=..

C9253
CHrEF OF FIELD FORCES
Fort Lionroe, Virginia
,;"TTNG-64 350.05/34(roCI)(C)(28 Dec .51)
28 J)ccember 19.51
SUBJECT: ___
ARMY WAR COLLEGE
PERIODICALS SECTION
i .....
l.::i::f
TO: See di stri utionFEB 28 1952
,
COPY .... I.......... ARMY WAR COLLEGE
1. In accordance ,-r!th SR 525-8.5-5, Processing of Combat Infor
mation, tho attached are fo:n7arded to Departr.:ent of the ;.m.y,
rield Forces the Schools for evaluation and necessar,y
action. It may be appropriate, in certain cases, for these agencies
to take action upon a single extracted item; in others, it may be
desirable to develop a cross-section of accumulated extracts on a
particular subject before initiating action; and often, the extracted
item serves to reaffirm our doctrines and techniques.
{"---....__._..-.....
2. Copies of Dissemination of Combat Information are forwarded,
"lei. th DepartOent of the .",:rr;ry approval, to information addressees for use
at the headquarters of the installation or activity concerned to keep
them informed concerning theatre from front line through the
logistical copmand.
3. The.se EXTR.:.CTS are derived fron reports TIhich arc classified
SECRET. For the greater con,venience of the user, this Office downgrades
each tb_'thelo.west .cla,6sification conpatible I';ith security.
No effort is made to paraphrase or delete any portion of the extracted
remarks, so that none of the original intent is lost.
4. Generally, the EXTR._CTS ,mch pertain to training appear under
the, claSSification of For COLlbat information of training
value at the Company-Batte.ry level, addressees are referred to ;.rrrry
Field Forces 'l'RiJNING BULLETINS, which are also published under the
RESTRICTED.
FOR THE CHIEF OF ;JUC{ FIELD FORCES:
. DECLASSIFIED BY OF
g;:O .a2 :ON
dij17'l/d!tw
.1 i:' t
1';. H.
racS"",!'Om,eo .. II. , ...
Lt Col, AGC
209 thru n8'
;
Asst .\djutant General
i
f
DISTRI13U'flQN:
l

UNCLASSIFIED
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UNCLASSIFIED .. '1'111 "
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Action Addressees
Deartment of the Army
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AOOFS, G-2, Intel
ACOFS, G-3, Opn
ACOFS, a-4, Log
CCMLO
COFENGRS
00FORD
COFPSYWAR
CSlGO
COFT
h1:S
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sa
TAG
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t
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l.FF Board No 1
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UNCLASSIFIED

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ESSE"'; sa .:.: =
BEWETc'" ....
UNCLASSIFIED
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Information ;... ddressees
EUCOM
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FEOOM


US..mC.iJUB
Office, Chief of A:mf Field Forces
Inspector Secretar1at
G3(64)
::..G Records
Extra Copies
Commanding General!3
First 1-.rrrry
Second :.rrrry
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Supt, :'Vest Point, NY
T.:.C, Langley AFB, Va
Chief, ..i.rrrry :...dvisory Gp, :lir Comd & Staff Sch, .:"ir Univ,
Max\'mll 11-FB, .<aa
Comdt, US.."..F I.ir --Ground Sch, Southern Pines, NC
Comdt, Counter-Intelligenoe Corps Sch, Fort Holabird,
Baltimore 19J Md
UNCLASSIFIED
... a.m y",.."., MP

'--------------- -_._----- _ ..
e.a.3iSt2
.UNCLASSIFIED
C 925')
"-
OFFICEr. CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES
Fort Monroe p Virginia
EXTRACTS OF COMBAT INFORMATION

DATE;
Command Report - 25th In! Div
March 1951 Source No. 209
TACTICAL DECEPTION
To further this secrecy and deception, a cover plan was put
into effect five (5) in advance of the actual crossing. This
plan provided for the two (2) front line Regiments holding the main
line to make a reconnaissance each morning to the
river crossing sites and nth-ocr sites along'the river. This was
carried out constantly each and at first drew considerable
fire from the enemy. As it _$ continued each day, the enemy
became accustomed to these "Morning patrols" and ceased fire on
them. Thus, when the morning for the assault crossing arrived,
the same movement was initiated toward the river bank. But this
time the assault boats were brought forward hitched to tanks.
It is believed that this COVGr plan contributed materially to the
surprise achieved during crossing. (CONFIDENTIAL)

INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS
In compliance 'with an Eighth Amy T'l.JX, a survey on "Inadequacy
of the Carbine and Pistol, caliber 45, in Combat" was conducted
vdthin three (3) Infantry Regiments and Tank Battalion. The
following comments were submitted:
1. Carbine
a. One company indicated that the carbine was too light
and was inadequate, as.it does not have sufficient
stopping. power.
b. All units agreed that the weapon unsatisfactory
due to malfunction when moving parts became dirty and when used in
cold weather.
c. One regiment commented that the carbine was inaccurate
when fired at ranges CJVer two hundred (200) . yards, and that
INC
(Over)
sum
UNCLASSIFIED
..... dC="; ae QUW
l)cAFF Fori'm"No 73
.... ..
!Revised i5 OC11:51) .
190'" II' . itil smur_
UNCLASSIFIED - :5ECRET ...
supply creates a problem. because the type of magazine
used is not available for replacement as are clips and bandoliers
for the weapons.
2. ,. P:Lstol, caliber
a. One regiment indicated the pistol to be adequate
for the purpose for which it was intended, as a defensive weapon
for close-in fighting.
b. Two (2) regiments indicated that the pistol 'Vras too
heavy and too complicated for field maintenance. Oue of these
two (2) regiments recommended that the carbine and pistol be
replaced with a light sub-machine gun. (RESTRIC'I':W) ,
SOURCE: Command Report - 23d Inf Regt
May 1951 Source No. 210 DATE:
INFANTRY }fATERIEL lDSSES
Operations during the "Battle of the SOYANG" presented a
tremendous supply problem. Vehicles used in supply transport
were kept mobile-loaded 'within the battalion perimeters. The
tactical situation resulted in a large scale enemy road block
being established to the rear of two (2) ivhich denied
the use of the MSR as an avenue of wi thdravra1.This resulted in
complete loss of seventy two (72) quarter ton, sixteen (16)
three-quarter ton and fourteen' (14) tvro and a half ton vehicles
wi th numerous quarter ahd.' one ton trailers. These vehicles
carried the organic loads, kitchens, P&A equipment, communications
equipment, battalion ammuni tion etc, to include tyro (2)
full platoons of 4.2 mortars. This costly operation clearly
indicates the necessity for logistical operation from a regimental
trains area established ....lithin reasonable supply radius in roar
of regimental soctor. (COnFIDENTIAL)
UNCLASSIFIED
OCAFF Form "!tec:r: PI hOi ".i1l r tV"
. (Revised 15 Oct . )

