Polish Foreign Policy in the 21st Century: A Social-Constructivist Analysis

Jeremy Wysakowski-Walters Supervised by Prof. Stanisaw Obirek Department of Transatlantic Studies Faculty of Politics and International Studies University of od

Introduction 1. The apparent problem This work is first and foremost the result of a foreigners attempt to understand Polish foreign policy. Since moving to Poland from Britain in 2004 I have attempted to learn not only my new countries language and culture, but also its politics and systems. This at times has been a somewhat bewildering experience as it often involves leaving behind the deep-rooted mindset that is the product of my British ethnicity. It is often said that to truly understand a people you must speak their language; never is this more a truism than when analysing political culture. Our modern word: politics comes from the Greek word polis meaning city. Cities are by their very nature huge conglomerates of people; they are dynamic and living things. To understand what politics is, we must understand this original meaning. Thus politics is dynamic and like language changes with the ebb and flow of humanity. However, like language it has its normative rules and can be categorised and analysed. As I learnt more about Poland and its politics I became aware of an apparent dichotomy: Poland seemed to be displaying both Euro-centric and Atlanticist tendencies. Further to this it appeared that few of their decisions matched the traditional mainstream International Relations (IR) theories. I gradually became aware that in fact an alternative theory must provide a more coherent explanation for what I witnessed. It became evident to me that Polish culture was in fact one of the main determinates of its foreign policy. This notion however was a raw appraisal and needed to be grounded in both philosophical and political theories. By stating both philosophical and political theories I am in fact outlining the whole approach that I took to the problem. Although IR borrows heavily from other social scientists, it has an often disparaging image of philosophy1. Whilst classical realism was based heavily on philosophical notions2, structural realism was less inclined to use philosophy as a benchmark. This moving away from political philosophy has had the effect that much of the writing at the end of the twentieth century was carried out with little reference to ontological or epistemological concepts. This however did not mean that such concepts were not inherent in IR. In order to carry
1 See Waltz 1979:6 where he talks of theory as explanations as opposed to collecting laws 2 Hobbes's 'State of Nature' was adapted to the State level

out any meaningful research you must have an idea of what constitutes facts and reality. The point is merely that these concepts were not brought into question, but tacitly accepted. For the majority of IR's existence as a science, positivism has been the unwritten rule. In fact as Alexander Wendt (2000:38) states 'the field has polarized into two main camps: (1) a majority who think science is an epistemologically privileged discourse through which we can gain a progressively truer understanding of the world, an (2) a large minority who do not recognise a privileged epistemic status for science in explaining the world out their.' Wendt's referral to science and epistemology is in fact an unstated reference to empiricism as true science. Therefore, the very way Wendt draws attention to the epistemological split within IR betrays the force with which enlightenment principles have affected our (contemporary people) thinking. This hard-wiring of what science is even affects the available degree titles within IR where some universities offer Bachelor or Arts in IR3 while others offer Bachelor of Science4 in IR. Although this may seem an irrelevant point to draw attention to, it illustrates the continued battle IR has within the scientific community. This battle for acceptance as a science is obviously hampered greatly by the discord that exists within the subject when some schools (reflectivist) are often referred to by others (rationalist) as unscientific. It is in view of the above that I therefore decided to go about this work with two principle goals in mind: (1) to assess Polish foreign policy with cultural considerations in mind and (2) ensure that philosophy retains its rightful place as a guide to scientific inquiry. 2. The philosophical considerations As mentioned above, for many people the philosophical grounding of science is something tacitly excepted but rarely considered. Most scientists go straight to questions of methodology without enquiring as to what ontological or epistemological stance they are taking. However these three factors are in fact inextricably linked. Ontology concerns questions of the fundamental kinds of things which exist (Jary and Jary 2000:428) whilst epistemology concerns how we can know the world (2000:186). These two concepts are the bedrock of scientific inquiry; without being certain of these, then we cast doubt on any research done. The third aspect of science is methodology. The methods chosen naturally follow from the ontology and epistemology assigned. Given the innate assumptions concerning both ontology and epistemology within science it is
3 See http://www.essex.ac.uk/coursefinder/CourseDetails.aspx?course=BA++L258 4 See http://www.londondegree.org/BSc_IR_Introduction.htm

