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2011 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7829, * In re C.C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. B.C. et al., Defendants and Appellants. B230272 COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION THREE 2011 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7829

October 17, 2011, Filed NOTICE: NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS. CALIFORNIA RULES OF COURT, RULE 8.1115(a), PROHIBITS COURTS AND PARTIES FROM CITING OR RELYING ON OPINIONS NOT CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION OR ORDERED PUBLISHED, EXCEPT AS SPECIFIED BY RULE 8.1115(b). THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION OR ORDERED PUBLISHED FOR THE PURPOSES OF RULE 8.1115. PRIOR HISTORY: [*1] APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. CK80313. Donna Levin, Referee. DISPOSITION: Affirmed. CORE TERMS: juvenile, domestic violence, prescription, substance abuse, counseling, medication, restraining order, alcohol, supplemental petition, custody, risk of harm, visitation, monitored, social worker, jurisdictional, dependency, removal, abused, detention, parental custody, additionally, aggressor, removing, tested positive, drug test, prescribed, directing, emotional, drug abuse, ordering

COUNSEL: Christopher R. Booth, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant B.C. Neale B. Gold, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant A.C. Andrea Sheridan Ordin, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, Navid Nakhjavani, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. JUDGES: KLEIN, P.J.; CROSKEY, J., ALDRICH, J. concurred. OPINION BY: KLEIN OPINION

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A.C. (mother) and B.C. (father) appeal jurisdictional findings on a supplemental petition and dispositional orders made with respect to their son, C.C. The family came to the attention of the Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) after an incident of domestic violence between mother and father in December of 2009. The juvenile court ordered mother to leave the family home and granted father custody of C.C. In March of 2010, the juvenile court placed C.C. in the home of mother and father with family preservation services. In late June of 2010, another incident of domestic violence occurred. On July 6, 2010, C.C. was detained as the result of an [*2] argument regarding his custody between mother and father at a courthouse in Riverside County. The juvenile court thereafter sustained a supplemental petition, placed C.C. in foster care and granted mother and father family reunification services and monitored visitation. Mother and father contend the evidence does not support the allegations of the supplemental petition or the removal of C.C. from parental custody. They additionally contend the juvenile court abused its discretion in ordering mother to participate in domestic violence counseling, in requiring father to attend substance abuse counseling and in ordering monitored visitation for father. We affirm the orders of the juvenile court. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 1. The initial detention of C.C. A detention report indicated that on December 2, 2009, police officers arrested mother after an incident of domestic violence between mother and father in the family home in the presence of two-month-old C.C. A social worker contacted father who stated mother has a 15-year history of abusing OxyContin and has a genetic disease, Ehlers-Danlos Syndrome, for which she takes Hydrocodone. Father indicated that, on December 2, 2009, he received [*3] a call from a friend who stated mother was intoxicated and that she left the home with a known abuser of OxyContin, taking C.C. with her. Father came home and found mother passed out with the child in her arms after she had consumed alcohol and OxyContin. When father confronted mother about her drug use, she attacked father. Police officers came to the home and arrested mother. Father reported there had been four prior incidents of mother attacking him in the previous year. Father stated he formerly had a substance abuse problem with cocaine but completed a drug program in 1994. Father went to prison in 1994 for fraud but has not been arrested since then. Mother told the social worker that on December 2, 2009 she drank two small bottles of Jack Daniels with soda and had no idea she would react to the alcohol as she did. When father came home, they argued and mother assumed father struck her. Mother stated she has been prescribed Hydrocodone, receives her prescriptions weekly and is tested by her doctor to ensure her levels of medication are appropriate. Mother indicated father dispenses her medication to her on a daily basis. The detention report noted mother had a prior referral in [*4] April of 2006 regarding an older son who now resides with his father. Mother was found wandering in Walnut Creek with the child. Mother tested positive for amphetamines, opiates and prescribed medication and was hospitalized for evaluation and treatment. Attached to the detention report was a police report related to an incident of domestic violence between mother and father on April 13, 2009. Mother, who was three months pregnant at the time, stated she fell down the steps of their mobile home during an argument with father. Also attached to the detention report was a supplemental report prepared in connection with the incident on December 2, 2009. It indicated mother told a sheriff's deputy that father punched her several times in the face and head, then pushed mother to the ground and placed his foot on her neck. Mother punched and kicked at father until he removed his foot from her neck and left the