"'--'-->.._----
saDlm rijfr,ZiiI:,
SiM'6MW1ia
UNCLASSIFIED
SOURCE:
DAT.8:
Connnand Report - Hq 8th US Army Korea (EUSAK)
Sec II: Supporting Documents
Book 8: Artillery
May 1951 Source No. 211
ARTILLERY Y.ATERIEL LOSSES
The combat losses of artillc17 pieces duo to dircct enemy
action have reached a total of 408 for all calibers. As has
happened in previous the enemy infiltrated to the roar
of the artillery positions and pIeced a fire block on each side
of the road, making it impossible for tho artillery to move its
vehicles and weapons through the road. The loss by US Artillery
uni ts has been 212 weapons and by Korean Army units 196 weapons.
(C'ONFIDENTIAL)
**********
HIGH ANGLE FIRE
The percentages of high-angle missions of the various type
uni ts are q.s follows:
1. D:i.vision Artillery
1st Marino Division
105-mm 14.5%
1.(-1
15S-mm 1 .4,:0
7th Div Arty
lOS-nun
lSS-mm 2.0;s
2d Div Arty
lOS-mm
ISS-rom
1st Cav Div Arty
lo5-rom
155-mm
UNCLASSIFIED 3
.1.1111 Fiii! Db J
OCAFF Form No 73
SEt"ZfI
(Revised 15 Oct 51)
sfIMi,,: ; tt3' om: 2_
..
UNCLASSIFIED
24th Di v Arty
1% of all missions to 31 Dec 50.
8% of all missions from 1 Jan 51 to 28 Apr 51.
25th Div Arty
of all missions.
3d Div Arty
5% of all missions
2. Non-Divisional Units
17th FA Bn (8" H TD) 0%
955th FA Bn (155 H TD) 0%
936th FA Bn (lS5 H TD) 0%
96th FA Bn(155 H TD) 10%
196th FA Bn (155 H TD) 0%
3. All SP units 0%
OOMMENT: Except for 24th "Div Arty, source does not give
period from vmich above percentages are taken. {RESTRICTED):
**********
The M-37 is extremely difficult to keep operational and
there are insufficient replacement parts on hand. Further, it
is not the proper equipment for a direct support battalion of
an infantry division. The troop basis proposod by EUSAK to
CINCFE recommends reorganizing the 58th FA Bn into a105-mm
Hovdtzer Battalion (towed). (CONFIDENTIAL)
**********
TRACK LAYING VEHICLES
1. Recommend that twelve (12) 2t ton trucks be authorized
in lieu of t',-mlve (12) M44 vehicles utility, armored, for each
self. propelled 105-mm and l55-nun unit. Conditions under w'hich
SP battalions operate in Korea make 2t ton truck a better
vehicle for carrying ammunition. .An importC'.nt factor is the
great distance to ASP's.
bCAFF Form Nc '}
(Revised 15 Oct :>1)
,..--- -,.-_.-------------_.
r
UNCLASSIFIED

" .. \
, , r',
2. Recommend tbe.. 1st !FA Observation.. ;Battalipn be .'
authorized eight (B)f'our (4) ton cargo trucks'm lieu of .
nineteen (19)-"M$ '?actors. " "The 1st FA Observation Battalion has .
seyen (7) radar sets 'and (7) generators. One 4 ton t:nMk
. ..:.. ean--be-tt"3'ed ,,f""'bwo...(2-l,.M5.. as"tn.,-gene ... - ... ... ,..,
.. be: placed on the truck and the radar sets .mch ar.e on tra;i1ers
Can be tOl".rcd by the truck. The M5 tractor has proven unsatis
",factpry, an? wheeled have proyed more. suitable. over
the terrain' encountered 'in Korea.' " .,
...\., ... "",' "
3. Recommend l55-mm gun battalions SP, be authorized
twenty-four. (24) 2t top trucks and twenty-four (24) MlO trailers
in lieu of thirteen (13) Me' tractors. There are no MB tractors .
available. units are equWped.with M4 .tractors (authorized.
substitutEl for' MB tractors), ;:1re unsatisfactory as " .
ammunition resupply vehicles primarily because they will not
.. hauls to -ASP's 'over the poor . .,.: ."'''"
,- . rof-ds. ( ...
,.. ..
----------..
I '
. eonimand Report .. -14th Engr -6 'Bn-' SOURCE:
DATE: April 1951
I.

OOMMUNICATIONS
'." ,
In adqiiion to the -lack of trained radio operators and.:", .
repaimen,the. communication sistem has continua1:1.y hamP'ered'
by the teITain and' the cti.spositions of.. .' '.
the companies far beyond the capabilities. of'the presontly
authorized SCR 694.. It is felt that ih the SCR 694
should be repiaeed'''by-::t;;he SCR 193 for the Engineer Combat Troops.
( OONFIDENTIAL) '.
OOURCE:
.: '". .. " . .
" .......
DATE: 1951

: ,'" ..

