You are on page 1of 19

British Society for Middle Eastern Studies

The Shia of Saudi Arabia: A Minority in Search of Cultural Authenticity Author(s): Madawi al-Rasheed Source: British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 25, No. 1 (May, 1998), pp. 121-138 Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/195850 . Accessed: 17/07/2011 10:23
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at . http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=taylorfrancis. . Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Taylor & Francis, Ltd. and British Society for Middle Eastern Studies are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies.

http://www.jstor.org

British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies (1998), 25(1), 121-138

The

Shia

of

Saudi

Arabia:

in Search Minority Authenticity


MADAWI AL-RASHEED*

of

Cultural

resistance This article focuses on the transformation Saudi ShiCa ABSTRACT of one which centred on military confrontation in the 1980s to one which from
invokes searching for cultural authenticity (al-asala al-shiciyya) in the 1990s.

Today the struggle of the Shicafor equal status among the Sunni majoritydraws intellectualsto write their own regional history. attentionto the attemptsof ShiCa Shica intellectualsand opposition leaders deconstructofficial representationsof themselves and provide alternative historical narratives which anchor their communityin Saudi history and society, thus dismissing suggestions that they are a non-indigenouscommunity.This article examines Shica historical narratives in an attempt to understandthe transformationin their struggle against discriminationin Saudi Arabia. Introduction of The transformation Saudi Shica opposition from military confrontationin the 1980s to the quest for cultural authenticityin the 1990s has not attractedthe attentionof scholars. The sparse literatureon this community tends to concentrate on the open and violent confrontationsin the early 1980s.1 Such overt
*Lecturerin Social Anthropology, Dept of Theology and Religious Studies, King's College, University of London, London, UK. This article draws on a joint researchproject conducted by the author and Loulouwa Al-Rasheed. This involved interviewing Shi'a opposition leaders in London in 1992-1993. Interviews were conductedwith Hamza al Hasanand 'Abdul Amir Musa, two active leadersof the opposition.An earlierversion of this article was presentedin a Workshopon Minoritiesin the Middle East organizedby the CarstenNiebuhr to Institutefor Near EasternStudies, University of Copenhagenin 1996. I thankthe contributors the workshop for theircomments.Also I thankthe anonymousBJMESrefereesfor theirconstructivecriticismand suggestions, some of which have been addressedin this article. 1 Researchon the Saudi Shi'a remains very limited. In the 1980s, a numberof referencesto their mobilization were included in some books and articles on Saudi Arabia. See W. Quandt, Saudi Arabia in the 1980's (Washington,DC: BrookingsInstitution,1981); J. Buchan, 'Secularand Religious Oppositionin Saudi Arabia', in T. Niblock (ed.), State, Society and Economyin Saudi Arabia (London:Croom Helm, 1982), pp. 106-124; J. Bill, 'Islam,Politics, and Shi'ism in the Gulf,' MiddleEast Insight,3 (1980); J. Goldberg,'The Shi'i Minority in Saudi Arabia,'in J. Cole and N. Keddie (eds), Shiismand Social Protest (New York: Yale University Press, (ed.), Shi'ism,Resistanceand Revolution 1986), pp. 230-246; J. Kostiner,'Shi'i Unrestin the Gulf,' in M. Kramer (Colorado:Westview Press, 1987), pp. 173-186. The Shi'a are also mentioned in researchon Saudi-Iranian relations;see I. Leverrier,'L'ArabieSaoudite,Le Pelerinageet L'Iran,' Cahiers d'Etudessur La Mediterranee 22 Orientaleset Le Monde Turco-Iranien, (1996), pp. 111-147; and Y. Richard,L'lslam Chi'ite Croyances et Ideologies (Paris:Fayard, 1991). 1353-0194/98/010121-18 ? 1998 British Society for Middle EasternStudies

MADAWI AL-RASHEED

confrontationsare no longer the main strategyof the Shi'a opposition.There has been a shift towards more subtle forms of resistance, led by Shi'a intellectuals and opposition leaders who assert what they call al-asdla al-shiliyya, (cultural authenticity).In this article, I consider the search for cultural authenticityas a mechanism for asserting the group's identity by drawing on cultural and historicalelements. This assertionhas come to replace direct confrontationswith the regime, thus allowing resistance to take place at the level of cultural contestation. While the relationshipbetween the Saudi Shi'a and the Sunni majority has always been characterizedby violence and conflict,2the greatest confrontation with the Saudi governmenttook place afterthe success of the Islamic revolution in Iran. In 1979, the Shi'a took to the streets during the cashura to mourn the death of their martyrs,Hasan and Hussein, a practiceforbiddenby the state and confined to the private sphere of Shi'a homes since 1913. The state dispatched In 20,000 National Guardsoldiers to disperse the mourners.3 the following year and a series of strikes in (1980) the Saudi Shi'a organizeda large demonstration Qatif to celebratethe first anniversaryof the returnof Imam Khomeini to Iran. This became an occasion to voice their discontent over their status as second class citizens in Saudi Arabia. Demonstrationswere repressed by the Saudi authoritiesand the National Guard,leading to a numberof deaths in the region. The Shi'a rememberthe events as intif.dat al-min.taqa al-sharqiyya(the uprising of the EasternProvince),4a symbol of the repressionwhich the communityhad historically been subjected to. The Organizationof Islamic Revolution (Mual-thawra al-islamiyya), a clandestine Shi'a organizationrepresenting naz.zamat the community in the Eastern Province, began to take shape as the political outlet for the group following the spontaneousevents of 1979-1980. Membership of the Organizationwas drawnfrom studentsin the University of Minerals and Petroleum (Dammam) and workers at the oil company, ARAMCO. The Organizationbegan broadcastingfrom Iranianradio stations in an attempt to reach the communityin Saudi Arabia, and an informationoffice was opened in Tehran to co-ordinate political activities.5 While the Organizationdenies the patronageof Iran,it is proudof the fact that it has become a focal point for other Shica in the Gulf (mainly in Kuwait, Bahrainand the United Arab Emirates).It insists that their opposition is an indigenous response to political conditions in Saudi Arabia,althoughit is clear that the supportof Iran and its adoptionof the movement played a crucial role in the intensificationof conflict with the Saudi governmentin the early 1980s.
2 Referencesto the tension between the Wahhabisand the Shi'a in the eighteenthand nineteenthcenturiesare found in C. Doughty, Travelsin Arabia Deserta, 2 vols. (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress, 1979); G. A. Wallin, 'Narrativeof a Journeyfrom Cairo to Medina and Mecca, by Suez, Araba,Tawila, al-Jauf,Jublae,Hail andNegd in 1845,' Journalof the Royal GeographicalSociety,1854,243, pp. 115-201; W. C. Palgrave,Personal Narrativeof a Year'sJourneythroughCentraland EasternArabia(1862-1863), 2 vols (London:Macmillanand Co., 1865); andJ. Philby, SaudiArabia (London:Benn, 1955). For a quick summaryof the events of this period, see Goldberg, 'The Shi'i Minority'. 3 Goldberg, 'The Shi'i Minority', pp. 240-241. 4 Hamza al-Hasanreferredto the event of 1979 in this mannerin his book and during the interview session. 5 Personalinterview with Hamza al-Hasan, January1993.

