FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 192217, March 02 : 2011] DANILO L. PAREL, PETITIONER, VS. HEIRS OF SIMEON PRUDENCIO, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION VELASCO JR., J.: This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 assails the February 4, 2010 Decision[1] and April 22, 2010 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 105709, which affirmed the Orders dated February 15, 2008 and July 31, 2008, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 60 in Baguio City, in Civil Case No. 2493-R for recovery of possession and damages. The Facts A complaint for recovery of possession and damages was filed by Simeon Prudencio (Simeon) against Danilo Parel (Danilo) with the RTC in Baguio City. Simeon alleged that he was the owner of a two-story house at No. 61 Forbes Park National Reservation in Baguio City. Simeon allowed Danilo and his parents to live on the ground floor of the house since his wife was the elder sister of Danilo's father, Florentino.[3] In November 1985, Simeon needed the whole house back and thus informed Danilo and his parents that they had to vacate the place. Danilo's parents acceded to Simeon's demand. Danilo, however, remained in the house with his family despite repeated demands on him to surrender the premises. This development drove Simeon to institute an action for recovery of possession and damages.[4] Danilo offered a different version of events. He maintained that the land on which Simeon's house was constructed was in his father Florentino's name. He explained that his father Florentino, who had by then passed away, did not have enough funds to build a house and thus made a deal with Simeon for them to just contribute money for the construction of a house on Florentino's land. Florentino and Simeon were, thus, co-owners of the house of which Simeon claims sole ownership.[5] The Ruling of the Trial Court On December 15, 1993, the RTC ruled in favor of Danilo. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby declares that the house erected at [No.] 61 DPS Compound, Baguio City is owned in common by the late Florentino Parel and herein plaintiff Simeon Prudencio and as such the plaintiff cannot evict the defendant as heirs of the deceased Florentino Parel from said property, nor to recover said premises from herein defendant. Likewise, the plaintiff is ordered to: (a) pay the defendant in the total sum of P20,000.00 for moral and actual damages; (b) pay the defendant P20,000.00 in Attorney's fees and P3,300 in appearance fees; (c) pay the costs of this suit. SO ORDERED.[6] The Ruling of the Appellate Court On March 31, 2000, the CA, on Simeon's appeal, rendered a Decision[7] reversing the RTC Decision as follows: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one is entered declaring plaintiff-appellant as the new owner of the residential building at 61 Forbes Park National Reservation, near DPD Compound, Baguio City; appellee is ordered to surrender possession of the ground floor thereof to appellant immediately. Further, appellee is hereby ordered to pay appellant P2,0000/month [sic] for use or occupancy thereof from April 1988 until the former actually vacates the same, and the sum of P50,000.00 as attorney's fees. And costs of suit.

SO ORDERED. Danilo challenged the CA Decision before this Court via an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. On April 19, 2006, this Court issued its Decision[8] in G.R. No. 146556, affirming the CA Decision. On May 9, 2007, Simeon sought to enforce this Court's April 19, 2006 Decision and thus filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution.[9] On June 19, 2007, Danilo filed his Comment[10] on Simeon's Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution.He prayed that the PhP 2,000 monthly rental he was ordered to pay be computed from April 1988 to March 1994 only since he had vacated the premises by April 1994. On February 15, 2008, the RTC ruled as quoted below: WHEREFORE, premises considered, let a Writ of Execution be issued to enforce the decision of the Court in the above-entitled case.[11] A Motion for Reconsideration of the February 15, 2008 RTC Order was filed by Danilo. On July 31, 2008, the RTC issued another Order[12] denying the motion. The dispositive portion of the Order is quoted below: WHEREFORE, premises duly considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby denied for lack of merit. Let a Writ of Execution be issued to enforce the decision of the Court in the above-entitled case. SO ORDERED. On February 5, 2009, the RTC ordered the following: Furthermore, the decision in the above-entitled case has already become final and executory. To reiterate, this Court, much less the defendant, cannot modify the decision of the higher courts which has now become final and executory. The defendant is bound by the said decision and he cannot alter the same nor substitute his own interpretation thereof. WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Motion filed by the defendant is DENIED. The Court reiterates its order dated July 31, 2008 for the issuance of a Writ of Execution to enforce the decision of the Court in the instant case. SO ORDERED.[13] On February 23, 2009, Danilo filed a Supplemental Petition with Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction to enjoin the RTC from enforcing the judgment against Danilo for him to pay PhP 2,000 in monthly rentals from April 1994 onwards. On August 23, 2010, this Court issued a Resolution requiring Simeon to file his Comment on Danilo's Petition for Review on Certiorari. On October 28, 2010, Simeon filed his Comment before Us. He argued that the RTC and CA correctly ruled that the prayer for a reduction of back rentals should be denied, since Danilo never turned over possession of the subject premises to him. The Issues I Whether the CA committed an error of law in upholding the RTC Order dated February 15, 2008. II Whether the Court of Appeals committed an error of law in upholding the RTC Order dated July 31, 2008 The Ruling of This Court

