Andrada v.

People Andrada was charged with frustrated murder for hacking Urgenio (an officer of the defunct Philippine Constabulary) on the head twice which could have caused his death were it not for the timely medical attention given to him. The trial court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt, which was affirmed by the CA with modifications as to the penalty taking into account the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority in his favor. ISSUES: 1. WON his right to due process was violated. 2. WON his plea of self-defense is in order. 3. WON the crime committed is frustrated murder or frustrated homicide. 4. WON he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. HELD: 1. No. Petitioner ascribes gross incompetence or gross negligence to his counsel for his alleged failure to present all the witnesses who could have testified that he is innocent, failure to present the medical certificate showing the injuries inflicted upon him by the victim, failure to notify him of hearing, and failure to submit a memorandum. For negligence or incompetence to be deemed gross, it must have prejudiced the constitutional right of an accused to be heard. The OSG notes that petitioner was represented by his counsel of choice. Records show that counsel for petitioner actively participated in the cross-examination of witnesses for the prosecution. Petitioner was present during the hearing. If he believed that his counsel was incompetent, he could have secured the services of a new counsel. A client is bound by the mistakes of his lawyer, as well as the latters decisions regarding the conduct of the case. His counsel was not so inept or motivated by bad faith, or so careless and negligent of his duties as to seriously prejudice the substantial rights of petitioner or prevent him from putting up a proper defense. 2. No. Petitioner has not adequately discharged his burden of proving the elements of self-defense. The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that at the time he hacked the victim, the latter was still seated while he (petitioner) was behind him.

during his arrival in Manila. Petitioners filed a Motion to Re-Open Case with Leave of Court who were convicted by the Sandiganbayan for the double murder of Ninoy and Rolando Galman. Petitioners were initially acquitted by the Sandiganbayan in 1985. But after finding that the proceedings were a sham trial, the Court nullified the proceedings and ordered a retrial. The Sandiganbayan then convicted petitioners in 1990 and the judgment became final. In 2004, the petitioners, with the assistance of the Public Attorneys Office, sought to present the findings of an independent forensic group from UP and allow the reopening of the case based on newly found evidence. The petitioners likewise invoke that there was a grave violation of due process and misapprehension of facts based on false forensic evidence. ISSUES: 1. 2. 3. HELD: 1. No. The threshold question in resolving a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence is whether the proferred evidence is in fact a newly discovered evidence which could not have been discovered by due diligence. The Court finds that petitioners purported evidence does not qualify as newly discovered evidence that would justify the re-opening of the case and the holding of a third trial. Petitioners failed to show that it was impossible for them to secure an independent forensic study of the physical evidence during the trial of the double murder case. It appears from their report that the forensic group used the same physical and testimonial evidence proferred during the trial, but made their own analysis and interpretation of said evidence. The report of the forensic group essentially reiterates the theory presented by the defense during the trial of the double murder case. Clearly, the report is not newly discovered, but rather recently sought, which is not allowed by the Rules. Certainly, a new trial will only be allowed if the new evidence is of such weight that it would probably change the judgment if admitted. Also, new trial will not be granted if the new evidence is merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching. No. Records show that they were ably represented by Atty. Jimenez. Petitioners did not allege any specific facts in their present motion to show that Atty. Jimenez had been remiss in his duties as counsel. Petitioners are therefore bound by the acts and decisions of their counsel as regards the conduct of the case. The general rule is that the client is bound by the action of his counsel in the conduct of his case and cannot be heard to complain that the result of the litigation might have been different had his counsel proceeded differently. In criminal as well as civil cases, it has frequently been held that the fact that blunders and mistakes may have been made in the conduct of the proceedings in the trial court, as a result of the ignorance, inexperience, or incompetence of counsel, does not furnish a ground for a new trial. So it has been held that mistakes of attorneys as to the competency of a witness, the sufficiency, relevancy, materiality, or immateriality of a certain evidence, the proper defense, or the burden of proof are not proper grounds for a new trial; WON a third retrial is proper based on newly discovered pieces of evidence that were not available during the second trial. WON petitioners were deprived of adequate legal assistance by counsel. WON there was misapprehension of facts.

3. No. We agree with the lower courts that the petitioner planned to kill the victim with treachery in mind. At that time, the victim was seated, having just finished a meal at a late hour. His back was towards petitioner when the latter, without warning, hacked him twice on his head with a bolo. The attack was so sudden and unexpected that the victim had no opportunity either to avert the attack or to defend himself. 4. For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the surrender must be spontaneous, made in such a manner that it shows the interest of the accused to surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or wishes to save them the trouble and expenses that would be necessarily incurred in his search and capture. Here, the surrender was not spontaneous.

2.

Custodio v. Sandiganbayan

Petitioners were members of the military who acted as Senator Ninoy Aquinos security detail

3.

No. The Court is not moved by petitioners assertion that the forensic evidence may have been manipulated and misinterpreted during the trial of the case. Again, petitioners did not allege concrete facts to support their crass claim.

he arraigned complainants by read[ing] to them [the information] in the dialect they understand and inform[ing] them [of] the nature of the evidence arrayed [against them]. However, there is no disputing that respondent judge failed to furnish complainants a copy of the information with the list of the witnesses. The rule is that when the law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. The Court sustained the OCAs recommendation but refrained from passing upon the complaint against Adulacion as he is not a member of the Bar nor a judiciary employee.