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location. The deputy noted swelling to the left side of mother's jaw and bruising under her chin and on her forearms. Mother stated father had consumed at least three 24 ounce beers. Father told the deputy that mother choked him, punched him about the head and body and pulled him to the [*5] ground. When father was able to get to his feet, mother kicked him in the mouth. Father indicated he had consumed only two 24 ounce beers and there was a history of domestic violence with mother being the aggressor. On December 4, 2009, father appeared in family law court and requested an order preventing domestic violence in which he alleged that on January 28, and December 2, 2009, mother physically assaulted father. The family law court issued a temporary restraining order directing mother, among other things, to move from the home. 2. Family reunification services. On December 9, 2009, the juvenile court released C.C. to father and directed mother not to reside in the home. The juvenile court ordered the Department to provide mother family reunification services. On January 22, 2010, mother and father pleaded no contest to the dependency petition, as amended, to allege mother abused prescription medication while C.C. was in her care and mother and father engaged in domestic violence in the presence of the child. On March 16, 2010, the juvenile court ordered mother to attend a drug and alcohol program with random testing, conjoint counseling with father, and individual counseling to [*6] address case issues including domestic violence. Over father's objection, the juvenile court ordered father to submit to on-demand drug testing if he appeared to be under the influence. The juvenile court ordered C.C. placed in the home of his parents and ordered the Department to provide family preservation services. 3. C.C. is redetained. On July 9, 2010, the Department filed a supplemental petition. The detention report indicated that on June 30, 2010, social worker Trish Knechtli received a telephone call from mother who was crying and upset. Mother stated that on June 28, 2010, father texted her during a group counseling session. The text stated father had heard what mother was saying during the session. Father sent another text stating that if mother did not get into the car immediately, he would leave her at the group session. After mother left with father, he yelled at her about things he had overheard during her group therapy session and stated he hated her. When they arrived home, father grabbed mother by the arm leaving a mark. The next day, father shoved mother into a doorway and kept her from exiting their motor home by blocking the door and threatening that if she tried [*7] to exit, she would be sorry. Mother reported she and the child were staying with a friend in Hemet. Mother stated she already had filed a police report against father for domestic violence in Riverside County. On July 6, 2010, Knechtli learned C.C. had been detained at a courthouse in Riverside County after an officer determined arguments between mother and father regarding his custody placed the child at risk. Father told Knechtli he went to the Riverside courthouse and saw C.C. with a woman he did not know. The woman ran from him and, when father came into contact with mother, she began to yell at him. Father asked to have an officer present and the child was taken into protective custody. Attached to the detention report were numerous letters from father to mother alleging infidelity and deception. One of father's letters indicated C.C. deserved an atmosphere "free of junkies and liars . . . ." On July 9, 2010, at the detention hearing on the supplemental petition, mother's counsel requested release of C.C. to mother and indicated mother was in a domestic violence shelter. Father's counsel stated the family temporarily had been residing in Riverside County because mother had relapsed [*8] and father was trying to get mother into a new rehabilitation program. Father's counsel blamed