122

THE SHI'A OF SAUDI ARABIA

After the confrontationsof 1979-1980, the Saudi state realized that a pragmatic approachto the Shi'a problemwould be more beneficial. Officials visiting the region immediately after these events openly recognized the social and economic privationof the communityand promisedto improve the educational, of health and economic infrastructure Shi'a towns.6 An assessment of the Shi'a opposition in the 1990s shows that economic development in the region did not immediately succeed in pacifying the Shi'a and winning their allegiance. Economic development did appeal to the traditional Shi'a leadership, who were satisfied with the promises of the state. However, they did not succeed in pacifying the young Shi'a activists, who were influencedby the rising tide of political Islam in the Middle East, and looked to Iran for inspiration.7Young Shi'a activists, who were behind the riots of 1979-1980 opted for exile, where they established their headquarters chalto lenge the state. This article investigates the shift in Shi'a tactics by examining Shi'a journalistic and historical narrativesin which their culturalauthenticityis established. Three sources are used. First, the monthly magazine al-JazTra al-'Arabiyya(The Arabian Peninsula),8published by the Shi'a opposition in London until 1993, was one of the most systematic publicationsof this opposition. It incorporated the views of the opposition and differed from other sources owing to the quality of its content and its regular appearance over three years. Second, Hamza al-Hasan's two volumes on the history of the Saudi Shi'a are consulted because they represent the most recent version of Shi'a historiography,written by an historian and political activist.9 His historical account is a unique attempt to representthe community's past and present from the perspective of an insider. Although these sources were officially outside the reach of the Saudi Shi'a because of the ban on opposition literature, they worried the government sufficientlythat when the oppositionreconciled with the state early in the 1990s, one of the state's conditions was that the magazine cease publicationand what the state regards as 'hostile literature' be suspended.?1However, it remains difficult to assess whetherthe magazine and al-Hasan's narrativeshave reached a wide public in Saudi Arabia. One can speculate that such literaturedid attract the attentionof not only the Saudi Shi'a but also other Saudi citizens, given the government's concern about their appearance.They were widely available in bookshops and newsagents in London and Arab countries such as Syria and Lebanon. Third, a numberof interviews were conducted with Shi'a opposition leaders during their exile in London. These interviews provided an opportunity to discuss the content of the opposition's publications and clarify their position
6 Goldberg, 'The Shi'i Minority', p. 243. 7 Personalinterview with Hamza al-Hasan, 1993. 8 Al-JazTra al-'Arabiyya(1991-1993), 1-31 (London). 9 Hamza al-Hasan, al-Shl'a ft al-Mamlakaal-'Arabiyyaal-Sa'udiyya, 2 vols (Mu'assasatal-Baqi li-Ihya'alTurath,1993). 10Personalinterview with Abdul Amir Musa, January1993.

123

MADAWI AL-RASHEED

regardingurgentpolitical matters.I will argue that the apparentabsence of open conflict with the state at present does not indicate the pacification of the Shi'a community.While violence remainsan option, in the 1990s the Shi'a have so far appearedto express their opposition as a cultural contestation reflecting their concern as a minority in Saudi Arabia. Resistance to domination by powerless groups takes various forms and aggression may not be the only feasible option. Scott, the political scientist, discusses alternative forms of resistance in situations whereby open confrontationresults in high casualties, which powerless groups cannot tolerate.1 One such option is the articulationof what Scott calls the 'hidden transcripts'. In these 'hidden transcripts', the subordinategroups usually articulate ideas which 'reverse' and 'negate' those generated by the dominant group. They consist of speeches, gestures, rituals and practices often taking place off-stage beyond direct observationby power holders. They also include narrativesand discourses challenging power relations of domination.Scott shows how 'hidden transcripts' may not remain 'hidden' as they erupt into the public realm. He arguesthat 'momentsof challenge and open defiancetypically provoke either a swift stroke of repression or, if unanswered,often lead to furtherwords and acts of daring'.12 'Breaking the silence', that is, the eruption of the hidden discourse into the public sphere, is a moment which generates its own political electricity, not only for the individualwhose discourse enters the public sphere, but also for the collectivity, the subordinategroup that shares this discourse.13 The subjective power of this moment is compoundedby a collective sense of satisfaction. Scott's importantanalysis of the resistanceof subordinate groupshas attracted the attentionof those anthropologistswho have traditionallypreoccupiedthemselves with investigatinglocal responses to domination.Althoughhis concept of 'hiddentranscripts'has been criticized and revised,'4his general line of reasonof ing seems to provide an analytical frameworkfor the interpretation the shift in Shi'a resistance. Shi'a narrativesabout their authenticityand their historical and social place in Saudi society can be regarded as 'hidden transcripts', increasingly finding their way into the public sphere. Although Shi'a publications are banned in Saudi Arabia (they are usually published in other Arab countries and Europe, mainly in London), they have reached clandestine members of the communityin Saudi Arabiaand abroad.These publicationsarticulate an alternativehistorical narrativeto that which is propagatedby Saudi official discourse. The latter has condemnedthe Shi'a because of their religious beliefs and practices, which do not conform to Wahhabism, the official religious of ideology of the state. Shi'a narratives,therefore,reverse these representations
11J. Scott,Dominationand theArts of ResistanceHiddenTranscripts (New Haven:Yale UniversityPress, 1990).
12 13 Ibid.,

S. Gall, 'Languageandthe Artsof Resistance',Cultural Anthropology,1995, 10(3), pp. 407-424 andD. Kulick, 'Causinga Commotion:Public Scandalas ResistanceamongBrazilianTransgendered Prostitutes,' Anthropology Today, 12(3) (1996), pp. 3-7.

14

Ibid., p. 19. p. 206.

