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Copyright 2007 by ISA, www.isa.org Presented at ISA EXPO 2007, 2-4 October 2007, Reliant Center, Houston, Texas
The typical industry risk tolerance for combined events that could result in irreversible human health effects, which is used to make risk reduction decisions, is 10-4. (Appendix E of CCPS Layer of Protection Analysis)
Within DuPont, when evaluating risk of process safety scenarios there is a need to recommend additional safety protection for risk mitigation. When the hazard evaluation analyst determines that a Risk Based approach is required and interlock design is needed. When a PHA team believes a scenario is too complex to make a risk judgment using purely qualitative judgment.
Data Required
Consequences
Standard S25A Tables 12.2a & b C4 through C1 Modeling (Scenario impact ; Potential severity)
Initiating Event
DRAFT LOPA Guidance manual Table 10.1 Frequency Initiating Events
Injury or Death or moderate health irreversible effects; heath effects: Emergency medical intervention and/or hospitalization
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Comments
Will reduce frequency of large consequences (widespread spill) of a tank overfill/rupture/spill/etc. Will reduce frequency of large consequences (widespread spill) of a tank overfill/rupture/spill/etc. Will prevent overpressure Will reduce the rate of heat input and provide additional time for depressurizing/firefighting Will reduce the frequency of large consequences of an explosion by configuring blast and protecting equipment/buildings/etc. If properly designed, installed and maintained these should eliminate the potential for flashback through a piping system or into a vessel or tank.
Flame/Detonation Arrestors
10-2
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Comments
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d / or Scenario # refres to WHAT-IF Item. are events per year, other numerical values are average probabil
1 Impact Event 2
Event Likelihood 8 9
PFD of SIF
Overpress ure TC-2, release of toxic (HFA, HFIP, H2) material/ flammable; catastroph ic
C4
0.100
IPLs
DRAFT No. 8 in LOPA WhaIf Documentwas analyzed AC Electric motor for failure) "backflow " only . It did not identify cause for "backflow ". LOPA identified a discrete cause (P1527 failure).
Two check valves in HFA transfer line, clean service. Will be checked or replaced on a regular frequency so credit taken.
Impact Event
TC-2 PRD 1205 0141 set @ 200 psi; {Has rupture disc] back to "Emergen cy" Scrubber , SB-126 operated as "passive" scrubber. since pump not operated, but instrumen ted with local temperatu re controller, and level
S-1b Conceptu al Design : 2460DPG Low Low (2460PT 1822PT) closes 1825HV via MLC2.
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IPLs Auditing
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Implementation Tasks
LOPA Guidance Document
~ 59 pages Target Audience : PHA Teams/Management, LOPA Analyst & Corporate Purpose : Broad Overview of LOPA; definitions; IPL values; initiating event frequencies.
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Points to Remember
Are you (organization) ready for LOPA?
Risk Management Philosophy Current Foundation Risk Assessment Risk Tolerance Criteria Data Required
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