Case # 1 (Conjugal Partnership, Absence of Ante-Nuptial Agreement) Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Fisher G.R. No.

L-11622, 28 January 1961 Facts: Walter Stevenson (born in Phils, of British parents, married in Mnla in 1909 to British subject Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson) died on Feb1951 in Sn Francisco, Cali., in permanent residence established with wife. He instituted his wife, who later assigned all her rights and interests to Fisher spouses in Dec 1952, as sole heiress to real & personal properties acquired by them while residing in Phil. Total gross of assets was P130,792.83. Ancillary administration proceedings in the Court of 1st Instance of Mnla were instituted to settle the estate in the Philippines. Ian Murray Scott was appointed ancillary administrator of the estate. He filed a preliminary inheritance and tax return with the reservation of having the properties declared finally appraised at values 6mos. after the death of Stevenson. On Sept 1952, estate and inheritance tax return was amended to avail of the right granted bysection 91 of NIR Code. There was a change in price per share of stock, the ancillary administrator based it on the quotation of the stock obtaining at the San Francisco Stock Exchange. He also made claim to deductions for funeral expenses, judicial expenses and others. On Sept 1953, he filed a second amended estate and inheritance tax return. It contained new claims for additional exemptions and deductions: 4,000 deduction from gross estate of decedent provided by Sec.861, no.4, US Fedl Internl Rev. Code, made allowable by way of reciprocity granted by Sec.122, NIR Code); other exemptions granted by reciprocity proviso. Refund of amount of 15, 259.83 allegedly overpaid was requested by the estate and denied by the Collector. Pursuant to Act No.1125, action commenced in Court of 1st Instance was forwarded to Court of Tax Appeals. Issues: 1. Wether or not one-half of the net estate should be deducted in determining the taxable net estate of the decedent as Beatrice Mauricias share in accordance with our law on conjugal partnership andsection 89 of the NIR Code 2. Wether or not estate can avail of inheritance and estate taxes on shares of stock in Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc., granted by reciprocity proviso in sec122, NIR Held: Decision affirmed with modifications. 1. Yes. In the absence of ante-nuptial agreement, the contracting parties are presumed to have adopted the system of conjugal partnership as to the properties acquired during their marriage. Since the marriage took place in 1909, Article 1325( not Art.124 of NCC which became effective only in 1950), adhering to the nationality theory of determining the property relation of spouses where one is a foreigner and there are no prior arrangements is the applicable law. However, in the instant case, both spouses are foreigners who married in the Philippines. Therefore, The law determining the Stevenson property relation is the English law, which must be presumed to be the same as our law since there is an absence of proof otherwise (processual presumption, p699). More importantly, property relations of spouses as distinguished from successional rights of spouses is governed differently by the specific and express provisions of Title VI, Chapter I of NCC. 2. No. There is no total reciprocity between the Philippines and the state of California in that while the former exempts payment of both estate and inheritance taxes on intangible properties, the latter only exempts the payment of inheritance.

Bellis vs Bellis #2 20 scra 358 Nationality Principle Amos Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas, and of the United States. By his first wife whom he divorced he had five legitimate children, by his second wife, who survived him, he had three legitimate children, and three illegitimate children. Before he died, he made two wills, one disposing of his Texas properties and the other disposing his Philippine properties. In both wills, his illegitimate children were not given anything. The illegitimate children opposed the will on the ground that they have been deprived of their legitimes to which they should be entitled, if Philippine law were to be applied. ISSUE: Whether or not the national law of the deceased should determine the successional rights of the illegitimate children. HELD: The Supreme Court held that the said children are not entitled to their legitimes under the Texas Law, being the national law of the deceased, there are no legitimes. TANJANCO vs. COUIRT OF APPEALS #3 SYLLABI: Breach of Promise to Marry FACTS: Petitioner Apolonio Tanjanco courted respondent Araulli Santoshe expressed and professed his undying love and affection towards her which she eventually reciprocated. For one year from Dec. 1953-Dec. 1954, petitioner succeeded in having carnal access to her, because of his protestation of love and promise of marriage. She got pregnant, for which she resigned from her work as IBM secretary to avoid embarrassment. He refused to neither marry her nor give support. Thus, she filed for an action before the trial court to compel him to recognize the unborn child and provide support. The complaint was dismissed for failure to state the cause of action. Upon appeal, the CA ruled that cause of action existed for damages as premised on Art. 21. ISSUE: Whether a breach of a promise to marry is an actionable wrong. HELD: The case under Art. 21, cited as an example by the Code Commission, refers to a tort upon a minor who has been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than sexual intercourse, or a breach or promise of marriage. It connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer, to which the woman has yielded. Where for one whole year, a woman of adult age maintained intimate sexual intercourse, such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly, there is voluntariness and mutual passion. Hence, no case is made under Art. 21, and no other cause of action being alleged, no error was committed by CFI in dismissing the complaint. In US v. Bustamante, 27 Phil 121: To constitute seduction, there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no seduction. Decision of CA reversed; that of CFI affirmed.

