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The Hungarian Parliamentary Party System-From a European

Perspective

by László Szarvas

Two years after Hungary's multiparty elections

launched the Europeanization process we find a manifest need
for a comparative analysis of the nascent Hungarian political
system and its degree of Europeanness. The emergence of this
need represents two distinct revolutions in thinking: one in
the comparative analysis of processes and structures--the
integration of the Central European Region into a larger,
political perspective of Europe-- the other in the adoption of
new cognitive and other research methods by scholars in the
field, "a veritable methodological emancipation." The above
mentioned two ultimate goals guide my work, when in this
study, with the aid of useful perspectives from West European
literature, I attempt to empirically categorize the Hungarian
Parliamentary parties and factions in a broader context. The
work of Jan-Erik Lane and Svante O. Ersson (1991) is a good
starting point for two reasons. First as the subject of their
analysis is Western Europe, (in essence countries with
"genuine" multiparty systems) their work summarizes and
distills the results of the entirety of non-socialist Europe.
Besides the usual English-French-German developments, their
study also provides us with ample information concerning the
processes which have been under way in the Scandinavian
countries, as well as with insight into the main features of
the recently completed transitions from dictatorship to
democracy in the countries of Southern Europe (Greece, Spain,
Portugal). The second main benefit of their work is that
because of its characteristically broad analysis of the events
of 1945-89 its scholarly foundations draw upon the best of
contemporary politology to have appeared in English or German.
As such the methodologies utilized in their analysis are
inherently applicable, including the possibility of their
extension to new regions and phenomena.1 On the basis of the
deductions expressed above, I concentrate in this study
specifically on points of contact or divergence between
Hungary's political system and the European norm. Yet when
the occasion permits, I also detour to touch upon
characteristic phenomena underway in the countries of the
region, more specifically among the Visegrad Three (Czecho-
Slovakia, Poland, Hungary).

____________________
1 From the perspective of my focus, the analysis of parties
and party systems, I should like to heighight the work of the
following individuals as being especially rich wellsprings of
thought: Lawson, K.; Lijphart, A.; Lipset, S.M.; Mair, P.;
Olsson, M.; Pridham, G.; Rokkan, S.; Rose, R.; Rostow, D.A.;
Sartori, G. It is especially mertious that the above named
authors base their conclusions on voluminous amounts of data,
thus specialists in empirical politology may gain much
comparative information thorough the use of their books.

I. The Main Clustering of Political Parties in

Europe

A useful point of departure for a comparative

analysis of parties and party systems may be an accounting of
parties active in individual countries, at least according to
main party groupings. (We naturally only consider "Relevant
Parties" (Sartori), those which have gained considerable
influence in the Parliament through elections.)
Evolving from a base of common historical
development, and more recently as a product of the
democratization process, we are witness to the evolution of
very similar parties throughout the European continent.
Developmental differences, individualities due to national
specificities, are not, however, to be discounted. Keeping
the above statements in mind, I base my analysis on two very
similar groupings of the main European political parties.
Michael Smart (In Smith, 1983. pp. 328-339)
channells the various parties of Western Europe into 11
political streams, which he thereafter aggregates into 6
individual types of party groups.
These are as follows:

Streams Groups
1. Communist Communist
2. Independent Socialist Socialist
3. Social Democratic
4. Liberal Radical Liberal Radical
5. Liberal Conservative
6. Center-Christian Democratic Left and Center
7. Conservative
8. Nationalist
9. Far Right Far Right
10. Ethnic and Religious Mixed (Other)
11. Environmentalist and Other

In their own categorization, Jan Erik Lane and Svante O.

Ersson (1991. pp. 103-111) list the following main parties:
religious, ethnic, agrarian (rual), socialist, communist, left
socialist, liberal, conservative, contesting, far right, post-
materialist (environmentalist, green). Given the two caveats
that it is natural that parties contain groups or individuals
whose characters diverge from that of the mainstream, and that
it is not always possible to categorize parties precisely, the
above list serves to characterize the party systems of Western
Europe to a sufficiently useful degree.
Among the political parties in countries
undergoing transitions to democracy we may observe an
emulation of the main trends. The Socialist, Liberal, and
Center parties have likewise played vital roles in the
countries of Southern Europe. Although a significant
alteration of the parties' relative power has taken place in
the past 10-12 years, and recently "party-corporations or
federations" allied for the "institution" of democracy and
"new" parties have achieved greater electoral success (eg. the

2
Union of the Democratic Center in Spain and New Greek
Democracy), the "traditional" left and center parties remain
inherently important figures in the running. (Pridham, 1990,
pp. 104-147, 179-203, Szoboszlai 1989. pp. 40-55; 1990 pp. 32-
46.)
What then is the situation in the countries of the
Visegrad Three?
In the process of party formation a difference in
phasing is becoming apparent separating. Hungary and
Distingushing Czecho-Slovakia from Poland. Only as late as
1991, with the disintegration of Solidarity, the only real
party-movement to have taken ground in Poland in the past 10
years, did a multi-partysystem develop. (A listing of the
parliamentary parties of the three countries of Central Europe
may be found in the appendix.)
We may characterize the emerging or emerged proto-
parties and parties as follows: from the viewpoint of
political ideology and value systems they attach themselves
organically to historical traditions (national-christian-
liberal-conservative-socialist-and even communist) but gained
decisive influence in Parliament due to their organizational
appeance as new parties (new "movement" or "catch all" type
parties) such as the MDF, Civic Forum, Public Against
Violence).(Judy Batt 1991, Szoboszlai 1991) The period of
transition also saw the revival of long dormant tradition-
based parties whose functioning was frozen for 40 years such
as the Christian Democrats, Liberals, Social Democrats, and
Peasant Parties.
The newly formed Hungarian multipary system
simultaneously reflects the political changes of the late-
communist period and the influence of European traditions.
Therefore, we may find the characteristic parties listed by
Gordon Smith in our party system as well. Links to historical
traditions and new organizational forms dominate the Hungarian
political system as well (with the MDF as a national,
Christian, and liberal party; the SZDSZ as a new, liberal
party; FIDESZ as a "generation based" liberal party, etc).
Accompanying this is a revival of some national historical
parties (eg. the Smallholders, the Christian Democrats, and
Social Democratic Parties). It must, however, also be clearly
noted that Hungarian political parties are not fully developed
and contain a plethora of internal contradictions and ever
increasing tensions.(Szoboszlai, 1991; Agh-Szarvas 1992;
Kurtán et. al. 1991, 1992) For the above reasons one may not
unambiguously rank them into European categories: one party
may be fitted into several categories at once. The MDF may at
once be categorized as centrist, _hristian, and national-
conservative; the Smallholders as Christian-national-
conservative and agrarian; or the SZDSZ as liberal-radical-
conservative (and even socialist-liberal).
The analysis of 3 distict strands of experience,
that of the Southern European transformations, the challenges
posed by the West European integration process, and the given
the internal stresses of the Hungarian party system, we may
justifiably conclude the following: the Hungarian party system
will undergo further changes whereby both internal re-
structuring and modification of trends will take place
alongside the formation of new party alliances or
constructions. Already, the National Democratic Alliance,
Party of Republic and National Socialdemocrat Party
established in 1992, leaders of which are already in the MPs'
Hungarian Parliament.

