1

U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of

Arkansas
Northern Division

Don Hamrick, pro se (Non-State Actor) )

5860 Wilburn Road )
Wilburn, Arkansas 72179 ) Case No.
1:06cv0044
)
-v- )
)
United Nations, et al )
New York, NY 10017 )

PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTION AND

MEMORANDUM OPINION IN OPPOSITION TO
THE UNITED NATIONS LETTER DATED APRIL 7, 2007. DOCKET ITEM #47.
RETURNING THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT UNEXECUTED
ON THE BASIS OF PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES

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PRESUMPTION
If everywhere I turn for remedies as a matter of
international, constitutional or statutory right and I am
denied those remedies then it stands to reason that
unenforceable rights are not rights at all but only
revocable or deniable privileges. Therefore, it stands to
reason that individual citizens without enforceable rights or
not free citizens at all, but slaves of the State, the United
States, and even the United Nations. The ultimate remedy

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therefore becomes rebellion or civil war for freedom from

government oppression and tyranny.

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Nicolas Michel, Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, Legal Counsel for

the United Nations is claiming privileges and immunities as an affirmative defense
on behalf of the United Nations (see last Exhibit) under:

(1) Article 105, paragraph 1 of the United Nations Charter;

“The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its

Members such privileges and immunities that are
necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes.”

(2) Article 105, paragraph 3 of the United Nations Charter;

“The General Assembly may make recommendations with

a view to determining the details o the application of
paragraph 1 . . . of this Article or may propose
conventions to the Members of the United Nations for this
purpose.” UN Charter, Art. 105, 1945 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News, at 985.
(3) Article II, Section 2 of the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the
United Nations, February 13, 1946, (CPIUN), 1 U.N.T.S. 15 (1946), General
Convention, Art. II, 21 U.S.T. at 1422. noting that the United States of America
acceded to the General Convention on April 29, 1970. 21 U.S.T. at 1418; [1970] TIAS
No. 6900.

“The United Nations, its property and assets wherever

located and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity
from every from of legal process except insofar as in any
particular case it has expressly waived its immunity. It is,
however, understood that no waiver of immunity shall
extend to any measure of execution.”

(4) United States International Organizations Immunities Act (IOIA). Pub. L.

No. 291, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., December 29, 1945 (codified at 22 U.S.C. 288 et
seq.).

QUESTION FOR THE COURT

Does privileges and immunities allow the United Nations to wage a war of
aggression upon the United States Constitution and on the Bill of Rights and on the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments in violation of the Chapter 1, Article 2,
Clause 7 of the United Nations Charter?
UNITED NATIONS CHARTER
CHAPTER 1 - PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES

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ARTICLE 2

7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall

authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters
which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of
any state or shall require the Members to submit such
matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this
principle shall not prejudice the application of
enforcement measures under Chapter VII.

I further claim that the United States is conspiring with and assisting the
United Nations in their War of Aggression on the American People’s Second
Amendment right as defined in ARTICLE 3(f) of the DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION which
states:

The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has

placed at the disposal of another State, to be used by that
other State for perpetrating an act of aggression against
a third State;

Exhibit 1 presents the United Nations DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION. Article 5 Clause 2

of the Definition states:
“A war of aggression is a crime against international
peace. Aggression gives rise to international
responsibility.”
It is my claim that the United Nations campaign for global gun control under
their PROGRAMME OF ACTION TO PREVENT, COMBAT AND ERADIATE THE ILLICIT TRADE IN SMALL ARMS AND

LIGHT WEAPONS IN ALL ITS ASPECTS, is, in fact and in constitutional and international law, a
War of Aggression on the individual freedoms of the people of the 192 Member
States of the United Nations and even of the countries not Member States of the
United Nations in violation of the Article 2, Clause 7, of the United Nations Charter.

To secure my allegation that the United Nations campaign for global gun
control is a War of Aggression on individual freedoms in violation of the United
Nations Charter I cite ARTICLE 1(b) of the DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION defines “State” to
include the concept of a “group of States” where appropriate. From that definition in
construe the fact that the United Nations is included in the definition of a “State.”

ARTICLE 1 of the DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION defines Aggression as “the use of armed

force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political

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independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the

Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this Definition.

To further secure my allegation I cite ARTICLE 4 of the DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION to

show that the list of definitions under the United Nations DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION, “are
not exhaustive and the Security Council may determine that other acts constitute
aggression under the provisions of the Charter.”
And to further secure my allegation I cite ARTICLE 5, CLAUSE 1, “No consideration
of whatever nature, whether political, economic, military or otherwise, may serve as
a justification for aggression.” From this clarification I allege that that the United
Nations campaign for global gun control is without justification.
It is also my allegation under ARTICLE 5, CLAUSE 3., “No territorial acquisition or
special advantage resulting from aggression is or shall be recognized as lawful” that
the Member States cascadingly passing gun control laws in accordance with the
United Nations Programme of Action is an unlawful acquisition or an unlawful
special advantage resulting from that aggression for global gun control.
And it is also my allegation under ARTICLE 7, that the United Nations campaign
for global gun control under their Programme of Action unlawfully “prejudices the
right to self-determination, freedom and independence, as derived from the [United
Nations] Charter, of peoples forcibly deprived of that right and referred to in the
DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW CONCERNING FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND COOPERATION AMONG

STATES in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, particularly peoples
under colonial and racist regimes or other forms of alien domination: nor the right
of these peoples to struggle to that end and to seek and receive support, in
accordance with the principles of the [United Nations] Charter and in conformity
with the above-mentioned Declaration.

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UNRATIFIED AND UNSIGNED TREATIES

STILL CONSTRAIN U.S. ACTION
Jon Kyl, Chairman
Republican Policy Committee
U.S. Senate
May 16, 2006
Introduction
International law is based on consent. There has been a veritable explosion in
recent decades in the number and scope of international agreements, some of
which promulgate principles of law that the United States does not accept. Signing a
treaty has consequences under international law, and thus it is an act not to be
taken lightly. Moreover, this paper will provide examples of how even treaties that
the United States has not signed still constrain U.S. action. This finding illustrates
why the United States must vigorously defend its position in international fora and
negotiations directed at new treaties. It is insufficient for the United States simply to
refuse to sign a treaty in the hopes of avoiding its adverse effects.
Treaty Background
International law is primarily concerned with the rights and obligations of
states and their relations with each other. Historically, it has been much less
directed at sub-state actors, such as individual persons.13 International treaties and
conventions are a primary source of international law; 14 and they are the most
obvious manifestation of international law to the general public.
A traditional principle of international law is that it is based on the consent of
states.15 In order for the rules of international law to be properly applied to states,
those states must have accepted those rules. As such, states are not bound by
treaties they do not sign.16

13
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 101 (1987) (defining
international law as the “rules and principles of general application dealing with the conduct
of states and of international organizations and with their relations inter se, as well as with
some of their relations with persons, whether natural or juridical”).
14
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, Art. 38 (“ICJ Statute”). THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE is annexed to the CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, and is reprinted at 59 Stat. 1031
(1945). Customary practices are another primary source of international law. ICJ Statute Art.
38(1)(b). In fact, “[u]ntil recently, international law was essentially customary law.”
Restatement at Part I, Chapter I, Introductory Note.
15
RESTATEMENT at § 102, Reporters’ Notes ¶ 1 (noting the “traditional principle that
international law essentially depends on the consent of states”).
16
VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES , art. 34, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (opened for
signature May 23, 1969, entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) (“A treaty does not create either
obligations or rights for a third State without its consent.”). The United States is not a
party to this treaty but essentially accepts the treaty as a declaratory
restatement of customary international law default rules governing the topic of
treaties in general. See RESTATEMENT at Part III, Introductory Note.

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In recent decades, there has been an increase in the number of international

agreements coming into existence, and an expansion in the topics they address.17
“[T]reaties have become the principal vehicle for making law for the international
system.”18 The subject of treaties is also of note, as, traditionally, they were
focused on relations between states, but they are now expanding to cover behavior
of sub-state actors, including corporations and individuals. An individual person was
historically not the “‘subject’ of international law,”19 and “it was thought to be
especially against their own governments.”20 Now, as the Restatement (Third) of
the Foreign Relations Law of the United States21 notes, how a state treats individual
human beings, including its own citizens, is considered to be a matter of
international concern, and a proper subject for regulation by international law.22
International agreements seem increasingly directed at creating legal measures to
constrain the ability of states to act unilaterally, especially in the use of force 23 —
and particularly directed at the United States. It is part of a trend that Henry
Kissinger describes as a movement “to submit international politics to judicial
procedures.”24 The United States itself has potentially exacerbated this trend.
Several years ago, John Bolton, now the United States Ambassador to the United
Nations, lamented the “legalism that has permeated American foreign policy during
the twentieth century.”25 The Rome Statute creating the International Criminal Court
and the Landmine Convention are examples of this trend. The United States, under
the Clinton Administration, was intimately involved in the negotiations of both of
these texts; but in the end, it did not sign the Landmine Convention, and only
signed the Rome Statute on the last day it was open for signature as a last act

17
Richard B. Graves, III, GLOBALIZATION, TREATY POWERS, AND THE LIMITS OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAUSE ,
50 J. Copyright Soc’y USA 199, 249 (2003) (“Both the number of treaties to which the United
States is a party, and particularly the scope of those treaties, have sharply increased in
recent decades.”); Curtis A. Bradley, THE TREATY POWER AND AMERICAN FEDERALISM, 97 Mich. L. Rev.
390, 396 (1998) (noting the “proliferation of treaties”).
18
RESTATEMENT at Part I, Chapter I, Introductory Note.
19
RESTATEMENT at Part VII, Introductory Note.
20
Mark W. Janis, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 245 (2d ed. 1993) (emphasis added).
21
The RESTATEMENT is published by the American Law Institute, and is generally regarded as a
persuasive declaration of the foreign affairs law of the United States. Though not binding
authority, U.S. courts, including the Supreme Court, do cite to it in their official opinions.
E.g., Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 670 (2005).
22
RESTATEMENT at Part VII, Introductory Note.
23
John R. Bolton, THE RISKS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT FROM AMERICA’S PERSPECTIVE,
Law & Contemp. Probs. (Vol. 64, No. 1, Winter 2001), at 167, 167-68.
24
Henry Kissinger, THE PITFALLS OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, Foreign Aff (July-Aug 2001), at 86, 86.
25
Bolton, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (Vol. 64, No. 1, Winter 2001), at 168.

