RepublicofthePhilippines SUPREMECOURT Manila ENBANC G.R.No.L26278August4,1927 LEONSIBAL,plaintiffappellant, vs. EMILIANOJ.VALDEZETAL.,defendants. EMILIANOJ.VALDEZ,appellee. J.E.Blancoforappellant. FelixB.BautistaandSantosandBenitezforappellee. JOHNSON,J.: TheactionwascommencedintheCourtofFirstInstanceoftheProvinceofTarlaconthe14thdayofDecember1924.The factsareaboutasconflictingasitispossibleforfactstobe,inthetrialcauses.

AsafirstcauseofactiontheplaintiffallegedthatthedefendantVitalianoMamawal,deputysheriffoftheProvinceof Tarlac,byvirtueofawritofexecutionissuedbytheCourtofFirstInstanceofPampanga,attachedandsoldtothedefendant EmilianoJ.Valdezthesugarcaneplantedbytheplaintiffandhistenantsonsevenparcelsoflanddescribedinthecomplaint inthethirdparagraphofthefirstcauseofaction;thatwithinoneyearfromthedateoftheattachmentandsaletheplaintiff offeredtoredeemsaidsugarcaneandtenderedtothedefendantValdeztheamountsufficienttocoverthepricepaidbythe latter,theinterestthereonandanyassessmentsortaxeswhichhemayhavepaidthereonafterthepurchase,andtheinterest correspondingtheretoandthatValdezrefusedtoacceptthemoneyandtoreturnthesugarcanetotheplaintiff. Asasecondcauseofaction,theplaintiffallegedthatthedefendantEmilianoJ.Valdezwasattemptingtoharvestthepalay plantedinfourofthesevenparcelsmentionedinthefirstcauseofaction;thathehadharvestedandtakenpossessionofthe palayinoneofsaidsevenparcelsandinanotherparceldescribedinthesecondcauseofaction,amountingto300cavans; andthatallofsaidpalaybelongedtotheplaintiff. PlaintiffprayedthatawritofpreliminaryinjunctionbeissuedagainstthedefendantEmilianoJ.Valdezhisattorneysand agents,restrainingthem(1)fromdistributinghiminthepossessionoftheparcelsoflanddescribedinthecomplaint;(2) fromtakingpossessionof,orharvestingthesugarcaneinquestion;and(3)fromtakingpossession,orharvestingthepalay insaidparcelsofland.Plaintiffalsoprayedthatajudgmentberenderedinhisfavorandagainstthedefendantsordering themtoconsenttotheredemptionofthesugarcaneinquestion,andthatthedefendantValdezbecondemnedtopaytothe plaintiffthesumofP1,056thevalueofpalayharvestedbyhiminthetwoparcelsabovementioned,withinterestandcosts. OnDecember27,1924,thecourt,afterhearingbothpartiesanduponapprovalofthebondforP6,000filedbytheplaintiff, issuedthewritofpreliminaryinjunctionprayedforinthecomplaint. ThedefendantEmilianoJ.Valdez,inhisamendedanswer,deniedgenerallyandspecificallyeachandeveryallegationofthe complaintandstepupthefollowingdefenses: (a) That the sugar cane in question had the nature of personal property and was not, therefore, subject to redemption; (b)Thathewastheownerofparcels1,2and7describedinthefirstcauseofactionofthecomplaint; (c)Thathewastheownerofthepalayinparcels1,2and7;and (d)Thatheneverattemptedtoharvestthepalayinparcels4and5. ThedefendantEmilianoJ.Valdezbywayofcounterclaim,allegedthatbyreasonofthepreliminaryinjunctionhewas unabletogatherthesugarcane,sugarcaneshoots(puntasdecanadulce)palayinsaidparcelsofland,representingalossto himofP8,375.20andthat,inadditionthereto,hesuffereddamagesamountingtoP3,458.56.Heprayed,forajudgment(1) absolvinghimfromallliabilityunderthecomplaint;(2)declaringhimtobetheabsoluteownerofthesugarcanein questionand of the palay inparcels 1,2 and7; and (3) orderingthe plaintiff topayto him the sum of P11,833.76, representingthevalueofthesugarcaneandpalayinquestion,includingdamages. Upontheissuesthuspresentedbythepleadingsthecausewasbroughtonfortrial.Afterhearingtheevidence,andonApril

28,1926,theHonorableCayetanoLukban,judge,renderedajudgmentagainsttheplaintiffandinfavorofthedefendants (1)Holdingthatthesugarcaneinquestionwaspersonalpropertyand,assuch,wasnotsubjecttoredemption; (2)Absolvingthedefendantsfromallliabilityunderthecomplaint;and (3)CondemningtheplaintiffandhissuretiesCenondelaCruz,JuanSangalangandMarcosSibaltojointlyand severallypaytothedefendantEmilianoJ.ValdezthesumofP9,439.08asfollows: (a)P6,757.40,thevalueofthesugarcane; (b)1,435.68,thevalueofthesugarcaneshoots; (c)646.00,thevalueofpalayharvestedbyplaintiff; (d)600.00,thevalueof150cavansofpalaywhichthedefendantwasnotabletoraisebyreasonofthe injunction,atP4cavan.9,439.08Fromthatjudgmenttheplaintiffappealedandinhisassignmentsoferror contendsthatthelowercourterred:(1)Inholdingthatthesugarcaneinquestionwaspersonalproperty and,therefore,notsubjecttoredemption; (2)Inholdingthatparcels1and2ofthecomplaintbelongedtoValdez,aswellasparcels7and8,andthatthe palaythereinwasplantedbyValdez; (3)InholdingthatValdez,byreasonofthepreliminaryinjunctionfailedtorealizedP6,757.40fromthesugarcane andP1,435.68fromsugarcaneshoots(puntasdecanadulce); (4)Inholdingthat,forfailureofplaintifftogatherthesugarcaneontime,thedefendantwasunabletoraisepalay ontheland,whichwouldhavenettedhimthesumofP600;and. (5)IncondemningtheplaintiffandhissuretiestopaytothedefendantthesumofP9,439.08. Itappearsfromtherecord: (1)ThatonMay11,1923,thedeputysheriffoftheProvinceofTarlac,byvirtueofwritofexecutionincivilcase No.20203oftheCourtofFirstInstanceofManila(Macondray&Co.,Inc.vs.LeonSibal),leviedanattachmenton eightparcelsoflandbelongingtosaidLeonSibal,situatedintheProvinceofTarlac,designatedinthesecondof attachmentasparcels1,2,3,4,5,6,7and8(ExhibitB,Exhibit2A). (2)ThatonJuly30,1923,Macondray&Co.,Inc.,boughtsaideightparcelsofland,attheauctionheldbythe sheriffoftheProvinceofTarlac,forthesumtoP4,273.93,havingpaidforthesaidparcelsseparatelyasfollows (ExhibitC,and2A): Parcel 1..................................................................... 2..................................................................... 3..................................................................... 4..................................................................... 5..................................................................... 6..................................................................... 7withthehousethereon.......................... 8..................................................................... 4,273.93 (3)Thatwithinoneyearfromthesaleofsaidparcelofland,andonthe24thdayofSeptember,1923,thejudgment debtor,LeonSibal,paidP2,000toMacondray&Co.,Inc.,fortheaccountoftheredemptionpriceofsaidparcels P1.00 2,000.00 120.93 1,000.00 1.00 1.00 150.00 1,000.00 ==========

ofland,withoutspecifyingtheparticularparcelstowhichsaidamountwastoapplied.Theredemptionpricesaid eightparcelswasreduced,byvirtueofsaidtransaction,toP2,579.97includinginterest(ExhibitCand2). Therecordfurthershows: (1)ThatonApril29,1924,thedefendantVitalianoMamawal,deputysheriffoftheProvinceofTarlac,byvirtueof awritofexecutionincivilcaseNo.1301oftheProvinceofPampanga(EmilianoJ.Valdezvs.LeonSibal1.the samepartiesinthepresentcase),attachedthepersonalpropertyofsaidLeonSiballocatedinTarlac,amongwhich wasincludedthesugarcanenowinquestioninthesevenparcelsoflanddescribedinthecomplaint(ExhibitA). (2)ThatonMay9and10,1924,saiddeputysheriffsoldatpublicauctionsaidpersonalpropertiesofLeonSibal, includingthesugarcaneinquestiontoEmilioJ.Valdez,whopaidthereforthesumofP1,550,ofwhichP600was forthesugarcane(ExhibitA). (3)ThatonApril29,1924,saiddeputysheriff,byvirtueofsaidwritofexecution,alsoattachedtherealpropertyof saidLeonSibalinTarlac,includingallofhisrights,interestandparticipationtherein,whichrealpropertyconsisted ofelevenparcelsoflandandahouseandcamarinsituatedinoneofsaidparcels(ExhibitA). (4)ThatonJune25,1924,eightofsaidelevenparcels,includingthehouseandthecamarin,wereboughtbyEmilio J.ValdezattheauctionheldbythesheriffforthesumofP12,200.Saideightparcelsweredesignatedinthe certificateofsaleasparcels1,3,4,5,6,7,10and11.Thehouseandcamarinweresituatedonparcel7(ExhibitA). (5)Thattheremainingthreeparcels,indicatedinthecertificateofthesheriffasparcels2,12,and13,werereleased fromtheattachmentbyvirtueofclaimspresentedbyAgustinCuyuganandDomicianoTizon(ExhibitA). (6)Thatonthesamedate,June25,1924,Macondray&Co.soldandconveyedtoEmilioJ.ValdezforP2,579.97all ofitsrightsandinterestintheeightparcelsoflandacquiredbyitatpublicauctionheldbythedeputysheriffof TarlacinconnectionwithcivilcaseNo.20203oftheCourtofFirstInstanceofManila,asstatedabove.Said amountrepresentedtheunpaidbalanceoftheredemptionpriceofsaideightparcels,afterpaymentbyLeonSibal ofP2,000onSeptember24,1923,frotheaccountoftheredemptionprice,asstatedabove.(ExhibitCand2). Theforegoingstatementoffactsshows: (1)TheEmilioJ.Valdezboughtthesugarcaneinquestion,locatedinthesevenparcelsoflanddescribedinthe firstcauseofactionofthecomplaintatpublicauctiononMay9and10,1924,forP600. (2)ThatonJuly30,1923,Macondray&Co.becametheownerofeightparcelsoflandsituatedintheProvinceof TarlacbelongingtoLeonSibalandthatonSeptember24,1923,LeonSibalpaidtoMacondray&Co.P2,000for theaccountoftheredemptionpriceofsaidparcels. (3)ThatonJune25,1924,EmilioJ.ValdezacquiredfromMacondray&Co.allofitsrightsandinterestinthesaid eightparcelsofland. (4)ThatonJune25,1924,EmilioJ.ValdezalsoacquiredalloftherightsandinterestwhichLeonSibalhador mighthavehadonsaideightparcelsbyvirtueoftheP2,000paidbythelattertoMacondray. (5)ThatEmilioJ.Valdezbecametheabsoluteownerofsaideightparcelsofland. Thefirstquestionraisedbytheappealis,whetherthesugarcaneinquestionispersonalorrealproperty.Itiscontendedthat sugarcanecomesundertheclassificationofrealpropertyas"ungatheredproducts"inparagraph2ofarticle334oftheCivil Code.Saidparagraph2ofarticle334enumeratesasrealpropertythefollowing:Trees,plants,andungatheredproducts, whiletheyareannexedtothelandorformanintegralpartofanyimmovableproperty."Thatarticle,however,hasreceived inrecentyearsaninterpretationbytheTribunalSupremodeEspaa,whichholdsthat,undercertainconditions,growing cropsmaybeconsideredaspersonalproperty.(DecisionofMarch18,1904,vol.97,CivilJurisprudenceofSpain.) Manresa,theeminentcommentatoroftheSpanishCivilCode,indiscussingsection334oftheCivilCode,inviewofthe recentdecisionsofthesupremeCourtofSpain,admitsthatgrowingcropsaresometimesconsideredandtreatedaspersonal property.Hesays: Nocreemos,sinembargo,queestoexcluyalaexcepcionquemuchosautoreshacentocantealaventadetoda cosechaodepartedeellacuandoaunnoestacogida(cosafrecuenteconlauvayylanaranja),yaladelenas, considerandoambascomomuebles.ElTribunalSupremo,ensentenciade18demarzode1904,alentendersobre uncontratodearrendamientodeunprediorustico,resuelvequesuterminacionpordesahucionoextinguelos derechos del arrendario,pararecolectaropercibirlosfrutoscorrespondientes alaoagricola,dentrodel que

nacieronaquellosderechos,cuandoelarrendorhapercibidoasuvezelimportedelarentaintegracorrespondiente, auncuandolohayasidoporpreceptolegalduranteelcursodeljuicio,fundandoseparaello,nosoloenquedeotra suertesedariaaldesahuciounalcancequenotiene,sinoenque,yestoeslointeresanteanuestroproposito,la consideraciondeinmueblesqueelarticulo334delCodigoCivilatribugealosfrutospendientes,nolesprivadel caracterdeproductospertenecientes,comotales,aquienes aellostengaderecho,Ilegadoelmomentodesu recoleccion. xxxxxxxxx MasactualmenteyporvirtuddelanuevaediciondelaLeyHipotecaria,publicadaen16dediciembrede1909,con lasreformasintroducidasporlade21deabrilanterior,lahipoteca,salvopactoexpresoquedispongalocontrario,y cualquieraquesealanaturalezayformadelaobligacionquegarantice,nocomprendelosfrutoscualquieraquesea lasituacionenqueseencuentre.(3Manresa,5.edicion,pags.22,23.) Fromtheforegoingitappears(1)that,underSpanishauthorities,pendingfruitsandungatheredproductsmaybesoldand transferredaspersonalproperty;(2)thattheSupremeCourtofSpain,inacaseofejectmentofalesseeofanagricultural land,heldthatthelesseewasentitledtogathertheproductscorrespondingtotheagriculturalyear,becausesaidfruitsdid notgowiththelandbutbelongedseparatelytothelessee;and(3)thatundertheSpanishMortgageLawof1909,as amended,themortgageofapieceoflanddoesnotincludethefruitsandproductsexistingthereon,unlessthecontract expresslyprovidesotherwise. AnexaminationofthedecisionsoftheSupremeCourtofLouisianamaygiveussomelightonthequestionwhichweare discussing.Article465oftheCivilCodeofLouisiana,whichcorrespondstoparagraph2ofarticle334ofourCivilCode, provides:"Standingcropsandthefruitsoftreesnotgathered,andtreesbeforetheyarecutdown,arelikewiseimmovable, andareconsideredaspartofthelandtowhichtheyareattached." TheSupremeCourtofLouisianahavingoccasiontointerpretthatprovision,heldthatinsomecases"standingcrops"may beconsideredanddealtwithaspersonalproperty.InthecaseofLumberCo.vs.SheriffandTaxCollector(106La.,418)the SupremeCourtsaid:"True,byarticle465oftheCivilCodeitisprovidedthat'standingcropsandthefruitsoftreesnot gatheredandtreesbeforetheyarecutdown...areconsideredaspartofthelandtowhichtheyareattached,butthe immovabilityprovidedforisonlyoneinabstractoandwithoutreferencetorightsonortothecropacquiredbyothersthan theownersofthepropertytowhichthecropisattached....Theexistenceofarightonthegrowingcropisamobilization by anticipation, a gathering as it were in advance, rendering the cropmovable quoad the right acquired therein. Our jurisprudencerecognizesthepossiblemobilizationofthegrowingcrop."(Citizens'Bankvs.Wiltz,31La.Ann.,244;Porche vs.Bodin,28La.,Ann.,761;Sandelvs.Douglass,27La.Ann.,629;Lewisvs.Klotz,39La.Ann.,267.) "Itistrue,"astheSupremeCourtofLouisianasaidinthecaseofPorchevs.Bodin(28La.An.,761)that"article465ofthe RevisedCodesaysthatstandingcropsareconsideredasimmovableandaspartofthelandtowhichtheyareattached,and article466declaresthatthefruitsofanimmovablegatheredorproducedwhileitisunderseizureareconsideredasmaking partthereof,andincurredtothebenefitofthepersonmakingtheseizure.Buttheevidentmeaningofthesearticles,iswhere thecropsbelongtotheowneroftheplantationtheyformpartoftheimmovable,andwhereitisseized,thefruitsgathered orproducedinuretothebenefitoftheseizingcreditor. Acropraisedonleasedpremisesinnosenseformspartoftheimmovable.Itbelongstothelessee,andmaybesold byhim,whetheritbegatheredornot,anditmaybesoldbyhisjudgmentcreditors.Ifitnecessarilyformspartof theleasedpremisestheresultwouldbethatitcouldnotbesoldunderexecutionseparateandapartfromtheland.If alesseeobtainsuppliestomakehiscrop,thefactor'slienwouldnotattachtothecropasaseparatethingbelonging tohisdebtor,butthelandbelongingtothelessorwouldbeaffectedwiththerecordedprivilege.Thelawcannotbe construedsoastoresultinsuchabsurdconsequences. InthecaseofCitizen'sBankvs.Wiltz(31La.Ann.,244)thecourtsaid: Ifthecropquoadthepledgethereofundertheactof1874wasanimmovable,itwouldbedestructiveofthevery objectsoftheact,itwouldrenderthepledgeofthecropobjectsoftheact,itwouldrenderthepledgeofthecrop impossible,forifthecropwasaninseparablepartoftherealtypossessionofthelatterwouldbenecessarytothat oftheformer;butsuchisnotthecase.True,byarticle465C.C.itisprovidedthat"standingcropsandthefruitsof treesnotgatheredandtreesbeforetheyarecutdownarelikewiseimmovableandareconsideredaspartoftheland towhichtheyareattached;"buttheimmovabilityprovidedforisonlyone inabstractoandwithoutreferenceto rightsonortothecropacquiredbyotherthantheownersofthepropertytowhichthecropwasattached.The immovabilityofagrowingcropisintheorderofthingstemporary,forthecroppassesfromthestateofagrowing

tothatofagatheredone,fromanimmovabletoamovable.Theexistenceofarightonthegrowingcropisa mobilization by anticipation, a gathering as it were in advance, rendering the crop movable quoad the right acquiredthereon.TheprovisionofourCodeisidenticalwiththeNapoleonCode520,andwemaythereforeobtain lightbyanexaminationofthejurisprudenceofFrance. Theruleaboveannounced,notonlybytheTribunalSupremodeEspaabutbytheSupremeCourtofLouisiana,isfollowed inpracticallyeverystateoftheUnion. FromanexaminationofthereportsandcodesoftheStateofCaliforniaandotherstateswefindthatthesettledoctrine followedinsaidstatesinconnectionwiththeattachmentofpropertyandexecutionofjudgmentis,thatgrowingcropsraised byyearlylaborandcultivationareconsideredpersonalproperty.(6CorpuzJuris,p.197;17CorpusJuris,p.379;23Corpus Juris,p.329:Raventasvs.Green,57Cal.,254;Norrisvs.Watson,55Am.Dec.,161;Whipplevs.Foot,3Am.Dec.,442;1 BenjaminonSales,sec.126;McKenzievs.Lampley,31Ala.,526;Crinevs.TiftsandCo.,65Ga.,644;Gillittvs.Truax,27 Minn.,528;Prestonvs.Ryan,45Mich.,174;FreemanonExecution,vol.1,p.438;DrakeonAttachment,sec.249;Mechem onSales,sec.200and763.) Mr.Mechemsaysthatavalidsalemaybemadeofathing,whichthoughnotyetactuallyinexistence,isreasonablycertain tocomeintoexistenceasthenaturalincrementorusualincidentofsomethingalreadyinexistence,andthenbelongingto thevendor,andthentitlewillvestinthebuyerthemomentthethingcomesintoexistence.(Emersonvs.EuropeanRailway Co.,67Me.,387;Cutting vs. PackersExchange,21Am.St.Rep.,63.)Thingsofthisnaturearesaidtohaveapotential existence.Amanmaysellpropertyofwhichheispotentiallyandnotactuallypossessed.Hemaymakeavalidsaleofthe winethatavineyardisexpectedtoproduce;orthegainafieldmaygrowinagiventime;orthemilkacowmayyieldduring thecomingyear;orthewoolthatshallthereaftergrowuponsheep;orwhatmaybetakenatthenextcastofafisherman's net;orfruitstogrow;oryounganimalsnotyetinexistence;orthegoodwillofatradeandthelike.Thethingsold,however, mustbespecificandidentified.Theymustbealsoownedatthetimebythevendor.(Hullvs.Hull,48Conn.,250[40Am. Rep.,165].) Itiscontendedonthepartoftheappelleethatparagraph2ofarticle334oftheCivilCodehasbeenmodifiedbysection450 oftheCodeofCivilProcedureaswellasbyActNo.1508,theChattelMortgageLaw.Saidsection450enumeratesthe propertyofajudgmentdebtorwhichmaybesubjectedtoexecution.Thepertinentportionofsaidsectionreadsasfollows: "Allgoods,chattels,moneys,andotherproperty,bothrealandpersonal,***shallbeliabletoexecution.Saidsection450 andmostoftheothersectionsoftheCodeofCivilProcedurerelatingtotheexecutionofjudgmentweretakenfromthe CodeofCivilProcedureofCalifornia.TheSupremeCourtofCalifornia,undersection688oftheCodeofCivilProcedure of that state (Pomeroy,p.424)has held,without variation,that growingcrops werepersonal property andsubject to execution. ActNo.1508,theChattelMortgageLaw,fullyrecognizedthatgrowingcropsarepersonalproperty.Section2ofsaidAct provides:"Allpersonalpropertyshallbesubjecttomortgage,agreeablytotheprovisionsofthisAct,andamortgage executed in pursuance thereof shall be termed a chattel mortgage." Section 7 in part provides: "If growing crops be mortgagedthemortgagemaycontainanagreementstipulatingthatthemortgagorbindshimselfproperlytotend,carefor andprotectthecropwhilegrowing. ItisclearfromtheforegoingprovisionsthatActNo.1508wasenactedontheassumptionthat"growingcrops"arepersonal property.Thisconsiderationtendstosupporttheconclusionhereinbeforestated,thatparagraph2ofarticle334oftheCivil Codehasbeenmodifiedbysection450ofActNo.190andbyActNo.1508inthesensethat"ungatheredproducts"as mentionedinsaidarticleoftheCivilCodehavethenatureofpersonalproperty.Inotherwords,thephrase"personal property"shouldbeunderstoodtoinclude"ungatheredproducts." Atcommonlaw,andgenerallyintheUnitedStates,allannualcropswhichareraisedbyyearlymanuranceand labor,andessentiallyowetheirannualexistencetocultivationbyman,.maybeleviedonaspersonalproperty."(23 C.J.,p.329.)OnthisquestionFreeman,inhistreatiseontheLawofExecutions,says:"Crops,whethergrowingor standinginthefieldreadytobeharvested,are,whenproducedbyannualcultivation,nopartoftherealty.Theyare, therefore,liabletovoluntarytransferaschattels.Itisequallywellsettledthattheymaybeseizedandsoldunder execution.(FreemanonExecutions,vol.p.438.) Wemay,therefore,concludethatparagraph2ofarticle334oftheCivilCodehasbeenmodifiedbysection450oftheCode ofCivilProcedureandbyActNo.1508,inthesensethat,forthepurposeofattachmentandexecution,andforthepurposes oftheChattelMortgageLaw,"ungatheredproducts" havethenatureofpersonal property.Thelowercourt,therefore, committednoerrorinholdingthatthesugarcaneinquestionwaspersonalpropertyand,assuch,wasnotsubjectto redemption.