124

THE SHI'A OF SAUDI ARABIA

themselves and articulate their history in a way that aims to correct what they call 'the misrepresentation of their community, religion and history'."1 Examining Shi'a narratives allows us to investigate how this minority resists by articulating an alternative discourse, whose main objective is to create a space for themselves in a society which so far has deprived them of religious and political rights, social recognition and economic prosperity. The narratives of their historians and intellectuals resemble what Scott calls 'cooked declarations'. According to him, these are:
more likely to be nuanced and elaborate because they arise under circumstances in which there is a good deal of off-stage freedom among subordinate groups, allowing them to share a rich and deep hidden transcript.In a sense, the hidden transcriptof such subordinate groups is already a product of mutual communication that already has a quasi-public existence. 6

The exile of Shi'a opposition intellectuals allows the production of 'cooked declarations' on the pages of a press beyond the control of the Saudi government. The mobilizing capacity of these declarations cannot be underestimated because in Scott's words 'at the level of political beliefs, anger, and dreams they are a social explosion'.17 Shi'a Opposition Discourse: 'Return to Ibn Khaldun'

The monthly magazine al-Jazfra al-'Arabiyya was perhaps one of the most
consistent publications containing the discourse of the Organization of the Islamic Revolution, which since 1992 has been known as al-haraka al-islahiyya (The Reform Movement). It represented the views of the movement's leadership. While the magazine systematically exposed the physical and symbolic violence of the Saudi state against members of the Shi'a community (by reproducing the reports of international human rights agencies), its exiled London-based editorial board tried to combine their direct attacks on the regime with quasi-academic discourse. In its search for credibility, the magazine contained leading articles by distinguished Shi'a writers and activists, including among others, Abdullah al-Hasan, Tawfiq al-Sheikh, Abdul al Amir Musa, and Hamza al-Hasan. One interesting and recurrent theme developed by the editorial board (founders and active members of The Reform Movement), was reference to the theories of Ibn Khaldun, the fourteenth century north African scholar. In his analysis of Muslim politics, Ibn Khaldun emphasized the segmentary nature of tribal and nomadic societies, which in his opinion were responsible for the cyclical pattern of dynastic rise and fall.18 Ibn Khaldun condemned the
15Personal interview with Hamza al-Hasan, 1993. 16 Scott, Domination,p. 216. 17 Ibid., p. 227. 18 Ibn Khaldun,TheMuqqadimah. Introduction History,trans.F. Rosenthal,N. J. Dawood (eds) (Princeton: An to PrincetonUniversity Press, 1967).

125

MADAWI AL-RASHEED

'bedouins' for their alleged continuous raids on the centres of civilization (the oases and cities of the region). He held them responsible for the instability of dynasticrule. However, he highlightedthe crucialrole of their militaryskills and more importantlytheir kinship solidarity, 'asabiyya, which if combined with religious zeal, tend to create favourableground for the foundationof dynasties. In brief, he characterized Muslim politics as a succession of dynasties, founded by bedouin chiefs, who combine their tribal solidarity with religious zeal to establish centralizedpolities with a lifespan not exceeding three or four generations. As bedouins establish their power and authorityover the oases, they tend to become lax, thus losing the purity of desert society. They eventually become corruptas they indulge themselves in the luxuries of sedentarylife. This results in the disintegration theirpolitical power underpressurefrom a new and fresh of
'asabiyya.

Ibn Khaldun's descriptionof the bedouins oscillates between admirationand condemnation.He praises the social cohesion of the bedouins and their military might. These two qualities allow the bedouins to play the role of founders of dynasties. However, these same qualities, in his opinion, predisposed the bedouins to destroy civilization. Ibn Khaldun'simages of the bedouins appealto some contributors al-Jazrraal-'Arabiyyaas they provide a frameworkfor the to of modern Saudi history and the rise of the Wahhabimovement, which analysis so far condemned the Shi'a and depicted them as ahl al-bida' (innovators). Above all, Ibn Khaldun's emphasis on the importanceof the alliance between religion and bedouin casabiyyaas a foundationfor dynasticrule seems to explain the establishmentof the Saudi state. Moreover the concept of 'asabiyya is used to analyse the dominationof the Najdi elite over other groups in modern Saudi Arabia. In a leaderarticle,Abdullahal-Hasancriticizes the regime for promotingtribal 'asabiyya and for promoting regionalism and sectarianism at the expense of developing a unifying national and religious identity in the country. Above all, he emphasizes the cultural, political and religious domination of Najd and its Saudi-Wahhabi allies over the rest of the Arabian Peninsula, including the EasternProvince, the Hijaz and Asir.19In his view, a Najdi identity, (al-hawiyya al-najdiyya) did not crystallize until the rise of the Wahhabi movement in the eighteenth century. Until that date, the 'Najdis' consisted of bedouin tribes whose internal cohesion compensated for lack of overarchingidentity. While bedouins resented and despised the city dwellers of the oases and cities of the Hijaz and the Easternprovince, the latterreciprocatedand regardedthe bedouins as 'uncivilized', 'poor' and 'in a state of savagery'. This line of argumentclearly reiteratesthe famous Ibn Khaldunianmodel and uncriticallyadoptsits premises. the Abdullahal Hasan concludes that the Wahhabimovement transformed Najdi bedouins and gave them a unity which they used as a weapon against othertribal Najd. This was later perpetuated groups and city dwellers, in areas surrounding consistent Saudi policies to marginalizeimportantregional identities in the by
19Al-Jazrra al-'Arabiyya, 16 (1992), pp. 12-18.

