EUROPEAN STUDIES

INTENSIVE PROGRAMME
Georg-August-Universitt Gttingen,
Germany 2011

EUROPE: SPACE FOR
TRANSCULTURAL EXISTENCE?


Student Name: Silvia Mosneaga
Home University: University oI Deusto
Host University: University oI Deusto
Sub-theme: Internal and external European trans-border relations
Title of Paper: Building a more attractive Europe: the Blue Card experience
Abstract: In search oI a comprehensive approach to legal immigration, in 2009 the European
Union (EU) introduced the Blue Card a horizontal directive establishing a single permit and
a single procedure Ior immigrants Irom third countries willing to work in the EU. In this
respect, this paper will mainly analyse to what extent the implementation oI the Blue Card
Directive makes EU attractive Ior highly qualiIied migrants. Considering the challenges the
EU Iaces in attracting highly skilled proIessionals to its member states, this essay will also
estimate whether the introduction oI the Blue Card could possibly solve the demographic
problems resulting Irom the ageing population. Thereupon, the paper will assess the eIIects
that the Blue Card directive could have on national labour markets. Taking into account the
distinctive European demographics, labour markets or the particular domestic labour capacity,
Germany and Spain will be considered as case studies. Based on the results oI this analysis,
this study will then determine whether the Blue Card is indeed a response to the EU
prospective.
Keywords: highly skilled immigrants, Blue Card, EU, Spain, Germany

2
Contents

1. Introduction..................................................................................................................... 3
2. The Blue Card: main Ieatures and Iunctionalities............................................................. 4
3. Immigration policy construction cycle ............................................................................. 5
3.1. National process oI HSI policy making .................................................................... 6
4. European immigration policy challenges ....................................................................... 10
4.1. European HSI policy approaches ............................................................................ 11
5. HSI developments and improvements at national and international level ....................... 12
5.1. Spain HSI policy developments and improvements ................................................ 13
5.2. German HSI policy developments and improvements ............................................. 13
5.3. Competitiveness oI the European Blue Card in comparison with the United States
Green Card ....................................................................................................................... 14
6. Critical approach toward the Iuture oI the Blue Card and the existing HSI policies ........ 15
7. Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 16
8. ReIerence List ............................................................................................................... 19

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Introduction
Demographic projections show that by 2060 the European Union`s (EU) active population
1
will decline whereas the retired numbers oI people will increase. The share oI people aged 65
years or over in the total EU population is projected to increase Irom 17.1 to 30.0 . And
the number oI 65 year olds is projected to rise Irom 84.6 million in 2008 to 151.5 million in
2060 (Eurostat 2008). This trend poses a real danger to the economic productivity oI the EU,
especially because the ratio oI working population Ior every EU citizen aged 65 years or over
is expected to drop to 2 to 1 (Muenz 2007, 1-3). The negative eIIects oI this phenomenon are
addressed in diIIerent proposals and strategies at European and national levels. One oI the
approaches considered at this stage is that immigrants could compensate the gap in the active
population and the recession in the work Iorce. ThereIore, the possibility Ior the EU to tackle
labour Iorce shortages and to boost the economy by attracting highly skilled workers Irom
outside has been discussed since 2005 (EurActiv 2009). The same tendencies on the labour
market are reported by a number oI researchers Irom the Institute Ior the Study oI Labour
Irom Germany (Zimmermann and Kahanec 2010, 1).
This paper will analyse the Blue Card a horizontal directive establishing a single permit
and procedure Ior high skilled immigrants Irom third countries applying Ior work in the EU.
The main objective is to examine to what extent the implementation oI the Blue Card
directive makes EU more attractive Ior highly qualiIied migrants. It is the contention oI this
paper that the diversity oI EU national labour markets and distinct national immigration
policies limit the eIIectiveness oI the EU Blue Card. First, this essay will introduce the main
Ieatures and Iunctionalities oI the Blue Card directive. The third section will present the
theoretical Iramework which underpins the immigration policy construction cycle at national
level. The Iourth section will examine the main challenges that this policy sector Iaces
presently in Europe with a particular Iocus on HSI approaches. The IiIth section will look at
the highly skilled immigrants` policies oI Spain and Germany and discuss developments and
improvements at the respective national levels including the progress in the Blue Card
implementation. In order to assess the competitiveness oI the Blue Card system in a broader
context, the European model will be compared to the United States Green Card scheme.
Finally, this essay will present a critical approach towards the Blue Card system with regard
to the existing HSI policies in the EU. The Conclusions will summarise the main Iindings oI
this paper.