Alltheotherassignmentsoferrormadebytheappellant,asabovestated,relatetoquestionsoffactonly.Beforeentering uponadiscussionofsaidassignmentsoferror,wedeemitopportunetotakespecialnoticeofthefailureoftheplaintiffto appearatthetrialduringthepresentationofevidencebythedefendant.Hisabsencefromthetrialandhisfailuretocross examinethedefendanthavelentconsiderableweighttotheevidencethenpresentedforthedefense. Comingnottotheownershipofparcels1and2describedinthefirstcauseofactionofthecomplaint,theplaintiffmadea futileattempt toshowthat saidtwoparcels belongedtoAgustinCuyuganandweretheidentical parcel 2whichwas excludedfromtheattachmentandsaleofrealpropertyofSibaltoValdezonJune25,1924,asstatedabove.Acomparison ofthedescriptionofparcel2inthecertificateofsalebythesheriff(ExhibitA)andthedescriptionofparcels1and2ofthe complaintwillreadilyshowthattheyarenotthesame. Thedescriptionoftheparcelsinthecomplaintisasfollows: 1. La caa dulce sembrada por los inquilinos del ejecutado Leon Sibal 1. en una parcela de terreno de la pertenenciadelcitadoejecutado,situadaenLibutad,Culubasa,Bamban,Tarlac,deunasdoshectareaspocomaso menosdesuperficie. 2.LacaadulcesembradaporelinquilinodelejecutadoLeonSibal1.,IlamadoAlejandroPolicarpio,enuna parceladeterrenodelapertenenciadelejecutado,situadaenDalayap,Culubasa,Bamban,Tarlacdeunasdos hectareasdesuperficiepocomasomenos."Thedescriptionofparcel2giveninthecertificateofsale(ExhibitA) isasfollows: 2a.TerrenopalayerosituadoenCulubasa,Bamban,Tarlac,de177,090metroscuadradosdesuperficie,lindaalN. conCanutoSibal,EstebanLazatinandAlejandroDayrit;alE.conFranciscoDizon,FelipeMauandothers;alS. conAlejandroDayrit,IsidroSantosandMelecioMau;yalO.conAlejandroDayritandPaulinoVergara.TaxNo. 2854,vadoramillaradoP4,200pesos. Ontheotherhandtheevidenceforthedefendantpurportedtoshowthatparcels1and2ofthecomplaintwereincluded amongtheparcelsboughtbyValdezfromMacondrayonJune25,1924,andcorrespondedtoparcel4inthedeedofsale (ExhibitBand2),andwerealsoincludedamongtheparcelsboughtbyValdezattheauctionoftherealpropertyofLeon SibalonJune25,1924,andcorrespondedtoparcel 3inthecertificateofsalemadebythesheriff(Exhibit A).The descriptionofparcel4(Exhibit2)andparcel3(ExhibitA)isasfollows: ParcelsNo.4.Terrenopalayero,ubicadoenelbarriodeCulubasa,Bamban,Tarlac,I.F.de145,000metros cuadradosdesuperficie,lindantealNorteconRoadofthebarrioofCulubasathatgoestoConcepcion;alEstecon JuanDizon;alSurconLucioMaoyCanutoSibalyalOesteconEstebanLazatin,suvaloramillaradoasciendea lasumadeP2,990.TaxNo.2856. Aswillbenoticed,thereishardlyanyrelationbetweenparcels1and2ofthecomplaintandparcel4(Exhibit2andB)and parcel3(ExhibitA).But,inasmuchastheplaintiffdidnotcaretoappearatthetrialwhenthedefendantofferedhis evidence,weareinclinedtogivemoreweighttotheevidenceadducedbyhimthattotheevidenceadducedbytheplaintiff, withrespecttotheownershipofparcels1and2ofthecompliant.We,therefore,concludethatparcels1and2ofthe complaintbelongtothedefendant,havingacquiredthesamefromMacondray&Co.onJune25,1924,andfromthe plaintiffLeonSibalonthesamedate. Itappears,however,thattheplaintiffplantedthepalayinsaidparcelsandharvestedtherefrom190cavans.Therebeingno evidenceofbadfaithonhispart,heisthereforeentitledtoonehalfofthecrop,or95cavans.Heshouldthereforebe condemnedtopaytothedefendantfor95cavansonly,atP3.40acavan,orthesumofP323,andnotforthetotalof190 cavansasheldbythelowercourt. Astotheownershipofparcel7ofthecomplaint,theevidenceshowsthatsaidparcelcorrespondstoparcel1ofthedeedof saleofMacondray&Co,toValdez(ExhibitBand2),andtoparcel4inthecertificateofsaletoValdezofrealproperty belongingtoSibal,executedbythesheriffasabovestated(ExhibitA).Valdezisthereforetheabsoluteownerofsaidparcel, havingacquiredtheinterestofbothMacondrayandSibalinsaidparcel. WithreferencetotheparceloflandinPacalcal,Tarlac,describedinparagraph3ofthesecondcauseofaction,itappears fromthetestimonyoftheplaintiffhimselfthatsaidparcelcorrespondstoparcel8ofthedeedofsaleofMacondrayto Valdez(ExhibitBand2)andtoparcel10inthedeedofsaleexecutedbythesheriffinfavorofValdez(ExhibitA).Valdezis thereforetheabsoluteownerofsaidparcel,havingacquiredtheinterestofbothMacondrayandSibaltherein. Inthisconnectionthefollowingfactsareworthyofmention:

ExecutioninfavorofMacondray&Co.,May11,1923.Eightparcelsoflandwereattachedundersaidexecution.Said parcelsoflandweresoldtoMacondray&Co.onthe30thdayofJuly,1923.RicepaidP4,273.93.OnSeptember24,1923, LeonSibalpaidtoMacondray&Co.P2,000ontheredemptionofsaidparcelsofland.(SeeExhibitsBandC). Attachment, April 29,1924,infavor ofValdez. Personal propertyof Sibal was attached,includingthesugarcane in question.(ExhibitA)Thesaidpersonalpropertysoattached,soldatpublicauctionMay9and10,1924.April29,1924,the realpropertywasattachedundertheexecutioninfavorofValdez(ExhibitA).June25,1924,saidrealpropertywassoldand purchasedbyValdez(ExhibitA). June25,1924,Macondray&Co.soldallofthelandwhichtheyhadpurchasedatpublicauctiononthe30thdayofJuly, 1923,toValdez. Astothelossofthedefendantinsugarcanebyreasonoftheinjunction,theevidenceshowsthatthesugarcaneinquestion coveredanareaof22hectaresand60ares(Exhibits8,8band8c);thatsaidareawouldhaveyieldedanaveragecropof 1039picosand60cates;thatonehalfofthequantity,or519picosand80cateswouldhavecorrespondedtothedefendant, asowner;thatduringtheseasonthesugarwassellingatP13apico(Exhibit5and5A).Therefore,thedefendant,asowner, wouldhavenettedP6,757.40fromthesugarcaneinquestion.Theevidencealsoshowsthatthedefendantcouldhavetaken fromthesugarcane1,017,000sugarcaneshoots(puntasdecana)andnot1,170,000ascomputedbythelowercourt.During theseasontheshootsweresellingatP1.20athousand(Exhibits6and7).Thedefendantthereforewouldhavenetted P1,220.40fromsugarcaneshootsandnotP1,435.68asallowedbythelowercourt. Astothepalayharvestedbytheplaintiffinparcels1and2ofthecomplaint,amountingto190cavans,onehalfofsaid quantityshouldbelongtotheplaintiff,asstatedabove,andtheotherhalftothedefendant.Thecourterredinawardingthe wholecroptothedefendant.Theplaintiffshouldthereforepaythedefendantfor95cavansonly,atP3.40acavan,orP323 insteadofP646asallowedbythelowercourt. Theevidencealsoshowsthatthedefendantwaspreventedbytheactsoftheplaintifffromcultivatingabout10hectaresof thelandinvolvedinthelitigation.Heexpectedtohaveraisedabout600cavansofpalay,300cavansofwhichwouldhave correspondedtohimasowner.Thelowercourthaswiselyreducedhisshareto150cavansonly.AtP4acavan,thepalay wouldhavenettedhimP600. Inviewoftheforegoing,thejudgmentappealedfromisherebymodified.TheplaintiffandhissuretiesCenondelaCruz, JuanSangalangandMarcosSibalareherebyorderedtopaytothedefendantjointlyandseverallythesumofP8,900.80, insteadofP9,439.08allowedbythelowercourt,asfollows: P6,757.40 forthesugarcane; 1,220.40 forthesugarcaneshoots; 323.00 forthepalayharvestedbyplaintiffinparcels1and2; 600.00 forthepalaywhichdefendantcouldhaveraised.

8,900.80 ============ Inallotherrespects,thejudgmentappealedfromisherebyaffirmed,withcosts.Soordered. Street,Malcolm,Villamor,RomualdezandVillaReal.,JJ.,concur.

RepublicofthePhilippines SUPREMECOURT Manila ENBANC G.R.No.6295September1,1911 THEUNITEDSTATES,plaintiffappellee, vs. IGNACIOCARLOS,defendantappellant. A.D.Gibbsforappellant. ActingAttorneyGeneralHarveyforappellee. PERCURIAM: Theinformationfiledinthiscaseisasfollows: TheundersignedaccusesIgnacioCarlosofthecrimeoftheft,committedasfollows: Thaton,during,andbetweenthe13thdayofFebruary,1909,andthe3ddayofMarch,1910,inthecityofManila, PhilippineIslands,thesaidIgnacioCarlos,withintentofgainandwithoutviolenceorintimidationagainstthe personorforceagainstthething,didthenandthere,willfully,unlawfully,andfeloniously,take,steal,andcarry awaytwothousandtwohundredandseventythree(2,273)kilowattsofelectriccurrent,ofthevalueofninehundred andnine(909)pesosandtwenty(20)centsPhilippinecurrency,thepropertyoftheManilaElectricRailroadand LightCompany,acorporationdoingbusinessinthePhilippineIslands,withouttheconsentoftheownerthereof;to thedamageandprejudiceofthesaidManilaElectricRailroadandLightCompanyinthesaidsumofninehundred andnine(909)pesosandtwenty(20)centsPhilippinecurrency,equaltoandequivalentof4,546pesetasPhilippine currency.Allcontrarytolaw. (Sgd.)L.M.SOUTWORTH, ProsecutingAttorney. Subscribedandsworntobeforemethis4thdayofMarch,1910,inthecityofManila,PhilippineIslands,byL.M. Southworth,prosecutingattorneyforthecityofManila. (Sgd.)CHARLESS.LOBINGIER, Judge,FirstInstance. Apreliminaryinvestigationhasheretoforebeenconductedinthiscase,undermydirection,havingexaminedthe witnessunderoath,inaccordancewiththeprovisionsofsection39ofActNo.183ofthePhilippineCommission, asamendedbysection2ofActNo.612ofthePhilippineCommission. (Sgd)L.M.SOUTHWORTH, ProsecutingAttorney. Subscribedandsworntobeforemethis4thdayofMarch,1910,inthecityofManila,PhilippineIslands,byL.M. Southworth,prosecutingattorneyforthecityofManila. (Sgd.)CHARLESLOBINGIER, Judge,FirstInstance. AwarrantforthearrestofthedefendantwasissuedbytheHonorableJ.C.Jenkinsonthe4thofMarchandplacedinthe handsofthesheriff.Thesheriff'sreturnshowsthatthedefendantgavebondforhisappearance.Onthe14thofthesame monthcounselforthedefendantdemurrertothecomplaintonthefollowinggrounds: 1Thatthecourthasnojurisdictionoverthepersonoftheaccusednoroftheoffensechargedbecausetheaccused hasnotbeenaccordedapreliminaryinvestigationorexaminationasrequiredbylawandnocourt,magistrate,or othercompetentauthorityhasdeterminedfromasworncomplaintorevidenceadducedthatthereisprobablecause tobelievethatacrimehasbeencommitted,orthatthisdefendanthascommittedanycrime. 2Thatthefactschargeddonotconstituteapublicoffense. Thedemurrerwasoverruledonthesamedayandthedefendanthavingrefusedtoplead,apleaofnotguiltywasenteredby directionofthecourtforhimandthetrialproceeded.

Afterdueconsiderationofalltheproofspresentedandtheargumentsofcounselthetrialcourtfoundthedefendantguiltyof thecrimechargedandsentencedhimtooneyeareightmonthsandtwentyonedays'presidiocorreccional,toindemnifythe offendedparty,TheManilaElectricRailroadandLightCompany,inthesumofP865.26,tothecorrespondingsubsidiary imprisonmentincaseofinsolvencyandtothepaymentofthecosts.Fromthisjudgmentthedefendantappealedandmakes thefollowingassignmentsoferror: I. Thecourterredinoverrulingtheobjectionoftheaccusedtothejurisdictionofthecourt,becausehewasnotgiven apreliminaryinvestigationasrequiredbylaw,andinoverrulinghisdemurrerforthesamereason. II. Thecourterredindeclaringtheaccusedtobeguilty,inviewoftheevidencesubmitted. III. Thecourterredindeclaringthatelectricalenergymaybestolen. IV. Thecourterredinnotdeclaringthattheplaintiffconsentedtothetakingofthecurrent. V. Thecourterredinfindingtheaccusedguiltyofmorethanoneoffense. VI. ThecourterredincondemningtheaccusedtopayP865.26totheelectriccompanyasdamages. Exactly the same question as that raised in the first assignment of error, was after a through examination and due consideration,decidedadverselytoappellant'scontentioninthecaseofU.S.vs.GrantandKennedy(18Phil.Rep.,122). Nosufficientreasonispresentedwhyweshouldnotfollowthedoctrineenunciatedinthatcase. Thequestionraisedinthesecondassignmentoferrorispurelyonefact.Uponthispointthetrialcourtsaid: Forconsiderablymorethanayearprevioustothefilingofthiscomplainttheaccusedhadbeenaconsumerof electricityfurnishedbytheManilaElectricRailroadandLightCompanyforabuildingcontainingtheresidenceof theaccusedandthreeotherresidences,andwhichwasequipped,accordingtothedefendant'stestimony,withthirty electriclights.OnMarch15,1909,therepresentativesofthecompany,believingthatmorelightwasbeingused thantheirmetershowed,installedanadditionalmeter(ExhibitA)onapoleoutsideofdefendant'shouse,andboth itandthemeter(ExhibitB)whichhadbeenpreviouslyinstalledinthehousewerereadonsaiddate.ExhibitAread 218kilowatthours;ExhibitB,745kilowatthours.OnMarch3,1910eachwasreadagain,ExhibitAshowing2,718 kilowatthoursandExhibitB,968.Itisundisputedthatthecurrentwhichsuppliedthehousepassedthroughboth metersandthecityelectriciantestifiesthateachmeterwastestedonthedateofthelastreadingandwas"ingood condition." The result of this registration therefore is that while the outsider meter (Exhibit A) showed a consumptionindefendant'sbuildingof2,500kilowatthoursofelectricity,thisinsidemeter(ExhibitB)showedbut 223kilowatthours.Inotherwordstheactualconsumption,accordingtotheoutsidemeter,wasmorethantentimes asgreatasthatregisteredbytheoneinside.Obviouslythisdifferencecouldnotbeduetonormalcauses,forwhile theelectriciancalledbythedefense(Lanusa)testifiestothepossibilityofadifferencebetweentwosuchmeters,he placestheextremelimitofsuchdifferencebetweenthem5percent.Here,aswehaveseen,thedifferenceismore than900percent.Besides,accordingtothedefendant'selectrician,theoutsidemetershouldnormallyrunfaster, whileaccordingtothetestmadeinthiscasetheinsidemeter(ExhibitB)ranthefaster.Thecityelectricianalso testifiesthattheelectriccurrentcouldhavebeendeflectedfromtheinsidemeterbyplacingthereonadeviceknown asa"jumper"connectingthetwooutsidewires,andthereisothertestimonythatthereweremarksontheinsulation ofthemeterExhibitBwhichshowedtheuseofsuchadevice.Thereisafurtherevidencethattheconsumptionof 223kilowatthours,registeredbytheinsidemeterwouldnotbeareasonableamountforthenumberoflights installedindefendant'sbuildingduringtheperiodinquestion,andtheaccusedfailstoexplainwhyheshouldhave hadthirtylightsinstalledifheneededbutfourorfive. Onthestrengthofthisshowingasearchwarrantwasissuedfortheexaminationofdefendant'spremisesandwas dulyservedbyapoliceofficer(Hartpence).HewasaccompaniedatthetimebythreeemployeesoftheManila ElectricRailroadandLightCompany,andhefoundtheretheaccused,hiswifeandson,andperhapsoneortwo

others.Thereisasharpconflictbetweentheseveralspectatorsonsomepointsbutononethereisnodispute.All agreethatthe"jumper"(ExhibitC)wasfoundinadrawerofasmallcabinetintheroomofdefendant'shouse wherethemeterwasinstalledandnotmorethan20feettherefrom.Intheabsenceofasatisfactoryexplanationthis constitutedpossessionondefendant'spart,andsuchpossession,undertheCodeofCivilProcedure,section334 (10),raisesthepresumptionthattheaccusedwastheownerofadevicewhoseonlyusewastodeflectthecurrent fromthemeter. Isthereanyother"satisfactoryexplanation"ofthe"jumper's"presence?Theonlyonesoughttobeofferedisthe statementbythesonoftheaccused,aboyoftwelveyears,thathesawthe"jumper"placedtherebythewitness Porter,anemployeeoftheLightCompany.TheboyistheonlywitnesswhosotestifiesandPorterhimselfsquarely deniesit.Wecannotagreewithcounselforthedefensethattheboy'sinterestintheoutcomeofthiscaseisless thanthatofthewitnessfortheprosecution.Itseemstousthathisnaturaldesiretoshieldhisfatherwouldfar outweightanyinterestsuchanemployeelikePorterwouldhaveandwhich,atmost,wouldbemerelypecuniary. Thereis,however,onewitnesswhomsofarasappears,hasnointerestinthematterwhatsoever.Thisisofficer Hartpence,whoexecutedthesearchwarrant.Hetestifiesthatafterinspectingotherarticlesandplaces inthe buildingasheandtheotherspectators,includingtheaccused,approachedthecabinetinwhichthe"jumper"was found,theofficer'sattentionwascalledtothedefendant'sappearanceandtheformernoticedthatthelatterwas becomingnervous.Wheretheonlytwowitnesseswhoaresupposedtoknowanythingofthematterthuscontradict eachotherthisitemoftestimonybytheofficerisofmorethanordinarysignificance;forif,astheaccusedclaims, the"jumper"wasplacedinthecabinetforthefirsttimebyPortertherewouldbenooccasionforanychangeof demeanoronthepartoftheaccused.Wedonotthinkthattheofficer'sdeclinationtowaituntildefendantshould secureanotarypublicshowsbias.Thepresenceofsuchanofficialwasneitherrequirednorauthorizedbylawand theveryefficacyofasearchdependsuponitsswiftness. Wemustalsoagreewiththeprosecutingattorneythattheattendingcircumstancesdonotstrengthenthestorytold bytheboy;thatthelatterwouldhavebeenlikelytocalloutatthetimehesawthe"jumper"beingplacedinthe drawer,oratleastdirectedhisfather'sattentiontoitimmediatelyinsteadofwaiting,ashesays,untilthelatterwas calledbytheofficer.Finally,toaccepttheboy'sstorywemustbelievethatthiscompanyoritsrepresentatives deliberatelyconspirednotmerelytolurethedefendantintothecommissionofacrimebuttofastenuponhima crimewhichhedidnotcommitandthusconvictaninnocentmanbyperjuredevidence.Thisisamuchmore serious charge than that contained in the complaint and should be supported by very strong corroborating circumstances whichwedo not find here. Weare, accordingly, unable toconsider as satisfactory defendant's explanationofthe"jumper's"presence. Theonlyalternativeistheconclusionthatthe"jumper"wasplacedtherebytheaccusedorbysomeoneactingfor himandthatitwastheinstrumentbywhichthecurrentwasdeflectedfromthematterExhibitBandtheLight Companydeprivedofitslawfulcompensation. Afteracarefulexaminationoftheentirerecordwearesatisfiedbeyondperadventureofadoubtthattheproofspresented fullysupportthefactsassetforthintheforegoingfinding. Counselfortheappellantinsiststhattheonlycorporealpropertycanbethesubjectofthecrimeoflarceny,andinthe supportofthispropositioncitesseveralauthoritiesforthepurposeofshowingthattheonlysubjectsoflarcenyaretangible, movable,chattels,somethingwhichcouldbetakeninpossessionandcarriedaway,andwhichhadsome,althoughtrifling, intrinsicvalue,andalsotoshowthatelectricityisanunknownforceandcannotbeasubjectoflarceny. IntheU.S.vs.Genato(15Phi.Rep.,170)thedefendant,theownerofthestoresituatedatNo.154Escolta,Manila,was usingacontrivanceknownasa"jumper"ontheelectricmeterinstalledbytheManilaElectricRailroadandtheLight Company.As aresult oftheuseofthis "jumper" themeter,insteadofmakingonerevolutionineveryfourseconds, registeredoneinseventysevenseconds,therebyreducingthecurrentapproximately95percent.Genatowaschargedinthe municipalcourtwithaviolationofacertainordinanceofthecityofManila,andwassentencedtopayafineofP200.He appealedtotheCourtofFirstInstance,wasagaintriedandsentencedtopaythesamefine.Anappealwastakenfromthe judgmentoftheCourtofFirstInstancetotheSupremeCourtonthegroundthattheordinanceinquestionwasnulland void.Itistruethattheonlyquestiondirectlypresentedwasofthevalidityofthecityordinance.Thecourt,afterholdingthat saidordinancewasvalid,said: Evenwithoutthem(ordinances),therightofownershipofelectriccurrentissecuredbyarticles517and518ofthe PenalCode;theapplicationofthesearticlesincaseofsubtractionofgas,afluidusedforlighting,andinsome respectsresemblingelectricity,isconfirmedbytherulelaiddowninthedecisionsofthesupremecourtofSpain

January20,1887,andApril1,1897,construingandenforcingtheprovisionsofarticles530and531ofthepenal codeofthatcountry,articlesidenticalwitharticles517and518ofthecodeinforceintheseIslands. Article517ofthePenalCodeabovereferredtoreadsasfollows: Thefollowingareguiltyoflarceny: (1)Thosewhowithintentofgainandwithoutviolenceorintimidationagainsttheperson,orforceagainstthings, shalltakeanother'spersonalpropertywithouttheowner'sconsent. Andarticle518fixesthepenaltyforlarcenyinproportiontothevalueofthepersonalpropertystolen. Itistruethatelectricityisnolonger,asformerly,regardedbyelectriciansasafluid,butitsmanifestationandeffects,like thoseofgas,maybeseenandfelt.Thetruetestofwhatisapropersubjectoflarcenyseemstobenotwhetherthesubjectis corporeal,butwhetheritiscapableofappropriationbyanotherthantheowner. Itiswellsettledthatilluminatinggasmaybethesubjectoflarceny,evenintheabsenceofastatutesoproviding.(Decisions ofsupremecourtofSpain,January20,1887,andApril1,1897,supra;also(England)Queenvs.Firth,L.R.1C.C.,172,11 CoxC.C.,234;Queen vs. White,3C.&K.,363,6CoxC.C.,213;Woods vs. People,222III.,293,7L.R.A.,520; Commonwealthvs.Shaw,4Allen(Mass),308;Statevs.Wellman,34Minn.,221,N.W.Rep.,385,and25Cyc.,p.12,note 10.) InthecaseofCommonwealthvs.Shaw,supra,thecourt,speakingthroughChiefJusticeBigelow,said: Thereisnothinginthenatureofgasusedforilluminatingpurposeswhichrendersitincapableofbeingfeloniously takenandcarriedaway.It isavaluablearticleofmerchandise,boughtandsoldlikeotherpersonal property, susceptibleofbeingseveredfromamassorlargerquantity,andofbeingtransportedfromplacetoplace.Inthe presentcaseitappearsthatitwasthepropertyoftheBostonGasLightCompany;thatitwasintheirpossessionby beingconfinedinconduitsandtubeswhichbelongedtothem,andthatthedefendantseveredaportionofthat whichwasinthepipesofthecompanybytakingitintoherhouseandthereconsumingit.Allthisbeingprovedto havebeendonebyhersecretlyandwithintenttodeprivethecompanyoftheirpropertyandtoappropriateittoher ownuse,clearlyconstitutesthecrimeoflarceny. Electricity,thesameasgas,isavaluablearticleofmerchandise,boughtandsoldlikeotherpersonalpropertyandiscapable ofappropriationbyanother.Sonoerrorwascommittedbythetrialcourtinholdingthatelectricityisasubjectoflarceny. Itisurgedinsupportofthefourthassignmentoferrorthatifitbetruethattheappellantdidappropriatetohisownusethe electricityaschargedhecannotbeheldguiltyoflarcenyforanypartoftheelectricitythusappropriated,afterthefirst month, for the reason that the complaining party, the Manila Electric Road and Light Company, knew of this misappropriationandconsentedthereto. TheoutsidemeterwasinstalledonMarch15,1909,andread218kilowatthours.Onthesamedaytheinsidemeterwasread andshowed745kilowatthours.BothmeterswereagainreadonMarch3,1910,andtheoutsideoneshowed2,718kilowatt hourswhiletheoneontheinsideonlyshowed968,thedifferenceinconsumptionduringthistimebeing2,277kilowatt hours.Thetakingofthiscurrentcontinuedoveraperiodofoneyear,lesstwelvedays.Assumingthatthecompanyreadboth metersattheendofeachmonth;thatitknewthedefendantwasmisappropriatingthecurrenttothatextent;andthatt continuedtofurnishthecurrent,therebygivingthedefendantanopportunitytocontinuethemisppropriation,still,wethink, thatthedefendantiscriminallyresponsibleforthetakingofthewholeamount,2,277kilowatthours.Thecompanyhada contractwiththedefendanttofurnishhimwithcurrentforlightingpurposes.Itcouldnotstopthemisappropriationwithout cuttingoffthecurrententirely.Itcouldnotreducethecurrentsoastojustfurnishsufficientforthelightingoftwo,three,or fivelights,asclaimedbythedefendantthatheusedduringthemostofthistime,butthecurrentmustalwaysbesufficiently strongtofurnishcurrentforthethirtylights,atanytimethedefendantdesiredtousethem. Thereisnopretensethattheaccusedwassolicitedbythecompanyoranyoneelsetocommittheactscharged.Atmost therewasamerepassivesubmissiononthepartofthecompanythatthecurrentshouldbetakenandnoindicationthatit wishedittobetaken,andnoknowledgebythedefendantthatthecompanywishedhimtotakethecurrent,andnomutual understandingbetweenthecompanyandthedefendant,andnomeasuresofinducementofanykindwereemployedbythe companyforthepurposeofleadingthedefendantintotemptation,andnopreconcertwhateverbetweenhimandcompany. Theoriginaldesigntomisappropriatethiscurrentwasformedbythedefendantabsolutelyindependentofanyactsonthe partofthecompanyoritsagents.Itistrue,nodoubt,asageneralproposition,thatlarcenyisnotcommittedwhenthe propertyistakenwiththeconsentofitsowner.Itmaybedifficultinsomeinstancestodeterminewhethercertainacts constitute,inlaw,such"consent."Butunderthefactsinthecaseatbaritisnotdifficulttoreachaconclusionthattheacts

