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SeeingandCaring: The Role of Affect in Feminist MoralEpistemology

MARGARET OLIVIA LITTLE

rolesfor emotionand desire.Caringfor moral I developtwo different epistemic role reliable a pivotalthough awareness endsandpeople plays contingent in ensuring various emotions motivesis a necessary and salientdetails; possession of of morally themselves. Thosewho condition autonomous understanding moralconcepts of for the status of moralitytend to believesuch connectionscompromise "objective" thanargue thebifurcated rather assume conception reasonandaffectthisessay for of challenges.

Moralwisdom is hard to come by. It is usuallya difficultand delicate job to Well we may ask,then, what is needed discernthe morallandscapeaccurately. What is the properepistemic stance to adopt to make good moraljudgments? in our effortsto arriveat fair and reliablemoralverdicts? According to one central and influential tradition, the stance appropriate one. To make considered, sound moral to moral wisdom is a dispassionate judgments,we should abstractfromour emotions, feelings, sentiments-what the eighteenth century would call "passions"-and from our desires,inclinations-what now go by the ungainlyterms"pro" "con"attitudes.Emotions and and desiresare not partof the equipmentneeded to discernmoralanswers.To be sure, their presence may be essential to our responding once appropriately we reach those verdicts-to act and to feel as we ought; but only trouble,it is thought, can come of their intrusion into deliberationstoward the verdicts themselves. At best, they are irrelevantdistractions,like so many pains and tickles. At worst, they are highly distortinginfluences:emotions "incite"and "provoke"us; desires "cloud"our judgment and "bias"our reasoning. This would be a problem in any epistemic endeavor,but it is disastrousto moral judgments,whose role is preciselyto serveas correctiveto the narrow, partisan
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focus of our sentiments. According to this view, then, to be objective is to be to to detached; be clear-sightedis to achieve distance; be carefulin deliberation is to be cool and calm. In contrast to this tradition, certain feminist theorists have argued that emotion and desire are valuable aspectsof the wise person'sepistemic repertoire. Certainly,our passionsand inclinations can mislead us and distort our perceptions,but it is a falselynarrowperspectiveto think that they invariably do so or that they have nothing distinctive to offer epistemologicalprojects. Distance does not always clarify. Sometimes truth is better revealed, the landscape most clearly seen, from a position that has been called "loving perception"or "sympatheticthinking."' I think that such feminist approachesto epistemology are of particular importancein the moraldomain, for moralityis preciselythe arena in which a proper epistemic stance demands the presence of what we might call In affect."2 this essay,I try to tease apartand articulateas clearly "appropriate as possible the epistemic roles of emotion and desire in gaining moralknowledge. I delineate two differentroles,both of which arecrucial,but one of which more fundamentallycalls into question the traditionalcompartmentalization of reason and affect. I first try to isolate what it is about caringthat makes it so helpful to our attempts to determine what, in the face of complicated circumstances, ought or ought not to be done. I then argue that possession of various emotions and desires-care, concern, love, but also anger, revulsion, indignation-is not just immensely useful to seeing the moral landscape, it is a necessarycondition of doing so. The idea of dispassion as the paradigmaticepistemic stance seems to me a dangerous one, for there are some truths, I want to argue, that can be apprehended only from a stance of affective engagement. The claim is an importantone, for, if correct, it means we must reject the model" of moralitythat is implicit in so many ethical theories. "bureaucratic On that model, moral agency involves a clear division of labor: reason is responsiblefor coming to the moralverdicts;it then passesits reporton to the will, motivation, or emotion, which then does or does not issuethe appropriate response.How good a person is at renderingaccuratemoral verdicts is quite independentof how responsiveshe tends to be to those verdicts. It is possible, on this familiar model, for people to combine tremendous moral acumen with completely atrophied affect: the best moral experts can be the least moral people. In contrast, the view under consideration claims that possession of certain desires and emotions is crucial for seeing what morality requiresin the first place. The moral landscape will be opaque to those who are in no way moral. Beforeturningto develop the role of affectin a feminist moralepistemology, it is worthpausingto confrontmoredirectlythe view that counsels dispassion. The view is, in a sense, our intellectual inheritance. It tends therebyto retain

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influence in shapingdiscussions, a subterranean determiningwhat gets marked as a departure as standingin need of explanation,and handingdown certain or themes and metaphors which, because of their familiarity, may go unarticulatedand hence unevaluated.Feministperspectivesin the historyof ideasgive us specialreasonto be waryof the themes and metaphorsthat tacitly underwritethe persuasivefeel of the doctrine. For all the hotly disputeddebates in the history of philosophy,one theme that emerges with remarkableconsistency is an association of women with affect and men with reason (Lloyd 1979, 1983, and 1984; McMillan 1982; Tuana 1992). The way in which this "association"is unpacked varies from philosopherto philosopher,but it is usuallyan interestinglytangledcombination of empirical, essentialist, and normative claims. Claims include that women as a class are in fact more swayedby affect and less by reasonthan men for are;that women bynaturehave less capacity reasonand morefor affectthan men have; or again, independentof any questionsof capacity,that it wouldbe to inappropriate woman's role for her to cultivate and act from reason and to appropriate cultivate and act fromemotion.3(Kant is especiallykeen on the last claim, mentioning that women who learn higher subjectssuch as Greek might as well have beards,such is the departurefrom the role properto their sex!) These relatively direct associationsare reinforcedby the fact that both women and affect share,in turn, an associationwith natureand the corporeal (Merchant 1980; McMillan 1982; Dinnerstein 1977; Ortner 1974). Forpurposesof this discussion,I want to drawattention, not to philosophy's traditionalview of woman,which is obviously(though depressingly) off-kilter, but to the resultantviews of reasonand affect themselves. The nearlyubiquitous and multilayeredassociationsof affectwith women, reasonwith men may well have influenced the ways in which affect and reasonhave been substantively conceived. Certain conceptions of affect and reason,that is, seem to be genderedconceptions: what is said about each-what functions they are capable of or supposedto play, what relationshipsthey stand in with respect to each another,how they areeach valued-seems to have been subtlyshaped by their respective associationswith certain narrow,distortedconceptions of female and male (a process that usually transpiresby the unintentional exchange of metaphorsused in each domain). The associations are perhapsmost easily seen in the doctrines developed duringthe Enlightenment. We can begin by noting its themes about women and men. As many feminist scholarshave noted, certain conceptions of men andwomen beganslowlyto solidifywith the advent of the scientific revolution (Pateman 1989; Bordo 1986;Lloyd 1983;Okin 1979; Gatens 1991). Men and women were understoodas having differentappropriate spheresof functions. Man's central role was in the public sphere-economics, politics, religion, culture;woman'scentral role was in the private sphere-the domestic realm ofcaretakingforthe most natural,embodiedaspectsof humans.The separation

