvertent escalation and both possess the technological prowess to develop secure, second-strike arsenals. The only proliferation
danger lies in transition. The United States, therefore, should maintain its current nuclear commitments while it pulls out o Asia.
During that time America should offer assistance on nuclear technology issues to the South Koreans and Japanese if they decide to
pursue their own deterrent forces.
AT Iran
Readiness won’t deter Iran
Heisbourg ‘05
(Francois-, Feb. 9, Financial Times, “We need a common policy on Iran”, Lexis; Jacob)
It is tempting to describe this as a "good cop, bad cop" division of labour between a hard-power US, with its military forces in
readiness, and a soft-power Europe tempting Tehran with assorted trade and technological goodies. But this is not the way things
work today. America's sabre-rattling is not likely to deter Iran: the last thing the overstretched US forces in Iraq need is Iran aiding
and abetting insurrection in Shia areas that are now quiescent. It would require a substantial reduction of US exposure in Iraq to
restore credibility to military pressure.
60
AT Israel
Non-U & e/d- Israel is paranoid now
The Atlantic Monthly Group ‘03

(June, “The Logic of Suicide Terrorism, Vol. 291 # 5)
Nearly everywhere in the world it is taken for granted that one can simply push open the door to a restaurant, café, or bar,
sit down, and order a meal or a drink. In Israel the process of entering such a place is more complicated. One often encounters an
armed guard who, in addition to asking prospective patrons whether they themselves are armed, may quickly pat them down,
feeling for the telltale bulge of a belt or a vest containing explosives. Establishments that cannot afford a guard or are unwilling to
pass on the cost of one to customers simply keep their doors locked, responding to knocks with a quick glance through the glass
and an instant judgment as to whether this or that person can safely be admitted. What would have been unimaginable a year ago is
now not only routine but reassuring. It has become the price of a redefined normality.
In the United States in the twenty months since 9/11 we, too, have had to become accustomed to an array of new, often
previously inconceivable security measures—in airports and other transportation hubs, hotels and office buildings, sports stadiums
and concert halls. Although some are more noticeable and perhaps more inconvenient than others, the fact remains that they have
redefined our own sense of normality. They are accepted because we feel more vulnerable than before. With every new threat to
international security we become more willing to live with stringent precautions and reflexive, almost unconscious wariness. With
every new threat, that is, our everyday life becomes more like Israel's.
61
U.S. engagements don’t effect Israeli security decisions.

For decades America has been a close friend of Israel, and a policy of restraint would not change this. The United States is
better off when its friends are safe and secure, even if their safety has no effect on American security or prosperity. Surrounded by
enemies, Israel has always fought its own battles, never requiring American troops to protect its borders. Israel's determination to
defend itself without American troops should embarrass America's allies in Europe and Asia. As lone as Americans (eel strongly
about Israel's well-being, loan guarantees. direct economic aid, and military sales will continue. But Israeli security make no
demands on American force structure and in no way justifies American military engagement.
AT Kashmir
U.S. can’t deter a war over the Kashmir
Bulletin's Frontrunner ‘02

