Diesel Construction v. Jolibee Petitioner Diesel Construction Company, Inc.

instituted before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City an action for the recovery of escalated construction costs, which it had allegedly incurred in the construction of buildings located in Batangas City and in the Municipality of Calamba, Laguna, owned by Respondent Jollibee Food Corporation. For the alleged failure of petitioner to complete these projects on time, JFC counterclaimed, in its Answer, recovery of damages and attorneys fees. At the pretrial, the parties agreed to reduce the issues to (1) whether DCCI had completed the Calamba and the Batangas City projects on time, and (2) whether DCCI was entitled to escalated construction costs. After trial, the RTC rendered its judgment, ruling that DCCI had completed both projects on time and was entitled to escalated construction costs. Contending that the RTC failed to order payment of extra work done, DCCI filed a Notice of Appeal and a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal citing as "good reasons" its financial distress as a small business and -- to answer for damages JFC might sustain by reason of the grant of the Motion -- the posting of a bond equivalent to 20 percent of the total amount due. The RTC, allowed execution pending appeal but ordering DCCI to post bond equivalent to 150% of the total amount of the judgment. JFC filed a Motion for Reconsideration with an alternative prayer that it be permitted to post a supersedeas bond pursuant to Section 3, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. the RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that the filing of a counterbond was premature, as DCCI had yet to file its own bond. DCCI filed with the Court of Appeals a "Motion for Issuance of Premature Writ of Execution. the CA, in its assailed Resolution directed the RTC to issue a writ of execution upon petitioner's posting of a P10 million bond, and to stay execution upon respondent's filing of a supersedeas bond of P15 million. DCCI filed a Motion for Reconsideration of this Resolution insofar as it allowed a stay of execution, which Motion the CA denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition. Issue: whether the pendency of an appeal or the posting of a supersedeas bond justifies a stay of execution pending appeal Held: the Court must stress that the execution of a judgment before its finality must be founded upon good reasons. The yardstick remains the presence or the absence of good reasons consisting of exceptional circumstances of such urgency as to outweigh the injury or damage that the losing party may suffer, should the appealed judgment be reversed later. Good reason imports a superior circumstance that will outweigh injury or damage to the adverse party. In the case at bar, petitioner failed to show "paramount and compelling reasons of urgency and justice." Petitioner cites as good reason merely the fact that "it is a small-time building contractor that

could ill-afford the protracted delay in the reimbursement of the advances it made for the aforesaid increased costs of x x x construction of the [respondents] buildings." Petitioner's allegedly precarious financial condition, however, is not by itself a jurisprudentially compelling circumstance warranting immediate execution. The financial distress of a juridical entity is not comparable to a case involving a natural person -- such as a very old and sickly one without any means of livelihood, an heir seeking an order for support and monthly allowance for subsistence, or one who dies. Indeed, the alleged financial distress of a corporation does not outweigh the long standing general policy of enforcing only final and executory judgments. Certainly, a juridical entity like petitioner corporation has, other than extraordinary execution, alternative remedies like loans, advances, internal cash generation and the like to address its precarious financial condition. Having come to the conclusion that extraordinary execution is not proper, the Court finds no more need to determine whether the filing of a supersedeas bond is, by itself, sufficient reason to stay the execution of a judgment pending appeal, because such issue has become moot. As a rule, "courts will not determine a moot question or abstract proposition or express an opinion in a case in which no practical relief can be granted." While there are exceptions to this general principle, none exists in the factual milieu of the present controversy. Assailed Resolutions are SET ASIDE. This Court finds no "good reasons" to grant extraordinary execution in the context of the present case.

Dial Corp. v. Soriano The petitioners are foreign corporations and are not domiciled in the Philippines, nor do they have officers or agents, place of business, or property in the Philippines; they are not licensed to engage, and are not engaged, in business here. The respondent Imperial Vegetable Oil Company, Inc. is a Philippine corporation which through its president, Dominador Monteverde, had entered into several contracts for the delivery of coconut oil to the petitioners. IVO filed a complaint for injunction and damages against nineteen (19) foreign coconut oil buyers including the petitioners, with whom its former president, Dominador Monteverde, had entered into contracts for the delivery of coconut oil. On motion of IVO, respondent Judge authorized it to effect extraterritorial service of summons to all the defendants through DHL Philippines corporation. Pursuant to that order, the petitioners were served with summons and copy of the complaint by DHL courier service. Without submitting to the court's jurisdiction and only for the purpose of objecting to said jurisdiction over their persons, the petitioners filed motions to dismiss the complaint against them on the ground that the extraterritorial service of summons to them was improper and that hence the court did not acquire jurisdiction over them. But the court denied their motions to dismiss and upheld the validity of the extraterritorial service of summons to them on the ground that "the present action relates to property rights which lie in contracts within the Philippines, or which defendants claim liens or interests, actual or inchoate, legal or equitable. The petitioners' motions for reconsideration were also denied by the court, hence this petition for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary retraining order which the SC granted. Issue: WON the extraterritorial service of summons made were valid. Held: Only in four (4) instances is extraterritorial service of summons proper, namely: (1) when the action affects the personal status of the plaintiffs; (2) when the action relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent; (3) when the relief demanded in such action consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in property located in the Philippines; and (4) when the defendant non-resident's property has been attached within the Philippines. The complaint in this case does not involve the personal status of the plaintiff, nor any property in the Philippines in which the defendants have or claim an interest, or which the plaintiff has attached. The action is purely an action for injunction to restrain the defendants from enforcing against IVO ("abusing and harassing") its contracts for the delivery of coconut oil to the defendants, and to recover from the defendants P21 million in damages for such "harassment." It is clearly a personal action as well as an action in

personam, not an action in rem or quasi in rem. "An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis of his personal liability, while an action in remedies is an action against the thing itself, instead of against the person. A personal action is one brought for the recovery of personal property, for the enforcement of some contract or recovery of damages for its breach, or for the recovery of damages for the commission of an injury to the person or property
The SC held that the extraterritorial service of summons on the petitioners was improper, hence null and void. The petition is granted.

Quelnan v. VHF Respondent VHF Philippines, Inc. filed an ejectment suit against petitioner Andy Quelnan, involving a condominium unit at the Legaspi Towers 300 at Roxas Boulevard, Manila which respondent claimed to have been leased by petitioner. The Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila, on its finding that summons together with a copy of the complaint was served [on petitioner] thru his wife on August 25, 1992 by substituted service and that petitioner failed to file his answer within the reglementary period, came out with a decision on November 23, 1992 rendering judgment in favor of the respondent. Copy of the aforementioned decision was served on petitioner by registered mail but the same was returned unclaimed on account of petitioners failure to claim the same despite the postmasters three (3) successive notices on November 25, 1992, December 7, 1992 and December 11, 1992. No appeal having been taken by the petitioner, the MeTC decision became final and executory. On May 18, 1993, a writ of execution, a notice of levy and a notice to vacate were served on petitioners wife who acknowledged receipt thereof. On May 24, 1993, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Manila a Petition for Relief from Judgment With Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or temporary restraining order, [4] thereunder alleging, inter alia, that he was never served with summons and was completely unaware of the proceedings in the ejectment suit, adding that he learned of the judgment rendered thereon only when a notice of levy on execution came to his knowledge. He thus prayed the RTC to annul and set aside the MeTC decision and the writs issued in connection therewith, which the RTC granted. Respondent moved for the reconsideration of the RTCs decision but it was denied. Respondent file a petition for review with the SC but the petition was remanded to the CA. The CA, upon a finding that petitioners petition for relief was filed with the RTC beyond the 60day mandatory period therefor under Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, reversed and set aside the RTC decision and reinstated that of the MeTC. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue: WON the petitioner is right in his contention that the 60-day-period of filing the petition for relief from judgment is reckoned from the time a party acquired knowledge of the judgment.

