U.S.

District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas

Northern Division

Don Hamrick, pro se (Non-State Actor) )

5860 Wilburn Road )
Wilburn, Arkansas 72179 ) Case No. 1:06cv0044
)
-v- )
)
United Nations, et al )
New York, NY 10017 )

PLAINTIFF’S
MANDATORY JUDICIAL NOTICE OF ADJUDICATIVE FACTS

PLAINTIFF HAS ADDITIONAL STANDING UNDER

GLOBAL WARMING CASE LAW AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT:

Massachusetts et al. v. EPA et al.

U.S. Supreme Court, Slip Opinion, No. 05-1120, April 2, 2007
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/06pdf/05-1120.pdf
&
Goldstein v. Van De Kamp
9th Circuit, No. 06-55537, March. 28, 2007
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/5B19072EE8E5CF46882572AB008167CE/$file/0655537.pdf

MASSACHUSETTS & GOLDSTEIN AS TENTH AMENDMENT CASES

RESTORING POWERS TO THE STATES &
POWERS RESERVED TO THE PEOPLE
WITH RESTORATIVE APPLICATIONS FOR
SECOND AMENDMENT POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
FOR THE
THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
THE U.S. COAST GUARD, THE TSA, THE BATFE, AND
40 OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES
 PROCLAMATION & DECLARATION OF
AN ACT OF REPOSSESSION OF FREEDOM AND
A REPOSSESSION OF A TENTH AMENDMENT POWER
RESERVED TO THE PEOPLE AS DETERMINED BY NEW CASE LAW
“FED UP!” “PLAINTIFF IS NOW DEMANDING JUSTICE!
Having endured 4 years, 8 months of obstruction of justice by the federal judiciary and by
the U.S. Department of Justice by every dirty trick of the federal bench and bar to deny my
Second Amendment case from proceeding to trial when the subject matter and the merits of my
case demand a jury trial, in an act of Constitutional self-defense and in defiance of the United
States Government’s attempt to take Tenth Amendment powers Reserved to the People by unjust
and abusive means of the political, legislative, and regulatory process, and by belligerently denying
all available statutory, regulatory, and judicial remedies guaranteed to me under the right to
petition clause of the First Amendment, and by the consequences of Government Action and
Inaction, having rendered me a citizen without effective rights, relegating me to the status
equivalent to that of a slave in violation of Abraham Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation, and
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment, though I be a white male of age 51, and having been
harassed by the U.S. Government with criminal investigations for acting in defense of my rights
under the Bill of Rights, and by authority of the U.S. Supreme Court case law in Massachusetts
and Goldstein, I, being a Citizen of the United States under the Fourteenth Amendment, and as a
Member of “the People” under the Tenth Amendment, and acting as a “Private Attorney General”
with a Civil RICO Act case for the Second Amendment as established in my previous pleadings,
do hereby proclaim that I now reclaim, and take back my status as a free citizen of the United
States, and further taking back certain powers reserved to The People under the Tenth
Amendment.
I, under the aforesaid status as a free citizen of the United States, do proclaim and declare
that I now have a GREATER STANDING to “FORCE federal agencies of the United States
Government [NOT by armed or physical force but by Force of their Oath of Office, demanding
compulsive obedience to their allegiance to defending the U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights
against all enemies, foreign and domestic under threat of Citizen’s Arrest for offenses against my
constitutional rights, duties, and powers with attending assistance of any federal law enforcement
agent as is appropriate and affirmed by a federal judge through a Warrant of Citizen’s Arrest as the
procedures may or may not require, as a means of last resort when all available remedies of
criminal procedure have been exhausted and/or denied by federal law enforcement agencies to the
neglect, degradation, or obstruction of justice.] the U.S. Marshals Service, the BATFE, the U.S.
Coast Guard, the U.S. Department of Justice, the FBI, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
the TSA, and 40 other federal agencies through this civil litigation to develop policies and
procedures and to force said federal agencies to adequately train and supervise their subordinates
to fulfill their constitutional obligations in regard to “The People’s” Second Amendment rights
under Parker, and Emerson, and under the U.S. Department of Justice August 24, 2004
MEMORANDUM OPINION finding that the Second Amendment is an individual right regardless of
membership in a militia.
This Proclamation extends to the Federal Court issuing a Court Order, if necessary,
compelling such obedience to the U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights in the interest of justice.
 APPLYING MASSACHUSETTS AND GOLDSTEIN
TO THE SECOND AMENDMENT