. '. 1"
..
A fully armored persohhel cab-i.er is ne:eded that"
can go anywhere" ';dth tanks. The laCk of' o'V'Grhead protection on
I:JNCLASSIFIED 5
oc:,)'jo f'.rM Ne 73 ( 1 ...........
" - - ". ..... "':;'-,." r
15 Oct 51)
....."'. livP',,;'
UNCLASSIFIED 6 '
-
-
the half tracks TFCommander to leave his diS
mounted elements behind sinde' theY. were unable to run the
, Also, the need for
armored infant-rv l.n . .,." ....._ ,_"
,1,"",,',;"/.1<,,-,., '.,. ,-' " .... whereorganiz:ed enemy
positiQns must be bypassed atJ3Ored
4
ihf.an1;'fY,
armored engineers and azmorad artillery. If any of the components
of the team are then armored results cannot be fully
obtained. .... ..
. . r .i!.f.... ,'-; ,it"". ,.' ,. ............. .... .' ....... ,. .. ,". .
**********
" ,
AP'iDR TACTICS'
, .,
. This action alsodemonstra:ted the ability of armored forces,
roving:deep inthe rear of eS'tablished;enemy defense11nes, to
surprise and terrorize ,the Such actions are tt'avot'ed py
the fact that the enemy'hq;svery limited warning (communication)
to employ armor, regardless of
how'small the.. scale, should, be sought and exploited. Even
plp.toon. .. Qf tanks, acm.eves .outstanding. ..res'Ul.ts.
"The enemy, in every engagement where armor has been employed
accordingto doctrine, has been demoralized.' (RESTRICTED)
... ' " .. .,. '.'_ Jo.'
Februart 1951 Source No. 214
.,' Keeping the COlIlbiltt6am
1
.1f vehicles movingo'Ver marginal
roads ( whert! on4) stalled vehicle means a blocked MSR) would be"
facilitated if a 4' ton wrecker 'were aVa'ilable in the regimental,
combat team. (RESTRICTED) .
Command Report - Hq 8th US Army Korea . , SOURCE:
May 1951 . -Source No. 215 DATE:
..
AMMUNITION stlPPLY ,"
,
.
AmnUflition situation remained critical... The 155;..mm )-'
HowitZer ammunition (60,000 rounds) was being off-loaded at
Pusan. The Gainesville Victor,y vms not selectively loaded.
UNCLASSIFIED
OCAFF- Form No
.-...1..
(Revised 15 Oct 51)

1
a A_In, S2 UtE'
a "MZr ....
UNCLASSIFIED
Propellent charges 'V19re the first to be off-loaded. The pro
jectiles 'were at the bottom of the ship and couldn't be off
loaded at the srune time. As a result the charges were sent
forward to Taegu, to be held there until the projectiles were
off-loaded. Then.oamplete trains were made up and fOT\varded.
This caused a rail which lasted for approximately fifteen
(15) days. (ltFSTRIOTED)
Command Report - Hq 8th Us Arrrr:r Korea (EUSAK)
DATE: March 1951 Source No. 216
ARTILLERY pEFEllSE
Artillery battalions in Korea have p:raven to be a primary
target for enemy troops. Present do not authorize
sufficient automatic for adequate defense; Therefore,
it is recol11l1lended that twelve (12) machine guns and twelve (12)
Browning Automatic Rifles be issued to each field artillery
battalion above T/OM!. allowances. (CONFIDENTIAL)
**********
HIGH ANGLE FIRE
Carriages motor M7 and M37 are not capable of high angle
fire. Maximum elevations that can be fired are '33 and 45 degrees
respectively.
Because of the rugged terrain encountered in Korea, these
weapons, with their limited maximum elevations, introduce
considerable dead space in the close support role. This aggravates
the already difficult problem of finding sui table gun positions.
It is recommended that a program for the modification of
carriages motor M7 and M37, so as to penni t high angle fire, be
initiated at an early date and that this program be given a
high priority. (RESTRIC'lED)
. \."
UNCLASSIFIED
7
OCAFF Form No 73
-'
'7
(Revised 15 Oct 51)
2 7
G56 T '6i'PMsc
fl
,

