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HEALTH AND SAFETY BRIEFING

No 46b
September 2004

Hazard Analysis (HAZAN)


Introduction

Other Health and Safety Briefings have discussed aspects of Risk Assessment:

• Risk Assessment – Practical Application in the Workplace


• Risk Assessment – Legal Position and Interpretation
• Quantified Risk Assessment Techniques (Part 1) – Failure Modes and Effects
Analysis (FMEA)
• Quantified Risk Assessment Techniques (Part 2) – Event Tree Analysis (ETA)
• Quantified Risk Assessment Techniques (Part 3) – Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
• Hazard and Operability Studies – (HAZOP)

This Briefing Note is intended to explain the meaning of the term Hazard Analysis
(HAZAN).

Hazard Analysis (HAZAN) is simply the application of numerical methods to obtain an


understanding of hazards in terms of:

1. How often a hazard will manifest itself


2. With what consequences for people, process and plant.

HAZAN is therefore the essential prerequisite for the complete risk assessment process,
i.e. first analyse the hazards and then go on to assess the risks they present and determine
what, if any, ameliorating measures should be taken.

Identifying the Hazards


For the hazard analysis to be complete it is essential that all the hazards present in the
defined system have been identified. Quantitative data based on past experience are the
most important means of identifying hazards and assessing potential frequency, although
for new processes and techniques experiential data may be limited.

Audits conducted by experienced assessors, who consider past experience and near misses
and procedures for dealing with emergencies and abnormal events, will identify hazards
effectively and produce a useful future record. Checklists can also be useful but can result
in limiting enquiry unless open questions are asked such as “how is the system protected
against…” rather than “is the system protected against…”. Checklists in themselves do
not provided quantitative ranking of hazards.

© 2004 The IEE


The Institution of Electrical Engineers is a not-for-profit organisation,
registered as a charity in the UK
How to Rank the Hazards
There are established indices such as the Dow Index and the Mond Index, which can be
used for systematically identifying hazards and providing a method of ranking priorities.
The Dow Index was originally developed by the Dow Chemical Company to assist in the
selection of fire protection methods. The guide has been updated several times but still
only covers process units rather than auxilliary plant such as power generators. The
Mond Index was developed by ICI for the chemical industry, after the Flixborough
disaster. It expands on the Dow Index to include wider consideration of continuous and
batch processes, loading and unloading and storage. It provides a more comprehensive
treatment of hazards from materials, reactions and toxicity. In summary:

• Dow Index: identifies fire, explosion and chemical reactivity hazards in plant design
and is used for existing plant.
• Mond Index: developed by ICI after the Flixborough disaster and wider in scope than
the Dow Index.

Methods of HAZAN
A number of techniques, referred to in other Health and Safety Briefings, including
HAZOP and FTA, could form the basis of a Hazard Analysis.

Whatever technique is used, it is important to have the practical advice of those who
understand the system being modelled. An expert analyst, who is unfamiliar with the
specific system may be unaware of some factors that are taken for granted by the
operators.

In the end, when management is reviewing the analysis, it is important to confirm that the
assumptions that have been made are reasonable and that the outcome appears to accord
with experience. A thoroughly conducted hazard analysis provides a sound quantitative
basis for decisions on ameliorative measures that it will be reasonable to take.

Further reading:
• American Institute of Chemical Engineers (1981) Dow’s Fire & Explosion Index:
Hazard Classification Guide (5th edition) LC 80-29237
• Lewis DJ (1980) The Mond Fire, Explosion & Toxicity Index. Loss Prevention,
vol 13. American Institute of Chemical Engineers
• Kletz T A (1986) HAZOP & HAZAN Notes on the Identification and Assessment
of Hazards The Institution of Chemical Engineers: London
These Briefings contain a summary of recent Health & Safety issues, provided for general
information purposes only, and should not be relied upon as legal advice. The IEE has
tried to make the Briefings accurate and informative, but they have not been prepared by
a lawyer and may not constitute an up-to-date summary of the law. The IEE accepts no
liability for your use of these Briefings. Further details and information on broader
Health & Safety issues can be obtained from the Government’s Health and Safety
Executive. Legal advice should be obtained on any specific issues.
The IEE is unable to provide further information on this topic. Please contact the
HSE.

For information about the IEE's Health and Safety Policy Advisory Group please contact:
Health and Safety Policy Advisory Group Secretary
© 2004 The IEE
The Institution of Electrical Engineers is a not-for-profit organisation,
registered as a charity in the UK
Engineering Policy Department
IEE
Six Hills Way
Stevenage
Herts
SG1 2AY
Tel: +44 (0) 1438 765687

© 2004 The IEE


The Institution of Electrical Engineers is a not-for-profit organisation,
registered as a charity in the UK

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