Danilo questions the following order of the CA: Further, appellee is hereby ordered to pay appellant P2,0000/month [sic] for use or occupancy thereof from April 1988 until the former actually vacates the same, and the sum of P50,000.00 as attorney's fees. And costs of suit.[14] We resolve to grant the petition. Danilo argues that he vacated the subject premises in April 1994 and claims that he stated this fact in his Comment on Simeon's Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution dated May 9, 2007 and in his Motion for Reconsideration before this Court on June 12, 2006. He, thus, argues that the monthly rentals he should pay should only be from April 1988 to March 1994. He alleges that the CA committed an error in law in upholding the RTC Orders dated February 15, 2008 and July 31, 2008. The questioned February 15, 2008 RTC Order stated: x x x The defendant should have filed his comment on any appropriate pleading before the Court or in the Supreme Court at the time when he actually vacated the premises, but he did not. Perhaps, still hoping that the decision of the higher courts would be in his favor. All told, the defendant never intended to surrender the premises to the plaintiff even after he vacated it in April 1994. For this reason, he should now suffer the consequences. It must be reiterated that this Court cannot now modify the decision of the higher courts which has now become final and executory.[15] On July 31, 2008, the RTC ruled: While the alleged supervening facts and circumstances which changed the situation of the parties in the instant case occurred before finality of the judgment, as in Morta vs. Bagagnan, the factual backdrop in the aforecited jurisprudence does not call for its application in the present case. In the cited case, the complainants have been ousted from the subject premises pursuant to the decision of the DARAB in two cases involving the same parcel of lot before the decision of the Supreme Court attained finality. In the case at bar, defendant claims to have vacated the subject premises as early as April 1994. This allegation however was belied by the fact that he did not turn[over] the premises to the plaintiff, a fact which has been stipulated by the parties. Defendant did not effectively and completely relinquish possession of the subject premises to the plaintiff thereby depriving the latter of effective possession and beneficial use thereof. To reiterate, defendant never intended to surrender the premises to the plaintiff even after he vacated it in 1994. Defendant's failure to seasonably bring to the attention of either the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court of the supposed change in the circumstances of the parties cannot be excused. Had the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court been seasonably informed of such fact, the appellate Courts would have considered the same in their respective decisions. It must be noted that defendant had more than enough time from April 1994 to June 2006, a total of 12 years, within which he could have informed the two appellate Courts of the supposed change in the circumstances of the parties, but he did not. He only belatedly informed the Supreme Court in its motion for reconsideration after the latter Court issued it decision, in the hope of reducing the full payment of back rentals.[16] It is true that Danilo should have brought to the Court's attention the date he actually left the subject premises at an earlier time. The RTC is also correct in ruling that the judgment involved was already final and executory. However, it would be inequitable to order him to pay monthly rentals "until he actually vacates" when it has not been determined when he actually vacated the ground floor of Simeon's house. He would be paying monthly rentals indefinitely. The RTC should have determined via hearing if Danilo's allegation were true and accordingly modified the period Danilo is to be held accountable for monthly rentals. Unjustified delay in the enforcement of a judgment sets at naught the role of courts in disposing justiciable controversies with finality.[17] Once a judgment becomes final and executory, all the issues between the parties are deemed resolved and laid to rest. All that remains is the execution of the decision which is a matter of right.[18] Banaga v. Majaducon,[19] however, enumerates the instances where a writ of execution may be appealed:

