Crawford TankFireandOvervill

API Storage Tank Conference September 2006
Tank Fire Suppression Tank Overfill Protection

API Storage Tank Conference
September 2006
Kendall C. Crawford, PE, CSP

Crawford Consulting Associates
8601 Lupton Lane Houston, Texas 77055 USA
Ken Crawford 8-4-2006
kendallcrawford@earthlink.net
Kendall C. Crawford, PE, CSP

Crawford Consulting Associates
Our Motto & Belief is - Everything has a Reason
K. C. Crawford Sept 2006
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API Storage Tank Conference - September 2006
Warning
This presentation moves through slides very rapidly Taking detailed notes may result in unexpected ergonometric stress
Electronic Handouts Coming Later
LEST WE FORGET
National Fire Prevention Week

October 8-14, 2006 Established to commemorate:
Great Chicago Fire Oct 8-9, 1871
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Great Chicago Fire of Oct 8-9, 1871 8-
Killed over 250 people, left 100,000 homeless, destroyed more than 17,400 structures and burned more than 2,000 acres
National Fire Prevention Week

ALSO REMEMBERS
( but most of us DON ) T DON
The Great Peshtigo Fire Oct 8, 1871

Same day as Chicago fire
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Great Peshtigo Fire Oct 8, 1871
October 8, 1871
The same day as the Great Chicago Fire the Great Peshtigo Fire roared through NE Wisc. 16 towns burned down, 1,152 people died and 1.2 million acres of forest burned (3.5% of Wisc.) Wisc.)
This forest fire started near Peshtigo, Wisc., which disappeared in an hour. The newspapers originated the word firestorm .
This was an industrial fire started by railway workers clearing brush for new tracks.
Today Scope s Tank Fire Suppression Basic Tank Fire Facts Norco & Buncefield Buncefield Investigation Tank Overfill Protection API RP 2350
(API Std 2610)
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Presentation Order
Tank Fire Supppression
Tank Fire Facts & Conclusions Explanation & examples 2 Classic Tank Fire Incidents
Overfill Protection API 2350

Orion Norco June 8, 2001
Buncefield UK Dec 11-15, 2005
270 ft diameter tank Tropical Storm Flooding
21 Tanks & Pool Fires Extensive Area Damage
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Tank Fire Fact

Emergency Response People are VERY SPECIAL
They run TOWARD Fires Instead of AWAY

Emergency Responders at both Orion and Buncefield were Outstanding
Tank Fire Facts

Most tank fires are seal fires -- many attributed to lightning SEAL FIRES don become full t surface fires without help!
So - Don Sink the roof ! t
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Seal Fire
July 23, 2000 -- Sealy, Texas Crude Oil
Rim Seal Fire Options API RP 2021
Wind Girder With Handrailer
Wind Girder Training
Aerial with Platform
Foam Dam With Pourers

Daspit Tool
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Crude Oil Seal Fire Sealy, Texas Many Hours burn Pre-foam Pre-
without becoming full surface unless sunk! (Best way to sink a roof lots of water!)
Confirms Seal fires burn forever forever
This puts out seal fires
Some folks suggest putting a dry riser & foam chamber at stairway platform which can be connected to foam truck to protect personnel on platform
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Daspit Tool in Action

Sealy Texas Crude Oil Seal Fire Flow Capability: 250 to 2000 USG/min
Ken Crawford 8-25-2006 8-25-
Seal Explosion Lightning Explosion

Immediate 360 Degree Seal Fire
Gary Selover - ChevronTexaco Pascagoula
Extinguished with Daspit Tool Tool
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Tank Fire Facts Full surface fires in large tanks over 150 ft (45 m) dia need large monitors for suppression
Big Footcan rapidly turn seal fires into fully involved tank fires but GREAT for full surface fires
Up to 14,000 USGPM (53,000 lpm)

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Municipal Focus Different

Unless specially trained, Municipal Fire Departments are not equipped mentally or physically to put out tank fires
They do buildings and wildland NOT hydrocarbons
Volunteer Fire departments may be better IF they have Industrial volunteer members
Prepare Municipal, Too

When Industry trains their ER folks on hydrocarbon fires invite the Municipal Department to participate OR pay the cost of Municipal representative attendance at a GOOD HC Fire School
Especially Fire Chief and Training Officer Include volunteer departments if they will respond
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Full Surface Tank Fires = Help Needed

Only very large Industrial facilities have enough equipment for fires in very large tanks Typically Mutual Aid help is needed for any big tank fire
Foam, monitors, pumps, hose, people, knowledge
AND Mutual Aid Saves TIME

Despite tank fire differences one key challenge is the same
LOGISTICS
Who ya gonna call??