(June 3, India-Pakistan Tensions Drawing Forces Away From Al Qaeda, Taliban Hunt, Lexis; Jacob)
The Wall Street Journal (6/3, Cloud, Robbins) reports, "The U.S. has no obvious military options for heading off a clash between
India and Pakistan, one that could escalate into the first war between nuclear- armed states, and leave millions of casualties.
Instead, President Bush and his top aides have plunged into round-the-clock diplomacy. But America's power to steer events may
be limited." The Journal adds, "India and Pakistan have a million troops along the border, nearly half of those facing off at the Line
of Control dividing Kashmir. There is no chance of U.S. troops going in to stop them from fighting.
62
AT Taiwan war
No risk China will attack Taiwan b/c they doubt the credibility of the U.S.’s deterrent
Haggard ‘04
(Stephan-, Jan. 1, Journal of East Asian Studies, “The balance of power, globalization, and democracy: international relations
theory in Northeast Asia”, Lexis; Jacob)
What about the intentions of the powers that have been deemed "revisionist," that is, China and North Korea? There is one
issue on which the PRC openly prefers a change in the territorial status quo, and that is with respect to Taiwan. Moreover, the
cross-strait conflict is one in which China's rising power provides it opportunities to exercise influence. We must ask two questions:
does China have the capability to challenge the status quo militarily, and would it be inclinedto do so given possible U.S.
responses? In short, just how revisionist is China?
The answer to the first question about capabilities is almost certainly no. China's military modernization efforts have been
devoted tocapabilities that are of political as well as military use in dealing with Taiwan. But these capabilities do not currently
constitute a credible threat to the territorial status quo, in part because of continuing shortcomings in Chinese capacity to project
force, in part because of the manifest willingness of both Taiwan and the United Statesto balance China on the issue. (34)
The second question is whether China would be inclined to test thecredibility of that commitment or to use its military capability as
it develops. China's approach to Taiwan encompasses a number of elements, of which military leverage is only one. The Chinese
leadership is also relying on economic integration and a "united front" strategy of reaching out to businesspeople and factions in the
Kuomintang, thePeople First Party, and the Democratic Progressive Party itself. Theshift in tactics away from the overt military
63
pressure demonstrated during the 1995-1996 crisis is arguably just that: a shift in tactics. Perhaps the United States should be as
concerned with integration through economic and political "stealth" as through more overt means. (35) Yet from the perspective of
the risk of militarized crisis, the Chinese Communist Party appears to have concluded that a confrontational approach to resolving
the cross-strait conflict was counterproductive.
The reassessment of Taiwan strategy now appears to be part of a wider reevaluation of Chinese grand strategy that began
in the mid-1990s. (36) Concerns about China's behavior had antagonized the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations)
states with respect to the South China Sea, contributed to the rise of the China hawks in the UnitedStates, and stirred Japan's fears.
These developments occurred in the context not of U.S. weakness and disengagement but a booming U.S. economy, a
reinvigoration of key alliance relationships with Japan andAustralia, and a series of reminders of the unique U.S. capacity to project
force: in the first Gulf War, in the Taiwan Strait in 1995-1996, in the Balkans, and finally in Iraq. These geopolitical developments
unfolded in the context of a rapidly growing Chinese dependence on the U.S. market and on foreign direct investment (FDI) more
generally (see below).
U.S. can’t deter a war over Taiwan
O'Hanlon ‘01
Administration 2001-05, P. 180, http://brookings.nap.edu/books/0815700792/html/; Jacob)
One might hope leaders in Beijing would be deterred from any attack on Taiwan out of fear of the enormous political and
economic consequences that would follow. Surely, global trade and investment with China would suffer for years to come,
regardless of the outcome of the battle. However, China may believe that western countries are so focused on making money that
they would soon forgive and forget any war that had only limited direct effect on them. Failing that, they might feel that they had
no choice but to attack Taiwan under certain circumstances, given the emotions that surround the Taiwan issue in China and the
fear among some in Beijing that letting Taiwan go could encourage other sep-aratist movements in their country.
AT Taiwanese Prolif (1 of 2)
U.S. Military doesn’t affect Taiwan’s nuclear decision

Taiwan is a less likely candidate for nuclear proliferation. Americas withdrawal from Asia would not deprive Taiwan of an
American nuclear commitment, because Taiwan never had one. Even with the United States engaged in Asia, Taiwan is vulnerable
to a nuclear first strike From China: restraint will do nothing to change this-Taiwan seems to have concluded that the risks of a
Chinese nuclear strike do not require a nuclear deterrent. Many analysts have long doubted the utility of nuclear weapons in civil
wars, and if China really believes it "owns" Taiwan, then a nuclear attack would be like an attack on itself. [50] The bottom line for
American defense policy is that, while the issue of Taiwan's nuclear vulnerability is tricky, America's current military posture in
Asia does little to relieve any nuclear tension there. With or without American power in the region, Taiwan will do what it has to do
to defend itself.
64
Taiwan can’t nuclearize even if they wanted to

