P 151614Z DEC 06 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 004572 SUBJECT: BAGHDAD CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM UNDER

STRESS CLASSIFIED BY: BAGHDAD PRT LEADER JOE GREGOIRE. REASON 1.4 (B) AND (D) 1. (U) This is a Baghdad PRT reporting cable. 2. (C) SUMMARY: Although functioning, the Baghdad criminal justice system is exhibiting stresses that, unless corrected, will seriously inhibit its long-term effectiveness and success. Inadequate investigative personnel, poor training and resources shortfalls; militia infiltration within the Iraqi Police (IP); delinquent relations between the police and judiciary;inadequate representation of detainees by poorly trained and underpaid appointed counsel; and prison overcrowding combine to create a highly ineffectual system. From May to November 2006 the Baghdad Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), Rule of Law Section (RoL), conducted numerous on-site assessments of police, court and prison facilities in the Baghdad Governate and held discussions with a variety of criminal justice contacts. This reporting synthesizes the PRT RoL

observations and findings during this period. END SUMMARY. ---------------------------------POLICE LACK RESOURCES AND TRAINING ---------------------------------3. (C) Although the Iraqi Police (IP) are relied on as the lead investigators for crimes and the apprehension of criminals, the IP often say they are poorly trained and generally not up to these tasks. Second Officer in Charge Adil of Police Station Belat al-Shuhda (Rasheed District) told PRT staff early September that 70% of his staff was insufficiently trained to conduct their work effectively. In a similar complaint, Colonel Raad from Mansour District's al-Khadra Police Station claimed that his staff also received insufficient training, particularly in weapons use. These complaints match many others that we have received from local Baghdad police stations. 4. (C) IP units at the local level chronically said they lacked basic financial resources, infrastructure and logistical support. During a visit in September, Major Salem Marush al-Maliki of Ghazaliya Police Station told PRT staff that his staff lacked sufficient uniforms, firearms, and vehicles to conduct their work properly. He also complained that his station did not have fuel to support their generator. Colonel Raad of Khadra Police Station described similar problems, and noted that his own officers buy fuel for the station out of their own salaries. These and other

police station heads have complained that support from the Ministry of Interior, responsible for providing these resources, is so poor that police on the street often don't have access to vehicles, electricity in the stations, ammunition, or office supplies. 5. (C) The IP mission at the street level is also hampered by militia interference and pressure, lack of local trust by the population, and fears for personal safety. MNF-I police trainer reports indicate a belief that JAM has infiltrated various police stations, for example Ghazalia Police Station in a predominantly Sunni area. Residents of other districts have often alleged to embassy officials that local police were infiltrated by Jaysh al Mahdi or Badr Corps militia. Fearing this infiltration, many residents, particularly those from Sunni neighborhoods say they do not trust their local police and fear going to them for help. 6. (C) The IP have indicated to PRT officials that since they generally lack the basic trust of the citizens of Baghdad and, because of security threats, they are often afraid to do their jobs. This fear is so extensive that Iraqi police are sometimes even unwilling to investigate the murder of fellow officers. In some areas of the city, police officials have openly admitted to RoL officals that they can investigate, at most, only 10% of all serious crimes reported. ---------------------------------------------RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLICE AND JUDICAL SYSTEM ----------------------------------------------

7. (C) When an arrest is made, the lack of trust and confidence between IPS and the investigative judges often prevents cases from being thoroughly and successfully investigated and prosecuted. In the Iraqi judicial system, investigative judges are the initial and primary gatekeepers for prosecutions. Iraqi police view investigative judges, and the judicial investigators they work with, as detached from and unresponsive to cases submitted by them. Deputy Chief Rahiem from Mamoun Police Station in Mansour told PRT staff in September that investigative judges do not come to the station to review cases nor to meet the police investigators as they used to prior to 2003. Colonel Raad from al Khadra police station complained in a separate visit that communication between investigative judges and investigative police is limited and never occurs face to face, potentially affecting the quality of investigations. 8. (C) Investigative judges in turn often view the IP as ineffective, corrupt and ill-prepared to investigate criminal cases. LTC Adil from police station Behat al Shuhada commented to PRT that the justice system does not understand the problems facing IPS and perceive them to be corrupt. 9. (C) Investigative judges, who before 2003 actively visited crime scenes to gather evidence and take witness statements, are now generally bound to their courthouses and rarely visit the police stations for which they are responsible.

Instead, investigative duties are delegated to the IP or judicial investigators. Both the IP and investigative judges are united in their belief that they have inadequate personnel and training to perform their responsibilities and consistently complain of the need for additional staffing and training to perform their duties. -----------------------------DETAINEES CAUGHT IN THE MIDDLE -----------------------------10. (C) These systemic problems have resulted in many cases of detainees being held for as long as two years awaiting trial. In the visit to al Khadra station in September, four of the 13 detainees held there claimed to have been detained over one year without having gone to trial ) one detainee said he had been in the holding cell for two years. These detainees are often held in small and over-crowded local police holding cells, neither intended nor suited for long term confinement. Lengthy detention is aggravated by prison over-crowding, resulting in local police station jail cells serving as both pre-trail detention facilities and long-term holding cells from convicted criminals. 11. (C) While waiting in their holding cells, detainees often do not enjoy the rights typically associated with access to justice. Although detainees who can not afford counsel are guaranteed representation, this counsel is generally not available until the day they are brought before an investigative judge, often days or weeks after

their initial detention and interrogation. Even after receiving court appointed counsel, appointed defense attorneys rarely, if ever, see their clients. When asked about this, police and investigators state that that defense attorneys have no incentive to follow a case. Payments are based on service, not performance. Defense attorneys receive 25,000 Dinar ($17 USD) when before an investigative judge and 50,000 Dinar ($34 USD) at the trial. 12. (C) A prominent exception to the problems referenced above is the Baghdad Branch of the Central Criminal Court of Iraq (CCCI). Significantly financed and supported by U.S. personnel and operating within the International Zone, the CCCI is responsible for the investigation and prosecution of some of the most prominent Baghdad criminal cases, including those of terrorism and corruption. The success of the CCCI demonstrates that, with sufficient attention to funding and security, the Iraqi criminal justice system can work. ------COMMENT ------13. (C) The Baghdad PRT ROL Team assesses that the Baghdad criminal court system is functioning, but under apparent and increasing pressure. The IP believe they have been abandoned by the Ministry of Interior and lack the funding, training, and resources to do their jobs well at police stations.

Militias continue to aggressively infiltrate or influence the police forces, which compromises their ability to fairly, uniformly, and aggressively enforce the law. Combined, these frictions have led to a police force that is generally unable to serve and protect the citizens of Baghdad and forward cases into the Baghdad criminal justice system. Dependence on Coalition Forces continues in the absence of viable MOI support. 14. (C) The participation in training and operation of the International Police Liaison Officers (IPLO) has gives some hope, but results are spotty and not all IP stations are covered by IPLO staff. Cooperation between the Baghdad PRT and the IPLO has resulted in new initiatives to integrate investigative judges, judicial staff, and police investigators in the IPLO training programs in an attempt to rectify some of the challenges we have uncovered. The PRT ROL section recognizes that criminal justice matters comprise only a part of the Iraqi justice system and will report separately on Iraqi civil courts, law schools, human rights organizations, and Sharia and tribal courts to determine how these institutions are working to address a range of social justice issues. KHALILZAD (Edited and reading.) reformatted by Andres for ease of