Held: SEC. 3. Time for filing petition; contents and verification. A petition provided for in either of the preceding sections of this Rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or final order was entered, or such proceeding was

taken; and must be accompanied with affidavits, showing the fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence relied upon and the facts constituting the petitioners good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be. Clear it is from the above that a petition for relief from judgment must be filed within: (a) 60 days from knowledge of judgment, order or other proceedings to be set aside; and (b) six (6) months from entry of such judgment, order or other proceeding. These two periods must concur. Both periods are also not extendible and never interrupted.[12] Strict compliance with these periods stems from the equitable character and nature of the petition for relief. Indeed, relief is allowed only in exceptional cases as when there is no other available or adequate remedy. As it were, a petition for relief is actually the last chance given by law to litigants to question a final judgment or order. And failure to avail of such last chance within the grace period fixed by the Rules is fatal. Petition denied, challenged decision and resolution of the CA, affirmed.

San pedro v. willy ong

San Pedro purchased from the spouses Narciso two parcels of land in Bulacan with areas of about 200 square meters and 150 square meters, respectively for P35,000.00, as evidenced by Deeds of Sale executed in his favor by the spouses Narciso. In order to transfer in his name the TCTs covering the subject properties, and upon the spouses Narcisos recommendation, San Pedro hired the services of Adora Dela Pea who is known to be very familiar with the intricacies of real property transfers.

After sometime, San Pedro inquired with the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan the status of his application for new TCTs for the subject properties but was surprised to find out that the subject properties were still registered in the names of the Narciso spouses and were mortgaged to Willy Ong. As stated in the annotation, the spouses Narciso authorized Dela Pea, two years after the sale, to mortgage the subject properties to Ong. The SPAs were procured by Dela Pea from the spouses Narciso with the help of the tricycle driver who accompanied Dela Pea to the spouses Narcisos residence. San Pedro found out that it was Normita Caballes, Ongs agent, who caused the registration of the mortgages with the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan and the annotation thereof on the TCTs of the spouses Narciso.

In order to free the subject properties from the said encumbrances, San Pedro filed with the RTC a Petition for Nullification of Mortgage with Damages against the spouses Narciso, Dela Pea, Landayan, Ong, and Caballes.

RTC issued summons to spouses Narciso which was received by their son, Dela Pea thru her sister-in-law, Landayan thru his son, Ong, and Caballes thru Caballes' son, directing them to file their Answers.

While the spouses Narciso, Landayan, Ong, and Caballes separately filed their Answers in accordance with the summons, thereby voluntarily submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the RTC, Dela Pea failed to do so and she was, thus, declared by the RTC to be in default.

After hearing, the court decided in favor of San Pedro, declared the SPA null and void and the mortgage void ab initio.

Without filing any Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC, Ong and Caballes appealed the adverse RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the person of Dela Pea. The CA decided granting the appeal finding that the service of summons was invalid and the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. San Pedro filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the CA. Hence, this petition.

Issue: WON dela Pea is an indispensable party to the case.

Held: Given that the civil case instituted by San Pedro is a an action for quieting of title, settled to be quasi in rem, the RTC was not required to acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants, it being sufficient for the said court to acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. By San Pedros institution of case, the RTC already acquired jurisdiction over the subject properties the res. Therefore, the service of summons to the defendants in said case, including Dela Pea, did not affect the jurisdiction of the RTC to hear and decide the case, and did not invalidate the proceedings held therein on the basis of jurisdiction. Admittedly, there was a defect in the service of the summons on Dela Pea. The Sheriff immediately resorted to substituted service of summons on Dela Pea without attempting first to effect personal service within reasonable time. The Sheriffs Return merely stated that he served a copy of the summons on Dela Peas sister-in-law who refused to sign the same.

Contrary to the pronouncement of the Court of Appeals, Dela Pea was not an indispensable party to this case, without whom, no final conclusion of the case can be arrived at. Petition granted.

Toyota Cubao, Inc v. Guevarra

Petitioner Toyota Cubao undertook repairs on the car owned by private respondent Danilo Guevarra, which was paid by means of BPI Check. When presented for payment, the check was dishonored due to Insufficient Funds. Petitioner thereupon requested that Guevarra should make good the check. When Guevarra failed to heed the demand, petitioner filed a civil case for collection of the unpaid account.

The trial court issued the summons to Guevarra at his address in Calamba, Laguna. After barely a month, the Process Server of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, submitted to the trial court a return on the service that it was duly served to the defendant DANILO A. GUEVARRA, thru her sister-in-law, GLORIA CABALLES, by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint but refused to sign.

Petitioner, claiming that Guevarra had failed to file an ANSWER within the reglementary period, moved to declare Guevarra in default. A copy of the motion was furnished Guevarra, through registered mail with return card, at the defendant's mailing address. The trial court granted petitioner's Motion To Declare Defendant In Default and allowed an ex-parte presentation of petitioner's evidence.

Petitioner presented its evidence ex-parte. Petitioner rested, following its formal offer of documentary exhibits, and submitted the case for resolution by the court. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner.

A writ of execution was issued to implement the decision. The sheriff, implementing the writ, levied the Guevarra's Toyota Corolla. The notice of levy was served on Guevarra personally but he refused to sign the receipt thereof, expressed surprise over it, and stated that he was not aware of any case instituted against him.

The Sheriff issued a notice of auction sale of the levied vehicle and was sold at public auction to the highest bidder. Whereupon, the corresponding certificate of sale was issued.

Guevarra turned over, on demand, the subject vehicle to the authorities; forthwith, however, he asked, in a certiorari petition before the Court of Appeals, for the nullification of the ex-parte judgment on the ground that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person because of a defective service of summons. The CA annulled and set aside the default judgment, the writ of execution, the levy on execution and the sale at public auction. Hence, this case. Issue: Whether or not there is valid service of summons on the defendant. Held: Section 7, Rule 14, of the Rules of Court requires that summons must be served personally by "handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him." If, however, this mode of service cannot be effected within a reasonable time, substituted service may be resorted to under Section 8 of the same Rule. A law prescribing the manner in which the service of summons should be effected is jurisdictional in character and its proper observance is what dictates the court's ability to take cognizance of the litigation before it. Compliance therewith must appear affirmatively in the return. It must so be as substitute service is a mode that departs or deviates from the standard rule. Substitute service must be used only in the way prescribed, and under circumstances authorized, by law. Petition for review DENIED.

Cerezo v. Tuazon A Country Bus Lines passenger bus collided with a tricycle along Captain M. Palo Street, Sta. Ines, Mabalacat, Pampanga. Tricycle driver Tuazon filed a complaint for damages against Mrs. Cerezo, as owner of the bus line, her husband Attorney Juan Cerezo, and bus driver Danilo A. Foronda. Tuazon filed a motion to litigate as a pauper. Subsequently, the trial court issued summons against the Cerezo spouses at the Makati address stated in the complaint. However, the summons was returned unserved as the Cerezo spouses no longer held office nor resided in Makati. Thus, the trial court issued alias summons against the Cerezo spouses at their address in Barangay Sta. Maria, Camiling, Tarlac. The alias summons and a copy of the complaint were finally served at the office of Atty. Cerezo, who was then working as Tarlac Provincial Prosecutor. Atty. Cerezo reacted angrily on learning of the service of summons upon his person. Atty. Cerezo allegedly cursed Sheriff serving the summons. The records show that the Cerezo spouses participated in the proceedings before the trial court. The trial court issued an order directing the Cerezo spouses to file a comment to the opposition to the bill of particulars.The counsel for the Cerezo spouses filed an urgent ex-parte motion praying for the resolution of Tuazons motion to litigate as a pauper and for the issuance of new summons on the Cerezo spouses to satisfy proper service in accordance with the Rules of Court. The trial court issued an order resolving Tuazons motion to litigate as a pauper and the Cerezo spouses urgent ex-parte motion. The Court is satisfied from the unrebutted testimony of the plaintiff that he is entitled to prosecute his complaint in this case as a pauper under existing rules. On the other hand, the Court denies the prayer in the Appearance and Urgent Ex-Parte Motion requiring new summons to be served to the defendants. The trial court issued an order directing the Cerezo spouses to file their answer within fifteen days from receipt of the order. The Cerezo spouses did not file an answer. Tuazon filed a motion to declare the Cerezo spouses in default. The trial court issued an order declaring the Cerezo spouses in default and authorizing Tuazon to present his evidence. The trial court ruled in Tuazons favor. The trial court held Mrs. Cerezo solely liable for the damages sustained by