Massachusetts v. EPA, U.S. Supreme Court Slip Opinion No. 05-1120, (April 2, 2007) on
global warming has restorative applications for Second Amendment policies and procedures for the
U.S. Department of Justice, The U.S. Department of Homeland Security, The U.S. Coast Guard, the
TSA, the BATFE, and 40 Other Federal Agencies

“Massachusetts v. EPA, 05-1120, was filed in order to force the EPA to limit emissions from
new cars and trucks by 12 states and 13 environmental groups, including California and
Massachusetts.” See, http://www.tothecenter.com/news.php?readmore=1453

Goldstein v. Van De Kamp, et al, (9th Cir., No. 06-55537, Mar. 28, 2007, affirmed NO
absolute immunity for elected Los Angeles County District Attorney John Van De Kamp and his
Chief Deputy District Attorney Curt Livesay. They are NOT entitled to absolute immunity from suit
based on allegations that they failed to develop policies and procedures and failed to adequately
trained and supervise their subordinates and to fulfill their constitutional obligation of ensuring that
information regarding jailhouse informants was shared among prosecutors in their office. See Giglio
v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972). For the reasons discussed in this opinion, we hold that
they are not, and we therefore affirm the opinion of the district court.” 1

The 9th Circuit held in Goldstein, “that the district court correctly determined that Goldstein’s
allegations against Van De Kamp and Livesay describe conduct in furtherance of an administrative
rather than prosecutorial function. 2 Van De Kamp and Livesay have therefore failed to meet their
burden of demonstrating that the allegations against them are so “intimately associated with the
judicial phase of the criminal process” that absolute immunity is warranted. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430.
Accordingly, the decision of the district court is AFFIRMED.”

I am not a lawyer nor do I play one on TV! I am, however, a U.S. merchant seaman with a
civil RICO Act case for Second Amendment against the United States (and recently adding the
United Nations as lead defendant) languishing in the federal courts for the last 4 years, 8 months
because I don’t back down from a fight.

1
Slightly edited for clarity from original. Emphasis is Plaintiff’s

2
Emphasis is Plaintff’s.
 Because my case is pushing for the right to [openly] keep and bear arms in intrastate and
interstate travel, a.k.a., National Open Carry Handgun, my case is ignored by the NRA and the
Second Amendment Foundation. Even though national open carry is the constitutional norm it is
not the social norm nor the legal norm. And as such my case is politically incorrect. For that reason
no lawyer will even review my case in the 4 years 8 months I have searched for an attorney. And
just because I do not file a judicial notice of this Judge Howard presumes facts not in evidence that I
have failed to look for an attorney. Such is judicial bias I find infested with the federal judicial
system.

As a U.S. merchant seaman I have “concrete interests” in the Second Amendment right to
openly keep and bear arms in intrastate and interstate travel, and in international travel as a seaman
under maritime law in regard to my right to self-defense against pirates in piracy waters “without
meeting all the normal standards for redressability and immediacy.”

My “procedural right” under 33 C.F.R. § 1.05–60 Negotiated Rulemaking provides my

Second Amendment case with standing because there is the distinct possibility that my requested
relief will prompt the injury-causing party (the U.S. Coast Guard) to reconsider the decision that
allegedly harmed the litigant (me). (Adapting Massachusetts to my case).

The U.S. District Court denied my Motion to enter into “Negotiated Rulemaking” with the
U.S. Coast Guard and 40 other agencies of the U.S. Government in lieu of Motion to Dismiss under
the Special Procedures clause of Rule 16(c)(9) & (12) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

NOTICE TO THE U.S. MARSHALS SERVICE

My Proclamation on page 2 is specifically for the benefit for the U.S. Marshals Service to
expedite their legal research into my question of the right of Citizen’s Arrest having application to
federal offenses by the members of the U.S. Government, i.e., federal judges and court clerks of
federal courts extorting, 18 U.S.C. § 872 filing fees from U.S. seamen that are exempt from
collection, the Seamen Suit law, 28 U.S.C. § 1916, and the federal courts cannot arbitrarily apply
the condition of in forma pauperis because the legislative history of the Seamen’s Suit law did not
attach that condition. The Seamen’s Suit law is a statutory right that the federal courts cannot deny
to a seaman with a Second Amendment case because it falls under the safety clause of the Seamen’s
Suit law.
 My Proclamation is inspired by Massachusetts and Goldstein. Although I construe the two
cases as a layman, I place my Proclamation in the hands of the federal court (hopefully in the hands
of a judge other than Judge George Howard) for the determination of plausibility and legality before
I stand behind that Proclamation. This is a dangerous Second Amendment case that I am pushing.
The danger of my case has been clearly pointed out to me by actions of federal law enforcement
agencies and the U.S. military (the U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. Naval Criminal Investigative
Service).