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mother for the family's current situation, stating mother had anger management issues. Father's counsel requested release of the child to father. C.C.'s counsel indicated there was ongoing conflict between the parents, noting each had obtained a restraining order against the other. C.C.'s counsel indicated she was not comfortable asking for release of the child to either parent. The juvenile court ordered C.C. placed in shelter care, stating both parents had caused the child great harm. The juvenile court noted each parent had filed a request for a restraining order against the other in Riverside County and directed them to refile the requests in the juvenile court. On July 27, 2010, mother filed a request for a restraining order which alleged father was verbally and physically abusive on April 6, 2009, and on June 28, 2010. The same day, father requested a temporary restraining order. Father alleged that in April of 2009, mother kicked, punched and bit father and threatened to kill him and, on June 28, 2010, mother threatened to cut father's throat with a knife while father slept and threatened [*9] to run away with their child. The juvenile court issued restraining orders against father and mother, granted each parent monitored visitation in a neutral setting and ordered the parents not to visit at the same time. On August 16, 2010, the Department filed an amended supplemental petition which added an allegation that father had a history of illicit drug abuse, he was a current user of opiates who had tested positive for opiates and Hydrocodone on May 7, 2010, and he had been under the influence of drugs while C.C. was in his care. 4. Jurisdiction report prepared for the adjudication of the supplement petition. The jurisdiction report indicated mother told dependency investigator Karen La that father drinks alcohol and takes Hydrocodone or OxyContin prescribed to mother on a daily basis. Also, on three occasions in March, father used methamphetamine. Knechtli told La that father was asked to drug test on May 7, 2010, because he appeared to be "on something." When he tested positive, father said he had a prescription but he would not provide it to Knechtli. In June, during a home visit, Knechtli again asked to see the prescription, causing father to "flip out." Family friend Charles Faulk, [*10] who works for a federal task force that investigates gangs involved in drugs, believed father was using drugs based on "his actions and . . . his pupils." Faulk had seen classic signs of father being under the influence. Faulk told La that father accuses mother of having sex with neighbors and acts like a private investigator. Also, mother and father both engage in domestic violence. An addendum report filed August 24, 2010, indicated that on August 17, 2010, father told La he occasionally drank beer but he does not drink when he takes medication. A family friend told La that father drinks soda and she had never seen him intoxicated. On August 23, 2010, father delivered several complaint letters and a printout from his facebook account in which father asked friends and family to provide negative information regarding mother and positive information regarding father. La expressed concern regarding father's mental and emotional stability. A prescription history for father from medco.com was attached to the addendum report. It indicated medco.com mailed Hydrocodone to father on September 16, and December 16, 2009, and on May 21, 2010. The printout indicates the Hydrocodone mailed on May [*11] 21, 2010, was a "new prescription."