126

THE SHI'A OF SAUDI ARABIA

Hijaz where a more established tradition of sedentarizationand civility had Shi'a population.In his existed and in al Hasa, especially among the agricultural a geographical schism between al-ddkhil (the interior, i.e. Najd) and opinion, al-sahil (the coastal areas) was transformedinto a political and social schism whereby the Najdi populationand its ruling religio-political elite enforced their dominationover the rest of the countrythanksto the power of Wahhabidogma. Again Ibn Khaldun's emphasis on the crucial role of religious ideology is reiteratedhere. The legacy of Ibn Khaldunpermeatesother articles in the magazine. Tawfiq al Sheikh asserts a patternin modern Saudi history whereby the rise of Saudi hegemony was accompaniedby a deliberate attemptto destroy al-madfna (the He city) not only physically but socially and culturally,especially in the Hijaz.20 states that 'the fall of Jiddahto the bedouin forces of King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud in January1926 representsthe unofficial collapse of civility and the triumphof the bedouin way of life, which became the dominantforce between the Red Sea and the ArabianGulf'.21 While acknowledgingthat Ibn Saud was not a bedouin (his ancestorshad been settled first in Deraiyya and later in Riyadh), he asserts that the bedouin social organizationand ethos were too strong to subdue. He argues that Ibn Saud's failure to attractthe allegiance of city dwellers led to his reliance on al-badiya (the bedouins) for the consolidation of his rule. This resulted in the triumph of the 'bedouin/tribalmodel of social and political relations', which was transformed into a state ideology insensitive to the identities of cities and their culturalheritage. One of the consequences of this triumph, in al Sheikh's view, was the marginalizationof al muthaqqaf, the intellectual, a productof city life. Al Sheikh observes that this marginalization was severe not only in the Hijaz but also in al Hasa, both of which had important intellectual traditions.According to al Sheikh, the consolidation of the Saudi state in the thirties led to the reduction of intellectual activities because of the flight of intellectualsto other countriesor their retreatand isolation in their own cities. It is clear that al Sheikh's analysis of the alleged dwindling of intellectual life in Saudi Arabiaimmediatelyafter the establishmentof the state is attributed to the triumphof the bedouins-who were considered a menace to civilization in Ibn Khaldun's thesis. While intellectuals are regardedas the first victims to have fallen after the triumphof the 'bedouins', other articles hold the success of the bedouin ethos responsible for the absence of an influential political elite in Saudi Arabia. Accordingto al Sheikh, reasonsfor this include the dominationof tribalideology and the failure of Ibn Saud to transformthe social and political organizationof his bedouin entourage.In his view, such organizationdepends on the leadership of the tribal sheikh, za'im al-qabila and excludes other centres of authority.He asserts that 'Ibn Saud enforced bedouin leadershipand never gave his advisors and ministers any real power to enable them to rise above their role as
20
21

Ibid., 18 (1992), pp. 10-14.


Ibid., p. 11.

127

MADAWI AL-RASHEED

He assistants'.22 cites the example of Abullah al Suleiman,the influentialfinance who served Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud for several years, but was not able minister, to sustain a political position after the latter's death and the succession of his of son, King Saud. Al Sheikh considers this case as a demonstration the bedouin of government, which inhibits the development of alternative political style leadership,especially that with no tribal foundation. The reiterationof some concepts in Ibn Khaldun'sanalysis of Islamic history This is not seem to appeal to al-Jazira al-'Arabiyyaand its various contributors. surprising given Ibn Khaldun's views on Islamic history and disparaging descriptionof nomadic tribal society. These are especially attractiveto the Shi'a intellectuals and opposition leaders, who belong to a community distinguished by its history of sedentarizationand agriculturalproduction. Historically the Shi'a were not only members of a religious minority among a Sunni majority, but were also agricultural farmers.The social hierarchiesof Arabiadistinguished between hadar and badw. The asfl tribes, who were often nomadic, despised the sedentaryfarmers,regardingthem as non-tribalor people who had fallen out of the tribal system even though the sedentary population of the oases included sections of importantasfl tribes. Therefore,the Shi'a experienceddiscrimination not only on the basis of their faith and practices, but also on the basis of their Articles in the magazine addressedthis livelihood (farmingand sedentarization). double discriminationby a subtle reiteration of the famous Ibn Khaldunian model. Like Ibn Khaldun,contributors associate sedentarization with civilization and intellectualactivity. Their narrativesequate the bedouin with barbarismand savagery. One contributoron the political system of the Gulf states argues that these states can be describedas 'oligarchies,whereby the rule of the minorityis dominant. Al-takhalluf, 'backwardness' was one of the reasons behind the predominance of oligarchies, sustained by the fact that the majority of the populationof the region consisted of nomadicbedouins who were poor, ignorant and unrelatedto civilization'.23 The magazine provided a forum for highlighting the theme of regional identity, not only that of the Shi'a, but also that of other groups such as the Hijazis, which are believed to have been undermined by siyasat al-tanjtd, "Najdization',a reference to the supremacyof Najd and its ruling group over other communities in Saudi Arabia. Muhammad al Hussein questions Saudi official representationsof this supremacy-'delivering the rest of the Arabian His interpretationdeconPeninsula from political and moral degeneration'24 structsthis official 'myth', by emphasizingthat the present unity of the regions is based on two pillars, so far endorsed by the Al-Saud: 'asabiyya najdiyya (Najdi solidarity)and 'asabiyyamadhhabiyya(sectariansolidarity).This resulted in an imposed unity and dependency to the detriment of local autonomy and Above all, 'the so-called unificationof Saudi Arabiareplaced regional character.
22 Ibid., 17, p. 6. 23 Ibid., 5 (1991), p. 38. 24 18 24-30.

Ibid.,

(1992), pp.

128

THE SHI'A OF SAUDI ARABIA

the traditionaleconomic and social interdependenceby utter dependency on Najd and its population which began to occupy an unequal position vis-a-vis other areas and local communities'.25 The rhetoric of this argumentcentres on the concepts of taba'iyya, saytara, and ilhaq, (subordination,hegemony, and annexation)all pointing to the political and social inequalitybetween Najd and the rest of the country.The text concludes by highlightingthe potentialthreatof division (al-taqsTm) which is believed to follow such inequality.The solution in the author'sview lies in a genuine attemptby the ruling groupto introducewider political participationwhich takes into account regional interests, cultural and religious specificity, and local political and economic aspirations.Moreover,this would involve the revival of mujtama' al-madaniyya (civil society) which is most conducive to the development of urban culture and intellectual pursuits. According to the same source, 'Najdization'has underminedthe urbanityof the Hijaz and al Hasa in favour of the Najdi bedouin solidarity. However, thereremainsthe problemof accountingfor the rise of the Wahhabi movement and its consequences for the Shi'a community. Some of the articles in al-JazLra al-'Arabiyyadirectly criticizedthe Wahhabireligious establishment, in particular head of the Wahhabi 'ulamd', Sheikh Abdul Aziz Ibn Baz. The the of criticism revolved aroundthe rigid interpretations Wahhabism,its refusal to adaptto moderntechnologicaland social change and its resistanceto new ijtihdd As (interpretations). the Shi'a clergy and their specific version of Islam represent an area totally rejectedby Wahhabism,the magazine also endeavouredto refute stereotypicalimages of the communitywhich the Saudi-Wahhabiestablishment had been promotingto discredit Shicsm. The picture of the 'Blind Sheikh' has become the caricatureto representIbn Baz, the spokesmanof official Islam, on the pages of the magazine. It is worthnoting that both the magazineand the editorialboardbehind it tried to build bridges with anotherIslamist movement in the country-that criticizing the regime from within the Wahhabiestablishment.Since the Gulf War in 1991 the so-called salafiyyun, a dissident group of young Wahhabi 'ulamd' and university studentshave been very active in reaching the Saudi public through faxes, petitions, cassettes and Friday sermons.26Their main criticism of the government originated with its use of foreign troops to defend the 'land of Islam'. Their demands revolve around reform and return to the doctrines of Wahhabismand the rejection of the corruptionof the ruling group. While some of the demands of the Wahhabi salafiyyun correspond to those of the ShiCa a communityand its representatives, wide gulf still separatesthe two opposition groups. The Shi'a community is still considered to be made up of 'kuffdr' (infidels) and 'mubdi'un'(innovators)by both the official Wahhabiestablishment and the dissident group within it. The history of propagandaagainst Shi'sm and
Ibid, pp. 24-30. For furtherdetails on the Wahhabidissidents, see H. Dekmejian, 'The Rise of Political Islamism in Saudi Arabia,' The Middle East Journal, 48(4) (1994), pp. 628-643; and M. Abir, SaudiArabia Government, Society and the Gulf Crisis (London:Routledge, 1993). For an analysis of the Islamist discourse, see M. Al-Rasheed, 'Saudi Arabia's Islamic Opposition,' CurrentHistory, 95(597) (1996), pp. 16-22.
26