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of spheres was understood to constitute a complementarysystem, in which each contributedsomething of value which, when combined, made an ideal whole (the marriageunit). Becausethe division was understoodas grounded in the naturesof man and woman, the separationwas a rigidone: the idea that either side of the division could offer something useful to the other's realm would simply not emerge as a possibility. This picture of "fitting complementarity"was then complicated, and a deep tension introduced,by an addedlayer:the division did not involve halves of equal worth, for woman and the private sphere were seen as intrinsicallyless valuable. It is man, and what is accomplished in the public sphere, that representsthe human ideal. Woman is understoodas existing for man as his helpmate, and in this regard she may be valued, but in a romanticizedand hence constrainingway. Moreover, and very important,her associationwith the body and nature grounded an image of woman as a potential source of contamination, infection, and disorder(Merchant 1980; Dinnerstein 1977; Ortner 1974). Now these are the verythemes that arise in the views of reason and affect presented by many Enlightenment thinkers. Reason and affect have rigidly separate, complementary functions: reason reveals the way the world is; emotion and desire move us to respondto that worldwith action and feeling. Each is valued for its role, but the idea that they interact much or that they could contribute to the other'sfunctions won't emergeas a seriouspossibility. Also, and in tension with this picture of complementaryspheres, there is a tendency to view emotion and desirewith deep suspicion,as something more to do with the body we have as animals than the mind we have as humans, and as something that infects, renders impure, and constantly threatens to disrupt-particularly in the epistemic arena.4 The Enlightenment conceptions of reason and affect, then, are markedby two themes. First,reason and affect will be conceptualizedas radicallyseparatedin function, role, and ideal:that one shouldenter the sphereof the other will seem almost incomprehensible.Second, affectwill show up in particularly devalued ways: it will be cast as a source of contamination, which we must control and, in the end, transcend.If such conceptions of reasonand affect are valorizedispassion,detachassumed,one will inevitably and understandably in epistemic enterprises.The question is whether the ment, and distance plausibilityof such conceptions surviveswhat seem to be historicallygendered origins. Must we regardreason and affect as so rigidlybifurcatedin function? Must we view affect solely as potential infection in moral epistemology? Leaving our ears tuned for recurrence of the metaphors discussed in this what the epistemic traditionalview, let us turnto the positive taskof addressing role of affect in moralityis. I want to separate out and develop two important roles for affect. To delineate the first role, let me begin with a now-familiarpoint about moral as deliberation.Even if such deliberationis best characterized the application

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of moral principles to a given situation, one obviously cannot start the enterpriseunless one is awareof the salient featuresof the situation (that one's neighbor is in pain, for instance): one wouldn't know what to apply the of principleto. Now, as severaltheoristshave lately emphasized,awareness the relevant features of a situation is no easy or automatic matter morally (Murdoch 1970 and 1956; Nussbaum 1985a and 1985b; Blum 1991). The details may be complex and subtle, and at any rate we are often obtuse creatures-it's all too easy to miss what'sin front of one's own nose. Think of the workaholic spouse who is oblivious of her partner'sgrowing despair,or whites who don't notice news reportsof murderwhen the victim is black but alwayslook up when the victim is white or from their neighborhood.Seeing what is importantin the situationswe face is not simply a matter of opening our eyes; as Iris Murdochsays, "It is a taskto come to see the world as it is" (1970, 91). The natural question is, What is needed to achieve the type of awarenessthat goes into makinggood moraljudgments? One naturalsuggestion (and one Murdochherselfstresses)is that we must as self-love. "The difficulty," she puts it, "isto transcendour all-too-absorbing keep the attention fixed upon the real situation and to prevent it from to returningsurreptitiously the self with consolations of self-pity,resentment, fantasy and despair"(1970, 91). But, although this is an importantpoint to make, those immersedin Enlightenmentconceptions of reason and affect are likely to pick this out as the sole feature of obtuseness:one is obtuse when one's vision, and affect is pegged as the sourceof obstrucsomething obscures tion. On this reading,emotion and desire once again get cast in the familiar role of contamination, here clouding what would otherwisebe clear. The view that obtusenessis causedonlyby the obscuringeffect of emotion and desire, though, operateson the faultypicture that seeing is passive:were we just to clear our pathwaysof distortingaffect, the informationwould come right in. This, of course, is not how it works.Think of what is really involved in seeing what is morallyrelevant.Often it meansnoticing what is not present: noticing that a student is not in class; spotting in a busy crowd that a child, with adults, is not accompanied any of them. Or again, though surrounded by subtle patterns:that a patient asksfor more pain medication on the noticing nights after she has had a visit from her husband.Or again, noticing what is so pervasivethat it tends to be invisible (notice how the movie FatalAttraction or the actions of LorenaBobbitt drawimmediateand dramaticpublic moralizing,while the ubiquitousviolence againstwomen in film and realitycontinues with still too little comment). When Murdochsays that it is a task to see the world, she does not just mean that there is a task preliminaryto seeing, like washingthe windowsbeforelooking outdoors.She means that the seeing itselfis a task-the task of being attentive to one's surroundings. Now someone deeply wedded to a stronglybifurcatedview of reason and affect might tend to interpret this task as equivalent to some consciously