performedbytheplaintiffcompanydidnotconstituteaconsentonitspartthedefendanttakeitsproperty.Wehavebeen unabletofindawellconsideredcaseholdingcontraryopinionundersimilarfacts,but,therearenumerouscasesholding thatsuchactsdonotconstitutesuchconsentaswouldrelievethetakerofcriminalresponsibility.Thefourthassignmentof erroris,therefore,notwellfounded. Itisalsocontendedthatsincethe"jumper"wasnotusedcontinuously,thedefendantcommittednotasingleoffensebuta seriesofoffenses.Itis,nodoubt,truethatthedefendantdidnotallowthe"jumper"toremaininplacecontinuouslyforany numberofdaysasthecompanyinspectedmonthlytheinsidemeter.Sothe"jumper"wasputonandtakenoffatleast monthly,ifnotdaily,inordertoavoiddetection,andwhilethe"jumper"wasoffthedefendantwasnotmisappropriatingthe current.Thecomplaintallegedthatthedefendantdidon,during,andbetweenthe13thdayofFebruary,1909,andthe3dof March,1910.willfully,unlawfully,andfeloniouslytake,steal,andcarryaway2,277kilowattsofelectriccurrentofthevalue ofP909.Nodemurrerwaspresentedagainstthiscomplaintonthegroundthatmorethanonecrimewascharged.The Governmenthadnoopportunitytoamendorcorrectthiserror,iferroratall.InthecaseofU.S.vs.Macaspac(12Phil. Rep.,26),thedefendantreceivedfromoneJoquinaPunuthesumofP31.50,withtherequesttodeliverittoMarcelinaDy Oco.ThedefendantcalleduponMarcelina,butinsteadofdeliveringthesaidamountsheaskedMarcelinaforP30inthe nameofJoaquinawhohadinnowayauthorizedhertodoso.MarcelinagaveherP30,believingthatJoaquinahadsentfor it.Counselforthedefendantinsistedthatthecomplaintchargedhisclientwithtwodifferentcrimesofestafainviolationof section11ofGeneralOrders,No.58.Indisposingofthisquestionthiscourtsaid: Thesaiddefectconstitutesoneofthedilatorypleasindicatedbysection21,andtheaccusedoughttohaveraised thepointbeforethetrialbegan.Hadthisbeendone,thecomplaintmighthavebeenamendedintime,becauseitis merelyadefectofformeasilyremedied....Inasmuchasinthefirstinstancetheaccuseddidnotmakethe corresponding dilatory plea to the irregularity of the complaint, it must be understood that has waived such objection,andisnotnowentitledtoraiseforthefirsttimeanyquestioninreferencetheretowhensubmittingtothis courtherassignmentoferrors.Apartfromthefactthatthedefensedoesnotpretendthatanyoftheessentialrights oftheaccusedhavebeeninjured,theallegationofthedefectabovealludedto,whichinanycasewouldonlyaffect formofthecomplaint,cannotjustifyareversalofthejudgmentappealedfrom,accordingtotheprovisionsof section10ofGeneralOrders,No.58. Inthecaseatbaritisnotpointedoutwhereinanyoftheessentialrightsofthedefendanthavebeenprejudicedbyreasonof thefactthatthecomplaintcoveredtheentireperiod.Iftwelvedistinctandseparatecomplaintshadbeenfiledagainstthe defendant,oneforeachmonth,thesumtotalofthepenaltiesimposedmighthavebeenverymuchgreaterthanthatimposed bythecourtinthiscase.Thecoveringoftheentireperiodbyonechargehasbeenbeneficial,ifanything,andnotprejudicial totherightsofthedefendant.Theprosecutingattorneyelectedtocovertheentireperiodwithonechargeandtheaccused havingbeenconvictedforthisoffense,hecannotagainbeprosecutedforthestealingofthecurrentatanytimewithinthat period.Then,again,weareoftheopinionthatthechargewasproperlylaid.Theelectricitywasstolenfromthesameperson, inthesamemanner,andinthesameplace.Itwassubstantiallyonecontinuousact,althoughthe"jumper"mighthavebeen removedandreplaceddailyormonthly.Thedefendantwasmovedbyoneimpulsetoappropriatetohisownusethecurrent, andthemeansadoptedbyhimforthetakingofthecurrentwereintheexecutionofageneralfraudulentplan. Apersonstolegasfortheuseofamanufactorybymeansofpipe,whichdrewoffthegasfromthemainwithout allowingittopassthroughthemeter.Thegasfromthispipewasburnteveryday,andturnedoffatnight.Thepipe wasneverclosedatthisjunctionwiththemain,andconsequentlyalwaysremainedfullofgas.Itwasheld,thatif thepipealwaysremainedfull,therewas,infact,acontinuoustakingofthegasandnotaseriesofseparatetalkings. Itwasheldalsothatevenifthepipehadnotbeenkeptfull,thetakingwouldhavebeencontinuous,asitwas substantiallyallonetransaction.(Regina vs. Firth,L.R.,1C.C.,172;11CoxC.C.,234.Citedonp.758of Wharton'sCriminalLaw,vol.1,10thed.) ThevalueoftheelectricitytakenbythedefendantwasfoundbythetrialcourttobeP865.26.Thisfindingisfullyin accordancewiththeevidencepresented.Sonoerrorwascommittedinsentencingthedefendanttoindemnifythecompany inthisamount,ortosufferthecorrespondingsubsidiaryimprisonmentincaseofinsolvency. Thejudgmentbeingstrictlyinaccordancewiththelawandthemeritsofthecase,sameisherebyaffirmed,withcosts againsttheappellant. Arellano,C.J.,Torres,MapaandCarson,JJ. SeparateOpinions MORELAND,J.,dissenting:

Ifeelmyselfcompelledtodissentbecause,inmyjudgment,thereisnoevidencebeforethiscourt,andtherewasnonebefore thecourtbelow,establishingthemostessentialelementofthecrimeoflarceny,namely,thetakingwithouttheconsentof theowner.AsIreadtherecord,thereisnoevidenceshowingthattheelectricityallegedtohavebeenstolenwastaken withouttheconsentofthecomplainingcompany.Thefactisthattherewasnotawitnesswhotestifiedfortheprosecution whowasauthorizedinlaw,orwhoclaimedtobeauthorizedinfact,totestifyastowhetherornottheallegedtakingofthe electricitywaswithouttheconsentofthecompanyor,eventhatsaidcompanyhadnotbeenpaidforallelectricitytaken.Not oneofthemwas,asamatteroflaw,competenttoeitherofthosefacts.Notoneofthemwasanofficerofthecompany.The leadingwitnessforthepeople,Kay,wasonlyaninspectorofelectriclights.Another,McGeachimwasanelectricalengineer in the employ of the company. Another, Garcia, was an electrician of the company. These witness all confined their testimonytotechnicaldescriptionsofmeters,theirnatureandfunction,ofelectriclightwires,thewritingofdefendant's house,theplacingofametertherein,theplacingofthemeteroutsideofthehouseinordertodetect,bycomparingthe readingsofthetwo,whethertheaccusedwasactuallyusingmoreelectricitythanthehousemeterregistered,thediscovery thatmoreelectricitywasbeingusedthansaidmeterregistered,andofthefindingofa"jumper"indefendant'spossession. Oneofthesewitnessestestifiedalsothathehadsuspectedforalongtimethattheaccusedwas"stealing"electricityandthat laterhewas"positiveofit." Inordertosustainachargeoflarcenyundersection517ofPenalCode,itisnecessarytoprovethattherewasataking withouttheconsentoftheowner.Thisisunquestioned.Thequestionis:Hastheprosecutionprovedthatfact?Hasitproved thattheelectricityallegedtohavebeenstolenwasusedwithouttheconsentofthecompany?Hasitprovedthattheaccused didnothavearighttouseelectricitywhetheritwentthroughthemeterornot?Hasitproved,even,thattheaccuseddidnot havearighttousea"jumper?"Hasitbeenprovedthatthecompanyhasnotbeenfullypaidforalltheelectricitywhich defendantused,howeverobtained?Notoneofthesefactshasbeenproved.Theonlywaytodeterminethosequestionswas toascertaintherelationswhichexistedbetweentheaccusedandthecompanyatthetimetheelectricityallegedtohavebeen stolenwasusedbytheaccused.Therewascertainlysomerelation,somecontract,eitherexpressorimplied,betweenthe companyandtheaccusedorthecompanywouldnothavebeensupplyinghimtheelectriccurrent.Whatwasthatrelation, thatcontract?Noonecanpossiblytellbyreadingtherecord.Thereisnotasinglewordinalltheevidenceevenreferringto it.Notoneofthepeople'switnessesmentionedit.Notoneofthem,verylikely,knewwhatitreallywas.Therelationwhich acorporationbearstoprivatepersonsforwhomtheyarerenderingserviceisdeterminedbythecorporationitselfthrough theactsofitsofficials,andnotbyitsemployees.Whileanemployeemight,astheactofaservant,havecausedthecontract betweenthecompanyandtheaccusedtobesignedbytheaccused,itwasneverthelessacontractdeterminedandprepared bythecompanythroughitsofficersandnotonemadebytheemployee;andunlesstheemployeeactuallyknewthetermsof thecontractsignedbytheaccused,eitherbyhavingreadit,ifinwriting,orbyhavinghearditagreedupon,ifverbal,he wouldnotbecompetenttotestifytoitstermsexceptrenderedsobyadmissionofthepartytobechargedbyit.Itnowhere appearsthatanyofthewitnessesfortheprosecutionhadanyknowledgewhateverofthetermsofthecontractbetweenthe companyandtheaccused.Itdoesnotappearthatanyofthemhadeverseenitorheardittalkedaboutbyeitherparty thereto.Thecompanyhasofferednotestimonywhateveronthematter.Therecordisabsolutelysilentonthatpoint. Thisbeingtrue,howcanwesaythattheaccusedcommittedacrime?Howcanwesaythatagivenactiscriminalunlesswe knowtherelationofthepartiestowhomtheactrefers?Arewetopresumeanactwrongwhenitmayberight?Areweto saythattheaccusedcommittedawrongwhenwedonotknowwhetherhedidornot?Ifwedonotknowthearrangements underwhichthecompanyundertooktofurnishelectricitytothedefendant,howdoweknowthattheaccusedhasnotlived uptothem?Ifwedonotknowtheircontract,howdoweknowthattheaccusedviolatedit? Itmaybeurgedthattheveryfactthatameterwasputinbythecompanyisevidencethatitwasforthecompany's protection.Thismaybetrue.Butisitnotjustaspropertopresumethatitwasputinfordefendant'sprotectionalso? Besides,itdoesnotappearthatthecompanyreallyputinthematter,nordoesnotappearthatthecompanyreallyputinthe meter,nordoesitevenappeartowhomitbelonged.Nomoredoesitappearonwhoseapplicationitwasputin.Thewitness whoinstalledthemeterindefendant'shousedidnotsaytowhomitbelongedandwasunabletoidentifytheonepresented by the prosecution on the trial as the one he installed. But however these things may be, courts are not justified in "assuming"menintostateprison.Theonlyinferencesthatcourtsarejustifiedindrawingarethosespringingfrom facts whicharenotonlyprovedbutwhichareofthemselvessufficienttowarranttheinference.Themerefact,itisafact,thatthe companyplacedameterindefendant'shouseisnotsufficienttosustaintheconclusioninacriminalcasethatthedefendant didnothavetherighttouseelectricitywhichdidnothavetherighttouseelectricitywhichdidnotpassthroughthemeter. Muchlesswoulditwarranttheinferencethat,insousingelectricity,thedefendantfeloniouslyandcriminallytook,sole,and carrieditawaywithouttheconsentofthecompany.Anaccusedispresumedinnocentuntilcontraryisproved.Hisguiltmust beestablishedbeyondareasonabledoubt.Itisincumbentonthestatetoproveeveryfactwhichisessentialtotheguiltof theaccused,andtoproveeverysuchfactasthoughthewholeissuerestedonit.Theevidenceoftheprosecutionmust

excludeeveryreasonablehypothesisofinnocenceaswithhisguilt,hecannotbeconvicted. Butwhatwasthenecessityofallthisuncertainty?Whatwastheforcewhichpreventedthecompanyfromprovingclearly andexplicitlythecontractbetweenitselfandtheaccused?Whatpreventeditfromprovingclearly,explicitly,andbeyondall cavilthattheelectricitywastaken(used)withoutitsconsent?Whydidnotsomecompetentofficialtestify?Whydidthe companystandbywhollysilent?Whydiditleaveitscasetobeprovedbyservantswhowerecompetenttotestify,andwho didactuallytestify,sofaras legal evidencegoes, onlyinrelationtotechnical matters relatingtometers andelectric currents?Whydidtheprosecutionplaceuponthiscourtthenecessityofdeducingandinferringandconcludingrelativeto thelackofconsentofthecompanywhenasinglewordfromthecompanyitselfwouldhaveavoidedthatnecessity?Wehave onlyoneanswertoallthesequestions:Wedonotknow. InthecaseofBubstervs.Nebraska(33Neb.,663),theaccusedwaschargedwiththelarcenyofbuggyofthevalueof$75. Hewasfoundguilty.Onappealthejudgmentofconvictionwasreversed,thecourtsaying: Therearetwoseriousobjectionstothisverdict.First,theownerofthebuggy,althoughapparentlywithinreachof theprocessofthecourt,wasnotcalledasawitness.Hersoninlaw,whoresidedwithher,testifiesthathedidnot givehisconsent,andveryfreelytestifiesthathismotherinlawdidnot.Shewaswithinreachoftheprocessofthe courtandshouldhavebeencalledasawitnesstoprovehernonconsent. Theruleisveryclearlystatedinnote183,volume1,PhilipsonEvidence(4thAm.ed.).Aconvictionoflarceny oughtnottobepermittedorsustainedunlessitappearsthatthepropertywastakenwithouttheconsentofthe owner,andtheownerhimselfshouldbecalled,particularlyinacaselikethatunderconsideration,whentheacts complainedofmaybeconsistentwiththeutmostgoodfaith.Thereisafailureofproofthereforeonthispoint. InthecaseofStatevs.Moon(41Wis.,684),theaccusedwaschargedwiththelarcenyofamare.Hewasconvicted.On appealthecourtreversedthejudgmentofconviction,saying: InStatevs.Morey(2Wis.,494)itwasheldthatinprosecutionsoflacerny,iftheownerofthepropertyallegedto havebeenstolenisknown,andhisattendanceasawitnesscanbeprocured,histestimonythatthepropertywas takenfromhimwithouthisconsentisindispensabletoaconviction.Thisisupontheprinciplethathistestimonyis theprimaryandthebestevidencethatthepropertywastakenwithouthisconsent,andhence,thatsecondary evidenceofthefactcannotberesortedto,untiltheprosecutionshowsitinability,afterduediligence,toprocurethe attendanceoftheowner. Involume1,PhillipsonEvidence(5thAm.,ed.,note183sec.635),theauthorsays: Inallcases,andespeciallyinthis,thelacernyitselfmustbeprovedbytheevidencethenatureofthecaseadmits... .Thisshouldbebythetestimonyoftheownerhimselfifthepropertywastakenfromhisimmediatepossession,or iffromtheactualpossessionofanother,thoughamereservantorchildoftheowner,thattheimmediatepossession was violated, and this, too, without the consent of the person holding it. Where nonconsent is an essential ingredientintheoffense,asitishere,directproofalone,fromthepersonwhosenonconsentisnecessary,can satisfytherule.Youaretoproveanegative,andtheverypersonwhocansweardirectlytothenecessarynegative must,ifpossible,alwaysbeproduced.(CitingEnglishauthorities.)Otherandinferiorproofcannotberesortedto tillitbeimpossibletoprocurethisbestevidence.Ifonepersonbedeadwhocansweardirectlytothenegative,and anotherbealivewhocanyetsweartothesamething,hemustbeproduced.Insuchcases,merepresumption,prima facieorcircumstantialevidenceissecondaryindegree,andcannotbeuseduntilallthesourcesofdirectevidence areexhausted. IquotetheseauthoritiesnotbecauseIagreewiththedoctrineasthereinsetforth.Iquotethembecausethereisaprinciple inherentinthedoctrinelaiddownwhichisrecognizedbyallcourtsashavingvalueandeffect.Itisthis:Failuretocallan available witness possessing peculiar knowledge concerning facts essential toa party's case, direct or rebutting,or to examinesuchwitnessastofactscoveredbyhisspecialknowledge,especiallyifthewitnessbenaturallyfavorabletothe party'scontention,relyinginsteadupontheevidenceofwitnesseslessfamiliarwiththematter,givesrisetoaninference, sometimesdenominatedastrongpresumptionoflaw,thatthetestimonyofsuchuninterrogatedwitnesswouldnotsustain thecontentionoftheparty.Wherethepartyhimselfistheonewhofailstoappearortestify,theinferenceisstillstronger. Thenonappearanceofalitigantorhisfailuretotestifyastofactsmaterialtohiscaseandastowhichhehasespeciallyfull knowledgecreatesaninferencethatherefrainsfromappearingortestifyingbecausethetruth,ifmadetoappear,wouldnot aidhiscontention;and,inconnectionwithanequivocalstatementontheotherside,whichifuntruecouldbedisapproved byhistestimony,oftenfurnishesstrongevidenceofthefactsasserted.Astothispropositiontheauthoritiesaresubstantially uniform.Theydifferonlyinthecasestowhichtheprinciplesareapplied.Asubstantiallyfulllistoftheauthoritiesisgiven

in16CyclopediaofLawandProcedure(pp.1062to1064,inclusive)fromwhichtherulesasstatedabovearetaken. Thiscourthasrecognizedthevalueofthisprincipleandhaspermitteditstronglytoinfluenceitsviewoftheevidencein certaincases.InthecaseofUnitedStatesvs.Magsipoc(20Phil.Rep.,604)oneofthevitalfactswhichtheprosecutionwas requiredtoestablishinordertoconvicttheaccusedwasthatacertainletterwhichtheaccusedallegedhemailedtohis daughter,whowasattendingaboardingschoolinIloilo,andwhichthedaughtertestifiedshehadreceived,hadnotreally beensentbytheaccusedandreceivedbythedaughterbut,instead,hadbeenpurloinedbyhimfromthepostofficeafterhe haddulyplaceditthereinandafterithadbeentakenintocustodyandcontrolofthepostalauthorities.Itwasconcededthat thedirectressoftheboardingschoolwhichthedaughterwasatthetimeattendingknewpositivelywhetherthedaughterwas atthetimeattendingknewpositivelywhetherthedaughterhadreceivedtheletterinquestionornot.Thiscourtheldthat,in weighingtheevidence,itwouldtakeintoconsiderationthefailureoftheprosecutiontoproducethedirectressoftheschool asawitnessinthecase,shebeingtheonlyperson,apartfromthedaughterherself,whoreallyknewthefact. AnotherthosecaseswasthatofU.S.vs.Casipong(20Phil.Rep.,178)chargedwithmaintainingaconcubineoutsidehis homewithpublicscandal.Toprovethescandalousconductchargedanditspublicity,theprosecutionintroducedtestimony, notofwitnessesinthevicinitywheretheaccusedresidedandwherethescandalwasallegedtohaveoccurred,butthose fromanotherbarrio.NoWitnesslivinginthelocalitywherethepublicscandalwasallegedtohaveoccurredwasproduced. Thiscourt,inthedecisionofthatcaseonappeal,alloweditself,inweighingtheevidenceoftheprosecution,tobestrongly influencedbythefailuretoproduceaswitnessespersonswho,iftherehadreallybeenpublicscandal,wouldhavebeenthe first,ifnottheonlyones,toknowit.Thecourtsaid: InthiscaseitwouldhavebeeneasytohavesubmittedabundantevidencethatJuanCasipongforsookhislawful wifeandlivedinconcubinageinthevillageofBolocbocwithhisparamourGregoriaHongoy,fortherewouldhave beenanexcessofwitnessestotestifyregardingtheactionsperformedbythedefendants,actionsnotofisolated occurrencebutcarriedonformanydaysinslightofnumerousresidentsscandalizedbytheirbadexample.Butitis impossibletoconcludefromtheresultofthetrialthattheconcubinagewithscandalchargedagainstthedefendants hasbeenproved,andthereforeconvictionoftheallegedconcubineGregoriaHongoyisnotaccordingtolaw. Inthecaseatbarthequestionoftheconsentofthecompanytotheusoftheelectricitywastheessenceofthecharge.The defendantdeniedthathehadtakentheelectricitywithouttheconsentofthecompany.Theprosecutiondidnotpresentany officerofthecorporationtooffsetthisdenialandthecompanyitself,althoughrepresentedonthetrialbyitsownprivate counsel,didnotproduceasinglewitnessuponthatsubject. InthecaseofStandardOilCo.vs.State(117Tenn.,618),thecourt(p.672)said: ButthebestevidenceofwhathisinstructionstoHoltwereandtheinformationhehadofthetransactionatthetime wasmadeweretheletterswhichhewrotetoHoltdirectinghimtogotoGallatin,andthedailyandsemiweekly reportsmadetohimbyHoltandRutherfordofwhatwasdonethere,whichwerenotproduced,althoughadmitted tobetheninhispossession.Hewasawareofthevalueofsuchevidence,asheproducedacopyofhislettertoHolt, condemning the transaction, as evidence in behalf of the plaintiffs in error. The presumption always is that competentandpertinentevidencewithintheknowledgeorcontrolofapartywhichhewithholdsisagainsthis interestandinsistence.(Dunlapvs.Haynes,4Heisk.,476;Kirbyvs.Tallmadge,160U.S.,379,16Sup.Ct.,349,40 L.ed.,463;PacificConstr.Co.vs.B.W.Co.,94Fed,,180,36C.C.A.,153) InthecaseofSuccessionofDrysdale(127La.,890),thecourtheld: Whenawillpresentedforprobateisattackedonthegroundthatitisaforgery,andtherearepertinentfactsrelating tothewillinthepossessionoftheproponent,andherepeatedlyfailstotestifywhenhistestimonycouldclearup manycloudedanddoubtfulthings,hisfailuretotestifycastssuspicionuponthewill,especiallywhentheone askingfortheprobateofthewillisaprincipallegatee. InthecaseofBelknapvs.Sleeth(77Kan.,164),thecourt(p.172)said: Whateffectshouldsuchconducthaveintheconsiderationofacase,wherethesuccessfulpartythuslivingbeyond thejurisdictionofthecourthasrefusedtotestifyinamaterialmatterinbehalfoftheopposingparty?Itmustbe concededthatthebenefitofallreasonablepresumptionsarisingfromhisrefusalshouldbegiventotheotherparty. Theconductofapartyinomittingtoproduceevidencepeculiarlywithinhisknowledgefrequentlyaffordsoccasion forpresumptionsagainsthim.(Kirbyvs.Tallmadge,160U.S.,379,16Sup.Ct.,349,14L.Ed.,463.)Thisrulehas beenoftenappliedwhereapartywithholdsevidencewithinhisexclusivepossessionandthecircumstancesare suchastoimpelanhonestmantoproducethetestimony.Inthiscasethewitnessnotonlyfailedbutrefusedto testifyconcerningmaterialmattersthatmusthavebeenwithinhisknowledge.

InthecaseofHeathvs.Waters(40Mich.,457),itwasheldthat: Itistobepresumedthatwhenawitnessrefusestoexplainwhathecanexplain,theexplanationwouldbetohis prejudice. IncaseofFrickvs.Barbour(64Pa.St.,120,121),thecourtsaid: Ithasbeenmorethanoncesaidthattestimonyinacaseoftenconsistsinwhatisnotprovedaswellasinwhatis proved.Wherewithholdingtestimonyraisesaviolentpresumptionthatafactnotclearlyprovedordisprovedexists, itisnoterrortoalludetothefactofwithholding,asacircumstancestrengtheningtheproof.Thatwasallthatwas donehere. InthecaseofFundavs.St.PaulCityRailwayCo.(71Minn.,438),thecourtheld: Thedefendanthavingomittedtocallitsmotormanasawitness,althoughwithinreachandavailable,thecourtwas, under the circumstances,justifiedininstructingthejurythat,inweighingthe effect oftheevidenceactually introduced,theywereatlibertytopresumethatthetestimonyofthemotorman,ifintroduced,wouldnothavebeen favorabletothecauseofdefendant. InthecaseofGulf,C.&S.F.Ry.Co.vs.Ellis(54Fed.Rep.,481),thecircuitcourtofappealsheldthat: Failuretoproducetheengineerasawitnesstorebuttheinferencesraisedbythecircumstancialevidencewould justifythejuryinassumingthathisevidence,insteadofrebuttingsuchinference,wouldsupportthem. InWigmoreonEvidence(vol.1,sec.285),itissaid: Theconsciousnessindicatedbytheconductmaybe,notanindefiniteoneaffectingtheweaknessofthecauseat large,butaspecificoneconcerningthedefectsofaparticularelementinthecause.Thefailuretobringbeforethe tribunalsomecircumstances,document,orwitness,wheneitherthepartyhimselforhisopponentclaimsthatthe factswouldtherebybeelucidated,servestoindicate,asthemostnaturalinference,thatthepartyfearstodoso,and this fear is some evidence that circumstances or document or witness, if brought, would have exposed facts unfavorabletotheparty.Theseinferences,tobesure,cannotfairlybemadeexceptuponcertainconditions;and theyarealsoopenalwaystoexplanationbycircumstanceswhichmakesomeotherhypothesisamorenaturalone than the party's fear of exposure. But the propriety of such an inference in general is not doubted. The nonproductionofevidencethatwouldnaturallyhavebeenproducedbyanhonestandthereforefearlessclaimant permitstheinferencethatitstenorisunfavorabletotheparty'scause.... Continuingthissamesubjectthesameauthorsays: Atcommonlawthepartyopponentinacivilcasewasordinarilyprivilegedfromtakingthestand(post,sec.2217); buthewasalsodisqualified;andhencethequestioncouldrarelyarisewhetherhisfailuretotestifycouldjustify anyinferenceagainsthim.Butsincethegeneralabolitionofbothoftheprivilegeandthedisqualification(post, secs.2218,577),thepartyhasbecomebothcompetentandcompellablelikeotherwitnesses;andthequestion plainlyariseswhetherhisconductistobejudgedbythesamestandardsofinference.Thisquestionnaturallybe answeredintheaffirmative....(SeeAragonCoffeeCo.,vs.Rogers,105Va.,51.) AsIstatedattheoutset,Ihavebeenunabletofindintherecordofthiscaseanyproofoflegalvalueshowingortendingto showthattheelectricityallegedtohavebeenstolenwastakenorusedwithouttheconsentofthecompany.Thedefendant, therefore,shouldbeacquitted. ThereareotherreasonswhyIcannotagreetotheconvictionoftheaccused.Eventhoughtheaccusedtobefoundtohave committedtheactschargedagainsthim,itstandsconcededinthiscasethatthereisaspeciallawpassedparticularlyand especiallytomeetcasesofthisverykind,inwhichtheoffenseismentionedbynameanddescribedindetailandistherein madeamisdemeanorandpunishedassuch.Itisundisputedandadmittedthatheretoforeandeversincesaidactwaspassed casessuchastheoneatbarhaveuniformlyandinvariablybeencognizedandpunishedundersaidact;andthatthisisthe firstattemptevermadeintheseIslandstodisregardutterlytheplainprovisionsofthisact,andtopunishthisclassof offensesundertheprovisionsofPenalCoderelatingtolarceny.Theapplicabilityofthoseprovisionsis,tosaytheveryleast, extremelydoubtful,evenadmittingthattheyarestillinforce.Eventhoughoriginallyapplicable,theseprovisionsmustnow beheldtoberepealedbyimplication,atleastsofarasthecityofManilaisconcerned,bythepassageofthesubsequentact definingtheoffenseinquestionandpunishingitaltogetherdifferently. Moreover,Idonotbelievethatelectricity,intheforinwhichitwasdeliveredtotheaccused,issusceptibleofbeingstolen underthedefinitiongivenbythelawoftheseIslandstothecrimeoflarceny.