25

129

MADAWI AL-RASHEED

the theological differences that exist between the two branches are difficult to reconcile. This makes any serious co-operation between members of the two oppositions almost inconceivable at present. This description of the main themes developed in al-Jazfra al-'Arabiyya demonstratesthat they rely on a specific interpretation Saudi history, politics of and society. This interpretationdraws heavily on Ibn Khaldunian concepts, specifically his descriptionof bedouin society. His views seem to correspondto the Shi'a's political agenda,which remainscritical of Saudi hegemony. From the Shi'a perspective, the so-called bedouin style of government resulted in the of marginalization important regions and groups, including the Shi'a while at the same time failing to establish a modern national identity in which they can be incorporatedas equal citizens. In their view, equality for the Shi'a involves above all recognition of their culturaland religious heritage. The search for this recognition seems to underlie the historiography of their intellectuals. The that Shi'a discourse goes beyond the demandfor following section demonstrates political rights as it tries to establish an authenticcultural,historical and social space for the community in Saudi society. A Minority in Search of Cultural Authenticity Today the Shi'a oppositioncalls for democracyand pluralism,having abandoned their previous discourse on Islamic revolution, militant action and extremism. Their main focus is no longer 'the tyrannical aspects of the Saudi regime'. Instead,the leadershipinvokes the discourse of human rights and the respect of religious and culturaldiversity in the country.This has been accompaniedby an emphasis on the centrality of al-asala al-shl'iyya (Shi'a cultural authenticity). Al-asala comes from the Arabic asl meaning root or origin. In recent Shi'a historical narratives, asala incorporates not only historical roots, but also hawiyya,identity.When Shi'a intellectualstalk about their asala, they invoke an authenticidentity rooted in Arab culture and history. Hamza al-Hasan's historical narrativeis permeatedby references to al-asala al-shl'iyya. In fact, the purpose of the narrativeis to prove this asala using historical evidence including local oral narratives,oral and written literature, Arab and European sources and archival data. His narrativestresses from the very beginning the objectives of its author-namely to prove the Arab identity of the Shi'a, a counterclaim to Saudi-Wahhabipropaganda which portraysthem as a Persian satellite in the Arabian Peninsula. Al-Hasan declares that this historical study of his own community aims first to introduce the authentic history, cultureand identity of the Saudi Shi'a, which in his opinion are omitted from Saudi narratives as if 'they do not exist', and second to highlight the discriminationto which the Shi'a are subjected under Saudi rule, described as promoting sectariandivisions among the population of the country.27 In his search for authenticityand a respectableand equal status for the Shi'a
27

Al-Hasan, al-Shla, I, pp. 7-10.

130

THE SHIA OF SAUDI ARABIA

within Saudi Arabia, al Hasan criticises official historical representations of themselves, which have dominated the teaching of history in the country. He laments the absence of the Shi'a from Saudi official history textbooks, which are taught in their local schools and also elsewhere in the country. He resents the fact that if ever they are mentioned, they are depicted as examples of ahl al-bida' 'innovators' who deviate from true Islam. This absence from history and their misrepresentation have given rise to his attempt to rewrite their own regional history, especially that of the al Hasa, where the majority of the Shi'a community live. As official narratives deny the Shi'a a position in history, he constructs counter-historical narratives whereby they are reintroduced into history as active agents with a separate, but not totally alien, regional identity. In the first volume, the opening chapter entitled 'The Shi'a of Saudi Arabia: identity, history, and people' forcibly argues that the Shi'a are 'true Muslims'. Al Hasan invokes the badw-hadar divide to demonstrate that their faith and practices are authentic and in line with mainstream Islam. He claims that while the religiosity of the nomads has always been 'doubted' by Saudi-Wahhabi discourse, the Shi'a have a history of sedentary existence and agricultural labour, both believed to be suitable conditions for practising Islam and observing its obligations and rituals. Al Hasan's work presents the origins of the Shi'a community as dating back to the times of the Prophet Muhammad. He lists the major Shi'a families in al-Hasa, Qatif and the Hijaz, while acknowledging the fact that Shi'a tribal origins cannot be easily traced because the community had been settled in towns, oases and cities longer than the rest of the population of Saudi Arabia. Sedentarization was accompanied by the weakening of tribal allegiances and marked genealogies. This combined with the fact that Shi'a Islam constituted the main bond uniting these sedentary communities led to the dissolution of tribal identities, which are now replaced by allegiance to Shiism. Al-Hasan's justification for the absence of extended tribal genealogies among the Shi'a is important in a country where tribal identities are still crucial in determining people's status, and access to resources and power. However, he clearly states that the absence of tribal genealogies among the Shi'a should not lead to doubting their 'Arabness'. In his opinion, the Shi'a are 'Arab in origin. They belong to two branches: one branch originated from the ancient Arab tribes in the pre-Islamic period such as 'Abd Qais, Bakr, and Way'l. Another branch consisted of the bedouin tribes who settled in the Eastern Province after they adopted Shi'ism'.28 He later concludes that Arab and foreign sources agree that the Shi'a of the al Hasa and Qatif have Arab origin and that they are the initial inhabitants of the land since ancient times'.29 In his opinion this should refute what he calls 'rumours' to discredit the Shi'a by claiming that they are not Arabs. Further evidence is given to establish the indigenous identity of the Shi'a. Al28
29

Ibid., p. 27. Ibid., p. 28.

