E.H.

Carrs Utopia and Reality

By Daniel Waller Spring 2005 IR501 Dr. Hayward Alker With World War Two just thirty days old and German troops conducting mop-up operations in Poland, E. H. Carr put the finishing touches on his soon-to-be released book, The Twenty Years Crisis. Ostensibly about the cause of the now unfolding war, the book was in actuality more about international relations, in general. Its original title, Utopia and Reality, while sure to have sold fewer books, was in fact much more reflective of its theoretical grounding. For in The Twenty Years Crisis, Carr attacked the Wilsonian Idealists and their ilk and, in the process, laid the foundation for what was to become Human Realism and eventually Neo-Realism. Before examining the central tenets of Carrs brand of Realism and some of the specifics of his attack on the Idealists, it would be beneficial to quickly outline his narrative of the interwar years. According to Carr, shortly after the Allies had imposed a harsh Treaty of Versailles on the vanquished Germans, a utopian world-view quickly took hold of the victorious allies. Ignoring the lessons of the past, the Utopians, led by the Americans and the British, attempted to create a new world order based around morality and justice. Their goal was none other than the total elimination of warfare. To see this goal through, the Utopians established the League of Nations, outlawed war, and created an international court and arbitration system to settle disputes. Laws, ethics, and morality were to be the guiding lights that kept nations on the path of peace; Public opinion was to be the force that shamed recalcitrant nations into compliance. Unfortunately, claimed Carr, the world did not work in the way the Utopians hoped. Instead of following laws, nations followed power. In place of universal ethics and morals to guide politics, the political needs of nations guided their ethical and moral arguments. Instead of international public opinion keeping nations in line, nations ignored it; or, equally likely, there was no one voice of public opinion to be followed in the first place. Despite the fact that the Utopians wished it and took steps to make it real, the world did not operate on Utopian, or Idealist, principles. International politics, claimed Carr, still operated on the exact same kind of power logic that had driven global events for centuries. The Utopians had made the blunder of trying to create the world the way it ought to be, and not the way it was. World War Two was the major outcome of the incredible political mismanagement allowed by this mistake. But how did the world according to Carr work? Strikinglyand in almost complete contrast with Utopianismmorals, laws, and ethics played, at most, only the very smallest roles. In their place, power was the main arbiter of world affairs. Indeed, the nation or group of nations with the most power could usually define morality and ethics, and have laws interpreted in ways that most benefited its interests. Carr outlined three kinds of power that impacted world politics. Of these, the most important was a nations military power. For with a strong military vis--vis its competitors, a country could use the threat of military action, or use actual military action to protect or promote its interests. Economic power was less straight forward. At its most basic, the size and technology level of an economy define important limits of a nations military strength. On a deeper level, wealthy countries could offer other nations economic incentives to cooperate, or, conversely, could economically punish nations that refused to cooperate. Related to this, another measure of economic power was a

countrys level of economic autarky, or self sufficiency. During times of peace a strongly autarkic country can resist more easily external economic pressure, and can thereby chart an independent course. And war remains an option for an autarkic country, because it cannot be brought to its knees by blockades or sanctions. Carrs final type of power was power over public opinion, via propaganda. In all, however, he seemed unconvinced that this was a major kind of power, except perhaps domestically. In the brief discussion about power above, the first inklings of what Carr calls the bankruptcy of Utopianism can be seen. Bankruptcy as used here refers not to the fact that Utopian policies reflected wishful thinking rather than practice in world politics. Instead, it refers to the fact that Utopian policies were not the universally beneficial policies they were lauded to be. Rather, they had the effect of upholding the status quo, or have powers, at the expense of the have not powers. As it pertained to Germany, this effect was magnified by the fact that Utopian ideals and institutions were foisted upon Germany at her very weakest moment. Germany, carved up, burdened with impossible reparations and war guilt, and forced to accept limited sovereignty, had no means of rectifying its situation within the Utopian framework, which in fact held it in check. As Germany recovered from the war and gained economic power and confidence, it could either accept its artificially low status, or it could more or less forcibly reclaim its proper position. Unsurprisingly, it followed the second route, but only after it had built up its forces to the point where it was unlikely to be challenged at each particular stage of its comeback. While Germany was the biggest loser of Utopianism, Carr argued that England and the United States were its biggest winners. Dominating world trade, and being wellpositioned throughout the world vis--vis colonies or access to markets, both of these countries benefited greatly from anything that cheaply preserved the status quo. Moreover, both countries could muster considerable economic leverage to impact other nations international or domestic policies, as discussed above. Germany and other economically weak countries could not use this kind of economic leverage. They might instead have resorted to attacking their smaller neighbors, but the fact that war had become illegal constrained their actions, at least for the 1920s. In this way, the outlawing of war benefited rich nations, because they were the only nations left that could still use coercive or friendly economic policies. Poor nations, undoubtedly to the benefit of rich countries, had lost their ability to do either. No wonder, as Carr noted, England and the US were the cheerleaders of Utopianism. That Utopianism upheld the status quo powers was one major thread running through The Twenty Years Crisis. The other was the conscious or subconscious effect that power had on policy in nearly all aspects of international politics. Both strands are closely tied together in Carrs examination of the issues of morality, law, and the sanctity of treaties. Morality and law are closely related, and each supported the status quo powers in the same way. They did so, because the powerful were able to define morality and had a disproportionate say in the drafting of laws. Carr argued that this was because laws and definitions of morality are a product of the standards of a given political society. Unfortunately, the international society of the 1920s and 1930s was too underdeveloped to create neutral laws and moralities. Instead, based on the old belief in the harmony of interests, the Utopian victors of the First World War passed laws and declared ethical standards that benefited themselves. They did so under the apparently