Concisely,then,Idissentbecause(a)thiscourt,byitsdecisioninthiscase,has,inmyjudgment,disregardedthepurposeof theLegislature,clearlyexpressed; because(b)it has appliedageneral law,ofat least verydoubtful application,toa situationcompletelydealtwith,andadmittedlysobyalaterstatuteconceivedandenactedsolelyandexpresslytocoverthat verysituation;because(c)thecourtmakessuchapplicationinspiteofthefactthat,underthegenerallaw,ifitisapplicable, thecrimeinhandisafelonywhileunderthelaterstatuteitisonlyamisdemeanor;because(d),inmyjudgment,thecourt modifiesthedefinitiongivenbytheLegislaturetothecrimeoflacerny,whichhasbeenthesameandhasreceivedthesame interpretationinthiscountryandinSpainformorethantwocenturies;because(e)thedecisiondisregards,givingno importancetoapositivestatutewhichisnotonlythelastexpressionofthelegislativewillontheparticularsubjectinhand, butwasadmittedlypassedfortheexpresspurposeofcoveringtheverysituationtowhichthecourtrefusestoapplyit.While thestatutereferredtoisanactoftheMunicipalBoardofthecityofManila,thiscourthasheldinarecentcasethatsaid boardwasauthorizedbythelegislaturetopassit.ThereforeitisanActoftheLegislatureofthePhilippineIslands. InthisdissentIshallassert,and,Ithink,demonstratethreepropositions,towit: First.Thatanelectriccurrentisnotatangiblething,achattel,butisacondition,astateinwhichathingorchattelfinds itself;andthataconditionorstatecannotbestolenindependentlyofthethingorchattelofwhichitisaconditionorstate. Thatitischattelswhicharesubjectsoflacernyandnotconditions. Second.That,evenifanelectriccurrentisatangiblething,achattel,andcapableofbeingstolen,inthecaseatbar no electriccurrentwastakenbythedefendant,andthereforenonewasstolen.Thedefendantsimplymadeuseoftheelectric current,returningtothecompanyexactlythesameamountthathereceived. Third.That,evenifanelectriccurrentisatangiblething,achattel,andcapableofbeingstolen,thecontractbetweenthe companyandthedefendantwasoneforuseandnotforconsumption;andallthedefendantisshowntohavedone,whichis allhecouldpossiblyhavedone,wastomakeuseofacurrentofelectricityandnottotakeorconsumeelectricityitself. Ishallthereforemaintainthatthereisnolacernyeventhoughthedefendantcommittedalltheactschargedagainsthim. Indiscussingthequestionwhether,underthelawofthePhilippineIslands,anelectriccurrentisthesubjectoflarceny,I shallproceeduponthetheory,universallyacceptedtoday,thatelectricityisnothingmoreorlessthan energy.AsMr. MeadowcroftsaysinhisABCofElectricity,indorsedbyMr.Edison,"electricityisaformofenergy,orforce,andis obtainedbytransformingsomeotherformofenergyintoelectricalenergy." InthisIdonotforgetthetheoryofthe"Electron"whichisnowbeingquietlyinvestigatedandstudied,whichseemstotend totheconclusionthatthereisnodifferencebetweenenergyandmatter,andthatallmatterissimplyamanifestationof energy.Thistheoryisnotestablished,hasnotbeenannouncedbyanyscientistasproved,andwouldprobablyhavenoeffect onthepresentdiscussionifitwere. BasedonthisacceptedtheoryIdrawtheconclusioninthefollowingpagesthatelectricityisnotthesubjectoflarcenyunder thelawofthePhilippineIslands. Partida3,title29,law4,thusdefines"cosasmuebles:" Thetermmueblesisappliedtoallthethingsthatmencanmovefromoneplacetoanother,andallthosethatcan naturally move themselves: those that men can move from one place to another are such as cloths, books, provisions,wineoroil,andallotherthingslikethem;andthosethatcannaturallymovethemselvesaresuchas horses,mules,andtheotherbeast,andcattle,fowlsandothersimilarthings. Partida5title5,law29,containsthefollowing: Butalltheotherthingswhicharemueblesandarenotannexedtothehouseordonotappeartaintheretobelongto thevendorandhecantakethemawayanddowhathelikeswiththem:sucharethewardrobes,casksandthejars notfixedintheground,andothersimilarthings. Article517ofthePenalCode,inthatportiondefininglarceny,aschargedagainsttheaccusedinthecaseatbar,reads: ART.517.Thefollowingareguiltyoftheft: 1.Thosewho,withintentofgainandwithoutviolenceorintimidationagainstthepersonorforceagainstthings, shalltakeanother'spersonalproperty(cosasmuebles)withouttheowner'sconsent. ThisarticleofthePenalCode,asisseen,employspreciselythewordsdefinedinthePartidas.Thedefinitionofthewordis clearinthelawaswritten.Itisalsoclearinthelawasinterpreted.IhavenotbeenabletofindawriteronSpanishorRoman criminallawwhodoesnotsayclearlyandpositivelythattheonlypropertysubjecttolacernyistangiblemovablechattels,

thosewhichoccupyspace,havethreedimensions,haveaseparateandindependent existenceoftheirownapartfrom everythingelse,andcanbemanuallyseizedandcarriedfromoneplacetoanother.Thiswastheunquestionedtheoryofthe RomancriminallawanditistheundoubtedandunquestionedtheoryoftheSpanishcriminallaw.NordoIfindawriteror commentatorontheSpanishorRomanCivilLawwhodoesnotdefineacosamuebleinthesameway. OneoftheleadingcommentatorsofSpainoncriminallawwritesthusconcerningthepropertysubjecttorobberyand lacerny: Personalpropertybelongingtoanother.Ifrobberyconsistsinthetakingofathingforthepurposeandbythe meansindicatedinthearticleinquestion,itfollowsfromtheverynatureofthisclassofcrimes,thatonlypersonal ormovablepropertycanbethesubjectthereof,becausenonebutsuchpropertycanbethesubjectofthecorrectatio oftheRomans;"Furtumsincecontrectationenonfiat,"saysUlpian.Theabstraction,therapine,thetaking,andall theanalogoustermsandexpressionsusedinthecodes,implythenecessitythatthethingsabstractedortakencan becarriedfromoneplacetoanother.Hencethelegalmaxim:Realproperty"noncontractantur,sedinvaduntur."(6 Groizard,p.47) Theactoftakingiswhatconstitutesthecontrectatioandtheinvitodominowhichallthegreatancientandmodern juristsconsiderasthecommoningredient(inadditiontothefraudulentintentionofgain),ofthecrimesofrobbery andtheft.Fromwhathasbeensaiditfollowsthatthetaking,theactoftakingwithoutviolenceorintimidationto thepersons,orforceuponthethings,forthepurposeofgainandagainstthewilloftheowner,iswhatdetermines thenatureofthecrimeoftheftasdefinedinparagraph1ofthissection.(6Groizard,pp.261,262.) Thematerialactoftakingis,therefore,anelementofthecrimewhichcannotbereplacedbyanyotherequivalent element.Fromthisprincipleimportantconsequencesfollowwhichweneednotnowstoptoconsiderforthereason thatinspeakingofthecrimeofrobberywehavealreadydiscussedthesubjectatgreatlength.Immovableand incorporealthingscannotbethesubjectofthetheftforthereasonthatinneithertheoneortheotherisitpossible toeffectthecontrectatio,thatistosay,thematerialactoflayinghandsonthemforthepurposeofremovingthe same, taxing the same or abstracting the same. Hence the legal maxims: "Furtum non committitur in rebus immobilibusandResincorporalesnectradipossideripossunt,itacontectavitnecaufferri."(6Groizard,p.266.) CriticisinganopinionofthesupremecourtofSpainwhichheldthatilluminatinggaswasasubjectoflacerny,thesame writersays: Theownerofacertainstorewhohadenteredintoacontractwithagascompanywherebyhesubstantiallyagreedto payfortheconsumptionoftheamountofgaswhichpassedthroughameter,surreptitiouslyplacedapipewhichhe connectedwiththebranchfromthemainpipebeforeitreachedthemeterandusedthesameforburningmore lightsthanthoseforwhichheactuallypaid.ThesupremecourtofMadridconvictedthedefendantofthecrimeof estafabutthesupremecourtofSpainreversedthejudgment,holdingthatheshouldbeconvictedoftheft.Theonly reasonwhichthesupremecourthadforsodecidingwasthattheownerofthestorehadtakenpersonalproperty belongingtoanotherwithoutthelatter'sconsent,therebycommittingthecrimenotofestafabutofconsummated theft.Butinourjudgment,consideringthesenseandimport ofthesectionunderconsideration,itcannotbe properlysaidthattheownerofthestoretookthegasbecauseinordertodothisitwouldhavebeennecessarythat thesaidfluidwerecapableofbeingtakenortransported,inotherwords,thatthe contrectatio,themeaningof whichwehavealreadysufficientlyexplained,shouldhavetakenplace. Gasisnotonlyintangibleandthereforeimpossibleofbeingthesubjectofcontrectatio,ofbeingseized,removed, ortransportedfromoneplacetoanotherbytheexerciseofthemeanspurelynaturalwhichmanemploysintaking possessionofpropertybelongingtoanother,but,byreasonofitsnature,itisnecessarythatitbekeptintank,or thatitbetransmittedthroughtubesorpipeswhichbyreasonoftheirconstruction,orbyreasonofthebuildingto whichthesamemaybeattached,partakeofthenatureofimmovableproperty.Thereisnomeans,therefore,of abstractinggasfromatank,fromatunnelorfromapipewhichconveysthefluidtoabuilding,forthepurposeof beingconsumedtherein,unlessthereceptaclecontainingthesameisbroken,orthetankorpipebored,andother tubesorpipesareconnectedtherewithatthepointoftheopeningorfracturebymeansofwhichthegascan conveyedtoaplacedifferentfromthatforwhichitwasoriginallyintended. Thisexposition,interpretation,ifyouchoosetocallitsuch,hasafurtherfoundationinouroldlawswhichhavenot beenchangedbutratherpreservedinthedefinitionofmovableanimmovablepropertygivenbytheCivilCode. AccordingtoLaw,ITitleXVII,PartidaII,personalpropertymeansthosethingswhichliveandmovenaturallyby themselves,andthosewhichareneitherlivingnorcannaturallymove,butwhichmayberemoved;andLawIV, TitleXXIX,PartidaIII,definespersonalpropertyasthatwhichmancanmoveortakefromoneplacetoanother,

andthosethingswhichnaturallybythemselvescanmove.Finally,corporealthings,accordingtoLawI,TitleIII, PartidaIII,arethosewhichmaybethesubjectofpossessionwiththeassistanceofthebody,andincorporealthose whichcannotbephysicallyseized,andcannotbeproperlypossessed.Fromthesedefinitionsitfollowsthatunless wedoviolencetotheplainlanguageofthesedefinitions,itwouldbeimpossibletoadmitthatgasisacorporeal thing,andmuchlessthatitismovableproperty.(6Groizard,pp.268,269.) Iftheholdingthatgas,whichisunquestionablyaphysicalentityhavingaseparateandindependentexistenceandoccupying space,hasapproachedthevergeofunstealablepropertysocloselythattheablestofSpaincommentatorsbelievesthatthere is grave danger of the complete destruction of the ancient legislative definition of stealable property by judicial interpretation,whatwouldbesaidinregardtoadecisionholdingthatanelectriccurrentisasubjectoflacerny? Itmaybewelltoaddjusthere,althoughitmaybesomewhatoutofitsregularorder,whattheauthorabovequotedregards wasthecrimeactuallycommittedinthecasehewasdiscussing.Hesays: Forus,forthereasonshereinbeforesetout,itwouldbemoreinharmonywiththeprinciplesandlegaltextswhich determinethenatureofthecrimesoftheftandestafa,toassignthelatterdesignationtothefraudulentactwhichhe haveheretoforeexaminedandwhichsubstantiallyconsistsinthealteration,bymeansofafraudulentmethod,ofthe systemestablishedbyanagreementtosupplyastorewithilluminatinggasandtodeterminetheamountconsumed forlightingandheatingandpayitsjustvalue.Werespect,however,thereasonstothecontraryadvancedinthe hopethatthesupremecourtinsubsequentjudgmentswilldefinitelyfixthejurisprudenceonthesubject. Norcantheabusiveuseofathingdeterminetheexistenceofthecrimeunderconsideration.Abaileeorpledgee whodisposesofthething,bailorpledgeentrustedtohiscustodyforhisownbenefitisnotguiltyoflacernyforthe reasonthatbothcontractsnecessarilyimplythevoluntarydeliveryofthethingbytheownerthereofandalawful possessionofthesamepriortotheabusiveuseofit. Notevenadenialoftheexistenceofthebailmentorcontractofpledgewithofgainconstitutesthecrimeoflacerny forthereasonthatthematerialactoftakingpossessionofthepropertywithouttheconsentoftheownerislacking. (6Groizard,p.269.) ThatundertheRomanandSpanishlawpropertytobethesubjectoflacernymustbeatangiblechattelwhichhasaseparate independentexistenceofitsownapartfromeverythingelse,whichhasthreedimensionsanoccupiesspacesothatitmayof itself be bodilyseized andcarriedaway,isnotanopenquestion.Thatthatwasalsothedoctrineofthecommonlawis equallybeyondquestion. Intheconsiderationofthiscasethegreatdifficultyliesinconfusingthe appearance withthething,inconfoundingthe analogy withthe things analogous.Itissaidthattheanalogybetweenelectricityandrealliquidsorgasisabsolutely complete;thatliquidsandgasespassthroughpipesfromtheplaceofmanufacturetotheplaceofuse;andtheelectric current,inapparentlythesamemanner,passesthroughawirefromtheplanttothelamp;thatitismeasuredbyameterlike liquidsandgas;thatitcanbedivertedordrawnfromthewireinwhichthemanufacturerhasplacedit,tothelightinthe possessionofanother;thatadesigningandunscrupulouspersonmay,bymeansofawiresurreptiouslyandcriminally transferfromawireownedbyanotheralltheelectricitywhichitcontainspreciselyashemightdrawmolassesfromabarrel forhispersonaluse.Andthequestionistriumphantlyput,"howcanyouescapetheinevitableresultsofthisanalogy?"The answeristhatitisananalogyandnothingmore.Itisanappearance.Thewirefromwhichtheelectricitywasdrawnhaslost nothing.Itisexactlythesameentity.Itweighsthesame,hasjustasmanyatoms,arrangedinexactlythesameway,isjustas hardandjustasdurable.Itexactlythesamethingasitwasbeforeitreceivedtheelectricity,atthetimeithadit,andafterit waswithdrawnfromit.Thedifferencebetweenawirebeforeandaftertheremovaloftheelectricityissimplyadifference ofcondition.Beingchargedwithelectricityithadaqualityorconditionwhichwascapableofbeingtransferredtosome otherbodyand,inthecourseofthattransfer,ofdoingworkorperformingservice.Abodyinanelevatedpositionisina conditiondifferentfromabodyatsealeveloratthecenteroftheearth.Ithasthequalityofbeingabletodosomething,to performsomeservicebythemerechangeoflocation.Ithaspotentialenergy,measuredbytheamountofworkrequiredto elevatedit.Theweightormonkeyofapiledriveristhesameweightwhenelevated50feetinairasitiswhenitliesontop ofthepile50feetbelow,butithasaltogetheradifferentquality.Whenelevateditiscapableofworkingformanbydriving apile.Whenlyingontopofthepile,oratsealevel,ithasnosuchquality.Thequestionis,"canyoustealthatquality?" Twopiledrivers,ownedbydifferentpersons,arelocatedneareachother.Theoneownerhas,bymeansofhisengineand machinery,raisedhisweighttoitshighestelevation,readytodeliverablow.Whilethisownerisabsentovernighttheowner oftheotherpiledriver,surreptiouslyandwithevildesignandintent,unlockstheweightand,bymeansofsomemechanical contrivance,takesadvantageofitsfallinsuchawaythattheenergythusproducedraisedtheweightofhisownpiledriver toanelevationoffortyfeet,whereitremainsready,whenreleased,toperformserviceforhim.Whathashappened?Exactly

thesamething,essentially,ashappenedwhentheelectricchargeofonebatteryistransferredtoanother.Thecondition whichwasinherentintheelevatedweightwastransferredtotheweightwhichwasnotelevated;thatis,thepotentialenergy whichwasaconditionorqualityoftheelevatedweightwasbyawrongfulacttransferredtoanother.Butwasthatcondition orqualitystoleninthesensethatitwasasubjectoflacernyasthatcrimeisdefinedtheworldover?Wouldtheonewho stolethebatteryafterithadbeenelevatedtotheceiling,ortheweightofthepiledriverafterithadbeenelevated50feetin theair,beguiltyofadifferentoffensethanifhestolethosechattelsbeforesuchelevation?Notatall.Theweightelevated hadmorevalue,inasense,thanonenotelevated;andthequalityofelevationisconsideredonlyinfixing value.Ithas nothingwhatevertodowiththenatureofthecrimecommitted.Itisimpossibletostealaqualityorconditionapartfromthe thingorchattelofwhichitisaqualityorconditionofathingaffectsthevalueofthething.Itisimpossibletostealvalue. Thething,thechattelisthatwhichisstolen.Itsqualityorconditionisthatwhich,withothercircumstances,goestomake thevalue. Amillownerhascollectedalargeamountofwaterinadamatsuchanelevationastobecapableofrunninghismillfora giventime.Aneighboringmillownersecretlyintroducesapipeinthedamandconveysthewatertohisownmill,usingit forhisownbenefit.Hemayhavestolenthewater,butdidhestealthehead,theelevationofthewaterabovethewheel?The factthatthewaterhadaheadmadeitmorevaluableandthatfactwouldbetakenintoconsiderationinfixingthepenalty whichoughttobeimposedfortheoffense;butithasnothingwhatevertodowithdeterminingthenatureoftheoffenseof whichthemanwouldbecharged. Larcenycannotbecommittedagainstqualitiesorconditions.Itiscommittedsolelyagainstchattels,tangiblethings.Agiven chattelisacompromiseresultofallitsproperties,qualities,orconditions.Noneofthequalitieswhichgomakeupthe completethingisthesubjectoflarceny.Onecannotstealfromaroofthequalityofsheddingrain,althoughhemayboreit fullofholesandthusspoilthatquality;andthis,nomatterhowmuchhemightbebenefittherebyhimself.If,inacountry whereblackhorseswereverydearandwhitehorsesverycheap,one,byasubtleprocess,tookfromablackhorsethequality ofbeingblackandtransferredthatqualitytohisownhorse,whichformerlywaswhite,therebygreatlyincreasingitsvalue andcorrespondinglydecreasingthevalueoftheotherhorsewhichbytheprocesswasmadewhite,wouldhebeguiltyof larceny?Wouldhebeguiltyoflarcenywho,withintenttogain,secretlyandfurtivelyandwiththepurposeofdeprivingthe trueownerofhisproperty,tookfromabarofstealbelongingtoanotherthequalityofbeinghard,stiffandunyieldingand transferredthatqualitytoawillowwandbelongingtohimself?Isheguiltyoflarcenywho,withintenttodefraudandto benefithimselfcorrespondingly,takesfromacopperwirebelongingtoanotherthequalityofbeingelectrifiedandtransfers thatqualitytoanelectriclight?Anelectriccurrentiseitheratangible thing,a chattel ofandbyitself,withaperfect, separateandindependentexistence,orelseitisamerequality,propertyorconditionofsometangiblethingorchattelwhich doeshavesuchanexistence.Theacceptedtheorytodayis,anditisthatwhichmustcontrol,thatelectricityisnotatangible thingorchattel,thatithasnoqualitiesofitsown,thatithasnodimensions,thatitisimponderable,impalpable,intangible, invisible,unweighable,weightless,colorless,tasteless,odorless,hasnoform,nomass,cannotbemeasured,doesnotoccupy space,andhasnoseparateexistence.Itis,mustbe,therefore,simplya quality,a condition,a property ofsome tangible thingorchattelwhichhasallormostofthosequalitieswhichelectricityhasnot.Beingmerelythequalityofathingandnot thethingitself,itcannotbethesubjectoflarceny. Torepeat"Asweknowit,electricityisnothingmoreorlessthanaconditionofmatter.Ithasnoexistenceapartfromthe thingofwhichitiscondition.Inotherwords,ithasnoseparate,independentexistence.Itisimmaterial,imponderable, impalpable,intangible,invisible,weightlessandimmeasurable,istasteless,odorless,andcolorless.Ithasnodimensions andoccupiesnospace.Itistheenergylatentinaliveherselfisthepowerpotentialinthearmofalaborer.Itistheforce storedinthewoundupspring.Itisanagency,nota"cosamueble."Itisamovementandnotachattel.Itisenergyandnota body.Itiswhatthelaborerexpendsandnotwhatheproduces.Itisstrengthstripedbyanunknownprocessfromarmsof menandatomsofcoal,collectedandmarshalledatagivenplaceunderthemysteriousleashofmetal,readytospringlikea livingservanttotheworkofitsmaster.Itisnotachattel,itislife.Itisasincapableofbeingstolen,byitself,astheenergy latentinalivehorse.Itisasimpossibletostealanelectriccurrentasitistostealtheenergyhiddeninawoundupwatch spring.Onemaystealthehorseandwithittheenergywhichisaqualityofthehorse.Onemaystealawatchandwithitthe energywhichisapropertyofthewoundup.Butcanwesaythatonecanstealtheenergyinthewatchspringseparatefrom thespringitself,orelectricityapartfromthewireofwhichitisaqualityorcondition? Alaborerwasstoredupinhismusclesthecapacitytodoaday'swork.Hehaspotentialenergypackedawayinlittlecellsor batteriesallthroughhisbody.Withthepropermechanismhecanenteraroomwhichitisdesiredtolightwithelectricity and,byusingthestoredupenergyofhisbodyonthemechanism,lighttheroombytransformingtheenergyofhismuscles intotheelectricitywhichilluminatestheroom.Wehave,then,alaborerwho,bymovinghishandsandarmsinconnection withtheappropriatemachinery,isabletolighttheroominwhichheisatthetime.Whatcausesthelight?Theenergyinthe laborer'smusclesistransformedintolightbymeansoftheintermediatephenomenonknownaselectricity.Asaconcrete