Every procedure I take will be with the Federal Rules of the various courts and will be
completely legal under the U.S. Code, the Code of Federal Regulations, under the U.S. Constitution,
the Bill of Rights, and under “right to life” provisions of international human rights conventions and
declarations of the United Nations and the Genocide Convention.

I do not intend to ever give any federal law enforcement agency any cause of action to strip
me of my freedom through the criminal procedure of arrest, arraignment, indictment, or
incarceration because it its my intent to lawfully and judicially set a precedent restoring the Second
Amendment right of national open carry handgun. So far, political events, and case law have been
in my favor in defiance of Judge Howard’s inclinations toward judicial supremacy as apposed to
popular constitutionalism. As a war on freedom? It appears that the liberal judges are losing this war.
 IS MASS V. EPA “SCRAP FOR A NEW GENERATION”?
By Jonathan H. Adler
Professor of Law & Director of the Center for Business Law & Regulation
Case Western Reserve University School of Law
Monday, April 02, 2007
As SCOTUSBlog readers may know, I
participated in an amicus brief 3 for the Cato
Institute and several law professors arguing
against standing in this case, so I find the
Chief Justice’s dissent more agreeable than
the standing analysis in Part IV of Justice
Stevens’ opinion. Setting aside who is correct,
I think that there is language and reasoning in
Justice Stevens’ opinion that future litigants
will rely upon to establish cases in future
challenges to federal agency (in)action, and
that state litigants may be the primary
beneficiaries of this latest twist in the law of
standing.
In his dissent, Chief Justice Roberts argues
that the standing analysis adopted by the
Court’s majority in Massachusetts v. EPA
“recalls the previous high-water mark of
diluted standing requirements, United States
v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency
Procedures (SCRAP).” In this 1973 opinion,
the Supreme Court found standing for an
environmental group to challenge an increase
in railroad shipping costs because this would
increase recycling costs and thereby increase
litter in local parks. Roberts writes:
Over time, SCRAP became
emblematic not of the looseness of
Article III standing requirements, but
of how utterly manipulable they are if
not taken seriously as a matter of
judicial self-restraint. SCRAP made
standing seem a lawyer’s game, rather
than a fundamental limitation
ensuring that courts function as courts
and not intrude on the politically
accountable branches. Today’s
3 Stevens notes that because the case concerns
http://www.cato.org/pubs/legalbriefs/ma_v_epa_10
-24-06.pdf
decision is SCRAP for a new
generation.
While I am not sure the bases for standing
asserted by the petitioners in Mass v. EPA are
more tenuous than those asserted by the
plaintiffs in SCRAP, I think Chief Justice
Roberts is correct that the Court’s majority
opinion lowered the bar for standing claims in
some important respects.
First, Justice Stevens’ majority opinion
stresses “the special position and interest of
Massachusetts” in the case. Justice Stevens
writes that ‘It is of considerable relevant that
the party seeking review here is a sovereign
State and not, as it was in Lujan, a private
individual,” and that courts should show a
“special solicitude” to state standing claims.
Why? Because states “are not normal litigants
for the purposes of invoking federal
jursidiction” because they may seek to protect
“quasi-sovereign interests.” The only real
support for this cited by Justice Stevens is the
1907 case of Georgia v. Tennessee Copper.
While the Supreme Court recognized that
states have important “quasi-sovereign”
interests in the lands of its citizens, and that
they may sue on behalf of their citizens, this
case did not involve Article III standing, nor
did it suggest that the injury requirement
should be lessened when a state is involved.
Whether the majority wishes to acknowledge
it or not, I think its opinion creates a special,
lowered standing threshold for states seeking
to challenge federal regulatory actions (or
inaction).
Justice Stevens’ majority opinion also
takes steps to loosen the standing
requirements where Congress has authorized
citizen suits to force agency actions. Justice
statutory construction, it involves “a question
eminently suitable to resolution in federal
court,” so many of the normal justiciability While this specific passage quotes a
concerns are absent. Justice Stevens further footnote from Justice Scalia’s majority
empahsizes language from Lujan to the effect opinion in Lujan, much of the relevant
that discussion in Justice Stevens’ opinion draws
upon (and repeatedly quotes) Justice
a litigant to whom Congtress has
Kennedy’s Lujan concurrence, including his
‘accorded a procedural right to protect
statement that “Congress has the power to
his concrete interests’ . . . ‘can assert
define injuries and articulate chains of
that right without meeting all the
causation that will give rise to a case or
normal standards for redressability
controversy where none existed before.” In
and immediacy.’ . . . When a litigant is
this way, I think the court’s opinion further
vested with a procedural right, that
dilutes the standing requirements as
litigant has standing if there is
articulated in Lujan, to the benefit of future
somepossibility that the requested
environmental litigants.
relief will prompt the injury-causing
party to reconsider the decision that
allegedly harmed the litigant.