3
 II. Parties in Parliament

In the section to follow I attempt a comparison

between the general European and the particular Hungarian
parliamentary party systems basing my analysis on Lane and
Ersson's methodology and data. One comment is in order before
we proceed further: in the context of the Hungarian data, time
is unidimensional. All information originates from a
momentary snapshot taken immediately following the 1990
elections, and thus may be evaluated only within certain
strict guidleines. In appropriate cases, Polish and Czech
examples are added to enrich and broaden the palette of
experiences.
The dimensional interplay of the various party
systems are relatively complex and somewhat overdetermined,
with different factors playing accentuated roles in individual
countries. In the recent past, alongside the consideration of
the characteristsics of each electoral system through the
aggragate number of parties present, analysts are increasingly
focusing on the relationships betweeen parties and social
fault-lines or cleavages (on the basis of Lipset and Rokkan's
(1967) famous work), polarization according to political
ideologies or programs, as well as on differences manifesting
themselves in Parliamentary functions. (Agh-Szarvas, 1992)
Keeping all the above caveats in mind, Lane and
Ersson attempt to describe and characterize the given
parliamentary party systems according to the following
criteria: (1) the ratio of electoral participation; (2) the
absolute # of parties having gained mandates; (3) the
"effective number" of parties; (4) ideological divergences, or
the index of "polarization"; (5) the roles played by social
cleavages and political orientations, and finally; (6) the
volatility of votes from election to election within a
specific party system. (Lane-Ersson, 1991, pp. 175-192).

1. Electoral Participation in National Elections

Country average% 45-89latest election in 85-89

Austria 93.6% 90.4%

West Germany 87.0% 84.3%
Denmark 85.2% 81.3%
Norway 81.3% 83.4%
Sweden 86.2% 87.9%
Great Britain 76.6% 75.4%
France 77.7% 71.9%
Italy 91.9% 90.5%
Greece 79.4% 83.5%
Portugal 81.7% 72.4%
Spain 73.0% 70.4%

1990 Round 1 1990 Round 2

Hungary
(Parliamentary) 65.7% 45.4%
(Local Governmental)40.2% 28.9%
Czecho-Slovakia
(Parliamentary) 1990 96%
Poland, 1989 62.1% 25.9%
1991 43.0%
Source: Lane, J. E. - Ersson, SoO. pp. 182; Kurtán 1991 p. 80;
Szoboszlai 1990/a, p. 445; Judy Batt 1991, Appendix)

4
 We identify the countries individually in order
to, portray the status of smaller north European and those of
the coutries undertaking the transition to democracy in
Southern Europe. Italy and Austria are accorded special
attention because of their historical ties with Hungary.
The above figures serve both to reveal and hide
many factors. In certain countries participation in elections
is mandated by law (eg. Italy), while elsewhere citizens vote
according to their own free will. In either case, however, the
ratio of participation in Western Europe remains high, though
the rate of participation has been somewhat less as of late
than in the previous forty years. A high rate of participation
is both a primary characteristic of a stable democracy as well
as one of the wellsprings of its stability and legitimacy. The
turnout ratio is indicative of the level of the country's
political culture in general, yet more specifically
characterizes voter behavior (the dominance of a
"participatory type of behavior"), the parties' social
recognition, and acceptance by society. Indirectly it is also
referential to the civil society's level of organization and
its capacity for self expression. Yet in Switzerland,
Europe's "oldest" democracy, voter turnout has averaged but
60% over the course of the past 45 years and was down to a
record low of 46.8% in the last elections. This figure
reminds us of the danger of isolating one set of data from its
context and considering it as an absolute indicator of the
health of democratic party systems. For the countries of
Central Europe, the electoral results of the Southern European
countries undergoing political transformations carry a
"message" well worth considering: the success of a country's
political transformation is, in part only, but nevertheless
directly related to the acknowledgement and legitimation of
politics by the country's voting public. In light of this
conclusion, Hungary's electoral turnout data gives cause for
concernt.
First and foremost we must acknowledge the
weakness of a "participatory" political culture in the region,
whose causes have already been analyzed by many observers.
(Szoboszlay 1990/a; Kurtán, et. al. 1991, 1992) At the same
time the data also reveals the degree of vulnerability with
regard to legitimacy which the present day parties and
government must contend with. Facts are facts: while the most
recent elections are unquestionable from a constitutional and
political perspective, its results, however, are far from the
state where they would be a genuine expression of a lasting
representative social concensus. (The results of regional
self-government elections and by-elections held since 1990
particularly serve to buttress the above observations.)
As concerns the Hungarian case, we may
independently arrive at similar conclusions upon inspecting
the results of public opinion research. Already in 1991 only
40-45% of those interviewed responded that the would certainly
vote if elections would be held the following Sunday; 25-33%
outrightly stated that they would certainly NOT vote| Even
more interesting is the data describing swings in party
preferences. According to these figures the percentage of
those intending to vote for the MDF oscillated between 16 and
21% from January to November 1991; SZDSZ's support between 17%
(May) and 26% (January). The most surprising results are those
registered by FIDESZ sympathizers. Of those questioned, 27%
in January and 37% in July would vote for FIDESZ in an
upcoming election. FIDESZ party leaders are also continuously

5
at the very top of personal popularity lists. Even if these
figures are not to be considered as certain harbingers, we may
nevertheless agree with the following conclusion: "...the
results of the 1990 elections are by no means to be considered
as eternally true as the voting camps of each of the parties
have changed considerably in makeup... What is certainly
true, however, is that these days 4/10ths of the voting public
may be considered as politically passive. In the two years
following the elections, the hopes, aspirations, and
expectations of the citizenry were left unfulfilled while
their prospects were restricted within ever narrower confines.
Yet the possibility still exists for the parties to dissolve
this crisis of confidence, and through their political actions
present true alternatives which establish direct connections
with the people on whose votes they may rely on even two years
from now." (Kurtán et. al. 1992. p. 631)

2. The Number of Parties and the Actual Party Number

(Fractionalization)

Country Number of PartiesActual (Effective) Party

Number
45-89 85-89 45-89 85-89
average average
Austria 3.3 4 2.5 2.7
West Germany 4.3 4 2.9 2.9
Denmark 7.8 8.5 4.8 5.8
Norway 6.1 6.0 3.9 4.2
Sweden 5.1 6.0 3.4 3.8
Great Britain 5.8 9.0 2.7 3.1
France 6.7 6.0 4.8 3.9
Italy 10.8 14.0 4.0 4.6
Greece 5.7 4.3 3.2 2.6
Portugal 6.6 6.0 3.6 3.9
Spain 12 13 4.0 3.9
1990 1990
Hungary (1990) 6 3.9
Czech-Slovakia (1990) 6
Poland (1991) 28

Source: Lane-Ersson, 1991.