131

MADAWI AL-RASHEED

Hasan dismisses the claim that because the Shi'a's dialect resembles Iraqi This resemblanceis dialect, one should conclude that they originatedin Iraq.30 interpretedas a function of the theological and religious links that the Saudi Shi'a had maintainedwith the Iraqi centres of religious learning. He points out that 'as most Shi'a 'ulamd' study in the religious centres of Iraq, their dialect is bound to resemble that of their teachers'.31 Their dialect in his opinion remains familiar to the rest of the population of the Arabian Peninsula. He asks the question: 'how can a bedouin assess the dialect of the Shi'a on the basis of which we conclude that they are of mixed or foreign origin?' From this explorationof the question of origin and dialect, al-Hasan stresses that the Shi'a are an indigenous group well rooted in the ArabianPeninsula, a claim counteringthat of the state, which has continued to propagatethat the Shi'a have their origins in neighbouringcountries, mainly Iraq and Iran. Al-Hasan also addressesthe lack of official census data on the basis of which one can reach an accurateestimate of the size of the Shi'a community.He argues that the size of the Shi'a population is a political issue rather than a mere statistical concern. In his opinion, the reluctance of the Saudi government to provide an accurate estimate of its population is a reflection of its general insecurity. This is particularlyrelevant to the Shi'a given the fact that their region is the primary area for oil in the country. Therefore, it is in the government's interest to underestimatetheir number and reduce them to the status of an insignificant minority. After a survey of many Western and Arab sources, he estimates a community of 2.5 million, thus representing12.5-25% of the total population;32 is worth noting here that this figure exceeds most It available estimates. The rest of al-Hasan's first volume is a detailed analysis of the history of the community between 1871 and 1913, highlighting the various Saudi attemptsto subjugatethe Shi'a and the discriminationwhich resulted from their incorporation in the first and second Saudi dynasties. At the same time, his account celebratesthe intellectualdevelopments,mainly in literatureand theology which flourishedamong the Shi'a at that time: a reiterationof the theme developed on the pages of al-Jazira al-'Arabiyyawhich associates sedentarylife with intellectual activity. Here it seems that al-asala al-shPiyya is not only anchoredin the community's ancient Arab roots but is also sustained by their contributionto turath 'heritage'. Al-Hasan argues that 'under Ottoman influence in the last decades of the nineteenth century, religious freedom prevailed. This allowed Shi'a intellectuals and theologians to study and produce important religious He treatiseand interpretations'.33 praises the Turksfor not imposing their Hanafi
30 Ibid., p. 31. 31 Ibid, p.31.. 32

It is difficultto give an accurateestimateof the size of the Shi'a community.Goldbergarguesthatone stumbles across figuresrangingfrom the most reserved,275,000-400,000, to the most optimistic,500,000. He considers the Shi'a to represent6% of the Saudi population.See Goldberg, 'The Shi'i Minority', p. 230. This figure may not include the Shi'a of the Hijaz. In this region, al Khoei estimates that 32,000 Shi'a live in Madinaand Wadi al-Fara.See Y. al Khoei, 'The Shi'a of Medina,' Dialogue (July 1996), pp. 4-5. 33 Al-Hasan, al-Shfa, p. 227.

132

THE SHI'A OF SAUDI ARABIA

on religious interpretations the populationof the EasternProvince and contrasts this situation with the restrictions that the Wahhabis introduced as they succeeded the Ottomans in the area. The Turks are also praised for establishing schools in the region as early as 1900. A numerationof Shi'a intellectuals and literary figures follows to establish evidence for the intellectual, literary and religious heritage of the community. One of the most interestingaccounts in al-Hasan'swork is his reinterpretation of the incorporationof the al Hasa region in the Saudi realm at the beginning of the twentieth century. He deals with this theme in a chapter, entitled 'The critical moment ... before the occupation 1912-1913'. The title is significantas it is a clear declarationof how he understandsthe incorporationof the Shi'a territoryinto the modern Saudi state. While official narrativesdescribe this as a function of a 'unification'process, al-Hasan's counter-narrative labels it as the of 1913. Al-Hasan dismisses the Saudi justification, described in 'occupation' Ibn Saud's words as 'a restorationof my ancestor's historical rights over this territory',by showing that in the nineteenth century Saudi hegemony over al Hasa lasted only for 31 years and was disrupted by various local revolts. According to al-Hasan,Ibn Saud's 'ancestralclaim' does not representa sound argument.Similarly, Saudi claims that they enteredal Hasa on the basis of local complaintswhich invited them to rescue the populationfrom Turkishrule echoes the well-established official story which depicts Saudi unification as rescuing local communities from the pervasive state of 'moral, social and political degeneration',an argumentwhich is used in relationnot only to al Hasa, but also to all regions which, in subsequentyears, became part of Saudi Arabia.34 Al Hasan's second volume deals with the consequences of the Saudi 'occupation' of the EasternProvince. Here the narrativefocuses on how this resulted in enforcing tai'ifiyya 'sectarianism',which has guided the Saudi regime's policy towardsthe Shi'a since 1913. He argues that Wahhabidogma depicted the Shi'a as a .ta'ifa sect, outside the realm of Islam. This was adoptedby the Saudis and was translatedinto various forms of discrimination.For example, he lists cases therebythe Shi'a were excluded from employmentin educationalinstitutionsand the army.He also points to how they are excluded from high rankingjobs within the oil company, ARAMCO. The appropriation Shi'a land by various Saudi of princes is interpretedas depriving the Shi'a of their territoryand threatening their livelihood. Discriminationalso includes the ban on building Shi'a mosques and centres of religious learning.35The narrative is full of cases of named individuals who have been discriminatedagainst on the basis of their Shi'ism, thus adding a personaldimension to this historicalaccount. Shi'a individualsare depictedas people whose life underSaudi rule is a continuousstruggle.They are victims of Wahhabiprejudiceand its Saudi enforcement.However, the narrative also portraysthe Shi'a as people who resist. They have not remainedsilent in the face of discrimination.Their resistance has manifested itself in various ways
34Ibid., p. 227. 35 Ibid., II, pp. 286-369.