result,wehavetheenergyinthelaborer'smusclestransmutedintolight.Now,istheenergypassingthroughthewire,more capableofbeingstolenthantheenergyinthemusclesofthelaborer?Oristhelightorheatanymoreorlessasubjectof larcenythantheelectriccurrentofwhichtheyareamanifestation?Couldtheenergywhichperformedtheday'sworkbe stolen?Couldtheelectriccurrentwhichlightedtheroombestolenapartfromthewireofwhichitwasaquality?Onemight kidnapthelaborerandwithhimtheenergywhichconstituteshislife;butcanwesaythattheenergy,ofitself,isthesubject ofseparatelarceny?But,itthelaborer'senergycannotbestolenwhileitresidesinandisaqualityofhisarm,canthesame energyanymorebestolenwhenitresidesinandisaqualityofawireintheformofelectricity?Ifso,justwhereisthe dividingline,whereisthepointatwhichthiskineticenergyceasestobeincapableofbeingseparatelystolenandbecomesa subjecttotheft?Isitatthecrankbywhichthelaborerturnsthemachine?Isitatthearmature,theconductor,thefields coils,thefieldmagnet,thecommutator,thebrushes,thedrivingpulley,orthebelttightener?Isitwherethecurrententers whatiscalledtheelectriclightwire,orisitwhereitentersthebulborarcandproducesthelight?Inotherwords,atwhat pointdoestheuntealablelaborer'senergybecomestealableelectricenergy? Anelectriclightwireplacedinahouseforthepurposeoffurnishinglightforthesamehasitsprecisecounterpartina laborerplacedthereinforthesamepurpose.Likethelaborer,itisfilledwithenergywhichwill,whenreleased,performthe serviceintended.Thewireissimplyameansoftransmittingtheenergyofthelaborer'smuscles,andthatstoredintonsof coalwhichhehandles,fromtheelectricplantorfactorytothehousewherethelightisproduced.Thewiresimplyavoids thenecessityofthelaborerbeingintheveryhousewhereheproducesthelight.Insteadofbeingthere,he,bymeansofthe socalledelectriclightwire,islocatedatadistance,butproducesthelightinexactlythesameway,transmittinghisenergy forthatpurpose.Thewirestandsinexactlythesamerelationtothepersoninwhosehouseitisputaswouldalaborerwho hadbeensenttothathousetorenderservices.Theenergymaybedivertedfromthepurposeforwhichitwasintended,ora wrongaccountgivenoftheamountofworkperformedbythatenergy;butitisimpossibletosteal,takeandcarrytheenergy away.Onecannotstealdays'works;andthatisallanelectriccurrentis.Onemayusethosedays'worksinhoeingcornwhen ithasbeenagreedthattheyshallbeusedinpickingcotton;butthatisnotlarcenyofthedays'works,aslarcenyhasbeen definedbythejurisprudenceofeverycountry,Or,onemayreporttotheownerofthosedays'worksthathehadusedthree ofthemwheninrealityheusedthirtyandpayhimaccordingly,butthatisnotlarcenyofthetwentyseven. But,itisargued,theillustrationisnotafairone;energyinalaborer'sarmorinthemusclesofahorseorinawoundup springis,sofarasitscapabilityofbeingstolenisconcerned,quitedifferentfromenergywhichhasbeenseparatedfromthe armsofthelaborerorthemusclesofthehorseanddriventhroughawire;fromsuchwireelectricitymaybedrawnlike waterfromabarrel;andwhileitisimpossibletostealtheenergyofamanorahorsebecauseitwoulddestroythelifeofthe animal,anentirelydifferentquestionispresentedwhentheenergy hasactuallybeenseparated fromthoseanimalsand confinedinawire. Thisargumenthasseveralfundamentaldefects.Inthefirstplace,itassumesthewholequestionatissue.Byassertingthat electricityisseparablefromtheobjectofwhichitisaqualityorstateistoassumethatelectricityisamaterialthing,which therealquestiontoberesolved.Inthesecondplace,ifelectricityisintherealsenseofthatterm,separablefromtheobject towhichitbelongs,thenitmustbeadmittedthatitiscapableofseparateandindependentexistenceapartfromanyother object.Thisisnotso.Itisnotonlyadmittedbutcontendedbyeveryscientistwhohastouchedthissubjectthatelectricityis incapableofanindependentexistenceapartfromsomegivenmaterialobject.Inthethirdplace,thisargumentoverlooksthe fact,evenifweassumethatitcanbeseparated,thatthethingwhenseparatedisnotthesamethingthatitwasbefore separation;inotherwords,whenthesocalledseparationoccursthereisnotonlyatransferenceofenergyfromthehorseto thebatterybutthereisalsoatransformation.Inthehorseitismuscularenergy.Inthewireitiselectricalenergy.Inthe horseitispotential.Inthewirekinetic.Itisnotthesamethinginthewirethatitwasinthehorse.Inthefourthplace,the argumentmakesthestealabilityofathingdependnotonitsnaturebutonwhereitislocated.Thisisanassumptionwholly unwarrantedandimpossibleunderthelaw.Tosaythatwhetherornotathingisstealabledependsnotonitsnaturebuton whereitislocatedisabsurd.Adiamondringinaburglarproofsafeisasmuchasubjectoflarceny,underthedefinitionof thelaw,asifitlayinanopenshowcase.Ifenergyisstealableatall,anditmustberememberedthatIamproceeding,aswe mustnecessarilyproceedupontheacceptedtheorythatelectricityisnothingmoreorlessthanenergy,itissobyreasonof itsnatureandbyreasonofitsresidinginabatteryratherthaninahorse;andifitisstealablebyvirtueofitsnatureitcanbe stolenfromthehorseaswellasfromthebatteryorwire.Athingissubjecttolarcenybecause,andonlybecause,itisacosa mueble,notbecauseitisinsideahorse,awireorasafe.Ifitisacosamuebleitisthesubjectoflarcenyalthoughitbe locatedonthemoon;andifitisnotacosamuebleitisnotsubjecttolacernyalthoughitbeplacedinadenofthieves.The difficultyoreaseofgettingatathinghasnothingwhatevertodowithitsstealability.Inthefifthplace,thisargument overlookstheveryimportantfact,tobedealtwithmoreatlengthlater,thattheelectriccurrentusedbytheaccusedwas returnedtothecompany,afteruse,absolutelyundiminishedinquantity. What,then,isthedifferencebetweencorn,forexample,andanelectriccurrent?Itisthis.Oneisacosamueblewhilethe

otherisnot;oneisproducedbyawhollydifferentprocessfromtheotherandfromwhollydifferentmaterials,ifwemaycall materialsthosechangeswhichresultintheimmaterialthingcalledanelectriccurrent;inthecaseofcornwedealnotwith thequalityorenergyofcorn,butwithcornasacompositeandconcreteresultofallitsqualitiesanduses;wedealwitha tangiblething,achattel,andnotwithaconditionorqualityofatangiblething;wedealwiththingsinsteadofideas,with thingswhichexistseparateandindependentandwhichdonotdepend,asdoeselectricity,whollyuponsomebodynotonly forthecapabilityofmanifestingitsexistence, butalsoforveryexistenceitself ;becausewedealwithsomethingwhich changesitsformbutneveritsnatureasaphysicalentity.Itisalwaysachattel,atangiblething,acosamueble. Ontheotherhand,inthecaseoftheelectriccurrentwedealnotwithathing,achattelacosamueble,butwithacondition or quality,a property ofa cosamueble;withanideawhichalways,beforeithasanysignificanceofmeaningwhatever, associatesitselfwithanentity,abodyorchattel,asacharacteristicorqualityofsuchbodyorchattel;withlinesofforce whicharemerelyandsolelyaquality,aproperty,acharacteristicofthemagnet,insteadofwhichgrainsofcornwhichare absoluteentities,independentofandapartfromeverythingelse,andnotmerecharacteristicorqualitiesofsomeentityof bodywhichdoesnotexistasanabsolutephysicalentityinitself;withthehorseandthevioletandnottheirperfume;with thelilyandnotits beauty;withthecloudsandnottheir color;withentitiesandnotaccidents;withrealitiesandnotthe imponderable,impalpableideasandqualitieswhichmakeupthereality. Ashealreadybeensaid,thedifficultyintheelucidationofthequestioncomesfromtheconfusionofqualitieswiththings, ofappearanceswithrealities.Apparentlyanelectriccurrentdoesthings.Itproducesphenomena.It,therefore,appearsto besomething.Butitmustnotbeforgottenthatmanytimesappearancesaredeceitful.Theydonotalwaysinsurerealities.It isnotjudicialtosaythat,becauseathinglooksso,itisso.Itisnotjudicialtosaythat,simplybecauseitlooksasifone committedlarceny,thereforeheisguiltyoflarceny.Beforewemaylegallyconvictoneoflarceny,wemustknowexactly what hedid.Justiceisnot foundedonguessworknoronappearances.Men'sright arepreservedbydefinitions,and definitionsarefoundedonfacts,notfancies,onrealities,notappearances.Because,whenonetapsanelectricallycharged wirebelongingtoanotherand,bymeansofacontrivance,transfersthechargetohisownuses,itlooksasifhewasstealing something,isnotsufficienttoconvicthimoflarceny.Wemustfirstknowwhatlarcenyis,aswellaswhatanelectriccurrent is,andwhatismeantbyitsuseinproducinglight.Toknowwhatlarcenyiswemustknowwhatlegislatorsandjudges duringthedevelopmentofjurisprudencehavealwayssaidandagreeditis.Inotherwords,wemustknowitsdefinition.It approachestyrannytoconvictoneofmurderwhenisactuallyguiltyofhomicideonly.Yettheonlythingwhichseparates thetwocrimesisadefinition.Itiswrongtoconvictoneofrobberywhoisguiltyonlyoflarceny.Yetthesetwocrimesare distinguishedonlybyadefinition.If,asinthecaseatbar,whetherornotoneisdeclaredafelonandissenttoprisonforone yeareightmonthsandtwentyonedays,isforeverdisqualifiedfromholdingpublicofficeandofexercisingtherightof suffrage,orwhether,instead,heisdeclaredguiltyofamisdemeanorsimplyandpunishedlightlywithnoaccompanying disqualifications,dependsuponwhetherhehascommittedlarcenyasdefinedbythePenalCodeorwhetherhehasmerely violatedacityordinance,thequestionwhether heactuallycommittedlarceny ornotbegins toassumeimportance.It assumesimportancenotonlytohimbuttosocietyaswell.Ifacourttodaypalpablymodifiesadefinitioninorderto convictanoffenderoflarceny,howcansocietybeassuredthattomorrowthesamecourt willnotmodifysomeother definitiontoconvictacitizenoftreason?Whendefinitionsaredestroyednomanissecureinhispersonorhisproperty. Whenmenactonappearancesinsteadofrealitiesjusticewillbeshortlived.Awhalelookslikeafish,actslikeafish,swims likeafishandlivesallitslifeinthewaterlikeafish.Butitisnotafish.Itisananimal.Itisairbreathing,warmblooded, andviviparous,andsucklesitsyoung.Now,ifwhetherornotawhaleisafishorananimalisthepotentfactordetermining whetheramangoestostateprisonasafelonwithallthedeplorableconsequencesresulting,orwhetherheislightly sentencedasameremisdemeanant,isitnotofthesupremestimportancetodeterminewhetherawhaleisafishoran animal?IaminformedthatitusedtobeacommonsightinTheNewYorkZoologicalGardenstoseeMr.Crowley,thelarge andextremelyintelligentchimpanzee,dressedinfaultlessattire,sitatthetableandtakehisfoodandwinelikeagentleman. Childrenbelievedhimtobeaman;andmanyintelligentgrownpeoplehonestlybelievedthathewasasmuchmanas chimpanzee.ButiftheofficialsofthecityofNewYorkhadbeenindictedforkidnapping,basedupontheseizureand forcibledetentionofMr.Crowley,woulditnothavebeenofthemostsolemnimportancetothemtothrowawayappearances anddetermineaccuratelywhatMr.Crowleyreallywas?Andincaseofdoubtastowhathewas,couldtheynotjustlyhave demandedthebenefitofthatdoubt? So,whereonewhodivertedanelectriccurrenthasbeenaccusedbyreasonthereofofthecrimeoflarceny,whichcrime,it being admitted, can be committed only against tangible things, chattels, is it not of the very greatest importance to determinewhatanelectriccurrentis,thatis,whetheritisa tangiblething,a chattel,ornotandwhatisthenatureand meaningoftheprocessbywhichittransformsitselfintoelectriclight?Andincaseofdoubtaswhatitis,cannotthe accusedjustlydemandthebenefitofthatdoubt?Toconvictoneoflarcenyitisnotsufficienttoshowmerelythatawrongful acthasbeendone;butitmustappearthatawrongfulactofaparticularkindhasbeencommitted.Toconstitutelarcenyit

mustbeprovedthatthewrongfulactwascommittedagainstchattels,againsttangiblethings,whichwereseizeduponand asported bytheoneaccused.Inthecaseatbarithasnotbeenshownthattheaccusedlaidunlawfulhandsuponand asportedatangiblething,achattel,unacosamueble.Theveryleastthattheprosecutionmustnecessarilyadmitisthatno oneknowswhatelectricityreallyis.Thatbeingso,itseemstometobeacontradictionoftermstosaythatlarceny,which mustadmittedlybecommittedagainsta knownthing,canbecommittedagainstathing absolutelyunknown.Atleastit wouldseemthatthereisagravedoubtaboutthedefinitionoflarcenycoveringwrongfulactsrelativetoanelectriccurrent; andbyreasonofthatdoubttheconvictionoughtnottobesustained.Andifitistrue,asIhavehereinattemptedtoshow, that,undertheprevailingandgenerallyacceptedtheory,electricityisnothingmoreorlessthanacondition,aquality,a propertyofsometangiblething,somechattelorbody,then,certainly,thechargeoflarcenymustfall,asthatcrimecanbe committedonlyagainstthethingandnotagainstaqualityofthething. Althoughtheonlyquestioninthiscaseiswhetherelectricityissuchatangiblething,ascan,underthedefinitionoflacerny containedinthePenalCode,bethesubjectoflacerny,neverthelessthecourtdismissedthatquestionsubstantiallywithout discussion,theonlyreferencetheretobeingthefollowing: Iistruethatelectricityisnolonger,asformerly,regardedbyelectriciansasafluid,butitsmanifestationsand effects,likethoseofgas,maybeseenandfelt.Thetruetestofwhatisapropersubjectoflacernyseemstobenot whetherthesubjectisincorporeal,butwhetheritiscapableofappropriationbyanotherthantheowner. xxxxxxxxx Electricity,thesameasgas,isavaluablearticleofmerchandise,boughtandsoldlikeotherpersonalpropertyandis capableofappropriationbyanother.Sonoerrorwascommittedbythetrialcourtinholdingthatelectricityisa subjectoflacerny. Thestatementfailtotouchtheessentialquestioninvolvedandiswhollybesidethepointforthefollowingreasons,lying asideforthemomentthenatureoftheactwhichtheaccusedactuallycommitted,assumingthathecommittedtheact describedbythewitnessesfortheprosecution: Inthefirstplace,asIunderstandthelaw,thestatementisnotquitecorrectthat,inthePhilippineIslands,"thetruetestof whatisapropersubjectoflacernyseemstobenotwhetherthesubjectiscorporealorincorporeal,butwhetheritiscapable of appropriation,"unlesstheword"appropriation"hasthesamemeaningastheword"taking"usedinthearticleofthe PenalCodedefininglarceny.Ifthecourtintendedtousetheword"appropriation"inthesenseof"taking,"thenitsusewas unnecessaryandmaybemisleading.Ifitdidnotsointend,thentheruleoflawlaiddownbythecourtisnotasIunderstand thelawtobe.Anappropriationinadditiontoordifferentfromthetakingisnotanessentialoflacernyanywhere.Wharton saysthat"lacernyidisthefraudulenttakingand carryingaway ofathingwithoutclaimofright,withthe intention of convertingittoauseotherthanthatoftheownerandwithouthisconsent."Article517ofthePenalCodeprovidesthatthey shallbeguiltyoflacerny"who...take(toman)(notappropriate)another'scosasmuebles(movablechattels)withoutthe owner'sconsent."Unless,therefore,theword"appropriation"isusedinthesamesenseas"taking,"theparagraphinthe court'sdecisionabovequoteddoesnotcontainacorrectstatementofthelaw.Ifitmeansthesamethingthentheuseofthe wordinnowayenlightensthesituation;foritisjustasdifficulttodeterminewhetheracosamueblecanbeappropriatedas itistodeterminewhetheritcanbetaken.Thequestionbeforeusiswhetherornotelectricityissuchacosamueblethatit canbetakenunderthelawoflacerny.Tosubstituteinthatproblemtheword"appropriation"fortheword"taking"doesnot laidinitssolutionintheslightestdegreewhenitisadmittedthatthewordsubstitutedmeansexactlythesamethingasthe wordintheplaceofwhichitwassubstituted. Anillustrationwillservefurthertoshowthefallacyinherentinthestatementquoted:LetussupposethatthePenalCode definedlarcenythus:"Anypersonwho,withintenttogain,takesfromanotherhiscakewithouthisconsentshallbeguilty oflacerny."Letussupposethatsomeoneshouldthendefinedthesubjectoflacernyasanything,corporealorincorporeal, whichcanbe"appropriated."Itwouldbeobviousthatsuchdefinitionwouldbeerroneous,forthereasonthat,whilepieisas capableofbeing"appropriated"ascake,still,underthetermsofthelaw,lacernycannotbecommittedagainstpie.Sothat wherethestatuteprescribesthattheonlythingsubjecttolarcenyisa cosamueble andthedefinitionofthesubjectof larcenyisclaimedtobeanythingthatcanbe"appropriated,"theansweratonceisthatsuchdefinitionisinaccurateunder thelawasitmaybetoobroad.Theremaybesomethingswhichcanbe"appropriated"thatarenotcosasmuebles. Inthesecondplace,thequotedparagraphfromthecourt'sdecisioncontainsanothererrorinthestatementofthelaw.Iam oftheopinionthat,underthecommonlaw,andIamsureundertheSpanishlaw,thestatementthat"thetruetestofwhatisa propersubjectoflarcenyseemstobenotwhetherthesubjectiscorporealorincorporeal..."isnotaccurate.Professor Beale,ofHarvard,saysinhisarticleonlarcenythat

Atcommonlawtheonlysubjectsoflarcenyweretangible,movablechattels;somethingwhichcouldbetakenin possessionandcarriedaway,andwhichhadsome,althoughtrifling,intrinsicvalue.Anysubstancewhichhas length,breadth,andthicknessmaybethesubjectoflarceny....Achoseinactionbeinginitsessenceintangible couldnotbethesubjectoflarcenyatcommonlawandthepaperevidenceofthechoseinactionwasconsidered mergedwithit. Whartonsays: Chosesinaction,includingbondsandnotesofallclassesaccordingtothecommonlawarenotthesubjectof larceny,beingmererightsofaction,havingnocorporealexistence;.... IhavealreadyquotedatlengthfromwritersontheSpanishandRomanlawtoshowthatonlytangible,corporealchattels canbethesubjectoflarceny. Inthethirdplace,byentirelybeggingthequestion,itleavesthewholepropositionofwhetherelectricityisasubjectof larcenynotonlyunsolvedbutwhollyuntouched.Aswehavealreadyseen,theword"appropriation"nowhereappearsin subdivision1ofthePenalCodeinconnectionwithlarceny.Butifitwerethereusedinconnectionwithsuchcrime,itwould necessarilyreferentirelytoacosamuebleasthatistheonlythingunderthatarticlewhichisthesubjectoflarcenyand, thereforeof"appropriation."Sothat,beforewecanpossiblyknowwhetherathingiscapableofappropriationornotunder thePenalCode,wemustknowwhetherthatthingisorisnotacosamueble,asthat,aswehavesaid,istheonlythingthat canbetakenorappropriatedincommittingthecrimeoflarceny.But,asisreadilyseen,thatbringsusrightbacktothe questionwestartedwith,Whatisacosamueble?Itismorethanapparent,therefore,thatthequotedparagraphaddsnothing whatevertothediscussion. Inthefourthplace,theword"appropriation"intheparagraphquotedisthereusedwithacompletemisapprehensionofits meaningasfoundinthearticleoftheCivilCodefromwhichitistaken.Articles334and335oftheCivilCodeseekto divideallpropertycapableofappropriationintoclasses.Theyread: ART.334.Sonbienesimmuebles: 1.Lastierras,edificios,caminosyconstruccionesdetodogeneroadheridasalsuelo. xxxxxxxxx Thisarticlehastensubdivisiondealingwithallkindsofrealproperty.Itisnotnecessarytoquoteitallatthistime. TheEnglishofthepartquotedisasfollows: ART.334.Realpropertyconsistsof 1.Lands,buildings,roads,andconstructionsofallkindsadherenttothesoil. xxxxxxxxx ART.335.Sereputanbienesmuebleslossusceptiblesdeapropiacionnocomprendidosenelcapituloanterior,yen generaltodoslosquesepuedentransportardeunpuntoaotrosinmenoscabodelacosaimmuebleaqueestuvieron unidos. ThisarticleinEnglishisasfollows: ART.335.Personalpropertyisconsideredanythingsusceptibleofappropriationandnotincludedintheforegoing chapter,and,ingeneral,allthatwhichcanbecarriedfromoneplacetoanotherwithoutdamagetotherealestateto whichitmaybeattached. Asisseenfromthetermsofthearticles,twoexpressionsareusedindefining"bienesmuebles,"oneofeliminationand otherofdescription.Theclauseofeliminationprovidesthatallpropertysubjecttoappropriationshallbepersonalproperty exceptthatpropertydescribedinarticle334.Butthisdescriptionwasfoundtobetoobroad.Itincludedtoomuch;andit was,therefore,necessarytomakeuseofalimitingorrestrictingclauseinconnectionwiththeexclusionclause.Tothatthe articlefurtherprovidedthatappropriablepropertyshallbe,"ingeneral,allpropertywhichcanbecarriedfromoneplaceto another."Underthisrestrictingclause,then,propertytobe personal propertymustbenotonlypropertynotincludedin article334butalsopropertywhichcanbetransportedfromoneplacetoanother.Itmustfulfilltworequirementsinsteadof one.Besides,undertheSpanishlaw,realpropertyisasmuchsubjecttoappropriationaspersonalproperty.Thewordin SpanishseemstobebroaderthanitslegaluseinEnglish. Fromtheforegoingitisplainthatpropertytobepersonalpropertymustnotonlybesusceptibleofappropriation,whichthe

courtinthequotedparagraphclaimsistheonlyrequirement,butitmustalsobecapableofbeingofitselfmanuallyseized andtransportedfromoneplacetoanother. ThispresentsthefourthreasonwhyIsaythatthepropositionlaiddownbythecourtinthequotedparagraphislaiddown underacompletemisapprehensionofthedefinitionofunacosamueble. Andfinally,theword"appropriate"whichthecourthasusedisfoundinsubdivision2ofarticle517ofthePenalCode.It providesthatthoseareguiltyoflarceny,"who,findingathing(unacosamueble)lostandknowingitsowner,appropriateit withintenttogain."Thesignificationwhichthewordherehasisquitedifferentfromthatoftheword"take"(toman)usedin thefirstsubdivision,beingconsiderablylimitedinitsreach.Asusedhereitisverylike"convert."Thereisnoremovalfrom thepossessionoftheowner,asinthefirstparagraph.InthePenalCodetheword"taking"meanssomething more than "appropriation."Itmeansaremovalfromthepossessionoftheowneratransportationorasportationofthethingfrom oneplacetoanotherfromthepossessionoftheownertothepossessionofthetheft;while"appropriation"means,rather, themakinguseoftheconvertingofthepropertyafterthetakingiscomplete,orwithoutany"taking"atall.Underthe Spanishlaw,whilerealestateisnot,ofcourse,subjecttoasportation,to"taking,"and,therefore,notthesubjectoflarceny, itissubjectto"appropriation."Inthesamewaywhileelectricityis,undertheSpanishandRomanlaws,whollyincapableof seizureandasportation,ofthemanual"taking"thetrespassessentialtolarceny,itmaypossibly,inoneoranothersenseof theword,besubjecttoappropriation."Ifatoneextremeofthescaleofthings,namely,realestate,thethingistootangibleto bestolen,isitnotlogicaltoexpectthatattheoppositeextremethething,electricity,forexample,maybefoundtoo intangibletobestolen? Wehaveseenthat,inallthehistoryofRomanandSpanishjurisprudence,thecrimeoflarcenyhasbeenconfinedto tangiblethings,tochattels,whichhaveanindependentexistenceoftheirown;whichhavethreedimensions;whichoccupy space;whicharecapableofhavingatrespasscommittedagainstthemselves;whichcanbe,ofthemselvesandalone,taken physicallyintopossessionandcarriedaway(asported). Wehavethatthefactthatelectricityisnotsuchathingisadmittedbyall. Andwehaveaskedthequestion,"How,then,canthechargeoflarcenybesustained?" Butletasassume,forthesakeofargument,thatelectricityisatangiblething,likewater,forinstance.Stillthecrime committed,ifany,isnotlacerny.LetusmodifytheillustrationalreadygivenofthesurreptitiousremovalbyAofwater storedinadambyBformillingpurposes.LetussupposethatBhasbuiltareservoironanelevatedportionofhisfarmfor thestorageofwaterforirrigatingpurposes.Hehasbuiltditchesorconduitsfromthereservoirtoeverypartofhisfarmto carrythewatertotheplacesneeded.DuringthedryseasonwhileBisengagedinirrigatinghislandsAsurreptitiouslyand withintenttogain,constructsasmallmillupononeoftheconduitsandutilizestherapidfallandswiftflowofthewaterto operatehismill.FormanymonthsAthustakesadvantagesofB'sconduitandwaterandenricheshimselfbyreasonthereof. DidAcommitthecrimelarceny?Thewater,everydropofit,afterbeingusedbyA,wenttoitsworkofirrigatingthelands ofB,pausingonlylongenoughtoturnthewaterwheelofA'smill.Certainlythen,nowaterwasstolen.Asimplymadeuse ofthe"head,"thefallofthewater.Ifanythingwasstolenitwasthe"head,"theelevationofthewater,theenergydeveloped byitspassagefromhightolowground.Thisispreciselywhathappenswhenanelectriccurrentpassesthroughanelectric bulborarcandproduceslight.Whetherthecurrentoperatesonelightofonehundred,the volume,theamperage,ofthe current,thatis,thequantityofit,ifwemayusetheterm(anditmustberememberedthatIamassumingelectricitytobea tangiblethingandwillspeakaccordingly)remainsexactlythesame.Thevolumeorquantityoftheelectricityisjustthe samewhenitcomesoutofthehundredthlightasitwaswhenitenteredthefirst.Whilethereisadifferencebetweenthe currentasitcomesfromthelastlightandasitenteredthefirst,itissimplyoneofcondition,orstate.Alloftheelectricityis stillthere.Likethewater;ithassimplylostits"head,"itsenergy.Ithasbeendeprivedofitspressure,ofitselectromotive force;butitisthesameoldelectricity,inthesameoldquantity.Sothat,whentheaccusedinthecaseatbar,bymeansofa "jumper,"burnedthirtylights,insteadofthethreeforwhichhepaidthecompany,hewasnotstealingelectricity.Exactlyas muchelectricitywentbackintothecompany'swireafterservingthetwentysevenlightsforwhichhedidnotpayascame outofthatwireinthefirstplace.Thedefendanttooknothing;heusedsomething.Inlarcenytheremustbeataking.Here thereisonlyause.Electricityisautility,notathing.Thecompany,intheceaseatbar,lostnomorethandidtheownerof theirrigationsystemintheexampleheretoforegiven.Asnowaterwastaken,sonoelectricitywastaken.Thesameamount ofwaterremainedtotheownerafteritsusebyA.Thesameamountofelectricityremainedtothecompanyafteritsuseby thedefendant. ThewellknownItalianauthor,Avv.UmbertoPipia,inhisveryableworkentitled"L'ElectricitanelDiritto"putsthe questionthus(translationofMr.PercyR.Angell,Manila,1911): Fromthepointofviewofthejuristcanelectricitybestolen?Apersonconnectsadeflectingwiretothemain