The first of the two indicators is easily

understable: it represents the number of parties which gained
mandates in the elections. Great Britain's results appear to
be somewhat surprising in light of it being traditionally
referred to as a two party system. In the last 4 or 5
elections, however, 8 or 9 parties gained seats in Parliament;
most of them in but nominally significant amounts. This
marginality is well reflected by the "Effective Party Number"
figures for Britain.
What in fact is the "Effective Party Number?"
This relative quantity reflects the weighted average of the
number of parties with Parliamentary mandates enjoying
relative power therein derived from their electoral success
and parliamentary influence. The larger the discrepancy
between the absolute and effective party numbers, the greater
the number of parties with little Parliamentary influence; or
from another vantage point, the greater the concentration of
power in the hands of a small group of political parties.
Britain, Italy, and Spain are all examples of such power
concentration. While the averages disguise the actual
tendency, more detailed data depicts a continuous increase in

6
the fragmentation of West European party systems in the past
10-15 years. During this period ever more parties ran in
elections and gained representatives in Parliament. The newly
arrived parties were in general organized in response to two
goals: either minority representation or global concerns (eg.
environmentalism.).
The above table does not adequately depict the
circumstances which arose as a result of inaguration of
Hungary's electoral law: namely that as a result of the 4%
threshhold, "only" 6 of the 12 major parties were accorded
mandates. Also disguised is the fact that due to the two
different electoral systems used (individual districts and
party lists) there were sharp differences in certain parties
between the percentage of actual votes gained and mandate
seats alotted. In this study I use the ratio of mandates
gained as these figures more appropriately reflect the true
power relations existing in Parliament. The effective party
number rather accurately reflects the internal makeup of the
Hungarian parliament. Viewed from the perspective of mandate
ratios, it appears obvious that the KNDP and FKGP amalgamate
organically into a larger entity, the governing coalition.
The effective party number also pinpointedly signals that the
political frontlines are not drawn between each of the six
parties, but rather between the dominant concentrations which
arose as a result of party opinion adjustements and "deals",
thereby decreasing fragmentation. Yet the relative magnitude
of the Effective Number also demonstrates that no single party
dominates Parliament, and consequentially does not implicitly
necessitate the development of bi-polar party system; though
the analysis of some voting patterns may indicate just that.
Poland's 1991 elections brought about an all time
negative sensation as concerns party fragmentation in Eastern
Europe: 29 parties gained Parliamentary mandates, of which 11
gained but one each. This atomization is proving to be most
problematic for the more influential parties, 6 of which
gained an "equal distribution" each in the range of 62-44
mandates, thereby creating countless scenarios for failure and
placing great obstacles in the path of development of a stable
and effective coalition government. This lone fact,
independent of the pasinons taken by political parties and
their coalitional expectations, will continue to make
consolidation very difficult in Poland. It is confirmed by the
dificulties of the form of governments in 1992, and the
changes of the party fractions by MPs.

3. Polarizational Index

Country 45-89 average 85-89

Austria 2.4 2.1
West Germany 3.6 4.0
Denmark 2.4 3.0
Norway 3.2 4.1
Sweden 3.2 3.5
Great Britain 3.3 3.0
France 5.1 6.7
Italy 3.7 3.6
Greece 3.7 4.2
Portugal 4.7 4.0
Spain 3.4 3.7

1990 1991
Hungary 1.15 2.39

7
Source: Lane Ersson 1991 pp. 154-158. and p. 178
My figures are derived from two bases. In the first instance I
use the data included in János Simon's "Parlamenti pártok a
politikai skálán," Magyar Hírlap, 1992. March 19th with the
follwing values: MDF:6.4; FKGP: 7.2; KDNP: 6.7; SZDSZ: 5.1;
FIDESZ:5.0; MSZP: 3.2; The second calculation is based on my
own valuation, with values as follows: MDF: 7.5; SZDSZ: 5.1;
FIDESZ: 5.1; FKGP: 8.5; MSZP: 3.3; KDNP: 7.6. The listing is
only subjective in part; its main characteristics are
discussed in the primary reference source, or is based on
studies of the political orientation of individual parties.

The polarizational index seeks above all to

express the differences in ideology, political values, and
orientation which exist between various political parties. In
constructing a composite picture of a party system the
practice in Western Europe has been to focus on the indicators
along a left-right continuum and combine its output with
electoral results, with attention paid to the number of
parties present. Lane and Ersson also grapple with the
internal contradictions inherent in this index, and
characteristically present 7 different results, each a product
of a different method of calculation. Even with regard to the
various possible interpretational alternatives and degree of
error, it is safe to say that this variable is indicative of
the degree to which two extremes are present and active in any
given Parliament; that is, how "stretched" the political field
is from a scale of 1 to 10. From another vantage point it
also offers valuable insights into the character of the
parliament as a whole. As this indicator reflects both the
ideological-political distances between the parties as well as
the influence of certain individual parties, its
interpretation is vital in analysis of certain countries'
political makeup. By way of this variable we are made
sensitive to the fact that the high degree of political
polarization in France emerged organically as a result of the
intractability of both extremes (Communists and the Far Right)
and not because of the electoral results of the socialist.
Elsewhere the necessity of creating a center (eg., Spain,
Greece and Portugal) is also well reflected.
The Hungarian measurement of the quantity is
relatively unstable and therefore requires some explanation.
It is unreliable primarily because the left-right scale is
extremely restricted in explaining the true relations between
parties in today's Hungary. This, in turn is directly linked
to the "multidimensional character" of the internal life of
the Hungarian parties (the formation of center and people
parties) as well as the absence of the open acceptance of the
values of the political left and right. For the above
enumerated reasons, the scale is useful, nevertheless the
limitations on its explanatory power should not be forgotten.
The unreliability and limited usefulness of this
index is further affirmed by its not incorporating and thus
not depicting one of the most important "fault-lines" of our
first generational party system. The present day Hungarian
party system is shaped to a much greater degree by the
parties' relations to national traditions than is the case in
the West. Therefore we may speak of a "bi-polar" party system,
but not one according to a traditional a left-right
interpretation, however G. Markus expresses this division, as
the party-blocks of National-Christian versus Liberal-
Westermized parties, based on the nex values.
National-Christian Liberal-Westernized

8
 populist style urbanist style
culture economy
religious ethnic secularization
state-controll of the market free market
collectivism individualism
"authoriter democracy" competitive democracy

Yet what do the numbers mean in Hungary's case?