Tuazon arising from the negligence of Mrs. Cerezos employee, pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Mrs. Cerezo received a copy of the decision on 25 June 1995. On 10 July 1995, Mrs. Cerezo filed before the trial court a petition for relief from judgment on the grounds of fraud, mistake or excusable negligence. Testifying before the trial court, both Mrs. Cerezo and Atty. Valera denied receipt of notices of hearings and of orders of the court. Atty. Valera claimed that he was able to read the decision of the trial court only after Mrs. Cerezo sent him a copy. Tuazon did not testify but presented documentary evidence to prove the participation of the Cerezo spouses in the case. The trial court issued an order denying the petition for relief from judgment. The trial court stated that having received the decision on 25 June 1995, the Cerezo spouses should have filed a notice of appeal instead of resorting to a petition for relief from judgment. The Cerezo spouses subsequently filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Section 1 of Rule 65. The Court of Appeals also denied Cerezo spouses motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. this Court rendered a resolution denying the petition for review on certiorari for failure to attach an affidavit of service of copies of the petition to the Court of Appeals and to the adverse parties. Even if the petition complied with this requirement, the Court would still have denied the petition as the Cerezo spouses failed to show that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error. The Courts resolution was entered in the Book of Entries and Judgments when it became final and executory on 28 June 1999. the Cerezo spouses filed before the Court of Appeals on 6 July 1999 a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 with prayer for restraining order. The Court of Appeals denied the petition for annulment of judgment. the Court of Appeals denied the Cerezo spouses motion for reconsideration. filed the present petition for review on certiorari before this Court. Issue: WON the CA is correct in dismissing the petition for annulment of judgment Held: a petition for certiorari to declare the nullity of a judgment by default isavailable if the trial court improperly declared a party in default, or even if the trial court properly declared a party in default, if grave abuse of discretion attended such declaration. Mrs. Cerezo had every opportunity to avail of other remedies such as 1) petition for certiorari under Rule 65, 2) motion for new trial, 3) appeal, within the reglementary periods provided under the Rules of Court. However, Mrs. Cerezo opted to file a petition for relief from judgment, which is available only in exceptional cases. A petition for relief from judgment should be filed within the reglementary period of 60 days from knowledge of judgment and six months from entry of judgment.

Evidently, there was no fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence that prevented Mrs. Cerezo from filing an appeal, a motion for new trial or a petition for certiorari. It was error for her to avail of a petition for relief from judgment. After the SCs resolution denying Mrs. Cerezos petition for relief became final and executory, Mrs. Cerezo, in her last ditch attempt to evade liability, filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of the judgment of the trial court. Annulment is available only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. If based on extrinsic fraud, a party must file the petition within four years from its discovery, and if based on lack of jurisdiction, before laches or estoppel bars the petition. Extrinsic fraud is not a valid ground if such fraud was used as a ground, or could have been used as a ground, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief from judgment. The instant petition for review is denied.

Chavez v. Sandiganbayan On July 31, 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) with the assistance of Solicitor General Francisco Chavez filed with the respondent Sandiganbayan a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 0033 against Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and Juan Ponce Enrile, among others, for reconveyance, reversion and accounting, restitution and damages. After the denial of his motion to dismiss, respondent Enrile filed his answer with compulsory counterclaim and cross-claim with damages. The Republic filed its reply to the answer and motion to dismiss the counterclaim. The motion was opposed by respondent Enrile. Respondent Enrile then requested leave from the Sandiganbayan to implead the petitioner and the PCGG officials as party defendants for lodging this alleged "harassment suit" against him.
motion was granted in a resolution dated June 8, 1989. In a resolution dated November 2, 1989, respondent Sandiganbayan denied a motion to reconsider the June 8, 1989 resolution.

Thereafter, all the PCGG officials filed their answer to the counterclaims invoking their immunity from suits as provided in Section 4 of Executive Order No. 1. Instead of filing an answer, the petitioner comes to this Court assailing the resolutions as rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

Issue: WON impleading the petitioner as additional party defendant in the counterclaim filed by respondent Enrile is proper.

Held:

Thus, the petitioner argues that since he is simply the lawyer in the case, exercising his duty under the law to assist the Government in the filing and prosecution of all cases pursuant to Section 1, Executive Order No. 14, he cannot be sued in a counterclaim in the same case. Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena correctly observed that there is no general immunity arising solely from occupying a public office.
The general rule is that public officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties where they have acted ultra vires or where there is a showing of bad faith. Immunity from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and non-accountability nor grant a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic.

Under the circumstances of this case, we rule that the charges pressed by respondent Enrile for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code arising from the filing of an alleged harassment suit with malice and evident bad faith do not constitute a compulsory counterclaim. To vindicate his rights, Senator Enrile has to file a separate and distinct civil action for damages against the Solicitor General.
the present petition is GRANTED. The questioned resolutions of the Sandiganbayan are SET ASIDE insofar as they allow the counterclaim filed against the petitioner.

Chan v. CA It appears from the records that on February 1, 1983, Felisa Chan and Grace Cu entered into a contract of lease whereby the latter will occupy for residential purposes Room 401 and the roof top of Room 442 of a building owned by the former located at Elcano corner Urbistondo, Manila. The term of the lease is one year or up to February 1, 1984 at a monthly rental of P2,400.00. Said contract of lease was renewed every year for two successive years or up to February 1, 1986. In the contracts, it was agreed that the premises shall be used as a learning center. After February 1, 1986, there was no written contract of lease executed by the parties, but Grace has continuously occupied the premises as a learning center. The monthly rental was raised every year. In January, 1989, it was increased to P3,484.80. Sometime in November, 1989, Felisa padlock the way to the roof top. Thereafter, there was an exchange of communications between the parties. Grace insisted that she should be allowed to use the roof top of Room 442, while Felisa maintained that only Room 401 was leased and that the use of the roof top which, according to her poses danger to the students, was merely tolerated. Eventually, Felisa terminated the lease, giving Grace until January 1, 1990 to vacate the premises. Because of the dispute between the parties, Felisa did not collect the rental for December, 1989. Whereupon, Grace tendered to Felisa a check amounting to P3,310.56. The latter refused to accept the check. So Grace's lawyer tendered the payment in cash in the same amount of P3,310.56, with notice to Felisa that if she will not accept the payment, the same will be deposited in court by way of consignation. At this juncture, Felisa allowed Grace to hold classes only up the March, 1990. Grace filed a civil case for consignation with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 15, alleging in her complaint that Felisa refused to accept, without justifiable

cause, the rentals for the premises in question. Felisa interposed in her answer a counterclaim for ejectment, contending that the lease, being month to month, had expired but that despite demand, Grace refused to vacate the premises. MTC rendered its decision fixing a period, after which the lessee is ordered to vacate the premises and declared the consignation of rentals made by the petitioner to be valid and legal. Both parties appealed to the RTC. Cu, asking for a longer period while Chan contended that the MTC erred in extending the lease and upholding the validity of the consignation. The RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC.

