Allan Bloom on Alexander Kojve

EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

1968 \(i i, i

Queneau's collection of Kojdve's thoughts about Hegel constirutes one of the few important philosophical books of the twentieth cenrury-e book, knowledge of which is requisite to the full awerenessof our situation and to the grasp of the most modern perspective on the eternal questions of philosophy. A hostile critic has given an accurete assessmeint Koidve's influence: of Kojive is the unknown Superior whose dogma is revered, often unawares,by that important subdivisionof the "animal kingdom of the spirit" in the contemporary world-the progressivist intellectuals. In the years preceding the second world war in France, the transmissionwas effected by meansof oral initiation to a group of personswho in turn took the responsibiliry of insuucting others, and so on. It was only in 1947 that by the effors of Raymond Queneau, the classeson the Phenomenology of Spirit taught by Alexandre Kojive * the Ecole des Hautes Etudes from 1933-1939 were published under the title, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel. This teaching was prior to the philosophico-politicalspeculations of J. P. Sartre and M. Merleau-Ponry, ro the publication of les Ternps modernes and the new orientation of. Esprit, reviews which were the most important vehicles for the disseminationof progressivistideology in France after the liberation. From that time on we have breathed Kojdve's teaching with the air of the times. It is known that intellectual progressivism itself admits of a subdivision, since one ought to consider its two species,_Christiag (Esprit) and 4-ttreis! Qes Temps modernes); bur this distinction, for reasons that the initial doctrine enablesone to clarify, does not take on the importance of a schism. . . . M. Kojive is, so far as we know, the first . . . to have attempted ro constirure the intellectual and moral mdnaged trois oI Hegel, Marx and Heidegger which has since that time been such a great success. [Aim6 Patri, "Dialecdque du Maitre et de l'Bclave," Le Contrat Social,V, No. a (July-August 196r), 234.1
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Inlr'od.tccbrt

KojEve is the most thoughtful, the most learned,the most prowith the thinnes of \found of those Marxists who, dissatisfied eccount of the human and metaphysicalgrounds of his lMarx's iteaching,mrned to Hegel as the truly philosophic-source thet of teaching.Although he madeno effort at publicizing his reflections, the superior force of his interpretationsimposedthem willy-nilly on those who heard him. For this reason,anyone who wishesto understand sense that mixture of Marxism and Existentialism the of which characterizes contemporeryradicalismmust turn to Kofdve. From him one can learn both the implications and the necessary what the presuppositions historicist philosophy; he elaborates of world must be like if terms such as freedom, work, and creetivity are to have a rational content and be parts of a coherent undersanding. It would, then, behooveany follower of the new version of the left who wishes to think through the meaning of his own action to mrdy that thinker who is at its origin. However, Koidve is aboveall a philosopher-which, at the leest, meansthat he is primarily interestedin the truth, the comprehensive truth. His passionfor clariry is more powerful than his passion for changingthe world. The charm of political solutionsdoesnot accountof the him to forget the needto presentan adequate cause rational basisof thosesolutions,and this removeshim from the althose of ways distorted atmosphere active commitment. He despises who respond to the demandsof the contemPorary intellectuals withof audienceand give thC appearance philosophicseriousness which would bore that audience out raising the kinds of questions or be repugnant to it. A cenain senseof the inevitability of this the kind of ebuse---of conversionof philosophy into ideology-is, perhaps,at the root of his distastefor publication. His work has beencommunicated gnly !o beenprivate and has,in large meesure' is the careful and scholarly friends. And the core of that work snrdy of Hegel. Bicausene is a seriousman, Kojive hasnever sought to be original, and his originaliry hasconsisteilin his seaichfor the truth in the thought of wise men of the past. His interpretadon has made Hegel an important alternativeagaiq and showed how much we hai to learn from him at a timt when he seemedno longer of this revival of interest in Kojdve accomplished living significance. him relevant,but by showing Ueglt n-otby adaptinghim to make viii