First and foremost it does not incorporate the most important
Hungarian specificity or uniqueness. Yet I could use no other
values in calculating this variable than the figures
standardized in the international literature. European
standards mandate this as well. Thus, according to one
interpretation of this indicator depicts the the Hungarian
Parliament to be much more "unified" than it actually is. On
the other hand it accurately expresses another of the
Parliament's character traits, namely the absence of
influential extremes. While Parliamentary debates may on
occassion become overheated, with the far-right's outbursts
increasing in decibels, it is however entirely accurate to
claim that no truly extremist political party exists on either
the far left or right of the Hungarian Parliamentary spectrum.
A further "refinement" of this indicator, the
development of a calculational algorithm to better reflect
Central European realities would serve as a contribution to
the development of international political science allowing
for a more effective use of comparative statistics. I am
thinking first and foremost of means whereby the internal
fragmentation of political parties (primarily the
fragmentation within parliamentary fractions) could be
incorporated into this index. On the other hand inherent
differences between various countries should be given greater
weight; in Hungary's case the national v. international,
traditional v. modernist relationships should be better
reflected. It maybe important to note that a three -
dimensional party-characterization is suggested by J. Wiatr,
in case of Poland that of the economic aspect (strongly
monetarist anti-monetarist), that of secularism vs.
fundamentalism and finally pro vs. anti-de-commuhization.
These aspects are mutually unrelated, and according to these,
parties which are ralatively close to each other on one issue,
stay poles apart on another.

4. The Social Structure and Party System

Strength of Class Strength of Minority Strength

of
Based Parties in Religious and Non-Structured
Parliament Agrarian Parties Parties
Countries 45-89 85-89 45-89 85-89 45-89 85-89

Austria 47.9 43.8 44.3 41.3 7.8 14.9

West Germany38.8 37.0 47.1 44.3 14.1 18.7
Denmark 46.1 47.4 18.3 11.2 35.7 41.5
Norway 49.0 45.5 18.2 15.0 32.8 36.9
Sweden 50.4 49.6 16.6 13.3 33.0 37.2
Great Britain43.3 40.5 2.2 3.9 54.4 55.6
France 44.1 46.1 11.3 0.0 44.3 53.9
Italy 43.8 45.6 39.6 37.0 16.6 17.4
Greece 25.8 53.8 0.0 0.0 74.2 46.2
Portugal 49.6 37.9 14.8 8.0 35.6 54.2

9
Spain 46.0 49.4 10.5 10.9 43.4 39.8

% of % of % of % of % of % of
votes mandates votes mandates votes mand.

Hungary 10.9 8.5 21.3 16.9 55.0 72.8

MSZP FKGP MDF
KNDP SZDSZ
Agrárszöv. FIDESZ
Source: J. E. Lane-S.O. Ersson (1991) pp. 186-188. Kurtan et.
AL. 1991-)
The literature used as background for this study
places great emphasis on the effect social fault-lines
exercise on the party mechanism as a whole. The first two
columns of the above table details the ideological fractures
in accordance with Lipset-Rokkan's model (the influence of
class-based versus that of minority (ethnic), religious, and
agrarian based parties.) The ranks of the "non-structured"
parties include those having their roots in traditional
political ideology (liberalism, conservatism), the"catch-all"
or so called center parties as well as those labelled as
parties for the "discontented."
The above table presents some interesting lessons.
Aside from some minor exceptions (Austria, Italy) two main
types rule the party structures . In part traditional class-
based parties (Communists and Social Democrats) and in part
non structured parties are dominant. The potency of the
former is obviously derived from the traditional mass party
character of workers'-labor parties, while the influence of
the latter is directly correlated with the rise of peoples'
parties. The examples cited also draw attention, although not
without characteristic exceptions, to the decline in the ratio
of votes received by minority, religious, and traditional
agrarian parties. In Austria, Germany, and Italy (largely due
to the Italian Christian Democrats) peoples' parties emerged
spontaneously, accompanying the rise in the influence of
Christian Democratic-Socialist type parties, in the meanwhile
simultaneously peripheralizing parties of an ethnic or
agrarian character. (Smith, 1980 pp. 334-335) Several
phenomena in the three southern European countries undergoing
internal transformations merit closer attention. The decisive
appearance of "class bases" appears to be coinciding with the
decline in the level of influence exerted by traditional
(minority-religious-agrarian) parties and the determining
influence of non-structured parties. While it is obvious that
in order for these parties to have forged the the internal
coalitions and have worked out successful plans of national
understanding, their actions must have been preconditioned on
mutual toleration. However, we may also not be far off the
mark in stating that such actions were in and of themselves
were also one of the preconditions for success.
The Hungarian case exhibits several unique
qualities which differentiate it from both the general
European as well as the "transitional" South-European models.
Let us begin by enumerating the similarities. First and most
strikingly manifest is the power and influence exercised by
"non-structural" parties. In other words, "new" parties
dominate the Hungarian parliament (especially in terms of
mandates.) This phenomena is technically referred to as "the
decisive trend of discontinuity" in the new party system.
(Agh-Szarvas 1992) What then is explanation for the haunting
presence of the past in inter-party relations? First and
foremost this arises from the rebirth of long dormant values

10
of political culture (but also the slow pace at which they
change) and similarly it is a function of a more rapid
organizational mobility. Secondly it may be explained by the
internal divisions arising within the "discontinued" parties.
Yet it is also partially a result of the MDF's
"traditionalist" political alliances and the weakness of
class-based parties in the absence of a credible left.
Indeed, through a slight alteration on the table (moving the
MDF into the center column) the situation suddenly becomes
much clearer and more palpable. The intellectual grounding
for this shift is to be found in the MDF's self-asserted
"ethnic" (Hungarian national) character, deep-rooted Christian
linkages and agrarian-village ambitions. Thus when we add the
MDF with 24.71% of the votes and 42.7% of the mandates to the
central grouping, the resultant figures for the center
hauntingly resemble those of the german case; the difference
still, however, being that the influence of non-structured
parties is still over 30% (SZDSZ, FIDESZ).
The categorizational uncertainties arise in part
because of methodological reasons. Oftentimes one
characteristic may not be severed from another for they are
organically fused; therefore clear-edged models prove
impossible to set up. The other reason for uncertainty lies
in the "multitude of colors" or many sidedness of the MDF;
primarily in the internal contradictions of its national
character. On the one hand, belonging to the national
grouping is certainly not a "minority" situation. Yet on the
other, the self-definition of the majority solely on
nationalistic grounds still mirrors a typically "minority"
vantage point. (In extremist speeches, sometimes we are
confronted with the literal slogan: "We (nationalists) are in
minority in this country.")
The most striking indicator of our divergence from
the models established by the sucessfully "transited"
countries of Southern Europe and Europe in general is the
virtual absence of class based parties in Hungarian politics.
While at present the above mentioned situation points to the
greatest difference, the weakness of non-structured parties
particularly in terms of mandates (with the possible exception
of the MDF), is not to be disregarded either.
The Hungarian statistics also reflect the changes
in the electoral mechanism; other analysts have discussed this
topic at length. (The 4% threshhold has negatively affected
"class based" parties. It is however important to note the
the MSZMP (the former ruling party) an Social Democratic Pary
achieved results very closely approaching the threshhold
value.) (Among others Szoboszlay, 199/b)
5. The Degree of Volatility
The Degree of Changes

Country 45-89 average 85-88

Austria 5.8 6.3
West Germany 13.8 5.9
Denmark 11.4 7.6
Norway 9.3 9.7
Sweden 6.1 7.9
Great Britain 7.0 3.9
France 14.4 10.5
Italy 11.1 9.1
Greece 19.9 5.7
Portugal 13.3 22.2
Spain 17.0 10.6
Hungary ?