BELTRAN VS PEOPLE #4 GR NO. 137567, JUNE 20,2000 Article 40-Family Code The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Prejudicial question FACTS: In 1973, Meynardo Beltran and Charmaine Felix married each other. Theyve had 4 children since then but after 24 years of marriage Beltran filed an action for the declaration of the nullity of their marriage due to Felixs PI. Felix countered that Beltran left the conjugal home to cohabit with a certain Milagros and that she filed a case of concubinage against Beltran. In 1997, the lower court found probable cause against Beltran and Milagros. In order to forestall the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him, Beltran raised the issue that the civil case he filed is a prejudicial question to the criminal case filed by Milagros. He said that the courts hearing the cases may issue conflicting rulings if the criminal case will not be suspended until the civil case gets resolved. The lower court denied Beltrans petition and so did Judge Tuazon of the RTC upon appeal. Beltran then elevated the case to the SC. ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of a previous marriage be invoked as a prejudicial question in the case at bar. HELD: The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of Beltrans marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. Article 40 of the Family Code provides: The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. The SC ruled that the import of said provision is that for purposes of remarriage, the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes of other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable. In a case for concubinage, the accused (Beltran) need not present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void. With regard to Beltrans argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage should his marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement that his marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense. PETITION IS DISMISSED

Case #5 Manzano vs Sanchez Manzano vs. Sanchez AM No. MTJ-001329, March 8, 2001 FACTS: Herminia Borja-Manzano was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano having been married on May 21, 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish in Caloocan. They had four children. On March 22, 1993, her husband contracted another marriage with Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. The marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were separated thus, respondent Judge ought to know that the marriage was void and bigamous. He claims that when he officiated the marriage of David and Payao, he knew that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years as manifested in their joint affidavit that they both left their families and had never cohabit or communicated with their spouses due to constant quarrels. ISSUE: Whether the solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who both have an existing marriage can contract marriage if they have been cohabitating for 5 years under Article 34 of Family Code. HELD: Among the requisites of Article 34 is that parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other. Considering that both parties has a subsisting marriage, as indicated in their marriage contract that they are both separated is an impediment that would make their subsequent marriage null and void. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least 5 years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Clearly, respondent Judge Sanchez demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage. DEDEL VS. CA #6 PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY FACTS: Petitioner David B. Dedel respondent Sharon L. Corpuz Dedel were married. The union produced four children. The conjugal partnership, nonetheless, acquired neither property nor debt. Petitioner avers that during the marriage, Sharon turned out to be an irresponsible and immature wife and mother.She had extra-marital affairs with several men: among them, Jordanian national later on sharon married and whom sharon had 2 children. sharon left her family and settled in jordan. petitioner alleged that Sharon was once confirmed in the Manila Medical City for treatment by Dr. Lourdes Lapuz, a clinical psychiatrist and despite that she did not stop her illicit affairs. petitioner filed for declaration of nullity of their marriage. it was then published in a newspaper of general circulation in the country considering that Sharon did not reside and could not be found in the Philippines. petitioner presented Dr. Dayan who testified that she conducted a psychological evaluation of petitioner and found him to be conscientious, hardworking, diligent, a perfectionist who

wants all tasks and projects completed up to the final detail and who exerts his best in whatever he does. Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social Personality Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity. Such immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the marriage like her repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her family are indications of Anti-Social Personality Disorder amounting to psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. lower court rendered Marriage declared null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent to perform the essential obligations of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. ISSUE: whether or not the totality of the evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding that respondent is psychologically incapacitated and does the aberrant sexual behavior of respondent adverted to by petitioner fall within the term psychological incapacity RULING: petition is DENIED Ratio Decidendi: Respondents sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity.At best, the circumstances relied upon by petitioner are grounds for legal separation under Article 55. Article 36 is not to be equated with legal separation in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. In short, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.