conduitofelectricity;hethusmakesasecondarycircuitinwhichheintroducesaresistanceandprofitsbythe electromotivepowerwhichisdeveloped,tosupplyhislampsorputhismotorinmovement.Insuchcasecanwe applyarticle402ofthePenalCode,whichprovidesthatwhoevertakespossessionofmovablepropertyofanother inordertoderiveprofitthereby,takingitfromtheplacewherehefindsitwithouttheconsentoftheowner,is punishedwithreclusionuptothreeyears? TheauthorthenreferstothedecisionsofcertaincourseofEuropewhichholdthatelectricityisstealable,andcontinues: TheRomancourtofcassationhaslostsightofthatfundamentalprincipleofinterpretationoflaw(aprinciple whichitoughttohavehadwellinmindbeforeapplyingtoanewmanifestationsofforcelegislativeprovisions enactedinviewoftotallydifferentcases)bywhichpenallawsdonotextendbeyondthecasesandthetimesin themexpressed.Nullapoenasinelege,istheruleintermsofpenallaw,unlesswewishtobringaboutadeplorable confusionofpowers,andthejudiciarydesirestousurptheauthorityofthelegislator.Ifinthewrittenlawsgapsor breaksareencountered,itisthedutyofthecourttopointthemouttothelegislator,totheendthathetakethe necessarymeasures;butitisnotlawfulforhimbyanalogousinterpretationtoapplyapenalprovisionwheresuch hasnotbeenexplicitlyenacted. Intheunanimousopinionofjurist,twoelementsarenecessarytoconstitutethecrimeoftheft,legallyspeaking;the firstisthetakingpossessionofthepersonal(movable)propertyofanother,contrectatio,andthetakingawayofthe thingfromtheplacewhereitisfoundwithouttheconsentofthepersontowhomitbelongs,ablatio. Nowwehaveconclusivelyshownthatelectriccurrentisnotathing,butastate,avibrationfollowingcertain convergingwaves.Itcannotthereforebetakenpossessionofasthepersonalpropertyofanother.Apersonwho unlawfullyuseselectriccurrentforhispersonalenjoymentplaceshimselfinastateofunlawfulenjoymentofa utility,buthedoesnottakepossessionofpersonalproperty.Itwasagraveerror,thatofthecourtofcassation,in holdingelectriccurrenttobeathingimprisonedinwires,andcomposedofparticlesthatcanbesubtracted.In connectingasecondcircuitonedoesnotsubtractelectriccurrent;notaparticleofelectricenergyentersintothe possessionofthesocalledthief;thesameamountinamperesthatwasfoundandderivedonconnectingthesecond circuit,isfoundattheendofthiscircuit.Thecurrenthasonlysufferedadiminutionofpotential;whilecontinuing tobeofthesamevolume,itbecomeslessadaptedfortheuseintended,becausehavingovercomearesistance,it haslostinpotential,itselectromotivepower. ...Itleavesthecircuitinthesameamountinwhichitentered.Onlyitspowerforworkhasdiminished.Nota singleparticleormoleculeofelectriccurrentistakenbysuchabusiveuse,onlythestateofundulation.The movementthatfirstfollowstheprincipal,andthenthesecondcircuit,andbytheseundulationsthesocalledthief illegallyderivesbenefit.Buttheextraordinaryprovisionsofcrimearenotapplicabletoallillegalactions. Anotherpowerfulargumentinfavorofmypositionisthis:Thatinnocaseofusurpation,theusingofthings protectedbylaw(diritto)thatarenotmaterialthings,dowespeakoftheft.Torepressabusesthelegislatorhas beenobligedtoestablishspecialprovisions oflaw,buthas explicitlyrecognizedthoserelatingtothefttobe inapplicable.Atrademark,tradename, modellodefabrica,ascientificorartisticwork,undoubtedlyconstitute objectsoflawsimilartothings;formthecontentsofvariousjuridicalrelations;havemoreorlesseconomicvalue; pertaintothepatrimonyofthepersonwhohasproducedthemorbroughtthemintobeing.Ifathirdpersonmakes useofthetrademarkortradename,thescientificworkorartisticproductionofanother,nobodydeniesthathe takespossessionofautilitythatdoesnotbelongtohim;thatbytheveryillegalacthederivesprofit,andatthe sametimediminishesthepatrimonyofthepersonhavinglegitimaterightsherein.Butwithallthat,ithasnever occurredtoanyonetobringanactionfortheftagainsttheusurperofthefirmname,thecounterfeitofthetrade mark or the plagiarist. The legislator, desiring to protect this new species of property, has provided special repressivemeasures;butintheirabsence,thecourtscannotapplytheactiofurti,becauseitisnotapplicableto casesandconditionsotherthanthoseprovidedfor. Ifthisbeso,whydifferentconceptionsonthescoreofelectricity?Herelikewise,thereisnosubtractionofpersonal property,buttheillegaluseofanadvantage,oftherightpertainingtoanother,whichremainhoweverunchanged. Hencethelegalsolutionshouldbethesame. Thesecondandnotlessessentialconditionoftheftisthatoftheablatio,thenecessityoftakingthethingfromthe placewhereitisfound.Butherewehavenothingofthat;thecurrentisdeviatedfromitscourse,true,butitreturns to the place where it was undiminished. The statement in the foregoing decision that there are particles transportablefromplacetoplaceisexact;theundulationisinitself,ithasitsownefficiency,butitisneithertaken awaynorsubtracted.Ithasbeenjustlysaidthatallthatisdoneistoerectabridgeoverwhichtheundulationsofthe

particlesaretransportedinthewireattached,butnothingcorporealpassesfromonewiretoanother,sincenotone ofthevibratingparticlesmoveswiththecurrentwhichflowsthroughtheconnectedwire. Consequently,inwhateveraspectthequestionisconsideredthepresumptionoftheftgrowsless.Infine,although therebeausurpationofautilitytotheprejudiceofanother,itshouldnotbeheldtoconstitutetheft,becausethatis thevulgar,notthelegalconception.Thatincivilandcommerciallawwemayresorttoanalogousinterpretation, andthat,intheabsenceofspecialprovisionsweshouldapplytheruleswhichgovernsimilarmattersandanalogous cases,thereisnodoubt.Thecourtscannotrefusetosaywhatthelawis(direiediritto)nordismissthelitigantson thepretextthatthelawhadmadenoprovisionfortheircase;anditisfromthisconceptthatelectricity,asarule,in thevariousrelationswhereitconstitutestheobject,isconsideredtobeathing,withalltheattributesofsuch.But the penal law is restrictive; under certain aspects it is exceptional. Here we have to do with limitations and restrictionsonthemostsacredrightsofpersons,therighttoliberty,therighttohonor.Andtheserightscannotbe abridgedwithoutdefiniteandexplicitprovisionsofthelaw.Wherethesearelackingwecanpray,asIdo,thatthey besupplied,butadecisioninsuchcaseisanarbitraryact(arbitro),notjustice:nullapoenasinelege. xxxxxxxxx Soonthewrongfuluseofelectriccurrent;profitisderivedfromitshighpotentialwhichisproducedbythework andexpenditureofmoneyonthepartofthefurnishingcompany;thecurrentisreturnedexactlyasitwasdelivered exceptithaslostacertainamountofelectromotivepowerthatwasillegally(antigiuridicamente)employedto overcometheresistanceintroducedbythethirdparty. xxxxxxxxx ...Penallawmustbestrictlyconstrued(ediinterpretazionerestrittiva).Itpunishesthecontractatioofamovable thingwhichistakenfromtheplacewhereitisfoundwithouttheconsentoftheowner.Inthepropositionunder discussion,wehavenottodowithmovablethings,thereisnotruetransportingtoanotherplace;thereforethe figuragiuridicaoftheftiswanting. Itcannotbedoubtedthatbymovablethingsismeantevenliquidsandfluids,becausethesearematerial,concrete, andcorporealthings,buttheirphysicalexternalmanifestationscannotaffectthejuridicalrelation.Butinourcase thereisnotathing,fluidorliquid;thereisastateofundulation,ofmovement,whichoneusesillegally,assuming howevertheobligationtoindemnifyforallthedamagesresultingfromhisillicitaction,butthereisnotheft,any morethantherewouldbewhereapersonappliedapulleytotheshaftofanengineinordertoputhisown machineryinmotion,sofarastherewouldbenoappropriation.Thecurrentwhichinjuriouslytraversethelampor electricmotorisnotappropriatedordestroyedbythepersonwhousesit;itflowsoutfromthelightsandcontinues itscourseinthecircuitundiminishedinintensity;ithasonlylostpartofitspower,because,havingencountereda resistance,ithasdevelopedcertainenergytoovercomeit,energywhichhasproducedlight,traction,ormechanical work. Normayitbesaidthatelectricitywouldthenbedeprivedofanylegalprotection.Dowenothavearticles1511et seq.oftheCivilCodethatprovideforfraud?Istherenotthecivilcrimeandquasicrime?Toprotectelectricenergy isitnecessarytoimprisononewhousesitantigiuridicamente,whiletheletterofthelawdoesnotconsent?Inany caseitisknownthatadducereinconveniensnonestsolvereargumentum.Asinthelawsofourcountryprovisionis madefortheillegaluseofafirmname,trademarkandworksofgenius(l'ingegno);inEngland,whereprovision hasbeenmadeforthematterwearediscussingtheyhaveenactedalawimposingseverepenaltiesuponpersons whoillegallyuseelectricenergy,andIamofthefirsttoapplaudthem.Butlettherebelaws,notmerelyjudicial opinion(arbitriadiinterpretati). Nordoesitavailtourgethatwhenwehavetodowithbenefitsthatareusefultoman,whichservehisends,thathe canappropriate,thesebenefitsareconsideredasthingsintheeyesofthelaw.Butitisnecessarytomakea distinction.Fromthestandpointofthecivillaw,theyare,becauseawideandanalogousconstructionispermissible andpermitted;butfromthatofthepenallaw,theyarenot,becausesuchconstructionisexpresslyforbiddenby article4ofthepreliminaryprovisionsoftheCivilCode. Ifatrademarkisnotabenefittoman,inwhatdoesitservehim?Isnotaliteraryorartisticproductionsuch?Does notthecounterfeiterillegallyappropriatesuchbenefits?Butifitisrequiredtoinflictcriminalpenaltiesuponhim,a speciallawmustbeenacted;theprovisionsrelativetotheftcanbeappliedinhiscase. xxxxxxxxx

Nor is it a conclusive argument to say that the manufacturer spends large sums of money and erects costly machinery to generate the electricity, and when others steal it from him, such action, according to juridical conscienceandsocialmorals,constitutestheft. Letussupposeanindividualacquiresaticketofadmission,andentersahallwherethereisbeingproducedaplay ofsomesort.He,onthestrengthofthelegalnegotiationwiththeimpresarioandtheacquisitionofthetickethasa righttothemost ampleenjoyment that his opticalandacousticsenses areabletorealize.But hearranges a phonograph and a cinematograph, and surreptitiously fixes and appropriates part of the acoustic and visual enjoymentthatdoesnotbelongtohim,takesitoutsideofthetheaterandlateravailshimselfthereoftohisbenefit byreproducingtheharmonyofthesoundsandtheopticalillusionofthescene.Isheliablefortheft? FromthestandpointofthedoctrineIamcombating,heis.Theimpresariohassacrificedmoneyorworktoproduce thespectacle.Ourfriendhastherighttoenjoyittothelimitofthecapacityofhisorgansofvisionandhearing,but beyondthat.Bymeansofsuitableinstrumentshehascaughtupthesounds,movements,andcolorsforthepurpose ofgain,andhecommitsatheftbecausethereenterthecorrectatioandtheablatio. Fromthepointofviewofthelawheisnot.Hewouldbeheldtoreimbursetheimpresarioforalldamages,buthe cannotbecalledathieft,norbepunishedassuch.Thesoundsandformsoflightarestates,notthings;therefore theycannotformsubjectsoftheft. Andifthisisso,thesameconclusionmustbereachedwithrespecttoelectricity. ThesupremecourtoftheGermanEmpire,sittingatLeipsic,October20,1896,inadecisionholdingthatelectricitywasnot asubjectoflarceny,said: Thecourtbelowfoundthattheactdidnotconstitutetheftorunlawfulappropriation,becauseelectricityisnottobe consideredathingwithinthemeaningofparagraph242ofthePenalCode,andbecausebythingsthelawmeans portionsofmaterialnature;thatcorporealexistenceisanessentialingredientofthething.EventhePenalCode startsfromthisprinciple.Incorporealthings,asforexamplerights,intellectualproductsandmachinepowerarenot subjectsoftheft.Thesamemustbesaidofelectricity.Expertssaythatthescienceisnotyetdetermined.Wewell knowwhatmustbedonetoproduceelectricenergy,butwedonotcomprehendthesevitaloperations,anymore thanweunderstandwhatisthatmakesthemusclesofthehumanarmcapableofexertingforce.Intheconclusions oftheCourtofFirstInstancethereisnoerroroflaw.Thatcourtstartsfromtheprinciplethatthecorporalexistence ofthethingmustbetheessentialelementtocomewithinthemeaningofarticle242.Thisassumptionisnotbased uponthepreceptsoftheCivilCode,but,rather,upontheideawhichisatthebottomofthePenalCode,namely,the movableandindependentthing,whichpresupposesthecorporealityoftheobject.Ifthen,underarticles242and 245,theconditionprecedenttothecommissionoflarcenyisthattheobjectoftheftorunlawfulappropriationbea pieceorportionofmaterialsubstanceineitherasolidorliquidstate,orinformofgas,theCourtofFirstInstance committednoerrorinfindingtherewasneithertheftnorillegalappropriation.Whetherornotthenotationofa thing,inthesenseofthepenallaws,requiressomethingcorporeal,isaquestionoflaw;butthequestionwhether electricityisasubstance,acorporealthing,oraforce,amovementofaminuteparticles,isaquestionoffactthat cannotbedecidedbytherulesoflaw,butbyphysicalresearchalone.Theconsiderationofthegreatimportanceof electricityincommerciallifeandtheplaceawaitingitamongthevitalconveniencesandthefactofitshaving commercialvalue,isnotanargumenttoprovethatelectricityisacorporealthing,becausethequalityofbeinga vitalconvenienceandhavingcommercialvaluedoesnotconstituteanecessarystandardofcorporelity,sinceforce, operations, intellectual products are vital conveniences (beni) and have commercial value. When, in the jurisprudenceofthedaytheneedforpenallawsforpunishmentofunjustappropriationofelectriccurrentbecomes apparent, the legislator should provide them. The courts can not be called upon to supply the lack of legal provisionsbyanalogousapplicationsofrulesnotmadetofitthecircumstance.Inpenallawtheprinciple nulla poenasineissupreme. TheseauthoritiesfullysupportmycontentionthatelectricityisnotstealableundertheprovisionsoftheSpanishPenal Code.Theyalsosupportthepropositionthatevenifelectricityisatangiblething,likewater,andthereforestealable,the crime,ifany,committedbythedefendantinthiscaseisnotlarceny,becausethecompanyhadjustasmuchelectricityafter theillegalactasithadbefore.Inotherwords,ithaslostnoelectricity.Havinglostnoelectricityitcannotchargeanyone withstealingit.Ifathousandlightswereburned,nomoreelectricitywouldbeconsumedthanifonelightwereburned,just as,nomorewaterisconsumedinrunningathousandwaterwheelsplacedonebelowanotherthaninrunningone.Justas muchwaterflowsoverthethousandthwheelasflowedoverthefirst.Inthesamemannerthereisjustasmuchelectricity flowingoutofthethousandthlightasflowedintothefirst.Justasinusingthewater,nothingisconsumedbutthehead,the

quantityofwaterremainingthesame,so,inusingelectricity,nothingisconsumedbutthehead(thepressure,thepotential, theelectromotiveforce),the electricityitselfremainingundiminished.Noelectricitywastaken. Itwasusedandthen returnedtoitsowner. Foraclearunderstandingofthisproblem,andalogicalandphilosophical,aswellaslegal,solutionthereof,wemustnever, foramoment,forgetthefactthattherealcontractbetweenthecompanyandthedefendantwasonetofurnishlaborand services;alease,ifyouplease,ofanagency,acontractofpreciselythesamenatureasonebywhichthecompanyletstothe defendanttheuseofoneofthecompany'sworkmentoturnbyhand,inthedefendant'sownhouse,anelectricalmachineand therebyproducelightfordefendant'suse.Thisisthecruxofthewholequestion.Whilenocontractwasprovedweknowof necessity,fromtheprincipleswhichunderlieandgovernelectriclighting,thatthecontractmusthavebeenasabovestated. Ifthedefendantshouldrequirethelaborerthusplacedinhishousetoworkovertimeandshouldnotpaythecompany therefor,thustakingadvantageofthesituation,therewouldbenolarceny.Tobesure,thedefendantwouldreturnthe workmantothecompanyfatiguedandreducedinstrengthbyreasonoftheovertimehehadrequiredhimtoputin,butit wouldbethesameworkmanwhichhehadreceived.Itisthiswhichshowstheabsurdityoftheclaimthatthedefendantin thiscaseisguiltyoflarceny.Thecompanyneverintendedto selltheworkman tothedefendantandthedefendantnever expectedtobuyhim.Itwasthe use thatwasthebasisofthecontract.Inexactlythesamemannerthecompanynever intendedtosellelectricitytothedefendantandthedefendantneverintendedtobuyelectricity.Thebasisofthecontractwas the use ofelectricity.Justasthelaborerwasreturnedbydefendanttothecompanyfatiguedandreducedinstrengthby reasonoftheovertimewhichthedefendanthadwrongfullyandillegallyrequiredhimtoputin,sothecurrentofelectricity wasreturnedbythedefendanttothecompanyfatiguedandreducedinstrengthbyreasonofthelightswhichthedefendant hadwrongfullyandillegallycausedittosupply;andjustas,notwithstandingthereductioninstrength,itwasthesame identicalworkmanreturnedthatwassentout, sotheelectriccurrentreturnedtothecompanyaftertheillegaluseby defendantwasthesameidenticalcurrentwhichthecompanyhadfurnishedhim.Wherethen,isthefoundationforthe chargeoflarceny? Letusnowseewhataretheresultsoftheholdingofthecourtthatelectricityissubjecttolarceny. TheSpanishLawofthePhilippineIslandshasnotbeenchangedbyanylegislativeenactment.Acosamuebleisthesame nowasitwasinthedaysofthePartidas.Nolegislaturehaschangedthelawoflarcenyasitcamefromthejurisprudenceof RomeandSpain.Norhasanylegislaturetouchedthelawofthepersonalchatteltogiveitanewdefinitionoronewhich changesitsancientsignification.ItspresentdefinitionisthesameasthatgivenbySanchezRoman,Pacheco,Scaevola, Manresa,andGroizardasdrawnformthedecreesofkingsandactsoflegislatures.Thatdefinitionhavingbeenframedby thelawmakingpowerofSpain,fromthePartidasdowntothePenalCode,itoughtnottobechangedbyanyagencyshortof thelawmakingpoweroftheUnitedStates.Thesubstanceandnatureofcrimeoughtnottobechangedbycourtsinacountry wherecrimes are purely statutory.It has theappearance ofa usurpationof thefunctions of thelawmakingbody,an unwarrantableassumptionofthelegislativeattributes. Theholdingofthecourtinthiscaseis,ineffect,anamendmenttothePenalCode.Ithaschangedmateriallythedefinition ofacosamuebleand,therefore,ofthecrimeoflarceny,asmadebythelawmakingbodiesofSpainandtheUnitedStates.I donotassertthatthecourtshavenottherighttodeterminewhetheragivensetoffactsdoordonotfulfillthedefinitionofa givencrime.WhatIdosayisthattheverygreatestcareshouldbeexercisedincaseswhichmayinvolvedasaconsequence oftheirdecisionthechangingofthescopeofthesubstantivelawofcrime.Thefact,admittedbyall,thatwhetherthe phenomenonwhichwecallelectricityreallyisa"cosamueble,"undertheaccepteddefinitionofthatword,isopentodoubt, shouldgiveuspause.Beforeholdingthatelectricityisacosamueble,thefactwhetheritisornotoughttobesubstantially freefrom doubt,Thisis particularlytrueinacountrywherecrimesarepurelystatutory,andinwhich,therefore,the legislatureispresumedtohavehadinmindinframingitsdefinitionof"cosasmuebles"onlysuchchattels,orthoseofthe samenature,aswereknowntothelegislatureatthetimeitacted.AtthetimethePenalCodebecameoperativesubstantially nothingwasknownbythosewhocreatedifofthephenomenon,electricity.Itismorethanclearthatatthetimeofthe enactmentofthelawsrelatingtolarceny,ofwhicharticle517ofthePenalCodeisareproduction,nothingwhateverwas knownofthatphenomenon.Wehave,therefore,nomeansofknowingwhatwouldhavebeenthelegislativeactionin relationthereto.Thelegislativeauthoritiesofthosetimesmighthavetreateditassubstantiallyeveryotherlegislativebody has treatedit that has touchedthequestion; namely,asathingseparateanddistinctfrom chattels,andunlawfulacts affectingitanditsuseascrimesdistinctfromthecrimesagainsttangibleproperty,suchasrobberyandlarceny.Inthis jurisdictionthelegislatureistheonlyauthorityforthedefinitionofthecrime.Whereanewsituationarisesbyvirtueof discoveries whichreveal agencies neverknownbefore,and whosereal natureis unknown eventothe discoverers the legislatureisthebodytotaketheinitiativeindeterminingthepositionofsuchagenciesamongtheaffairsofmen,unless theyclearlyfallwithinaclassalreadyestablishedanddefined;anditappearsthatsomelegislativebodieshavedonethat verythingandhavepassedspeciallawstouchingtheplacewhichshouldbegivenelectricityinthecivilandcriminallaw.

