Matthew Swire, Malcolm Ordone and Madeline Bordelon Oil Refinery

BP at Texas City

The Accident Itself; Step by Step According to the Popular Mechanics Website

Computerized records from the control system equipment indicate pressure inside the production tower rose rapidly from 20 psi to 60 psi (Figure #1). This triggered three pressure-relief valves to open for 6 minutes. (Figure #2) These six minutes were enough time to allow the discharging of enough fuel into the blow down drum to overwhelm the system (Figure #3). All of the spilt over oil couldnt be recycled back through the refinery quickly enough, forcing liquid and vapors up the 120-ft. stack (Figures #4 and #5). As fuel oozed out to the ground, it ignited in a blast strong enough to rip the roof off one of the benzene storage tanks 300 yards away. Investigators discovered that a 6-in. drain leading to the plant sewer had been chained open (Figure #6). Fumes traveling under the refinery may have fueled one of what is believed to have been five explosions at the Texas City Oil Refinery. Blow down drums are a common feature at refineries, as are towers used to release evaporating gases. Most tower vents, however, include a flare system--a sort of pilot light that ignites potentially hazardous vapors as they funnel out. The fire that triggered the explosions was the result of overflowing oil and gas making contact with a contractors truck engine as it was running-

Texas City knows industrial facilities and their dangers. Often referred to as "Toxic City," it is home to four chemical plants and three major refineries. The sprawling BP complex in Texas City is the third largest of about 150 petroleum refineries nationwide. In the weeks following the accident, BP's operations came under intense scrutiny from the media and peoples opinions. Eventually, the facts came out about BPs nasty track record pertaining to the upkeep of its facilities. The managing staff and BP Corp were warned multiple times of the Texas City Oil Refinerys substandard safety conditions and of its dangerous practices. Most efforts were futile considering that none of the facilities problems had been fixed. The meltdown and the consequent explosions were just waiting to occur. It was inevitable for the 180 injuries and the 14 deaths to happen when all procedures were violated every day. BP was fined 50 million before the accident and another 87 million in its aftermath. Within twenty minutes of the explosions, the police force had to declare a no fly zone with a 3-mile radius to prevent any more accidents from the immense amounts of smoke and ash in the air. The BP Texas City Refinery Explosion could have been easily prevented without the loss and injury of so many people.