#8 About Conjugal Properties TING vs. VILLARIN Facts: On September 17, 1981, private respondent Consolidated Bank and Trust Company filed a complaint for a sum of money with prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment against Perlon Textile Mills and its directors. Roberto Ting, a director, was impleaded with his wife Dolores Lim Ting. The complaint recites that the wife was impleaded as a party defendant in order to bind their conjugal partnership of gains which allegedly benefitted from the transactions subject of the complaint. On Sept 23, 1981, respondent judge issued order to attach the estate, real & personal, of the said defendants. Petitioners filed a Motion to Quash attachment but was denied. Petitioners filed a motion fore reconsideration but was still denied. Hence, this petition. Issue: W/N a conjugal property can be a subject of preliminary attachment. Ruling: Petition Granted. The levy on attachment made are declared NULL AND VOID.

Ratio: The attached property of the spouses Ting are conjugal, the same cannot be validly brought under the painful process of attachment because: (a) First, the wife Dolores was impleaded merely because of the fact that she is the spouse of Roberto; chanrobles virtual law library (b) Second, the conjugal partnership cannot possibly be benefitted (again, here, Consolidated Bank's allegation that the act of the husband redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership is mere "book form" when the husband binds himself, as guarantor, because this act does not conserve or augment conjugal funds but instead threatens to dissipate them 12 by unnecessary and unwarranted risks to the partnership's financial stability. When the husband assumes the obligation of a guarantor, the presumption that he acts, as administrator, for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, is lost. case 9. Valdez vs. RTC psychological incapacity; what law should govern re disposition of the properties. FACTS: Antonio Valdez was married to Consuelo Gomez. Begotten during the marriage were five children. Valdes sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity to comply with their essential marital obligations. the petition was granted. The petitioner and respondent are directed to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with the provisions of Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same code, within thirty (30) days from notice of this decision. Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision directing compliance with Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code. She asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions without marriage." Parenthetically, during the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing their desire to remain with their father, Antonio Valdes, herein petitioner. ISSUE:what law should govern liquidation of properties in a void marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. HELD: In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household. When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation. In all other cases, it is not to be assumed that the law has also meant to have coincident property relations, on the one hand, between spouses in valid and voidable marriages (before annulment) and, on the other, between common-law spouses or spouses of void marriages, leaving to ordain, in the latter case, the ordinary rules on co-ownership subject to the provision of Article 147 and Article 148 of the Family Code. It must be stressed, nevertheless, even as it may merely state the obvious, that the provisions of the

Family Code on the "family home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the Family Code, remain in force and effect regardless of the property regime of the spouses. Case no. 10 MANACOP VS. CA GR No. 97898 August 11, 1997 Facts of the Case: In 1972, petitioner bought a house and lot which became their family home. Thereafter, petitioner obtained a loan from private respondent E & L Mercantile, Inc. Because petitioner failed to pay such loan, his family home was executed. Petitioner claimed that his family home was exempt from execution despite the fact that only his overseer resides therein and his family resides abroad. Private respondent contended that petitioners family home is not exempt from execution because it was not judicially constituted as a family home based on the Civil Code prior to the enactment of the Family Code on Aug. 3, 1988. Issues: 1. W/N a writ of execution issued before the effectivity of the Family Code can be executed on the family home constituted prior to the enactment of the Family Code. 2. W/N the contention of petitioner that his family home is exempt from execution because his overseer resides therein is tenable. Decision: Petition Denied. Ratio Decidendi: Art. 153, FC has no retroactive effect. Prior to Aug. 3, 1988, the procedure mandated by the Civil Code had to be followed for a family home to be constituted as such. Since the petitioners debt was incurred prior to Aug. 3, 1988 and there being no proof that the property was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as family home as required by the Civil Code, it follows that the laws (Family Code) protective mantle cannot be availed by petitioner. For purposes of discussion only to correct petitioners misconception of law: Occupancy of the family home either by the owner thereof or by any of its beneficiary must be actual. That which is actual is something real, or actually existing, as opposed to something merely possible, presumptive or constructive. Actual occupation may be made by the owner or beneficiaries by Art. 154, FC (READ). This enumeration may include the in-laws when family home is constituted jointly by the husband and wife. But the law definitely excludes maids and overseers. G.R. No. L-49542 September 12, 1980 ANTONIO MACADANGDANG, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ELIZABETH MEJIAS, respondents. SYLLABI: Presumption of legitimacy FACTS: v Respondent Elizabeth Mejias is a married woman, her husband being Crispin Anahaw.She allegedly had intercourse with petitioner Antonio Macadangdang sometime in March, 1967 . v She also alleges that due to the affair, she and her husband separated in 1967. On October 30, 1967 (7 months or 210 days following the illicit encounter), she gave birth to a