Gamas v. Oco (admin) Complainants are the accused of a case for theft of corn worth P4,500. They are complaining against Judge Oco, presiding judge of the MTC of Polomok, South Cotabato, and police prosecutor Adulacion for grave misconduct and gross ignorance of the law. As respondent judge had issued warrants for their arrest, complainants on 3 October 1996 went to the MTC Polomolok to post bail. Complainants allege that respondent Adulacion enticed them to plead guilty to the charge, apply for probation, and thus avoid imprisonment. The complainants signed the draft decision allegedly prepared by Adulacion upon the latters assurance that once the police apprehend the rest of the accused, the police will revive the case and respondent Adulacion will present complainants as star witnesses. Complainants later found out that what they signed was an Order finding them guilty of theft. Complainants sought assistance of a lawyer and upon the latters motion, respondent judge vacated his order on the ground that the complainants entered improvident guilty pleas and scheduled their re-arraignment. Complainants contend that respondent judge is administratively liable for rendering judgment against them without the benefit of an arraignment and in violation of their right to be represented by counsel. The investigating judge found the respondent guilty of simple neglect of duty and recommended a P10,000 fine. The OCA found respondent liable for gross ignorance of the law. ISSUE: WON respondent judge is liable. HELD: Yes. Respondent judge failed to properly apprise the complainants of their right to counsel. Sec 6 of Rule 116 mandates that it is the duty of the court to inform the accused of his right to counsel. Unless the accused is allowed to defend himself in person or has employed counsel of his choice, the court must assign a counsel de oficio to defend him. It means that the court has four duties to comply with: ppears [at the arraignment] without [an] attorney, the court has four important duties to comply with: 1 It must inform the defendant that it is his right to have [an] attorney before being arraigned; 2 After giving him such information the court must ask him if he desires the aid of attorney; 3 If he desires and is unable to employ attorney, the court must assign [an] attorney de oficio to defend him; and 4 If the accused desires to procure an attorney of his own the court must grant him a reasonable time therefor. The only instance when the court can arraign an accused without the benefit of counsel is if the accused waives such right and the court, finding the accused capable, allows him to represent himself in person. However, to be a valid waiver, the accused must make the waiver voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. In this case, there is no basis for the alleged waiver of such right. In his Answer, respondent judge does not deny that when he arraigned complainants, no lawyer assisted the complainants. . Respondent judge is grossly mistaken in saying that securing a lawyer was their (complainants) problem. Once the accused informs the judge that he cannot afford a lawyer and the court has not allowed the accused to represent himself, or the accused is incapable of representing himself, the judge has the duty to appoint a counsel de oficio to give meaning and substance to the constitutional right of the accused to counsel. The Court also finds the arraignment highly irregular. Respondent judge similarly failed to comply with the requirements of Section 1(a) of Rule 116. Complainants deny respondent judges claim that

People v. Peralta Appellants were convicted of qualified theft for taking or carrying away punctured currency notes due for shredding. The offense was committed with grave abuse of confidence as they were at the time being employees of the Central Bank of the Philippines. The prosecution alleged that based on a complaint filed, one of the accused, Garcia, was apprehended and was brought to the police station for investigation. The latter allegedly gave three statements admitting his guilt, identified the other accused and narrated their participation. Based on these sworn statements, the other named accused were invited for questioning and were subsequently charged. According to the defense, Garcia was arrested without a warrant, brought to a safe house where he was tortured by water cure, and was forced to sign the alleged sworn statements. During the trial, Atty. Sanchez testified that he did not assist Gracia when he was investigated by the police and that he signed the sworn statements merely as a witness. The RTC found Garcias allegations of torture and coerced confessions unsupported by evidence. Moreover, it held that the recovery of three pieces of perforated P100 bills from Garcias wallet and the flight of Peralta and Datuin Jr. were indicative of the guilt of the accused. ISSUES: 1. WON there is sufficient evidence against the appellants, including the admissibility of Garcias confessions and of the three perforated P100 currency notes. 2. WON the denial to their demurrer to evidence was proper. HELD: 1. The three sworn statements were obtained without the assistance of counsel in violation of the accuseds constitutional right. The right to counsel has been written into our Constitution in order to prevent the use of duress and other undue influence in extracting confessions from a suspect in a crime. The basic law specifically requires that any waiver of this right must be made in writing and executed in the presence of a counsel. Hence, the lawyers role cannot be reduced to being that of a mere witness to the signing of a pre-prepared confession, even if it indicated compliance with the constitutional rights of the accused. A waiver in writing, like that which the trial court relied upon in the present case, is not enough. Without the assistance of a counsel, the waiver has no evidentiary relevance. The Constitution states that [a]ny confession or admission obtained in violation of [the aforecited Section 12] shall be inadmissible in evidence x x x. Hence, the trial court was in error when it admitted in evidence the uncounseled confessions of Garcia and convicted appellants on the basis thereof. The question of whether he was tortured becomes moot.