Note: Another version of this commentary is posted on the Volokh Conspiracy here:
http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2007_04_01-2007_04_07.shtml#1175535806
 DISCUSSION BOARD: THOUGHTS ON MASS V. EPA
by Jason Harrow, Monday, April 02, 2007
http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/2007/04/discussion_boar_3.html#comments
The following is a discussion board post
from David B. Rivkin, Jr., a partner in the
Washington, D.C. office of Baker & Hostetler
LLP. He participated in this case as an
amicus, filing a brief on behalf of
constitutional law experts supporting the
respondent. We will continue to post thoughts
on this decision, featuring contributors on
both sides of the issue.
The practical result of today’s ruling in
Massachusetts v. EPA, No. 05-1120, is that
five justices, in a binding decision of the
Supreme Court, have ordered EPA to review
its decision to not regulate greenhouse gas
emissions from new motor vehicles. The
Court does not tell EPA what decision to
reach, and EPA may very well reach the same
result as before, just on different grounds that
are more permissible to this Court.
What is remarkable about the decision is
that the Chief Justice, in dissent, spent his
entire argument reflecting on the gateway
issue of standing, expressing grave concerns
about the Court’s venture into issuing
symbolic proclamations.
Regarding standing, the Court did not
simply weigh the arguments of Massachusetts
against those of EPA and find that
Massachusetts met the existing test. Instead,
five of the justices had to first reset the rules.
In grade school, I remember that boys had to
perform push-ups with only their feet and
hands touching the mat, but girls could do
them on their knees. Likewise, Massachusetts
and other states now have shiny new rules
that go easier on them because of “special
solicitude.” Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent
argues that the creation of “special solicitude”
for Massachusetts is an implicit
acknowledgement that it cannot establish
standing on traditional terms.
That the Court changed the rules is
indicated by its reliance on Georgia v.
Tennessee Copper. The dissent points out
that this case, which recognized the state’s
right to bring an action on behalf of its
citizens, has traditionally been thought of as
adding a criteria for standing—the state’s right
to act on behalf of its citizens—rather than
easing the standing analysis by no longer
having to prove that either the state or any of
its citizens individually meet the standing
requirement.
Chief Justice Roberts addresses other
shortcoming in the standing realm. He
observes that, after the Court gives
Massachusetts “special solicitude” because of
its quasi-sovereign interests, the Court then
applies the standing requirements to a very
non-quasi-sovereign interest, the ownership of
land. This type of injury does not merit a
relaxed standing analysis.
Finally, the Chief Justice noted that in
cases involving the assertion of a quasi-
sovereign right on behalf of its citizens, the
state claims have not been asserted against
the federal government. Instead, those cases
are brought against private parties; claims on
behalf of citizens against the government are
brought by the federal government on behalf
of citizens.
The Roberts dissent then reviews the
Court’s application of traditional standing
criteria, assessing injury in fact, causation, and
redressability. It notes that the “actual injury”
is based on one conclusory statement and
does not acknowledge other non-GCC related
reasons for the loss of coastal land. Further,
the dissent observes that the use of a 100-year
horizon for demonstration of “imminence,”
and the use of compounded estimates,
renders the concept utterly toothless.
Regarding causation, the dissent notes the
difficulty of tracing the requested reduction in
mobile source emissions for new vehicles,
which amount to a very small fraction of
global emissions of greenhouse gases to the
particularized loss of Massachusetts coastal
property, concluding that it is far too
speculative to establish causation. As to
redressability, the dissent notes that the
requested emissions reductions are likely to
have little if no effect on the global carbon
levels, given increased emissions outside of
the United States and the State’s reliance on
mere speculation that other countries will
follow the lead of the United States in
reducing the emission of greenhouse gases.
Chief Justice Roberts’ suggests that, given
the mismatch between the narrow subject-
matter addressed in the case and the broad
claimed effect of global warming, the suit was
more symbolic than practical, and this betrays
the limited role of the courts within
government. His observation and comfort
taken from the fact that “special solicitude” is
limited to states is probably very little comfort
indeed, at least in the global climate change
area, given the very active litigation role that