1
Population oI working age (15-64 years old)
4
The Blue Card: main features and functionalities
Attracting highly skilled migrants is seen by the EU as a measure to improve its international
competitiveness. As Vice-President Franco Frattini, the Commissioner responsible Ior
Freedom, Security and Justice stated: 'We want Europe to become at least as attractive as
Iavourite migration destinations such as Australia, Canada and the USA (IP/07/1575 2007).
The Iigures presented by him show that 55 oI the United States (US) immigrants are highly
qualiIied (engineers, technicians and ICT specialists), whereas in the EU only 5 oI
immigrants are highly skilled and other 85 have limited qualiIications (EurActiv 2009).
Translating these Iigures in percentage oI the total employed population, the highly qualiIied
workers in EU constitute 1.72, in Australia 9.9, Canada 7.3 and US 3.2
(MEMO/07/423 2007). Based on these statistical data, it can be concluded that the EU has
recently experienced diIIiculties in attracting skilled Ioreign workers.
ThereIore, in an attempt to gain more competitiveness and attract highly skilled workers
Irom third-countries, aIter a long process oI negotiation and elaboration, the EU Council
adopted the European Blue Card system in May 2009. The legal Iramework is set under the
Directive 2009/50/EC clariIying the conditions oI entry and residence oI third-country
nationals Ior the purposes oI highly qualiIied employment (EUR-Lex 2009). The Directive
aims at Iacilitating work conditions and authorizations Ior highly skilled proIessionals Irom
non-EU countries in order to improve EU`s ability oI attracting highly qualiIied labour Iorce.
Another goal oI the Blue Card project is to reduce the existing diIIerences between the laws
and practices oI the 27 member states
2
. Thus, the Blue Card system was developed in
compliance with the objectives oI the Lisbon Strategy and does not replace the existing EU
member states immigration systems. In Iact, it represents a horizontal approach to a new
common process oI receiving highly qualiIied proIessionals Irom third countries. Bearing in
mind the necessity to tackle the challenges oI demographics, labour markets and economic
realities, the signatory states have to implement by 19
th
oI June 2011 individual systems Ior
qualiIying the applicants and issuing the Blue Cards consistent with EU Council`s guidance
and policies.
The Blue Card Iacilitates several aspects Ior migrant applicants. The main Ieature oI the
Blue Card is that qualiIied migrants Irom outside the EU have the right to work and reside in
an EU country Ior a period between 1 and 4 years (decided individually by each member
state), aIter which the Ioreign national may apply Ior a new Blue Card, in the same or another
member state. During the Iirst period oI admission, 18 months consecutively, the highly

2
Nonetheless, Denmark, the United Kingdom and Ireland opted out.
5
skilled proIessional is limited to work in the country that issued the Blue Card (Europa 2009).
Furthermore, the Blue Card project Ioresees simple admission and application procedures
both Ior the migrant and the employer. In addition, Iamily reuniIication and the right to work
Ior spouses are Iundamental elements granted through the above mentioned Directive.
With regard to the eligibility criteria, the Blue Card applicant needs to present plenty oI
documents beIorehand such as: a valid work contract or a binding job oIIer oI at least one
year in one oI the EU member state; a document attesting legal requirements oI the contract in
case oI regulated proIessions, or establishing the relevant higher proIessional qualiIications in
case oI unregulated proIessions; a valid travel document as determined by national law, and
prooI oI health insurance. Concerning the salary threshold, the Directive respects the
competences oI the member states and sets a wage oI 'at least 1.5 times the average gross
annual salary in the Member State concerned (EUR-Lex 2009). For certain proIessions,
member states may reduce the salary threshold to 1.2 times. In line with these requirements,
Blue Card holders and their Iamily members should enjoy equal treatment in terms oI
working conditions, social security, pensions, recognition oI diplomas, access to services, etc.
Nonetheless, the same Directive stipulates that in order to respect the Community
preIerence principle member states have to maintain control on the qualiIication proIile and
the number oI Ioreign nationals entering their labour markets. On the one hand, it is a
'mechanism Ior improving labour market eIIiciency, preventing skill shortages and oIIsetting
regional imbalances (Directive 2009/50/EC, 15); on the other hand, it gives preIerence to the
new 2004 and 2007 member states workers over the third-country nationals. This is to say that
the Directive enables the EU countries to decide based on their own labour market
circumstance whom the priority is given to: national workers, EU citizens or third-country
nationals who are already residents or wish to become long-term residents (EUR-Lex 2003).
The EU estimates that while medical and technical proIessionals will be particularly sought
aIter Ior the Blue Card program, a number oI proIessions Irom other Iields will be in demand
as well.

