Fitna: How a film which spreads hate had a healing effect on relations between Muslims and nonMuslims in the

Netherlands Speech by Halim El Madkouri, programme manager Religion and Identity issues at Forum Conference Violent extremism in Europe, organised by the US Department of State and The George C. Marshall European center for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany 5-7 November 2008 Since 9/11, the Netherlands has served as a laboratory for the concepts of the clash of civilisations paradigm. The Dutch situation provided casuistry for the supposed irreconcilability of Islam with liberal Western norms and values, the formation of home grown terrorism and the evolution patterns of (Islamic) radicalisation. Paradoxically, my country also provides examples of the opposite: namely that a synthesis of Islam and the values of modernity and loyalty to the democratic constitutional state is in fact possible. In the Netherlands, conservative and radical forces have interacted intensively on the side of both Muslims and natives. They have shaped recent Dutch history after 9/11 by helping to determine the social, cultural and political climate in the country. Happily, the Netherlands is also a proving ground for alternative, positive experiences. The way the film Fitna has been received indicates that relations between Islam/Muslims and the West/modernity can be quite different. Good news is not viewed as news: positive developments are never given much coverage. Own intiative and responsibility in the battle against radicalism and extremism On 20 January 2008, a number of active Dutch citizens of Moroccan origin and their organisations joined forces under the umbrella of the National Moroccans Council (LBM). This is an ad-hoc alliance which focuses specifically on the potential consequences of the anti-Koran film by Dutch politican Geert Wilders. The LBM decided to respond calmly and sensibly to Geert Wilders film. This led to the creation of an intervention programme aimed at mobilising Muslims both in the Netherlands and in Muslim countries to adopt this approach. To achieve this, a fundamental effort has been made to correct existing negative opinions about the Netherlands and the position of Muslims in this country. A good example of this is the Factbook set up by FORUM, Institute for Multicultural Development (http://www.forum.nl/pdf/factbook-islam-en.pdf). With this Factbook under its arm, the LBM was able to focus in Muslim countries not just on stating the Dutch Muslims position on Wilders film. It was also able to improve the image of the Netherlands in the eyes of the Muslim world. Geert Wilders Koran film posed a number of risks, both in the Netherlands and abroad, and could therefore have sparked events similar to those of the Danish cartoons crisis. The spiritual authorities in a number of Muslim countries played a major role in that process. Their views and comments only served to escalate the crisis. The spiritual authorities (individual leaders but also institutes) viewed the insults against Islam incidents as part of a global attack against Islam. This process threatened to repeat itself, playing off the tense social climate and polarisation surrounding Islam in the Netherlands. The focus here would have been on Geert Wilders. In many Muslim countries, the Netherlands has a repuation of being an Islam-unfriendly country in which Muslims are repressed and persecuted. These countries tend to view the countries around the Netherlands as a homogenous block, whereby no distinction is made between Geert Wilders, the Dutch parliament, government and society. The views held by spiritual leaders and authorities in Muslim countries, whether in the form of calls or fatwas, can greatly influence the conduct of believers. One way to exert influence on the conduct of believers is to exert influence on the spiritual leaders and authorities. An alternative approach to the Danish one The calm and sensible response to Wilders Koran film intervention programme is an autonomous initiative which arose out of the repsonsibility of Dutch Moroccan organisations and citizens who were concerned about Wilders comments being interpreted as provocation and about potential repercussions for society as a whole.