deeply flawed belief that these policies would be good for everyone, including the vanquished. In fact, argued Carr, rules and ethical standards are always aimed at a group without power. By their very design, they protect the interests of the status quo group, and make it difficult for the group without power to rise up. Similarly, enforcement of treaties is also connected to the controlling of weaker nations and the issue of who has power. Powerful nations can break treaties with little fallout; weak countries cannot. Weak countries are forced to accept treaties; powerful nations design them for their own advantage. Carr therefore argued that concern about the sanctity of treaties is a tool that powerful nations use to keep weak nations in check. In writing the The Twenty Years Crisis, Carr sounded the death knell of the Idealist School of International Relations, while laying important tenets of the modern Realism School. His arguments about the primacy of power in international politics and the worthlessness of policies based not on practice but on hope were completely convincing. It is clear that nations cannot pass laws to make states act in ways that states do not normally act, except, perhaps, unless those policies are backed by overwhelming force and the promise to use force in the event of abrogation. Members of the European Union who believe that Iran will end its nuclear program without a threat of force will probably be disappointed in the final outcome. Ironically, many of these same Europeans who believe in negotiations without threat of violence in Iran may have voted against enacting serious consequences against Iraq after it went against the terms of its peace treaty. Why now should the Iranians think the EU will ever take serious putative action against it if it continues its nuclear program? They should have read their Carr. Carrs expose of how statesmen bend morality and legality to their nations benefit, and how there is really no such thing as a neutral morality or ethics makes sense as well. These arguments are still cogent today and can inform us about a good many aspects of international politics, including questions over the International Criminal Court, sovereignty and human rights vis--vis countries such as China, and the ability of the UN to pass moralistic, non-binding resolutions on heated issues such as Israel and Palestine. The ability and willingness of status quo countries to use the institutions of the world to hold down other nations is a final major point made by Carr that is worth recalling. While it is true that recent Neo-Liberal scholars have advanced the level of discussion on regimes to a level unimagined by Carr, there still remains the possibility that certain regimes exist just because they benefit very powerful countries. Tied closely to the issue of morality, concern over issues such as human rights could be on the front burner of some nations agendas only because it benefits them to push that issue in certain situations. Carrs theoretical work on Utopianism and Realism is more of a set of guidelines to understanding International Relations than it is hard theory. The scientifically-minded social scientist will be disappointed with the lack of qualifiers and methods for measuring power. S/he will also fret over the lack of an explanation for conflict or cooperation. But Carrs book is an excellent wakeup callan exposeto get political theorists thinking about how the world really works. There was much work on which Morgenthau, Waltz, and other more scientific Realists could expand. Michael Cox, in his introduction to the newest edition of The Twenty Years Crisis, makes one particularly interesting point about the book. He claimsand he cites modern critical theorists to back up his argumentthat Carr not only served as a grandfather to

modern Realism, but that he was also a grandfather to modern Critical Theory. And indeed there are a few paragraphs and solitary sentences to support this argument. Carr claims for instance that the Realist, in searching only for causes, deprives himself of the possibility of changing reality. Moreover, because Realism is devoid of an end goal, it also serves no real purpose, except the propagation of more of the same dismal business. Perhaps because he recognizes the sorry state of things, Carr concludes his book with a few pages which try to anticipate a better world order. In line with some modern Critical theorists he argues that the nation state need not be the final political unit. Indeed, he writes, it is the moral task of the world powers to create the conditions upon which a new international order can be attained.