states, in particular Massachusetts, New York,
and California, have taken, against targets
ranging from trucks and cars to power plants
and refineries.
That said, the bottom line impact of
Massachusetts is likely to be quite limited. In
the most prominent cases involving global
warming that are currently pending,
considerations beyond the question of parens
patriae and the Clean Air Act’s proper
construction are critical. For instance,
Connecticut v. American Electric Power,
currently pending before the Second Circuit,
concerns not only standing but a question to
what extent this attempted state action
adversely and unconstitutionally impacts
foreign affairs interest of the United States, as
well as the propriety of crafting a common law
cause of action to address the unique problem
of global warming. Similarly, in a suit filed by
the automobile manufacturers against the
California Air Resources Board over that
state’s tailpipe emissions standards, standing
is not in question.
Moreover, it is by no means clear that on
remand, EPA will come to the conclusion
desired by Massachusetts and the other
petitioners. The Court’s opinion does not
purport to eliminate EPA’s discretion about
whether or not it has to regulate; instead, it
merely reaffirms that EPA must exercise that
discretion in conformity with the Clean Air
Act’s decisional criteria. EPA could, for
instance, come to the conclusion that more
greenhouse gasses would be emitted by
automobiles and other sources around the
world, exacerbating the petitioners’ injuries, if
EPA regulated unilaterally and
unconditionally because, as confirmed by the
State Department, the Executive would lose
critical leverage in negotiating a multilateral
solution to climate change concerns. In this
case, it is likely that the Supreme Court would
defer to EPA’s reasoned judgment that more
pollution would result from regulating than
would result from not regulating.
One thing is sure, however. The need for
cohesive and comprehensive policy-making
by the political branches of government is
even greater, unless we truly do want our
federal courts to make more of these decisions
for us.
 Massachusetts et al. v. EPA et al.
U.S. Supreme Court Slip Opinion, No. 05-1120 April 2, 2007)
The U.S. Supeme Court Held:
1. Petitioners have standing to challenge
the EPA’s denial of their rulemaking petition.
Pp. 12–23.
(a) This case suffers from none of the
defects that would preclude it from being
a justiciable Article III “Controvers[y].”
See, e.g., Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1.
Moreover, the proper construction of a
congressional statute is an eminently
suitable question for federal-court
resolution, and Congress has authorized
precisely this type of challenge to EPA
action, see 42 U. S. C. §7607(b)(1).
Contrary to EPA’s argument, standing
doctrine presents no insuperable
jurisdictional obstacle here. To
demonstrate standing, a litigant must
show that it has suffered a concrete and
particularized injury that is either actual or
imminent, that the injury is fairly traceable
to the defendant, and that a favorable
decision will likely redress that injury. See
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S.
555, 560–561. However, a litigant to
whom Congress has “accorded a
procedural right to protect his concrete
interests,” id., at 573, n. 7—here, the right
to challenge agency action unlawfully
withheld, §7607(b)(1)—”can assert that
right without meeting all the normal
standards for redressability and
immediacy,” ibid. Only one petitioner
needs to have standing to authorize
review. See Rumsfeld v. Forum for
Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc.,
547 U. S. 47, 52, n. 2. Massachusetts has
a special position and interest here. It is a
sovereign State and not, as in Lujan, a
private individual, and it actually owns a
great deal of the territory alleged to be
affected. The sovereign prerogatives to
force reductions in greenhouse gas
emissions, to negotiate emissions treaties
with developing countries, and (in some
circumstances) to exercise the police
power to reduce motor-vehicle emissions
are now lodged in the Federal
Government. Because congress has
ordered EPA to protect Massachusetts
(among others) by prescribing applicable
standards,§7521(a)(1), and has given
Massachusetts a concomitant procedural
right to challenge the rejection of its
rulemaking petition as arbitrary and
capricious, §7607(b)(1), petitioners’
submissions as they pertain to
Massachusetts have satisfied the most
demanding standards of the adversarial
process. EPA’s steadfast refusal to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions presents a risk
of harm to Massachusetts that is both
“actual” and “imminent,” Lujan, 504 U.
S., at 560, and there is a “substantial
likelihood that the judicial relief
requested” will prompt EPA to take steps
to reduce that risk, Duke Power Co. v.
Carolina Environmental Study Group,