Immigration policy construction cycle
In order to veriIy the hypothesis put Iorward by this paper, and namely that EU national
labour markets are diverse and distinct in their immigration policies approaches and
outcomes, I build on the theoretical Iramework developed by Lucie Cerna in 'The Varieties oI
High-Skilled Immigration Policies: Sectoral Coalitions and Outcomes in Advanced Industrial
Countries (Cerna 2007). Applied to the European context, one notices that on one hand the
6
EU institutions try to identiIy and tackle common challenges among the member states.
However, on the other hand, the 27 member states have distinct preIerences as to highly
skilled immigrants in the labour markets along with diIIerent Iactors that inIluence the
immigration policy outcomes. This model was developed based on some speciIic members oI
the Organisation Ior Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
3
; however it is also
applicable to the EU
4
. In order to demonstrate that inside the whole Union there are distinct
approaches in developing immigration policies, it is suIIicient to show that at least some
countries have diIIerent outputs. Furthermore, due to the unanimity rule oI voting in the
Council oI the EU and the diIIerent degrees oI inIluence exerted by diIIerent players in the
policy making process, this section will Iurther elaborate on the above theoretical Iramework
in order to determine how HSI policies are developed and what Iactors inIluence their
contents both at national and European levels.
This paper proceeds Irom the assumption that interactions occur in the EU at two levels:
national and supranational (EU level). On the national stage each government enacts separate
immigration policies; at the Union level, each government wants to inIluence and bring Iorth
its own input. ThereIore, when it comes to deciding on a common immigration procedure at
the supra-national level, the process oI achieving unanimity is gruelling and burdensome. This
explains, in the case oI this paper, why the approval oI the Blue Card has been a long and
diIIuse process.

National process of HSI policy making
According to Cerna, there is a continuing divergence among countries` policies that target
HSI (Cerna 2010). Subsequently, considering that although all EU countries have common
goals and opt Ior liberalised policies, not all oI them are equally transparent due to their
internal preIerence and priorities. To put it diIIerently, the policy-making process at the
national level represents a controversy that implies convergent goals with divergent
immigration policy developments.
For these reasons, I concur with Cerna`s aIIirmation: 'No consistent HSI position oI leIt
and right parties exists cross-nationally because oI diIIerent coalitions between groups oI
high-skilled labour, low-skilled labour and capital take place (Cerna 2007, 2). ThereIore, she
builds the theoretical Iramework oI varying HSI policy outcomes based on diIIerent types oI
coalitions oI these actors, but also on the distinct preIerences they have. ThereIore, she

3
Namely: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States
4
The analysed countries are among the main global highly skilled immigration players.
7
designs a schema which is Iully applicable to the hypothesis oI this essay maintaining that EU
national labour markets are diverse and distinct in their immigration policies (Figure 1).
Figure 1: HSI causal schema

Source: Cerna, Lucie, 'The Varieties oI High-Skilled Immigration Policies: Sectoral
Coalitions and Outcomes in Advanced Industrial Countries, 2007, p. 4
In the above schema, under the section 'PreIerences, Cerna presents in Iact Iour groups
that emerge at individual level, which she later simpliIies and reduces to three: native high-
skilled workers, native low-skilled workers, high-skilled industries and low-skilled industries.
The preIerences oI these participants are determined by the political-economic organization
and institutions governing their political participation. ThereIore, she argues, these
'PreIerences (i.e. personal wants and desires oI political actors), when interacting with
'Institutions (i.e. Iormal and inIormal rules), lead to speciIic outcomes with regard to HSI
policies.
Accordingly, she argues that native high-skilled workers oppose more open HSI policies
due to labour market competition. As a result, the native group oI labour would lose in
competition with the immigrants, by accepting lower wages and/or Iacing unemployment.
Consequently, groups oI low-skilled workers are more willing and pro-HSI, as they can
beneIit oI greater 'productivity and wages through increased demand Ior labour services
(Chiswick in Cerna 2007, 7). Regarding the high-skilled industries and low-skilled industries,
the author groups them under the same capital sector (named 'Capital in the presented chart),
which constitute owners and employers that are more or less in Iavour oI the HSI
liberalization, as in both groups they beneIit Irom lower wages, greater proIit and sustainable
production growth. Such a presentation oI actors and their preIerences on a national labour
market has a very wide application. ThereIore, this model can be adapted to any EU national
labour market.
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As a next step, Cerna asserts that coalitions occur between these groups oI interests inside
a domestic labour market. The author presents three pairs oI coalitions between the above-
mentioned groups (native high-skilled (HS) labour, native low-skilled (LS), and labour and
capital) with six winning possibilities that predict six possible HSI policy responses (Table 1).
Depending on the strength oI the coalition towards the third actor, two HSI outcomes are
anticipated.
Table 1: Political coalitions and HSI outcomes
Coalition line-up Winner Predicted HSI outcome
Pair A:
1) HS Labour LS Labour
vs. Capital
2) HS Labour LS Labour
vs. Capital