I UNCLASSIFIED 8
1 _-.,_----.,------------..:::-.-----------------
1
I

SOURCE: Comnand Report - 555th FA Bn
January 1951 Source No. 217 DATE:
TECHNIQUE
In this withdrawal, the artillery was first displaced to
temporary positions from which they could support the ltathdraml.
A battalion of infantry was sent to secure these
positions. Under cover of artiller,y fire a battalion of
Infantry, regimental combat team headquarters and the separate
company units were \v.ithdrawn from the line, leaVing one battalion
to hold. As this second group passed the artillery temporary
positions, they were joined by the artiller,f battalion (-) and
the battalion of infantry securing the positions. One battery
was left to support the battalion still holding the line. When
this. last battalion withdrew, the battery of artillery supporting
it pulled out with them to, the newly established friendly lines.
( OONFIDENTIAL)
-----------+-----------------------------------------------------------------
Command Report - 1st Cav Dav SOURCE:
February 1951 Source No. 218 DATE:
NIGHT Am SUPPORT
,
5th Cavalry Reeent, A previously arranged bombing mission,
composed of one illU1lll..nation plane and t'wo (2) B-2p bombers,
struck Check Points 50 and 51 at 0325 hours. These points re
ceived a total of eight (8) napalm and sixteen (16) 250 lb
fragmentation bombs, in addition to strafing by .50 cal machine
guns. Civilians interrogated from the area reported between
300 and 400 CCF troops killed or wounded as a result of the
bombardment. (REST1UCTED)
**********
roMMUNICATION
During the period the 2d Battalion, adjusting defensive
fire on the flank, delivered mortar fire into the 1st Battalion
-which was still on the move. The firing had been cleared by
the Battalion Cormnanders concerned. However, last minute
UNCLASSIFIED
OCAFF Form No
- S"f'C'TX "'SmMU6W
......
(Revised 15 Oct. I
r ..15: VCYEJi
fiV_' ))JJ 'tS: L
UNCLASSIFIED iEl AZB__.._
clearances were not obtained. The basic fault lay in insufficient
lateral communication. Greater emphasis must be placed on
lateral communication; radio in a moving situatior.. and radio and
wire when units halt for an appreciable time. (RESTRICTED)
**********
G.ASOLINE OONSU'"fPTI011 FAC'IOR
.
Close conformity to the consumption factor guide for Korea
on POL consumption is being maintained. The consumption quantity
for gasoline on. the number of gallons per man per day for this
Division ,-;as 1.22 gallons 1dri.ch conforms c1osel..v to the 1.25
gallons per man per day as indicated in the tables published by
the Japan area Petroleum Office. (CONTIDENTIjJ.)

SOURCE: Command Report - I US Corps
DATE: February 1951 Source No. 219
VT FUZE FOR EIGHT INCH SHELIS
The use of VT (proximity) fuzes in lo5-rom and l55-Im'il shells
proved SO successful that it "Tas desired to use the fuzes in
8-inch shells and British 25-pound shells. the cavity
in these shells yrould not accont.lo:btcthe desired fuze. The task
of providing tools to cavitize the 8-inch and 25-pound shells l'TaS
given to 538th Ordnance J4tJvI Company. Al though this \7ClS a new
type of operation for the maintenance personnel, they manufactured
an auger that "\rould do the job. The operation vms very success
ful on the 8-inch shell but the British 25-pounder did not react
too well with the VT fuze. (SIWRET)
SOURCE: Command Report - Section I - Part 4 EUSAK
DATE: March 1951 Source No. 220
REPLA.CEEENTS
Matching the stepped-up quantity was an improvenent in the
quality of replacements. from combat units indicated
that those recently received from the Zone of the Interior were
better trained and both phYsically and mentally better suited
OCAFF Form No 73 UNCLASSIFIED )4e:".
(Revised 15 Oct 51) .. ifi"".iI".r.I!lfii"'-"""",-_
UNCLASSIFIED
10
for combat than the ones the Arrrr:r had been supplied with in
the latter part of 1950 and early 1951, when most of the incoming
replacements had brought directly out of the Enlisted
Reserve Corps and basic training camps. (RESTRICTED)
1-----+-----------------"--------------
SOURCE: Commapd Report - Section I: Narrative
Hq 8th US Army Korea
Th\TE: June 1951 Source No. 221