11
Soruce: J. E. Lane - S. O. Erson, p. 189

The conclusions do as yet only refer to Western

Europe, which attest to slow and incremental transformations
as opposed to quick and radical shifts; stressing continuity
over discontinuity. (Here we disregard a potent exception
when in the "new" elections of 1949 a 64.2% alteration with
respect to previous voting patterns was registered in the
Federal Republic of Germany.) One more observation perhaps:
in elections held during the course of the transitions, the
frequency of more significant changes was markedly higher.
(In 5 of the 9 elections held between 1975 and 1989 in the
three Southern European countries volatility was over 10%,
with an individual peak of 22%.) Hungary will have to contend
with this palpable result of political freedom only two years
from now. Yet some phenomena worthy of attention is already
on the horizon.
The dominant governing coalition clearly lost
strength in the local self-government elections held in the
fall of 1990. Aside from a strong showing by a solid group of
independent representatives and mayors, the opposition parties
gained the greatest influence in the affairs of self-
governments. While this large scale shift does not in and of
itself guarantee a sure basis from which to predict the events
of 1994, it does clearly indicate that almost anything can
happen.

III. Party Fractions in Parliament

The functioning of Parliament interweaves the

political representational character of political parties and
Parliament's (and government's) national and common law based
institutional structure in a unique manner. The former refers
to the possibility of forming and operating various groupings
within the House, the latter to the topical (and functional)
division of labor in Parliament as well as among individual
committees or between the diverse organs of Parliament. This
dual character (and vantage point) most clearly collides in
the opposition between the Parliament's party nature and its
professional-technical side; each having historically evolved
along individual paths until institutionalized by common law.
The House Rules (or sometimes the Constitution itself) fixed
the positions and roles the parliamentary party groups are to
play in the legislative process. Meanwhile they also formulate
the doctrine concerning the necessity of safeguarding the free
development of both the representatives' and the general will.
1. The Institutionalization of Party Fractions
The common law institutionalization of
Parliamentary party groupings in various countries is outlined
in the table below.

Country Names given Legal basis Precond. of Body

deciding on
to Parl. groupsof ackowledgement acknowled.
acknowledgement

Austriaclubs(fractions) House Rules min. 5 pers. President

West Germanyfractions House Rules min 5%, less in Only the

Federal

12
 spec. instances Assembly

Denmark party groups None, though not Directly, Nonexistent

existance ackn. but according
in House Rulesto elec results

Norway parliam. groups None min 1 person Nonexistent

Sweden party groups Constitution Party Repr. Pres. of

House

Great Britainparties only indirect none Nonexistent

France groups House Rules min. 30 pers. President

Italy parliam. groupsConstitution and min. 10 pers Committee

of
House Rules (5 if repr. from Pres of
House
parties w/min
15 regional list

Greece parliamentary House Rules 1/20th of repr. Parliament

party groups or parties with
1/10th of vote
party repr.

Portugalparlim. groups Constitutionmin. 2 repr.; min. Pres

of Parliament
parties 25 indep repr.

Spain parlim. groups Constitution15 repr.; parties Presiding

Committee
and House Rules over 5%

Hungaryparty fractions House Rules min. 10 pers Pres. of

Nation. Assem.
(groups of repr.)
Source: See Parliaments in the World: A Comparative Reference
Compandium, Volume 1, pp. 589-624, Interparliamentary Union,
1986, and A Magyar Köztársaság Országgyûlésének Házszabályai,
Képviselõi Kézikönyv, 1990 (The Rules of the House of Hungarin
Parliament, 1990)

While in certain parliaments the Constitution

itself, in the majority of cases the "Constitutions of the
House" (Standing Orders, Rules of the House) legalize and
regulate the most general operational pre-requisites of
Parliamentary groups.
The pre-requisites for the formation of a new
party group have two distinct objectives. On the one hand
they allow for affiliation with a common party (membership in
a group of representatives, or party support), on the other
they safeguard the representatives' right to join voluntarily.
This special affiliational relationship also illustrates the
duality inherent in the system: independence co-existing with
committment to a party; which may often become contradictory
in the day to day work of a representative.
The numerical prerequisites for forming party
fractions has relatively broad guidelines Europe-wide, from a
minimum of 1 or 2 persons (Norway and Portugal respectively)
to a minimum of 30 people required to form a fraction in
France. The numerical minimums in general correlate with the

13
height of the threshhold value and size of the house of
representatives in each respective country. From this vantage
point, the Hungarian Parliament is structured in accordance
with European norms; a minimum of 10 persons is the equivalent
of a 3% threshhold. A new amendment to the House Rules has as
its aim to raise the present minimum to be fully in line with
the 4% Parliamentary entry threshhold level, and thus
advocates raising the minimum number of representatives
necessary to form a fraction from 10 to 15. (Proposal 1991) In
the meanwhile, however, the Hungarian Parliament has pioneered
an innovation in the field of fraction formation: the so
called group of independent representatives. The group of
independents is not structured along party lines and thus is
not a fully legal fraction in the sense that it does not have
the right to delegate faction representatives to every
committee. Momentarily, according to a political agreement,
they have been allotted seats in but 4 permanent committees.
Reasons may be brought up both for and against the
existance of the group of independents. Those seeking to
buttress the group's claim to an independent existance base
their arguments first and foremost on the firm soil of the
ideals of voluntary groupings and equality of representation,
according to which no community of voters may be negatively
discriminated against in Parliament (for restrictions on
taking part in committee work is synonymous with just such a
handicap). However, due to the broad differences in political
orientation between the members of this group, oftentimes even
a "minimal" consensus is quite seriously lacking; which
supplies the main line of reasoning for those opposed to the
group's legitimacy or necessity. In any case, newly proposed
bill would make possible the independence of individual
representatives not wishing to be formal members of any party
(thereby replacing the group of independents with
individuals). It is also obvious that further political and
constitutional-legal debates are to be expected concerning
this matter, especially in close conjunction with the new
electoral law which will stipulate the conditions for
independent candidates' contestation of offices.
The primary right of Parliamentary fractions is
the validation of party ideals in the functioning of the
House. One means of achieving this goal is the construction
or election of the organs of the national assembly.
Parliamentary fractions propose candidates to fill official
Parliamentary posts (President of the Assembly and
substitutes, clerks, the presidents and members of permanent
committees, etc.) as well as agree by consensus on the ratio
of fraction members holding seats in each committee. In
certain European states it is the House Rules which
methodically stipulate that committees be filled by faction
members in relation with their relative representation. In
most other cases the staffing of committees is based in
"common law" by way of either inter-party or tacit agreements.
Similarly, in Hungary the House Rules do not regulate such
staffing in accordance with the relative power of the
factions. The representational ratios arise from an agreement
between the factio leaders, including the election of
opposition representatives as committee heads.
Across Europe party-fraction leaders are members of the
House Presidency Committee or House Leadership. These bodies
play important and decisive roles in determining the order of
the day's legislation, the formulation of rules governing both
the formal legislative process and the so called unwritten
rules of Parliament. For this very reason it is important to