Cu then went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for review. Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decisions of the MTC and the RTC and dismissed the complaint for consignation for lack of merit. It likewise said that the MTC and the RTC erred in passing upon the issue of ejectment raised in Chan's counterclaim since an action for ejectment can only be initiated through a verified complaint, not a counterclaim.
Chan's motion to reconsider the decision having been denied by the Court of Appeal, she filed the instant petition for review on certiorari. Issue: WON the CA is correct in reversing the decision of the lower courts. Held:

Section 8, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court provides that the answer may contain any counterclaim which a party may have against the opposing party provided that the court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim and can, if the presence of third parties is essential for its adjudication, acquire jurisdiction of such parties. Under Section 4 of Rule 9, a counterclaim not set up shall be barred if it arises out of or is necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. A counterclaim may be compulsary or permissive. Chan's counterclaim for ejectment is a compulsary counterclaim because it is necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of Cu's complaint, viz., the lease contract between them. Consequently, the Court of Appeals erred when it held that Chan's cause of action for ejectment should not be set up in a counterclaim.

Cojuangco v. villegas the parents of private respondent Purificacion Villegas, with the acquiescence of Don Juan Cojuangco, constructed a residential house and later a structure housing a bakery on the aforesaid lot. It was understood that they could remain on the land with his blessings and without paying rentals on condition that they would vacate the premises when needed by the owner. After her parent's death, Villegas remained in the property and also leased out a portion of the land without the knowledge and consent of the owner. Due to this, the owner demanded that she leave the property but villegas refused, prompting Cojuangco to institute ejectment proceedings against her before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Malolos, Bulacan. MTC dismissed for lack of jurisdiction stating that accion publiciana was under the jurisdiction of the CFI. On appeal, the CFI reversed the decision and ordered that villegas to vacate the premises. When the case was elevated to the appellate and the supreme court, both upheld the petitioners right to possession. Writ of execution was filed and writ of demolition was issued to villegas which she did not oppose but just asked the lower court 40 days for her to vacate the property. Before the lapse of the grace period, Villegas filed a separate civil action against petitioner and the provincial sheriff "for specific performance with urgent prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction." This case, instead of being referred to Branch which had earlier issued the writ of

demolition, was raffled to another Malolos branch of the Bulacan Trial Court, which issued on the same day a temporary restraining order enjoining petitioner and particularly the sheriff "from enforcing or implementing the Order of Demolition which was followed by another order granting a writ of preliminary injunction. The two orders are now the subject of the instant petition for certiorari on the ground that they have been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Issue: whether or not villegas has a still a right to institute a separate independent civil action after the writ of demolition was issued to her. Held: Rule 9, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Court on compulsory counterclaim provides
A counterclaim or cross-claim not set up shall be barred if it arises out of or is necessarily connected with, the transaction or occurrence that is the subject-matter of the opposing party's or co-party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.

Villegas' claim to recover compensation for improvements made on the land is essentially in the nature of a counterclaim since it is inter-woven with the fact of possession. Said claim for compensation should have been presented as a counterclaim in the ejectment suit. It is deemed barred if not raised on time and the party in error is precluded from setting it up in a subsequent litigation. 9 The rule on compulsory counter-claim is designed to enable the disposition of the entire conflict at one time and in one action. The philosophy of the rule is to discourage multiplicity of suits. 10

Wee v. de Castro Respondent is the owner of a two-story building in a parcel of land which was rented out to the petitioner on a monthly basis for P9,000. Respondent and petitioner agreed to increase the rent to P15,000.00. Petitioner, however, failed or refused to pay for one month. For failure to arrive into an agreement in the barangay level, a Certification to file an action in court was issued. Respondent sent a letter to petitioner terminating their lease agreement and demanding them to vacate the premises. The petitioners refused to vacate, hence, the respondent filed an ejectment case with the MTC. It must be noted, at this point, that although the Complaint stated that it was being filed by all of the respondents, the Verification and the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping were signed by respondent George de Castro alone. Petitioner countered that there was no agreement as to the increase of the monthly rentals. The Certification to file action issued by the Barangay Lupon appended to the respondents' Complaint merely referred to the issue of rental increase and not the matter of ejectment.

Petitioner asserted further that the MTC lacked jurisdiction over the ejectment suit, since respondents' Complaint was devoid of any allegation that there was an "unlawful withholding" of the subject property by the petitioner. The MTC, rendered a Decision dismissing respondents' Complaint for failure to comply with the prior conciliation requirement before the Barangay Lupon. On appeal, the RTC of Alaminos, Pangasinan affirmed the dismissal of respondents' Complaint for ejectment after finding that the appealed MTC Decision was based on facts and law on the matter. The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision granting the respondents' Petition and ordering petitioner to vacate the subject property and turn over the same to respondents. The appellate court denied the Motion for Reconsideration interposed by petitioner for lack of merit. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Issue: WON the barangay certification relating to the disputed rental amounts is sufficient to authorize respondents to institute the ejectment suit. Held: The rentals being paid monthly, the period of such lease is deemed terminated at the end of each month. Thus, respondents have every right to demand the ejectment of petitioners at the end of each month, the contract having expired by operation of law. Without a lease contract, petitioner has no right of possession to the subject property and must vacate the same. Respondents, thus, should be allowed to resort to an action for ejectment before the MTC to recover possession of the subject property from petitioner. While it is true that the Certification to file action refers only to rental increase and not to the ejectment of petitioner from the subject property, the submission of the same for conciliation before the Barangay Lupon constitutes sufficient compliance with the provisions of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law. Given the particular circumstances of the case at bar, the conciliation proceedings for the amount of monthly rental should logically and reasonably include also the matter of the possession of the property subject of the rental, the lease agreement, and the violation of the terms thereof. the instant Petition is DENIED
G.R. No. 121165 September 26, 2006

HON. DOMINADOR F. CARILO, Presiding Judge, R.T.C. XI-19 Digos, Davao del Sur, BONIFACIO J. GUYOT, Clerk of Court and Provincial Sheriff of Davao del Sur, ALFREDO C. SENOY, Deputy Prov. Sheriff assigned to R.T.C. XI-19 Digos, Davao del Sur, MARCOS D. RISONAR, JR., ., Registrar of Deeds of Davao del Sur, and MARIA GONZALES, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, MARIA PAZ DABON and ROSALINDA DABON, respondents. RESOLUTION FACTS: petitioner Maria Gonzales filed a complaint against the spouses Priscilla and Jose Manio with the RTC of Digos, Davao del Sur, Branch 19. Gonzales sought the execution of the deed of sale in her favor for the property she bought from Priscilla Manio. She also asked for damages and attorney's fees.