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On August 24, 2010, the juvenile court continued the matter for adjudication and admonished father not to discuss the case on facebook and not to send emails and texts to the Department and other people, noting father's conduct "border[ed] on harassment." 5. The contested adjudication on the supplemental petition. On October 20, 2010, the juvenile court conducted a combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing on the supplemental petition. Mother testified she and father intended to reconcile. They were not living together due to the restraining order but had attended counseling in March and May of 2010. They recently had found a new therapist and were scheduled to start marital counseling next week. They continued to live in the same motor home park and mother speaks to father at visitation exchanges. Mother believed the restraining order, which Knechtli instructed her to get, was unnecessary. Regarding the incident of June 29, 2010, mother testified she was not "really fearful" of father but believed she needed to remove C.C. from the home to allow the situation to cool down. Also, mother was concerned father might take the child out of state. Mother [*12] denied she had threatened to cut father's throat and abscond with C.C. Mother changed her facebook status to indicate she is in a relationship with father after they attended some counseling sessions and mother began to take responsibility for her own actions. Social worker Kenchtli admitted C.C. was not injured during the domestic violence incidents in June and there had been no reports indicating the child was neglected as a result of father's alleged drug abuse. When Knechtli first met father in May of 2010, father presented as physically threatening and angry and was acting in a very suspicious manner that led Knechtli and her supervisor to request a drug test. Dependency investigator La testified she had received no information indicating C.C. had been harmed or injured as a result of the June incident. La was aware that father has a back condition for which he had been prescribed pain medication and the substance for which he tested positive in May of 2010, was a prescribed medication. La conceded there had been no reports of neglect or abuse of C.C. as a result of father's use of prescription drugs. However, La was concerned that father had tested positive for controlled substances [*13] and was under the influence, which "automatically places a risk to that child" in that the parent's ability to function is compromised. La noted the medco.com paperwork father provided does not list a doctor. After counsel for the parties argued the matter, the juvenile court found the victim in this case was C.C. and there "[i]s a risk when parents have engaged in . . . domestic violence over and over again." The juvenile court noted there also was a risk to C.C. in that father was taking Hydrocodone and mother had just recently completed a drug program. Further, father stated in a sworn declaration that mother kicked him, punched him and threatened to kill him on April 15, 2010. Shortly after that, father tested positive. The juvenile court noted that, in her application for a restraining order, mother asked that father have no visits. "That's how afraid she was that the father was either going to take the child or do something harmful." The juvenile court noted father, on his facebook page, called mother a "mentally challenged, immature, disturbed drug addict with a long history of personal and family mental illness." The juvenile court observed that mother and father still planned [*14] to "get back together" and, although that was "their business," the juvenile court had "to protect their child because they're not doing a very good job of it." The juvenile court found there was certainly "more than enough" evidence of a risk of harm C.C. to sustain the domestic violence allegation. The juvenile court stated the restraining orders would expire that date, noting the child was not in parental custody and mother testified father is no longer a threat to her. Regarding the substance abuse allegation, the juvenile court noted it had no evidence father was being treated by a physician and father had not produced a prescription for Hydrocodone. The juvenile court sustained both counts of the supplemental petition.1 Father's counsel asked the juvenile court to return C.C. to father, arguing domestic violence was not likely to recur given that

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mother and father intended to divorce. In response, the juvenile court noted mother testified the parents planned to reconcile. Further, during the adjudication, mother asked father for a document, which father provided. This indicated to the juvenile court that mother and father were on friendly terms. The juvenile court stated that, before [*15] mother and father could reunify and provide an appropriate home for C.C., they needed family reunification services. FOOTNOTES As sustained, the supplemental petition alleged mother and father have a history of violent altercations in the child's presence as evidenced by the incidents on June 28 and 29, 2010. Count two alleged father has a history of illicit drug abuse and is a current abuser of opiates which renders father incapable of providing regular care and supervision. Father tested positive for Hydrocodone on May 7, 2010, and, on or about that date, father was under the influence of drugs while the child was in his care.
1

The juvenile court declared C.C. a dependent child and ordered him removed from the custody of his parents. The juvenile court directed the Department to provide reunification services, including a 52-week domestic violence counseling program and conjoint counseling for both parents. The juvenile court ordered father to attend a drug abuse program approved by the Department and to drug test on demand. The juvenile court granted mother and father monitored visitation. CONTENTIONS Mother contends the evidence did not support the domestic violence allegation of the supplemental [*16] petition and the juvenile court abused its discretion in ordering mother to participate in domestic violence counseling. Father contends the evidence does not support the substance abuse allegation and the juvenile court abused its discretion in requiring father to attend substance abuse counseling and in ordering monitored visitation for father. Both parents contend there was insufficient evidence to support the removal of C.C. from their custody. DISCUSSION 1. The evidence supports the allegations of the supplemental petition. a. General principles. In order to assert jurisdiction, the juvenile court must find a child falls within one or more of the categories specified in Welfare and Institutions Code section 300.2 (In re Veronica G. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 179, 185.) The Department bears the burden of proving the child comes under the juvenile court's jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. (Ibid.; 355, subd. (a).) FOOTNOTES
2

Subsequent unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

Section 300, subdivision (b), at issue here, permits the juvenile court to adjudge a child a dependent if "the child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will [*17] suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child . . . ." ( 300, subd. (b).) "The basic question under section 300 is whether circumstances at the time of the hearing subject the minor to the defined risk of harm. [Citation.]" (In re Nicholas B. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1134.)