14
note and appreciate that this body in Hungary utilizes the
consensus method of decision-making. On several occasions in
1992 however, decisions were carried out which only the ruling
party majority supported.
The interesting information accompanying the table
is concerned with the question of the opposition's official
acceptance. According to the cited source, only in Britain
(and in other 2 party Parliaments) do the House Rules
enumerate the specific rights of the opposition party
(including rules stipulating that the opposition party's
leader's pay be similar in magnitude to that of the leader of
the governing party.) The "multiparty" Parliaments of the
continent do not specifically list the rights and freedoms to
be enjoyed by the opposition despite the fact that the
governing party-opposition distribution of power plays the
decisive role in the day to day legislative process. (A.
Lijphart, 1984)
The rights and freedoms of the opposition in
liberal democracies are regulated in an indirect manner. One
means of achieving this is the blanket spread of laws and
responsibilites to every fraction and every representative
equally (in standing for elections, determination of
compensation, the equal right to initiate laws and other
Parliamentary decisions, etc.) Another means is the detailed
formulation of the rights and freedoms to be enjoyed by those
remaining in the minority. To these regulations belong the
right to initiate special sessions or to alter the order of
the day's legislation (eg, at the request of 15% of the
representatives, or at the bidding of one party fraction, such
as in Germany). The opposition's other rights include: the
regulation of the order of addresses in daily debate (eg.
equal allottment of time guaranteed to both sides or the
prohibition of ending the debate before the opposition has
claimed its turn), the appearance of the opposition's point of
view on committee records, etc. We find similar regulations
in the Hungarian Parliament. The induction of the so called
2/3 laws into the Constitution, in certain instances, requires
that the opposition (or a part thereof) and the government
reach a consensus. In the meanwhile we may also discern mixed
signals. The new Hungarian House Rules Proposal, for example,
intends to raise the ratio of delegates required to call a
special session from the current minimum of 20% to a simple
majority. The practical implementation of the 2/3 laws has
also had a boomerang effect in Hungary. Because of the
vehemence of political debates and difficulty in reaching a
compromise the government has visibly abstained from placing
such issues on the agenda, thereby signaling firm limits on
the opposition's range of possibilities. Both Hungarian
experiences and the examples of the Western democracies expose
the grevious need for spcific rules to regulate the
interaction of governing and opposition parties in Parliament.
This would first and foremost aid in smoothing out the
functioning of parlaiments of countries currently making the
transition to democracy.

2. Party Fractions in the European Parliament.

Beyond the comparative analysis of the Parliaments

of various European nations, we take a short detour to analyze
the parties forming the European Parliament, the harbinger of
the consequences and demands Europeanization and integration;
with special concern to the prospects facing the countries of

15
Central Europe.
The European Parliament, as the integrated
parliament of the European Community, plays an increasingly
active and potent role in the process of European political
integration. While it does not override the decisions of
individual nations, the European Parliament's
reccommmendations and stances have great supportive and
indirect influence. Thus nations seeking closer ties with the
EC should pay close attention to the events unfolding there.
The representatives of the Parliament have, since
1979, been elected both siumultaneousely and directly in
member countries, with their numbers fixed country by country.
National Parliaments, do not, however, have any functions of
influence to fill in the European Parliament. The preparatory
working committee is allotted the most important role in the
functioning of the Parliament, while the plenary meetings are
divided along party group or fraction lines. Let us look at
the facts:

Parties and Fractions in the European Parliament

1986 June 1989

Left
Communists and Allies 48 41
Rainbow Group (and Greens) 20 39
Socialists 165 180
Total: 233 260

Center and Right

Independents 15 16
Christian Democrats 115 123
Organization of European Democrats 29 44
Liberal, Reform Democrats 44 20
European Democrats 63 34
Europan Far Right 16 21
Total: 282 258

Source: Macridis 1990, pp. 336-350.

Some experiences concerning the election of the

European Parliament and its party distribution:
a) Voter turnout for European Parliamentary
elections is generally lower that for national elections. The
highest figures registered at the last election was for Italy,
where despite a legal obligation to vote, only 86% of the
population did so. Great Britain registered the lowest
turnout at 31%, with the average hovering around 56%.
b) Parties advocating national isolation have
generally suffered losses in the countries of the community,
although in the last elections the nationalist far-right
parties have grown in strength.
c) In several countries the environmentalists or
greens have made significant progress (Britain: 15%, Belgium
14%, France 11%, and West Germany with 8.4%). These figures
serve to support the observation that in European
Parliamentary elections the citizens implicitly criticize the
power relationships existing in individual nation-states for
they vote differently in national elections. Another
interpretation attributes this difference in votes to a
difference in voting camps between those who vote in national
elections or those who vote in the European Parliament's
elections.
d) Despite the reservations voiced above, the two

16
main groupings of the European Parliament are analogous to the
party groups forming in individual national parliaments: the
left and center-right factions have almost the same ratio in
Parliament.
In light of the experiences listed above, the
European Parliament as an assimilating institution present
certain "challenges" to the party groups in Central Europe
wishing to join the community. Even the physical line-up (and
ordering according to factions) challenges these parties with
the necessity of clarifying their political orientations.
This simultaneously signals the arrival of a "positive
identity," the need and compulsion of a decisive acceptance of
left-right values as well as the coordination of the
integratory process assimilating small groups of nationalists.
From the turn out ratio for national elections in Hungary, we
have one firm lesson to draw: that much greater effort needs
to be directed toward the legitimization of electoral results.
Our parties need to pay attention to even such "simplistic"
details in order to accumulate an actual membership base.