HS Labour LS Labour

Capital

Restrictive

Open
Pair B:
1) HS Labour Capital vs.
LS Labour
2) HS Labour Capital vs.
LS Labour

HS Labour Capital

LS Labour

Restrictive

Open
Pair C:
1) LS Labour Capital vs.
HS Labour
2) LS Labour Capital vs.
HS Labour

LS Labour Capital

HS Labour

Open

Restrictive
Source: Cerna, Lucie, 'The Varieties oI High-Skilled Immigration Policies: Sectoral
Coalitions and Outcomes in Advanced Industrial Countries, 2007, p. 8
The Iirst pair is representing the combination oI high and low skilled labour Iorces against
the capital. II HS Labour and LS Labour make concessions or common agreements, Ior
example supporting each other Ior higher wages, then, in a speciIic country, a restricted
policy outcome can be predicted. On the contrary, a more open policy towards HSI is sought
in case the capital wins, due to Iavourable beneIits both owners and employers have Irom
HSI. In this respect, a relevant example can be seen in the case oI Sweden, which until 2006
was mainly protecting its domestic high-skilled workers with no speciIic policy towards HSI.
However, with the change oI the government, the new 2008 Immigration Law 'liberalised
immigration policy and made it more employer-driven (Cerna 2009, 3). The case oI Sweden
is also relevant as an example oI political inIluence on the coalition shiIt.
The second pair is embodying the high-skilled labour and capital coalition opposing the
low-skilled labour. II this coalition emerges to win, then HSI policies are expected to be
restrictive. This can occur iI a compromise is reached between these groups, Ior instance
when native high-skilled workers agree to accept lower wages in return Ior less open HSI.
9
Instead, a more open HSI policy outcome is predicted iI native low-skilled labour comes out
as a winner. The case oI Denmark could be relevant Ior describing the HS Labour and Capital
success on the labour market, where the high-skilled workers were demanding the
government not to lower their wages and to give preIerential treatment to Danish unemployed
specialists. Also, Danish government agencies give advantage to the proIessionals already
residing in the country over Ioreign immigrants (Zimmermann and Kahanec 2010, 7).
The third pair is exempliIying the coalition oI low-skilled labour and capital that can lead
to more open policy outcomes. In this equation, both parts can beneIit Irom HSI and this can
be oIten seen in practice. However, due to the labour market competition, the native high-
skilled workers also have the possibility to succeed. As an example oI the succeeding
coalition between low-skilled labour and the capital, United Kingdom (UK) can be named as
one oI the Iew countries with the most open programmes and policies Ior attracting high-
skilled immigrants (Cerna 2009, 7). AIter revision oI its immigration scheme in 2008, the UK
introduced a target system Ior Iive groups. The Iirst two categories are endeavouring high
skilled immigrants, entrepreneurs, investors, and graduate students who have job oIIers in the
UK (UK Border Agency). Such an immigration policy output demonstrates the coalition
strength oI low-skilled labour and capital in a speciIic country.
Furthermore, according to Cerna`s theory, these national actors build coalitions in order to
compete Ior political inIluence. ThereIore, the 'PreIerences interact with another set oI
determinants oI the policies outcome, called 'Institutions, which comprise labour market
organisation and the electoral system. In the interaction process, the labour market
organisations, represented by unions and employers` associations, are targeting speciIic
coalitions in order to gain authority in the policy-making process. For this reason, in some
countries, unions or proIessional associations rather than political parties are interested in the
representation oI native, high-skilled workers (e.g. Scandinavia) (Cerna 2010, 10). However,
in other countries, preIerences diIIer and hence are directly linked to the political interest and
representation (e.g. Sweden, Germany) (Cerna 2010, 10). To sum up, depending on a speciIic
country, national labour actors interact more in response to labour market organisations or
political parties and thereIore achieve diIIerent policy outputs Ior high skilled immigrants.
I argue that the described theoretical Iramework has a cross-national application and
thereIore can explain the distinct immigration policies approaches and outcomes. Each
country has its own domestic coalition on the labour market; labour market organisation and
political interests also change Irom one entity to another. All these disparities at national
levels can be translated successIully at the European level. The theoretical model can also be
10
related to the Blue Card Directive, which provides EU member states with common
regulations and provisions to interest Ioreign high skilled immigrants in working in the EU.
However, because oI the earlier described policy approaches and consequences that vary Irom
country to country, I consider that the implementation process resulting in a joint European
policy will have dissimilar shapes` and Ieatures, regulated internally on the behalI oI the
sovereign state.
The EU reached prosperous agreements in terms oI economic cooperation; nevertheless,
when it comes to immigration, one can notice that member states are reluctant to cede their
sovereignty over social or political matters. I argue that besides their will to control such
matters, this also happens because oI the distinct internal composition oI actors, institutions`
strength (e.g. associations, unions) and political parties` inIluence. These Iindings, based on
the discussed Cerna Iramework, concur with the hypothesis and support the idea that EU
national labour markets are diverse and distinct in their immigration policies approaches and
outcomes.