1) the writ of execution varies the judgment; 2) there has been a change in the situation of the parties making execution inequitable or unjust; 3) execution is sought to be enforced against property exempt from execution; 4) it appears that the controversy has never been subject to the judgment of the court; 5) the terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there remains room for interpretation thereof; or 6) it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is defective in substance, or is issued against the wrong party, or that the judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied, or the writ was issued without authority; In these exceptional circumstances, considerations of justice and equity dictate that there be some mode available to the party aggrieved of elevating the question to a higher court. That mode of elevation may be either by appeal (writ of error or certiorari), or by a special civil action of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus. The instant case falls under one of the exceptions cited above. The fact that Danilo has left the property under dispute is a change in the situation of the parties that would make execution inequitable or unjust. Moreover, there are exceptions that have been previously considered by the Court as meriting a relaxation of the rules in order to serve substantial justice. These are: (1) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (2) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (3) the merits of the case; (4) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (5) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (6) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.[20] We find that Danilo's situation merits a relaxation of the rules since special circumstances are involved; to determine if his allegation were true would allow a final resolution of the case. Applicable, too, is what Sec. 5, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court states as one of the powers of a court: Section 5. Inherent powers of the courts.Every court shall have power: xxxx (g) To amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice. Thus, the Court ruled in Mejia v. Gabayan:[21] x x x The inherent power of the court carries with it the right to determine every question of fact and law which may be involved in the execution. The court may stay or suspend the execution of its judgment if warranted by the higher interest of justice. It has the authority to cause a modification of the decision when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it. The court is also vested with inherent power to stay the enforcement of its decision based on antecedent facts which show fraud in its rendition or want of jurisdiction of the trial court apparent on the record. (Emphasis supplied.) The writ of execution sought to be implemented does not take into consideration the circumstances that merit a modification of judgment. Given that there is a pending issue regarding the execution of judgment, the RTC should have afforded the parties the opportunity to adduce evidence to determine the period within which Danilo should pay monthly rentals before issuing the writ of execution in the instant case. Should Danilo be unable to substantiate his claim that he vacated the premises in April 1994, the period to pay monthly rentals should be until June 19, 2007, the date he informed the CA that he had already left the premises. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 105709 is hereby SET ASIDE. The RTC, Branch 60 in Baguio City is ORDERED to determine the actual date petitioner left the subject premises before issuing the writ of execution in Civil Case No. 2493-R that will be based on the resolution of said issue. SO ORDERED. Corona, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Del Castillo, and Perez, JJ., concur.

Endnotes: Rollo, pp. 20-27. Penned by Associate Justice Jane Aurora C. Lantion and concurred in by Associate Justices Rebecca de Guia-Salvador and Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe.
[1] [2]

Id. at 33. CA rollo, p. 21. Id. Id. Rollo, p. 22. Penned by Judge Pastor V. de Guzman.

[3]

[4]

[5]

[6]

Id. at 103-112. Penned by Associate Justice Corona Ibay-Somera and concurred in by Associate Justices Portia Alio Hormachuelos and Elvi John Asuncion.
[7]

Id. at 129; 487 SCRA 405. Penned by then Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez and concurred in by then Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban and then Associate Justices Consuelo YnaresSantiago, Romeo S. Callejo, Sr. and Minita V. Chico-Nazario.
[8] [9]

Id. at 48-50. Id. at 51-54. Id. at 63. Id. at 69-70. Penned by Judge Edilberto T. Claravall. Id. at 92. Supra note 7. Rollo, p. 63. Id. at 69. Aguilar v. Manila Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 157911, September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 354, 382. National Power Corporation v. Laohoo, G.R. No. 151973, July 23, 2009, 593 SCRA 564, 580. G.R. No. 149051, June 30, 2006, 494 SCRA 153, 162-163. PCI Leasing and Finance v. Milan, G.R. No. 151215, April 5, 2010, 617 SCRA 258, 279. G.R. No. 149765, April 12, 2005, 455 SCRA 499, 512.

[10]

[11]

[12]

[13]

[14]

[15]

[16]

[17]

[18]

[19]

[20]

[21]

SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. 184980, March 30 : 2011] DANILO MORO, PETITIONER, VS. GENEROSO REYES DEL CASTILLO, JR., RESPONDENT. DECISION ABAD, J.:

This case is about the right of the petitioner to be reinstated through an action for quo warranto against the present holder meantime that petitioner has appealed from the Ombudsman's decision dismissing him from the service for, among other grounds, misconduct in office. The Facts and the Case On December 7, 2005 the Ombudsman charged respondent Generoso Reyes Del Castillo, Jr. (Del Castillo), then Chief Accountant of the General Headquarters (GHQ) Accounting Center of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), with dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service in OMB-P-A-06-0031-A. The Ombudsman alleged that Del Castillo made false statements in his Statement of Assets and Liabilities from 1996 to 2004 and that he acquired properties manifestly out of proportion to his reported salary. On April 1, 2006 the GHQ reassigned Del Castillo to the Philippine Air Force (PAF) Accounting Center by virtue of GHQ AFP Special Order 91 (SO 91).[1] Through the same order, petitioner Danilo Moro (Moro), then Chief Accountant of the Philippine Navy, took over the position of Chief Accountant of the GHQ Accounting Center. Meantime, on August 30, 2006 the Ombudsman placed Del Castillo under preventive suspension for six months and eventually ordered his dismissal from the service on February 5, 2007.[2] The penalty imposed on him included cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the government. Del Castillo filed a motion for reconsideration, which is pending to this date. Following the lapse of his six-month suspension or on March 12, 2007 Del Castillo attempted to reassume his former post of GHQ Chief Accountant. But, he was unable to do so since Moro declined to yield the position. Consequently, on April 4, 2007 Del Castillo filed a petition for quo warranto[3] against Moro with the Regional Trial Court[4](RTC) of Paraaque City in Civil Case 07-0111. Del Castillo claimed that Moro was merely detailed as GHQ Chief Accountant when the Ombudsman placed Del Castillo under preventive suspension. Since the latter's period of suspension already lapsed, he was entitled to resume his former post and Moro was but a usurper. [5] For his part, Moro pointed out in his Answer[6] that his appointment under SO 91 as GHQ Chief Accountant was a permanent appointment. Indeed, the GHQ had already reassigned Del Castillo to the PAF Accounting Center even before the Ombudsman placed him under preventive suspension. Del Castillo was, therefore, not automatically entitled to return to his former GHQ post despite the lapse of his suspension. During the pendency of the quo warranto case before the RTC, Del Castillo refused to report at the PAF Accounting Center despite a memorandum from the AFP Acting Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel that carried the note and approval of the AFP Chief of Staff.[7] Del Castillo insisted that he could not be placed under the PAF since he was the GHQ Chief Accountant.[8] On October 10, 2007 the RTC dismissed Del Castillo's petition,[9] holding that Moro held the position of GHQ Chief Accountant pursuant to orders of the AFP Chief of Staff. Moreover, the RTC found Del Castillo's reassignment to the PAF Accounting Center valid. Under the Civil Service Commission (CSC) Rules, a reassignment may be made for a maximum of one year. Since Del Castillo's preventive suspension kept him away for only six months, he had to return to the PAF to complete his maximum detail at that posting. Besides, said the trial court, the Ombudsman's February 5, 2007 Order, which directed Del Castillo's dismissal from the service for grave misconduct, among others, rendered the petition moot and academic. The RTC denied Del Castillo's motion for reconsideration. Instead of appealing from the order of dismissal of his action, Del Castillo filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 103470. On October 13, 2008 the CA

reversed the RTC Decision.[10] Notwithstanding the procedural error, the CA gave due course to the petition on grounds of substantial justice and fair play. It held that Del Castillo's reassignment exceeded the maximum of one year allowed by law and that SO 91 was void since it did not indicate a definite duration for such reassignment. Further, the CA held as non-executory the Ombudsman's dismissal of Del Castillo in view of his appeal from that dismissal. With the denial of his motion for reconsideration, Moro filed this petition via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The Issue Presented The key issue in this case is whether or not respondent Del Castillo is entitled to be restored to the position of Chief Accountant of the GHQ Accounting Center that he once held. The Court's Ruling An action for quo warranto under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court may be filed against one who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office.[11] It may be brought by the Republic of the Philippines or by the person claiming to be entitled to such office.[12] In this case, it was Del Castillo who filed the action, claiming that he was entitled as a matter of right to reassume the position of GHQ Chief Accountant after his preventive suspension ended on March 11, 2007. He argues that, assuming his reassignment to the PAF Accounting Center was valid, the same could not exceed one year. Since his detail at the PAF took effect under SO 91 on April 1, 2006, it could last not later than March 31, 2007. By then, Moro should have allowed him to return to his previous posting as GHQ Chief Accountant. But, as Moro points out, he had been authorized under SO 91 to serve as GHQ Chief Accountant. Del Castillo, on the other hand, had been ordered dismissed from the service by the Ombudsman in OMB-PA-06-0031-A. Consequently, he cannot reassume the contested position. Del Castillo of course insists, citing Lapid v. Court of Appeals,[13] that only decisions of the Ombudsman that impose the penalties of public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more than a month or a fine of one month salary are final, executory, and unappealable. Consequently, when the penalty is dismissal as in his case, he can avail himself of the remedy of appeal and the execution of the decision against him would, in the meantime, be held in abeyance. But, the Lapid case has already been superseded by In the Matter to Declare in Contempt of Court Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong, Secretary of DPWH.[14] The Court held in Datumanong that Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order 7, as amended by Administrative Order 17,[15] clearly provides that an appeal shall not stop a decision of the Ombudsman from being executory. The Court later reiterated this ruling in Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals.[16] In quo warranto, the petitioner who files the action in his name must prove that he is entitled to the subject public office. Otherwise, the person who holds the same has a right to undisturbed possession and the action for quo warranto may be dismissed.[17] Here, Del Castillo brought the action for quo warranto in his name on April 4, 2007, months after the Ombudsman ordered his dismissal from service on February 5, 2007. As explained above, that dismissal order was immediately executory even pending appeal. Consequently, he has no right to pursue the action for quo warranto or reassume the position of Chief Accountant of the GHQ Accounting Center. WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision dated October 13, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 103470, andREINSTATES the October 10, 2007 decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case 07-0111, which dismissed the complaint for quo warranto. SO ORDERED. Carpio, (Chairperson), Nachura, Peralta, and Mendoza, JJ., concur. Endnotes:
[1]