baby boy who was named Rolando Macadangdang in baptismal rites held on December 24,1967. v The records also disclose that respondent (then plaintiff) filed a complaint for recognition and support against petitioner (then defendant) with the CFI of Davao. But defendant opposing plaintiff's claim and prayed for its dismissal. CFI dimissed the complaint and CA reversed the previous decision. ISSUE/S: 1. Whether or not the child Rolando is conclusively presumed the legitimate issue of the spouses Elizabeth Mejias and Crispin Anahaw; and 2. Whether or not the wife may institute an action that would bastardize her child without giving her husband, the legally presumed father, an opportunity to be heard. HELD: CA reversed. The child Rolando is presumed to be the legitimate son of respondent and her spouse. This presumption becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there was physical impossibility of access between the spouses in the first 120 days of the 300 which preceded the birth of the child. This presumption is actually quasi-conclusive and may be rebutted or refuted by only one evidence the physical impossibility of access between husband and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 which preceded the birth of the child. This physical impossibility of access may be caused by any of these: 1. Impotence of the husband; 2. Living separately in such a way that access was impossible and 3. Serious illness of the husband. MENDOZA vs. CA #12 Illegitimate Children Facts: The private respondent claimed she was the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza, but the latter denied her claim. He denied it to his dying day. Teopista Toring Tuacao was born to Brigida Toring, who was then single, & defendant Casimiro Mendoza, married at that time to Emiliana Barrientos. She averred that mendoza recognized her as an illegitimate child by treating her as such and according her the rights and privileges of a recognized illegitimate child. Casimiro Mendoza, denied the plaintiffs allegations, he established ec\vidence that Teopista continuously lived with her mother and never had come to live with him. He set up a counterclaim for damages & attorney's fees. Teopista presented witnesses & evidences to prove that Casimiro indeed was her father. The trial court ordered believed Casimiro dismissed her complaint for compulsory recognition. Teopista's evidences are not sufficient to show that she had possessed continuously the status of a recognized illigetimate child. On appeal, however, the respondent court find that Teopista has sufficiently proven the continuos possession of a recognized illegitimate child. Hence, this petition. Issue: W/N Teopista was in continuous possession of her claimed status of an illegitamte child of Casimiro Mendoza. Ruling: Petition Denied. Declarerd Teopista to be the illegitimate child of casimiro Mendoza &entitiled to all the rights appurtenant to such status.