European immigration policy challenges
This section maps out the current challenges to the European immigration policy sector. In
order to quantiIy the analysis, I will use data Irom the Institute Ior the Study oI Labour (IZA)
Expert Survey on High-Skilled Labour Immigration in the EU held in 2009. This survey is
relevant to this research because it comprises data on possible inIlow tendencies and
perceptions oI high and low skilled immigrants in Europe, based on IZA expert opinions
(Irom a total oI 545 Iellows, 182 answered all the questions) (Zimmermann and Kahanec
2010).
Firstly, it appears important to address high and low immigration issues in connection with
the current economic situation. Overall in the media it is oIten reported and assumed that due
to the economic crisis the need Ior immigrants will decrease. ThereIore, in search oI pro`s or
con`s, it is imperative to take into account experts` data. Analysing experts` responses
regarding their long-term expectations toward immigrants` labour Iorce in the EU, 85.5
consider that the crisis will not change the need Ior immigrant labour. Moreover, 87.3 claim
that European labour markets need at least as many immigrants as now, whereas 56.6
suggest an even higher number (Zimmermann and Kahanec 2010, 3). This is to say that the
EU should consider immigrants as an essential part oI their Iuture economic welIare.
Considering the previous assumptions that high skilled labour Iorce impacts more
positively economic productivity, it is necessary to consider at this stage what the
11
expectations Irom the immigrant labour Iorce are. 78.6 oI the experts surveyed by IZA
Institute Ioresee a growth in low skilled immigrants` inIlows. I believe that this assumption
can be developed Iurther. As long as there is no economic stability and saIety, no unique
diploma recognition system or language barriers persist even at country level (e.g. bi-, multi-
lingual European countries), then most immigrants, both low and high skilled, will be more
inclined to turn their proIile Irom a high to a low skilled one. ThereIore one could anticipate
the gaps and weaknesses the European immigration policy has Irom the perspective oI an
immigrant.
Building on the theoretical approach discussed above, this paper has shown how and why
policies outputs may vary in diIIerent countries. Here the Iocus is on the overall progress oI
immigration policies and the importance oI having more open and immigrant-oriented
policies at national and European level. Many scholars argue that European countries rather
hold back their immigration policies and thereIore markets are aIIected by labour shortages.
Looking back at the data Irom the survey, only 39.6 oI the respondents believe that national
EU immigration policies impede the access oI third countries high skilled workers, whereas
65.2 consider the same Ior the low skilled immigrants. Consequently, Irom these Iigures, it
can be concluded that 'current immigration policies help to reduce the aIorementioned
mismatch between the supply and demand Ior high- and low-skilled labour in the EU
(Zimmermann and Kahanec 2010, 4).
Another relevant Iinding is that the respondent experts agreed that both national and
European levels were essential when implementing immigration policies. However, only a
small percentage considered the national level to be addressed primarily Ior this issue. This
Iinding suggests that the EU level is the Iirst stage where supranational immigration policies
start to harmonise with the national ones. Furthermore, the data Irom the Eurobarometer 2008
show that 63 oI the EU citizens consider that decision-making on the migration and asylum
policies should occur at supranational level (Eurobarometer 2008, 3-4).