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Easy Questions Hard Answers?

What will be needed to put out fire? Where will you get resources? How fast can you get them? Can you get them to the site? Can you apply agent to the fire? Can you extinguish the fire? Can you prevent reignition? reignition?
Ken Crawford 4-13-2004 Planning Part 2 4-1-2003
LOGISTICS
LOGISTICS
Sample Resources needed:
Expertise Firewater [quantity & pressure at site] Foam concentrate [right type at site] Foam application equipment People
Obvious Choice -- MUTUAL AID

Ken Crawford 4-13-2004 Planning Part 2 4-1-2003
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Mutual Aid Means Sharing You can join a Mutual Aid t organization if you have no resources to share
It like going empty handed to a pot luck dinner s
Foam stock, Command Post, LD hose, pumps, fire truck etc

So Get Something to Share!
Tank Fire Foam Basics Foam Concentrate is: the stuff you buy Foam Solution is: % of Foam Concentrate mixed with water
How much foam do we need? = Concentrate need? Putting foam on the fire = Foam Solution fire
(6% or 3% or 1%)
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Significance of foam concentrate percentage and application rate

Water flow required is the same regardless of concentrate percentage Water and concentrate flow both go up as application rate goes up [but time may go down] Total water and foam usage goes down as extinguishing time goes down Total foam concentrate required goes down as percent in solution goes down Logistics improve with lower % concentrates
Tank Fire Basic Facts

1% foam works and provides great logistics relief
Once in solution the active ingredient concentration is the same w 6%, 3%, 1%
Use bulk foam transport -totes or tank trucks -no buckets or pails
(drums may do but are labor intensive)
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Flow, GPM
18,000 17,000 16,000 Water-Foam Solution Flow Rate, GPM 15,000 14,000 13,000 12,000 11,000 10,000 9,000 8,000 7,000 6,000 5,000 4,000 3,000 2,000 1,000 0 0
Water-Foam Solution Flow Requirement, GPM at Varied Application Rates (in GPM/sq ft)
Application GPM/ft2
Application Rates
0.24 GPM/sq ft
Big Tank Range

0.20 GPM/sq ft
0.16 GPM/sq ft
0.10 GPM/sq ft
20
40
60
80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 260 280 300
Tank Diameter
Tank Diameter, Feet
270 ft dia = Orion

Effect of Foam Concentrate Percentage

USG of Foam Concentrate Required for 65 Minutes at 0.16 g/ft2
Logistics Total Foam Concentrate Required
30 ft dia tank
60 ft dia tank
6% = 440 6% = 1760 6% = 11,025 6% = 35,730
3% = 220 3% = 880 3% = 5,510 3% = 17,865
1% = 75 1% = 295 1% = 1,835 1% = 5,955
150 ft dia tank 270 ft dia tank
Note: time and application rate based on NFPA 11 MINIMUM
Additional foam needed to secure site after extinguishment

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Tank Fire Basic Fact Full Surface Fires Need Lots of Foam
150 ft dia tank 1% foam needs at 0.16 usgpm/ft2 300 Gallons per 10 minutes ~ 60 Pails, 5 drums, 1 tote
Gallons of Foam Concentrate Needed for Each Ten Minutes of Foam Application at 1%, 3% and 6% Concentrations
9000 Foam Concentrate, Gal/Ten Minutes 8000 7000 6000 5000 4000 3000 2000 1000 0 0 2,000 4,000 6,000 8,000 10,000 12,000 14,000 Water-Foam Solution Flow, GPM
6% Concentrate
3% Concentrate
1% Concentrate
270 ft dia = Orion

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Ancient Adage
There are no embarrassing questions
Ancient Adage
There are no embarrassing questions
Only embarrassing answers
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Like the answer to: Where did you park your 737?
SWA Stopped at Burbank Chevron Station
Like the answer to: Where did you park your Pickup?
Ken Crawford 5-52005
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is an Embarrassing Answer
get my foam in buckets I buckets
Honolulu 1980
Bulk Tanker Transport Works

Shell Deer Park Bobtail Conversion Foam Tender
Shell Deer Park have two 4,000 gallon tankers with120 GPM Edwards Edwards foam pumps. Internals lined with epoxy coating before adding foam foam
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Flatbed Totes Work

Patoka Illinois Spring 2005
2650 USG Concentrate = 265,000 1% USG Solution 150 ft tank ~ 94 min at 0.16 200 ft tank ~ 46 min at 0.18 270 ft tank ~ 20 min at 0.22
Ten 265 USG (1,000 liter) Totes 1x3
We Know This Won Work! t