For failure to file an Answer, the Manios were declared in default and Gonzales was allowed to present evidence ex parte. After trial, the court rendered judgment in favor of Gonzales. Since there was no appeal, the trial court's decision became final and executory. On December 14, 1990, herein respondents Maria Paz Dabon and Rosalina Dabon, claiming to have bought the aforementioned lot from Aristotle Manio filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of judgment and orders of the RTC in Civil Case No. 2647. The Dabons alleged therein that the judgment of the trial court was void ab initio because of lack of jurisdiction over their persons, as the real parties in interest, and that they were fraudulently deprived of their right to due process. They also prayed for a Temporary Restraining Order and for Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction against Gonzales. The Court of Appeals, without giving due course to the petition, issued a resolution restraining the trial court from implementing its Decision dated June 19, 1990 7 and its subsequent orders thereto in Civil Case No. 2647 until further notice from the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals in a resolution denied the application for preliminary injunction and appointed a commissioner to receive evidence of the parties.Following the Commissioner's report, the Court of Appeals found that (1) the contract of sale between Gonzales and Priscilla was unenforceable because the sale was evidenced by a handwritten note which was vague as to the amount and which was not notarized; (2) the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the indispensable parties; and (3) the proceedings were attended with fraud. The Court of Appeals nullified the judgment of the RTC in Civil Case No. 2647 and cancelled TCT No. T-23690. Issue: Whether or not the Dabons proper parties to file the petition for annulment of judgment? HELD: Section 3 of Rule 3 of the Rules on Civil Procedure which explicitly states that an action should be brought against the real party in interest,12 and in case the action is brought against the agent, the action must be brought against an agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal without joining the principal, except when the contract involves things belonging to the principal.13 The real party in interest is the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment or is the party entitled to the avails of the suit. We have held that in such a situation, an attorney-in-fact is not a real party in interest and that there is no law permitting an action to be brought by and against an attorney-infact.14 Worth stressing, the action filed by Gonzales before the RTC is for specific performance to compel Priscilla to execute a deed of sale, involving real property which, however, does not belong to Priscilla but to Aristotle Manio, the son of Priscilla. The complaint only named as defendant Priscilla, joined by her spouse, yet Priscilla had no interest on the lot and can have no interest whatever in any judgment rendered. She was not acting in her own name, nor was she acting for the benefit of an undisclosed principal. The joinder of all indispensable parties is a condition sine qua non of the exercise of judicial powers, and the absence of indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.15 Accordingly, the failure to implead Aristotle Manio as defendant renders all proceedings in the Civil Case No. 2647, including the order granting the cancellation of TCT No. 16658 and issuance of a new title, null and void.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision dated February 22, 1995 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23687, is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner Maria Gonzales.

Continental Cement Corporation vs. DANFOSS and Mechatronics Instruments and Controls, Inc. (MINCI) FACTS: The antecedents show that on November 5, 1998, respondent Continental Cement Corporation (CCC) filed a complaint for damages against petitioner DANFOSS and Mechatronics Instruments and Controls, Inc. (MINCI) before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 80, alleging that: On 1 September 1997, Plaintiff CCC purchased from defendant MINCI two (2) unit 132 KW Danfoss Brand Frequency Converter/Inverter for use in the Finish Mill of its Cement Plant located in Barrio Bigte, Norzagaray, Bulacan. The said purchase is covered by a Purchase [Order] (PO) No. 36625. Under the terms and conditions of the purchase order, the delivery of the two (2) unit Frequency Converter are to be delivered within eight (8) to ten (10) weeks from the opening of the letter of credit;

As a consequence thereof, plaintiff CCC has suffered an actual substantial production losses in the amount of Eight Million Sixty-four Thousand Pesos (P8,064,000.00) due to the time lost and delay in the delivery of the said two (2) unit Frequency Converter/Inverter. Likewise, plaintiff CCC was compelled to look for another supplier. petitioner DANFOSS filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it did not state a cause of action: xxx xxx xxx The above allegations of the complaint clearly establish the following key constitutive facts: Plaintiff's claim for damages could not have accrued until after defendant incurred in delay. The plaintiff's cause of action against Danfoss or plaintiff's right to demand delivery cannot arise earlier than November 19, 1997, which is the last day for the defendant Danfoss's principal (Danfoss Denmark) to deliver the two (2) units Frequency Converter. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter also denied Danfoss' petition for lack of merit. The CA likewise denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration, hence, this appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not there is no cause of action for Continental Cement Corporation HELD: There is no cause of action. A cause of action is defined under Section 2, Rule 2 of the same Rules as: Sec. 2. Cause of action, defined. A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. It is the delict or wrongful act or omission committed by the defendant in violation of the primary right of the plaintiff.[6] In order to sustain a dismissal on the ground of lack of cause of action, the insufficiency must appear on the face of the complaint. And the test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint to constitute a cause of action is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment thereon in accordance with the prayer of the complaint. we rule that the same failed to state a cause of action. When respondent sued petitioner for damages, petitioner had not violated any right of respondent from which a cause of action had arisen. Respondent only surmised that petitioner would not be able to deliver the two units frequency converter/inverter on the date agreed upon by them. Based on this apprehension, it cancelled its order six days prior to the agreed date of delivery. How could respondent hold petitioner liable for damages (1) when petitioner had not yet breached its obligation to deliver the goods and (2) after respondent made it impossible for petitioner to deliver them by cancelling its order even before the agreed delivery date? In addition, the dismissal of the complaint was warranted on the ground of prematurity. WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition. The assailed decision of the CA dated February 11, 2000 and its resolution dated June 7, 2000 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. Q-98-35997 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 80, is hereby DISMISSED.

G.R. No. 151942. November 27, 2003] Spouses GREGORIO GO and JUANA TAN GO, petitioners, vs. JOHNSON Y. TONG; COURT OF APPEALS; and Honorable Judge JUAN NABONG of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, Manila, respondents. The Facts Petitioner Juana Tan Go (petitioner Juana) purchased a cashiers check dated September 13, 1996 from the Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC) Lavezares, Binondo Branch in the amount ofP500,000.00, payable to Johnson Y. Tong (private respondent). Juanas instruction, the cashiers check bore the words Final Payment/Quitclaim. After the check was delivered to private respondent, he deposited it with the words Final Payment/Quitclaim already erased, hence, it was not honored. Private respondents counsel

subsequently wrote the manager of FEBTC Lavezares Branch informing that the words Final Payment/Quitclaim on the check had been inadvertently erased without being initialed by your bank or the purchaser thereof and thus requesting that the check be replaced with another payable to Johnson Tong-Final Settlement/Quitclaim with the same amount, the bank charges to be paid by his client-private respondent. Private respondent filed a complaint against FEBTC and petitioner Juana and her husband Gregorio Go at the Manila RTC, for sum of money, damages, and attorneys fees, subject of the case at bar. During the pendency of the case, petitioners son, George Tan Go, filed a criminal complaint against private respondent for falsification of the check. The criminal complaint was dismissed. Private respondent filed Supplemental Complaint which alleged that petitioners used their son to file the criminal complaint for falsification against him which caused damages, hence, the prayer for an increase in the amount of moral and exemplary damages sought to be recovered from P2.5 million to P55 million and praying for the award of actual damages of P58,075.00. Defendants allege Plaintiff cannot prosecute his Supplemental Complaint, and the same should be dismissed, unless the corresponding docket fee and legal fees for the monetary claims in the amount of P55,057,075.00 are paid for. Public respondent, in the interest of justice allowed private respondent to first deposit P25,000.00 on or before December 15, 1999 and P20,000.00 every month thereafter until the full amount of docket fees is paid, and only then shall the deposits be considered as payment of docket fees. Hence arose the present petition filed on May 30, 2000 which ascribes to public respondent the commission of grave abuse of discretion in issuing allowing the payment, on staggered basis, of the docket fees for the Supplemental Complaint Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court. Issue: whether or not payment of docket fees on instalment basis is allowed The Petition has no merit. The Court clarified the rule in Sun Insurance thus: It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.[35] (Italics supplied) Plainly, while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement, even its nonpayment at the time of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as long as the fee is paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period; more so when the party involved demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such payment. While the cause of action of private respondent was supposed to prescribe in four (4) years,[38] he was allowed to pay; and he in fact paid the docket fee in a years time. [39] We do not see how this period can be deemed unreasonable. Moreover, on his part there is no showing of any pattern or intent to defraud the government of the required docket fee. We sustain the CAs findings absolving respondent judge of any capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. the assailed Decision and

G.R. No. L-29791 January 10, 1978 FRANCISCO S. HERNANDEZ and JOSEFA U. ATIENZA, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. RURAL BANK OF LUCENA, INC., CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, in its capacity as Liquidator of Rural Bank of Lucena, and JOSE S. MARTINEZ in his capacity as Receiver of Rural Bank of Lucena,defendants-appellants. FACTS: This case is about the propriety of a separate action to compel a distress rural bank. which is under Judicial liquidation, to accept a check in payment of a mortgage debt. Spouses Francisco S. Hernandez and Josefa U. Atienza obtained from the Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc. a loan by a mortgage on their two lots situated in Cubao, Quezon City.