European HSI policy approaches
Until recently, the media and political discourse perceived immigration as intimidating Ior the
European integrity. In particular, not much importance has been given to the speciIic group oI
highly skilled immigrants, which are considered among scholars as economic immigrants.
Nowadays, as a consequence oI the economic crisis and the demographic decline represented
by an increasing ageing population, economic immigration became a priority and many
countries started to revise their domestic immigration policies in order to resolve speciIic
12
labour market shortages. ThereIore, EU member states responded to this need by opening
their internal labour markets, albeit not all oI them (e.g. Romania and Bulgaria are still
outside` the Iree movement oI workers zone). The positive developments oI the enlargement
related to labour markets are clearly stated in the European Commission Directorate General
Ior Economic and Financial AIIairs Communication COM(2009) 79 report: 'The enlargement
has opened, Ior enterprises in the old member states, new markets Ior exports and Ioreign
investment. It has oIIered them opportunities to increase their eIIiciency and competitiveness
(COM(2009) 79 report 2009, 5). Later member states started to revise immigration policies at
national level Ior third countries immigrants, whereas at the European level it was agreed on a
common Community preIerence principle. When analysing the member states policies`
approaches towards third country nationals, several restrictions can be spotted.
Transitional arrangements limited the EU 10 labour Iorce to the old` member states (2004
enlargement countries) until May 2010 and are still restricting the EU 2 countries (2007
enlargement countries) until 2014 (BBC 2009). In other words, the competition to access the
EU 15 labour market is now bigger, especially Ior the highly skilled immigrants. The
comparison with the US labour market reveals other unattractive restraining Iactors in the EU:
no single communication language, strongly to moderate diIIerentiated cultural patterns,
diverse labour legislations. The listed diIIerences are applicable also to immigrants. One
could also add other administrative procedures impeding Iree circulation Ior labour migrants.
For example, in case oI third-country migrants Iurther restrictions apply, such as transIer oI
social security beneIits or health insurance. Furthermore, the tax system and pension scheme
in each country is diIIerent and complex, both Ior EU and non-EU citizens. With regard to
diploma recognition, Ioreign highly skilled immigrants Iace particular diIIiculties because oI
the variable coding oI educational qualiIications. Also, reIerring to the Directive 2005/36/EC
on the recognition oI proIessional qualiIications, the related costs are high and the process is
time consuming (Directive 2005/36/EC).

HSI developments and improvements at national and international level
This section adds an empirical layer to the research by examining two case studies oI Spain
and Germany. This analysis Iocuses on HSI policy developments and improvements at
national levels. These countries have been selected on the grounds oI diIIerent migration
patterns: one Irom Southern Europe and the other Irom the Nordic corpus. Moreover, Spain
presents a good case study due to the Iact that it used to be an emigrant country which later
emerged into one oI the most attractive countries Ior a big number oI low-skilled workers.
13
Germany, instead, aIter World War II, has always been a popular host country Ior immigrants.
Its immigration policies were revised twice during the last decade (in 2005 and 2009) and
during the discussions on the approval oI the Blue Card, Germany insisted on restricting the
HSI Ior the Iirst 18 months to one country. ThereIore these two contrasting EU countries
present good grounds Ior comparison oI the success oI their HSI policies. The Iindings and
reIlection oI this comparison will also be transposed with regard to the Blue Card Directive.

Spain HSI policy developments and improvements
In 2005 Spain legalised 700.000 illegal immigrants. This decision was highly debated at the
European level (BBC 2005). Nonetheless, the general work permit procedure in Spain
Iunctions in two ways. Either the immigrant has a Spanish employer with an 'oIIer oI
employment or a home employer hosted by a Spanish company. To be eligible Ior the
second case, the worker should be remunerated Irom the home country. The work permit
validity in the Iirst case is up to three years maximum, whereas in the second case it can be
Ior a maximum oI nine months (MTIN 2011). With respect to high skilled workers, there was
no direct mentioning oI the category in Spanish immigration policies. Still, there are speciIic
provisions applicable to certain categories oI workers (e.g. researchers, academics, etc.), as
well as a list oI in-demand jobs (Spain Expat 2010). With regard to social security, the period
oI registration with the Spanish authorities is one month. Spain is one oI the EU countries that
already incorporated the Blue Card Directive provision into its national law, but has not
started accepting applications yet. As a result, the social security registration period has been
extended to three months. Also, no more 'oIIer oI employment is required. Nonetheless,
with the introduction oI the Blue Card, a Iormal labour contract with the proposed salary is
required and it must be registered with a local employment oIIice (LexUniversal 2010).