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adoptedassignmentto be disciplinedabout gatheringimportantinformation. FlorenceNightingale offersan interestingexampleof this sortof intellectualist interpretation.A chapterof her shorttract,Noteson Nursing,is devoted to the importanceof observation(Nightingale 1969,105-26). She notes with censure the lack of observationshe sees amongthose who attend patients:they do not notice when food goes uneaten, whether a patient wants solitude or diversion-indeed, she says, they don't even observe thatthey don't observe. She then offersher recommendationfor solving this problem:nursesshould work on memoryskills,stay moredisciplinedin focusingon their tasks,and practice surveyingtheir field of vision while reciting what they see (she cites with approvalthe method used by one father,who had his small son rehearsethe contents of a toy-storewindow each day afterthey passedby). Nightingale'smethod limits the scope of attentiveness to conscious observationalvigilance.But, while such effort is helpful at times (as when you mentally shake off your torporto confront a difficultdecision), this is not the centralfeatureof attentiveness.Forthere is no exhaustingahead of time what one should be on watch for. There are indefinitely many things that may be morallyrelevant in a situation,featuresthat areoften presentin novel or subtle combinations. The morally aware person, then, is not someone who approacheseach situation with some conscious grocerylist of things to check for.The requiredattentiveness is a background dispositionfor relevant details to come into your consciousness-for them to emerge for you as salient, to come to the forefrontof your attention. Given this, it turs out that what one is attentive to is largelya function of the one thing Nightingale does not mention, namely, one's affect. What one is attentive to reflects one's interests,desires, in brief, what one caresabout. Think, for instance, as SaraRuddickasksus to do, of the awarenessdisplayed in paradigmatically loving relationships,such as a healthy mother and child (Ruddick 1987). It is becausethe mother caresfor her child that relationship she is attunedto subtledangers,picksup on delicate signals,notices when help is needed. More generallyput, if one cares about something, one is prepared to to respondon its behalf, and preparedness respondis intimately linked with awarenessof opportunitiesto do so. How reliable one will be in accurately discerningthe moral landscapeand knowing what ought to be done depends, then, not just on how good one is at weighing risks and foreseeing consequences, say,but on the natureof one's emotions and desires. What kind of affect does one need to be reliably good at making moral judgments?The question is well worth pressing.Obviously, when thinking aboutwhat it takes to be moral,we think that people need to care aboutwhat might be called recognizablymoral objects or ends-justice, the patient's interests,one'schild. But it isn't as clearthat one needs to careaboutsuch ends in orderto knowwhat it takes to be moral.After all, the lesson so far is quite general:to make reliable, consideredmoraljudgments,one must be awareof

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morallyrelevant facts, and what one tends to be awareof reflects what one cares about. This in itself doesn't prevent us from finding moral expertise in one whose nonmoralinterests,by happycoincidence, attune them to the sorts of details that turn out to have moralsignificance. But in fact it is extremelyunlikelythat one will be reliablysensitive to moral moralends. To make good moral saliences unless one caresaboutrecognizably one must be awareof a complex set of details and the shape they judgments, form (Dancy 1993, chap. 7; Friedman1989). Operatingunder the influence of other interests,sooner or later (and usuallysooner), the contoursof what is noticed will diverge from the contours of what is morally important. A painkiller,for instance, pharmaceutical companymarketinga new all-purpose has a very strong desire to maximize sales. Its marketingdivision, certainly though, will not reliably notice instances of pain: it will reliably notice instancesof affluentor insuredpeople'spain. A sadistwho delightsin knowing of others' pain, on the other hand, will be exquisitely reliable at sniffing out all instances of pain, but he will be oblivious to the myriad other details relevant to determining what morally should be done about that pain. A constellation of featuresare salient to determiningthe answer to that question-the cause of the pain (tortureor appropriate punishment?),the preferences of the one in pain (she mightpreferthe pain to the stuporthe medication gives her), one'srelationshipto the personin pain (alleviatingthe pain of one's alcoholic husband may count as enabling instead of as helping him). The extent to which one actuallycaresaboutand is responsiveto moralends, then, has enormous impact on how accurately and reliably one sees the moral landscape, because what one is attentive to is deeply influenced by what one cares about, and caring about other than recognizably moral ends will significantly compromise one's propensity to notice the morally relevant set of details. Those who work in the ethics of care have advanced a furtherand more specific claim. The attentiveness necessary to good moral judgment is best ensured,it is argued,when we care, not simplyabout impersonalmoral ideals such as justice, but aboutpeoplethemselves (Blum 1988;Walker1991). In order for Nightingale to encourageher nursesto be optimally observantof salient details, on this view, she shouldhave urgedthem not just to care deeply about dischargingwell the duties of nurse, or even promoting the interests of the patient, but to care about thepatientherself. Now there is no doubt that caringfor a person, if the caring is healthy and mature,helps keep one attentive to details important to her situation. One might well wonder, though, why we should accept the claim that caring for people carriesany particularepistemic advantageover caring for impersonal moral ends. I think the answerlies in the importanceof a particularkind of receptive listening that comes with properlycaringfor a person. Becausethe featuresrelevant to determiningwhat one ought to do are often complex, one

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of must be receptive to the particulars cases, to what is differentand novel in a case, and not just notice what, at a lower level of resolution,appearas broad often have to do with details similarities.As these importantparticularities known only to the people whose interests are at issue-their fears, hopes, worries,how they conceptualizethe situation-we will gain importantinformation by listening to their narratives.So much is obvious. But notice, now, what happens when we do this with the stance of an investigator, asking questionsof the persononly becausewe see her as the sourceof importantdata unfortunatelyunavailable elsewhere (such as data about her mental states). When we listen fromthis stance, we objectifythe person in a certain way:we see her as a means to aiding our agenda, including agendas as laudable as furtheringjustice or diminishingsuffering. This stance of personaldisengagement,however passionateone's desire to find out truthsor to see interestsadvanced,carrieswith it tremendousepistemic danger. Most of us resist what is unique, and most of us have deep tendencies to project our own template of experiences onto others. We catalogueand classifyothers'experiencesas soon as they arementioned, eager for them to be confirminginstances of our currentfavoritegenerality.(Here, ironically,we do have a desirethat infects ourepistemicefforts-the desirefor intellectual closure.) One of the few antidotes we have againstthese tendencies is listening froma stance of caringfor the personherself. In such a stance, we want to hearhow it is forher,in a waythat welcomesnovelty or uniqueness, is slow to applytemplatesand open to changing them, is readyto reconceptualizewhat the agendaitself might end up being. This is not to be confusedwith patronizing agreement or the mindless suspension of judgment. Part of the love or caring here includes respect for the person as a responsible subject, which often entails voicing disagreement or even arguing (for more on the connections of respect and care, see Piper 1991; Dillon 1992). Indeed, to do otherwise is to view the person as an object in your agenda of "listening carefully to others." The first lesson about affect'srole in moralepistemology,then, is that from the valorizedposition of dispassionatedetachment we are often actually less likely to pick up on what is morallysalient. Emotionaldistancedoes not always clarify;disengagementis not alwaysthe most revealing stance. To see clearly what is beforeus, we need to cultivate certain desires,such as the desireto see justice done, and the desire to see humans flourish, but we must also, more work at developing our capacities for loving and caring about particularly, people. The epistemicrole so faroutlined for affectis a deeply importantone. I want now to argue that it is not the only one. It is, we can agree, extraordinarily unlikely that one will reliably tease out and notice all the disparatemoral saliences of the complicated situations we face unless one has the affective propensitiesdetailed above;but nothing saidso farimpliesthat it is impossible.