Inc., 438 U. S. 59, 79. Pp. 12–17.
(b) The harms associated with climate
change are serious and well recognized.
The Government’s own objective
assessment of the relevant science and a
strong consensus among qualified experts
indicate that global warming threatens,
inter alia, a precipitate rise in sea levels,
severe and irreversible changes to natural
ecosystems, a significant reduction in
winter snowpack with direct and
important economic consequences, and
increases in the spread of disease and the
ferocity of weather events. That these
changes are widely shared does not
minimize Massachusetts’ interest in the
outcome of this litigation. See Federal
Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U. S. 11,
24. According to petitioners’ uncontested
affidavits, global sea levels rose between
10 and 20 centimeters over the 20th
century as a result of global warming and
have already begun to swallow
Massachusetts’ coastal land. Remediation
costs alone, moreover, could reach
hundreds of millions of dollars. Pp. 17–
19.
(c) Given EPA’s failure to dispute the
existence of a causal connection between
man-made greenhouse gas emissions and
global warming, its refusal to regulate such
emissions, at a minimum, “contributes” to
Massachusetts’ injuries. EPA overstates its
case in arguing that its decision not to
regulate contributes so insignificantly to
petitioners’ injuries that it cannot be haled
into federal court, and that there is no
realistic possibility that the relief sought
would mitigate global climate change and
remedy petitioners’ injuries, especially
since predicted increases in emissions
from China, India, and other developing
nations will likely offset any marginal
domestic decrease EPA regulation could
bring about. Agencies, like legislatures, do
not generally resolve massive problems in
one fell swoop, see Williamson v. Lee
Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U. S. 483, 489,
but instead whittle away over time,
refining their approach as circumstances
change and they develop a more nuanced
understanding of how best to proceed, cf.
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194,
202–203. That a first step might be
tentative does not by itself negate federal-
court jurisdiction. And reducing domestic
automobile emissions is hardly tentative.
Leaving aside the other greenhouse gases,
the record indicates that the U. S.
transportation sector emits an enormous
quantity of carbon dioxide into the
atmosphere. Pp. 20–21.
(d) While regulating motor-vehicle
emissions may not by itself reverse global
warming, it does not follow that the Court
lacks jurisdiction to decide whether EPA
has a duty to take steps to slow or reduce
it. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U. S. 228,
243, n. 15. Because of the enormous
potential consequences, the fact that a
remedy’s effectiveness might be delayed
during the (relatively short) time it takes
for a new motor-vehicle fleet to replace an
older one is essentially irrelevant. Nor is it
dispositive that developing countries are
poised to substantially increase
greenhouse gas emissions: A reduction in
domestic emissions would slow the pace
of global emissions increases, no matter
what happens elsewhere. The Court
attaches considerable significance to
EPA’s espoused belief that global climate
change must be addressed. Pp. 21–23.
2. The scope of the Court’s review of the
merits of the statutory issues is narrow.
Although an agency’s refusal to initiate
enforcement proceedings is not ordinarily
subject to judicial review, Heckler v. Chaney,
470 U. S. 821, there are key differences
between non enforcement and denials of
rulemaking petitions that are, as in the present
circumstances, expressly authorized. EPA
concluded alternatively in its petition denial
that it lacked authority under §7521(a)(1)to
regulate new vehicle emissions because
carbon dioxide is not an “air pollutant” under
§7602, and that, even if it possessed
authority, it would decline to exercise it
because regulation would conflict with other
administration priorities. Because the Act
expressly permits review of such an action,
§7607(b)(1), this Court “may reverse [it if it
finds it to be] arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law,” §7607(d)(9). Pp. 24–25.
3. Because greenhouse gases fit well within
the Act’s capacious definition of “air
pollutant,” EPA has statutory authority to
regulate emission of such gases from new
motor vehicles. That definition— which
includes “any air pollution agent . . . ,
including any physical, chemical, . . .
substance . . . emitted into . . . the ambient air
. . . ,” §7602(g) (emphasis added)—embraces
all airborne compounds of whatever stripe.
Moreover, carbon dioxide and other
greenhouse gases are undoubtedly “physical
[and] chemical . . . substance[s].” Ibid. EPA’s
reliance on post enactment congressional
actions and deliberations it views as
tantamount to a command to refrain from
regulating greenhouse gas emissions is