German HSI policy developments and improvements
In 2005 and in 2009 Germany revised its Immigration Law and in both cases anticipated and
introduced separate provisions Ior the high skilled citizens oI the new EU members and their
Iamilies. Those citizens or Iamily members that hold a qualiIication diploma equivalent to the
German one 'do not need the consent oI Germany`s Federal Employment Agency to obtain a
work permit (Zimmermann and Kahanec 2010, 7). ThereIore, non-EU immigrants can
receive a work permit only iI there is a speciIic job position. However, priority to Germans,
EU citizens, citizens Irom EEA states will be given over high skilled immigrant Irom non-EU
countries (BMAS 2009). A temporary residence permit can lead to a permanent one aIter a
14
stay oI Iive years. The German legislation does not stipulate Iixed salaries, but Ioresees
language and culture integration courses Ior any immigrant (both EU and non-EU). Due to the
special provisions enacted by the Immigration Law Irom 2009, third countries nationals and
their Iamily members that hold university degrees and have jobs are allowed to work without
the consent oI the Federal Employment Agency. Other positive developments are also listed
in the law. In 2000, Germany also introduced an individual Green Card system to attract IT
specialists. However, because oI poor success, it was stopped.
By and large, the German immigration legislation liberalised and became more open
towards HSI. But, even iI Germany revised its immigration approach, statistics show that it
'did not seem to be the cause Ior an increase in the number oI high-skilled Ioreign immigrants
only 151 in 2007 and still just 157 in 2008 (SPW 2010). Analysing Iurther the German
case and recalling the theoretical Iramework provided at the beginning oI the paper, the case
study can be enriched with more details regarding its political stage and the high skilled
immigrants` policies. Germany is a country where on the national arena stronger and
prominent low skilled native labours and the capital are present (unions, employers`
organisations, etc.) (Cerna 2007, 18). The Iailure oI the Green Card program can be explained
by the Iear oI this coalition to get lower wages. Only as time passed, Iollowing a lot oI
debates between the political parties and many compromises, the new Law on Immigration
was adopted in 2009, a law which is more open toward HSI workers.
With regard to the Blue Card Directive, during the discussions leading to its adoption,
Germany insisted on restricting the HSI Ior the Iirst 18 months to a certain country. At the
beginning, Germany opposed and reIused the implementation oI the EU Commission project
aimed at highly skilled immigrants (Spiegel 2007). However, in August 2010 the German
Chancellor Angela Merkel rejected a proposal by two German cabinet oIIicials in Iavour oI
the Blue Card (EU Blue Card Immigration 2010). No Iurther inIormation is available
regarding the integration oI the Blue Card into the existing immigration system oI Germany.

Competitiveness of the European Blue Card in comparison with the United
States Green Card
The EU Blue Card policy is comparable to the US Green Card, the main European competitor
in attracting migrants. The table below shows the main convergent and divergent Ieatures oI
both systems.
Table 2: European Blue Card in comparison with the United States Green Card
Blue Card (EU) Green Card (US)
15
Does not give permanent residency. Gives holder permanent residency.
Valid up to Iour years, renewable. Valid Ior 10 years, renewable.
Allows holder and Iamily to live, work
and travel in the EU.
Allows holder and Iamily to live, work
and travel in the US.
Applicant must present:
a recognised diploma, and;
prooI oI at least three years oI
proIessional experience, and;
a one-year EU job contract with an
annual salary oI 1.5 times the average
gross annual salary.
Nevertheless, the Blue Card will be
attached to the individual, not the job.
Five channels to seek a card:
employment, or;
Iamily links, or;
a lottery, or;
investment, or;
resident since beIore 1972.
Permanent residency automatic aIter Iive
years.
Holders can become US citizens aIter Iive
years.
Source: EurActiv 2009
Analysing the table, one can see that the only common Ieature the two schemes share is the
possibility to renew the card. As Ior the rest, it might appear that the Blue Card is more
attractive Ior the holder`s Iamilies to live, work and travel in the EU. However, this is not
necessarily the case, as the US Green Card oIIers many more channels to seek a card, as well
as a longer validity period and a permanent residence with the possibility to become a US
citizen. For the most part, when comparing it to another internationally competitive system,
the value oI the EU model has decreased. According to E. Guild, the EU Blue Card will not
assure 'the security oI residence and access to the labour market that the US Green Card
does (Guild 2007, 4). Neither will it Iormulate 'a right oI entry Ior a labour migrant (Guild
2007, 4). In addition, proceeding Irom the Directive provisions, the migrant worker has access
solely to one EU Member State at a time. As a result, the mobility oI the worker is
geographically limited and oIIers Iewer job opportunities. ThereIore, the Blue Card
programme is less Ilexible and competitive with similar programmes, such as the US Green
Card, aimed at attracting highly skilled workers.