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In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a jurisdictional finding, we apply the substantial evidence test. (In re J.N. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1022.) b. Mother's appeal. Mother contends the evidence did not support the finding mother had a history of engaging in violent altercations in the presence of the child. Mother argues there was no evidence of ongoing domestic violence, C.C. was not at risk of physical harm in the past altercations between mother and father, and it was unlikely he would be at risk of harm in the future. (In re Daisy H. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 713, 717.) Mother notes Kenchtli testified C.C. was never injured during any domestic violence incident and La testified she had no information indicating the child had ever been harmed. Mother claims the fact the juvenile [*18] court did not renew the restraining orders suggests the altercation in June of 2010 was not violent and, in any event, father was the aggressor in that incident. Mother also claims the juvenile court could not properly consider the prior incidents of domestic violence, which occurred more than a year before the incident underlying the supplemental petition, in determining whether C.C. currently was at risk of harm. (In re James R. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 129, 135-136; In re David M. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 822, 829.) Mother's arguments are not persuasive. In addition to the most recent incident of domestic violence, mother and father had a documented history of domestic violence that included incidents in April and December of 2009, both of which resulted in police intervention. In determining to exercise jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b), "past harmful conduct is relevant to the current risk of future physical harm to a child . . . ." (In re J.N., supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 1025.) These incidents were not too remote to be considered by the juvenile court. Further, dependency jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b) may be exercised based on a showing the child "has [*19] suffered or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or abuse." (In re Adam D. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1261, quoting section 300, subd. (b).) Thus, jurisdiction under this subdivision may be based on evidence of prior acts. (In re J.K. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1438.) Additionally, contrary to mother's assertion that father had been the aggressor in June of 2010, the evidence indicated mother threatened to slit father's throat in connection with this incident. Thus, both mother and father continued to engage in domestic violence in the presence of C.C. Further, after the incidents of June 28 and 29, 2010, mother and father had a confrontation on July 6, 2010, which resulted in C.C. being detained. Although C.C. was not harmed in either the past or the most recent episodes of domestic violence, mother and father exposed the child to the violence and, given his age, this was sufficient to permit the juvenile court to sustain the petition. With respect to the risk of future harm to C.C., mother minimized the domestic violence that previously had occurred and testified she and father were going to commence counseling with a new therapist and they [*20] intended to reconcile. This testimony indicates mother planned to return to her abusive relationship with father. Based thereon, the juvenile court reasonably could conclude there was a substantial risk C.C. would be exposed to domestic violence between mother and father in the future. Mother's reliance on the juvenile court's refusal to extend the mutual restraining orders as evidence there was no current risk of harm to C.C. is misplaced. The juvenile court refused to extend the restraining orders because, in addition to mother's testimony she had never been in fear of father, the juvenile court found mother and father regularly had violated the orders. Thus, the juvenile court's refusal to extend the restraining orders does not detract from the jurisdictional finding. In re Daisy H., supra, 192 Cal.App.4th 713, cited by mother, does not assist her argument. Daisy H. held risk of emotional harm, which is not one of the enumerated risks in section 300, subdivision (b), insufficient to warrant dependency jurisdiction. (In re Daisy H., supra, at p. 717.) Here, the evidence