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before leaving office.26 The United States has since removed its signature from the
Rome Statute. But, as discussed herein, both treaties continue to affect U.S. affairs.
Legal Effect of Signing a Treaty
Signing a treaty, even if that treaty is never ratified, has consequences for the
signatory state under international law. When negotiations for a treaty or
international convention are completed, that instrument generally is opened for
signature, which differs from ratification. Ratification, under international law,
“refer[s] to a conclusive act by which a state party communicates its consent to an
international agreement to its treaty partners.”27 “Ratification is also used to refer to
internal procedures (like those under Article II of the U.S. Constitution) that national
law requires as a condition precedent for ratification in the international law
sense.”28 Signature, on the other hand, is generally the first step in the process by
which a state makes an initial tangible commitment to the treaty.
It is crucial to note that a state literally “signs up” to some legal consequences
under international law when it signs a treaty. Article 18 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties outlines the most important consequence under international
law of signing a treaty. It provides that a state that has signed, but not ratified, a
treaty is “to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty
. . . until it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty.”29
The Vienna Convention does not define “object and purpose,” and, as the
Restatement notes, “[i]t is often unclear what [state] actions would have such
effect”30 of defeating the object and purpose of a treaty. Moreover, the “Vienna
26
The United States was an initial supporter of both the creation of a permanent
international criminal court and some type of ban on antipersonnel landmines. Once the
negotiations of agreements directed towards these ends were hijacked by countries more
interested in constraining great power action, particularly U.S. action, it was almost
inevitable that the final texts would be irredeemably hostile to U.S. interests.
27
Edward T. Swaine, UNSIGNING, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 2061, 2066 n. 21 (2003).
28
Swaine, 55 Stan. L. Rev. at 2066 n. 21 (parenthesis in original). Under U.S. law, it is the
Executive Branch that exchanges the instrument of ratification with foreign treaty partners,
and officially commits the United States to a treaty under international law. This, of course,
may only take place after at least two-thirds of the Senate has approved a resolution of
ratification. TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, pp. 147-
49, S. Prt. 106-71, 106th Cong, 2d Sess (2001). The President cannot ratify a treaty without
the consent of the Senate, although one can imagine an odd scenario in which the President
chooses not to ratify a treaty after the Senate consents to it. See TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS, pp. 152-53, S. Prt. 106-71. For example, the Senate could attach Reservations,
Understandings, or Declarations that the President would find unacceptable.
29
VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES , art. 18, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (opened for
signature May 23, 1969, entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) (emphasis added). “Prior to the
entry into force of an international agreement, a state that has signed the agreement or
expressed its consent to be bound is obliged to refrain from acts that would defeat the
object and purpose of the agreement.” Restatement at § 312(3). Other practical effects of
signature are that “signature tends to fix the treaty’s substantive terms,” Swaine, 55 Stan. L.
Rev. at 2067; and, in some instances, “may also invest the signatory with particular rights
under the treaty.” Swaine, 55 Stan. L. Rev. at 2067 n.25.
30
RESTATEMENT at § 312, cmnt i.

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Convention does not suggest any easily administered test for determining a treaty’s
‘object and purpose’ or, for that matter, assessing when a state’s actions would
‘defeat’ it.”31
The scope of this obligation is, therefore, unclear. Some commentators suggest that
state behavior violates the interim obligation when the behavior violates the
treaty’s provisions, particularly “major or indispensable provisions.” 32 This likely
proves too much, however, because Article 18 of the Vienna Convention “clearly
resists any attempt to break up the object and purpose of a treaty into the objects
and purposes of smaller parts of the treaty.”33 Moreover, such a test would
essentially equate signature with ratification,34 and completely conflate concepts
that are treated separately under international law, and the Vienna Convention
itself. A better approach to this interim obligation is a requirement that a signatory
not engage in acts that would disable it from complying with the treaty if ratified. 35
Formulated slightly differently, a state must “not do anything which would affect its
ability fully to comply with the treaty once it has entered into force.”36
This obligation has important real-world impacts. The Restatement offered the
following example with respect to the Second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty,
which was signed in 1979 but has never been ratified: “Testing a weapon in
contravention of a clause prohibiting such a test might violate the purpose of the
agreement, since the consequences of the test might be irreversible. Failing to
dismantle a weapon scheduled to be dismantled under the treaty might not defeat
its object, since the dismantling could be effected later.”37 Similarly, as a signatory
to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,38 for example, it would seem that the United
States could maintain a posture where it could be in a position to conduct a nuclear
test in a timely manner at some point in the future,39 but not conduct an actual test.

31
Swaine, 55 Stan. L. Rev. at 2078.
32
See arguments discussed in Swaine, 55 Stan. L. Rev. at 2078.
33
Jan Klabbers, HOW TO DEFEAT A TREATY’S OBJECT AND PURPOSE PENDING ENTRY INTO FORCE: TOWARD MANIFEST
INTENT, 34 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 283, 293 (2001).
34
Klabbers, 34 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. at 293-94.
35
Swaine, 55 Stan. L. Rev. at 2078.
36
Anthony Aust, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE, p. 94 (Cambridge 2000).
37
RESTATEMENT at § 312, cmnt i.
38
COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY, 35 I.L.M. 1439 (1996) (opened for signature Sept. 24, 1996).
The United States remains a signatory to the CTBT, but has no intention of becoming a party
to it. Condolezza Rice, Response of the Secretary of State to a Question for the Record of
Senator Biden (No. 12), Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb. 16, 2005, reprinted at 151
Cong. Rec. S8532 (daily ed. July 20, 2005) (noting that “the U.S. does not support the CTBT
and will not become a party to it”). The ratification of the United States is required for the
treaty to enter into force. CTBT, art. 14 and Annex II (listing the states whose ratification is
required for the treaty to enter into force, which includes the United States).
39
Cf. CONFERENCE REPORT attending FY06 ENERGY AND WATER APPROPRIATIONS ACT, Pub. L. No. 109-103,
Conf. Rpt. 109-275, p. 159 (directing the Department of Energy to “maintain the current 24-

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Because of these interim obligations, signing a treaty is not an act to be completed

blithely. It is also possible to “unsign” a treaty, as the United States did with the
Rome Statute creating the International Criminal Court.
The practical effect of “unsigning” a treaty is that a state removes itself from this
burden to not frustrate the treaty’s object and purpose. Article 18, by its terms,
contemplates that states can exit from under this interim obligation. 40 It is entirely
appropriate that unsigning a treaty be “acknowledged as a legitimate and
understandable course of action under the Vienna Convention.”41
Moreover, even when the United States does not sign a treaty—or even if it
“unsigns” a treaty previously signed but not ratified—those treaties can still affect
the United States. The next section will illustrate, by reference to the International
Criminal Court and the Landmine Treaty, how international law principles to which
the United States has not consented still constrain U.S. action.

month test readiness posture”). Being able to resume nuclear weapons testing requires the
nuclear weapons and scientific communities to conduct various non-nuclear experiments.
40
Swaine, 55 Stan. L. Rev. at 2082 (noting that Article 18 “does not require that the interim
obligation be observed for all eternity, but instead only ‘until [the signatory] shall have made
its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty’”) (brackets in original).
41
Swaine, 55 Stan. L. Rev. at 2089.

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UNCONTROVERTABLE EVIDENCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

WAGING A WAR OF AGGRESSION ON FREEDOM
I cite Barbara Frey, Special Rapporteur for the United Nations General
Assembly FINAL REPORT ON SPECIFIC HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES: PREVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
COMMITTED WITH SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS, dated July 26, 2006, Report No.
A/HRC/Sub.1/58/27. See Exhibit 2 for excerpts.42
¶21. No international human right of self-defence is
expressly set forth in the primary sources of international
law: treaties, customary law, or general principles. While
the right to life is recognized in virtually every major
international human rights treaty, the principle of self-
defence is expressly recognized in only one, the CONVENTION
FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS
(EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS), article 2.43 Self-
defence, however, is not recognized as a right in the
European Convention on Human Rights. According to one
commentator, “The function of this provision is simply to
remove from the scope of application of article 2 (1)
killings necessary to defend against unlawful violence. It
does not provide a right that must be secured by
the State”.44

42
Complete report available Online at
http://www.iansa.org/un/documents/salw_hr_report_2006.pdf
43
CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS , 213 UNITED NATIONS
TREATY SERIES 222, entered into force on 3 September 1953, as amended by Protocols Nos. 3,
5, 8 and 11, which entered into force on 21 September 1970, 20 December 1971, 1 January
1990 and 1 November 1998, respectively. Article 2 states:
(1) Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be
deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court
following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.
(2) Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in
contravention of this article when it results from the use of force
which is no more than absolutely necessary:
(a) In defence of any person from unlawful violence;
(b) In order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of
a person lawfully detained;
(c) In action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or
insurrection.
44
John Cerone, “A HUMAN RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE?”, George Mason Journal of Law, Economics, &
Policy (accepted for 2006 publication).

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Citing paragraph 40 in the CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (pp. 13-14) of that

report, “States have positive obligations to protect individuals from violations by
State and non-State actors.” This United Nations conclusion and recommendation
stands directly counter to American jurisprudence.

“[C]itizens have no right to demand or even expect police

protection. Courts have consistently ruled “that there is
no constitutional right to be protected by the state
against being murdered by criminals or madmen.” Bowers
v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982). Furthermore,
courts have ruled that the police have no duty to protect
the individual citizen. DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Dep’t of Social Serv., 109 S.Ct. 998, 1004 (1989); South v.
Maryland, 59 U.S. 396 (1855); Morgan v. District of
Columbia, 468 A.2d 1306 (D.C. App. 1983) (en banc);
Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d 1 (D.C. App.
1981) (en banc); Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County, 360
Md. 617, 510 A.2d 1078 (1986).
From Amicus Curia Brief of CONGRESS OF RACIAL EQUALITY in Support of Appellants Seeking
Reversal, Parker, et al. v. District of Columbia, et al., DC Circuit No. 04-7041. (These
cases were not cited in the DC Circuit’s Opinion finding in favor of Parker. However
the DC Circuit did rule that the Second Amendment is an individual right.

Case Law

Citing the listed case law in the Appendix to the HISTORY: SECOND AMENDMENT RIGHT
TO “KEEP AND BEAR ARMS” in United States Senate, REPORT OF THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS,
Committee Print I-IX, 1-23 (1982):

The United States Supreme Court has only three times

commented upon the meaning of the second amendment to our
constitution. The first comment, in Dred Scott, indicated strongly
that the right to keep and bear arms was an individual right; the
Court noted that, were it to hold blacks to be entitled to equality
of citizenship, they would be entitled to keep and carry arms
wherever they went. The second, in Miller, indicated that a court
cannot take judicial notice that a short-barrelled shotgun is
covered by the second amendment — but the Court did not
indicate that National Guard status is in any way required for
protection by that amendment, and indeed defined “militia” to
include all citizens able to bear arms. The third, a footnote in

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Lewis v. United States, indicated only that “these legislative

restrictions on the use of firearms” — a ban on possession by
felons — were permissable [sic]. But since felons may
constitutionally be deprived of many of the rights of citizens,
including that of voting, this dicta reveals little. These three
comments constitute all significant explanations of the scope of
the second amendment advanced by our Supreme Court. The
case of Adam v. Williams has been cited as contrary to the
principle that the second amendment is an individual right. In
fact, that reading of the opinion comes only in Justice Douglas’s
dissent from the majority ruling of the Court.

The appendix which follows represents a listing of twenty-one

American decisions, spanning the period from 1822 to 1981,
which have analyzed right to keep and bear arms provisions in
the light of statutes ranging from complete bans on handgun
sales to bans on carrying of weapons to regulation of carrying by
permit systems. Those decisions not only explained the nature of
such a right, but also struck down legislative restrictions as
violative of it, are designated by asterisks.

