Nuclear Sites Facilities

Tehran Nuclear Research Center

Tehran Research Reactor (TRR)

The Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) is a 5 megawatt-thermal (MWth) pool-type light water research reactor. The United States supplied the TRR to Iran in 1967 and weapon-grade uranium fuel for the reactor. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspects this reactor. After the 1979 revolution, Iran was no longer able to procure replacement fuel from the United States or Europe. In 1987, the AEOI paid Argentinas Applied Research Institute (INVAP) $5.5 million to convert the reactors fuel from 93 percent enriched uranium to slightly less than 20 percent enriched uranium, just below the cutoff for highly enriched uranium (HEU). (A timeline of the fuel requirements for the Tehran Research Reactor can be found here: Argentine Low-Enriched Uranium at the Tehran Research Reactor) The reactor has been operating with LEU fuel since 1993. Of the original U.S.-supplied fuel, about 7 kilograms of irradiated HEU remains stored at the reactor site. Iran likewise is storing irradiated Argentine-supplied LEU The reactor has operated at 3 MW-th, partially due to a shortage of fuel. The Tehran Research Reactor is expected to run out of Argentinesupplied fuel at the end of 2010 or sometime in 2011. Iran used this reactor to conduct activities possibly linked to early efforts to develop nuclear weapons. Without notifying the IAEA Iran irradiated uranium oxide (UO2) targets in the TRR and separated plutonium in glove boxes at Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC) laboratories. Iran also admitted to producing small amounts of polonium-210 in the TRR in the early 1990s through the irradiation of bismuth targets. Polonium 210 is a well-known radioactive material used in a beryllium-polonium neutron initiator that starts the chain reaction in a nuclear weapon. Iran claims that the polonium was produced as part of a study of the production of neutron sources for use in radioisotope thermoelectric generators and not for use in a nuclear weapons neutron initiator. The TRR was under traditional safeguards at the time of the undeclared plutonium experiments and polonium production. This type of safeguards is not designed to detect such small-scale activities.

Arak
Near the city of Arak is Irans heavy water production plant, which has been operational since 2006, and a heavy water reactor, which remains under construction. The reactors projected completion date is 2013, although this date may slip. Iran originally intended to build a hot cell facility at Arak for the separation of long-lived radioisotopes, believed to be a euphemism for plutonium, but in 2004 Iran informed the IAEA that it was abandoning that plan. It is expected to build hot cells to separate shorter-lived radioisotopes, such as cobalt-60 and iridium-192, for civilian applications.

Arak Heavy Water Production Plant at Khondab Irans heavy water production plant was commissioned in August 2006. The existence of this facility was first revealed publicly by the Iranian opposition group, National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), in August 2002. ISIS then located the site in commercial satellite imagery after a wide-area search. By United Nations Security Council resolution 1737 (2006), Iran was to suspend all work on heavy water related projects. However, Iran has not halted this work and maintains that it has no legal obligation to do so under its safeguards agreement. Iranian officials speaking at a March 5-6, 2005 conference in Tehran said that the plant was in its first stage of operation. As of 2010, imagery of the heavy water production plant analyzed by the IAEA indicates that it is operating. Under traditional safeguards, heavy water production facilities are not subject to IAEA safeguards or inspection. Under the IAEA Additional Protocol, however, they are subject to declarations and complementary access. The IAEA monitors the status of the facility via satellite imagery.

Arak
Arak IR-40 Heavy Water Reactor

Iran claims to have decided to construct a heavy water reactor in the 1980s. After presumably successful testing activities at the Esfahan nuclear research center, Iran decided to build a heavy water reactor in the mid-1990s. The reactor, the IR-40, is designed to produce 40 megawatts thermal (MWth) of power and use natural uranium oxide fuel, which will be produced at Esfahan conversion and fuel fabrication facilities. The start date of the reactor is difficult to determine. Officially, Iran has said that the reactor will will achieve criticality in 2013. However, this date could be delayed because of problems acquiring necessary items overseas or in building the reactor. If operating optimally, the IR-40 would produce about 9 kilograms of plutonium annually or enough for about two nuclear weapons each year. Before it could use any of the plutonium in a nuclear weapon, however, it would first have to separate the plutonium from the irradiated fuel. Intermittently, Iran has allowed the IAEA access to the IR-40 reactor at Arak. In recent years, Iran has justified its refusal to grant the Agency full access to the IR-40 reactor by saying that since the IR-40 was not in a situation to receive nuclear material, no design-inventory-verification was required. (See ISIS Report, Misconceptions about Irans Nuclear Program) Iran has softened its position and allowed the IAEA to visit the reactor. (See IAEA Safeguards Report, November 16, 2009). Because Iran has completed the external structure of the IR-40 reactor, commercial satellite images can no longer monitor the progress of the reactor. In mid 2010, through visits to the reactor, the IAEA verified that the civil construction of the buildings was almost complete, and that the main crane in the reactor building and the pressurizer for the reactor cooler system had been installed. See IAEA Safeguards Report, September 6, 2010).

Fuel Assembly
In the spring of 2010, President Ahmadinejad proudly unveiled a fuel assembly, which purportedly is for the Arak reactor. The fuel assembly on display by President Ahmadinejad is of a surprising shape for a small, 40 megawatt-thermal heavy water reactor and confirms that Russian entities were important in designing this fuel and reactor. As can be seen in Figure 1, this fuel element is extremely long and thin. It closely resembles the fuel used in an RBMK (Reaktor Bolshoy Moshchnosti Kanalniy), Soviet-era reactor. Figure 2 shows a sketch of the RBMK element from a Russian web site and the similar characteristics are obvious, including the length, shape, types of pins and fitting on the ends. Based on interviews with knowledgeable officials, NIKIET and a Russian company in Obninsk provided technology for the Arak reactor. (See ISIS Report, Update on Arak Reactor) This assistance included modifying the design of a RBMK fuel rod bundle for use in the Arak heavy water reactor. As a result of U.S. pressure, their assistance to the Arak reactor project stopped in the late 1990s.

The Arak fuel pin is designed to have a zirconium cladding. Iran has built a zirconium plant at Esfahan that is expected to supply cladding for the Arak fuel pins, although the plants operational status is unknown. (See ISIS Satellite Imagery of Esfahan)

As a result of its clandestine nature, the project was reportedly falling outside of the budgetary supervisory purview of Iran's Organization for Planning and Budget and was also not registered officially with the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran's (AEOI) Human Resources Office. Instead, bureaucratic operations of the project were directly supervised by the Security and Itelligence office of the AEOI and of the Central Office of Security. According to the NCRI, the project's managing director was Davood Aqajani, its supervisor was Dr. Mohammad Qannadi (Deputy for Production of Nuclear Fuel), and its operational manager was Behman Asgarpour.