Honolulu Pails
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Norco Louisiana
Orion - June 8, 2001 - Largest Tank Fire Ever Extinguished 270 ft (82 m) dia by Williams Fire & Hazard Control Remnants of TS Allison ~ 15 inches of rain Lightning protection is difficult -- AFTER the roof sinks. 65 min suppression out 13 hrs from ignition 270 ft (80 m) dia is 82% more surface area than 200 ft (60m) tank
Largest Tank EVER Extinguished Orion Norco June 8, 2001
June 8, 2001 270-foot diameter gasoline storage tank 32-foot-tall storage tank at 28 ft of its full 27032- foot325,000 barrel capacity; 160,000 barrels of gasoline remained in the tank after extinguishment
Ken Crawford 8-24-2006 8-24-
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5.2.4 Design Criteria for Foam Monitors and Handlines. 5.2.4.1 LIMITATIONS. LIMITATIONS 5.2.4.1.1 Monitor nozzles shall not be considered as the primary means of protection for fixed-roof fixedtanks over 18 m (60 ft) in diameter.
NFPA 11 says --
270Gasoline Storage Tank Over the Top 270 Top Suppression Using two Big Gun monitors flowing 50% more water than total available at Buncefield
8,000 GPM
4,000 GPM
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NFPA 11 vs REAL WORLD

Fixed Protection sometimes works on small tanks especially seals Fixed protection sized for seals, not full surface fires Monitors are the only option for large, full surface tank fires
Lesson Learned from

(Really a lesson reconfirmed)
Norco Orion?
Large full-surface Tank Fires need Large Monitors to extinguish You can put out one-half of t a full surface fire!
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Flame Collapse
12 Minutes
8,000 GPM Bigfoot Bigfoot 4,000 GPM 2x6 2x6
270Gasoline 270 Storage Tank
Orion Extinguishment Time: 65 Min.

Product Saved: 6,800,000 USG = 56%
Foam Concentrate Used = 28,000 USG ATC @ 3%
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Buncefield Terminal Fire December 11, 2005
Buncefield Terminal Fire Sunday Dec 11, 2005 Aerial View of a World Class Event
Note small (vent or seal?) fires
Largest UK Multi-Tank (21) Fire MultiBuncefield Dec 11-15, 2005 11-
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Q. How do you Eat an Elephant?
A. One Bite at a Time
Thanks to my mentor Hubie Miller

R.I.P.
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Tank Fire Basic Fact No Water = No Foam

If it isn on site determine t how you will get it. 150 ft dia tank fire needs 4,000+ USG/min water
(hoses & hi-volume portable pumps are hiscarce & labor intensive)
Buncefield Investigation
Bruncefield Incident Dec 11 15, 2005 First Interim Report Feb 21, 2006 Incident & Emergency Response Second Interim Report April 11, 2006 Environmental aspects Third Interim Report May 9, 2006 Cause Analysis - Overfill 4th Report called Initial Report7-13-06 Initial Conclusions & work ongoing
Source: www.buncefieldinvestigation.gov.uk
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How the Buncefield fire was fought
1) Water pumped from lake to artificial pool used to produce foam 2) Fire engines, foam cannon and fixed fire-fighting units apply foam 3) Huge clouds of smoke produced 4) Water curtain protects intact tanks on eastern part of site. 5) Bunds fail to contain firewater contaminated with HC fuel. 6) Investigations find "large amounts" of run-off escaped from the site, contaminating ground and surface water.
Twelve 150 mm (6 in) Fire Hose lays to Buncefield Fire site one plus mile from lake source
Six primary pumps each with two 6 hoses plus three booster pumps; four hydrosubs; 30 km (18 miles) of 6 hose; operated 24 hrs/day for five days at average 25,000 lpm (ca 7,000 GPM) with peak of 42,000 lpm (8500 gpm)
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Water relay for fire at Buncefield
Twelve 150 mm (6 in) Fire Hose lays to Fire site 1+ mile from water source. 18 miles of hose to flow 32,000 liters/min (8,500 USG/min) using UK New Dimensions initiative pumps & hose Dimensions
Buncefield Peak Resources (Massive!)