133

MADAWI AL-RASHEED

ranging from letters to princes, petitions to local governors, and open confrontation with the governmentthroughdemonstrationsand revolts. The narrativeoutlines the history of Shi'a military resistance in the Eastern Province and Saudi violence against it. Imprisonment,torture, terminationof employment, and exile are described as daily occurrences in the lives of the Shi'a. However, in this account, the threatenedShi'a individual and community emerge as both victims and survivors. Continuous oppression results in the solidification of their identity and the crystallisationof their demand for equal on the basis of which they deserve recognition. Al-Hasan also deals with the relationshipbetween the Shi'a opposition and other opposition groups in Saudi Arabia.While al-JazTra al-'Arabiyyaincluded references to the development of the salafiyyun as mentioned earlier in this article, al-Hasan'sbook offers a direct critiqueof it. He argues that 'they remain narrowin their focus and radical in their world view which does not accommodate that of the Shi'a. The salafiyyunclaim monopoly over the truthand have a tendency to impose their views on others'.36In his opinion, the Shi'a and this opposition differ in their interpretationof political, religious and intellectual freedoms. According to him, 'the Shi'a insist on general freedoms to be granted to communities such as theirs whereas the salafiyyun's demand for increased freedoms in the country is not generalised to include those of the Shi'a'.37 Examples of these differences are drawn from the various opinions of activists and 'ulamd' who are associated with the Wahhabisalafiyyan and have not been sympatheticto the Shi'a, such as Juhayman,the leader of the 1979 siege of the Mecca Mosque, Sheikh Salman al'Awdah, outspoken young Wahhabireligious scholar whose anti-government preachingduring the Gulf Crisis of 1991 led to his imprisonment,and Safar al Hawli, Dean of Islamic Studies at Umm al Qura University in Mecca whose critical treatise of the government also led to his imprisonment.These anti-governmentculama' share a consensus regardingthe Shi'a. They continue to describe them as rawcfid 'rejectionists', 'allies of Khomenei and Iran', and kuffdr 'infidels'. He concludes that 'our salafiyyun brothers must pay attention to the religious and social diversity of the Saudi population. Co-operationwith them at the present is not possible before they adopt the principle of mutualrespect and above all the respect of the opinion of those who do not agree with them'.38 Al-Hasan's criticism of the salafiyyin confirms the observationthat since the early 1990s the Shi'a opposition has been trying to distance itself from radicalism by adopting the rhetoric of pluralism, diversity, dialogue, and mutual respect. Both al-Hasan's historical narrativeand al-Jazrraal-'Arabiyyaseem to projectan image of the Shi'a as a communitysearchingfor a political and social position in Saudi Arabia founded on respect of their cultural uniqueness as a
36

status as an authentic indigenous group. What has been maintained is their asala,

37
38

Ibid., p. 402.

Ibid., p. 402. Ibid., p. 410.

134

THE SHI'A OF SAUDI ARABIA

minority.To argue like Goldbergthat the Shi'a of Saudi Arabiahave abandoned their confrontational attitudeto the Saudi regime as they shifted their revolutiondiscourse and demandsto one which concentrateson concrete economic and ary social demandsdoes not fully describethe situationamong the Saudi Shi'a in the 1990s.39It is true that no serious confrontationwith the state has taken place since 1980-a fact which Goldbergregardsas an evidence to supporthis claim that the Shi'a have been successfully pacified by the state. However, this article has shown that the contestationhas moved away from overt riots, demonstrations, and violence to one which is fought at the culturallevel. Shi'a opposition publicationsand intellectual activity, discussed above, demonstratethat dealing with Shi'a socio-economic problems cannot alone fully pacify the community. While development projects may bring about tangible amelioration in life conditions, a serious change in attitudes towards this minority remains a preconditionfor their integrationinto Saudi society as citizens with equal rights. As long as Wahhabi dogma continues to be propagatedby the radical interpretersof Islam (an activity which so far has not been fully curbedor controlled by the state), the Shi'a will remain sceptical about the long-term benefits of regularor haphazardstate economic handouts.While Shi'a intellectuals remain active in the rigorous productionof counter-cultural claims, motivated by their for asala, it cannot be said that this problem,which has worriedthe state search since its creationand the discovery of oil in the heartof the Shi'a homeland,has been resolved. The starting point of Shi'a intellectual activity is the deconstructionof the well-establishedofficial vision of society and history, which has so far negated the authenticity of the Shi'a as an indigenous Muslim community. Shi'a challenges this official vision as partof their resistance.The Shi'a historiography have taken the lead in making their own history. Al-Hasan's two volumes represent an experiment in applying historical research and methodology to political ends. The authorinforms his reader that his work is a reaction to the informed by As 'discourse of misrepresentation'. such it is a counter-narrative, both the historical record of outsiders, found in archives and in Western and Arab literature,and the oral testimony of the community itself. As a Shi'a, he has access to the Shi'a oral tradition.In this narrative,the past, the origins, the dialect, the suffering, the survival and the resistance of the Shi'a merge to form an identity, which privileges the voices of those who had been silenced. The search for cultural authenticity is a fixation that permeates the text at every juncture. Responses to the Shift Shi'a oppositiondiscourse shifted from an insistence on the un-Islamicnatureof the Saudi regime to one which increasingly stresses the need for democratization. According to Shi'a spokesman,Tawfiq al-Sheikh, this means 'a redistribu39 J. Goldberg, 'The Shi'i Minority', passim.

135

MADAWI AL-RASHEED

tion of economic and political power among the different regions which make The exiled Shi'a leadershipmoved from total rejection of the up the country'.40 the time when the movement was 'revolutionary'(i.e. immediregime during ately after the events of the early 1980s)-to a call for dialogue with the state. In the 1990s, the leadershiphas called for gradualchange and reformratherthan revolution. The change in Shi'a oppositiondiscoursehas been welcomed by the state. The latterrespondedby inviting the exiled oppositionleadershipto come back to the country. The initiator of dialogue with the Shi'a exiled opposition was the According to the Shi'a present Saudi ambassadorto London Ghazi al-Guseibi.41 opposition, since al-Guseibi's appointmentin London, he has been trying to build channels of communicationwith their leadership.In September 1993, his efforts succeeded in containing the opposition and the return of some of its leading figures to Saudi Arabia. The invitation was accompanied by further promises for investment in the EasternProvince, the creation of new economic opportunitiesand a general relaxationof the rules governing their presence such as the ban on building Shi'a Mosques and the celebration and excessive The government mourningduring special Shi'a religious festivals and rituals.42 promised the release of some Shi'a political prisoners and issued passports to those in exile in orderto enable them to returnto Saudi Arabia. The invitation was dependenton the leadership'scommitmentto terminatingthe publicationof their magazine, al-Jazira al-'Arabiyya. The London based Shi'a opposition accepted the invitation and sent representativesto Saudi Arabia to continue the process of negotiation with the government. Other members remain in exile because of the mistrust which has been nourished over the years between the opposition and the state. From the opposition's perspective,the reconciliationis interpretedas a success; now that the state has been forced to open channels of communicationwith them. However, from the state's point of view, this was the first move in the direction of encapsulatingan opposition at a crucial moment when the Wahhabiestablishmenthas generatedits own opposition to the state. The Shi'a leadership, however, continues to propagatethe idea that the publication of their magazine is 'suspended' ratherthan permanentlyterminated. The shift in Shi'a tactics and its welcome by the government need to be understoodwithin the changing political context of Saudi Arabia in the 1990s. This new political context has influenced both the Shi'a opposition and the policies of the government towards them. Two main interrelatedfactors have been crucial: first the Gulf War and its political ramificationsand second the rising influence of the Wahhabi dissident movement during the war, both of which createdunprecedented upheavalsin a countryconsideredone of the most stable regions in the Middle East by outside observers. Until the early 1990s, political unrest in Saudi Arabia was not comparableto that experiencedin, say,
40 The Independent,3 March 1992. 41
42