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After all, the featuresof a situation relevant to determining its moral qualities-the sociological, psychological,economic, or physical properties,sayavailable to anyone. Perhapsit is only because we are such are in principle to inadequateepistemic creatures," use MarkPlatts'sphrase (Platts "tawdry, becausewe areso little andso selectively awareof oursurroundings, 1979, 247), that we need special affective interests in justice, or caring engagement with people, to get us to notice what is there, availableto be seen. For all that has been said so far, then, the idealknower, facing no such limitations, has no epistemic need of affect. Here the traditionalconception of reason and affect resurfaces, providing now the archetypeof the ideal. The ideal epistemic stance is, after all is said and done, still the detached "pointof view of the universe,"fromwhich all is seen but nothing is caredfor.The province of knowledgeturnsout in the end to be a role properlyreservedfor reason alone; affect has merely a temporary role as a corrective.Affect servesas helpmateto reasonas he struggleswith his to imperfections,but if all were right in the world, the separationappropriate their natureswould be restored.To be sure,affect is acknowledgedas valuable for the aid she gives, but the value is only instrumental,and the acknowledgment is markedwith the ambivalence one feels toward the crutch that is a reminderof one's defects. As faras epistemologicalprojectsare concerned,we can yearn for the day when affect will be left behind as superannuated. From a feminist perspective,of course,such a view has a depressingfamiliarity: once again, it is what is associatedwith man that defines the ideal. I want to argue now that the move is not just depressing;it is wrong. Possession of certain condition of discerningmoral desiresand emotions turnsout to be a necessary and hence must form part of even the ideal observer'sepistemic properties, repertoire. On reflection, most people would agree that there is a differencebetween acknowledgingthat an action causespain, say,and coming to see it as cruel,a differencebetween noting that a homeless person is going hungryand seeing is that charity called for.The firstsortof judgmentconcernspropertiesthat are in fact morally salient, as we've put it; that is, they are the good- and bad-makingproperties,those in virtue of which the actions have the moral propertiesthey do. But one can acknowledgesuch propertiesand not see that they aremorallyrelevant, or what exactly their moralrelevance comes to. One could, for instance, simply lack the moral concept at issue (perhaps some animals are like this, having the concept of pain but not the concept of cruelty). Or again, if one had the relevant concept, one could fail to see its applicationin the presentinstance. One could see the relevant pieces but not the proper gestalt; one could fail to see the moral meaning the elements together carry.There is, then, an important difference between judgments concerning propertiesthat are in fact morally relevant and judgments that actuallyemploy moral concepts.

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Put What is involved in ascension to the level of moral awareness? most generically,to conceptualizea situation in moralterms is to see it as meriting some response-one sees the situation as calling for some action, or again, as deservingsome emotional responsesuch as outrageor love (McDowell 1985; Wiggins 1987; McNaughton 1988). It is, in short, to see the situation in a way one who becomes morally aware has come to that is essentially evaluative: acknowledge the salient featuresof a situation as constituting a reasonor a for justification some response. Thus the difference, for instance, between someone who discerns the painfulnessof torture and someone who sees the evil of it is that the latter person has come to see the painfulnessas a reason not to torture,to understandtortureas meritingrevulsion. To see a situation in such light is to see it in a waythat can rationallyexplain why someone is angryif we learn having the meritedresponse.We understand he believed himself the victim of grave injustice;we learn why someone that an performed action if we learnshe thought it her moralduty.More explicitly, the way in which the situation is conceptualizeditselfis sufficient to provide the explanation, to make it intelligible to us why the person had the merited response.While we would need to know more about an agent who rushedat an angrybull than is given by his testimony that it scared him (that he had accepteda dareto do something frightening,perhaps),we do not need similar supplementationwhen the agent explains his refusalto join in some teasing sensitivity,doing so wouldinvolve bysayinghe thought that, given the person's With moral awareness,the very way in which the situation is concruelty. ceived carriesexplanatoryforce. Thus when two people faced with the same moral requirement differ in their response, such that one has the merited responseand the other has no responseat all, there is some way in which their conceptions of the situation differ.They do not see it in the same light; they do not conceptualizeit in the same way.Analogously,to give an examplefrom anotherevaluative realm,aesthetics, a personwho hearsthe particular beauty in jazz and the person who hears it as plain noise are not experiencing the music in the same way (McNaughton 1988, 112). This is not to say that all moralconclusions, or even all sincere and deeply held moral conclusions, are followed by right action or displaysof emotion. For one thing, the response is often overwhelmedor shunted aside by countervailing psychological forces. Overpoweringsexual desire, the weight of depression,the dissonance of accommodatingthe full implications of a disturbingbelief-all these can outweigh the moral motivations one genuinely possesses,can submergeemotional reactionsto deeperrecessesof one'spsyche. The point is worth underscoring,for the fact that we do not immediately does not mean that experience the responseswe acknowledgeas appropriate are not there, manifesting themselves indirectly in how they structure they variousaspects of our lives. Thus we speak of depressionas masking rage, for