+ Industrial foam fire trucks & big gun monitors gun
26 Hertfordshire pumper trucks
(Day 2 Monday lunchtime, 12 Dec 2005)
180 firefighters 250,000 litres (66,000 USG) foam concentrate USG) 25 million litres (7 MM USG) water 30 km (98,000 ft) high-volume hose high-
Other reports: up to 600 firefighters (probably due to shift relief); more foam and more water
Advisors included Kelvin Hardingham of Williams and Dr. Niall Ramsden from RPI. Much tank foam equipment, and experienced HC fire personnel provided by UK industry
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Buncefield Fire Suppression

Many Techniques Used:
Handheld hoses Truck mounted monitors (on foam trucks) Portable Big Guns & Foam Cannons Dual Agent (foam + dry chem) on Pressure Fires Med-Expansion Bund Pourers on pool fires
Heroic work Surrounded by Fire fires While surrounded by
Putting Foam on Tank
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Foam for API Storage Tank ConferenceSupplied in Bulk Buncefield - September 2006
Refilling fire truck w foam concentrate from tanker
Buncefield Small Bites -Bites One tank at a time
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Buncefield - some Bigger Bites-Using big guns on larger tank fires
Flow capacity 2,000 to 6,000 USG/min (7500 to 22,000 l/min)

Yellow is Water & gray is foam concentrate
One method Used to Address Extensive Pool Fires in Berm Areas Around Tanks Medium Expansion Bund Pourers 25 to 35:1 expansion ratio low p 1.5 3 bar
Bund Pourer
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Buncefield Extinguishment: ~ 4 days

Product & Facility Losses: Major Social & Political Impact: Continuing
How does one PREPARE for a BIG tank fire?

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PREPARATION PLANNING IS CALLED
PLANNING
PRE-Planning is -PRESomething you do BEFORE you Plan
like -- get folks together with a beverage of their choice and say LET BRAINSTORM! S
And then -- PLAN!
Preparation for Tank Fires? API RP 2021 helps Planning Management of Atmospheric Storage Tank Fires
(2001 reaffirmed 2006)
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Preparing for Storage Tank Fires

Ensure Availability of EOC & Field Resources
Prepare Incident Management Resources
Specifically what is needed for Each Tank?
Detail Needs of Tank-Specific Plans
How will we notify and get the help needed on site at the incident?
Establish Logistics Communications People Supplies
Train on Plan Specific to Each Tank or Set of Tanks
Train & Test System Effectiveness
Storage Tank Fire Management Part 2
Planning
Develop Firefighting Philosophy for the Storage Tank Facility
Develop Fire Protection & Firefighting Philosophy
Develop Plan Specific to Each Tank or Set of Tanks
Does this fire need to be put out?
Develop Tank-Specific Tank Fire Plans
Establish Type, Quantity & Delivery e.g. Water, Foam
Develop Suppression Agent Plans
Planning Part 2 4-1-2003
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Knowledge and Experience Help PLANNING and PREPARATION

One Knowledge Source: Buncefield Investigation Dec 11, 2005 -- Incident Feb 21, 2006 -- 1st Progress Report -- plus -HSE Advisory for Self-Audits w Inspections SelfApr 11, 2006 2nd Progress Report May 9, 2006 3rd Progress Report July 4, 2006 HSE TAV Switch Alert July 13, 2006 Initial Report Aug 22, 2006 Release Site for work Sept 13, 2006 BP Start HC Removal
www.buncefieldinvestigation.gov.uk
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1st Interim Report
Feb 21, 2006
Incident Description and Emergency Response
Tank 12 Tank 912 Damaged Office Building

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The Buncefield Investigation Second progress report 11 April, 2006
2nd Interim Report
April 11, 2006