unavailing. Even if post enactment legislative
history could shed light on the meaning of an
otherwise-unambiguous statute, EPA
identifies nothing suggesting that Congress
meant to curtail EPA’s power to treat
greenhouse gases as air pollutants. The Court
has no difficulty reconciling Congress’ various
efforts to promote interagency collaboration
and research to better understand climate
change with the agency’s preexisting mandate
to regulate “any air pollutant” that may
endanger the public welfare. FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S. 120,
133, distinguished. Also unpersuasive is EPA’s
argument that its regulation of motor-vehicle
carbon dioxide emissions would require it to
tighten mileage standards, a job (according to
EPA) that Congress has assigned to the
Department of Transportation. The fact that
DOT’s mandate to promote energy efficiency
by setting mileage standards may overlap with
EPA’s environmental responsibilities in no
way licenses EPA to shirk its duty to protect
the public “health” and “welfare,”
§7521(a)(1). Pp. 25–30.
4. EPA’s alternative basis for its decision—
that even if it has statutory authority to
regulate greenhouse gases, it would be unwise
to do so at this time—rests on reasoning
divorced from the statutory text. While the
statute conditions EPA action on its formation
of a “judgment,” that judgment must relate to
whether an air pollutant “cause[s], or
contribute[s] to, air pollution which may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare.” §7601(a)(1). Under the
Act’s clear terms, EPA can avoid
promulgating regulations only if it determines
that greenhouse gases do not contribute to
climate change or if it provides some
reasonable explanation as to why it cannot or
will not exercise its discretion to determine
whether they do. It has refused to do so,
offering instead a laundry list of reasons not to
regulate, including the existence of voluntary
Executive Branch programs providing a
response to global warming and impairment
of the President’s ability to negotiate with
developing nations to reduce emissions.
These policy judgments have nothing to do
with whether greenhouse gas emissions
contribute to climate change and do not
amount to a reasoned justification for
declining to form a scientific judgment. Nor
can EPA avoid its statutory obligation by
noting the uncertainty surrounding various
features of climate change and concluding
that it would therefore be better not to
regulate at this time. If the scientific
uncertainty is so profound that it precludes
EPA from making a reasoned judgment, it
must say so. The statutory question is whether
sufficient information exists for it to make an
endangerment finding. Instead, EPA rejected
the rule-making petition based on
impermissible considerations. Its action was
therefore “arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise
not in accordance with law,” §7607(d)(9). On
remand, EPA must ground its reasons for
action or inaction in the statute. Pp. 30–32.
415 F. 3d 50, reversed and remanded.
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the
Court, in which KENNEDY, SOUTER,
GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined.
ROBERTS, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in
which SCALIA, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ.,
joined. SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion,
in which ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS and
ALITO, JJ., joined.
 COURT RULES AGAINST EPA
by Robin Weage
Staff Writer ToTheCenter.com
http://www.tothecenter.com/news.php?readmore=1453
On Monday, the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, said the Clean Air Act gives the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) the authority to regulate emissions of carbon dioxide and other
greenhouse gases from cars.
Massachusetts v. EPA, 05-1120, was filed in order to force the federal agency to limit emissions from
new cars and trucks by 12 states and 13 environmental groups, including California and
Massachusetts.
In order to make a decision, the court had to consider three questions. Do states have the right to
sue the EPA to challenge its decision? Does the Clean Air Act give the EPA the authority to regulate
tailpipe emissions of greenhouse gases? And, does the EPA have the discretion not to regulate those
emissions?
The court determined that states do have the standing to sue. In the majority opinion, Justice
Stevens pointed to the state of Massachusetts’s contention that its coastline is already being
damaged by rising sea levels. In addition, Stevens said that greenhouse gases are air pollutants
under the Clean Air Act, and the Clean Air Act instructs the EPA to regulate air pollutants that “may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”
Stevens wrote, “If the scientific uncertainty is so profound that it precludes EPA from making a