20TH CENTURY CASES

1. State v. Blocker, 291 Or. 255, 630 P.2d 824 (1981).
“The statue is written as a total proscription of the mere
possession of certain weapons, and that mere possession,
insofar as a billy is concerned, is constitutionally protected.”
“In these circumstances, we conclude that it is proper for us to
consider defendant’s ‘overbreadth’ attack to mean that the
statute swept so broadly as to infringe rights that it could not
reach, which in the setting means the right to possess arms
guaranteed by sec 27.”
2. State v. Kessler, 289 Or. 359, 614 P. 2d 94, at 95, at 98 (1980).
“We are not unmindful that there is current controversy over the
wisdom of a right to bear arms, and that the original motivations
for such a provision might not seem compelling if debated as a
new issue. Our task, however, in construing a constitutional
provision is to respect the principles given the status of
constitutional guarantees and limitations by the drafters; it is
not to abandon these principles when this fits the needs of the
moment.”
“Therefore, the term ‘arms’ as used by the drafters of the
constitutions probably was intended to include those weapons
used by settlers for both personal and military defense. The
term ‘arms’ was not limited to firearms, but included several
handcarried weapons commonly used for defense. The term

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‘arms’ would not have included cannon or other heavy ordnance

not kept by militiamen or private citizens.”
3. Motley v. Kellogg, 409 N.E. 2d 1207, at 1210 (Ind. App. 1980)
(motion to transfer denied 1-27-1981).
“[N]ot making applications available at the chief’s office
effectively denied members of the community the opportunity to
obtain a gun permit and bear arms for their self-defense.”
4. Schubert v. DeBard, 398 N.E. 2d 1339, at 1341 (Ind. App. 1980)
(motion to transfer denied 8-28-1980).
“We think it clear that our constitution provides our citizenry the
right to bear arms for their self- defense.”
5. Taylor v. McNeal, 523 S.W. 2d 148, at 150 (Mo. App. 1975)
“The pistols in question are not contraband. * * * Under Art. I,
sec 23, Mo. Const. 1945, V.A.M.S., every citizen has the right to
keep and bear arms in defense of his home, person, and
property, with the limitation that this section shall not justify the
wearing of concealed arms.”
6. City of Lakewood v. Pillow, 180 Colo. 20, 501 P. 2d 744, at 745 (en
banc 1972).
“As an example, we note that this ordinance would prohibit
gunsmiths, pawnbrokers and sporting goods stores from carrying
on a substantial part of their business. Also, the ordinance
appears to prohibit individuals from transporting guns to and
from such places of business. Furthermore, it makes it unlawful
for a person to possess a firearm in a vehicle or in a place of
business for the purpose of self-defense. Several of these
activities are constitutionally protected. Colo. Const. art. II, sec
13.”
7. City of Las Vegas v. Moberg, 82 N.M. 626, 485 P. 2d 737, at 738
(N.M. App. 1971).
“It is our opinion that an ordinance may not deny the people the
constitutionally guaranteed right to bear arms, and to that
extent the ordinance under consideration is void.”
8. State v. Nickerson, 126 Mt. 157, 247 P. 2d 188, at 192 (1952).
“The law of this jurisdiction accords to the defendant the right to
keep and bear arms and to use same in defense of his own
home, his person and property.”
9. People v. Liss, 406 Ill. 419, 94 N.E. 2d 320, at 323 (1950).
“The second amendment to the constitution of the United States
provides the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not
be infringed. This of course does not prevent the enactment of a
law against carrying concealed weapons, but it does indicate it
should be kept in mind, in the construction of a statue of such
character, that it is aimed at persons of criminal instincts, and

14
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for the prevention of crime, and not against use in the protection
of person or property.”
10. People v. Nakamura, 99 Colo. 262, at 264, 62 P. 2d 246 (en banc
1936).
“It is equally clear that the act wholly disarms aliens for all
purposes. The state . . . cannot disarm any class of persons or
deprive them of the right guaranteed under section 13, article II
of the Constitution, to bear arms in defense of home, person and
property. The guaranty thus extended is meaningless if any
person is denied the right to possess arms for such protection.”
11. Glasscock v. City of Chattanooga, 157 Tenn. 518, at 520, 11 S.W. 2d
678 (1928).
“There is no qualification of the prohibition against the carrying
of a pistol in the city ordinance before us but it is made unlawful
‘to carry on or about the person any pistol,’ that is, any sort of
pistol in any sort of manner. *** [W]e must accordingly hold the
provision of this ordinance as to the carrying of a pistol invalid.”
12. People v. Zerillo, 219 Mich. 635, 189 N.W. 927, at 928 (1922).
“The provision in the Constitution granting the right to all
persons to bear arms is a limitation upon the right of the
Legislature to enact any law to the contrary. The exercise of a
right guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be made subject to
the will of the sheriff.”
13. State v. Kerner, 181 N.C. 574, 107 S.E. 222, at 224 (1921).
“We are of the opinion, however, that ‘pistol’ ex vi termini is
properly included within the word ‘arms,’ and that the right to
bear such arms cannot be infringed. The historical use of pistols
as ‘arms’ of offense and defense is beyond controversy.”
“The maintenance of the right to bear arms is a most essential
one to every free people and should not be whittled down by
technical constructions.”
14. State v. Rosenthal, 75 VT. 295, 55 A. 610, at 611 (1903).
“The people of the state have a right to bear arms for the
defense of themselves and the state. *** The result is that
Ordinance No. 10, so far as it relates to the carrying of a pistol,
is inconsistent with and repugnant to the Constitution and the
laws of the state, and it is therefore to that extent, void.”
15. In re Brickey, 8 Ida. 597, at 598-99, 70 p. 609 (1902).
“The second amendment to the federal constitution is in the
following language: ‘A well-regulated militia, being necessary to
the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and
bear arms, shall not be infringed.’ The language of section 11,
article I of the constitution of Idaho, is as follows: ‘The people
have the right to bear arms for their security and defense, but

15
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the legislature shall regulate the exercise of this right by law.’

Under these constitutional provisions, the legislature has no
power to prohibit a citizen from bearing arms in any portion of
the state of Idaho, whether within or without the corporate limits
of cities, towns, and villages.”

19TH CENTURY CASES

16. Wilson v. State, 33 Ark. 557, at 560, 34 Am. Rep.

52, at 54 (1878).
“If cowardly and dishonorable men sometimes
shoot unarmed men with army pistols or guns, the
evil must be prevented by the penitentiary and
gallows, and not by a general deprivation of
constitutional privilege.”
17. Jennings v. State, 5 Tex. Crim. App. 298, at 300-01 (1878).
“We believe that portion of the act which provides that, in case
of conviction, the defendant shall forfeit to the county the
weapon of weapons so found on or about his person is not within
the scope of legislative authority. * * * One of his most sacred
rights is that of having arms for his own defence and that of the
State. This right is one of the surest safeguards of liberty and
self-preservation.”
18. Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. 165, 8 Am. Rep. 8, at 17 (1871).
“The passage from Story shows clearly that this right was
intended, as we have maintained in this opinion, and was
guaranteed to and to be exercised and enjoyed by the citizen as
such, and not by him as a soldier, or in defense solely of his
political rights.”
19. Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. (1 Kel.) 243, at 251 (1846).
“The right of the people to bear arms shall not be infringed.” The
right of the whole people, old and young, men, women and boys,
and not militia only, to keep and bear arms of every description,
and not such merely as are used by the militia, shall not be
infringed, curtailed, or broken in upon, in the smallest degree;
and all this for the important end to be attained: the rearing up
and qualifying a well- regulated militia, so vitally necessary to
the security of a free State.”
20. Simpson v. State, 13 Tenn. 356, at 359-60 (1833).
“But suppose it to be assumed on any ground, that our
ancestors adopted and brought over with them this English
statute, [the statute of Northampton,] or portion of the common
law, our constitution has completely abrogated it; it says, ‘that
the freemen of this State have a right to keep and bear arms for

16
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their common defence.’ Article II, sec. 26. * * * By this clause of

the constitution, an express power is given and secured to all
the free citizens of the State to keep and bear arms for their
defence, without any qualification whatever as to their kind or
nature; and it is conceived, that it would be going much too far,
to impair by construction or abridgement a constitutional
privilege, which is so declared; neither, after so solemn an
instrument hath said the people may carry arms, can we be
permitted to impute to the acts thus licensed, such a necessarily
consequent operation as terror to the people to be incurred
thereby; we must attribute to the framers of it, the absence of
such a view.”
21. Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 90, at 92, and 93, 13 Am.
Dec. 251 (1822).
“For, in principle, there is no difference between a law
prohibiting the wearing concealed arms, and a law forbidding
the wearing such as are exposed; and if the former be
unconstitutional, the latter must be so likewise.”
“But it should not be forgotten, that it is not only a part of the
right that is secured by the constitution; it is the right entire and
complete, as it existed at the adoption of the constitution; and if
any portion of that right be impaired, immaterial how small the
part may be, and immaterial the order of time at which it be
done, it is equally forbidden by the constitution.”

ARE WE IN AN
UNDECLARED PERIOD OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY
OVER THE SECOND AMENDMENT?
Now, if the Court finds itself agreeable with the above case law and agrees
with my line of reasoning thus far then the next question to ask the Court is
See Exhibit 3 (50 U.S.C. § 1621 and § 1631)
QUESTION:  Are we in an undeclared national emergency over the Second
Amendment. Another question I ask of the Court?
QUESTION:  Does the United Nations declaration that individuals do not have
the right of self-defense present a threat to the American People,
to the Second Amendment, and to the United States?
QUESTION:  If the answer to either of the two questions above is yes then
that begs the following question: Should the President declare a
national emergency over the Second Amendment, and

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consequently over the First Amendment against the threat

presented by the United Nations.
FACT:  U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 delegates to the
President the “power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators
present concur.”
FACT:  The President and the Senate are elected positions of
government.
FACT:  The People elect the President and the Senate.
PRESUMPTION:  Whenever any elected member of the U.S. Government
neglects, fails, or refuses to perform the duties of the office that
Government Employee is elect to fulfill in accordance with the
Oath of Office the duties of that office fall upon the States or upon
the People.
EXAMPLE: U.S. Citizens conducting a “Border Watch” on the
Mexican Border in support and defense of the United States
because the President and the Executive Branch have refused or
neglected to establish greater security on the border in a timely
fashion to protect the States and the United States from invasion
(see U.S. Constitution, Art. I, Sect. 8, Clause 15, and Art. IV, Sect.
4.).
PRESUMPTION: By the lack of any evidence to the contrary the President, nor the
U.S. Department of State are countering the United Nations War of
Aggression on the Second Amendment. Therefore the defense of
the Second Amendment falls upon the States or to the People. I
am a member of The People, being a U.S. citizen. I have been
directly aggrieved by the United Nations anti-gun policies through
the International Maritime Organization and subsequently down
through the U.S. Coast Guard.
FACT: I have a First Amendment right to petition the Government for
redress of grievances.
FACT: The word “Government” is not defined are limited to the State
Government or to the U.S. Government.

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PRESUMPTION: I therefore presume that I have a First Amendment right to sue the
United Nations as a Ninth Amendment right and as a Tenth
Amendment power reserved to The People when I can show that
my Second Amendment right to open keep and bear arms in
intrastate and interstate travel was denied in violation of my Fifth
Amendment rights and that such denial was in conformity with
United Nations policy through the International Maritime
Organization and most recently by the United Nations Human
Rights Council’s Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection
of Human Rights.
QUESTION: How is it logical or legal to protect human rights by denying them?

On the presumption that I do, in fact and constitutional and international law,
have a right to sue the United Nations for constitutional violations of my Second
Amendment rights, I will now describe the authorities to which I can proceed with a
judicial remedies in the U.S. District Court and in the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights via the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights as Petition No. 1142-06
against the United States and the United Nations.