Major emphasis environmental including especially bund integrity and failure to contain
Bund/Firewall Damage - Buncefield
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Bund/Firewall Damage - Buncefield
Buncefield Aftermath Note foam & water in Bunds Which became a major issue
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Third Interim Report
May 9, 2006
May 9, 2006 Cause Analysis: Describes overfill release scenario of Tank 912 and subsequent consequences resulting from unexplained overpressure
Bruncefield Third Interim Report May 9, 2006
Overpressure magnitude
current method would predict overpressure of 20 to 50 millibar (0.3 to 0.5 psi) pp 55
The magnitude of the overpressure generated in the open areas is not consistent with current understanding of vapour cloud explosions. A explosions.
Current best estimates of the overpressure are in the order of 700 to 1000 millibars in the car parks (10 to 15 psi). pp 54
Estimated actual ca 20 to 30 times predicted (kcc) Source: www.buncefieldinvestigation.gov.uk
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July 13, 2006 Initial Report Although prior reports were interim, detail is not repeated in this Initial Report The Investigation Continues
Unexplained Omission?
is actually the 4th Report Issued -after 3 Interim Progress Reports Cause: Tank Overfill attributed to equipment malfunction Still don Understand t Why Such Severe Overpressure Groundwater Contamination led to Declaring Major Accident to the Environment (MATTE) Resulting in COMAH Notification
Initial Report July 13, 2005 Report
No Mention of Operators
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Event massive vapor cloud & high overpressure explosion Cause TANK OVERFILL attributed to equipment malfunction (and???) Aftermath Extensive Community damage & loss of containment Closure of terminal for ??
(9 months prohibited access released for Work Aug 22, 2006)
Environmental Concerns leading to COMAH report to EU
Buncefield Investigation report
Much uncertainty remains about why the explosion was so violent, generating overpressures a magnitude greater (700-1000 millibar) (700millibar) than current understanding of vapour cloud explosions would predict (20-50 millibar) (20millibar)
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One of Many Automobiles Damaged in Buncefield Incident
Why and how did car get to this location in this condition?
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Buncefield Investigation Initial Report Report The paramount need is to ensure the integrity of the primary means of containment, i.e. to make sure that fuel does not escape from the vessels in which it is normally contained. (Keep the HC in the Tanks)
Incident Dec 11, 2005 Report July 13, 2006
Buncefield Investigation Initial report 3:00 a.m. 5:20 a.m. 5:50-6:00 6:01 Level gauge stopped showing increase Calculated overflow begins Flow rate increases to 890 m3/hr First Explosion of several -- then tank fires
But flow ex P/L still 550 m3/hr (3,500 bbl/hr, 2,400 USgpm) USgpm)
Evidence suggests that the protection system which should have shut off the supply of petrol to the tank to prevent overfilling -did not operate. operate.
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Buncefield Investigation Initial report

This does not however lessen the need for effective secondary and tertiary containment (bunds and drains, mainly) that prevent pollutants from escaping the site and contaminating the environment should primary containment be lost.
Incident Dec 11, 2005 Report July 13, 2006
(HSE ~ USA OSHA) Dec 11, 2005 Incident
HSE Post-Buncefield Action Post-
Feb 21, 2006 -- HSE issues precautionary advice to fuel depot operators self-audit with advice selfHSE follow-up. 4-16-06 due date. follow4- 16June 13 HSE Publishes initial audit feedback
July 4, 2006 HSE TAV Switch Alert

July 26, 2006 CSB Courtesy Alert
(at HSE request?)
Aug 22, 2006 HSE Release Site for work Sept 13, 2006 BP Start HC Removal by Truck
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Buncefield Investigation Stated Issues of concern arising from Investigation to date Design & Operation of Storage sites
Containment [of release and overfills]
Emergency Response
Judged Good [with room for improvement]
Advice to Planning Authorities

Where/what OK to build near oil terminals
The Investigation Continues

Note: the joint UK HSE & EA investigation is structured as a CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION
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Buncefield - What Happened For Sure ? Sure

Major Vapor Cloud Explosion with massive overpressure 21 Tanks burned Community Injuries & Damage Valiant fire suppression strong industry support + pumps Al-Qaeda threat reported; Police discounted
What we DON KNOW? (or hasnbeen fully reported.) T t hasn

Event initiating product release (WHY not what) WHY Specific location of initial release (appears to be Tank 912) Amount of material released (estimated 80,000 USG) Who was on-site (or had been on site prior to incident) Why power went out before explosion Source of Ignition How severely damaged cars ended up so far away Why overpressures were so high (20 to 30 times expected)
UK Environmental Agency (EA)

Latest Update -- 23 August 2006
26 Million Liters of Stored Firewaters The oil companies have assured us that they are working on this issue but that the clean up of the firewater is a complex process. find this continued delay unacceptable We and still await formal proposals from them and a date for clean up work to start.
(Note: proposal received September 12, 2006 and under review by UK EA) review Concerns include PFOS at ppb levels
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How does one Keep Potential Tank Fire Effluents Contained?

API Std 2610
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API Std 2610 9.2.9 Piping Piping or conduit passing through dike walls shall be designed to prevent build-up of excessive stresses on pipe or conduit as a result of settlement. Penetration of dikes (except drains) shall be kept to a minimum to eliminate leakage paths through the dike. The area surrounding the penetration shall be sealed with a high-temperature fire resistant material to prevent migration of liquids through the dike.
How does one Reduce Potential for Tank Fires?
Keep HC in Tanks
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API RP 2350
3rd Edition Jan 2005
OVERFILL PROTECTION FOR STORAGE TANKS IN PETROLEUM FACILITIES