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indicated ongoing domestic violence between mother and father which placed C.C. at substantial risk of harm. Accordingly, [*21] Daisy H. is distinguishable. In sum, the evidence supports the juvenile court's jurisdictional finding on the domestic violence allegation of the supplemental petition. c. Father's appeal. Father disputes the jurisdictional finding on the allegation father has a substance abuse problem. Father asserts his prescription for Hydrocodone predated the Department's involvement in this case. He claims lawful use of prescription pain medication did not demonstrate a risk of harm to C.C. Father argues that, absent evidence of neglectful conduct or a present substantial risk of harm, the dependency allegation must be reversed. (In re Rubisela E. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 177, 194-195; In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 820.) Father compares his case to Jennifer A. v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1322, in which a mother's "missed, diluted, and positive tests for marijuana between the 12-month review report/hearing and the 18-month review report/hearing" did not mean return of the children to mother would create a substantial risk of detriment to their physical or emotional well-being "in light of factors in the case militating in favor of their return." (Id. at p. 1346.) Father claims [*22] that, as in Jennifer A., there was no evidence mother or father ever physically or emotionally abused C.C., there was no evidence father's use of prescription painkiller and alcohol affected his parenting skills, he acted appropriately with C.C. during monitored visits, and there was no evidence father used any drugs other than alcohol and prescribed painkillers. Further, the Department presented no evidence that established father displayed signs of clinical substance abuse. (Id. at p. 1346.) Father concludes "the mere use of [drugs] by a parent will not support a finding of risk to minors," particularly where that risk is "speculative." (In re Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 452.) Thus, the juvenile court's jurisdictional finding was not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree. The evidence before the juvenile court showed more than the lawful use of prescription medication. Father's positive drug test for Hydrocodone was obtained because the case worker and her supervisor observed father to be in an agitated and emotional state when he appeared at the offices of the Department in May of 2010. This positive drug test showed that, even when father was not consuming alcohol [*23] in combination with prescription medication, he exhibited signs of being under the influence that were apparent to neutral observers. This suggests father took excessive amounts of Hydrocodone. Additionally, mother reported father used her prescription medication as well as his own in combination with alcohol on a daily basis. Further, a family friend who was versed in the objective signs of drug intoxication told the case worker father regularly demonstrated classic signs of being under the influence of drugs. This evidence was sufficient to warrant the juvenile court's finding father was a current abuser of prescription medication and, as a result, C.C. was at substantial risk of harm in his care. Where a child is under the age of two years, "the absence of adequate supervision and care poses an inherent risk to [the child's] physical health and safety." (In re Rocco M., supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 824.) Jennifer A., the case on which father places primary reliance, involved a mother who used marijuana and was never seen to have been impaired. Here, the evidence showed father not only abused Hydrcodone, a powerful prescription drug, but also mixed it with alcohol, and that he did so [*24] regularly. This evidence abundantly supports the juvenile court's jurisdictional finding. 2. The juvenile court committed no abuse of discretion in removing C.C. from the custody of his parents. a. General principles. The standard for removal of a child from parental custody is found in section 361, subdivision (c) which provides, in relevant part, "A dependent child may not be taken from the physical custody of his or her parents or guardian or guardians with whom the child resides at the time the petition was initiated, unless the juvenile court finds clear and convincing evidence . . . [t]here is or would be a