UNITED NATIONS CHARTER, CHAPTER VI, PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES are listed in Exhibit
4. Articles 33 to 38 of CHAPTER VI are my stepping stones to the VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE

LAW OF TREATIES (VCOLT) (May 23, 1969) signed by the United States April 24, 1970 but
not yet ratified. The VCOLT entered into force January 27, 1980. The VCOLT contains
the remedies that I seek to get the United Nations to cease and desist in their War
of Aggression over the Second Amendment.
Under Article 33’s requirement that “[t]he parties to any dispute, the
continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace
and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation,
conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or
arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice” is exactly what I have
done. I litigated my case for 4 years at the U.S. District Court for DC, the DC Circuit,
and the U.S. Supreme Court only to be denied every step of the way. Having failed
to achieve resolution of my case in a timely manner I moved my case to the U.S.
District Court in Little Rock, Arkansas to which I am please to admit that the Final

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Scheduling Order is a milestone that I did not achieve in Washington, DC. But yet I
fear the Court will yank the rug out from under me before I get to voir dire by
dismissing my case in response to the U.S. Government’s Motion to Dismiss. I warn
the Court against such treachery because I still have my human rights case at the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in Washington, DC.
The Court must also take judicial notice of the fact that I have submitted
proposals for “Negotiated Rulemaking” under Title 33 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (CFRs), and I have submitted proposals for a Collaborative System of
Justice in accordance with Title 28 of the CFRs and the Title 4 of the U.S. Attorney’s
Manual as necessary under Article 33 of the United Nations Charter. Every proposal
was denied. I am therefore justified in bring in the United Nations as Lead
Defendant because of the apparent conspiracy between the United States and the
United Nations on their dual effort at global gun control.
I have reason to believe that the United Nations War of Aggression with their
campaign for global gun control has directly or indirectly influenced the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives(BATFE) to revoke as many Federal
Firearms License gun dealers in the United States. I recent news report prompted
me to email the U.S. Attorney’s Office requesting discovery from the BATFE. I
include that email herein on the next page:

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EMAIL

DATE: Apr 9, 2007 3:24 AM

(I frequently pull all nighters pushing this case)
FROM:Don Hamrick <4donhamrick@gmail.com>
TO: U.S. ATORNEY’S OFFICE
Kim Squires <Kim.Squires@usdoj.gov>,
Richard Pence <richard.pence@usdoj.gov>,
Tim Griffin <tim.griffin@usdoj.gov>,
Jane Duke <jane.duke@usdoj.gov>
SUBJ: REQUEST DISCOVERY FROM BATFE
I require discovery from BATFE based on the news report
below.
I want BATFE data on FFL license revocations from 1933 to
the present broken down to levels of severity of reason for
revocation. Example, from minor paperwork errors up to
the most severe reason for revocations, whatever those
reasons are documented to be.
I want the data in prepared in MS Access format such that
the data can be presented in graphs.
Intent is to discover if there is an actual attack on Second
Amendment rights.
Signed: Don Hamrick
-----------------------------------------

Twin Falls Gun Shop Fires Back Against

ATF
Ryan Horsley says agency revoked store’s license in
‘attack’ on Second Amendment
By Cassidy Friedman - The Times-News
Edition Date: 04/09/07
http://www.idahostatesman.com/103/story/78778.html
TWIN FALLS, IDAHO — A gun shop here is going national
with its fight against the federal government.
Ryan Horsley’s family-run gun store, Red’s Trading Post, is
possibly the oldest gun shop in Idaho. The Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives stripped Red’s
of its license March 5. A federal judge upheld ATF’s
decision last week.
Horsley has gone onto the airwaves, protesting a
perceived “attack” against the Second Amendment, which

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he says underlies the ATF’s motivation for revoking

licenses.
Horsley’s media debut came April 8 with a local TV
commercial. Last Tuesday, he interviewed on Jack Blood’s
Deadline Live, a Texas-based nationally syndicated radio
talk show.
The facts Horsley refers to are a nonprofit group’s report
that shows an 80 percent decline in gun shops since 1994
and a Shooting Sports Retailer Magazine report that found
ATF license revocations increased 600 percent in five
years.
Since 1993, the number of federally licensed gun shops in
Idaho has dropped 54 percent, from 2,627 to 1,189. Some
dealers attribute the decline to tougher licensing rules
and increased competition from large retailers like Wal-
Mart and the Sportsman’s Warehouse.
An audit found numerous violations at Red’s Trading Post
over five years, a period in which 10,000 guns were sold,
Horsley said. A previous audit had found Red’s sold guns
improperly. This time, the ATF revoked the store’s right to
sell guns. Gun sales make up 90 percent of the store’s
income.
Horsley’s legal team protested the ATF’s decision in
federal court, claiming the errors amount to unintentional
low-level mistakes. His attorneys asked a federal judge to
give Red’s permission to continue buying and trading
guns while it fights to dismiss the ATF’s allegations.
But U.S. District Judge Edward Lodge ruled Wednesday
that Red’s failed to show the ban was causing irreparable
harm. Lodge urged both sides to work out an agreement
that would allow Red’s to continue its 70-year-old
business with restrictions until the court can review the
legality of the ATF’s revocation.
Horsley said national trends coincide with local evidence
of an ATF campaign to clamp down on gun sellers.
Across town Tuesday, behind the counter of Mountain Man
Custom Jewelry Gun and Pawn Inc., an ATF investigator
was on her second day of an audit. This is the store’s first
audit since it opened in 1985, according to its owner.
In the last five years, the ATF has revoked one Idaho gun
shop’s license. In 2004, the ATF revoked the license for
Blue Lakes Sporting Goods in Twin Falls.
“Most of these dealers have not seen an ATF agent in
their shop for 20 years and all of a sudden — guess what?
Up pops an ATF agent,” Horsley said. “It’s not a

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coincidence that other dealers are suddenly getting

inspected.”
Owner Gary Painter said his gun dealership license lapsed
in January for the first time. In the past, Painter had
renewed his license every four years. An ATF supervisor
said the ATF runs audits whenever a store’s license
lapses.
“All they are doing is making sure that he is operating in
compliance with the gun control act,” said Linda Young,
ATF’s Spokane area office supervisor.
“We’re trying not to let a dealer go more than 20 years
without an inspection,” she said. “We don’t want a dealer
out there for that long without having some kind of
contact with us.”

I further have reason to believe that this War of Aggression over the Second
Amendment is also being waged at the State level to the extent that the AFL-CIO
was stepped into the fight for Second Amendment rights in Florida. My union, the
Seafarers International Union (SIU) is affiliated with the AFL-CIO. Note the following
news report:

AFL-CIO Sides With NRA

In Backing Employee Gun Rights
By KEVIN BEGOS The Tampa Tribune
Published: Mar 28, 2007
TALLAHASSEE - The issue was whether employees have
the right to keep guns in their cars at work, and the
National Rifle Association got help from an unexpected
ally at a committee hearing Tuesday: the AFL-CIO labor
union.
The business community strongly opposes the new NRA-
supported legislation, but that’s no surprise, said AFL-CIO
spokesman Rich Templin, who said big business wants
sweeping new property rights.
“They’re seeking to put the rights of dirt over the rights of
people,” Templin said. “They’re seeking to say that the
rights of Floridians stop at the boundaries of our property.
People should not have to lose their rights simply to keep
a job.”

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Templin said the labor group was motivated by situations

in other states in which workers were fired for having
union material in cars.
The Florida Chamber of Commerce and other business
groups said the bill attacks their right to regulate behavior
on private property. The bill sponsor is Sen. Durell Peaden,
R-Crestview, and an identical House bill is sponsored by
Rep. Dennis Baxley, R-Ocala.
Peaden said the right to bear arms is the core issue in the
bill.
Chamber Executive Director Mark Wilson said the bill is
the biggest assault on private property rights the
Legislature has been asked to consider. He noted that for
many years his group and the NRA were partners in
fighting to limit government power.
“When the NRA sides with labor unions for bigger
government, we have a problem,” Wilson said.
Sen. Nancy Argenziano, R-Crystal River and Criminal
Justice committee chairwoman, said businesses aren’t the
only ones with property rights.
“I think there’s two property rights,” Argenziano said,
referring to the owner of a car and the owner of a parking
lot. “I think it’s a great bill.”
The committee voted 7-1 to approve Peaden’s bill, but
with an amendment that requires the guns or other
private material to be kept out of sight in the car.
The vote doesn’t guarantee the bill will pass. Last year a
similar bill passed initial committee stops, but it stalled
later and was not brought to a full floor vote.
WHAT’S NEXT
SB 2356 will next be heard by the Senate Judiciary
Committee. A date has not been set. The House version,
HB 1417, has not been scheduled for a hearing.
Sponsors
SB 2356: Durell Peaden, R-Crestview,
peaden.durell.web@flsenate.gov,
(850) 689-0556.
HB 1417: Dennis Baxley, R-Ocala,
dennis.baxley@myfloridahouse.gov, (850) 488-0335.
Track Bills
www.flhouse.govor www.flsenate.gov
Reporter Kevin Begos can be reached at
kbegos@tampatrib.com or (850) 222-8382.

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The Constitution of the SEAFARERS INTERNATIONAL UNION OF NORTH AMERICA-ATLANTIC, GULF,

LAKES AND INLAND WATERS DISTRICT/NMU, as amended December 15, 2006, states:

PREAMBLE
...
Based upon these principles, it is among our objects: to
use our influence individually and collectively for the
purpose of maintaining and developing skill in
seamanship and effecting a change in the maritime
law of the United States so as to render it more
equitable and to make it an aid instead of a
hindrance to the development of a merchant
marine an a body of American seamen.

STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES AND

DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
In order to form a more perfect Union, we workers in the
maritime and allied industries, realizing the value and
necessity of uniting in pursuit of our improved economic
and social welfare have determined to bind ourselves
together in the Seafarers International Union of North
America-Atlantic, Gulf, Lakes and Inland Waters
District/NMU, and hereby dedicate ourselves to the
following principles:
In promoting our economic and social welfare, we shall
ever be mindful, not only of our rights, but also of our
duties and obligations as members of the community, our
duties as citizens, and our dut to combat the menace of
communism and any other enemies of freedom and the
democratic principles to which we seafaring men dedicate
ourselves in this Union.
We shall affiliate and work with other free labor
organizations; we shall support a journal to give additional
voice to our views; we shall assist our brothers of the sea
and other workers of all countries in these obligations to
the fullest extent consistent with our duties, obligations
and law. We shall seek to exert our individual and
collective influence in the fight for the enactment of labor
and other legislations and policies which look to the
attainment of a free and happy society without distinction
based on race, creed or color.
To govern our conduct as a Union and bearing in mind
that most o our members are migratory, that their duties
carry them all over the world, that their rights must and

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shall be protected, we hereby declare these rights as

members of the Union to be inalienable.

MARITIME ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH (MACOSH)
U.S. Department of Labor
Occupational Safety & Health Administration

The Maritime Advisory Committee for Occupational Safety

and Health (MACOSH) was established on February 8,
1995 to advise the Assistant Secretary for Occupational
Safety and Health on issues relating to the delivery of
occupational safety and health programs, policies, and
standards in the maritime industries of the United States.
The committee provides a collective expertise not
otherwise available to the Secretary to address the
complex and sensitive issues involved.

MACOSH is intended to address the concerns of the entire

maritime community, focusing on the shipyard and
marine cargo (longshoring) handling industries. This
committee continues the efforts of the previously
chartered Shipyard Employment Standards Advisory
Committee (SESAC) and provides a forum for ongoing
discussions with the marine cargo handling community.
The specific objectives of this committee are to make
recommendations on issues related to: (1) reducing
injuries and illnesses in the maritime industries, (2)
improving OSHA outreach and training programs through
the use of innovative partnerships, and (3) expediting the
development and promulgation of OSHA maritime
standards.

CURRENT MEMBERSHIP
GOVERNMENT INTERESTS
 Stephen D. Hudock - National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health
 CAPT. Lorne Thomas – U.S. Coast Guard
 Charles Lemon - Washington State Department of Labor
and Industry
 Jim Maddux - Designated Federal Official
EMPLOYER INTERESTS
 James Thornton – Northrop Grumman Newport News
Shipbuilding

26
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 CAPT. Teresa Preston – Atlantic Marine/ Alabama

Shipyard, Inc.
 Marc MacDonald – Pacific Maritime Association
 Jim Burgin - National Maritime Safety Association
 Donald Raffo - General Dynamics
 Stewart Adams - Naval Sea Systems Command
EMPLOYEE INTERESTS
 Michael Flynn - International Association of Machinists
and Aerospace Workers
 David Tubman, Jr. - Marine Engineers’ Beneficial
Association
 Robert Gleason - International Longshoremen’s
Association, AFL-CIO
 John Castanho - International Longshore and
Warehouse Union
 Earnest Whelan - International Union of Operating
Engineers, Local 25
 T. Warren Fairley, Jr. - International Brotherhood of
Boilermakers, Iron Shipbuilders, Blacksmiths, Forger
and Helpers

Augustin Tellez – Executive Vice President of the Seafarers International Union

was a member of the Employee Interests of MACOSH last year in 2006. I sent one or
more letters to Mr. Tellez inquiring about MACOSH having a role in my Second
Amendment case. I received no replies from Mr. Tellez. I sent letters of inquiry to
Michael Sacco, President of the Seafarers International Union over the last 4 years.
Again, no replies. Their presumed neutral, non-involvement positions in regard to
my Second Amendment case is not exactly what I would call using their “influence
individually and collectively for the purpose of maintaining and developing skill in
seamanship and effecting a change in the maritime law of the United States so as
to render it more equitable and to make it an aid instead of a hindrance to the
development of a merchant marine and a body of American seamen” as pledged in
the Preamble to the Constitution of the Seafarers International Union. But what can I
do about? Oh, yeah, I’m suing the United Nations and the United States!

JUSTIFICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL REMEDY

Getting back on track now with my litigious remedy through the United
Nations Charter to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties I have already
established that the United Nations is violating their own Charter under Article 2,
Clause 7 by meddling in the internal affairs of Member States with their PROGRAMME OF

27
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ACTION TO PREVENT, COMBAT AND ERADIATE THE ILLICIT TRADE IN SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS IN ALL ITS

ASPECTS (i.e., their campaign for global gun contrl).

Now that the offense has been established I now proceed to list the
justifications to seek remedy at the international level.
Because Nicolas Michel, Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, Legal
Counsel for the United Nations has claimed privileges and immunities as an
affirmative defense on behalf of the United Nations he as taken this dispute to the
next step under Article 33, Clause 2, whereupon showing that the United Nations is
doing almost nothing to stop and prevent genocide in Darfur and around the world
while they are pushing global gun control, the very means of self-defense for the
People of countries suffering genocide I can easily support my allegation that the
United Nations itself likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and
security under Article 33, Clause 1 such that the Security Council, in Clause 2,
ought to find it necessary to call upon the United Nations to settle this dispute by
any such means as listed in Clause 1.
If President Bush issued a declaration of national emergency over the United
Nations declaration that the individual has no right to self-defense then, under
Article 34, the U.N. Security Council will be compelled to investigate this dispute,
which might lead to international friction in order to determine whether the
continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of
international peace and security.
Under Article 35, Clause 1, the Secretary of State by direction of President
Bush can bring this dispute under Article 34 to the attention of the Security Council
or of the General Assembly. From their the U.N. Security Council can resolve the
dispute under Articles 36 to 38.

VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES

BETWEEN STATES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OR
BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 1986
The alternative to the U.N. Security Council approach is the VIENNA CONVENTION
ON THE LAW OF TREATIES BETWEEN STATES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OR BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS 1986 (Not yet in force. United States signed June 26, 1987, but not
ratified.). The companion treaty is the VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 1969

28
 29

(Entered into force January 27, 1980. United States signed April 24, 1970, but not
ratified.). Both treaties are nearly identical.
The instead of just seeking a remedy for violations of my Second Amendment
rights, i.e., the restoration of Second Amendment rights to their full practical
application in daily life of an individual, the alternative remedy is this not only the
remedy of restoration of Second Amendment rights but also the nullification of the
United Nations Charter and the disbanding of the United Nations which has
functionally become sarcastically known as the “United Governments” protecting
not only themselves from each other but from their own People. Hence the United
Nations’ PROGRAMME OF ACTION TO PREVENT, COMBAT AND ERADIATE THE ILLICIT TRADE IN SMALL ARMS AND

LIGHT WEAPONS IN ALL ITS ASPECTS. A replacement of the United Nations would call for a
“United People” passing treaties that would more effectively protect the People
from their own Government. But this admittedly is a pipe dream.
The alternative remedy under the two Vienna Conventions on the Law of
Treaties would charge the United Nations with:
SECTION 2 INVALIDITY OF TREATIES:
 ARTICLE 49 - FRAUD,
 ARTICLE 53 - TREATIES CONFLICTING WITH A PEREMPTORY NORM OF GENERAL INTERNATIONAL

LAW (JUS COGENS)

SECTION 3 TERMINATION AND SUSPENSION OF THE OPERATION OF TREATIES:

 ARTICLE 60 - TERMINATION OR SUSPENSION OF THE OPERATION OF A TREATY AS A

CONSEQUENCE OF ITS BREACH

 ARTICLE 61, CLAUSE 2 - SUPERVENING IMPOSSIBILITY OF PERFORMANCE (BREACH)

 ARTICLE 62 - FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES

 ARTICLE 64 - EMERGENCE OF A NEW PEREMPTORY NORM OF GENERAL

INTERNATIONAL LAW (JUS COGENS)

The remedial procedures for disbanding the United Nations are listed in
Section 4. Articles 65 through 68.
The consequences of disdanding the United Nations, under Section 5 –
Consequences of the Invalidity, Termination or Suspension of the Operation of a
Treaty, Articles 69 through 72, in so far as the Second Amendment and the
Genocide Convention are concerned is the restoration of the international human

29
 30

right of armed self-defense against the common criminal and against their own
government.

JURISDICTION
Therefore, under the circumstances noted above, the U.S. District Court in
Little Rock, Arkansas has jurisdiction and venue under FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT
OF 1976 codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) and (6). General exceptions to the
jurisdictional immunity of a foreign state, and § 1606.
Because treaties are more frequently reaching to the individual there must be
available remedies for the individual to petition the United Nations.

NEW HAMPSHIRE HOUSE BILL REPEALING THEIR BAR ASSOCIATION.

See Exhibit 6.
Respectfully filed,

Don Hamrick, Plaintiff, pro se

5860 Wilburn Road
Wilburn, Arkansas 72179

Cc: Nicolas Michel,

Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs,
Legal Counsel for the United Nations

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 EXHIBIT 1: UNITED NATIONS’ DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION

UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Resolution 3314 (XXIX).

DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION
Committee: 6

Vote: Adopted without a vote

Ref: 3105(XXVIII), 2967(XXVII), 2781(XXVII), 2644(XXV), 2549(XXIV), 2420(XXIII),

2330(XXII), 1181(XII), 895(IX), 688(VII), 599(VI)

The General Assembly,

Having considered the report of the Special Committee on the Question of
Defining Aggression, established pursuant to its resolution 2330(XXII) of 18
December 1967, covering the work of its seventh session held from 11 March to 12
April 1974, including the draft Definition of Aggression adopted by the Special
Committee by consensus and recommended for adoption by the General
Assembly,45
Deeply, convinced that the adoption of the Definition of Aggression would
contribute to the strengthening of international peace and security,
1. Approves the Definition of Aggression, the text of which is annexed to the
present resolution;
2. Expresses its appreciation to the Special Committee on the Question of
Defining Aggression for its work which resulted in the elaboration of the Definition of
Aggression;
3. Calls upon all States to refrain from all acts of aggression and other uses of
force contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles
of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;46
4. Calls the attention of the Security Council to the Definition of Aggression,
as set out below, and recommends that it should, as appropriate, take account of
that Definition as guidance in determination, in accordance with the Charter, the
existence of an act of aggression.

2319th plenary meeting

14 December 1974

45
Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 19
(A/9619 and Corr. 1).

46
Resolution 2625 (XXV), annex.

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 EXHIBIT 1: UNITED NATIONS’ DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION

ANNEX
DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION
The General Assembly,
Basing itself on the fact that one of the fundamental purposes of the United
Nations is to maintain international peace and security and to take effective
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for
the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace,
Recalling that the Security Council, in accordance with Article 39 of the
Charter of the United Nations, shall determine the existence of any threat to the
peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression and shall make recommendations,
or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to
maintain or restore international peace and security,
Recalling also the duty of States under the Charter to settle their
international disputes by peaceful means in order not to endanger international
peace, security and justice,
Bearing in mind that nothing in this Definition shall be interpreted as in any
way affecting the scope of the provisions of the Charter with respect to the
functions and powers of the organs of the United Nations,
Considering also that, since aggression is the most serious and dangerous
form of the illegal use of force, being fraught, in the conditions created by the
existence of all types of weapons of mass destruction, with the possible threat of a
world conflict and all its catastrophic consequences, aggression should be defined
at the present stage,
Reaffirming the duty of States not to use armed force to deprive peoples of
their right to self-determination, freedom and independence, or to disrupt territorial
Integrity,
Reaffirming also that the territory of a State shall not be violated by being the
object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force taken
by another State in contravention of the Charter, and that it shall not be the object
of acquisition by another State resulting from such measures or the threat thereof,
Reaffirming also the provisions of the Declaration on Principles of
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
Convinced that the adoption of a definition of aggression ought to have the
effect of deterring a potential aggressor, would simplify the determination of acts of
aggression and the implementation of measures to suppress them and would also
facilitate the protection of the rights and lawful interests of, and the rendering of
assistance to, the victim,
Believing that, although the question whether an act of aggression has been
committed must be considered in the light of all the circumstances of each
particular case, it is nevertheless desirable to formulate basic principles as guidance
for such determination,

32
 EXHIBIT 1: UNITED NATIONS’ DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION

Adopts the following Definition of Agression:47

47
Explanatory notes on articles 3 and 5 are to be found in paragraph 20 of the Report of the
Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression (Official Records of the General
Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 19 (A/9619 and Corr. 1). Statements on the
Definition are contained in paragraphs 9 and 10 of the report of the Sixth Committee
(A/9890).

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 EXHIBIT 1: UNITED NATIONS’ DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION

ARTICLE I
Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty,
territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this
Definition.
Explanatory note: In this Definition the term “State”:
(a) Is used without prejudice to questions of recognition or to whether a State
is a member of the United Nations;
(b) Includes the concept of a “group of States” where appropriate.
ARTICLE 2
The First use of armed force by a State in contravention of the Charter shall
constitute prima facie evidence of an act of aggression although the Security
Council may, in conformity with the Charter, conclude that a determination that an
act of aggression has been committed would not be justified in the light of other
relevant circumstances, including the fact that the acts concerned or their
consequences are not of sufficient gravity.
ARTICLE 3
Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, subject to
and in accordance with the provisions of article 2, qualify as an act of aggression:
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of
another State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such
invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another
State or part thereof,
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of
another State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another
State;
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of
another State;
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or
marine and air fleets of another State;
(e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of
another State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the
conditions provided for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in such
territory beyond the termination of the agreement;
(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the
disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of
aggression against a third State;
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars
or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such
gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein.
ARTICLE 4

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 EXHIBIT 1: UNITED NATIONS’ DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION

The acts enumerated above are not exhaustive and the Security Council may
determine that other acts constitute aggression under the provisions of the Charter.

35
 EXHIBIT 1: UNITED NATIONS’ DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION

ARTICLE 5
1. No consideration of whatever nature, whether political, economic, military
or otherwise, may serve as a justification for aggression.
2. A war of aggression is a crime against international peace. Aggression
gives rise to international responsibility.
3. No territorial acquisition or special advantage resulting from aggression is
or shall be recognized as lawful.
ARTICLE 6
Nothing in this Definition shall be construed as in any way enlarging or
diminishing the scope of the Charter, including its provisions concerning cases in
which the use of force is lawful.
ARTICLE 7
Nothing in this Definition, and in particular article 3, could in any way
prejudice the right to self-determination, freedom and independence, as derived
from the Charter, of peoples forcibly deprived of that right and referred to in the
Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
particularly peoples under colonial and racist regimes or other forms of alien
domination: nor the right of these peoples to struggle to that end and to seek and
receive support, in accordance with the principles of the Charter and in conformity
with the above-mentioned Declaration.
ARTICLE 8
In their interpretation and application the above provisions are interrelated
and each provision should be construed in the context of the other provisions.