CATIONS
It is recotnended that the present T/O&E of an Battalion
be revievled to give consideration to authPrizinrs a radio set
AN/GRG-9 for each platODo. It is also recommended that each
platoon be authorized a radio set SCR 609 for use at platoon
level as net control station for vehicular sets in motor patrols.
(RESTRI CTED)
Command Report - Section II: Supporting DocUf.lents
Book It Office of the CG,
SOURCE:
June 1951 Source No. 222 DA.TEz
AIR SUPPORT PROCEDURES
,
1. I Corps Staff Officers complained that .\ir-Force-operated
1-19 type Mosquitos were not permitted to reconnoiter for suitable
targets as the AT-6 type formerly did. This result.ed in the 1-19
Mosquito, on ground standby, missing several targets and, on
occasiQn, arriving at previously located targets later than the
jet planes it wes supposeci to direct. The nembers of I Corps
Staff preferred the fonner method of mosquito operation, i.e.,
the Mosquito cruising the front looking for targets of opportunity
and standing by (in the air) for targets to be pointed out to
it. It was then immediately available to direct air strikes.
2. I Corps Staff "agreed that the basing of the Uosquito
pilots on strips in the operating area ,was a sound idea, but
suggested that personnel, as well as M.r Force personnel,
were capable of controJ.ling air strikes frOlil 1-19 planes.
(RESTRI CTED)
.1
,..---
'.
.-J;=7i<. _..
UNCLASSIFIED
.. -----------------
S'>URCE: Command Report - 780th Bn
.. 1951 . source No. 223 .:: ... :::- .... DATE:
,', ',' ::.1,
:. " '.
.. .. ).
VEHICLES .
, .
.,
Maintenance of equipment llas been excellent. One inherent
failure of the torque converter radiator on the 144 Tractors has
caused considerable maintenance difficulties and loss of use of
the tractors. Delayiri receiving 7i-ton ammunition trucks has
. hampered training of drivers and ammuriitionsections. Request
is being made for specialpintJ.es for the7t-ton trucks to enable
them to be used as alternate prime movers for the Hoi7it,zer.
(CONfIDENTIn) . oJ
**********
, Present A-Frames and Hoists on the back of the 7Jr-ton truck .
are too slow and tiresome for. loading and unloading a=inch shells.
Recommend that. a study be .made with a view of providing a quicker
and more efficient method 1OadiJl8....... IfIael.J..jntIC, qt
those trucks. (OONPIDENTIiJ.) .
; .
.. ;:Recommend that the T/O&E be changed to. ]).:-4
b1,1lldozer per Howitzer battery, based on the fact that the' size.
of the gun pit for. 8-inch Howitzer weUld make it difficult
for 'one bulldozer to d1gtvielvEt
...., .
.The T/O&E .does not authorize ar)Y
..
...-- ..
.....',
'. . ..
........
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.......... tt .... -........--
Command Report -, lOth F.t'.. Bn SOURCE:
DATE: January 19.51 . '. Source No. ??4
...
. ."l
UNIT PERSlNNEL'SECTIONS
. ,.
: .! "
present, the personnel section is over two 'hUndred (200)
miles away from its parent unit. matter required
in a normal dayt s operatipn is not available. Securing infor
mation of this nature entails a delay of from six (6) to seven (7)
UNCLASSIFIED 11
OCAFF Form No 73
t!!.!SiMI:!'
(Revised 15 Oct 51)
L_____________________
----

UNCLASSIFIED ..
12

,
days. Some personrtelproblema can1'lot be BQlved at all, or only
.. on other i,ndividuals that normally
would not have be'eft :involved. It is therefore recommended that
,ynit with seI"'{ice units of the
commands concerned, and divorced from the rear echelon of division
. (RESTRICTED) .
j.
SOURCE:

-'
Command Report' .2d' Engr' CBn ...
May 19S.l Source No. 225
IUNES
l.. distinct need was sh01'ln in' the defensive and counteroffensive
action for' a better system for' disseminating present minefield
doctrine. The principal arm with friendly antipersonnel
minefields is tl\e infantry. It is recommended, therefore, that
minefield doctrine be published in anini'antry .field manual of the
"7"series. (RESTRICTED)
* * * * . * * *-* * *
SUPPLY OF MU.TES
In the defensive operation, considerable confusion resulted
because of the prevalent opinion that the engineers, avowed
..
specialists in the installation of activated antitank and antipersonnel
mines, were also responsible for the supply of mines for all defensive
installations of the diYision. (RFSTRICTlD)
.**********
AID,DRED PEROONNEL C1"JmIERS
.".. was shO'\'1!l for armored personnel carriers to transport
engineer personnel through enemy road blocks of small anllS and mortar
. f?-;!,e .in: ,t.o friendly thrusts. The ,
bulk of the casualties of the 2d Engineer Battalion occurrod. 'ftb.an
engineer' elements accompanying friendly' armor-infantry thrusts in
the counteroffensive were caught by enemy fire, on the road and in
trucks. (CDNPIIRNTL..L)
UNCLASSIFIED
OCAFF Form No
(l:evised 15 Oct 51, __

r'----
UNCLASSIFIED
SOURCE:
DAm:
SOURCE:
J1."..TE:
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OCAFF Form No 73
(Revised 15 Oct 51)

Command Report - l38th i-Ju't Gp
May 1951 Source No. 226
, .
USE OF SlDKE IN DEFENSE
.,.
1. The use of,chemical smcke as a passive defense measure
is limited. . .
.2. The use of smoke precludes utiliZation of antia;ircraft
automatic weapons in smoked areas, and decreases the efficiency
of antiaircraft gun batteries. (BDTRI01'.ID)
Command Report - 24th In! Div
.d.pril 19,51 Source No. 227
'"'lOW B,:illB
.
It is recommended that two (2) each tov" bars be issued each
platoon of a tank unit equipped "vi th M-46 type tanks, as tn;is
tank cannot be towed ,.r.tth cables when the engine fails.
(REsTRICTED) . ' , , .. ," . ." ,
**********
OOMl1UNIc..:.TIONS
The complete reliance' upon telephones'or 1.N/GRC-9 radios
for contact between various units w.i.thin the Division has proved
This,' combined with the delay caused in receipt of
messages through a central message center, is often a great .
hindrance. It is reoommended that all General Staff sections be
furnished vehicles in which radio set SCR 193 can be mounted,
and that radio sets similar to those in an armored division be
adopted. This would enable- more positive control at ;times,
especially during movement, and would make for much greater, ",
flexibility in establishing command (RESTRICTED)
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UNCLASSIFIED 13
UNCLASSIFIED
EXOlL'iNGE
Recommend that quotas for the direct exchange of new or
vehicles, bet'leen division ordnance units and
..\I'II\V ordnance vehicular pools, be stepped up to reduce the heavy
in the combat units caused b.Y complete wear' out.
(RESTRI CTEn) .
**********
It is suggested that "Weasel-type" Vlire laying vehicles,
issued on a basis of tiro (2) for each headquarters battery and
one toeach.firing battery, 1'1Quld be of inestimable value in
carrying out the complex wiring problem of artillery units.
(RESTRI CTIID)
SOURCE: .'Command Report - 82d .. ..'.oW Bn (sp)
May 1951 Source 'No. 228
, . TIONS
1. That live (5) power telephones (TP-9) be 'issued over
and above authorized T/Q&E for utilization in battery CP1s and
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operations sections. "
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2. That all 11-161 s be equipped ".lith armor plate gunners'
shields.
, 3. 'Searehllght companies used on battlefield illumination
missions should be to CO'rps :Artillery.
That Mark IX Sight on M-16
1
s be replaced b.Y the Reflex
Sight M-18. .
.. ' ..
5. . That an antiaircraftordriance company provide support for
." ... .. ..... .. ---.... '. ," maintenance .ofremo,te control syst.em o! the H-19 and all
devices.
i.' '.'
,'.
.,
UNCLASSIFIED
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OCAFF .Form No
(Revised 15 Oct 51,