Wilders Koran film posed a wide range of potential risks and threats to the constitutional state, the security of citizens and the entire social order. Geert Wilders strategy via his film Fitna was to attempt a breakthrough in highlighting social contradictions so that society would definitively turn its back on Muslims and their faith. We were faced with a historic challenge, which we gladly took up out of a sense of duty and loyalty to the democratic rule of law, state and society. Dutch Muslims, in particular those of Moroccan origin, have attempted to solve their historic responsibility relating to such conduct and problems within Dutch constitutional, political, social and religious relations, without any form of external intervention or management. The Dutch democratic rule of law provided and continues to provide many opportunities to address the issues surrounding Fitna within Dutch relations. The approach to Fitna is fundamentally different from that of Danish Muslims to the cartoons in the sense that Moroccans appealed to their status as Dutch citizens and the corresponding entitlements and obligations when tackling this potential crisis. The Netherlands highest authorities, i.e. Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands, the Dutch government, democratic parties and the social midfield, provided a great deal of support, whether directly or indirectly. Seeking moral, political and financial aid from foreign powers and groups was therefore not an issue on principle. Correctly managing autonomous actors The involvement of the Dutch government and its effective management of processes surrounding the Koran film were decisive in averting conflicts between population groups, which had possibly been Wilders intention. The pro-active approach to an emerging crisis appears to have been effective. The government took preventive measurements (talks with Wilders, preparation of authorities for a potential crisis, consultations with Muslims etc.). On the one hand, this spared our country unnecessary internal tensions and conflicts and, on the other, foreign interference and enmity. We have so far encountered no significant displays of aggression against the Netherlands. The decision to adopt a calm and sensible approach also had positive effects as far as Dutch Muslims are concerned. After all, extremism arises out of conflict and tension. By adopting a calm and sensible approach to the Koran film, Dutch Muslims have succeeded in preventing any potentially far-reaching political consequences arising from Fitna. Secondly, they opted to address the potential crisis, which foresaw chaos and anarchy within Dutch politics and social relations, without any external interference. They succeeded in consigning the undesired influences of authoritative and influential actors to the fringes and transforming their involvement in insults against Islam in the Netherlands into support for the Dutch government, society and Muslims. Network contacts, mails, letters and advisory activities were deployed to transform potentially harmful foreign actors in the process into strategic allies. As early as November 2007, FORUM talked to the grand mufti of Egypt Sheikh Ali Gomaa about the approaching crisis. We informed him of developments and their implications, of official political and administrative stances. And we informed him in detail about the real position of Muslims in the Netherlands. The grand mufti showed understanding and empathy and promised to do everything in his power to prevent things escalating unnecessarily. The LBM also approached Sheikh Yusuf Qaradawi, chair of the International Union for Muslim Scholars (an influential body which monitors insults against Islam), with a similar message. The result: after Fitna had been shown, he expressed his approbation of the way the Dutch government was handling the issue. This was a unique situation compared to previous crises surrounding insults against Islam. Finally the LBM, with the support of FORUM, spent two months working with Muslims in preparation for receiving Fitna calmly and sensibly. The stance of the government, the involvement of various actors in Dutch society (FORUM, civil society, churches, political parties and industry) and the efforts of Dutch Muslims in general and the LBM in particular meant that Wilders was subjected to a great deal of pressure. As a result of this growing pressure, Wilders was forced to review the intent and concept behind his Koran film continuously and to correct it himself. The final product was adapted and altered until it more or less complied with the legal norms and requirements. The law, pressure of public opinion and the stance adopted by the government ultimately checked the originally highly aggressive and confrontational intent of the film. This unique cooperation and approach largely neutralised the potentially explosive consequences of Fitna. The results achieved are due to the correct management of efforts by various autonomous actors,

each of which set to work loyally and genuinely out of a sense of responsibility to democratic ideals. FORUM played a major role in managing the situation. We see the Dutch crisis and process management surrounding Fitna as an example of harmonious relations between Muslims and Dutch society and government, but also as a model for other countries in tackling any other crises involving Islam. As an illustration: in 2006, 40% of the Dutch population was negative towards Muslims; in 2008, that figure is 24%. In 2006, 61% indicated that they never had contact with ethnic minorities or Muslims; that percentage is now 33%. It is therefore advisable to evaluate and investigate this process thoroughly with a view to developing new instruments and methods for conflict management in a multicultural society. The Dutch government should take the lead here. Fitna overseas The response to Fitna from overseas was, with a few exceptions, generally moderate and calm in Muslim countries. So far the scale of the response has remained tiny compared to the Danish cartoons crisis. The main catalysts in crises surrounding insults against Islam, namely the spiritual authorities and leaders, were convinced by the Dutch approach, partly thanks to the efforts of Dutch Muslims. All in all, it can be concluded that Fitna was received very differently in Muslim countries from the Danish cartoons. Although the film was earmarked by governments and other actors in Islamic countries as antiIslamic propaganda, Dutch society and the government were spared alleged anti-Islamism. Moreover, the films producer was not associated with the Dutch people or the Dutch state. No hostile image of the Netherlands was formed in the run-up to Fitna being shown and neither were there hostile acts. The approach adopted by Dutch Muslims ultimately worked completely differently from that of the Danish Muslims. Dutch Muslims influenced spiritual leaders in Muslim countries and not vice versa: the result is that the radical forces which abuse the insults against the Prophet theme had the wind knocked out of them. Muslims or Moroccans in the Netherlands succeeded in: 1. Prompting Muslims around the world to respond calmly, collectedly and sensibly to Wilders Koran film; 2. Convincing Muslims around the world to refrain from violence against Dutch citizens and objects in Muslim countries; 3. Convincing Muslims in countries which had initiated boycotts (Egypt and Jordan) to refrain from boycotting Dutch products, goods and services. Sense of urgency How was this approach possible? Firstly, Dutch Moroccans were aware of the intent and historical significance of Fitna in the event that consequences got out of hand and developed into a Danish crisis. Moroccans were the primary victims of the consequences of the 9/11 attacks. The murder of Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn only increased pressure on them. The murder of Dutch film director Theo van Gogh by a young Dutch Moroccan further exacerbated the situation. Renewed escalation on the scale of the Danish cartoon crisis would have caused harm lasting decades. A sense of urgency and historic awareness were of overriding importance. Muslims in the Netherlands realise that the misfortune of Islam and Muslims outside the Netherlands should not be allowed to determine their relations with others in the Netherlands. This approach was made possible partly by the way in which Dutch Muslims view the Koran. This led to a different reading and interpretation of the verses on relations between Muslims and others. Muslims or Dutch Moroccans in Dutch society took their position and experience within Dutch society as a starting principle and not the historical context of Mecca and Medina at the time of the Prophet. The calm and sensible response approach to Wilders Koran film was also based on a detailed reflection of classic authoritative works on Islamic dogma, law and ethics, until now a monopoly held by radical and extremist Islamic movements in both Muslim countries and the West.