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 EXHIBIT 2: U.N. DECLARATION NO INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENSE

http://www.iansa.org/un/documents/salw_hr_report_2006.pdf

UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

A/HRC/Sub.1/58/27
27 July 2006

SPECIFIC HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES

Prevention of human rights violations committed with small arms and light
weapons.
Final report submitted by Barbara Frey, Special Rapporteur,
in accordance with Sub-Commission resolution 2002/25**

II. THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DEFENCE WITH REGARD TO

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS COMMITTED WITH
SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS
(p. 8)
19. This report discusses and recognizes the principle of self-defence in human
rights law and assesses its proper place in the establishment of human rights
principles governing small arms and light weapons.48 Those opposing the State
regulation of civilian possession of firearms claim that the principle of self-defence
provides legal support for a “right” to possess small arms thus negating or
substantially minimizing the duty of States to regulate possession. 49 The present
report concludes that the principle of self-defence has an important place in
international human rights law, but that it does not provide an independent, legal
supervening right to small arms possession, nor does it ameliorate the duty of
States to use due diligence in regulating civilian possession.
A. SELF-DEFENCE AS AN EXEMPTION TO CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY, NOT A HUMAN RIGHT (pp. 9-10)
20. Self-defence is a widely recognized, yet legally proscribed, exception to the
universal duty to respect the right to life of others. Self-defence is a basis for
exemption from criminal responsibility that can be raised by any State agent or non-
State actor. Self-defence is sometimes designated as a “right”. There is inadequate

48
Because of the severe limits on space and the breadth of issues that need to be covered in
this study, the author does not attempt here to undertake a full legal discussion of the
principle of self-defence in international law. For an authoritative discussion of this complex
topic, see Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law (2003). In addition, the legal concepts
discussed herein assume a non-conflict setting. Situations of mass human rights abuse and
armed conflict involve international humanitarian law and security law principles that require
an extended if not completely separate set of legal and policy considerations. For the Special
Rapporteur’s findings and recommendations regarding role of small arms and light weapons
in violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in armed conflict, see her
progress report (E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/37).
49
David Kopel, Paul Gallant, and Joanne Eisen, “IS RESISTING GENOCIDE A HUMAN RIGHT?” Notre Dame
Law Review, vol. 81, No. 4 (2006), p. 1 (“… The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
affirms the existence of a universal, individual right of self-defense, and also a right to
revolution against tyranny … Taken in conjunction with Anglo-American human rights law,
the human rights instruments can be read to reflect a customary or general international law
recognizing a right of armed resistance by genocide victims”.).

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 EXHIBIT 2: U.N. DECLARATION NO INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENSE

legal support for such an interpretation. Self-defence is more properly characterized

as a means of protecting the right to life and, as such, a basis for avoiding
responsibility for violating the rights of another.
21. No international human right of self-defence is expressly set forth in the primary
sources of international law: treaties, customary law, or general principles. While the
right to life is recognized in virtually every major international human rights treaty,
the principle of self-defence is expressly recognized in only one, the CONVENTION FOR THE
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS (EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS),
article 2.50 Self-defence, however, is not recognized as a right in the European
Convention on Human Rights. According to one commentator, “The function of this
provision is simply to remove from the scope of application of article 2 (1) killings
necessary to defend against unlawful violence. It does not provide a right that
must be secured by the State”.51
22. Self-defence is broadly recognized in customary international law as a defence
to criminal responsibility as shown by State practice. There is not evidence however
that States have enacted self-defence as a freestanding right under their domestic
laws, nor is there evidence of opinio juris that would compel States to recognize an
independent, supervening right to self-defence that they must enforce in the
context of their domestic jurisdictions as a supervening right.
23. Similarly, international criminal law sets forth self-defence as a basis for
avoiding criminal responsibility, not as an independent right. The International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia noted the universal elements of the
principle of self-defence.52 The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former

50
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213
UNITED NATIONS TREATY SERIES 222, entered into force on 3 September 1953, as amended by
Protocols Nos. 3, 5, 8 and 11, which entered into force on 21 September 1970, 20 December
1971, 1 January 1990 and 1 November 1998, respectively. Article 2 states:
(1) Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be
deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court
following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.
(2) Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this
article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely
necessary:
(a) In defence of any person from unlawful violence;
(b) In order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of
a person lawfully detained;
(c) In action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or
insurrection.
51
John Cerone, “A HUMAN RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE?”, George Mason Journal of Law, Economics, &
Policy (accepted for 2006 publication).
52
Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law (New York, Oxford University Press, 2003), p.
223, No. 2 (2003) (citing Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez, International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia (Trial Chamber) (26 February 2001) at section 451). “In Kordić and
Čerkez a Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia held
that self-defence as a ground for excluding criminal responsibility is one of the defences that
‘form part of the general principles of criminal law which the International Tribunal must take

38
 EXHIBIT 2: U.N. DECLARATION NO INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENSE

Yugoslavia noted “that the ‘principle of self-defence’ enshrined in article 31,

paragraph 1, of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court ‘reflects
provisions found in most national criminal codes and may be regarded as
constituting a rule of customary international law’”.53 As the chapeau of article 31
makes clear, self-defence is identified as one of the “grounds for excluding criminal
responsibility”. The legal defence defined in article 31, paragraph (d) is for:
conduct which is alleged to constitute a crime within the jurisdiction of
the Court has been caused by duress resulting from a threat of
imminent death or of continuing or imminent serious bodily harm
against that person or another person, and the person acts necessarily
and reasonably to avoid this threat, provided that the person does not
intend to cause a greater harm than the one sought to be avoided.54
Thus, international criminal law designates self-defence as a rule to be followed to
determine criminal liability, and not as an independent right which States are
required to enforce.
24. There is support in the jurisprudence of international human rights bodies for
requiring States to recognize and evaluate a plea of self-defence as part of the due
process rights of criminal defendants. Some members of the Human Rights
Committee have even argued that article 6, paragraph 2, of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights requires national courts to consider the
personal circumstances of a defendant when sentencing a person to death,
including possible claims of self-defence, based on the States Parties’ duty to
protect the right to life.55 Under common law jurisdictions, courts must take into
account factual and personal circumstances in sentencing to the death penalty in
homicide cases. Similarly, in civil law jurisdictions: “Various aggravating or
extenuating circumstances such as self-defence, necessity, distress and mental
capacity of the accused need to be considered in reaching criminal
conviction/sentence in each case of homicide.”56
25. Again, the Committee’s interpretation supports the requirement that States
recognize self-defence in a criminal law context. Under this interpretation of
into account in deciding the cases before it’.” Idem at p. 223 (citing Prosecutor v. Kordić and
Čerkez, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (Trial Chamber) (26
February 2001) at section 449).
53
Ibid., p. 223, No. 2 (2003) (quoting Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez, International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (Trial Chamber) (26 February 2001) at section 451).
54
ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (A/CONF.183/9), adopted 17 July 1998, as
corrected by the procés-verbaux of 10 November 1998, 12 July 1999, and 8 May 2000.
55
See communication No. 806/1998 of the Human Rights Committee, Thompson v. Saint
Vincent and the Grenadines (CCPR/C/70/D/806/1998) of 5 December 2000. In his dissent,
Lord Colville said self-defence was an avenue for the defence to counter accusations of
homicide which must result in acquittal of any crime, “unless the prosecution can satisfy the
tribunal of facts that the defendant’s actions, which led to the death, exceed a proportional
response, in his own perception of the circumstances, to the threat with which he was faced”
(para. 5).
56
Human Rights Committee, communication No. 1077/2002, Jaime Carpo et al. v.
Philippines (CCPR/C/77/D/1077/2002) of 15 May 2003 dissenting opinion of Mr. Nisuke Ando.

39
 EXHIBIT 2: U.N. DECLARATION NO INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENSE

international human rights law, the State could be required to exonerate a

defendant for using firearms under extreme circumstances where it may be
necessary and proportional to an imminent threat to life. Even so, none of these
authorities enumerate an affirmative international legal obligation upon the State
that would require the State to allow a defendant access to a gun.

40
 EXHIBIT 2: U.N. DECLARATION NO INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENSE

B. NECESSITY AND PROPORTIONALITY REQUIREMENTS FOR CLAIM OF SELF-DEFENCE

(PP. 10-11)
26. International bodies and States universally define self-defence in terms of
necessity and proportionality.57 Whether a particular claim to self-defence is
successful is a fact-sensitive determination. When small arms and light weapons are
used for self-defence, for instance, unless the action was necessary to save a life or
lives and the use of force with small arms is proportionate to the threat of force,
self-defence will not alleviate responsibility for violating another’s right to life.
27. The use of small arms and light weapons by either State or non-State actors
automatically raises the threshold for severity of the threat which must be shown in
order to justify the use of small arms or light weapons in defence, as required by the
principle of proportionality. Because of the lethal nature of these weapons and the
jus cogens human rights obligations imposed upon all States and individuals to
respect the right to life,58 small arms and light weapons may be used defensively
only in the most extreme circumstances, expressly, where the right to life is already
threatened or unjustifiably impinged.
28. The requirements for a justifiable use of force in self-defence by State officials
are set forth in the United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms
by Law Enforcement Officials. In exceptional circumstances that necessitate the use
of force to protect life, State officials may use firearms and claim self-defence or
defence of others as a justification for their decision to use force.59 However, if
possible to avoid the threat without resorting to force, the obligation to protect life
includes the duty of law enforcement to utilize alternative non-violent and non-
lethal methods of restraint and conflict resolution.60

57
The presence of the principle of self-defence in emerging international criminal law
reflects the global uniformity of the principle of self-defence and its elements. Antonio
Cassese summarized the required elements of self-defence as a justification for criminal
action in customary international criminal law as:
“(i) the action in self-defence is taken in response to an imminent or actual
unlawful attack on the life of the person or of another person;
(ii) there is no other way of preventing or stopping the offence [necessity];
(iii) the unlawful conduct of the other has not been caused by the person
acting in self-defence;
(iv) the conduct in self-defence is proportionate to the offence to which the
person reacts.” Cassese, op. cit., p 222.
58
Ibid. (“[T]he life, body, and dignity of human beings are protected by international norms
having the rank of jus cogens, and are therefore not derogable by either States or
Individuals.”)
59
Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, adopted
by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of
Offenders, Havana, Cuba, 27 August to 7 September 1990 (hereinafter “Basic Principles”),
principle 9.
60
Basic Principles, principle 4 (“Law enforcement officials, in carrying out their duty, shall, as
far as possible, apply non-violent means before resorting to the use of force and firearms.
They may use force and firearms only if other means remain ineffective or without any

41
 EXHIBIT 2: U.N. DECLARATION NO INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENSE

29. The severe consequences of firearm use therefore necessitate more detailed
and stricter guidelines than other means of force.61 Even when firearm use does not
result in death, the injuries caused by firearm shots can be paralyzing, painful, and
may immobilize a person for a much longer period of time than would other
methods of temporary immobilization.62 The training handbook for police on human
rights practices and standards produced by the Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights says that “firearms are to be used only in extreme circumstance”.63
Any use of a firearm by a law enforcement official outside of the above-mentioned
situational context will likely be incompatible with human rights norms.
...
C. THE CLAIM OF SELF-DEFENCE DOES NOT NEGATE THE DUE DILIGENCE OBLIGATION
TO PREVENT PRIVATE SECTOR VIOLENCE (pp. 12-13)
33. The individual’s desire to carry a gun as self-defence must be considered in the
broader context of the State’s obligation to maximize protection of human rights.
The State has an obligation under international law to promote law enforcement and
to suppress private violence by creating a legal and social system in which the

promise of achieving the intended result.”). See also Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights, Professional Training Series No. 5/Add.3, Human rights
standards and practice for the police (United Nations publication Sales No. E.03.XIV.7)
(2004), p. 23.
61
Basic Principles, article 9, states that “Intentional lethal use of firearms may only be made
when strictly unavoidable in order to protect life”. See also Human Rights Committee,
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States parties under article 40 of the Covenant,
Second periodic report of States parties due in 1996, Addendum: Ireland (28 April 1999)
(CCPR/C/IRL/98/2, para. 113). “The Human Rights Committee, in its comments on the first
periodic report of Ireland (A/48/40, para. 612) emphasized the importance of the issuing of
rules and guidelines on, inter alia, the use of firearms, and ensuring the strict enforcement
thereof by law enforcement officials.” “The regulations governing the use of firearms by the
Gardaí forces in Ireland thereafter developed are detailed in the Irish Garda Code 25.42.”
Idem., para. 117.
62
Small Arms Survey 2001: Profiling the Problem (Geneva, the Graduate Institute of
International Studies, 2001), pp. 216-17. (“Victims of small arms injuries often require
resource-intensive surgery, followed by prolonged hospitalization and rehabilitation … For
the individual, the repercussions from firearm injury are profound … [including] long-term,
often permanent, psychological trauma and social marginalization.”)
63
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Professional Training
Series No. 5/Add.3, Human rights standards and practice for the police (United Nations
publication Sales No. E.03.XIV.7) (2004), p. 24. The handbook further states that:

Firearms are to be used only in self-defence or defence of others against

imminent threat of death or serious injury, or to prevent a particularly serious
crime that involves a grave threat to life, or to arrest or prevent the escape of
a person posing such a threat and who is resisting efforts to stop the threat
and in every case, only when less extreme measures are insufficient.
Intentional lethal use of force and firearms shall be permitted only when
strictly unavoidable in order to protect human life.