Held: Continuous does not mean that the concession of status shall continue forever but only that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it continues. The possession of such status means that the father has treated the child as his own, directly and not through others, spontaneously and without concealment though without publicity. There must be a showing of permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his own by continuous and clear manifestation of paternal affection and care. In this case, although Teopista was not living with Casimiro because of the fact that he was married to another, Casimiro was supporting Teopsita financially and even supporting Teopista's son whom he considered as his grandchild. GAN VS. REYES #13 TOPIC : SUPPORT FACTS Bernadette S. Pondevida was quite apprehensive that she would not be able to send to school her 3 year old daughter Francheska, wrote petitioner Augustus Caezar R. Gan demanding support for their "love child." Petitioner, in his reply, denied paternity of the child. An exasperated Bernadette thereafter instituted in behalf of her daughter a complaint against petitioner for support. He moved to dismiss on the ground that the complaint failed to state a cause of action and argued that in an action by a child against his putative father, adultery of the child's mother would be a valid defense to show that the child is a fruit of adulterous relations for, in such case, it would not be his child therefore not entitled to support which was denied by the trial court and decided in favor of the respondent. The latter moved for execution of the judgment of support, which the trial court granted by issuing a writ of execution, citing as reason therefore Francheskas immediate need for schooling. Petitioner argues that under the rules a judgment for support which is subject of an appeal cannot be executed absent any good reason for its immediate execution. ISSUE Whether the court erred in issuing an order of immediate execution of judgment. RATIO Parenthetically, how could he be allowed to prove the defense of adultery when it was not even hinted that he was married to the mother of Francheska. In all cases involving a child, her interest and welfare are always the paramount concerns. There may be instances where, in view of the poverty of the child, it would be a travesty of justice to refuse her support until the decision of the trial court attains finality while time continues to slip away. The money and property adjudged for and education should and must be given presently and without delay because if it had to wait the final judgment, the children may in the meantime have suffered because of lack of food or have missed and lost years in school because of lack of funds. One cannot delay the payment of such funds for support and education for the reason that if paid long afterwards, however much the accumulated amount, its payment cannot cure the evil and repair the damage caused. The children with such belated payment for support and education cannot act as gluttons and eat voraciously and unwisely, afterwards, to make up for the years of hunger and starvation. Neither may they enrol in several classes and schools and take up numerous subjects all at once to make up for the years they missed in school, due to non-payment of the funds when needed.

Case # 14. (Custody of Children) REYMOND B. LAXAMANA, vs. MA. LOURDES D. LAXAMANA G.R. No. 144763. September 3, 2002 FACTS: Reymond B. Laxamana and Ma. Lourdes D. Laxamana met sometime in 1983. They got married on June 6, 1984. The union was blessed with three children. All went well until petitioner became a drug dependent. Despite several confinements, respondent Ma. Lourdes claimed petitioner was not fully rehabilitated. His drug dependence worsened and it became difficult for respondent and her children to live with him, Thus respondent and her 3 children abandoned petitioner. Petitioner filed an instant petition for habeas corpus praying for custody of his three children. Respondent opposed the petition, citing the drug dependence of petitioner.Meanwhile, respondent filed a petition for annulment of marriage. Later, petitioner filed in the habeas corpus case, a motion seeking visitation rights over his children. After the parties reached an agreement, the court issued an order granting visitation rights to petitioner and directing the parties to undergo psychiatric and psychological examination by a psychiatrist of their common choice. The parties further agreed to submit the case for resolution after the trial courts receipt of the results of their psychiatric examination. Upon receipt of the psychiatric exam results, The trial court rendered the assailed decision awarding the custody of the three children to respondent and giving visitation rights to petitioner. Issue: Whether or not the trial court considered the paramount interest and welfare of the children in awarding their custody to respondent based only in the results of their psychiatric examination. Held: In controversies involving the care, custody and control of their minor children, the contending parents stand on equal footing before the court who shall make the selection according to the best interest of the child. The child if over seven years of age may be permitted to choose which parent he/she prefers to live with, but the court is not bound by such choice if the parent so chosen is unfit. In all cases, the sole and foremost consideration is the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the respective resources as well as social and moral situations of the opposing parents. Mindful of the nature of the case at bar, the court a quo should have conducted a trial notwithstanding the agreement of the parties to submit the case for resolution on the basis, inter alia, of the psychiatric report of Dr. Teresito. Thus, petitioner is not estopped from questioning the absence of a trial considering that said psychiatric report, which was the courts primary basis in awarding custody to respondent, is insufficient to justify the decision . Moreover, the children in this case were 14 and 15 years old at the time of the promulgation of the decision, yet the court did not ascertain their choice as to which parent they want to live with. The case was remanded back to the trial court.