ThiswasdoneherebythepassageoftheordinanceofthecityofManila.Thefactthatlegislaturesinmanyjurisdictions haveenactedspeciallawsrelativetoelectricityistheveryclearestproofthattherewasthegravestdoubtamonglearnedmen oftheapplicabilityofexistinglawstoactscommittedagainsttherightsofproducersofelectricity.Thelegislatureofthe IslandshavingactedthroughthecouncilofthecityofManilaandbysuchactionmadeillegalactsagainsttheproducersof electricityaspecialcrime whollydistinctfromlarceny,suchactshouldbeconclusiveonthiscourtastothelegislative intent. Section649oftheRevisedOrdinanceofthecityofManilaprovidesinpart: Nopersonshall,foranypurposewhatsoever,useorenjoythebenefitsofanydevicebymeansofwhichhemay fraudulently obtain any current of electricity or any telephone or telegraph service; and the existence in any buildingorpremisesofanysuchdeviceshall,intheabsenceofsatisfactoryexplanation,bedeemedsufficient evidenceofsuchusebythepersonbenefitingthereby. This section was enacted under theauthorityof the Legislatureof thePhilippineIslands, as was section930of said ordinances,bythetermsofwhichonewasviolatestheprovisionsofsection649"shallbepunishedbyafineofnotmore thantwohundredpesosorbyimprisonmentfornotmorethansixmonths,orbothsuchfineandimprisonment,inthe discretionofthecourt,foreachoffense." Articles517and518ofthePenalCodereadinpartasfollows: ART.517.Thefollowingareguiltyoftheft: 1.Thosewho,withintentofgainandwithoutviolenceorintimidationagainstthepersonorforceagainstthe things,shalltakeanother'spersonalproperty(cosamueble)withouttheowner'sconsent. xxxxxxxxx ART.518.Thoseguiltyoftheftshallbepunished: 1.Withthepenaltyofpresidiocorreccionalinitsmediumandmaximumdegreesifthevalueofthestolenproperty shouldexceed6,250pesetas. 2.Withthepenaltyof presidiocorreccional initsminimumandmediumdegreesshoulditnotexceed6,250, pesetasandbemorethan1,250pesetas. 3.Witharrestomayorinitsmediumdegreetopresidiocorreccionalinitsminimumdegreeshoulditnotexceed 1,250pesetasandbemorethan250pesetas. 4.Witharrestomayortoitsfullestextentshoulditbemorethan25butnotexceed250pesetas. 5.Witharrestomayorinitsminimumandmediumdegreesifitshouldnotexceed25pesetas;ifexceeding25and notmorethan65pesetas,atheftofnutritiousgrains,fruits,orwoodshallbepunishedwithafineofroom325to 500pesetas. Undersubdivision2ofthearticlelastquoted,whichistheparagraphunderwhichtheaccusedispunishedinthecaseatbar, thepenaltyprescribedisfromsixmonthsandonedaytofouryearsandtwomonths.Theaccusedinthiscasewasactually sentencedtooneyeareightmonthsandtwentyonedaysofpresidiocorreccional,toindemnifythecompanyinthesumof P865.26,tothecorrespondingsubsidiaryimprisonmentincaseoffailuretopaysaidsum,andtotheaccessorypenalties providedbylaw. Havingbeforeusthesetwolaws,wemaynowseetowhatuntowardandunfortunateresultsthemajorityopinionleadsusin holdingthatapersonwhocommitsacrimeagainstanelectriccurrentcanbepunishedundereither,orboth,oftwodifferent statutes.Aswehaveseenalreadythereis,relativelyspeaking,anenormousdifferenceinthepenaltiesprescribedbysaid law.ThatimposedbytheordinanceofthecityofManilacannotinanyeventexceedsixmonths'imprisonmentandafineof P200;whilethatprovidedinthePenalCodemaybeassevereasfouryearsandtwomonthsimprisonment,withindemnity equaltothevalueofthepropertystolen,withcorrespondingsubsidiaryimprisonmentincaseofnonpayment.Tothismust beaddedallthoseaccessorypenaltiesprescribedbythecode,suchassuspensionfromanypublicoffice,professionor trade,andfromtherightthesuffrage.Tomeitiswhollyunbelievablethat,underthecircumstancesofthiscaseandthe natureoftheoffenseitself,itwastheintentionofthelegislativeauthoritytopermittheconcurrentexistenceoftwolaws, bothinforce,punishingthesamecrimewithpenaltieswhichbearnorelationtoeachotherandwhicharewidelydifferentin severity.Notewhatresultsfromsuchaholding.Prosecutionundertheordinancemustbeinthemunicipalcourt.Prosecution underthePenalCodemaybeinthemunicipalcourtoritmaybeandgenerallymustbe,asinthiscase,intheCourtofFirst

Instance.Butitiscertainthat,undertheordinance,everycasemaybeprosecutedinthemunicipalcourt,whateverthevalue oftheelectricitytaken;or,ifthevalueissufficient,theprosecutionmaybebroughtintheCourtofFirstInstance. The selectionofthecourtislefttothecomplaint.Thismeansthatthe complaintisabletosaywithincertainlimitswhat punishmentshallbeinflicted;for,ifhedesiresthattheaccusedshallbelightlypunishedhewillbringtheactioninthe municipalcourt,whichhealwayscandoifhewish,andifhedesirestopunishhimveryseverelyhewillbringitinthe CourtofFirstInstance,whichhecangenerallydoifhecaresto.Itisincoceivablethatthelegislatureintendedthatsucha conditionshouldexist.Itisinviolationofeverysenseoffairness,isagainsteveryruleofstatutoryconstruction,andis clearlyinimicaltopublicpolicy.Toassertthatthecomplaininginwhichheshallprosecutetheaccusedbutalso,ineffect, thecrimeofwhichheshallbecharged,asthedecisioninthiscaseholdsineffect,istoassertaproposition,thebare statementofwhichisitsowncompletestrefutation. Forthesereasonsthejudgmentofconvictionshouldbereversed. Haystack: USv.Carlos [G.R.No.6295.September1,1911.] EnBanc,percuriam:4concur. Facts:IgnacioCarloshasbeenaconsumerofelectricityfurnishedbytheManilaElectricRailroadandLightCompanyfora buildingcontainingtheresidenceoftheaccusedand3otherresidences.On15March1909,representativesofthecompany, believingthatmorelightisconsumedthanwhatisshowninthemeter,installedanadditionalmeteronapoleoutside Carloshousetocompareactualconsumption(2,500kilowattsagainst233kilowatts).Marksontheinsulationofthemeter pointstotheuseofjumper.Further,theconsumptionregisteredintheinsidemeterisnotthereasonableamountforthe numberoflightsinstalledinCarlosbuilding.Onthestrengthofasearchwarrantdulyservedbyapoliceofficer,ajumper wasfoundinadrawerofasmallcabinetintheroomofthedefendantshousewerethemeterwasinstalled.Intheabsenceof anyexplanationforCarlospossessionofsaiddevice,thepresumptionraisedwasthatCarloswastheownerofthedevice whoseonlyusewastodeflectthecurrentfromthemeter. Thus,itwasdeducedthatfrom13February,1909anduntil3March1910,Carloswasfoundtohavetaken2,273kilowattsof electriccurrent,worthP909.20,theelectricitybeingthepropertyoftheManilaElectricRailroadandLightCompany,a corporationdoingbusinessinthePhilippineIslands,withouttheconsentoftheownerthereof.Thus,hewaschargedwith thecrimeoftheft.AwarrantforthearrestofCarloswasissuedbyJudgeJenkinson4Marchandplacedinthehandsofthe sheriff.Thesheriff'sreturnshowsthatthedefendantgavebondforhisappearance.On14March,thecounselforthe defendantdemurredtothecomplaintclaimingthecourthasnojurisdictionoverthepersonoftheaccused,andthatthefacts donotconstituteapublicoffense.Thedemurrerwasoverruled,andasdefendantrefusedtoplead,apleaofnotguiltywas enteredforhim.Afterduetrial,Carloswasfoundguiltyandwassentencedto1year,8monthsand21daysinprison,and wasorderedtoindemnifyManilaElectricRailroadandLightcompanyinthesumofP865.26withsubsidiaryimprisonment incaseofinsolvency;andtopaythecosts.Fromthisjudgment,defendantappealed. TheSupremeCourtaffirmedthejudgmentappealedfrom;withcostsagainsttheappellant. 1.USv.GrantandKennedy;overruleofdemurreronissueinvolvingallegedlackofpreliminaryinvestigation Thequestionwhether"thecourterredinoverrulingtheobjectionoftheaccusedtothejurisdictionofthecourt,becausehe wasnotgivenapreliminaryinvestigationasrequiredbylaw,andinoverrulinghisdemurreristhesameaswasraisedinUS v.GrantandKennedy(18Phil122),whereafterathoroughexaminationanddueconsideration,decidedadverselyto appellant'scontention.NosufficientreasonispresentedwhytheCourtshouldnotfollowthedoctrineenunciatedinthat case. 2.Rightofownershipofelectriccurrentsecuredbyarticle517518ofthePenalCode Therightofownershipofelectriccurrentissecuredbyarticles517and518ofthePenalCode;theapplicationofthese articlesincasesofsubstractionofgas,afluidusedforlighting,andinsomerespectsresemblingelectricity,isconfirmedby therulelaiddowninthedecisionsofthesupremecourtofSpainJanuary20,1887,andApril1,1897,construingand enforcingtheprovisionsofarticles530and531ofthepenalcodeofthatcountry,articlesidenticalwitharticles517and518 ofthecodeinforceinthePhilippines(USv.Genato). 3.Testofpropersubjectoflarceny Thetruetestofwhatisapropersubjectoflarcenyseemstobenotwhetherthesubjectiscorporealorincorporeal,but whetheritiscapableofappropriationbyanotherthantheowner.Itistruethatelectricityisnolonger,asformerly,regarded

byelectriciansasafluid,butitsmanifestationsandeffects,likethoseofgas,maybeseenandfelt.Thereisnothinginthe natureofgasusedforilluminatingpurposeswhichrendersitincapableofbeingfeloniouslytakenandcarriedaway.Itisa valuablearticleofmerchandise,boughtandsoldlikeotherpersonalproperty,susceptibleofbeingseveredfromamassor largerquantity,andofbeingtransportedfromplacetoplace(Commonwealthv.Shaw).Electricity,thesameasgas,isa valuablearticleofmerchandise,boughtandsoldlikeotherpersonalpropertyandiscapableofappropriationbyanother. 4.Illuminatinggassubjectoflarcenyevenintheabsenceofstatute Further,itiswellsettledthatilluminatinggasmaybethesubjectoflarceny,evenintheabsenceofastatutesoproviding. (DecisionsofsupremecourtofSpain,January20,1887.andApril1,1897,supra;also(England)Queenvs.Firth,L.R.1C. C.,172,11CoxC.C.,234;Queenvs.White,3C.&K.,363,6CoxC.C.,213;Woodsvs.People,222Ill.,293,7L.R.A., 520;Commonwealthvs.Shaw,4Allen(Mass.),308;Statevs.Wellman,34Minn.,221,N.W.Rep.,385,and25Cyc.,p.12, note10.) 5.Noconsentbycompanyfordefendanttomisappropriateelectricity Thecompanyhadacontractwiththedefendanttofurnishhimwithcurrentforlightingpurposes.Itcouldnotstopthe misappropriationwithoutcuttingoffthecurrententirely.Itcouldnotreducethecurrentsoastojustfurnishsufficientfor thelightingoftwo,three,orfivelights,asclaimedbythedefendantthatheusedduringthemostofthistimesbutthe currentmustalwaysbesufficientlystrongtofurnishcurrentforthethirtylights,atanytimethedefendantdesiredtouse them.Thereisnoindicationthatthecompanywishedtheelectricitytobetaken,andnoknowledgebythedefendantthatthe companywishedhimtotakethecurrent,andnomutualunderstandingbetweenthecompanyandthedefendant,andno measuresofinducementofanykindwereemployedbythecompanyforthepurposeofleadingthedefendantinto temptation,andnopreconcertwhateverbetweenhimandthecompany:Theoriginaldesigntomisappropriatethiscurrent wasformedbythedefendantabsolutelyindependentofanyactsonthepartofthecompanyoritsagents. 6.Consolidationofcomplaintcoveringaperiodbeneficial,ratherthanprejudicialtothedefendant Noneoftheessentialrightsofthedefendantwereshowntohavebeenprejudicedbyreasonofthefactthatthecomplaint coveredtheentireperiod.Iftwelvedistinctandseparatecomplaintshadbeenfiledagainstthedefendant,oneforeach month,thesumtotalofthepenaltiesimposedmighthavebeenverymuchgreaterthanthatimposedbythecourtinthis case.Thecoveringoftheentireperiodbyonechargehasbeenbeneficial,ifanything,andnotprejudicialtotherightsofthe defendant.Theelectricitywasstolenfromthesameperson,inthesamemanner,andinthesameplace.Itwassubstantially onecontinuousact,althoughthe"jumper"mighthavebeenremovedandreplaceddailyormonthly. 7.Continuousact;Analogyofapersonstealinggasbymeansofapipe Apersonstolegasfortheuseofamanufactorybymeansofapipe,whichdrewoffthegasfromthemainwithoutallowing ittopassthroughthemeter.Thegasfromthispipewasburnteveryday,andturnedoffatnight.Thepipewasneverclosedat itsjunctionwiththemain,andconsequentlyalwaysremainedfullofgas.Itwasheld,thatifthepipealwaysremainedfull, therewas,infact,acontinuoustakingofthegasandnotaseriesofseparatetakings.Itwasheldalsothatevenifthepipe hadnotbeenkeptfull,thetakingwouldhavebeencontinuous,asitwassubstantiallyallonetransaction."(Reginavs.Firth, L.R.,1C.C.,172;11CoxC.C.,234.Citedonp.758ofWharton'sCriminalLaw,vol.1,10thed.)

RepublicofthePhilippines SUPREMECOURT Manila ENBANC G.R.No.18520September26,1922 INVOLUNTARYINSOLVENCYOFPAULSTROCHECKER,appellee, vs. ILDEFONSORAMIREZ,creditorandappellant. WILLIAMEDMONDS,assignee. Lim&Limforappellant. Ross&LawrenceandAntonioT.Carrascoso,jr.,fortheFidelity&SuretyCo. ROMUALDEZ,J.: Thequestionatissueinthisappealis,whichofthetwomortgageshereinquestionmustbegivenpreference?Isittheonein favoroftheFidelity&SuretyCo.,orthatinfavorofIldefonsoRamirez.Thefirstwasdeclaredbythetrialcourttobe entitledtopreference. Inthelowercourttherewerethreemortgageeseachofwhomclaimedpreference.Theywerethetwoabovementionedand ConcepcionAyala.Thelatter'sclaimwasrejectedbythetrialcourt,andfromthatrulingshedidnotappeal. ThereisnoquestionastothepriorityintimeofthemortgageinfavoroftheFidelity&SuretyCo.whichwasexecutedon March10,1919,andregisteredinduetimeintheregistryofproperty,thatinfavoroftheappellantbeingdatedSeptember 22,1919,andregisteredalsointheregistry. Theappellantclaimspreferenceonthesegrounds:(a)Thatthefirstmortgageabovementionedisnotvalidbecausethe propertywhichisthesubjectmatterthereofisnotcapableofbeingmortgaged,andthedescriptionofsaidpropertyisnot sufficient;and(b)thattheamountduetheappellantisapurchaseprice,citingarticle1922oftheCivilCodeinsupport thereof,andthathismortgageisbutamodificationofthesecuritygivenbythedebtoronFebruary15,1919,thatis,priorto themortgageexecutedinfavoroftheFidelity&SuretyCo. Astothefirstground,thethingthatwasmortgagedtothiscorporationisdescribedinthedocumentasfollows: ...hishalfinterestinthedrugbusinessknownasAntiguaBoticaRamirez(ownedbySrta.DoloresdelRosarioand themortgagorhereinreferredtoasthepartnership),locatedatCalleRealNos.123and125,DistrictofIntramuros, Manila,PhilippineIslands. Withregardtothenatureofthepropertythusmortgaged,whichisonehalfinterestinthebusinessabovedescribed,such interestisapersonalpropertycapableofappropriationandnotincludedintheenumerationofrealpropertiesinarticle335 oftheCivilCode,andmaybethesubjectofmortgage.Allpersonalpropertymaybemortgaged.(Sec.2,ActNo.1508.) Thedescriptioncontainedinthedocumentissufficient.Thelaw(sec.7,ActNo.1508)requiresonlyadescriptionofthe followingnature: Thedescriptionofthemortgagedpropertyshallbesuchastoenablethepartiestothemortgage,oranyother person,afterreasonableinquiryandinvestigation,toidentifythesame. Turningtotheseconderrorassigned,numbers1,2,and3ofarticle1922oftheCivilCodeinvokedbytheappellantarenot applicable.Neitherhe,asdebtor,northedebtorhimself,isinpossessionofthepropertymortgaged,whichis,andsincethe registrationofthemortgagehasbeen,legallyinpossessionoftheFidelity&SuretyCo.(Sec.4,ActNo.1508;Meyersvs. Thein,15Phil.,303.) InnowaycanthemortgageexecutedinfavoroftheappellantonSeptember22,1919,begiveneffectasofFebruary15, 1919,thedateofthesaleofthedrugstoreinquestion.Onthe15thofFebruaryofthatyear,therewasastipulationabouta personssecurity,butnotamortgageuponanyproperty,andmuchlessuponthepropertyinquestion. Moreover,theappellantcannotdenythepreferentialcharacterofthemortgageinfavoroftheFidelity&SuretyCo.because intheverydocumentexecutedinhisfavoritwasstatedthathismortgagewasasecondmortgage,subordinatetotheone madeinfavoroftheFidelity&SuretyCo. ThejudgmentappealedfromisAFFIRMEDwithcostsagainsttheappellant.SOORDERED.

G.R.No.L50008August31,1987 PRUDENTIALBANK,petitioner, vs. HONORABLEDOMINGOD.PANIS,PresidingJudgeofBranchIII,CourtofFirstInstanceofZambalesandOlongapo City;FERNANDOMAGCALE&TEODULABALUYUTMAGCALE,respondents. PARAS,J.: ThisisapetitionforreviewoncertiorarioftheNovember13,1978Decision*ofthethenCourtofFirstInstanceof ZambalesandOlongapoCityinCivilCaseNo.24430entitled"SpousesFernandoA.MagcaleandTeodulaBaluyut Magcalevs.Hon.RamonY.PardoandPrudentialBank"declaringthatthedeedsofrealestatemortgageexecutedby respondentspousesinfavorofpetitionerbankarenullandvoid. Theundisputedfactsofthiscasebystipulationofthepartiesareasfollows: ...onNovember19,1971,plaintiffsspousesFernandoA.MagcaleandTeodulaBaluyutMagcalesecuredaloanin thesumofP70,000.00fromthedefendantPrudentialBank.Tosecurepaymentofthisloan,plaintiffsexecutedin favorofdefendantontheaforesaiddateadeedofRealEstateMortgageoverthefollowingdescribedproperties: l.A2STOREY,SEMICONCRETE,residentialbuildingwithwarehousespacescontainingatotalfloorareaof 263sq.meters,moreorless,generallyconstructedofmixedhardwoodandconcretematerials,underaroofingof cor.g.i.sheets;declaredandassessedinthenameofFERNANDOMAGCALEunderTaxDeclarationNo.21109, issued by the Assessor of Olongapo City with an assessed value of P35,290.00. This building is the only improvementofthelot. 2.THEPROPERTYherebyconveyedbywayofMORTGAGEincludestherightofoccupancyonthelotwherethe abovepropertyiserected,andmoreparticularlydescribedandbounded,asfollows: Afirst class residential landIdentffiedas Lot No.720,(Ts308,OlongapoTownsiteSubdivision) ArdoinStreet,EastBajacBajac,OlongapoCity,containinganareaof465sq.m.moreorless,declared andassessedinthenameofFERNANDOMAGCALEunderTaxDurationNo.19595issuedbythe AssessorofOlongapoCitywithanassessedvalueofP1,860.00;boundedonthe NORTH:ByNo.6,ArdoinStreet SOUTH:ByNo.2,ArdoinStreet EAST:By37CandaStreet,and WEST:ByArdoinStreet. Allcornersofthelotmarkedbyconc.cylindricalmonumentsoftheBureauofLands asvisiblelimits.(Exhibit"A,"alsoExhibit"1"fordefendant). Apartfromthestipulationsintheprintedportionoftheaforestateddeedofmortgage,thereappearsa ridertypedatthebottomofthereversesideofthedocumentunderthelistsofthepropertiesmortgaged whichreads,asfollows: ANDITISFURTHERAGREEDthatintheeventtheSalesPatentonthelotapplied forbytheMortgagorsashereinstatedisreleasedorissuedbytheBureauofLands, theMortgagorsherebyauthorizetheRegisterofDeedstoholdtheRegistrationof sameuntilthisMortgageiscancelled,ortoannotatethisencumbranceontheTitle uponauthorityfromtheSecretaryofAgricultureandNaturalResources,whichtitle withannotation,shallbereleasedinfavorofthehereinMortgage. Fromtheaforequotedstipulation,itisobviousthatthemortgagee(defendantPrudentialBank)wasat theoutsetawareofthefactthatthemortgagors(plaintiffs)havealreadyfiledaMiscellaneousSales Applicationoverthelot,possessoryrightsoverwhich,weremortgagedtoit. Exhibit"A"(RealEstateMortgage)wasregisteredundertheProvisionsofAct3344withtheRegistry ofDeedsofZambalesonNovember23,1971. OnMay2,1973,plaintiffssecuredanadditionalloanfromdefendantPrudentialBankinthesumof P20,000.00.Tosecurepaymentofthisadditionalloan,plaintiffsexecutedinfavorofthesaiddefendant anotherdeedofRealEstateMortgageoverthesamepropertiespreviouslymortgagedinExhibit"A." (Exhibit"B;"alsoExhibit"2"fordefendant).ThisseconddeedofRealEstateMortgagewaslikewise registeredwiththeRegistryofDeeds,thistimeinOlongapoCity,onMay2,1973. OnApril24,1973,theSecretaryofAgricultureissuedMiscellaneousSalesPatentNo.4776overtheparcelofland,

RepublicofthePhilippines SUPREMECOURT Manila FIRSTDIVISION

possessoryrightsoverwhichweremortgagedtodefendantPrudentialBank,infavorofplaintiffs.Onthebasisof theaforesaidPatent,anduponitstranscriptionintheRegistrationBookoftheProvinceofZambales,Original CertificateofTitleNo.P2554wasissuedinthenameofPlaintiffFernandoMagcale,bytheExOficioRegisterof DeedsofZambales,onMay15,1972. ForfailureofplaintiffstopaytheirobligationtodefendantBankafteritbecamedue,anduponapplicationofsaid defendant,thedeedsofRealEstateMortgage(Exhibits"A"and"B")wereextrajudiciallyforeclosed.Consequentto theforeclosurewasthesaleofthepropertiesthereinmortgagedtodefendantasthehighestbidderinapublic auctionsaleconductedbythedefendantCitySheriffonApril12,1978(Exhibit"E").Theauctionsaleaforesaid washelddespitewrittenrequestfromplaintiffsthroughcounseldatedMarch29,1978,forthedefendantCity Sherifftodesistfromgoingwiththescheduledpublicauctionsale(Exhibit"D")."(Decision,CivilCaseNo.2443 0,Rollo,pp.2931). RespondentCourt,inaDecisiondatedNovember3,1978declaredthedeedsofRealEstateMortgageasnullandvoid(Ibid., p.35). OnDecember14,1978,petitionerfiledaMotionforReconsideration(Ibid.,pp.4153),opposedbyprivaterespondentson January5,1979(Ibid.,pp.5462),andinanOrderdatedJanuary10,1979(Ibid.,p.63),theMotionforReconsiderationwas deniedforlackofmerit.Hence,theinstantpetition(Ibid.,pp.528). ThefirstDivisionofthisCourt,inaResolutiondatedMarch9,1979,resolvedtorequiretherespondentstocomment(Ibid., p.65),whichorderwascompliedwiththeResolutiondatedMay18,1979,(Ibid.,p.100),petitionerfileditsReplyonJune 2,1979(Ibid.,pp.101112). Thereafter,intheResolutiondatedJune13,1979,thepetitionwasgivenduecourseandthepartieswererequiredtosubmit simultaneouslytheirrespectivememoranda.(Ibid.,p.114). OnJuly18,1979,petitionerfileditsMemorandum(Ibid.,pp.116144),whileprivaterespondentsfiledtheirMemorandum onAugust1,1979(Ibid.,pp.146155). InaResolutiondatedAugust10,1979,thiscasewasconsideredsubmittedfordecision(Ibid.,P.158). InitsMemorandum,petitionerraisedthefollowingissues: 1.WHETHERORNOTTHEDEEDSOFREALESTATEMORTGAGEAREVALID;AND 2. WHETHER OR NOT THE SUPERVENING ISSUANCE IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS OF MISCELLANEOUSSALESPATENTNO.4776ONAPRIL24,1972UNDERACTNO.730ANDTHECOVERING ORIGINALCERTIFICATEOFTITLENO.P2554ONMAY15,1972HAVETHEEFFECTOFINVALIDATINGTHE DEEDSOFREALESTATEMORTGAGE.(MemorandumforPetitioner,Rollo,p.122). Thispetitionisimpressedwithmerit. Thepivotalissueinthiscaseiswhetherornotavalidrealestatemortgagecanbeconstitutedonthebuildingerectedonthe landbelongingtoanother. Theanswerisintheaffirmative. IntheenumerationofpropertiesunderArticle415oftheCivilCodeofthePhilippines,thisCourtruledthat,"itisobvious thattheinclusionof"building"separateanddistinctfromtheland,insaidprovisionoflawcanonlymeanthatabuildingis byitselfanimmovableproperty."(Lopezvs.Orosa,Jr.,etal.,L1081718,Feb.28,1958;AssociatedInc.andSuretyCo., Inc.vs.Iya,etal.,L1083738,May30,1958). Thus,whileitistruethatamortgageoflandnecessarilyincludes,intheabsenceofstipulationoftheimprovementsthereon, buildings,stillabuildingbyitselfmaybemortgagedapartfromthelandonwhichithasbeenbuilt.Suchamortgagewould bestillarealestatemortgageforthebuildingwouldstillbeconsideredimmovablepropertyevenifdealtwithseparatelyand apartfromtheland(LeungYeevs.StrongMachineryCo.,37Phil.644).Inthesamemanner,thisCourthasalsoestablished thatpossessoryrightsoversaidpropertiesbeforetitleisvestedonthegrantee,maybevalidlytransferredorconveyedasina deedofmortgage(Vda.deBautistavs.Marcos,3SCRA438[1961]). Comingbacktothecaseatbar,therecordsshow,asaforestatedthattheoriginalmortgagedeedonthe2storeysemi concreteresidentialbuildingwithwarehouseandontherightofoccupancyonthelotwherethebuildingwaserected,was executedonNovember19,1971andregisteredundertheprovisionsofAct3344withtheRegisterofDeedsofZambaleson November23,1971.MiscellaneousSalesPatentNo.4776onthelandwasissuedonApril24,1972,onthebasisofwhich OCTNo.2554wasissuedinthenameofprivaterespondentFernandoMagcaleonMay15,1972.Itisthereforewithout questionthattheoriginalmortgagewasexecutedbeforetheissuanceofthefinalpatentandbeforethegovernmentwas divestedofitstitletotheland,aneventwhichtakeseffectonlyontheissuanceofthesalespatentanditssubsequent registrationintheOfficeoftheRegisterofDeeds(VisayanRealtyInc.vs.Meer,96Phil.515;DirectorofLandsvs.De Leon,110Phil.28;DirectorofLandsvs.Jurado,L14702,May23,1961;Pena"LawonNaturalResources",p.49).Under theforegoingconsiderations,itisevidentthatthemortgageexecutedbyprivaterespondentonhisownbuildingwhichwas erectedonthelandbelongingtothegovernmentistoallintentsandpurposesavalidmortgage. Astorestrictionsexpresslymentionedonthefaceofrespondents'OCTNo.P2554,itwillbenotedthatSections121,122

and124ofthePublicLandAct,refertolandalreadyacquiredunderthePublicLandAct,oranyimprovementthereonand thereforehavenoapplicationtotheassailedmortgageinthecaseatbarwhichwas executedbeforesucheventuality. Likewise,Section2ofRepublicActNo.730,alsoarestrictionappearingonthefaceofprivaterespondent'stitlehas likewisenoapplicationintheinstantcase,despiteitsreferencetoencumbranceoralienationbeforethepatentisissued becauseitrefersspecificallytoencumbranceoralienationonthelanditselfanddoesnotmentionanythingregardingthe improvementsexistingthereon. Butitisadifferentmatter,asregardsthesecondmortgageexecutedoverthesamepropertiesonMay2,1973foran additionalloanofP20,000.00whichwasregisteredwiththeRegistryofDeedsofOlongapoCityonthesamedate.Relative thereto,itisevidentthatsuchmortgageexecutedaftertheissuanceofthesalespatentandoftheOriginalCertificateof Title,fallssquarelyundertheprohibitionsstatedinSections121,122and124ofthePublicLandActandSection2of RepublicAct730,andisthereforenullandvoid. Petitionerpointsoutthatprivaterespondents,afterphysicallypossessingthetitleforfiveyears,voluntarilysurrenderedthe sametothebankin1977inorderthatthemortgagedmaybeannotated,withoutrequiringthebanktogetthepriorapproval oftheMinistryofNaturalResourcesbeforehand,therebyimplicitlyauthorizingPrudentialBanktocausetheannotationof saidmortgageontheirtitle. However,theCourt,inrecentlyrulingonviolationsofSection124whichreferstoSections118,120,122and123of CommonwealthAct141,hasheld: ...Nonetheless,weapplyourearlierrulingsbecausewebelievethatasinparidelictomaynotbeinvokedtodefeat thepolicyoftheStateneithermaythedoctrineofestoppelgiveavalidatingeffecttoavoidcontract.Indeed,itis generallyconsideredthatasbetweenpartiestoacontract,validitycannotbegiventoitbyestoppelifitisprohibited bylaworisagainstpublicpolicy(19Am.Jur.802).Itisnotwithinthecompetenceofanycitizentobarteraway whatpublicpolicybylawwastopreserve(GonzaloPuyat&Sons,Inc.vs.DelosAmasandAlinosupra).... (Arsenalvs.IAC,143SCRA54[1986]). Thispronouncement covers onlytheprevioustransactionalreadyalludedtoanddoesnotpassuponanynewcontract betweentheparties(Ibid),asinthecaseatbar.Itshouldnotprecludenewcontractsthatmaybeenteredintobetween petitioner bank and private respondents that are in accordance with the requirements of the law. After all, private respondents themselves declarethattheyarenot denyingthelegitimacyoftheirdebts andappeartobeopentonew negotiationsunderthelaw(Comment;Rollo,pp.9596).Anynewtransaction,however,wouldbesubjecttowhateversteps theGovernmentmaytakeforthereversionofthelandinitsfavor. PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Zambales & Olongapo City is hereby MODIFIED,declaringthattheDeedofRealEstateMortgageforP70,000.00isvalidbutrulingthattheDeedofRealEstate MortgageforanadditionalloanofP20,000.00isnullandvoid,withoutprejudicetoanyappropriateactiontheGovernment maytakeagainstprivaterespondents. SOORDERED. Teehankee,C.J.,Narvasa,CruzandGancayco,JJ.,concur.