reasoned judgment as to whether greenhouse gases contribute to global warming, EPA must say
so.”
On the third question, the court ordered the EPA to re-evaluate its contention that it has the
discretion not to regulate tailpipe emissions. The majority said the agency must tie its rationale more
closely to the Clean Air Act, instead of foreign policy considerations. Stevens said, “[The] EPA has
offered no reasoned explanation for its refusal to decide whether greenhouse gases cause or
contribute to climate change.”
The court’s four conservative justices, Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Samuel Alito, Antonin
Scalia and Clarence Thomas, dissented. Roberts based his dissent on the issue of standing and not a
“judgment on whether global warming exists, what causes it, or the extent of the problem.” Scalia
contended that the court “has no business substituting its own desired outcome for the reasoned
judgment of the responsible agency.”
Environmentalists were happy with the decision. “The ruling is a total rejection of the Bush
administration’s refusal to use its existing authority to meet the challenge posed by global warming,”
Carl Pope, the Sierra Club’s executive director, said in a statement.
Democratic Senator Jeff Bingaman of New Mexico, the chairman of the Energy and Natural
Resources Committee, said in a statement, “Today’s Supreme Court decision leaves no doubt that
the federal government has the authority and duty to act to address global warming.”
The ruling doesn’t require the EPA to impose new regulations, but it does add to the pressure on the
administration to set mandatory limits on carbon emissions. The decision is also a setback for
General Motors Corp. and other automakers, and for utilities with coal-fired plants that have been
lobbying heavily against setting limits on greenhouse gases.
Information from the Associated Press and Bloomberg News was used in this report.
 MD. A.G. GANSLER APPLAUDS SUPREME COURT
DECISIONS ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES
Posted on April 02, 2007
Southern Maryland Online
http://somd.com/news/headlines/2007/5669.shtml
Cases Aimed at Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions
ANNAPOLIS - Maryland Attorney General Douglas F. Gansler today applauded two Supreme Court
decisions issued today in which state and environmental petitioners prevailed in two important air
pollution cases—one involving EPA’s authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from motor
vehicles, and the other involving the appropriate emissions test for determining when modifications
to existing power plants and other industrial facilities trigger a requirement to install state-of-the-art
pollution control equipment affecting greenhouse gas emissions. In the first case, Massachusetts v.
EPA, the United States Supreme Court rejected EPA’s arguments that it does not have the authority
to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, and that even if it did have the authority, it had properly
refused to exercise its authority. In a 5 to 4 decision, the Court ruled that the Clean Air Act clearly
authorizes regulation of greenhouse gas emissions and that EPA’s determination not to regulate such
emissions was based on impermissible considerations under the Clean Air Act.
In the second near unanimous decision, Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy, the Supreme
Court reversed the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals decision and held that upgrades or other
modifications to existing power plants or other industrial facilities are subject to Clean Air Act permit
provisions requiring installation of best available control technology when the modifications result in
annual emissions increases, regardless of whether there is an hourly emission rate increase. The
court rejected the Fourth Circuit Court’s view that the permit requirement applies only if the
modification results in an hourly increase in emissions. Maryland applies an annual emissions test,
which subjects more upgrades to the permit requirements, and thus, is more protective of health and
the environment.
“Today’s Supreme Court decisions are an important victory for the states,” said Attorney General
Gansler. “For years, states have taken the lead in enforcing environmental laws in the absence of a
strong federal partner. We strongly encourage the EPA to do its job and regulate greenhouse gas
emissions from automobiles and require utilities to install state-of-the-art pollution controls.”
Maryland participated as an amicus along with other states in support of the state and environmental
petitioners.
 Don Hamrick, Plaintiff, pro se
5860 Wilburn Road
Wilburn, Arkansas 72179

CERTIFICATION

A copy of the above was emailed to Richard Pence, Defense Counsel and to the U.S. Marshals
Service at about 3:00 AM, Tuesday, April 3, 2007 and mailed later that same day to Defense
Counsel.

Don Hamrick, Plaintiff, pro se

5860 Wilburn Road
Wilburn, Arkansas 72179