a. IAEA safeguards
Mitchell ‘04
(Derek J.- Sr. Fellow for Asia in the International Security Program @ CSIS, “The Nuclear Tipping Poiny Why States Reconsider
Their Nuclear Choices”)
Furthermore, over the past decade, Taiwan’s nuclear program became the first “substantial” (defined as involving big
power reactors) program to become subject to the additional protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement instituted after the Iraq
war. Beginning in 1996, the protocol expanded the range of items subject to IAEA inspection from “nuclear material” to “nuclear-
related activity,” a much broader scope that severely restricts a nation’s ability to cheat. Indeed, inspectors report that they have had
no major issues concerning the safeguard regime on Taiwan. At the same time, the U.S. State Department and Taiwan participate in
the “Joint Standing Committee on Civil Nuclear Cooperation,” a confidence-building measure that promotes health and safety in
civilian nuclear use and includes elements that ensure the island meets its nuclear obligations stemming from integration of U.S.
nuclear components. In addition, the United States continues to enjoy consent rights to all nuclear material in Taiwan under the
1950s-era Nuclear Cooperation Agreement.
b. No scientists
Mitchell ‘04
Second, the scientists who led Taiwan’s nuclear program have retired or passed away, reportedly including the two most capable
nuclear engineers of their day. While technical know-how has assuredly been preserved for a new generation of Chungshan
Institute scientists and technicians, they have not had the opportunity to engage in practical training in the field. Indeed, Taiwan
observers note that young engineers are not interested in pursuing such work, viewing it as irrelevant and not “career-enhancing.”“
Taiwan scientists claim that a whole new generation of nuclear scientists would need to be “nourished,” requiring a substantial
investment of money and time.” U.S. monitors note that technicians have not been maintaining their expertise in the relevant areas
of nuclear physics, including solvent extraction chemistry, uranium fuel fabrication and reprocessing, uranium purification, and
related aspects of chemical engineering, for example. Were technicians indeed pursuing such training, these monitors contend, it
would be detectable.
AT Taiwanese Prolif (2 of 2)
c. No material and processing capability
Mitchell ‘04
That said, despite its clear nuclear weapons ambitions and capabilities of the past, Taiwan has several technical and
practical obstacles to quickly becoming a nuclear power today. First, according to experts, Taiwan is in far worse shape today in
terms of materials and processing capability than it was fifteen years ago when it renounced its nuclear program and shut down its
largest research reactor and its reprocessing facilities. The research reactor is now reported by outside sources to be entirely clean, a
hollow shell disassembled in the presence of U.S. and IAEA observers, with key components buried and only the fuel pond—and
spent fuel—remaining inside under keen IAEA observation. All Taiwan power reactors are dutifully inspected quarterly. An
informed U.S. source confirms that Taiwan possesses less than two kilograms of plutonium and less than two tons of uranium,
leftovers from 1988 that are closely monitored by the United States and the IAEA. The island today lacks uranium enrichment or
spent fuel reprocessing capabilities. Its facility for handling plutonium has been dismantled. Observers confirm that INER itself is
65
out of the fuel cycle business, does not do nuclear material handling, has ended its nuclear research programs and light-water
reactor fuel development work, and focuses today instead on the job of developing alternative energy sources.
66

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Caldebate.

com Readiness Good/Bad

*** Readiness Good ***

Allied Prolif- Generic Scenario (1 of 2)

Allied Prolif- Generic Scenario (2 of 2)

Allied Prolif- Japan Scenario

B. The impact is the whole world blowing up.

Kennedy & Irie ‘00

Allied Prolif- Japan- Kashmir !

B. The ! is nuclear winter.

Washington Times ‘01

Allied Prolif- Japan- ↓ Confidence  Re-arm

Allied Prolif- Taiwan Scenario (1 of 2)

B. That perception will scare Taiwan into nuclearizing.

C. The ! is nuclear war.

• Miscalc resulting from keeping weapons on hair-trigger alert

Allied Prolif- Interal for Asia Scenarios- Readiness k

Asian Stability Scenario

B. The impact is the whole world blowing up.

Kennedy & Irie ‘00

Asian Prolif Scenario

B. The ! is worldwide prolif & nuclear war.

B. The ! is nuclear war

Hege- Readiness k deterrence/warfighting (1 of 2)

Policy Papers ‘02

Hege- Readiness k deterrence/warfighting (2 of 2)

B. The ! is an apocalyptic firestorm.

Regional Conflicts Scenario (1 of 2)

Regional Conflicts Scenario (2 of 2)

Regional Conflicts- Perception of Readiness key

Regional Conflicts- Readiness key (1 of 2)

Regional Conflicts- Readiness key (2 of 2)

Regional Conflicts- Prolif !

Regional Conflicts- Terrorism ! (1 of 2)

The impact is extinction.

Regional Conflicts- Laundry list !

Fearon & Laitin ‘04

Regional Conflicts- ! Calc Probability

Fearon & Laitin ‘04

That perception makes miscalculation and major war inevtible

At this point, none

Strait Times ‘00

THE DOOMSDAY SCENARIO

Taiwan- Readiness key (1 of 2)

Readiness k prevent war over Taiwan

Asian Political News ‘05

Taiwan- Readiness key (2 of 2)

Center for Security Policy ‘01

Readiness k deter taiwan war

Hall & Karl ‘00

The impact is extinction.

Terrorism- Readiness key (1 of 2)

Terrorism- Readiness key (2 of 2)

White House National Security Strategy ‘00

Terrorism- Failed States key

AT Intervention Bad- ! t/ Shield (1 of 2)

Kagan & Kristol ‘00

Intervention inev- readiness  intervening faster which is more effective

AT Intervention Bad- ! t/ Shield (2 of 2)

AT Interventionism- Its Good (1 of 2)

AT Interventionism- Its Good (2 of 2)

Brooks & Wohlforth ‘02

AT No specific scenario proves no !

*** Readiness Bad ***

* Readiness Good *

* Readiness Bad *