Angseop Lee

To what extent are ethical theories helpful when considering the issues surrounding homosexuality? Of what help might ethical theories be, with regard to issues of homosexuality? Before one can provide an answer to this question, however, one must first consider what the word help may mean in such a question. Might providing a view be a possible interpretation? But if one were to define help with this criterion, then mere opinion would suffice, in which case ethics and opinion become indistinguishable. So, the distinction between the two has to be intact in our definition of help if one is to make the question above meaningful. But what, then, is the distinction? It is, of course, exactly that which characterises the fundamental difference between the twonamely, a theoretical grounding, which is absent in opinion, but is fundamental to ethics. In fact, one might even claim, rightly, that the entirety of ethics is indeed founded on this task to provide a theory, from which one might derive justified actions, as opposed to subjective, purely-opinionated ones. Hence ethical theories. With this definition in mind, let us now turn to homosexuality. Historically, the word homosexuality has been associated with iniquitous acts, such as promiscuity and lust, and it is this synonymy that has resulted, arguably, in the transformation of homosexual behaviour into an issue, or even a social pathology. But to what extent does this characterisation hold? If pathology is to be associated with the concept of abnormality, then, insofar as homosexuality is seen as the opposite of the norm of heterosexuality, homosexuality becomes a deviation from that norm, given the notion of normality is defined in relation to a certain teleology, as in the natural law tradition. In such a case, homosexuality has to be accounted for by a disorder in naturethe subjects active subversion of the natural orderwhich is motivated by lust (which is, paradoxically, an excess of nature, insofar as lust is driven by our bodily instincts).1 By failing to infer the order in nature from its material and phenomenal representations, the homosexual becomes a symbol for hedonism, someone who cannot look beyond the immediate, earthly pleasures to a higher, divine and spiritual fulfilment in the Kingdom. By this view, homosexuality becomes a negative influence upon humanity, insofar as the purpose of humanity is such a fulfilment. As such, it could also be considered a vice, in virtue ethics, as it hinders oneself and others from achieving the eudaimonia qua telos in nature. Given that Gods Creation is purposive and therefore that sexual intercourse aims at an end, namely reproduction, then a homosexual is someone who fails to see this divine purpose and thus succumbs to the materiality of the body. But this approach is not without its faults. The main problem is its confusion between two categories of fact and value. It appeals to objectively verifiable facts, namely that homosexual intercourse cannot result in reproduction, but then ascribes them subjective values, namely that one ought to follow the natural order, which cannot be objectively verified. Another problem is that it fails to acknowledge the material aspect of heterosexual intercourse. Given that our biology is structured for heterosexual behaviour, and if we assume that attraction to the opposite sex is biologically determined, by mechanisms of the human body, then is not the succumbing to heterosexual attraction as material and lustful as homosexuality is characterised to be? If we take Augustines claim to be true, that men and women can never have a true friendship in our state of fallenness, then is not engaging in heterosexual behaviour an embracement of the fallen state of humanity? In this sense, then, might not homosexuality be considered superior, in that it overcomes our biology, in a way that no other animal could?

One should note that nature of lust is nature in the sense of materiality, than of order. Whether these two senses are different aspects of the same nature, or referring to two distinct concepts which are merely homonymous, I shall have to answer that what follows assumes the former.
1

Angseop Lee

From this perspective, homosexuality, contrary to its previous characterisation, seems not to be entirely grounded in materiality and biology, but rather to have a unique dimension which cannot be wholly accounted for in nature. A radical interpretation might be that it looks not to the materiality of the other, but rather to the beyond of materialitythat is, rationalityof the other. It is an expression of human freedom and the human capacity to establish relationships based on rationality than materiality. In this way, could not homosexuality be an expression of the Kantian ideal of the Kingdom of Ends, insofar as the relationship has an aspect which cannot be assimilated into mere inclination? Similarly, could it not be a virtue, by the practising of which one may be able to achieve the eudaimonia qua telos in rationalitythe Enlightenment ideal? However, even if homosexuality were thus reconsidered, its practical application would prove problematic if it is not accompanied by the delimitation of the conditions upon which homosexuality may be practiced in society. For freedom to flourish, it must be accompanied by its opposite since, to ensure that ones freedom is not violated by anothers freedom, the extent of ones freedom in the social sphere must be restricted. In other words, freedom must, paradoxically, be limited for it to be definable within the constitution of a certain society. Freedom cannot except its own definition. Therefore, even if one accepts the above Kantian twist of homosexuality, it must be supplemented by a theory of application in order for it to function in society. This is where utilitarianism is of considerable help in its formulation of the harm principle, which states that one is free to do whatever one wishes except in cases when the said freedom might restrict anothers freedom. In fact, a parallel can be drawn between the harm principle and Kants distinction of the public and private uses of reason, outlined in his article What is Enlightenment?2when in public, one should, for the sake of the welfare of the society as a whole, approach matters with a certain criticism and suspicion, by means of our faculty of reason so espoused by the Enlightenment, or, in Kants own words, use reason as a man of learning addressing the entire reading public, so that the state could re-adjust the its governance according to the rationallyassessed views of its citizens, on whom the envisioned changes would have the most immediate effect; in contrast, when in private, one must obey! the given rules in whatever situation. But note that this is not a mere physical distinctionprivate could well be outside ones home. Kant gives the example of the clergyman teaching the doctrines of the Church to his congregation privately as a clergyman, but also offering considered thought on the mistaken aspects of those doctrines publicly as a scholar, for the sake of the betterment of the arrangement of religious and ecclesiastical affairs. Therefore, the parallel aforementioned lies in the fact that Kantian split of duties could be said to correspond to the delimitation of freedom in the utilitarian harm principle since, for Kant, the two uses should not be conflated. That is, if the private use of reason limits the capacity of the public use of reason, then paternalism is justified so that the public use may prevail. This, I hold to be analogous to the harm principle. To conclude: as the above examination has shown, the use of ethical theories, and the comparison between them, allows one to reveal the logic behind the problematisation of homosexuality into an social issue, to reassess that logic, and also to determine the conditions for the application of those theories in the social sphere. These are all done within the framework of rational investigation, as opposed to popular opinion. I consider these as sufficient grounds for considering ethical theories, if not in general then at least for the ones mentioned in this essay, as helpful. (1,357 words)

Immanuel Kant, An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment? in From Modernism to Postmodernism: An Anthology, ed. Lawrence E. Cahoone (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), pp. 45-48.
2