Interviewwith Hamza al Hasan and Abdul Amir Musa, 1993. Details of the reconciliationarein L. Al-Rasheed, 'L'OppositionChiiteen ArabieSaoudite,'UnpublishedMA dissertation,Ecole d'Etudes Politiques, Paris, 1994.

136

THE SHI'A OF SAUDI ARABIA

Egypt or Algeria. With the exception of the seizure of the Mecca Mosque in 1979 and Shi'a riots in the EasternProvince in the early 1980s, serious violence and political unrest have not been regular occurrencesin Saudi Arabia.43 The Gulf War and the failure of the Saudi governmentto resolve the conflict with Iraq peacefully, exposed the precariousness of this apparent stability. New opposition forces began to take shape. These originatedmainly from within the Wahhabiestablishmentand became identifiedas the new Islamists, thus bringing Saudi Arabiain line with the rising tide of political Islam in the region. 'Ulamd' followpetitions, criticalFridaysermonsby young preachersand demonstrations ing the arrestof some activists were events which accompaniedthe progress of the military campaigns in the Eastern Province against Saddam Hussein.44 Negotiations with the Shi'a came at a crucial moment when their region was to receive thousands of foreign troops, invited by the government to defend the 'land of Islam' despite serious objections from some members of the religious The negotiations were to demonstrate the good will of the establishment.45 government and its intention to deal with discriminationagainst this minority whose territoryhad become the seat of a majorinternational conflict. The Shi'a on government insecurity during the war. It altered its opposition capitalized image by distancing itself from extremism and elicited a favourable response from the state. The reconciliation with the Shi'a can also be interpretedas a pre-emptive strike by the government to prevent the possibility of the Shi'a opposition joining forces with the Wahhabi dissident, even if this remained a remote possibility given the wide political and religious differences between the two Both the Shi'a opposition and the Wahhabidissidents were unable oppositions.46 to entertain any pragmatic alliance which would have overcome their wide differences. From the Shi'a perspective, any scores gained by the so-called neo-Wahhabimovement would be detrimentalto the survival of the Shi'a in Saudi Arabia because their 'ulamd' and activists seemed to continue the propagandawar against them. Al-JazTra al-'Arabiyya's coverage of the rising influence of this oppositionand al-Hasan'sdirectcriticism of it highlightedShi'a fears and apprehensionregardingthe new dissidents. However, the government
al Mecca, see A. al YassiniAl-D[nwa al-DawlafifalMamlakaal-'Arabiyya Sa'udiyya(London: Dar al Saqi 1987). 44 On the activities of the Wahhabidissidents, see M. Al-Rasheed, 'Saudi Arabia'sIslamic Opposition'and M. Abir, Saudi Arabia Government,Society and the Gulf Crisis (London:Routledge, 1993). 45For example, Sheikh Salman al-Awdah,a young Wahhabireligious scholarrefused to sanctionthe invitation of foreign troops in his Fridaysermons.He arguedthat it is un-Islamicto fight an evil with the aid of a greater evil (WahhabiOppositionCassette).The same opinion was reiteratedby Sheikh Safaral Hawli in his treatiseto Sheikh Ibn Baz, entitled,Kashfal-GhammaCan 'ulamd'al-umma(The Unveilingof the 'Ulamd's Distress) (Dar al-Hikma,1991). For a detailed discussion of the Wahhabi 'ulamd'sreactionto the invitationof foreign troops, see M. Al-Rasheed, 'La couronneet le turban.L'Etat Saoudiena la recherched'une nouvelle legitimitdapres la and (eds) guerredu Golf,' in B. Qudmani-Darwish M. Chartouni-Dubarry Les EtatsArabesFace a la Contestation Islamiste (Paris:ArmandColin, 1997), pp. 71-97. 46 The Shi'a opposition draws on the variousfatawd, 'religious opinions', issued by members of the Wahhabi dissident movement regardingthe status of the Shi'a; these Fatawds are referredto and criticized in Hamza al Hasan's book. See al Hasan, al-Shi'a, p. 410.
43 On the events in

137

MADAWI AL-RASHEED

could not rule out any overtures between the Shi'a and at least the moderate branches of the Wahhabi dissident movement. So far the containmentof the Shi'a opposition has lessened the government'sfears and allowed it to direct all its attention to the Wahhabi challenge. The Shi'a opposition abandoned its previous revolutionaryrhetoricand adopted subtle forms of resistance fought at the level of culture.This is a transitionperiod which began in 1993, and it is too early to predict whether the Shi'a will be satisfied in the long term. It remains to be seen whetherthe position of the Shi'a as equal citizens will be established without major restructuring Saudi politics and widening of political particiof Until then, theirjournalisticnarrativesand historiography pationin the country.47 represent latent resistance against persistent domination. Their 'hidden tranthan scripts' may prove to be more efficient weapons againsttheir discrimination overt aggression,the cost of which remainsintolerablyhigh for the community.

47 It is perhapspremature assess the implicationsof the recentreformsintroducedby the governmentafterthe to Gulf War, especially the implementation majlis al-shura 'ConsultativeCouncil' on the Shi'a community.So of farthe Wahhabidissidentmovementhas not been silenced by these reforms.The appointment a Shi'a member of to the council was considereda sign of goodwill by the Shi'a opposition.On the implicationsof the government's recentreforms,see R. Aba Namay, 'Constitutional Reforms:A Systemizationof SaudiPolitics', Journalof South Asian and MiddleEasternStudies,XVI(3) (Spring,1993), pp. 43-88, andA. Cordesman, SaudiArabia Guarding the Desert Kingdom(Boulder:Westview Press, 1997), pp. 19-27.

138

You might also like