ESLAO vs. CA, CORDERO #15 Facts: 1984, Spouses Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye and Reynaldo Eslao stayed with respondent Teresita Eslao, mother of the husband. They have two children, Leslie and Angelica. Leslie was entrusted to the care and custody of petitioners mother in Sta. Ana, Pampanga, while Angelica stayed with her parents at respondents house. On August 6, 1990, Reynaldo died. Maria intended to bring Angelica with her to Pampanga but the respondent insisted the custody of Angelica to her, reasoning that her son just died and she needed the company of the child to at least compensate for the loss of her late son. Later, Maria got married to Dr. James Manabu-Ouye, a Japanese-American, who is an orthodontist in the US on 1992. After 10 mos. or on Jan. 15, 1993, Maria migrated to San Francisco, California, USA, to join her new husband. After 5 mos. she returned to the Philippines to be reunited with her children and bring them to the US. She informed the respondent about her desire to take custody of Angelica and explained that her present husband is willing to adopt Leslie and Angelica. However, respondent resisted the idea by way of explaining that the child was entrusted to her when she was ten days old and accused the petitioner of having abandoned Angelica. Because of such refusal, Maria, through her lawyer, wrote a letter to the respondent demanding for the return of the custody of Angelica to her and when the demand remained disregarded, Maria instituted this action. It was granted by the lower court. It was affirmed by the CA. Issue: W/N the mother has the right to the custody of her daughter. Held: Parental authority is a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants to parents for the purpose of the childrens physical preservation and development, as well as the cultivation of their intellect and the education of their heart and senses. As regards parental authority, there is no power, but a task; no complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor. Their responsibilities are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a childrens home or an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same. Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the courts that the right of parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incident to parenthood, a right supported by law and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not created by the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental relationship. Case #16 Tamargo vs CA 209 SCRA 18 GR No. 85044, June 3, 1992 About: Article 35: Parental Authority; liability FACTS: In October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, minor, 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries that resulted in her death. The petitioners, natural parents of Tamargo, filed a complaint for damages against the natural parents of Adelberto with whom he was living the time of the tragic incident.

In December 1981, the spouses Rapisura filed a petition to adopt Adelberto Bundoc. Such petition was granted on November 1982 after the tragic incident. ISSUE: WON parental authority concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to make adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed against the adopted child where actual custody was lodged with the biological parents. HELD: Parental liability is a natural or logical consequence of duties and responsibilities of parents, their parental authority which includes instructing, controlling and disciplining the child. In the case at bar, during the shooting incident, parental authority over Adelberto was still lodged with the natural parents. It follows that they are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages. Parents and guardians are responsible for the damage caused by the child under their parental authority in accordance with the civil code. SC did not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at the time when they had no actual or physical custody over the adopted child. Retroactivity may be essential if it permits accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. Under Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, parental authority is provisionally vested in the adopting parents during the period of trial custody however in this case, trial custody period either had not yet begin nor had been completed at the time of the shooting incident. Hence, actual custody was then with the natural parents of Adelberto. #18 REPUBLIC vs. CAGANDAHAN GR No. 166676, September 12, 2008 FACTS: Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate of her name from Jennifer B. Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and her gender from female to male. It appearing that Jennifer Cagandahan is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a rare medical condition where afflicted persons possess both male and female characteristics. Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with secondary male characteristics. To further her petition, Cagandahan presented in court the medical certificate evidencing that she is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which certificate is issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital, who, in addition, explained that Cagandahan genetically is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally, thus has organs of both male and female. The lower court decided in her favor but the Office of the Solicitor General appealed before the Supreme Court invoking that the same was a violation of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because the said petition did not implead the local civil registrar. ISSUE: The issue in this case is the validity of the change of sex or gender and name of respondent as ruled by the lower court. RULING: The contention of the Office of the Solicitor General that the petition is fatally defective because it failed to implead the local civil registrar as well as all persons who have or claim any interest therein is not without merit. However, it must be stressed that private respondent furnished the local civil registrar a copy of the petition, the order to publish on December 16, 2003 and all pleadings, orders or processes in the course of the proceedings. In which case, the Supreme Court ruled that there is substantial compliance of the provisions of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held

that the determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue which in this case should be dealt with utmost care in view of the delicate facts present in this case.