3. Fractions and Individual Representatives, Fractions and

Party Leaderships

With the difficulties enumerated above, we return

to a discussion of national parliaments. In this short
section I attempt to analyze the relationship extant between
the individual representative's need for independence and
his/her responsibility toward their respective party. My
analysis as of yet is largely composed of legal demands and
ideological observations; the incorporation of empirical
observations concerning representatives' behavior would make
bring such an analysis much closer to being true to life.
Parliamentary fractions (as communities within
Parliament)arise from the voluntary joining together of
representatives. Therefore their functioning may not restrict
the independence of any of their member, wherein lies the
essence of representation. In daily affiars, however,
situations of conflict may arise as a result of differences of
opinion between a minority (or even individual) stance and one
supported by the majority of the party. Similar conflicts may
be engendered by the parties' efforts to "command" or give
orders to individual representatives. (An extreme case of the
latter is manifest in the Independent Smallholders' Party's
schism between the parliamentary fraction and party which led
to the expulsion of the representatives from the party
proper.)
Fractions, in their capacities as communities,
may, in the name of the fraction, influence and oversee the
work of fraction members. First and foremost the fraction may
democratically decide questions concerning the fraction's
leadership, membership in various committees, and
consequentially may withdraw their confidence from individual
representatives or even recall their members from specific
committees. Likewise the fraction-community decides as
concerns the "incorporation" of representatives wishing to
join the fraction; thus necessitating a collective, rather
than just an individual, decision on all questions of "seat
switching."
Fractions in general seek to influence individual
representatives' opinions along the decision making process,
focusing on influencing the way they vote. Besides requiring
their members to listen to expert opinions, attend pre-vote

17
stance adjustment meetings or decisions to hold a collective
stance on a particular issue, in specific instances, fractions
may also determine the behavior of their delegates before and
during a crucial vote by demanding "fraction obedience." All
such directives are enumerated in the fraction rules or in
decisions taken by the organs of the party leadership. In the
meanwhile, however, such "discipline" or "obedience" may take
place only by respecting the individual representative's right
to free choice. Only in very rare instances, and even then
only through a 2/3 approval of the fraction, may a compulsory
decision be "mandated"; fractions do not posess strong
disciplinary powers. In the most "extreme" of cases
representatives who on multiple occasions have slighted the
calls for fraction-obedience may be called upon to leave the
group or may even be excluded. In the very rarest instances
the fraction may call upon a representative to resign his/her
mandate. European democracies, in general, are unfamiliar with
the institution of representative recall. (Indeed,
representatives in Norway may not resign their mandates
voluntarily. Only judicial decisions or incapacity rendering
the MP unfit for the post justify the representative's
replacement.) Party fractions are thus given important roles
to play in influencing representatives' behavior in periods
between elections. The ideal of a representative's freedom of
choice, fortunately however, limits the fractions' range of
possibilities. Yet voting "en bloc" is still relatively
common, as are unified behavior or stances taken by fraction
members on certain issues. In 1991 the members of the
Hungarian governing coalition voted identically in 94% of
instances. This glaringly high ratio as much reflects the
inclination to conformity of certain representatives as the
pressure exerted by the respective party fractions.
The European practice of Parliamentarism
organically incorporates a dynamic relationship between party
fractions within Parliament and party stryctures without.
From a historical as well as a political vantage point the
double edged question is: which group does in fact lead the
party or has greater influence in shaping party politics, the
parliamentary fraction (or more specifically its leadership)
or the elected leadership of party members? From another
angle: which forum determined the behavior of representatives
in Parliament, the fraction (or rather its leadership) or the
decision making organs of the party proper resident outside of
Parliament?
Answers to the above questions are neither simple
nor consistent, but rather alternate by country, party, or
historical period under consideration. Here, after a brief
review of European tendencies, I comment on several
characteristic traits of the Hungarian situation.
For traditional parliamentary parties, the party
fraction is its most important political organ. Even after
the development of institutions outside of Parliament, the
fraction remains fost important decision making forum.
Accordingly, in the British Conservative Party of today the
parliamentary representatives of the party elect the party
leader as well as remain the source of most important
decisions affecting the party. For many years the same
practice prevailed in the Labour Party, despite the supreme
importance of the party's extra-parliamentary organized
groupings (unions). The party's 1981 reforms reflected the
need for change, altering the composition of the leadership.
The national leadership of the Labour Party has, since the
reforms, been composed 40% of union delegates, 30%

18
representatives of party members at large, and 30% of Labour
MPs. This "corporative" organization elects the President and
presidium, determines the party's political orientation and
tactical path to follow.
We may observe the very opposite tendency to that
having taken place in the Labour Party in the mass parties
which grew from the so called extra-parliamentary parties and
gained their entry into Parliament largely as a result of the
extension of suffrage. The leaders of the Social Democratic
parties were in earlier days elected by representatives of the
party membership, whereafter the leadership decided questions
of the party's ideological direction as well as strategy to be
followed by the Parliamentary Fraction. As a rivalry soon
developed between the various party leaderships and
parliamentary fractions and in the 1960s and 70s these parties
also reached a point where the various "layers" of the party
had to be represented in the leadership. In the German Social
Democratic Party for example, the party's National Executive
Council" and the "Budestag Fraction" jointly, with many mutual
personell overlaps, form the highest party leadership.
This situation is identical to that of the CDU-CSU
where the representatives of the regional party apparatuses,
the party's Bundestag fraction, delegates from unions and
industrial chambers form the party's national leadership.
The main trend is clear: today's western
democracies are characterized by consensus and corporative
cooperation between the significant political actors both
inside Parliament (the fraction) and outside (party leaders),
solving the problem of dominance and establishing a balanced
cooperation between the two groups. (Naturally the British
Conservative Party has decided differently.) Thus the party
leadership plays a decisive role in the formulation of party
programs, the selection of representatives, and in influencing
opinions of MPs. While on the one hand they lean on the
parliamentary party groups on the other they guarantee
maneuvering space for the fraction in the intra-Parliamentary
decision making process.
The same situation is in existance in the newly
nascent Hungarian Parliament, with several points of
uniqueness however. The present day leaders of Hungary's
political parties have had the lion's share of influence in
formulating political programs, selecting candidates for
elections, and exercising control over groups of
representatives. First and foremost among those specificities
of the Hungarian system which differ from the European norm is
the extraordinary overlap of personalities between the party
leaderships and members of the parliamentary fractions. Aside
from one or two exceptions (such as during János Kis' tenure
as president of the SZDSZ) almost the entirety of the
leadership of the new Hungarian parties gained seats in
Parliament (mainly through party lists.) This situation,
however, is entirely understandable given the circumstances of
the early elections and difficult positions parties were
thrust into (especially as concerns recruitment.) Thus the
dichotomy between "fraction or party leadership" is hardly
significant in the Hungarian case. Nevertheless it still
exists. The majority of the representatives composing the
MDF's Parliamentary fraction was elected in individual
districts; such MPs are also to be found in the fraction
leadership. These MPs often proposed modifications to bills
put forward by the government and on several occasions they
even voted differently from the fraction as a whole. As a
result of personnel changes which took place in the party

19
leadership of the Independent Smallholders' Party in the fall
of 1991, the discrepancies betweeen the fraction and party
leadership developed into an acute conflict concerning
political tactics.
Thus in today's Hungary we find attempts at
establishing a party leadership domination over the
representatives (FKGP) side by side with stances urging the
fraction to sieze decisive control over party politics. The
latter is primarily to be found within the SZDSZ.
European tendencies are to be found instilled in
parties whose the leadership has accepted the fraction and its
leadership as one of the factors shaping the party along with
the imput from the representatives of party organs, and
delegates of party membership groups. (FIDESZ, MSZP, MDF).
At present the parliamentary fractions' influences
are still quite potent in the party leaderships, yet the
forces "outside of Parliament" have also assumed a more
decisive stance in the leadership and political discourse of
the SZDSZ and FKGP. It is also increasingly obvious that these
new shifts in power do exert influence on the functioning of
their Parliamentary fractions.
In the technical details of politics, as well as
in many areas of llife, we are living in an era of great
changes. The relationship between the Hungarian Parliamentary
party fractions and party leadership are fortunately following
European tendencies in a surprisingly regular manner, which in
turn is an encouraging sign of health for the entirety of the
Parliament and party system. Yet analysis of the power
relations within the party system fall outside the bounds of
this study.