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when the depressiveis finally readyto feel her rage, it is accompaniedby the realizationthat she has beenangryat her tormentorfor years. But the furtherand crucial point is that where one does fail to have the response,the failurewill show up in how clearlyor how fully one appropriate saw the moral status of the situation (see McDowell 1978 and 1979; Platts 1979;Nussbaum1985b;Sherman 1989). One who failsto respondtakesin the case, perhaps,but the perceptionis cloudy,incomplete, distortedin some way. Aristotle makes the point by reference to the difference between the truly virtuousperson, who respondsmorallywithout struggle,and those who must battle (successfully or not) to do so. The difference, Aristotle notes, is a it differencein the quality perception: is becausethe virtuouspersonsees more of clearly that her response comes easily, directly, reliably (see, for instance, Ethics1146b30-1147a4, 1147a10-24). Nicomachean Take,for instance, someone who gives change daily to the homeless person near her office but who does so to qualm her furtive feelings of guilt, to compensate for the irritationshe can't help feeling at his presence, and to maintain a self-image she can tolerate. Now imagine that one day, walking towardthe homeless person, she suddenlysees the situation differently.Her perspective shifts; the elements fall into place; she has fit the case into a differentcontext. Perhapsshe suddenlysees in this person the loneliness she herself has felt, and the picture resolves itself into a simple case of helping a fellow human in a bit of need. This change is a change in her apprehensionof the situation. This is not to say that she necessarilycame to know some new detail of the case. Seeing moreclearlyis often a matterof discerninga different gestalt of the individual elements one already apprehends:one sees the elements in a way that lets one recognizesome furtherpropertythey together fix. (Someone who sees a nose, mouth, eyes but cannot recognizethem as his lover'sface suffers kind of blindness.) a And the betterapprehensionbringswith it a better response:in our example, a kindly responsefeels of a piecewith the new, more accurateway in which the woman apprehendsthe situation. If this view of moralmotivation is correct,then, in orderto "see"the moral landscape clearly,5in order to discern it fully and properly,one must have certaindesiresand emotions. Caring,being outraged,being moved to act-all these are part of discerningmoral featuresclearly.The ideal epistemic agent herself would have appropriate affect, for it is needed if one is to discern all that there is to see. I find the theory just outlined persuasivelargelybecause it fits and makes sense of a rich array phenomena in moralpsychology,but also becauseI find of its traditionalrival deeply dissatisfying. the rival picture of moralmotivaOn tion, the affective efficacyof moralawarenessis completely independentof its cognitive quality, for motivation is the province of some separate domain: depending on the particularsof the theory, it is a function of will, practical rationality,a facultyof emotions, or of independentlyintelligible desires.Note,

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model," as I have called it, leaves open the now, that such a "bureaucratic that there are certain creatureswho fully apprehend the moral possibility landscape-who gaze intelligibly at the moral order,in all its glory-and yet neverrespond as merited. They have, perhaps,some persistentpractical irrationality and comprehensivelyfail to drawthe practicalinferencesthey ought who do not possessany capacityfor to in this area;or, again, they arecreatures or again, they are creatureswhose desiresextend only to anger,love, outrage; gratifyingtheir own most immediatefelt urgesfor food and sex. Such beings and who understand apprehendthe cruelty arenonetheless held to be creatures in the torturethey witness (or perform),who discern moral obligation when they see a hungrychild, who reliablydetect when courageis called for. I think this profoundlyempties and distorts what is involved in grasping it "thepoint"of morality.Morefundamentally, makesno sense of why we come to use moralconcepts, and leaves asidewhat it is to understandthem. A person who never appropriatelyresponds at any level to what he terms cruel or understandingof the obligatory,I want to argue, does not have autonomous he invokes. Imaginea personwho tries to understandwhat is meant concepts who by "valuable," suddenlyseems to catch on and says, "Yes,now I see!" but tries to destroywhat we point to as examples.Or again, imagine a persistently personwho seems to understandthat a set of her beliefs constitutes conclusive for "justification" a propositionand yet, with full possession of her faculties, remainscompletelyimpassiveat the notion of actuallydrawingthe conclusion. of In these cases, we do not credit the people with understanding the evaluative becausethey miss their practicalforce. concepts involved, precisely Of course,even the complete amoralistmay use moralwords:he may tell us in exasperationthat he knowsperfectlywell that murderis evil and that giving to the poor is good. But his use of moral terms will not be born of his independentcompetence with the language,of his having autonomousknowlparasitic. edge of "how to go on." His use of moral terms,instead, is essentially with color mayhelp illustratewhat I mean.6To use FrankJackson's An example scenario,imagine a personwho has lived all her life in a black and white room (Jackson 1986). If she is equippedwith science textbooks on color and light ways; waves, she can come to use the word"green"in completely appropriate if she also has a light wave meter to consult alongside her science book, she wouldpossessthe abilityto pick out greenobjectswith perfectreliability.Still, it is when she finally steps out of the room into the sunlit forest that she has and the concept of green,as opposed to having the concept of lightwavelength a conversion manual. In something analogousto this case, the amoralistcan, as an outsider to the moral system, get a sense of how it goes. He knows empiricallythat we place great store by things labeled "good"and that we frown and punish when people do "bad."He can, then, begin to employ the termshimself. But, as in the case with green, the use is alwaysa parasiticone: the amoralistis always glancing sideways,as it were, picking up on others'