 G.R.No.127941January28,1999 BIBLIATOLEDOBANAGAandJOVITATAN,petitioners, vs. COURTOFAPPEALSandCANDELARIODAMALERIO,respondents. MARTINEZ,J.: The Court of Appeals (CA), ina decision penned by thenjustice Richard Francisco, 1 categoricallydeclared private respondentastheabsoluteownerofthelandsubjectofthiscase.ThatdecisionwasaffirmedbythisCourt,becamefinal andexecutoryandwasremandedtothelowercourtforexecution.ButtheRegisterofDeedsfrustratedprivaterespondent's judiciallydeterminedrightasitrefusedtoissueCertificatesofTitleinhisnameonthegroundthatthemattershouldbe referred"enconsulta"totheRegisterofDeedsbeforepetitioner'stitlecanbecanceledandanewoneissuedinthenameof thewinningpartyhereinprivaterespondent.So,forthethirdtime,thissimpleredemptioncasewhichcommencedinthe 1980'sisagainbeforethisCourt. Hereisasummaryofthefacts,overwhichthereisnodispute: InanactionforredemptionfiledbypetitionerBanaga,thetrialcourtdeclaredthatshehadlostherrighttoredeemher propertyearlierforeclosedandwhichwassubsequentlysoldatpublicauctiontoprivaterespondent2CertificatesofTitle coveringthesaidpropertywereissuedtoprivaterespondentoverwhichpetitionerBanagaannotatedonMarch3,1983a noticeoflispendens.3OnappealbypetitionerBanaga,theCAreversedthedecisionofthetrialcourtandallowedthe formertoredeemthepropertywithinacertainperiod.4Privaterespondent'spetitiontothisCourtwasdismissed5andthe decisionbecamefinal. OnJune11,1992petitionerBanagatriedtoredeemthepropertybydepositingwiththetrialcourttheamountofredemption whichwasfinancedbyhercopetitionerTan.Privaterespondentopposedtheredemptionarguingthatitwasmadebeyond thetimegiventoherbythecourtintheearliercaseHowever,thelowercourtissuedanorderonAugust7,1992upholding theredemptionandorderedtheRegisterofDeedstocancelprivaterespondent'sCertificatesofTitleandissuenewtitlesin thenameofpetitionerBanaga6WhenhismotionforreconsiderationwasdeniedbythetrialcourtinanorderdatedJanuary 4,1993,privaterespondentfiledapetitionforcertiorariwiththeCAwhichwasdocketedasCAG.R.No.29869.On January 11, 1993, private respondent caused the annotation of said petition as another notice of lis pendens on the CertificatesofTitle.Threedayslater,theCAissuedatemporaryrestrainingordertoenjointheexecutionoftheAugust7, 1992andJanuary4,1993orders. Meanwhile,onJanuary7,1993,petitionerBanagasoldthesubjectpropertytopetitionerTanwiththedeedofabsolutesale mentioningprivaterespondent'scertificateoftitlewhichwasnotyetcancelled.Notwithstandingthenoticeoflispendens, petitionerTansubdividedthepropertyinquestionunderasubdivisionplan,whichshemadenotinhernamebutinthe nameofprivaterespondent.TherebeingnopreliminaryinjunctionissueandwiththeexpirationoftheTRO,petitionerTan askedtheRegisterofDeedstoissuenewtitlesinhername.OnMarch24,1993,suchtitleswereissuedinpetitionerTan's namebutitstillcarriedtheannotationsofthetwonoticesoflispendens.UponlearningofthenewtitleofpetitionerTan, privaterespondentimpleadedtheformerinhispetitioninCAG.R.No.29869. OnOctober28,1993,theCAsetasidetheAugust7,1992andJanuary4,1993ordersofthetrialcourtanddeclaredprivate respondentabsoluteownerofthesubjectpropertytheCAdisposedofthepetitionasfollows: WHEREFORE,inviewoftheforegoingconsiderations,theinstantpetitionisherebyGRANTED.Theorderissued bypublicrespondentjudgedatedAugust7,1992andJanuary4,1993areherebyorderSETASIDEandanewone isherebyentereddeclaringpetitionerastheabsoluteowneroftheparcelsoflandsubjectofredemptionforfailure ofprivaterespondenttoexercisetherightofredemptionwithinthethirty(30)daysperiodpreviouslygrantedherby thiscourt.7 ThatdecisionbecamefinalandexecutoryafterpetitionerBanaga'spetitionforreviewwasdismissedbythisCourtforlack ofmerit.8Uponmotionofprivaterespondent,thetrialcourtissuedawritofexecutiononDecember27,1994orderingthe RegisterofDeedstoreinstatetheCertificatesofTitleinthenameofthemovanthereinprivaterespondent.Initsorder whichpetitionersdidnotcontest,thecourtaquosaidthat: AlthoughthereisnospecificpronouncementinthedecisionoftheCourtofAppealsthatrevertsthetitlestothe landsubjectsofredemptiontothedefendant,thefactthatitdeclaredthepetioner(Damalerio)astheabsoluteowner ofthelandsentitleshimtowritofexecutionissuingfromthiscourtdirectingtheRegisterofDeedstoreinstatehis titlestohisname.Asitisimpliedfromthedecisiondeclaringhimtheabsoluteownerofthelandberevertedtohim

RepublicofthePhilippines SUPREMECOURT Manila FIRSTDIVISION

(SeeUyv.Capulong,221,SCRA87). Let therefore a writ of execution issue in this case to enforce the decision of the Court of Appeals. In this connection,theRegisterofDeedsoftheRegistryofDeedsforGeneralSantosCityisherebyorderedtoreinstate thetitleofCandelarioB.DamalerioTransferCertificatesofTitleNo.T19570andT19571,bothoftheRegistry ofDeedsfromGeneralSantosCity.9 ButtheRegisterofDeedsrefusedtocomplywiththewritofexecutionallegingthattheCertificatesofTitleissuedto petitionerTanmustfirstbesurrendered.Accordingly,privaterespondentmovedtocitetheRegisterofDeedsincontemptof court which was denied, as the trial court ruled on January 11, 1995 that the former's remedy is by consulta to the CommissionerofLandRegistration.10Inanotherorder(datedMarch29,1996)thetrialcourtlikewisedeniedprivate respondent'smotionfortheissuanceofawritofpossessionrulingthatthelatter'sremedyisaseparateactiontodeclare petitionerTan'sCertificatesofTitlevoid.Aggrieved,privaterespondentagainelevatedthecasetotheCAviaapetitionfor certiorariandmandamus11assailingtheabovementionedtwoordersofthecourtaquonamingasrespondentsthetrial courtjudge,theRegisterofDeedsandthepetitioners.OnNovember7,1996,theCArenderedadecisiongrantingthe petitionand,amongothers,setasidetheassailedordersofthetrialcourt.ThedispositiveportionoftheCAdecisionreads: WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the petition is GRANTED. Judgment is hereby rendered: 1. settingasidetheordersoftherespondentjudgedatedJanuary11,1995andMarch29,1996; 2. declaring the title issued to Biblia ToledoBanaga, Jovita Tan and to those other subsequent transferee or transferees,ifany,asnullandvoid; 3. orderingtheRegisterofDeedsofGeneralSantosCitytoissueanewcertificatesoftitletoCandelarioDamalerio overtheparcelsoflandinquestion; 4. orderingtherespondentcourttoissuewritofexecutionfortheenforcementofthisdecisionandofthedecisionin CAG.R.SPNo.29868(sic),aswellaswritofpossessionforthedeliverytopetitionerDamalerioofthePhysical possessionoftheparcelsoflandsubjectmatterofthiscase. SOORDERED.12 UpondenialbytheCAoftheirmotionforreconsideration,petitionersfiledtheinstantpetitionforcertiorariandmandamus. TheCourt,however,ispuzzledwhypetitioners,intheirpetition,wouldseektosetasidethetwoorders(January4,1995and March29,1996)of"respondentjudge"whowasnotnamedintheirpetition.13Assumingthisbeamerelapsussincethey alsoconfusinglyrefertoBanagaandTanas"privaterespondent"andtoDamalerioas"petitioner",14thepetitionisstill utterlywithoutmerit.Itispetitioners'stand(1)thatpetitionerTanisabuyeringodfaithand(2)thattheremedyofprivate respondenttosecurethetitlesinhisnameisbyconsultatotheLandRegistrationCommissionerandnotthroughcontempt. TheCourtisnotconvincedoftheargumentsprofferedbypetitioners. ByarguingthatpetitionerTanwasabuyeringoodfaith,petitionersineffectraiseoncemoretheissueofownershipofthe subjectproperty.ButsuchissuehadalreadybeenclearlyandcategoricallyruleduponbytheCAandaffirmedbythisCourt, whereinprivaterespondentwasadjudgedtherightfulandabsoluteownerthereof.Thedecisioninthatcasebarsafurther repeatedconsiderationoftheverysameissuethathasalreadybeensettledwithfinality.Toonceagainreopenthatissue throughadifferentavenuewoulddefeattheexistenceofourcourtsasfinalarbitersoflegalcontroversies.Havingattained finality,thedecisionisbeyondreviewormodificationevenbythisCourt.15 Undertheprincipleofresjudicata,theCourtandtheparties,areboundbysuchfinaldecision,otherwise,therewillbeno endtolitigation.Itistotheinterestofthepublicthatthereshouldbeanendtolitigationbythepartiesoverasubjectfully andfairlyadjudicated,andanindividualshouldnotbevexedtwiceforthesamecause.16Alltheelementsofresjudicata arepresentinthiscase,whichare: a. theformerjudgmentmustbefinal; b. thecourtwhichrenderedjudgmenthadjurisdictionoverthepartiesandthesubjectmatter; c. itmustbeajudgmentonthemerits; d. andtheremustbebetweenthefirstandsecondactionsidentityofparties,subjectmatter,andcauseofaction.17 The judgment in the redemption suit had long become final and executory; there is no question that the court had jurisdictionovertheparties andthesubject matter;itinvolves anadjudicationonthemerits ofthecaseas thecourt discussedandpasseduponpetitionerBanaga'srightofredemptionwhichshedidnottimelyexerciseandasaconsequence, lostherclaimofownershipofthelot.Bothpetitionersandprivaterespondentarepartiestotheearliercases,disputingthe sameparceloflandwithbothopposingpartiesclaimingownershipthereof.Certainly,resjudicatahadsetin.Besides,once judgmenthadbecomefinalandexecutory,itcannolongerdistributednomatterhowerroneousitmaybe.Inanycase,no sucherrorwasattributedtointhiscase. Contrarytopetitioners'argument,privaterespondent'sremedyisnotadirectorindependentcivilactionforcancellationof petitioner Tan's titles. The facts, circumstances, evidence and arguments invoked in this derailed final and executory decisionaretheverysamemattersthatwillbeestablishedassumingsuchindependentsuitislegallywarranted.Itdoesnot

matterwhethertheformercasewasaredemptionsuitandthenewonewillbeforcancellationoftitlebecausethetestof identityofcausesofactionisnotinitsformbutwhetherthesameevidencewouldsupportandestablishtheformerand presentcausesofaction.18 Petitionersothercontentionthattheexecutionofthefinalandexecutorydecisionwhichistoissuetitlesinthenameof private respondent cannot be compelled by mandamus because of the "formality" that the registered owner first surrendersherduplicateCertificatesofTitleforcancellationperSection80ofPresidentialDecree152919citedbythe RegisterofDeeds,20bearsnomerit.Ineffect,theyarguethatthewinningpartymustwaitexecutionuntilthelosingparty hascompliedwiththeformalityofsurrenderoftheduplicatetitle.Suchpreposterouscontentionbordersontheabsurdand hasnoplaceinourlegalsystem.Precisely,theSupremeCourthadalreadyaffirmedtheCA'sjudgmentthatCertificatesof Titlebeissuedinprivaterespondent'sname.Tofileanotheractionjusttocompeltheregisteredowner,hereinpetitionerTan, tosurrenderhertitlesconstituteviolationof,ifnotdisrespectto,theordersofthehighesttribunal.Otherwise,ifexecution cannotbehadjustbecausethelosingpartywillnotsurrenderhertitles,theentireproceedinginthecourts,nottosaythe efforts,expensesandtimeoftheparties,wouldberenderednugatory.Itisrevoltingtoconsciencetoallowpetitionersto further avert the satisfaction of their obligation because of sheer literal adherence to technicality, 21 or formality of surrenderoftheduplicatetitles.Thesurrenderoftheduplicateisimpliedfromtheexecutorydecisionsincepetitioners themselveswerepartiesthereto.Besides,aspartoftheexecutionprocess,itisaministerialfunctionoftheRegisterof Deedstocomplywiththedecisionofthecourttoissueatitleandregisterapropertyinthenameofacertainperson, especiallywhenthedecisionhadattainedfinality,asinthiscase. Inaddition,theenforcementoffinalandexecutoryjudgmentislikewiseaministerialfunctionofthecourts22anddoesnot callfortheexerciseofdiscretion.Beingaministerialduty,awritofmandamusliestocompelitsperformance.23Moreover, itisaxiomaticthatwhereadecisiononthemeritsisrenderedandthesamehasbecomefinalandexecutory,asinthiscase, the action on procedural matters or issues becomes moot and academic. 24 Thus, the socalled consulta to the CommissionerofLandRegistration,whichisnotapplicableherein,wasonlyanaiveandbelatedeffortresortedtoby petitionersinordertodelayexecution.Ifpetitionersdesiretostoptheenforcementofafinalandexecutorydecision,they shouldhavesecuredtheissuanceofawritofpreliminaryinjunction,25butwhichtheydidnotavailknowingthatthere existsnolegalorevenequitablejustificationstosupportit. Atanyrate,thetimepetitionerBanagasoldthepropertytopetitionerTan,thelatterwaswellawareortheinterestofprivate respondentoverthelot.PetitionerTanfurnishedtheamountusedbypetitionerBanagafortheattemptedredemption.One whoredeemsinvainapropertyofanotheracquiresnoticethattherecouldbeacontroversy.Itisforthesamereasonthat petitionerTanwasincludedaspartytothecasefiledincourt.Worse,atthetimeofthesale,petitionerTanwasbuying propertynotregisteredintheseller's name.This clearfrom thedeedofabsolutesalewhichevenmentionedthatthe CertificatesofTitleisstillinthenameofprivaterespondent.Itissettledthatapartydealingwitharegisteredlandneednot gobeyondtheCertificateofTitletodeterminethetrueownerthereofsoastoguardorprotectherinterest.Shehasonlyto lookandrelyontheentriesintheCertificateofTitle.Bylookingatthetitle,however,petitionerTancannotfeigned ignorancethatthepropertyisregisteredinprivaterespondent'snameandnotinthenameofthepersonsellingtoher.Such factaloneshouldhaveatleastprompted,ifnotimpelledhertoinvestigatedeeperintothetitleofhersellerpetitioner Banaga,moresowhensucheffortwouldnothaveentailedadditionalhardship,andwouldhavebeenquiteeasy,asthetitles stillcarriedthetwonoticesoflispendens. Byvirtueofsuchnotices,petitionerTanisboundbytheoutcomeofthelitigationsubjectofthelispendens.Asatransferee pendentelite,shestandsexactlyin.theshoesofthetransferorandmustrespectanyjudgmentordecreewhichmaybe renderedfororagainstthetransferor.Herinterestissubjecttotheincidentorresultsofthependingsuit,andherCertificates ofTitlewill,inthatrespect,affordhernospecialprotection.26 Torepeat,atthetimeofthesale,thepersonfromwhompetitionerTanboughtthepropertyisneithertheregisteredowner norwastheformerauthorizedbythelattertosellthesame.Sheknewshewasnotdealingwiththeregisteredownerora representativeofthelatter.Onewhobuyspropertywithfullknowledgeoftheflawsanddefectsinthetitleofhisvendoris enoughproofofhisbadfaith27andcannotclaimthatheacquiredtitleingoodfaithasagainsttheownerorofaninterest therein.28Whenshenonethelessproceededtobuythelot,petitionerTangambledontheresultoflitigation.29Sheis boundbytheoutcomeofherindifferencewithnoonetoblameexceptherselfifsheloosesherclaimasagainstonewhohas asuperiorrightorinterestovertheproperty.ThesearetheundeniableandunconvertedfactsfoundbytheCA,which petitionersevenquoteandciteintheirpetition.AsaptlyconcludedbytheCAthatpetitionerTanisindeedabuyerinbad faithonwhichtheCourtagrees: NotwithstandingherconstructiveandactualknowledgethatDamaleriowasclaimingtheland,thatthelandwasin hisname,anditwasinvolvedinpendinglitigation.JovitaTanboughtitfromBanagaonJanuary7,1993.Thedeed ofsalerecitesthattheparcelsoflandsoIwerecoveredbyTransferCertificatesofTitleNo.(formerly)[T12488]T 530)andTCTNo.(formerly[T12488]T530)(sic)"andTCTNo.(formerlyP1294)(Annex"F",Petition).Apart fromthefactthatBanagawaswithoutanyTCT,asabovestated,TCTNo.T12488waspetitioner'stitle(Annex

"C",Petition).HereinprivaterespondentTanwasbuyingalandnotregisteredinherseller's(Banaga's)name,butin thatpetitionerDamaleriowhohadbeenclaimingitashisown.Sheadmittedthisfactwhenshehadtheland subdividedonFebruary2,1993notinhernamebutinthenameofCandelarioDamalerio(Annex"Q",Reply). Evidently,shewasapurchaserinbadfaithbecauseshehadfullknowledgeoftheflawsanddefectsoftitleofher seller,Banaga.... ThenoticeoflispendensregisteredonMarch3,1993involvingthelandinquestionandprivaterespondentTan's actualknowledgeofthethenpendingCivilCaseNo.2556,wherethequestionastowhethertheredemptionofthe landwhichshefinancedwasraised,renderedherapurchaserinbadfaithandmadethedecisionthereinbinding uponher.30 Beingabuyerinbadfaith,petitionerTancannotacquireabetterrightsthanherpredecessorininterest,31forshemerely steppedintotheshoesofthelatter.Suchfindingofbadfaithisfinalandmaynotbereopenedforthelawcannotallowthe partiestotriflewiththecourts.32 Withrespecttotheissueofpossession,suchrightisanecessaryincidentofownership.33Theadjudicationorownershipto privaterespondentincludesthedeliveryofpossessionsincethedefeatedpartiesinthiscasehasnotshownbywhatrightto retainpossessionofthelandindependentlyoftheirclaimofownershipwhichwasrejected.34Otherwise,itwouldbeunjust ifpetitionerswhohasnovalidrightoverthepropertywillretainthesame.35Thus,theCAcorrectlydisagreedwiththe trialcourt'sorderdenyingprivaterespondent'smotionforwritofpossessionforthefollowingreasonscitedinitsdecision: 1.TheorderviolatesthedoctrinelaiddowninJaviervs.CourtofAppeals,224SCRA704,whichruledthatthe issuanceoftitleinfavorofapurchaserinbadfaithdoesnotexemptthelatterfromcomplyingwiththedecision adversetohispredecessorininterest,norprecludehimfrombeingreachedbywritofexecution; 2.PrivaterespondentTanwasapartyrespondentinCAG.R.SPNo.29869,shehavingbeenimpleadedina supplementalpetition,whichthisCourtgaveduecourseandrequiredtherespondentstofiletheiranswer.Thefact thatshedidnotfileanypleading,norintervenethereindidnotexcuseherfrombeingboundbythedecision, otherwiseallthatapartyrespondentwastofoldhisarmtopreventhimfrombeingboundbyadecisioninacase. Hersecuringtitlesoverthelandduringthependencyofsaidcasedidnotprotectherfromtheeffectsofsaid decision.Thevalidityoftileofapurchaserofregisteredlanddependsonwhetherhehadknowledge,actualor constructive,ofdefectsinthetitleofhisvendor.Ifhehassuchknowledge,heisapurchaserinbadfaithand acquiresthelandsubjecttosuchdefects(...indicatesthatcitationsofauthoritiesomitted)Thetitlesecuredbya purchaserinbadfaithisanullityandgavethelatternorightwhatsoeverasagainsttheowner(...). 3.Private,respondentTan'stitlesandthoseofherpredecessor,BanagaarosefromthevoidordersofAugust7,1992 andJanuary4,1993.Sinceavoidordercouldnotgiverisetovalidrights,saidtitleswerealsonecessarilynulland void(...). 4.PrivaterespondentsandrespondentJudgeexecutedthequestionedordersofAugust7,1993andJanuary4,1993, pendingreviewofsaidordersinCAG.R.SPNo.29869.Thenullificationofsaidordersbythisoutimposedupon theprivaterespondentstheobligationtoreturnthepropertytoDamalerioanduponrespondentJudge,uponmotion forexecution,toorderthecancellationofprivaterespondentstitlesandtheissuanceofnewtitlestohim. 5. This Court inits decisioninCAG.R.SP.No. 29869declared petitioner Damalerio absolute owner of the propertyinquestion.Privaterespondentswerepartieslitigantsinsaidcase,whodidnotclaimpossessionofthe landseparatelyfromtheirclaimofownershipthereof.Suchbeingthecase,thedeliveryofpossessionisconsidered includedinthisCourt'sdecisiondeclaringDamalerioabsoluteowneroftheproperty (...),whichcanbeenforcedbywritofpossession(...).Indenyingpetitioner'smotionforwritofpossession,the trialcourtviolatedsaiddoctrines,and 6.Lastly,theeffectofrespondentJudge'sorderofMarch29,1996istoreopenthedecisioninCAG.R.SPNo. 29689forrelitigationandalterationinaseparateaction.Forwhilethis Court alreadydeclaredthat Banaga's redemptionofthelandfinancedbyprivaterespondentTanwasinvalid,andasaconsequencedeclaredDamalerio absoluteowneroftheproperty,whichwasbindingagainstprivaterespondentTan,asshewasarespondenttherein andapurchaserpendenteliteandinbadfaith,theorderoftherespondentCourtholdingthatanothercivilactionbe filedtoannulprivaterespondentTan'stitleswouldbetorelitigatesuchissuesandmodifyoralterthisCourt'sfinal decision. TherespondentCourthasnoauthoritytodoso.36 WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,thepetitionisherebyDENIEDandtheassaileddecisionoftheCourtofAppealsis AFFIRMEDintotowithcostsagainstpetitioners.Nofurtherproceedingwillbeentertainedinthiscase.1wphi1.nt SOORDERED. Davide,Jr.,C.J.,Melo,KapunanandPardoJJ.,concur.