API 2350 3rd Edition, January 2005 Only tank Overfill Protection Standard in the USA (World?)
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API RP 2350 Some basic principles (Section 1.4): Protection against overfills best achieved by: Awareness of capacity & inventory Careful monitoring and control of product movement High level detectors and/or automatic shutdown/diversion systems shall not be used for control of routine filling operations.
SCOPE OF 1996 2nd EDITION The scope of this recommended practice is
SCOPE: API RP 2350 2nd Ed - 1996
specifically limited to petroleum facilities with aboveground storage tanks that receive Class I liquids from mainline pipelines or marine vessels.
API 2350 is CONSISTENT WITH NFPA 30
EXCLUSIONS This recommended practice does not apply to the following:
Aboveground storage tanks with less than 600 gallons capacity. capacity Aboveground storage tanks with over 600 gallons capacity that receive or contain Class II or Class III liquids. Aboveground storage tanks that contain noncombustible liquids and other non-petroleum products. Aboveground storage tanks that contain Class I liquids received from other than mainline pipelines or marine transfer (such as receipts from tank trucks, railroad tank cars, transfers from other tanks, facility process units, private pipelines, and crude oil production facilities). Underground storage tanks.
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Expanded coverage to include Class II as well as Class I starting with tanks above 1320 USG Excludes Process tanks, service station tanks whether above or below ground, underground & loading or delivery from wheeled vehicles (tank trucks, tank cars).
SCOPE: API RP 2350 3rd Ed 2005
1.2.1 APPLICABILITY Specifically limited to tanks associated with marketing, refining, pipeline and similar facilities containing Class I or Class II petroleum liquids. Underground storage tanks Above ground tanks of 1320 US gallons (5000 liters) or less Tanks that are integral to a process Tanks containing Class III liquids Tanks containing non-combustible liquids Service Stations (whether above or below ground) Loading or delivery from wheeled vehicles (such as tank trucks or railroad tank cars) 1.2.2 CONSISTENT WITH NFPA 30
SCOPE API RP 2350 3rd Ed Jan 2005
RP 2350 does not apply to:
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API RP 2350
3rd Edition Jan 2005
4th Edition (end 2007??)
What about the 4th Edition of RP 2350?

(And why a 4th Edition so soon?)
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API RP 2350 4th Edition 200x (2007?) Same Scope as 3rd Edition Improved guidance (friendlier?) Classify Tank Operations (risk base?) Revised Definitions?? (probably) Incorporate Human Factors?? Levels of Protection Concepts Protection
[Conceptual Alignment with IEC 61508, IEC 61511 & NewS84.01]
ANSI Status??
Traditional TraditionalIPL Concepts: Independent Protection Layers (IPLs)
Process Design
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Alternate IPL Depiction
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Protect Occupants Keep Bullets OUT
Street-Smart L.O.P. Street-
Hydrocarbon Layers of Protection Is Really from the Inside Out Protect by Keeping Hazards IN
Goal: Prevent Escape of Whatever is the Tank In Tank

(Thanks to Mike Schmidt) of Emerson)
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Key Element = Independent
API 2350 Workgroup Resource References Safety Instrumented Systems Standards

IEC 61508 Generic for All Industries IEC 61511 Specific to Process Industries NewISA S84.01 Same as 61511 (almost) New
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May 9, 2006 interim report says Tank 912 OVERFILL was release source
Tank 12
Tank 912
Damaged Office Building
Based on Bruncefield Investigation Before Initial Formal Report
HSE safety alert July 4, 2006 re TAV Switches
Certain aspects of installation and testing the high level safety system to prevent tank overfill are critical in ensuring that it works properly
Operators of establishments similar to Bruncefield are advised to carry out immediate checks where TAV level switches are fitted to their storage tanks. Operators should check TAV level switches fitted with change over (double throw) reed switches.
The switches are tested by using a lever or plate fitted to the head of the switch, which can be raised to simulate a high level of liquid in the tank. If the switch is working, then alarms and trips tank. connected to the switch should operate. It is critical that after this test the lever or plate is returned to returned the correct position and locked into place, using a special padlock switch being inoperative in normal operating mode even though it gives the appearance of functioning normally when tested.
supplied by the manufacturer, and in accordance with the manufacturer instructions. Failure to do this can lead to the s
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HSE Safety Alert to Fuel Depot Operators reTAV Level Switch
E071:06 4 July 2006
The relevance of the installation and performance of these (TAV) switches in respect of the Buncefield incident is only one of a number of lines of enquiry. It is therefore inappropriate to comment on its relevance in the particular circumstances of Buncefield. Buncefield. is also too early to say when the It Buncefield investigation will conclude, or what it might say regarding these switches. switches.
HSE Disclaimer
Significance for Storage Tank Operators Ensure tank overfill protection is robust robust
Suggestion review API RP 2350 Overfill Protection for Storage Tanks In Petroleum Facilities 3rd Ed Check for TAV Switches & follow HSE advice
Review training & proficiency Review emergency response plans Who ya gonna call?(apologies to Ghostbusters)
CHALLENGES: PERSONNEL, LOGISTICS, KNOWLEDGE 911 not prepared for terminal fires Consider & participate in mutual aid organizations
(no free lunch participation must be substantive)
Or consider specialist fire suppression organizations
Examine Security System Effectiveness Expect U.S. OSHA/EPA/DOT (Homeland Security?)