IV. Some Conclusions in Summary

Our joining the process of European political

integration bears two main faces: one is obviously our
adaptation of political value structures and institutions to
those of the other members, the other is the preservation and
continued representation of distinctly Hungarian (and Central
European) values and characteristics. The above may be
reached only as a result of a longer, developmental political
process and conscious, goal oriented political acts. Some
conclusions of my study may aid in this learning-adaptational
process.
1. Deducing from the characteristic groups of
European parties, the formulation of party identities and
self-definitions is not to be equated with narrow party
interests. For some time it will be possible for parties of
mixed or quasi-characteristics to maintain electoral success
in Central Europe. Yet the need for stability and
consolidation will apply pressure for the emergence of a
clear, modernized, representational system based on the
historical left-right continuum, upon which party politics
more concretely based on true social layerings may function.
2. The other important portion of my conclusions
is that party identities should at once be messages to society
at large, should present more equivocal electoral options
toward which democratic "voters" may orient themselves. I feel
that, specifically in Hungary, parties themselves should more
seriously assess why society at large does not support them,
or more specifically: which strata do (and which parties), and
which none at all. Although some reasons are superficially
known (the historical recent past, the weakness of "public
institutions," and relatively small number of "selfgoverning

20
democrats," etc.) the actual and more detailed
interconnections should be discovered and depicted as soon as
possible. It is not enough to recognize the symptoms of
apathy, it is vitally important to detail its reasons and
attempt to decrease it given the circumstances. Not just
vehement "activism," but passivity itself may also be a force
weakening political stability.
3. The internal tendencies of the party systems of
Europe depict the lasting and harmonic coexistance of
different political orientations and the governmental
combination of the parties of the center-left and center-
right. To fulfill this assignment we require politically
adept "masters" and tolerant parties ready to compromise. In
accordance with long term tendencies, Central Europe must also
face the partial restructuring of today's parties, the
combined efforts of political parties, the forging of tactical
(or strategic) alliances, the strengthening of partner
relationships within the context of democratic rules. The
sooner we achieve this in the relationships between parties,
the closer we will be to Europe.
4. While the parties are learning their roles in
society, we are witnesses to a similar learning process in
Parliament. Before anything else the substantive functioning
of the governing party-opposition relationship must be
adopted, for only through the experiences gained on the home
turf may we become worthy partners for Europe and valuable
players in this "European game."
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Social Scince Institute of Hung. Scientific Academic (1990/a)
György Szoboszlai (ed): Váltók és utak Transformations and
roads Hung. Pol. Science Ass. Yearbook (1990/b)
György Szoboszlai (ed): Demokratikus átmenetek, Democratic
Transitions, Hungarian Political Science Association Yearbook
1991/a
György, Szoboszlai (ed): Democracy and Political
Transformation Hungarian Political Science Association,
Budapest, 1991/b
Jerzy J. Wiatr: Fragmented Parties in a New Democracy: Poland
(draft)
(Presented at the Conference on Political Parties in the New
Democracies, Vienna April 24-26, 1992)
APPENDIX

Hungary

General election result

March 25 and April 25, 1990: election of National Assembly

(Országgyûlés)

Party name 1st round vote Total

by Party list % seats

Hungarian Democratic Forum (HDF or MDF)24,71%42,49 164

Alliance of Free Democrats (SzDSz)21,38% 23,83 92
Independent Smallholders' Party (FKGP)11,76% 11,40 44
Hungarian Socialist Party (HSP or MSZP)10,98% 8,55 33
League of Young Democrats (FIDESZ) 8,94% 5,70 21
Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP) 6,46% 5,44
21
Agrarian Alliance 3,15% 1
Independents and others 10
Total (not including eight seats for minorities)
386

Czecho-Slovakia

The parliamentary parties in Czecho-Slovakia after the June

1992 elections

ELECTION RESULTS IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC

Party House of the People House of

Nations National Council
(PERCENTAGE)(SEATS)

Civic Democratic Party/Christian Democratic Party33,904833,43

37 29,37 76
Left Bloc (Communists) 14,27 1914,48 1514,05 35
Czechoslovak Social Democracy7,6710 6,80 6 6,53 16

22
Republican Party 6,48 8 6,37 6 5,98 14
Christian Democratic Union5,98 7 6,08 6 6,28 15
Liberal Social Union 5,84 7 6,06 5 6,52 16
Civic Democratic Alliance - - - - 5,93 14
Association for Moravia and Silesia - - - - 5,87
14

ELECTION RESULTS IN THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC

Party House of the People House of

Nations National Council
(PERCENTAGE)(SEATS)

Movement for a Democratic Slovakia33,532433,85 3337,26 74

Party of the Democratic Left (Communists)14,44 1014,04 13
14,70 29
Slovak National Party 9,39 6 9,35 9 7,93 15
Christian Democratic Movement8,96 6 8,81 8 8,88 18
Coexistence/Hungarian Chrisitan
Democratic Movement - - - - 7,42 14
Coexistence/Hungarian Christian
Democratic Movement/Hungarian
People's Party 7,37 5 7,39 7 - -
Social Democratic Party in Slovakia - - 6,09 5 -
-

Poland

Oct. 27, 1991: first fully free elections to bicameral

National Assembly

% votes Sejm
seats Senate seats
in 1991 in 1992**

+ Democratic Union 12,3 62 62 21

Democratic Left Alliance
(former communists) 12,0 60 59 4
* Polish Peasant Party - 8,7 48 50 7
Programmatic Alliance
Confederation for an
Independent Poland 7.5 46 51 4
Catholic Electoral Action 8.7 49 49 9
*+ Centre Alliance 8.7 44 42 9
Liberal Democratic Congress7.5 46 51 4
+ Solidarity Union 12.3 62 62 21
*+ Peasant Accord 5.5 28 18 5
Beer Lover's Party 3.3 16 3

Total 460 460 460

* Represented within the Olszewksi government formed in

December.
+ One of the groups formed from the basis of the Solidarity

23
movement.
** Completed by J. Wiatr (1992)

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