Case 19 CHANGE OF NAME LLANETA vs AGRAVA 57 Scra 29, No. L-0 32054. May 15, 1974 Facts: Teresita's mother, one Atanacia Llaneta, was once married to Serafin Ferrer with whom she had but one child named Victoriano Ferrer. In 1942 Serafin Ferrer died, and about four years later Atanacia had relations with another man out of which Teresita was born. Shortly after Teresita's birth, Atanacia brought her and Victoriano to Manila where all of them lived with Atanacia's mother-in-law, Victoria vda. de Ferrer. Teresita was raised in the household of the Ferrer's, using the surname of Ferrer in all her dealings and throughout her schooling. When she was about twenty years old, she applied for a copy of her birth certificate in Irosin, Sorsogon, where she was born, as she was required to present it in connection with a scholarship granted to her by the Catholic Charities. It was then that she discovered that her registered surname is Llaneta not Ferrer and that she is the illegitimate child of Atanacia and an unknown father. Issue: WON an illegitimate child is allowed to bear surname of husband of mother? Held: YES. The petitioner has established that she has been using the surname Ferrer for as long as she can remember; that all her records, in school and elsewhere, put her name down as Teresita Ferrer; that her friends and associates know her only as Teresita Ferrer; and that even the late Serafin Ferrer's nearest of kin (who apparently have kept Teresita's illegitimacy a secret from her) have tolerated and still approve of her use of the surname Ferrer. Indeed, a sudden shift at this time by the petitioner to the name Teresita Llaneta (in order to conform to that appearing in her birth certificate) would result in confusion among the persons and entities she deals with and entail endless and vexatious explanations of the circumstances of her new surname. 1 In her official dealings, this would likewise mean a lifelong fending with the necessary affidavits. Moreover, it is a salutary law that would allow Teresita, inspite of her illegitimate birth, to carry on in society without her unfortunate status being bandied about at every turn. Case 20 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION IN THE ENTRIES OF BIRTH, PROCEEDINGS REPUBLIC vs VALENCIA 141 SCRA 462. No. L- 32181. March 5, 1986 Facts: Respondent Leonor Valencia, for and in behalf of her minor children, Bernardo Go and Jessica Go filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu a petition for the cancellation and/or correction of entries of birth of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go involving the civil status and nationality or citizenship, from Chinese to :Filipino: and their status from Legitimate to Illegitimate, and changing also the status of the mother respondent from married to single in the Civil Registry of the City of Cebu. The Solicitor General filed an opposition to the petition alleging that the petition for correction of entry in the Civil Registry pursuant to Article 412 of the New Civil Code of the

Philippines in relation to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, contemplates a summary proceeding and correction of mere clerical errors, those harmless and innocuous changes such as the correction of a name that is merely mispelled, occupation of parents, etc., and not changes or corrections involving civil status, nationality, or citizenship which are substantial and controversial. Issue: WON summary proceeding sought by respondent-mother is correct for substantial errors? Held: Yes, A petition for correction of entries in the record of birth, even if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of Revised Rules of court can no longer be described as summary if all the procedural requirements under said Rule 108 have been followed. Proceedings under rule 108 are not anymore summary once all its requisites are complied with. It becomes adversary. The case at bar complied with all the requisites of adversary proceeding. In the instant case, a petition for cancellation and/or correction of entries of birth of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go in the Civil Registry of the City of Cebu was filed by respondent Leonor Valencia on January 27, 1970, and pursuant to the order of the trial court dated February 4, 1970, the said petition was published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in the, Cebu Advocate, a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Cebu. Notice thereof was duly served on the Solicitor General. the Local Civil Registrar and Go Eng. The order likewise set the case for hearing and directed the local civil registrar and the other respondents or any person claiming any interest under the entries whose corrections were sought, to file their opposition to the said petition. An opposition to the petition was consequently filed by the Republic on February 26, 1970. Thereafter a full blown trial followed with respondent Leonor Valencia testifying and presenting her documentary evidence in support of her petition. The Republic on the other hand crossexamined respondent Leonor Valencia. We are of the opinion that the petition filed by the respondent in the lower court by way of a special proceeding for cancellation and/or correction of entries in the civil register with the requisite notice and publication and the recorded proceedings that actually took place thereafter could very well be regarded as that proper suit or appropriate action.