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substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which the minor's physical health can be protected without removing the minor from the minor's parent's or guardian's physical custody." ( 361.5, subd. (c).) "The parent need not be dangerous and the child need not have been actually harmed for removal to be appropriate. The focus of the statute is on averting harm to the child. [Citations.] In this regard, the court may consider the parent's past [*25] conduct as well as present circumstances. [Citation.]" (In re Cole C. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 900, 917.) The juvenile court's findings must be based on clear and convincing evidence. (In re Kristin H. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1635, 1654.) However, we review an order removing a child from parental custody for substantial evidence in a light most favorable to the juvenile court findings. (In re H.G. (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 1, 13; In re Henry V. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 522, 529; In re Heather A. (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 183, 193.) "We do not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts. [Citation.]" (In re H.G., supra, at p. 13.) b. The parents' arguments. Mother contends the order removing C.C. from her custody was error in that she posed no risk of harm to the child. Mother argues she was not an aggressor in the June 2010 incidents, any evidence indicating she had been an aggressor was in the remote past, and the social reports indicated mother had been compliant with her case plan. Further, in June 2010, mother removed C.C. from the home to ensure the child's safety, thereby demonstrating mother would act appropriately to protect the child. Mother [*26] concludes the order removing C.C. from her custody must be reversed. Father contends that, at the time of the disposition hearing, there was no evidence indicating C.C. would be at risk of harm in father's care due to father's alleged substance abuse. Father notes mother and father had not engaged in domestic violence in more than four months and the juvenile court did not extend the mutual restraining orders, thereby recognizing there was no continuing danger of domestic violence. Mother and father both additionally contend the Department and the juvenile court failed to explore other reasonable means of protecting C.C. short of removing him from parental custody. (In re Henry V., supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 528; In re Basilio T. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 155, 169-170, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in In re Lucero L. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1227, 1239-1243.) c. The evidence supports the juvenile court's removal order. With respect to mother's arguments, as previously noted and contrary to her assertion, mother was an aggressor in the June 2010 incident in that she threatened to slit father's throat in his sleep. Further, the prior incidents of domestic violence between mother [*27] and father were not so remote that the juvenile court could not consider them in determining whether C.C. was at risk of harm from domestic violence while in the care of his parents. The juvenile court may "consider a broad class of relevant evidence" in deciding whether a child is at substantial risk from a parent's failure or inability to adequately protect or supervise the child. (In re Y.G. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 109, 116.) Accordingly, the ongoing domestic violence between mother and father supported the removal of C.C. from parental custody. With respect to father's claim there was no evidence showing C.C. was at risk of harm in his care due to drug abuse, as stated in section 300.2, a home "free from the negative effects of substance abuse is a necessary condition for the safety, protection and physical and emotional well-being of the child." ( 300.2) A parent who uses illegal substances or abuses prescription drugs has a reduced ability to care for children. Here, the evidence showed father was a current abuser of prescription medication in that he took excessive medication and he used prescription medication in combination with alcohol. Based on this evidence, the juvenile [*28] court reasonably could find by clear and convincing evidence that C.C.

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could not safely remain in father's custody. Father's continuing claim he did not abuse prescription drugs by mixing them with alcohol indicates father lacks insight into his situation. Additionally, the juvenile court was not required to wait for actual harm to the child before removing the child from parental custody. (In re Cole C., supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 917.) With respect to the claim the juvenile court failed to consider less drastic alternatives before ordering the child removed from parental custody, the juvenile court previously had placed the child in father's care, ordered mother to leave the home and ordered the Department to provide family maintenance services. Thus, less restrictive alternatives previously had been explored in this case but had proved inadequate. In the cases cited by the parents, In re Basilio T., supra, 4 Cal.App.4th 155, and In re Jeannette S. (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 52, the juvenile court ordered children placed in foster care immediately after the initial section 300 hearing. Accordingly, they are distinguishable from the situation presented here. Based on the foregoing, we conclude [*29] the removal order is supported by substantial evidence. 3. The dispositional order that mother attend domestic violence counseling. Mother contends the order directing her to participate in a 52-week domestic violence counseling program was an abuse of discretion because she was not the aggressor in the incident that led to the filing of the supplemental petition. Thus, the order was not tailored to fit the family's circumstances. (Mark N. v. Superior Court (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 996, 1010; In re Dino E. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1768, 1777.) Mother notes the juvenile court did not renew the restraining order against her and concludes that, because there was no evidence indicating mother had unresolved domestic violence issues, the order directing mother to participate in domestic violence counseling was an abuse of the juvenile court's discretion. "The juvenile court has broad discretion to determine what would best serve and protect the child's interest and to fashion a dispositional order in accordance with this discretion. [Citations.] The court's determination in this regard will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. [Citation.]" (In re Jose M. (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 1098, 1103-1104.) Our [*30] rejection of mother's attack on the jurisdictional finding and removal order foreshadows our rejection of this claim. The evidence showed mother and father had a volatile relationship marked by frequent episodes of domestic violence. Further, mother had continuing domestic violence issues in that she threatened to slit father's throat in connection with the June 2010 incidents. Given that mother planned to reconcile with father, which suggested C.C. again would be placed at risk of domestic violence if returned to the care of his parents, the order directing mother to participate in domestic violence counseling was well within the juvenile court's discretion. 4. The dispositional order that father attend a drug abuse program. Father contends the evidence was insufficient to support the order requiring father to participate in substance abuse counseling. Father asserts the evidence failed to indicate a current substance abuse problem which resulted in dependency. (In re Basilio T., supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at pp. 172-173.) Father notes Basilio T. held a parent's behavior cannot be the only evidence of substance abuse and there must be some indication the substance abuse led to the conditions [*31] that caused the dependency. (Ibid.) Father argues that, because the only evidence of alleged substance abuse came from father's neighbor, the order requiring father to undergo drug treatment must be reversed. Father further contends the Department presented no evidence indicating father displayed clinical symptoms of substance abuse. Rather, the Department relied exclusively on "the opinion of the . . . social worker . . . ." (Jennifer A. v. Superior Court, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 1346.) Father's claims are meritless. In accordance with section 362, the juvenile court may make "any and all reasonable orders for the care, supervision [or] custody . . . of the child" and "any and all reasonable orders to the parents or guardians" to ameliorate the conditions that led to the