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Keeping Product in Tanks isnt brain surgery -- but it does require: planning, procedures, qualified personnel, the right equipment and resources --- and PROPER EXECUTION
Regulation for Operating Bulk Plants

Flammable and Combustible Liquids Liquids OSHA 1910.106 from www.osha.gov
For Good Practice Use:

API Standards for Tank Construction NFPA 30 for Facility Layout API 2350 for Overfill Prevention API 2021 for Tank Fire Management API & NFPA for Operation Recognize Good Practice Priority
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NFPA 30 2007 -- BIG CHANGES (high probability) Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code All Aboveground Storage Tanks to be tested, inspected, repaired and maintained in accordance with API Std 653 & API RP 12R1.
(did not previously reference API standards).
flammable liquids by mainline pipeline or marine to have overfill prevention). overfill
Requires ALL tanks storing Class I and Class II liquids to have overfill protection in accord with API RP 2350. (previously required only Class I tanks receiving
(Also Requires all terminals to establish procedures to check and remove water bottoms in accordance with API 1501, 1621 and 2610 or STI Bulletin "Keeping water out of your tanks" )
NFPA 30 - 2007 Newly Referenced Safety Documents

API Std 653 Tank Inspection, Repair, Alteration, and Reconstruction (inspection of tanks constructed in accordance with API 650 or
API 620 and other large field-erected tanks)
API 12R1 - Setting, Maintenance, Inspection, Operation and Repair of Tanks in Production Service STI SP001 - Standard for Inspection of Aboveground Storage Tanks 3rd Ed. July 2005 API RP 2350 - Overfill Protection for Storage Tanks in Petroleum Facilities, 3rd Ed. Jan 2005 Facilities
The IFC meets in September 2006 for hearings on code changes. Since the IFC references many NFPA 30 requirements, expect these to apply there also Ken Crawford 4-5-2006
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How to Get API Standards

Order API Standards from API's primary distributor
Global Engineering Documents www.global.ihs.com

At the Global Web site enter API xxxx in the Document Numberbox for a Search Click on See Details-- Look for the current Edition
Note -- if it says that a document has been cancelled -- click on the box Superceding Documentand follow the trail.
By Phone: 1-800-854-7179 (Toll-free in U.S.A. & Canada)
A catalog of API Standards is viewable at www.api.org/cat

API Members Should Receive 50% Discount
End of Formal Presentation Questions or Comments? Comments?
Ken Crawford 5-3-2005 Ken Crawford 4-13-2004
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God Bless America

And God Bless Our British Allies

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Buncefield Investigation Event massive vapor cloud & high overpressure explosion Cause Tank Overfill attributed to equipment malfunction (300 Tonnes ~ 100,000 USG) Aftermath Extensive Community damage & loss of containment
(9 months prohibited access Aug 22, 2006 released for Cleanup Work 9-13-06 BP began trucking fuel site not released for normal operations)
Closure of terminal for ??
Environmental Concerns leading to COMAH report to EU
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Tank Examples - Layers of Protection Tank Fill & Drain Valves (chain & lock) Firewall (bund) Firewall drain valve (chain & lock) Grading away from tank Metering in & out charts & computer Operating staff (on-site & off-site) (onoffGauging equipment (redundant on separate power) Automatic shutdowns Procedures & Training? Tank Inspection Site security (physical & cyber/electronic)
Tank Fire Suppression Process

Get close enough to fight fire Get equipment, foam & water to fire Apply foam properly flow rate, position & duration Monitor, understand and address progress & problems Maintain post-suppression monitoring Clean up and go home
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13th Annual Les Williams Advanced Flammable Liquid Firefighting Foam Technology Workshop - May 2006
Tank Fire Suppression s Do

DO: Evaluate Conditions Directly in Real Time Hose stream or Dwight Williams Wet Glove Test [or IR?] s DO: Understand if fire is time sensitive (Crude?) DO: Consider Metal Shields for personnel heat protection DO: Use check valves if needed to prevent HC backflow DO: Shut off pressure fires at source before extinguishment DO: Exploit available resources
Police (or other) helicopters ask Jerry Craft Recycle water (remember, most muni trucks draft) Use optical or radar distance measuring devices Use infrared temp measurement (tank & exposures) Use news rawfootage
DO: Use tote tanks or bulk trucks for foam supply DO: Understand monitor reach capability as function of angle DO: Train facility management in ICS (before they take command)
13th Annual Les Williams Advanced Flammable Liquid Firefighting Foam Technology Workshop - May 2006
Tank Fire Suppression Don ts