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signals, and not responding to the goodnessor badnessin the situation. The amoralist, then, is not simply someone who fails to respond to the moral he requirements sees:rather,he does not himselfautonomouslysee that a given situation is cruel, kind, right, or wrong. Now, in the case of green, of course, absence of understandingdoes not compromiseone's reliabilityin indicatinggreen. Armed with your light wave meter and conversion manual, you'll get it right. If this were true of moral model would remain concepts as well, a modifiedversion of the bureaucratic an amoralistcould not be said to have moralunderstanding or open: although moralknowledge, he would, with propertraining,be able to deliver accurate moral judgments. (He could be not a moral expert, but an expert moral consultant.) But moralityis cruciallydisanalogousto color here. Moralpropertiesdo not map onto nonmoralpropertiesthe way color mapsonto light wavelength (see McDowell 1981; Wiggins 1987; McNaughton 1988, chap. 13; Dancy 1993). Itemsgroupedtogetherundermoralclassificationssuch as "cruel" not form do kinds recognizableas such at the nonmoral level. For one reason, there are infinitely many ways to be, say, cruel: there is no way to mark out in purely nonmoraltermswhy kicking the dog, verbaltaunting, and forgettingto invite the neighbor'schild to your daughter's birthdayparty get classifiedtogether. Foranother,as JonathanDancy and David McNaughton point out, considerations seem to carrytheir reason-givingforceholistically in the moraldomain: the contributionmadeby anygiven featureto an action'smoralstatusdepends, in a way that escapescodification,on what other featuresarepresentor absent (so, for instance, the fact that an action is fun is often reason in its favor but might be preciselywhat makeshunting animalsmorallyproblematic).7 This means that there are no conversion manuals-not even immensely complex ones-for inferringmoral propertiesfrom nonmoral properties,no algorithmsinto which one can feed the latter to derive all and only the right moralanswers.8 Those then with merelyparasiticcompetence in moralitywill go wrong.They can mimic genuine practicewell in certaineasycases,for there areobvious rules of thumb to make use of. But their epistemologicalexpertise will be compromised,and usuallyseverely. It is no accident that amoralists, when trying to display their moral competence, tend to recite the crudest mantrasabout morality ("killingis wrong";"feedingthe hungryis good");for the subtle contoursdisplayedby the morallandscapeof lived experienceswill escape them. Affect, then, has an ineliminablerole in moralepistemology.Forwhile affect is contingently (though significantly) importantto our noticing the natural affect propertiesthat are in fact good- and bad-making properties,appropriate is a necessarycomponent of apprehendingthe moralpropertiesthemselves. If we were to succeed in transcendingour affect and occupying a dispassionate

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epistemicstance, then, we wouldbe blind to some of the most importanttruths there are, namely, moraltruths. The traditionalpartitionof reasonand affectshowsup in one final and very importantway in discussionsof morality.Historically,manywho have granted morality'sintimate connection with affect have concluded that the connection comes at a price: it reveals that there are in fact no moral propertiesor moraltruths.PhilosophersfromHume to Mackiehave arguedthat the necesand sary connection of a moral verdict to affect gives us in-principle ex ante reason, in advance of any substantive investigation into moral systems, for to concludingthat those claimsdo not correspond the way the worldis (a short of skepticalclassicswouldinclude Hume 1978;Ayer 1936;Stevenson 1959; list Mackie 1977; and Harman 1977). If the use of moral concepts is necessarily tied to the possessionof affective states, after all, then one's choice of moral concepts and the moralconclusions one arrivesat turn out to be constrained, and in this sense determined,by the specific palette of emotions and desires one happensto have. This means, it is thought, that moralverdictscannot be genuine productsof reason, and hence cannot be cases of discerningthe way the world is, for they do not result from proper employment of some epistemic method such as perceiving, weighing evidence, or reasoning. Thus, while it may look at first sight as though the motivational and emotional states we've discussed are cases of discerning moral properties, in fact what we "discern" is the result of projecting those affective states onto the world: our deep moral convictions reflect the nature of our own hearts rather than the nature of the world. Such moral skeptics acknowledge (indeed, insist upon) affect'srole in the productionof moral verdicts, then, but they retain the view that affect'srole is not an epistemologicalone, in any robustsense of the term, for it has no role in finding out what is true. For indeed, it is affect'spresence in moralitythat ensuresthere is no truth there to be found. Here, once again, affect is cast as a contaminatingfactor.Its differentialpresenceis sufficientto valorizescience over morality:the former,whateverother problemsit faces, can at least aspire to truth,while the latter,whateverother importanceit may carry,is in the end merely a matter of taste. Anything too tightly associatedwith emotion and desire,it turns out, is metaphysicallya second-classcitizen. Now, debates over moral realism-over whether there is knowable moral truth-are as complicatedas any. I don't pretendto mount a defense of moral realismin this essay.What I do want to registeris my skepticismof the claim basis for rejecting that morality'sconnection to affect provides a principled moralrealism.The fact that moralverdictssustaina necessarytie to affectdoes not itself force us to abandonthe idea that such verdictsareproductsof reason, for it may be that some productsof affect are also productsof reason. That is, the fact that the moral views we hold are logically constrainedby the affect we have does not itself obviate the possibilitythat the views are epistemically

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sound, that they are reachedby our sensitivity to the way the world is, or that their best explanation lies in the fact that they are true:for it might be that affect is revealing of truth. Why think that the connection to affect compromises the robustlycognitive statusof moralverdicts, instead of thinking that such statusextends in a meaningfulsense to affect?In short, the skepticneeds an argumentto explain and defend his premisethat productsof affect cannot often simply be productsof reason.And here, I think, the arguments proffered Let me give a couple of examplesof the sort of problematic beg the question. argumentationI have in mind. One recent skepticalargumentdefendsits claim that moralverdictsarenot productsof reasonby appealingto desire's"directionof fit" (Smith 1987). The argument is aimed against the suggestion that moral conclusions can be can productsof reason, despite their connection to desires,because desires be productsof reason.The suggestion,that is, is that we can come to have intrinsic desires in response to evidence that the end in question is a morallyworthy one. The skeptical argument,currentlymuch discussed,claims to show that the very natureof desireprecludesthis possibility:intrinsic desiresarenot the sortof thing we can come to by sifting throughevidence, for they do not have the properdirection of fit. The argumentgoes something like this. Beliefs and desires,we are reminded,are each intentional mental states, in which a particularkind of attitude is directedtowarda proposition (the idea is first set out in Anscombe 1957). A believing attitude, we might say, is an attitude of "regarding true"some proposition, while a desiring attitude is as as one of "regarding to be broughtabout." Beliefs, more specifically,have a mind-to-worlddirection of fit: they try to match the way the world is. This meansthat, in puttingforward belief, we regardourselvesas obligatedto offer a andrespondto considerations that seem to bearon the truthof its propositional content. It also means that, to count as a belief, a mental state must display some level of counterfactualsensitivity to evidence about its propositional content-at some point, disregardfor evidence about the truth of one's assertionsindicates that one is not, despite first appearances, really makinga claim about the world.Desires,in contrast,have a world-to-minddirection of fit: they don't try to match the world;they try to change it. They thus tend to in persist,not disappear, the face of evidence that their contents arefalse;and, because they aim at making the world match their propositional contents, desiresgrounddispositionsto act in waysthe agent believes will lead to their realization. The charge is now made, on the basis of these quite neutral and perfectly acceptable characterizations,that desires cannot be the products of reason. Desires,it is claimed,aresimplynot held accountableto how the worldactually is. While beliefs should change in the face of evidence, normativeassessments of desiresare insulatedfromsuch considerations: do not appraisean agent's we desiresby looking at any of the evidence she has. And desiresdo not display