perhaps natural that I should not start from the top (ontology) but rather from somewhere between epistemology and methodology. Using my first objective: to assess Polish foreign policy with cultural considerations in mind, I worked my way backwards. The natural point I arrived at first was constructivism which is defined by Alexander Wendt as: (1) the fact that structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than by material forces, and (2) that the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature (1999:1). Wendt goes on to say that constructivism is therefore a kind of structural idealism The fact that structures are created by humans and that in turn these structures have a feedback affect on the humans and help create their identities is from an ontology perspective closed to existentialism. In the preface to Frantz Fanon's The Wretched Earth Jean-Paul Sartre (1965) wrote: 'We only become what we are by the radical and deep-seated refusal of that which others have made of us'; this, on an individual level, becomes on a state level a conflict between structural forces as conceived of in constructivism and actors' identities. In point of summary then, I chose existentialism to be my guiding philosophical theory and foundation on which to build my constructivist theories. This however means little unless I talk about the ontological and epistemological theories to which I set myself in opposition. As mentioned in section 1, traditional IR has rested on the epistemology of positivism. Positivism involves the use of an empirical methodology (Jary and Jary 2000:471) where data is recorded using physical science methods of measurement and the search for laws. A belief in a positive epistemology is known in philosophical terms as empiricism (2000: 181) , yet it is essential to note that within IR a somewhat confusing term is used. Schools of thought that rely essentially on positivism are in fact grouped under the heading of rationalism (Wendt 1999:27). Rationalism within philosophy refers to the use of reason to gain knowledge a priori. Rationalism, within philosophy, is thus in opposition to empiricism. The term rationalism in IR in fact has more to do with rational choice theory and in fact belief in the constancy of state attributes and qualities of the international system (Wendt 1999:35-38). Rationalism (or empiricism) in IR thus represents the dominant ontological approach, with reflectivism being the group name for the ontological alternatives. I emphasised group name as there are many diverse methodologies, and hence ontologies, within reflectivist IR. As mentioned above I will concentrate on constructivism, yet keep in mind other approaches as I work.

3. The thesis outline Retuning to the original quandary: that few Polish policy decisions matched the traditional mainstream International Relations (IR) theories, and the fact that I wished to (1) to assess Polish foreign policy with cultural considerations in mind and (2) ensure that philosophy retains its rightful place as a guide to scientific inquiry; I will now give an outline of both my overall thesis and chapter content. As outlined above, the main conflict exists between reflectivist and rationalists IR theories. I have therefore set about comparing these competing approaches with regards Polish foreign policy. For this I set a time-frame of ten years in order to limit the amount of empirical evidence that could be reviewed. The period under investigation is the first decade of the twenty-first century and primarily deals with the 2003 Iraq War, the 2004 EU accession and the 2008 US/Polish Strategic Declaration. These events marked defining moments in Poland's history. The work consists five chapters and as such represents a whole; however, the constitutive chapters can be read as separate and stand-alone pieces. To this end I have build in some degree of redundancy within the dissertation. Certain key concepts are repeated as well as key motivations and summaries. 4. A chapter breakdown Chapter One has three principle tasks. As is perhaps traditional, the chapter sets out the main theoretical concepts to be discussed within the work. All of the main IR theories are outline with relevant literature quoted. The second part represents an analysis of the current literature regarding Polish foreign policy. This was by no means an attempt to give an exhaustive overview of the corpus, but rather a way of introducing the reader to the main issues concerned. Finally the chapter deals with the scientific methodology that will be employed within the work. Chapter Two represents the first part of the comparison. The three historical case studies are reviewed using rationalist methodology. The chapter provides and important springboard for the overall thesis as it shows that in fact rationalism can not explain Polish behaviour. This therefore brings fourth the need for a reflectivist. As highlighted earlier, a constructivist approach is chosen.

Chapter Three contains the heart of the work. Constructivism by its very nature must be devised and thus this chapter deals with analysing the empirical evidence necessary in order to construct a new model of Polish behaviour. Here documentary and statistical evidence is used to demonstrate Polish 'beliefs'; these beliefs are then used to form the model. Chapter Four returns to the original case studies in order to test the new constructivist model. Further to this, more recent events are analysed using the mode. Finally assessments are made based on the analysis carried out. This in fact provides the most important part of the work in terms of its contribution of the study of IR. Finally Chapter Five provides a point of reflection. Action Research principles are used in order to assess the work, as well as to provide fresh insights. This culminates in suggestions for future work.