DON PUT PEOPLE AT RISK TO SAVE PROPERTY T DON DON put people on roof use hose or Daspit tool T DON fight seal fire from wind girder without railing T DON allow sightseers in fire working areas T DON SINK A FLOATING ROOF T DON DON start foam application until enough on hand T DON fight a major fire from 5-gallon buckets T DON BURN UP YOUR FIRE TRUCK T DON
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Tank Fire Lessons Learned

1% foam (synthetic not protein) Large tanks need big monitors (despite NFPA 11) Large diameter hose (5 inch or larger) No Water = No Foam Fixed systems (OK for seals, often disabled & not sized for full surface fires) Greatest need for Logistics not Suppression (think orchestra w conductor and section leads) Seal fires dont become fully involved unless roof sinks Crude boilover remains a concern Mutual Aid will bring old foam stock (and expect new technology replacement) Largest single tank ever extinguished is 270 ft dia w Largest single monitor = 14,000 USG/min Largest demo flow = 31,000 USG/min Application rate (GPM/sq ft) increases as tank size increases Max foam run ca 100 ft In UK HSE & EA investigation structured as a CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION Firewater stored for 8 months (and counting) causing EA ire
Like Emergency Response Plans & Revised Standards

69K
Introduction to Safety Around Tanks Workshop - June 2006
Facility-Specific Planning
Netherlands Antilles
Leaders & helpers & equipment? Where will you get enough foam concentrate & water & move to site? Where will you stage equipment and set up for suppression?
Eight 625,000 BBL (100,000 M3) Floating Roof Crude Oil ca 275 ft dia
How will you protect exposures? Where will run-off go? Time Time -- Time
Facility-Specific Planning
Richmond California
Access!!
Leaders & helpers & equipment? Where to get foam concentrate & water & move to site? Where to stage equipment and set up for suppression? How to protect exposures? Where will run-off go? Time Time -- Time
Dutch engineers first used this layout so crude could gravity feed through the process areas. If there is a boilover IT WILL!
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Bruncefield Incident Dec 11 14, 2005 Third Interim Report May 9, 2006 Cause Analysis - Overfill Initial ReportJuly 13, 2006
Much uncertainty remains about why the explosion was so violent, generating overpressures of a magnitude much greater than current understanding of vapour cloud explosions would predict. For example, a method in current use would predict overpressures of 20-50 millibar (mbar) in the open areas of the Northgate and Fuji car parks. The current best estimates of the overpressures that actually occurred in these areas are of 700-1000 mbar, leading to extensive damage to adjacent buildings. Annex 6 describes the mechanics of fire and explosion hazards from fuels such as petrol, as currently understood. Further work is needed to research the actual mechanism for generating the unexpectedly high explosion overpressures seen at Buncefield. This is a matter of keen international interest,
Still don Understand t WhySeverity of Overpressure

December 12, 2005 -- Police have said they had found nothing malicious" in the incident, which happened in Hemel Hempstead on 11 December, 2005. Shortly after incident UK Fire Expert me, what To s interesting is how this fire and cloud could initially have made such a big bang. In an open space you would expect a flash of fire which would have burned out quickly, not a big explosion
May 9, 2006 Interim Report pp 55
The investigation has, so far, been unable to establish why the ignition of the vapour cloud and the explosion propagation in the relatively uncongested environment of the adjacent car parks caused significant overpressures
71K
Introduction to Safety Around Tanks Workshop - June 2006 On Wednesday, December 7 (4 days before the incident) a videotape by al-Qaeda's deputy leader, Ayman al-Zawahri, was shown on the Internet calling for attacks against Gulf oil facilities. The video had first been released on Sept. 19 and shown on Al-Jazeera TV. "I call on the holy warriors to concentrate their campaigns on the stolen oil of the Muslims, most of the revenues of which go to the enemies of Islam," said al-Zawahri, the Egyptian deputy of al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. "The enemies of Islam are exploiting such vital resources with incomparable greed, and we have to stop that theft with all we can and save this fortune for the nation of Islam. The cause of yesterday's disaster was not immediately known, said Total SA, the French oil company that operates Buncefield in a joint venture with Texaco. Source Newspaper/TV reports
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Crawford TankFireandOvervill

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