About three months after that loan was obtained, the Lucena Bank became a distress bank. The Monetary Board advised Lucena bank not to issue drafts or make any disbursements without the prior approval of Central Bank. Hernandez went to the Lucena bank and offered to pay the loan which was drawn against the bank by a depositor, the San Pablo Colleges, and which was payable to Fernandez, the payment was not consummated. The vice-president explained that because there was a run the bank its assets were exhausted, and so the check sent by Hernandez, which check was drawn against the Lucena bank, could not be accepted. Hernandez filed an action for specific performance at the Court of Batangas. Central Bank filed a motion to dismiss. It contended that there was improper venue because, as the action allegedly involved title to real property, it should have been instituted in Quezon City where the encumbered lots are situated. The motion was denied. The Lucena bank, the Central Bank and its employee, the receiver, appealed to this Court. The Central Bank contends that the trial court erred (1) in not holding that the venue was improperly laid; defendants-appellants contend that the action of the Hernandez spouses to compel them to honor the check in question and to cancel the mortgage on their two lots is a real action affecting title to real property which should have been filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal at Quezon City where the mortgaged lots are situated. Issue: Whether or not the venue was improperly laid. On the issue of venue, the action is primarily to compel the mortgagee to accept payment of the mortgage debt and to release the mortgage.That action, which is not expressive included in the enumeration found in section 2(a) of Rule 4, does not involve the title to the mortgage lots. It is a personal action and not a real action. The mortgagee has, not foreclosure the mortgage, Plaintiffs' title is not in question. They are in possession of the mortgaged lots. In this case, the plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that they were residents of San Juan, Batangas, which in their brief (They characterize as their legal residence and which appears to be their domicile of origin. On the other hand, it is indicated in the promissory note and mortgage signed by them and in the Torrens title covering the mortgaged lots that their residence is at 11 Chicago Street, Cubao, Quezon City, which apparently is the place where the said lots are located, We hold that the trial court should have dismissed the action because the venue thereof was improperly laid in Batangas. The term "resides" in section 2[b] of Rule 4 refers to the place of actual residence or domicile.) San Juan, Batangas might be the place where the plaintiffs have their domicile or legal residence but there is no question that 11 Chicago Street, Cubao, Quezon City is their place of abode or the place where they actually reside. So, the action in this case, which is a personal action to compel the defendants to honor the check in question and to Cancel the mortgage, should have been filed in Quezon City if the plaintiffs intended to use their residence as the basis for their choice of venue.

[G.R. No. 140954. April 12, 2005]

HEIRS OF BERTULDO[1] HINOG: Bertuldo Hinog II, Bertuldo Hinog III, Bertuldo Hinog, Jr., Jocelyn Hinog, Bertoldo Hinog IV, Bertoldo Hinog V, Edgardo Hinog, Milagros H. Pabatao, Lilian H. King, Victoria H. Engracia, Terisita C. Hinog, Paz H. Besana, Roberto C. Hinog, Vicente C. Hinog, Roel C. Hinog, Marilyn C. Hinog, Bebot C. Hinog, lordes C. Hinog, Pablo Chiong, Arlene Lanasang (All respresented by Bertuldo Hinog III), Petitioners, vs. HON. ACHILLES MELICOR, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 4, 7th Judicial Region, Tagbiliran City, Bohol, and CUSTODIO BALANE, RUFO BALANE, HONORIO BALANE, and TOMAS BALANE, Respondents. FACTS:. The factual background of the case is as follows:

On May 21, 1991, private respondents Custodio, Rufo, Tomas and Honorio, all surnamed Balane, filed a complaint for 'Recovery of Ownership and Possession, Removal of Construction and Damages' against Bertuldo Hinog (Bertuldo for brevity). Private respondents sought to oust Bertuldo from the premises of the subject property and restore upon themselves the ownership and possession thereof, as well as the payment of moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses 'in amounts justified by the evidence. Atty. Petalcorin filed a motion to expunge the complaint from the record and nullify all court proceedings' on the ground that private respondents' failed to specify in the complaint the amount of damages claimed so as to pay the correct docket fees; and that under Manchester Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, non-payment of the correct docket fee is jurisdictional. Atty. Petalcorin further alleged that the private respondents failed to pay the correct docket fee since the main subject matter of the case cannot be estimated as it is for recovery of ownership, possession and removal of construction. The trial court, while ordering the complaint to be expunged from the records and the nullification of all court proceedings taken for failure to pay the correct docket fees. Accordingly, on January 28, 1999, upon payment of deficiency docket fee, private respondents filed a manifestation with prayer to reinstate the case. On July 14, 1999, petitioners manifested that the trial court having expunged the complaint and nullified all court proceedings, there is no valid case and the complaint should not be admitted for failure to pay the correct docket fees; that there should be no case to be reinstated and no case to proceed as there is no complaint filed. On November 24, 1999, petitioners filed before us the present petition for certiorari and prohibition. [27] They allege that the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the case to be reinstated after private respondents paid the docket fee deficiency since the trial court had earlier expunged the complaint from the record and nullified all proceedings of the case and such ruling was not contested by the private respondents.

Issue: Whether or not the payment of docket fee deficiency reinstates the case. Ruling: 1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fees within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. Plainly, while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement, even its nonpayment at the time of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as long as the fee is paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. THEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

G.R. No. 96541 August 24, 1993 DEAN JOSE JOYA, CARMEN GUERRERO NAKPIL, ARMIDA SIGUION REYNA, PROF. RICARTE M. PURUGANAN, IRMA POTENCIANO, ADRIAN CRISTOBAL, INGRID SANTAMARIA, CORAZON FIEL, AMBASSADOR E. AGUILAR CRUZ, FLORENCIO R. JACELA, JR., MAURO MALANG, FEDERICO AGUILAR ALCUAZ, LUCRECIA R. URTULA, SUSANO GONZALES, STEVE SANTOS, EPHRAIM SAMSON, SOLER SANTOS, ANG KIU KOK, KERIMA POLOTAN, LUCRECIA KASILAG, LIGAYA DAVID PEREZ, VIRGILIO ALMARIO, LIWAYWAY A. ARCEO, CHARITO PLANAS, HELENA BENITEZ, ANNA MARIA L. HARPER, ROSALINDA OROSA, SUSAN CALO MEDINA, PATRICIA RUIZ, BONNIE RUIZ, NELSON NAVARRO, MANDY NAVASERO, ROMEO SALVADOR, JOSEPHINE DARANG, and PAZ VETO PLANAS, petitioners, vs. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), CATALINO MACARAIG, JR., in his official capacity, and/or the Executive Secretary, and CHAIRMAN MATEO A.T. CAPARAS, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.: All thirty-five (35) petitioners in this Special Civil Action for Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order seek to enjoin the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) from proceeding with the auction sale scheduled on 11 January 1991 by Christie's of New York of the Old Masters Paintings and 18th and 19th century silverware seized from Malacaang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila and placed in the custody of the Central Bank. Petitioners claim that as Filipino citizens, taxpayers and artists deeply concerned with the preservation and protection of the country's artistic wealth, they have the legal personality to restrain respondents Executive Secretary and PCGG from acting contrary to their public duty to conserve the artistic creations as mandated by the 1987 Constitution, particularly Art. XIV, Secs. 14 to 18, on Arts and Culture, and R.A. 4846 known as "The Cultural Properties Preservation and Protection Act," governing the preservation and disposition of national and important cultural properties. Petitioners also anchor their case on the premise that the paintings and silverware are public properties collectively owned by them and by the people in general to view and enjoy as great works of art. They allege that with the unauthorized act of PCGG in selling the art pieces, petitioners have been deprived of their right to public property without due process of law in violation of the Constitution. 12 ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi. Held: None. The petitioners have no legal capacity to sue. A party having no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff in an action. 7 This is premised on Sec. 2, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court which provides that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, and that all persons having interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded shall be joined as plaintiffs. The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal question. "Legal standing" means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The term "interest" is material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. 8 Moreover, the interest of the party plaintiff must be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and related party. 9 Petitioners' arguments are devoid of merit. They lack basis in fact and in law. Neither can this petition be allowed as a taxpayer's suit. A taxpayer's suit can prosper only if the governmental acts being questioned involve disbursement of public funds upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the state for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds, which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer. 14 In view of the foregoing, this Court finds no compelling reason to grant the petition. Petitioners have failed to show that respondents Executive Secretary and PCGG exercised their functions with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of their jurisdiction. WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition for prohibition and mandamus is DISMISSED.