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that contemporaryconcernsare bestunderstoodin the permanent Iight of Hegel's teaching.Kojdve's book is a model of textual inthat it is of tCrpretation;the book is suffusedwith the awereness such a thinker meent' pressing concern to 6nd out preciselywhat for he may well know much more than we do about the things is that we needto know. Here scholarship in rhe serviceof philosophy, and Kojdve givesus a glimpseof the power of great minds of business spending ,andrespectfor the humble and unfashionable t' yeeg studying an old book. His own teachingis but the distillation of more than six years devoted to nothing but reading a single book, line by line. INrnooucrtoN To rHE Rpeowc or Hocei- con'stitutes the most authoritative interpretation of Hegel. of Such a careful and comprehensive study which makessense Hegel'svery difficult textswill be of greatvalue in America where, though his influence has been great and is ever greater,very few peopleread, let alone understand,him. He has regularly been ignored by academic positivistswho are put off by his languageand are unawereof the problemsinvolved in their own understanding of scienceand the relation of scienceto the world of human con;ccrn. Hegel is now becomingpopular in literary and artistic circles, but in a superficial form adaptedto pleasedilettantesand other seekers after the senscof depth who wish to use him rather than understandhim. Koidve presentsHegel's teaching with a force and rigor which should counterpoise both tendencies. What distinguishes Koidve's treatment of Hegel is the recognition that for Hegel the primary concern is not the knowledge of anything outside himself-be it of nature or history-but knowledgeof himself,that is, knowledge of what the philosopheris and how he can know what he knows. The philosophermust be able of tt_glplg1 lir own doingp;an explanationof the heavens, animals, or of nonphilosophicmen which does not leave room for, or doesnot talk about, the philosopheris radically incompletebecauseit cennot eccount for the posibility of its own existence as knowledge. The world known by philosophy must be such that it supportsphilosophy and makesthe philosopherthe highest or { most complete khd of human being. Koilve learnedfrom Hegel that the philosopherseeksto know himself or to possess full self-consciousness, that, therefore, and thc tnrc philosophicendeavor a coherentexplanation all things is of
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that culminetes in the explenation of philosophy. The man who seeksany other form of knowledge, who cannot explain his own doings, cennot be called a philosopher. Discussionof the retionel $ate is only a corollary of the proof that the world can be known or is rational. Koilve insiststhat Hegel is the only man who succeededin making this proof, and his interpretation of the Phenomenology expandsand clarifies Hegel's assertionthat realiry is rational and henceiustifiesrationel discourse about it. According to Kojive, Hegel is the fulfillment of what Plato and Aristotle could i only pray for; he is the modern Aristotle who respondedto-or, I better, incorporated-the objectionsmade to Aristotelian philosoIn phy by modern natural rnd human science.Koilve intransigently uies to makeplausibleHegel's claim that he hed achievedabsolute / wisdom.He argues wisdom, that without the possibilityof absolute 1 or all knowledge,science, philosophy is impossible. "'\. to It may indeedbe doubted whether Koidve is fully persuasive the modern consciousnes,particularly since he fnds himself compelled to abandon Hegel's philosophy of nature as indefensible that Heidegger'smeditationon being may provide a and sugEesa substimrc for it. The ablndoned philosophy of nature may well suPPoftfor Hegel's human,historicalteachbe e necesaiji Cosmic ing. One might ask whether Koidve is not really-somewherebettJ"en Hegel and Heidegger,but it should be addedthat Kofdve himself leadsthe readerto this question'which is a proper theme of philosophical reflection. Koilve describesthe charecter of wisdom evenlf he doesnot Proveit hasbeenactualized. Now, the most striking feature of Koive's thought is his insistence-fully lustifed-that for Hegel, and for all followers of that -nothing really new can again ffegel, history is complet-ed, utterly i. the world. To most of us, such a position seems Iffi p"t"do*i""I and wildly implausible.But Koidve easily shows the for ineluctablenecessityof this consequence anyone who understandshuman life to be historically determined,for anyone who that thought is relative to time-that is, for most modern believes '\-' men. For if thought is historical, it is only at the end of history , \that this fact can-beknown; there can only be knowledge if histhe meaningof this tory et some point stops.Koidve elaborates throughout the courseof the book and attemPts logical necessity to indicate how a sensiblemrn could eccePt it and interpret the
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with it. It is preciselyMam's failure to thinki world in accordence through the meaning of his own historical thought that_provesI his philosophicalinadequacyand cornpelsus to turn to the Pro- I founder Hegel. i If concreie historical reality is all that the human mind can know, if there is no-tg1lgl![lgnt intelligible world, then, for there to be philosophy or-science,realiry must have become rational. by The Hegeliarsolution, accepted Koiive, is that this hasindeed and that the enunciationof the universal,rational princi-l happened plesof the rights of man in the French Revolution marked the be-l g"nni"g of thi end of history. Thereafter,thesearethe only accept-l able, viable principles of the state.The dtgnity of man has been and all men are understoodto participatein it; all that recognized, remainsto do is, et most, to realize the state grounded on these can principlesall over the world; no antithesis underminethis synIn which containswithin itself all the valid possibilities. this thesis, perspectiveKojve interprets our situation; he paints a powerful picture of our problemses thoseof post-historicalman with none of the classictasks of history to perform, living in a universal, state where there is vimral egreementon all the homogeneous \ politics, and religion. He charfundamenta!principles of science, the acterizes life of the man who is free. who hasno work, who has to no worlds to conquer,states found, gods to revere,or truths to \# h , discover.In so doing, Koidve gives an exampleof what it means to follow out the necesiry of one's position manfully and philosophically.If Koldve is wrong, if his world doesnot correspondto the real one, vr'elearn at leastthat either one must abandonreason -and this includesall science-or one must abandonhistoricism. but less intrensigent writers would not More common-sensical the essential outlines of teach us nearly so much. Koidve presents historicalthought; and,to repeet,historicalthought, in one foim or another,is at the root of almostall modern human science. It is concerningthe characterization man at the end of history of that one of the most inuigui"g C$ggl$s in Kojdve's teaching arises. is only to be expected,his honesty and clarity lead him As to posethe difficulty himself. If Hegel is right that history fulfills of the demands reason,the citizen of the finel state should enloy of human aspirations; should be he the satisfaction all reasonable r free, rational being, content with his situation and exercising all

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of his powerq emencipatedfrom thc bonds of prciudicc md opprcssion. But looking around us, Koidvc, like every other pcnetrating observer, seesthar thc completion of the human task may very wcll coincidewith the decayof humaniry,the rebarbarizrtion or even reanimalizationof man. He addresses problcm pefticuthis in the note on Japanaddedto the secondedition (pp. rrg,l*ly I 16z). After reading it, one wonders whether the citizcn of the \univenal homogeneousstate is not identicel to Nietzsche's Last lMan, and whether Hegel's historicismdoes not by an inevitable -*orc ''dialectic force us to a somber and more radical historicism which reiects rcason.We are led to a confrontation berweenHegel end Nieusche and perhaps,even funher, toward a reconsideration of the classicdphilosophy of Plato and Arl*otle, who rciectcd historicism before the fact and whom Hegel believed he had zurpased. It is the speciel merit of Koilve to bc one of the very few srre guides to the contempladon of the fundamental alternatives.
ALLIIN BLOOM

Itbaca, Ne,utYotk

[Shonly after the completion of this $atement I learncd that Alcxandrc Koilve had died in Bmsels in May, 1968.1