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even the minimum counterfactualsensitivity to evidence that beliefs must: desiresdo not alter accordingto evidence. It is concluded, then, that intrinsic desirescannot be "contraryto" or "conformableto" reason, as Hume put it, becausethey, like painsor tickles,arenot the sortof thing we come to by sifting throughevidence about how the world is. But this argument, as it stands, does not succeed. Although analysis of desire'sdirection of fit isolates an important aspect in which desires have evidential immunity,the aspect is a verynarrowone, and in its own rightdoes nothing to foreclosethe possibilitythat desirescan be productsof reason.The analysis makes explicit that a desire is neither sensitive to nor judged by referenceto evidence about its own propositionalcontent: the desire that p is neither responsivenor responsibleto evidence about whether p. But nothing in that definitional point indicates that desires cannot be responsive to or judgedby evidence about some otherproposition,that its possessionor rejection is immune fromany evidential considerations.More specifically,nothing said so far bars the claim that sometimes an intrinsic desire for some end is developed as a responseto genuine evidence that the end is a morallyworthy one. To put it schematically,the desirethat p maybe sensitive to evidence that p is good.Such a mental state can be thought of, if one likes, as a state that has two directions of fit toward two different propositions, respectively: it is a believing attitude directedtowardthe propositionp is good(it is responsiveto evidence about whetherp isgood),and it is a desiringattitudedirectedtoward the proposition p (it grounds a disposition to perform actions the agents believes will bring it about that p). There is nothing in the mere definition of belief or desirethat standsin the wayof this suggestion:there are,for instance, no conflicting instantiation conditions involved in such a scenario. One will an see in these neutralcharacterizations indication of desire'sinherent disreputable epistemic status only if one has alreadystarted with the historically traditionaltendency to segregatereason and affect-here, by assumingthat no mental states instantiate featuresof both belief and desire. Another recent skeptical argumentis providedby BernardWilliams, who offersan argumentfrom rational convergence to explain why, while "science has some chance of being more or less what it seems ... ethical thought has no chance of being everything it seems" (Williams 1985, 135). In science, Williams states, we can well imagine that all suitablyequipped investigators might ultimately converge on one theory, and in a way that would be best explainedby the truthof that theory.But we have, he says,"no such coherent of hope" in ethics (1985, 136). Precisely'because their intimate connections to our desiresand motivations, ethical views are destined to remain local in a way scientific theories are not: any convergence we might witness would be not serendipitous, best explainedas the resultof the theoristshaving exercised their sensitivities to the worldas it reallyis.

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On what is this confident predictionbased,though?A thought experiment is tacitly invoked, in which we are to imagine that similarly situated and suitably trained investigators-those equipped with the proper epistemic resources-will not converge onto any one ethical theory however long they investigate, or will do so only for reasonsunrelatedto evidence (mass brainwashing,say). But of course,this thought experimentproceedsasplanned only if it is assumedthat possessionof certain affective states is not partof being properlyepistemically equipped.If we regardedthe capacity to respondwith certain emotions and desiresas partof what is needed to apprehendthe world, ethics would be seen as being just as susceptibleto rationalconvergence as any other domain (however much or little that might be). To disqualify affect as an epistemic resource-and not simply beg the question by assumingit is not-one must have some nontendentious criteria of what things count as epistemic resourcesand what things do not, and none is forthcoming.In point of fact, I don't think we have ex ante any substantive pictureof what sortsof things areproperly thoughtof asepistemicequipmentsome independent, settled list of the sorts of things that help gain access to truth. Rather,we fill in our picture of epistemic access and our picture of the waythings areconcomitantly,each reciprocally influencingthe other.The list of epistemic equipment may be modified, then, by reference to the sorts of propositionswe come to regardas true:if we have strongreasonto believe that some things are good or courageous,and such beliefs are necessarilytied to desires and emotions, we will find ourselves with good reason for regarding affect as an epistemic preconditionfor apprehendingcertain truths. Attempts to maintain divisions of labor between reason and affect have appearedin many realms.We have seen them surfacein certain traditionalist views of marriage, wherethe man is assignedthe thinking workand the woman assigned the emotional work for the two, and again in certain traditionalist views of health care roles, where the doctor is supposedto handle the curing while the nurse handles the caring.These bureaucratic divisions work out in moralepistemologyno better than they do in those other contexts. One must be someone who is at least somewhatresponsive moralconsiderationsto be to someone who can reliablydiscernmoralconsiderations.Foraffect,it turs out, is crucial to moral knowledge, and in two independent ways. First,given our human epistemic limitations, caringfor recognizablymoral ends is crucial to being attentive to the morallysalient details of the situationswe face. This is an importantpoint in its own right.Foreven if the ideal epistemicstance turns out to be a dispassionateone, we will not make the (oddly common) fallacyof taking features of the ideal as direct guides to what we should strive for. (Sometimesgetting bettermeanscultivatingpreciselythose featuresnot found in the ideal.) Second, possessingappropriate affect turnsout to be a necessary precondition for seeing the moral landscape.This need not render morality some poor second cousin to science, for affect may be revealing of truth.