G.R. No. L-55687 July 30, 1982 JUASING HARDWARE, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE RAFAEL T. MENDOZA, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, and PILAR DOLLA,respondents. FACTS: On August 17, 1979, Juasing Hardware, alleging to be a single proprietorship duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines and represented by its manager Ong Bon Yong, filed a complaint for the collection of a sum of money against Pilar Dolla. The complaint charged that defendant Dolla failed and refused to pay, despite repeated demands, the purchase price of items, materials and merchandise which she bought from the plaintiff. In her Answer, defendant stated, among others, that she "has no knowledge about plaintiff's legal personality and capacity to sue as alleged in ... the complaint."

The case proceeded to pre-trial and trial. After plaintiff had completed the presentation of its evidence and rested its case, defendant filed a Motion for Dismissal of Action (Demurrer to Evidence) 4 praying that the action be dismissed for plaintiff's lack of legal capacity to sue. Defendant in said Motion contended that plaintiff Juasing Hardware is a single proprietorship, not a corporation or a partnership duly registered in accordance with law, and therefore is not a juridical person with legal capacity to bring an action in court. Trial Court dismissed the case for lack of legal capacity of the plaintiff. Issue: Whether or not a sole proprietorship can be a party to a civil action. HELD: No. Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court provides as follows Sec. 1. Who may be parties.-Only natural or juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action. Petitioner is definitely not a natural person; nor is it a juridical person as defined in the New Civil Code of the Philippines thus: There is no law authorizing sole proprietorships like petitioner to bring suit in court. The law merely recognizes the existence of a sole proprietorship as a form of business organization conducted for profit by a single individual, and requires the proprietor or owner thereof to secure licenses and permits, register the business name, and pay taxes to the national government. It does not vest juridical or legal personality upon the sole proprietorship nor empower it to file or defend an action in court. Thus, the complaint in the court below should have been filed in the name of the owner of Juasing Hardware.

December 3, 1947 G.R. No. L-1539 MA-AO SUGAR CENTRAL CO., petitioner, vs. CONRADO BARRIOS, ET AL., respondents.

FACTS: a petition was filed by Carlos N. Francisco and Ceferino Francisco praying that a new plan covering certain parcels of land, titles to which had been decreed before by the court, be approved and that new certificates be issued in favor of the said petitioners. Jose de Borja objected to the petition on the ground that some of the lots mentioned therein from an integral part of his land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 12377, but according to the evidence

and the findings of the lower court his claim is utterly unfounded because the said lots are outside of the limits covered by the title in his name. The said court, however, denied the petition on two grounds First, that it has no jurisdiction to act thereon as the title to the land had been decreed long before by the court .

Issue: Whether or not there is an issue on the identity of the said lots that is subject to a cause of action. Held: There is no issue. The old title was based on a plan which was never approved by the Bureau of Lands, the survey not having been made under the modern system which is more scientific. When the land covered and subdivided into lots, the total area in the new plan did not tally with that contained in the one. However, the boundaries remained the same. As regards lots Nos. 4-A and 6 of Plan Exhibit F, it appears that either through omission or error they were not included in the subdivisions although as a matter of fact they were within the boundaries of the whole land covered by the old certificate of title. There is no valid reason why the court should deny the approval of the new plan and the consequent issuance of a new certificate of title corresponding thereto as recommended by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office. No right of a third party is affected. There is no change in the identify of the land.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993 Minors OPOSA et. al., petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents. In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice."

The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners. 1 The complaint2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit 3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn." 4Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered: . . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country; Original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss. 7 In the said order, not only was the defendant's claim that the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.. Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case. 8 Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment. On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. ISSUE: Whether or not the minors has locus standi in the suit. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.

We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.

[G.R. No. 165147, July 09, 2008] PHILIPPINE FIRST INSURANCE CO., INC. AND PARAMOUNT GENERAL INSURANCE CORPORATION, PETITIONERS, VS. PYRAMID LOGISTICS AND TRUCKING CORPORATION (FORMERLY PANACOR INTEGRATED WAREHOUSING AND TRUCKING CORPORATION), RESPONDENT. DECISION CARPIO MORALES, J.: Pyramid sought to recover the proceeds of two insurance policies issued to it issued by petitioner Philippine First. Despite demands, petitioners allegedly failed to settle them, hence, it filed the complaint subject of the present petition. In its complaint, Pyramid alleged that on November 8, 2000, its delivery van bearing license plate number PHL-545 which was loaded with goods belonging to California Manufacturing Corporation (CMC) valued at PESOS NINE HUNDRED SEVEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FORTY NINE AND SEVEN/100 (P907,149.07). Pyramid was assessed P610 docket fee, apparently on the basis of the amount of P50,000 specified in the prayer representing attorney's fees, which it duly paid.[5]

Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of, inter alia, lack of jurisdiction, Pyramid not having paid the docket fees in full.On the other hand, in the prayer in the Complaint, plaintiff deliberately omitted to specify what these damages are Verily, this deliberate omission by the plaintiff is clearly intended for no other purposes than to evade the payment of the correct filing fee if not to mislead the docket clerk, in the assessment of the filing fee. In fact, the docket clerk in the instant case charged the plaintiff a total ofPhp610.00 only as a filing fee, which she must have based on the amount of Php50,000.00 [attorney's fees] only.[10] (Emphasis in the original; italics and underscoring supplied) Petitioners cited[11] Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals[12]which held: x x x [A]ll complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not be accepted or admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record.[13] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied They cited too Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion[14] which held that "[i]t is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action."[15] Petitioners thus concluded: With the above cases as a backdrop, the Supreme Court, in revising the rules of pleading and practice in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, added a tenth ground to a Motion to Dismiss - to wit, "[t]hat a condition precedent for filing claim [sic] has not been complied with.["] condition precedent. On the contrary, if plaintiff would insist that its claim against the defendants is only Php50,000.00 plus Php 1,500.00 as appearance fee per court hearing, then it follows that it is the Metropolitan Trial Court which has jurisdiction over this case, not this Honorable Court. Such amount is way below the minimum jurisdictional amount prescribed by the rules in order to confer jurisdiction to the Regional Trial Court.[16] (Underscoring supplied) the trial court[20] denied the Motion to Dismiss. Petitioners did indeed eventually file before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari. Court of Appeals partially granted petitioners' petition for certiorari by setting aside the trial judge's assailed orders and ordering Pyramid to file the correct docket fees within a reasonable time. ISSUE: Whether or not correct docket fees were paid by Pyramid. HELD: Where the action is purely for the recovery of money or damages, the docket fees are assessed on the basis of the aggregate amount claimed, exclusive only of interests and costs. In this case, the complaint or similar pleading should, according to Circular No. 7 of this Court, "specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of filing fees in any case." Pyramid captioned its complaint as one for "specific performance and damages" even if it was, as the allegations in its body showed, seeking in the main the collection of its claims-sums of money representing losses the amount of which it, by its own admission, "knew."[46] And, indeed, it failed to specify in its prayer in the complaint the amount of its claims/damages.