Critical approach toward the future of the Blue Card and the existing HSI
policies
When connecting the Blue Card Ieatures and Iunctionalities to a broader European HSI
immigration context, it can be observed that it oIIers some positive developments, such as the
right to permanent residence Ior highly skilled immigrants and their Iamily members. The
possibility Ior a third country national to move Irom one labour market to another aIter a
minimum oI 18 months can also be perceived as positive. Another positive element is the
16
equal treatment in terms oI working conditions, social security, pensions, recognition oI
diplomas, and access to services.
However, on the other hand, one needs to point out the impediments that could stop
immigrants Irom considering the Blue Card program attractive. Among them, some countries
might appear more attractive than others due to bigger salaries and more HSI job
opportunities (as shown in the case study oI Spain and Germany). Language barrier is also a
limitation; some countries are missing immigration integration programmes, a Iact which can
reIlect negatively on the success oI the Blue Card (reIer to the case oI Spain and Germany).
Besides, the Blue Card Directive does not oIIer a concrete deIinition Ior HSI, which might
result in some countries interpreting this proIile oI migrants in a diIIerent manner. Coupled
with these negative outcomes oI the programme, one could add also the Iact that each
country, in light oI the sovereignty principle, will determine its own need oI HSI inIlows and
set domestic labour preIerences over the HSI. Similarly, one could understand the Iirst 18
months period oI admission as limiting. The lack oI a common recognition Iramework Ior
qualiIications and skills together with the social security, health insurance, taxes and other
elements will still remain diIIerent among member states and as such will create restraints
with regard to third country nationals (EC 2011).
To sum up, the Blue Card can be considered as a good tool in order to reduce diIIerences at
the European level. However, it should be seen only as a system that oIIers a common process
that intends to attract highly skilled immigrants to the stringent job vacancies that EU member
states need to Iill in. Taking into consideration all the above mentioned constraints, the
application oI the system appears to be limited in scope and eIIectiveness.

Conclusion
Data on the current labour situation in the EU seem to suggest a lack oI highly qualiIied
proIessionals. To attract this segment oI labour Iorce, the EU developed an analogue oI the
American Green Card the Blue Card, a special work permit with a temporary residence
condition. One oI its main objectives is to create a common process regulating the entry and
residence oI third-country nationals Ior the purposes oI highly qualiIied employment. Taking
into consideration the distinctive European labour market preIerences and demands, the cross-
national theoretical Iramework showed in detail the immigration policy construction cycle,
with a special emphasis on the national process oI policy making. The theoretical Iramework
explains how and why distinct immigration policies approaches have certain outcomes on
national immigration policy. Examples oI coalitions that exist in some countries showed that
17
the disparities at national levels, translated at European level, also lead to diversiIication oI
policy results. Consequently the case studies oI Spain and Germany exempliIied contrasting
national immigration legislations and Blue Card approaches that have dissimilar shapes` and
Ieatures. The comparison with its US competitor the Green Card, and coupled with earlier
depicted attributes, revealed Iurther gaps and weaknesses oI the Blue Card limiting the
attractiveness oI the system as a whole.

Source: Personal elaboration
The chart above schematises the main conclusion oI this paper and namely that as long as
an EU policy area is dominated by distinct national interests and coalitions, its outputs will
vary Irom country to country. ThereIore, in the case oI the Blue Card, whenever the EU
launches an immigration procedure, each member will implement it in an individual way
inIluenced by the existing actors on the national stage. The same pattern can be seen in the
decision making at the EU level, where each state will try to push Iorward its distinctive
approach and interest, as it happened with the lengthy approval oI the Blue Card. In the end,
on account oI strong sovereignty willingness, EU member states agreed on a common
process, but with a minimal number oI harmonising and uniIying provisions. The underlying
hypothesis oI this essay holds true: the diversity oI EU national labour markets and distinct
18
national immigration policies limit the eIIectiveness oI the Blue Card. The individual member
states need more convergence oI their national immigration policies in order to provide a truly
attractive scheme Ior highly qualiIied workers. In the short and medium term, this does not
appear to be the case.

19
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