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NOTES Portions of this essay were presented to the philosophy department at Virginia Commonwealth University and to the Kennedy Institute of Ethics at Georgetown for I University.I wouldlike to thankthe participants helpfulandlivelydiscussions. would also like to thank Tom Beauchamp,Alisa Carse,Jon Faust, Gene Mills, and Kayley Vemallisfor their helpfulcommentson earlierdrafts. 1. See, for instance,Lugones(1987), Jaggar (1989), Walker(1992). Here, as often, workexplicitly labeledfeministfindsfriendlyparallelswith workby the neo-Aristotelians.See Nussbaum(1990), Sherman(1989), McDowell(1978). Affect'srole in scientific investigation is a popular,though less well developed thesis in feminist philosophyof science:see, for instance,Keller(1982), Rose (1983). 2. Throughoutthis essay,I use the term "affect" a generic label for desiresand as carriesthe connotation of emotions. It is a somewhatmisleadinglabel, because"affect" feelings,and I mean it to includedesiresand motivationalpropensitiesthat arenot felt. 3. Indeed, it is often difficultto separateout which thesis is being advancedwithin a given philosopher'sviews. Philosopherswho discuss the issue in depressingfashion include:Aristotle, Politics,1252a ff., Generation Animals,1.20 and 2.3; Rousseau,part of 5 of Emile; on and Kant, sec. 3 of Observations theFeeling theBeautiful Sublime; of Hegel, women's Philosophy theRight.(An excellent articleon Aristotle'sargumentregarding of is irrationality Spelman[1983]). Earlyand eloquentdefenseof women'sequalrationality is found in Mary Wollstonecraft,Vindication the Rightsof Woman,but of course of does not challenge the genderednatureof the reasonshe is so eagerto Wollstonecraft attributeto women. 4. Thus, for instance,in settingout to providea unifiedmethodfordiscerningtruth, the Descartes'injunction to transcendthe particular, parochial,and the perspectival quickly translatedinto an injunction to transcendinclination, emotion, and desire. Interestingly,it is the connection to body that seems operative here. According to Descartes,affect is associatedwith the body,and the corporealalwaysconfuses(indeed, he thought emotions were simply confused beliefs). (See especially his Discourseon and Method The Passions theSoul.) of Kant,we all know,had a tremendous generalsuspicionof emotion and inclination:he regardedaffect as squarelyon the side of the empirical, the determined, and the which waswhyhe believedthat affectcouldnot formthe paradigmatically psychological, properimpetus for moral action. This is not to say he left no moral role for affect: Herman(1985) have taken pains to emphasizethe role of neo-Kantianssuch as Barbara in Kant'slater work,The Doctrine Virtue(see for instance p. 126). But my of sympathy own readingof his text is that, even wherehe does concede a roleforaffect in morallife, motivationwhen it is only the role of helping us respondand act as we should(supplying of the motive of dutyfails us), not helping us to discernwhat moralityrequires us in the firstplace: that epistemologicalprojectis still the sacrosanctdomain of reason.Forthe rich I record, mightaddthat, while I findthe recentworkof neo-Kantians and interesting, I do think it is importantto recordwhereKanthimself,as well as the Kantof traditional as fails or role interpretation, to acknowledge to highlightsomethingas important affect's in moral epistemology.As feminists have often pointed out, what is not said or not in emphasized a traditionis as telling as what it advancesand underscores. Hume presents perhaps the most interesting case. As a member of the Scottish Enlightenment-as a Moral Sense theorist-he of course regarded passionsand senti-

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is to ment as indispensable moraljudgment.The argument, familiarly, that reasonalone cannot yield moralverdicts,forsuchverdictsmove us to act, and reasonitself is impotent on this score. Hume thus receiveshigh marksfrommanyfeminists,for reasonturnsout to be the slave of the passionsin practicaldeliberations(see, for instance, Baier 1989). But in a very deep way,I think Hume'stheoryonly reinforcesthe traditionalview. It is determined ourpassions becausehe thinksthat moralverdictsareimportantly by precisely them as impossiblecandidatesfor truth (see the penultimatesection of that he regards this essay). According to Hume'sview, there are no moral truths. When we think we detect them, we are in fact simply readingoff what we ourselveshave put there-our sentimentsprojectedonto the worldas it reallyis. Affect, then, still has no role that we for in wouldcall epistemological any robustsenseof epistemology, it doesnot help usgain true belief or help us determinehow the worldis. Quite to the contrary,its presenceis claim to full epistemicrespectabilpreciselythat which contaminatesthe moralverdict's of ity (see A Treatise HumanNature,2.3.3 and 3.1.1). when I talk 5. Throughoutthis essay,I have helped myselfto the notion of "seeing" moraltruths.Lest that usageconjureworriesstemmingfrom its misuse of apprehending by ethical intuitionistsof previouscenturies,let me say I am not positing any sui generis that somethingis cruel facultyof moralperception.We explainourabilityto apprehend in the same way we explain our ability to apprehendthat something is a table; not by appealto any special sense organ,but by appealto a much morefamiliar"faculty"-the that Put capacityto applyconceptscorrectly. bluntly,we apprehend somethingfallsunder the classification"cruel"by attending to the details at hand and making a judgment (which is not to say it is an easy skill to exercise). Of course, a full theory of moral are epistemologywouldprovidean accountof how and when such judgments justified.I do not take myselfto have offeredany such account in this essay. this 6. My thanks to Gene Mills for suggesting example. who 7. The exampleis cited in Dancy (1993, 61); he attributesit to Roy Hattersley, shouldnot be fun." explained"slaughter 8. This is not to deny that moral propertiesare fixed by the nonmoral ("goodin making") properties a given situation.It is ratherto agreewith Aristotlethat thereare can no principlescodifyingthe myriadwaysin which nonmoralproperties fix the moral ones. Murdoch (1970) arguesthat we are tempted to insist that there must be such principlesin the offing,despitethe enormousvariationswe experiencein actualcasesof cruelty,kindness, obligation, only out of anxiety at the complexity of the world.McDowell (1978) arguesthat the urgeto posit such principlesis born of misplacedloyalty to a falselynarrownotion of consistency:namely,one that counts us as "goingon in the same way"when applyingmoraltermsonly if the samenessof situationscan be seen at the nonmorallevel.

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