When Pyramid amended its complaint, it still did not specify, in its prayer, the amount of claims/damages it was seeking. x x x While it is true that the determination of certain damages x x x is left to the sound discretion of the court, it is the duty of the partiesclaiming such damages to specify the amount sought on the basis of which the court may make a proper determination, and for the proper assessment of the appropriate docket fees. The exceptioncontemplated as to claims not specified or to claims although specified are left for determination of the court is limited only to any damages that may arise after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading for then it will not be possible for the claimant to specify nor speculate as to the amount thereof. WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing discussions, the petition is DENIED.

G.R. No. L-25024 March 30, 1970 TEODORO C. SANTIAGO, JR. Minor, Represented by his Mother, Mrs. Angelita C. Santiago, petitioner-appellant, vs. MISS JUANITA BAUTISTA, ROSALINDA ALPAS, REBECCA MATUGAS, MILKITA INAMAC, ROMEO AGUSTIN, AIDA CAMINO, LUNA SARMAGO, AURORA LORENA, SOLEDAD FRANCISCO and MR. FLOR MARCELO,respondents-appellees. BARREDO, J.: Angelita Santiago contests the decision of Sero Elementary School Committee on the Rating of Students for Honors, in connection with the selection of her son minor Teodoro Santiago to the rank of 3rd Honors. Mrs. Santiago contends that it was her son minor Santiago as the deserving 1st Honor for the school year 1964- 1965. With the impending graduation ceremonies, Mrs. Santiago sought relief from the Court of First Instance of Cotabato because of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the search committee. They prayed the court, among others, to set aside the final list of honor students in Grade VI of the Sero Elementary School for that school year 1964-1965, and, during the pendency of the suit, to enjoin the respondent teachers from officially and formally publishing and proclaiming the said honor pupils in Grade VI in the graduation exercises the school was scheduled to hold on the 21st of May of that year 1965.

The injunction prayed for was denied by the lower court in its order of May 20, 1965, the said court reasoning out that the graduation exercises were then already set on the following day, May 21, 1965, and the restraining of the same would be shocking to the school authorities, parents, and the community who had eagerly looked forward to the coming of that yearly happy event. As scheduled, the graduation exercises of the Sero Elementary School for the school year 1964-1965 was held on May 21, with the same protested list of honor students. Having been required by the above-mentioned order to answer the petition within ten (10) days, respondents moved for the dismissal of the case instead. Under date of May 24, 1965, they filed a motion to dismiss, on the grounds (1) that the action for certiorari was improper, and (2) that even assuming the propriety of the action, the question brought before the court had already become academic. This was opposed by petitioner. The motion to dismiss of respondents was granted by the trial court. ISSUE: whether or not there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Honors Committee HELD: None. Allegations relating to the alleged 'grave abuse of discretion' on the part of teachers refer to errors, mistakes, or irregularities rather than to real grave abuse of discretion that would amount to lack of jurisdiction. Mere commission of errors in the exercise of jurisdiction may not be corrected by means of certiorari. In view of the foregoing, the Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the petition states no cause of action and should be, as it is hereby dismissed. A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers; the exercise of a judicial function is the doing of something in the nature of the action of the court. Judicial power" implies the construction of laws and the adjudication of legal rights. It includes the power to hear and determine but not everyone who may hear and determine has judicial power. The term "judicial power" does not necessarily include the power to hear and determine a matter that is not in the nature of a suit or action between the parties.' (34 committee on the rating of students for honor whose actions are questioned in this case exercised neither judicial nor quasi judicial functions in the performance of its assigned task. FOR THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant.

EN BANC G.R. No. L-64013 November 28, 1983 UNION GLASS & CONTAINER CORPORATION and CARLOS PALANCA, JR., in his capacity as President of Union Glass & Container Corporation, petitioners, vs. THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION and CAROLINA HOFILEA, respondents. This petition for certiorari and prohibition seeks to annul and set aside the Order of the Securities and Exchange Commission, upholding its jurisdiction in SEC Case No. 2035, entitled "Carolina Hofilea, Complainant, versus Development Bank of the Philippines, et al., Respondents." Private respondent Carolina Hofilea, complainant in SEC Case No. 2035, is a stockholder of Pioneer Glass Manufacturing Corporation, Pioneer Glass for short, a domestic corporation engaged in the operation of silica mines and the manufacture of glass and glassware. Since 1967, Pioneer Glass had obtained various loan accommodations from the Development Bank of the Philippines [DBP], and also from other local and foreign sources which DBP guaranteed.

As security for said loan accommodations, Pioneer Glass mortgaged and/or assigned its assets, real and personal, to the DBP, in addition to the mortgages executed by some of its corporate officers over their personal assets. It appears that through the conversion into equity of the accumulated unpaid interests on the various loans amounting to P5.4 million as of January 1975, and subsequently increased by another P2.2 million in 1976, the DBP was able to gain control of the outstanding shares of common stocks of Pioneer Glass, and to get two, later three, regular seats in the corporation's board of directors. Sometime in March, 1978, when Pioneer Glass suffered serious liquidity problems such that it could no longer meet its financial obligations with DBP, it entered into a dacion en pago agreement with the latter, whereby all its assets mortgaged to DBP were ceded to the latter in full satisfaction of the corporation's obligations On April 1, 1981, Carolina Hofilea filed a complaint before the respondent Securities and Exchange Commission against the DBP, Union Glass and Pioneer Glass, docketed as SEC Case No. 2035. first cause of action was based on the alleged illegality of the aforesaid dacion en pago. On April 21, 1981, Pioneer Glass filed its answer. On May 8, 1981, petitioners moved for dismissal of the case on the ground that the SEC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the suit. On July 23, 1981, SEC Hearing Officer Eugenio E. Reyes, to whom the case was assigned, granted the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. However, on September 25, 1981, upon motion for reconsideration filed by respondent Hofilea, Hearing Officer Reyes reversed his original order by upholding the SEC's jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the persons of petitioners. Unable to secure a reconsideration of the Order as well as to have the same reviewed by the Commission En Banc, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the order of September 25, 1981, and to prevent respondent SEC from taking cognizance of SEC Case No. 2035. ISSUE: The issue raised in the petition may be propounded thus: Is it the regular court or the SEC that has jurisdiction over the case? HELD: Yes. In the ordinary course of things, petitioner Union Glass, as transferee and possessor of the glass plant covered by the dacion en pago agreement, should be joined as party-defendant under the general rule which requires the joinder of every party who has an interest in or lien on the property subject matter of the dispute. 4 Such joinder of parties avoids multiplicity of suits as well as ensures the convenient, speedy and orderly administration of justice. But since petitioner Union Glass has no intra-corporate relation with either the complainant or the DBP, its joinder as party-defendant in SEC Case No. 2035 brings the cause of action asserted against it outside the jurisdiction of the respondent SEC. The fact that the controversy at bar involves the rights of petitioner Union Glass who has no intracorporate relation either with complainant or the DBP, places the suit beyond the jurisdiction of the respondent SEC. The case should be tried and decided by the court of general jurisdiction, the Regional Trial Court. This view is in accord with the rudimentary principle that administrative agencies, like the SEC, are tribunals of limited jurisdiction6 and, as such, could wield only such powers as are specifically granted to them by their enabling statutes.