Garcias arrest was not under any of the circumstance that would justify a valid warrantless arrest. Hence, Garcia was not lawfully arrested. Nonetheless, not having raised the matter before entering his plea, he is deemed to have waived the illegality of his arrest. Note, however, that this waiver is limited to the arrest. It does not extend to the search made as an incident thereto or to the subsequent seizure of evidence allegedly found during the search. Where the arrest was incipiently illegal, it follows that the subsequent search was similarly illegal. In this case, the perforated currency notes are inadmissible as evidence. Indeed, the prosecution sufficiently proved the theft of the perforated currency notes for retirement. It failed, however, to present sufficient admissible evidence pointing to appellants as the authors of the crime. Without the extrajudicial confession and the perforated currency notes, the remaining evidence would be utterly inadequate to overturn the constitutional presumption of innocence.

James Andrews alleged minority.

People v. Jusayan

2. Yes. Even if the confiscated perforated notes from the person of the former were held to be inadmissible, the confessions would still have constituted prima facie evidence of the guilt of appellants. On that basis, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying their demurrer to evidence.

Appellant Jusayan was convicted of statutory rape for sexually abusing a 10-year old girl. As the trial court imposed a death penalty, the case was brought for automatic review. Prosecution presented as evidence the testimony of the victim and that of Dr. Bautista as the examining physician. The victim testified that the accused was a pedicab driver who, instead of bringing her to school, brought her to the cemetery. She was raped there and sustained physical injuries. A witness, Rentoza, testified that he saw the victim and the accused in the cemetery twice that morning. Dr. Bautista, on the other hand, testified that the victims hymen had fresh minimal laceration and was found positive for spermatozoa. Accuseds counsel, Atty. Sampang from the PAO of Dinalupihan, Bataan, filed an urgent motion for the mental and psychiatric examination of the appellant as he was allegedly feeble-minded and had difficulty in comprehending the questions propounded to him. The same was denied as it appeared that appellant was of sound mind. In a manifestation, Atty. Sampang submitted the case for resolution as the defense waived its right to present evidence on the ground that the prosecution had not proved appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the trial court convicted the accused and sentenced him to death. ISSUES:

People v. Larranaga 1. WON, appellant, through counsel, validly waived his right to present evidence. 2. WON the prosecution has proven appellants guilt with moral certainty. Appellants filed four motions for reconsideration assailing the decision of the Court convicting them of the crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention, including a case concerning the abduction and killing of the Chiong sisters. Appellants brought up various issues, including one of the accuseds (Aznar) assignment of error based on a violation of the accuseds right to due process. The trial court excluded Professor Jerome Bailen and Atty. Florencio Villarin, NBI, Regional Director, as defense witnesses. ISSUE: WON the trial court violated their right to due process when it excluded the testimony of other defense witnesses HELD: No. Professor Bailen was properly excluded. First, he is not a finger-print expert but an archaeologist. And second, his report consists merely of the results of his visual inspection of the exhibits already several months old. Anent Atty. Villarins failure to testify before the trial court, suffice it to say that his belated Affidavit, which Aznar submitted via his supplemental motion for reconsideration dated May 5, 2004, raises nothing to change our findings and conclusions. What clearly appears in said Affidavit is a man trying to impress people that he was the one responsible for solving the Chiong case and for that, he deserves a promotion. The Court also refused to entertain at a late stage Dr. Fortuns separate study to show that the examination conducted on the body found in Tan-awan, Carcar is inadequate. Such study cannot be classified as newly-discovered evidence warranting belated reception. *The Court denied all the motions except for the motion filed by the Uy brothers with respect to 3. WON the imposition of death penalty was proper. HELD: 1. Although there is nothing in the records to show that the trial court advised appellant on the repercussions of his waiver to present evidence in his own defense, this lapse did not work to effectively vacate the findings of guilt made by the trial court because appellants guilt for the crime of statutory rape has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. In the case at bar, the elements of statutory rape were adequately established not only by the victims straightforward testimony but likewise by the findings of the examining physician presented by the prosecution. 2. Yes. Private complainants account on how appellant ravished her sexually was replete with details, dispelling any bit of suspicion on its truthfulness. The fact that private complainant was crying during her testimony bolstered her credibility with the verity born out of human nature and experience. Furthermore, as previously held, when a young girl like private complainant cries rape, she is saying in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has indeed been committed. 3. No. The fact that the victim in this case was only ten years old when the rape occurred does not by itself warrant the penalty of death. In this case, although the minority of the victim was alleged and proven, such allegation and proof of the minority of the victim, without any allegation and proof of

her relationship to the appellant, would not qualify rape as a capital crime. Moreover, as previously held, minority of the offended party, by itself, is not an aggravating circumstance that can increase the penalty to death (refer to Anti-Rape Law). Neither can we sentence appellant to death under par. 5 of Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code because par. 5 refers only to rape of "a child below seven (7) years old." Here the victim was already ten (10) years old. In fine, appellant is guilty only of statutory rape defined in Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, punishable by reclusion perpetua. *The Court modified the award of damages to include moral and exemplary damages in addition to civil indemnity.