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assumption of jurisdiction over the child. ( 362, subds. (a) & (c).) These statutory provisions "have been broadly interpreted to authorize a wide variety of remedial orders intended to protect the safety and well-being of dependent children . . . ." (In re Carmen M. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 478, 486.) Thus, an order directing a parent with a substance abuse problem to participate in a drug treatment program is [*32] not an abuse of discretion. (See generally In re Christopher H. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1006.) Father's reliance on Basilio T. is misplaced. Basilio T. found that, other "than the social worker's observation that [mother] behaved somewhat out of the usual and was obsessed with discussing a fortune-making invention, there was nothing in the record to indicate either [mother or father] had a substance abuse problem. . . . [T]he only remaining factor supporting the substance abuse component was [mother's] behavior," which "by itself, cannot support a conclusion she had a substance abuse problem." (In re Basilio T., supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at pp. 172 -173.) Here, the social worker asked father to drug test after he presented as physically threatening and angry and acted in a suspicious manner. Additionally, mother reported father mixed alcohol and prescription medication on a daily basis and a friend of the family told the social worker father regularly displayed classic symptoms of being under the influence of drugs. Thus, Basilio T. is distinguishable. In Jennifer A. v. Superior Court, the other case cited by father, there was no evidence the parent had used any drug other than alcohol [*33] and marijuana, or that she ever drank alcohol or smoked marijuana around the children. (In re Jennifer A., supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 1345.) Additionally, no evidence linked the parent's use of alcohol and marijuana to the parent's judgment or parenting skills. The social worker testified the parent never appeared to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs and the parent did not have a drug problem that affected her parenting skills. (Id. at p. 1346.) Here, the opposite is true. Father appeared to the social worker to be under the influence and mother testified father abused prescription pain killers or a daily basis. Thus, the order directing father to participate in a drug abuse program was not an abuse of the juvenile court's discretion. 5. The order for monitored visitation. Father contends the evidence did not support the juvenile court's orders that father's visitation be monitored. Father claims there was no evidence of risk of harm to the child and asks this Court to reverse the visitation order and remand with directions to to grant father unmonitored visitation, including weekend and/or overnight visits. "Courts have long held that in matters concerning child custody and [*34] visitation trial courts are vested with broad discretion. On appeal the exercise of that discretion will not be reversed unless the record clearly shows it was abused." (In re Megan B. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 942, 953; In re Christopher H., supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at p. 1006 ["The court has broad discretion to determine what would best serve and protect the child's interest and to fashion a dispositional order in accord with this discretion."].) Applying these principles here, and given father's abuse of prescription medication, it is apparent the juvenile court committed no abuse of its discretion in ordering that father's visitation with C.C. be monitored. DISPOSITION The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS KLEIN, P.J.

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We concur: CROSKEY, J. ALDRICH, J.

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