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 EXHIBIT 2: U.N. DECLARATION NO INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENSE

general duty is to avoid the use of force where non-violent means of self-protection
are reasonably available. 64
34. Even if there were a “human right to self-defence”, it would not negate the
State’s due diligence responsibility to maximize protection of the right to life for the
society through reasonable regulations on civilian possession of weapons. While
there is no international mandate to prohibit all civilian ownership, neither is there a
mandate to allow every individual to carry a weapon. The State must consider the
community as a whole, and not just the single individual, in carrying out its
obligation to minimize physical violence.
35. For example, even if there were a “right” to self-defence, that would not negate
the State’s due diligence responsibility to keep weapons out of the hands of those
most likely to misuse them. As the responses to the Special Rapporteur’s
questionnaire show, screening for likely misuse is one of the measures commonly
used by States to implement legitimate State policy interests in preventing small
arms violence by non-State actors. This common State practice is an example of the
responsible implementation of the legal principle of due diligence that has been
elaborated in many international bodies with no apparent negative impact on self-
defence law. Thus it appears that States, at the very least, should put in place
regulations to keep weapons away from certain people who - based on factors such
as age, past record of criminality or personal violence, or lack of mental fitness - can
be reasonably expected not to understand or comply with the requirements of
necessity and proportionality that are the prerequisites to invoking self-defence.
36. Having established that the affirmative duty of States to impose some
regulation on unfettered civilian possession is not inconsistent with principles of
self-defence, other instances of appropriate regulation may also be identified. For
example, the State has particularly acute obligations when it comes to protecting
the rights of vulnerable groups, including victims of domestic violence, who are
most at risk from misuse of a gun in the home. The presence of a gun in the home
can easily turn domestic violence into domestic homicide. Recent studies show that,
in the United States, firearms are used in 59 per cent of all intimate partner
homicides of women,65 and having one or more guns in the home makes a woman
7.2 times more likely to be murdered by an intimate partner.66 Despite self-defence
justifications for possessing a firearm, research indicates that firearms are rarely
used to stop crimes or kill criminals. 67 Instead, they are often turned on the very

64
Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria (Application Nos. 43577/98 and 43579/98) [2004],
European Convention on Human Rights 89 (26 February 2004), para. 105.
65
United States Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2002, cited in Small Arms Survey 2004: rights at
risk, A project of the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, p. 183.
66
James E. Bailey, MD, MPH, et. al., “Risk factors for violence death of women in the home,”
Archives of Internal Medicine, vol. 157, No. 7 (1997), pp. 777-782.
67
In 2003 only 203 justifiable homicides by private citizens using firearms were reported by
the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation Uniform Crime Reports, including 163 with
handguns. This number compares to the 17,108 suicides, 11,829 homicides and 762
accidental deaths caused by firearms in 2003, data compiled by the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention.

43
 EXHIBIT 2: U.N. DECLARATION NO INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENSE

person who may have the best arguments for self-defence – the woman herself.68 In
the face of such evidence and under the international due diligence legal mandate
that has been elaborated by human rights bodies to prevent violence against
women - including:
“the duty of Governments to … exercise due diligence to prevent,
investigate and, in accordance with national legislation, to punish acts
of violence against women and to take appropriate and effective action
concerning acts of violence against women, whether those acts are
perpetrated by the State or by private persons …”69
- the State has an irrefutable international legal duty to keep small arms out of the
hands of persons who have a history of interfamilial violence.
37. Screening for likely misuse and removing of weapons where there is a history of
interfamilial violence are two examples where States’ duty of due diligence to
regulate firearms is: (a) consistent with commonly reported State practices; and (b)
not inconsistent with the principle of self-defence. Such regulations can be carried
out in a manner that does not implicate issues of generalized confiscation that are
raised disingenuously by opponents of any regulation of civilian possession. Other
instances of such regulation may be evaluated based on the experience in States
that have implemented them and on the criteria that have been discussed in this
paper and the draft principles.
...
III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (pp. 13-14)
40. To meet their obligations under international human rights law, States must
enact and enforce laws and policies to maximize protection of human rights for the
most people. States must consider the community as a whole and not just the
single individual in carrying out their obligation to minimize violence by promoting
law enforcement and suppressing private violence. International human rights law
mandates States “to respect and to ensure” human rights to all individuals subject
to their jurisdiction. Under this mandate, States have positive obligations to protect
individuals from violations by State and non-State actors.
41. States must take effective measures to reduce the need for people to arm
themselves by ensuring an atmosphere of public safety supported by law
enforcement that is committed and trained to protect the rule of law and to prevent
illegal acts.
42. States must also take effective measures to minimize violence carried out by
armed private actors. States are required to enforce criminal sanctions against
persons who use arms to violate the law. States are further required, under the
principle of due diligence, to prevent small arms from getting into the hands of
those who are likely to misuse them. Under the due diligence standard, international
human rights bodies should require States to enforce a minimum licensing standard
68
K.M. Grassel and others, “Association Between Handgun Purchase and Mortality from
Firearm Injury”, INJURY PREVENTION, vol. 9 (2003) (reporting that women who were murdered
were more likely, not less likely, to have purchased a handgun in the three years prior to
their deaths).
69
THE ELIMINATION OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, Commission on Human Rights resolution 1996/49,
para. 4.

44
 EXHIBIT 2: U.N. DECLARATION NO INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENSE

designed to prevent small arms from being used by private actors to violate human
rights.
43. Other effective measures consistent with due diligence include the prohibition of
civilian possession of weapons designed for military use; the sponsoring of effective
amnesty programmes to decrease the number of weapons in active use;
requirement of marking and tracing information by manufacturers; and
incorporation of a gender perspective in policies regarding small arms. States have
an affirmative duty under international human rights law to protect groups that are
most vulnerable to small arms misuse, including victims of domestic violence.
44. The principle of self-defence, as an internationally recognized exemption from
criminal responsibility, is not inconsistent with the due diligence responsibilities of
States to regulate civilian possession of small arms. There is no independent or
supervening right in international human rights law of self-defence that would
require States to provide civilians with access to small arms; nor does the principle
of self-defence diminish the State’s responsibility to use due diligence to keep
weapons out of the hands of those most likely to misuse them. Rather, States
should exercise their due diligence responsibilities in the context of self-defence
law, including the likelihood that those possessing firearms will act only out of
necessity and with proportionality.
45. Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations applies to States acting in self-
defence in response to armed attacks against their State sovereignty. It does not
apply to situations of self-defence for individual persons.
46. The Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights should
act to clarify the positive responsibilities of States to prevent human rights
violations committed with small arms. To this end, the Special Rapporteur with the
task of preparing a comprehensive study on the prevention of human rights
violations committed with small arms and light weapons would welcome the
endorsement by the Sub-Commission of the draft principles on the prevention of
human rights violations committed with small arms (E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/35) as an
important contribution to the ongoing delineation of measures regarding small arms
and light weapons to be carried out by States in order to give effect to international
human rights in communities around the world.

45
 EXHIBIT 3: DECLARATION OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY

U.S. CODE
TITLE 50—WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE
CHAPTER 34—NATIONAL EMERGENCIES
SUBCHAPTER II—DECLARATIONS OF FUTURE NATIONAL
EMERGENCIES
50 U.S.C. § 1621. Declaration of national emergency by President; publication in
Federal Register; effect on other laws; superseding legislation
(a) With respect to Acts of Congress authorizing the exercise, during the period
of a national emergency, of any special or extraordinary power, the President is
authorized to declare such national emergency. Such proclamation shall
immediately be transmitted to the Congress and published in the Federal
Register.
(b) Any provisions of law conferring powers and authorities to be exercised
during a national emergency shall be effective and remain in effect
(1) only when the President (in accordance with subsection (a) of this
section), specifically declares a national emergency, and
(2) only in accordance with this chapter. No law enacted after September 14,
1976, shall supersede this subchapter unless it does so in specific terms,
referring to this subchapter, and declaring that the new law supersedes the
provisions of this subchapter.

SUBCHAPTER III—EXERCISE OF EMERGENCY POWERS AND AUTHORITIES

50 U.S.C. § 1631. Declaration of national emergency by Executive order; authority;

publication in Federal Register; transmittal to Congress
When the President declares a national emergency, no powers or authorities
made available by statute for use in the event of an emergency shall be
exercised unless and until the President specifies the provisions of law under
which he proposes that he, or other officers will act. Such specification may be
made either in the declaration of a national emergency, or by one or more
contemporaneous or subsequent Executive orders published in the Federal
Register and transmitted to the Congress.

46
 EXHIBIT 4: U.N. CHARTER – PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

UN CHARTER
CHAPTER VI PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

ARTICLE 33
1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the
maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution
by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial
settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful
means of their own choice.
2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the
parties to settle their dispute by such means.
ARTICLE 34
The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead
to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the
continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of
international peace and security.
ARTICLE 35
1. Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the
nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the
General Assembly.
2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of
the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if
it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific
settlement provided in the present Charter.
3. The proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of matters brought to its
attention under this Article will be subject to the provisions of Articles 11 and 12.
ARTICLE 36
1. The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in
Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or
methods of adjustment.
2. The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the
settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the parties.
3. In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council should also
take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by
the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of
the Statute of the Court.
ARTICLE 37
1. Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle
it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security Council.
2. If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely
to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide
whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement
as it may consider appropriate.

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 EXHIBIT 4: U.N. CHARTER – PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

ARTICLE 38
Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37, the Security Council may, if
all the parties to any dispute so request, make recommendations to the parties with
a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute.

48
 EXHIBIT 5: FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT OF 1976

FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT OF 1976

Pub. L. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891,
28 U.S.C. 1330, 1332(a), 1391(f), 1601-1611, 1608(b)(3)

U.S. CODE
TITLE 28 - JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE
PART IV - JURISDICTION AND VENUE
CHAPTER 85 - DISTRICT COURTS; JURISDICTION

28 U.S.C. § 1332. Diversity of citizenship; amount in controversy; costs

(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest
and costs, and is between—
(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state;
(3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state
are additional parties; and
(4) a foreign state, defined in section 1603 (a) of this title, as plaintiff and
citizens of a State or of different States.
For the purposes of this section, section 1335, and section 1441, an alien admitted
to the United States for permanent residence shall be deemed a citizen of the State
in which such alien is domiciled.

CHAPTER 97—JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF FOREIGN STATES

28 U.S.C. § 1603. Definitions

For purposes of this chapter—
(a) A “foreign state”, except as used in section 1608 of this title, includes a political
subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state as
defined in subsection (b).
(b) An “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state” means any entity—
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a
majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state
or political subdivision thereof, and
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States as defined in section
1332 (c) and (d) of this title, nor created under the laws of any third country.
(c) The “United States” includes all territory and waters, continental or insular,
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
(d) A “commercial activity” means either a regular course of commercial conduct or
a particular commercial transaction or act. The commercial character of an activity

49
 EXHIBIT 5: FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT OF 1976

shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular

transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose.
(e) A “commercial activity carried on in the United States by a foreign state” means
commercial activity carried on by such state and having substantial contact with the
United States.

28 U.S.C. § 1604. Immunity of a foreign state from jurisdiction

Subject to existing international agreements to which the United States is a party at
the time of enactment of this Act a foreign state shall be immune from the
jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States except as provided in
sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter.

28 U.S.C. § 1605. General exceptions to the jurisdictional immunity of a

foreign state
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United
States or of the States in any case—
(1) in which the foreign state has waived its immunity either explicitly or by
implication, notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver which the foreign
state may purport to effect except in accordance with the terms of the waiver;
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the
United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States
in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon
an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial
activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the
United States;
(3) in which rights in property taken in violation of international law are in issue
and that property or any property exchanged for such property is present in the
United States in connection with a commercial activity carried on in the United
States by the foreign state; or that property or any property exchanged for such
property is owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality of the foreign
state and that agency or instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activity in
the United States;
(4) in which rights in property in the United States acquired by succession or gift
or rights in immovable property situated in the United States are in issue;
(5) not otherwise encompassed in paragraph (2) above, in which money
damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death, or
damage to or loss of property, occurring in the United States and caused by the
tortious act or omission of that foreign state or of any official or employee of that
foreign state while acting within the scope of his office or employment; except
this paragraph shall not apply to—
(A) any claim based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function regardless of whether the
discretion be abused, or

50
 EXHIBIT 5: FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT OF 1976

(B) any claim arising out of malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel,
slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights;
(6) in which the action is brought, either to enforce an agreement made by the
foreign state with or for the benefit of a private party to submit to arbitration all
or any differences which have arisen or which may arise between the parties
with respect to a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not,
concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration under the laws
of the United States, or to confirm an award made pursuant to such an
agreement to arbitrate, if
(A) the arbitration takes place or is intended to take place in the United
States,
(B) the agreement or award is or may be governed by a treaty or other
international agreement in force for the United States calling for the
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards,
(C) the underlying claim, save for the agreement to arbitrate, could have
been brought in a United States court under this section or section 1607, or
(D) paragraph (1) of this subsection is otherwise applicable; or
(7) not otherwise covered by paragraph (2), in which money damages are sought
against a foreign state for personal injury or death that was caused by an act of
torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of
material support or resources (as defined in section 2339A of title 18) for such
an act if such act or provision of material support is engaged in by an official,
employee, or agent of such foreign state while acting within the scope of his or
her office, employment, or agency, except that the court shall decline to hear a
claim under this paragraph—
(A) if the foreign state was not designated as a state sponsor of terrorism
under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 App. U.S.C.
2405 (j)) or section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
2371) at the time the act occurred, unless later so designated as a result of
such act or the act is related to Case Number 1:00CV03110(EGS) in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia; and
(B) even if the foreign state is or was so designated, if—
(i) the act occurred in the foreign state against which the claim has been
brought and the claimant has not afforded the foreign state a reasonable
opportunity to arbitrate the claim in accordance with accepted
international rules of arbitration; or
(ii) neither the claimant nor the victim was a national of the United States
(as that term is defined in section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act) when the act upon which the claim is based occurred.
(b) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the
United States in any case in which a suit in admiralty is brought to enforce a
maritime lien against a vessel or cargo of the foreign state, which maritime lien is
based upon a commercial activity of the foreign state: Provided, That—
(1) notice of the suit is given by delivery of a copy of the summons and of the
complaint to the person, or his agent, having possession of the vessel or cargo

51
 EXHIBIT 5: FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT OF 1976

against which the maritime lien is asserted; and if the vessel or cargo is arrested
pursuant to process obtained on behalf of the party bringing the suit, the service
of process of arrest shall be deemed to constitute valid delivery of such notice,
but the party bringing the suit shall be liable for any damages sustained by the
foreign state as a result of the arrest if the party bringing the suit had actual or
constructive knowledge that the vessel or cargo of a foreign state was involved;
and
(2) notice to the foreign state of the commencement of suit as provided in
section 1608 of this title is initiated within ten days either of the delivery of
notice as provided in paragraph (1) of this subsection or, in the case of a party
who was unaware that the vessel or cargo of a foreign state was involved, of the
date such party determined the existence of the foreign state’s interest.
(c) Whenever notice is delivered under subsection (b)(1), the suit to enforce a
maritime lien shall thereafter proceed and shall be heard and determined according
to the principles of law and rules of practice of suits in rem whenever it appears
that, had the vessel been privately owned and possessed, a suit in rem might have
been maintained. A decree against the foreign state may include costs of the suit
and, if the decree is for a money judgment, interest as ordered by the court, except
that the court may not award judgment against the foreign state in an amount
greater than the value of the vessel or cargo upon which the maritime lien arose.
Such value shall be determined as of the time notice is served under subsection
(b)(1). Decrees shall be subject to appeal and revision as provided in other cases of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. Nothing shall preclude the plaintiff in any
proper case from seeking relief in personam in the same action brought to enforce a
maritime lien as provided in this section.
(d) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the
United States in any action brought to foreclose a preferred mortgage, as defined in
the Ship Mortgage Act, 1920 (46 U.S.C. 911 and following). Such action shall be
brought, heard, and determined in accordance with the provisions of that Act and in
accordance with the principles of law and rules of practice of suits in rem, whenever
it appears that had the vessel been privately owned and possessed a suit in rem
might have been maintained.
(e) For purposes of paragraph (7) of subsection (a)—
(1) the terms “torture” and “extrajudicial killing” have the meaning given those
terms in section 3 of the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991;
(2) the term “hostage taking” has the meaning given that term in Article 1 of the
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages; and
(3) the term “aircraft sabotage” has the meaning given that term in Article 1 of
the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation.
(f) No action shall be maintained under subsection (a)(7) unless the action is
commenced not later than 10 years after the date on which the cause of action
arose. All principles of equitable tolling, including the period during which the
foreign state was immune from suit, shall apply in calculating this limitation period.
(g) Limitation on Discovery.—

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 EXHIBIT 5: FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT OF 1976

(1) In general.—
(A) Subject to paragraph (2), if an action is filed that would otherwise be
barred by section 1604, but for subsection (a)(7), the court, upon request of
the Attorney General, shall stay any request, demand, or order for discovery
on the United States that the Attorney General certifies would significantly
interfere with a criminal investigation or prosecution, or a national security
operation, related to the incident that gave rise to the cause of action, until
such time as the Attorney General advises the court that such request,
demand, or order will no longer so interfere.
(B) A stay under this paragraph shall be in effect during the 12-month period
beginning on the date on which the court issues the order to stay discovery.
The court shall renew the order to stay discovery for additional 12-month
periods upon motion by the United States if the Attorney General certifies
that discovery would significantly interfere with a criminal investigation or
prosecution, or a national security operation, related to the incident that gave
rise to the cause of action.
(2) Sunset.—
(A) Subject to subparagraph (B), no stay shall be granted or continued in
effect under paragraph (1) after the date that is 10 years after the date on
which the incident that gave rise to the cause of action occurred.
(B) After the period referred to in subparagraph (A), the court, upon request
of the Attorney General, may stay any request, demand, or order for
discovery on the United States that the court finds a substantial likelihood
would—
(i) create a serious threat of death or serious bodily injury to any person;
(ii) adversely affect the ability of the United States to work in cooperation
with foreign and international law enforcement agencies in investigating
violations of United States law; or
(iii) obstruct the criminal case related to the incident that gave rise to the
cause of action or undermine the potential for a conviction in such case.
(3) Evaluation of evidence.— The court’s evaluation of any request for a stay
under this subsection filed by the Attorney General shall be conducted ex parte
and in camera.
(4) Bar on motions to dismiss.— A stay of discovery under this subsection shall
constitute a bar to the granting of a motion to dismiss under rules 12(b)(6) and
56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
(5) Construction.— Nothing in this subsection shall prevent the United States
from seeking protective orders or asserting privileges ordinarily available to the
United States.

28 U.S.C. § 1606. Extent of liability

As to any claim for relief with respect to which a foreign state is not entitled to
immunity under section 1605 or 1607 [N/A. (1607 refers to a counterclaim against
action brought by foreign state)] of this chapter, the foreign state shall be liable in

53
 EXHIBIT 5: FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT OF 1976

the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances; but a foreign state except for an agency or instrumentality thereof
shall not be liable for punitive damages; if, however, in any case wherein death was
caused, the law of the place where the action or omission occurred provides, or has
been construed to provide, for damages only punitive in nature, the foreign state
shall be liable for actual or compensatory damages measured by the pecuniary
injuries resulting from such death which were incurred by the persons for whose
benefit the action was brought.

54
 EXHIBIT 6: NEW HAMPSHIRE HOUSE BILL REPEALING THE BAR ASSO.

HB 670 – AS INTRODUCED
2007 SESSION
07-0115
10/03
HOUSE BILL 670

AN ACT relative to repealing the incorporation of

the New Hampshire Bar Association.
SPONSORS: Rep. L. Christiansen, Hills 27
COMMITTEE: Judiciary
ANALYSIS
This bill repeals the corporate status of the New Hampshire Bar Association
pursuant to language in the original incorporation act adopted in 1873.
-----------------------------------------------
Explanation: Matter added to current law appears in bold italics.
Matter removed from current law appears [in brackets and struckthrough.]
Matter which is either (a) all new or (b) repealed and reenacted appears in regular
type.
07-0115
10/03
STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
In the Year of Our Lord Two Thousand Seven
AN ACT relative to repealing the incorporation of the New Hampshire Bar
Association.
Be it Enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in General Court
convened:
1 New Hampshire Bar Association; Repeal of Incorporation; Intent.
The general court finds that part II, article 83 of the New Hampshire constitution
specifically enumerates free and fair competition by the people in all of their
commercial endeavors. This right is to be preserved by the duty imposed on the
legislature by their action to remove any monopoly or conspiracy which tends to
hinder or destroy this right. The general court by this act therefore:
I. Finds that the New Hampshire Bar Association as established in
1873, chapter CXV, has become a constitutionally prohibited monopoly
and conspiracy of power in the practice of law.
II. Relies on section 6 of the laws of 1873, chapter CXV to repeal the
charter and corporate status of the New Hampshire Bar Association,
and upon its dissolution, the unlawful accumulation of any and all
assets of the monopoly shall escheat to the state.

55
 EXHIBIT 6: NEW HAMPSHIRE HOUSE BILL REPEALING THE BAR ASSO.

2 Effective Date. This act shall take effect 60 days after its passage.

56
 CERTIFICATION

A copy of the above was emailed to Richard Pence, Defense Counsel on or arbout
Friday, April 13, 2007 and to Nicolas Michel, Under-Secretary-General for Legal
Affairs, Legal Counsel for the United Nations.

Don Hamrick, Plaintiff, pro se

5860 Wilburn Road
Wilburn, Arkansas 72179

57