Records, p. 113. Rollo, pp. 88-115. Records, pp. 41-54.

[2]

[3]

[4]

Branch 274. Records, pp. 47-48. Id. at 99-111. Id. at 121-122. Id. at 123. Rollo, pp. 48-54. Penned by Presiding Judge Fortunito L. Madrona.

[5]

[6]

[7]

[8]

[9]

Id. at 58-87. Penned by Associate Justice Pampio A. Abarintos and concurred in by Associate Justices Amelita G. Tolentino and Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok.
[10] [11]

Rule 66, Section 1. Action by Government against individuals.

An action for the usurpation of a public office, position or franchise may be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines against: (a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, position or franchise; (b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which, by the provision of law, constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his office; or (c) An association which acts as a corporation within the Philippines without being legally incorporated or without lawful authority so to act.
[12]

Rule 66, Section 5. When an individual may commence such an action.

A person claiming to be entitled to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another may bring an action therefor in his own name.
[13]

G.R. No. 142261, June 29, 2000, 334 SCRA 738. G.R. No. 150274, August 4, 2006, 497 SCRA 626.

[14]

Section 7. Finality and execution of decision. - Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final, executory and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review under the requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the written Notice of the Decision or Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration.
[15]

An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension or removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal. A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of course. The Office of the Ombudsman shall ensure that the decision shall be strictly enforced and properly implemented. The refusal or failure by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Office of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, or censure shall be ground for disciplinary action against said officer. (Emphasis supplied)
[16]

G.R. No. 159395, May 7, 2008, 554 SCRA 75, 93-94. Feliciano v. Villasin, G.R. No. 174929, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 348, 366.

[17]

SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. 191389, March 07 : 2011] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. LUISITO LALICAN Y ARCE, APPELLANT. DECISION ABAD, J.: The public prosecutor charged the accused Luisito Lalican y Arce with rape before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila[1] in Criminal Case 05-238386. The prosecution presented the testimonies of SHINE,[2] the private complainant; SPO2 Manuel Castro III, the arresting officer; and Dr. Anabelle L. Soliman, the medico-legal officer. SHINE worked as guest relations officer in a club in Tondo, Manila. She had been renting a room in accused Lalican's two-storey house in Tayuman for the past seven months. SHINE stayed at the ground floor while Lalican and his family occupied the second floor. SHINE testified that at around 9:00 to 10:00 a.m. on July 10, 2005 she heard Lalican knock on her door. Hesitant at first, she eventually opened the door to find Lalican imploring her help because he and his wife supposedly had gotten into a fight. SHINE declined to intervene, however, afraid of the wife's ire. She started to close the door on him but Lalican resisted and forced it open. He closed the door and pulled a knife, pointing it at SHINE's neck. Shocked, she was unable to scream for help. Lalican grabbed and undressed her, using his right hand. He then put down the knife and removed his clothes. He pushed SHINE down on the floor and successfully had his way with her, keeping his hand on the knife that lay on the floor. After ravishing SHINE, Lalican stood up but remained in the room. Although Lalican would not let her go to the bathroom at first, he eventually let her. She hid there and later left the house for a nearby store and bought prepaid credits for her mobile phone so she could call her brother-in-law, a policeman, for help. When she could not contact him, she went to the police station to report the matter. Some policemen went with her to Lalican's house but SHINE declined to enter it. After arresting Lalican, they all went back to the police station. SPO2 Castro testified that at around 10:00 a.m. on July 10, 2005, SHINE arrived at the Police Station 7 in Tayuman and complained that Lalican had raped her. SPO2 Castro and three other officers went with SHINE to Lalican's house. Upon entering it, SHINE pointed to Lalican as the man who raped her. The officers then invited Lalican to come to the police station for investigation. Dr. Soliman testified having examined SHINE. She noted (1) no extragenital physical injuries on her body; (2) that the hymen was reduced to carunculae myrtiformis; and (3) that succeeding sexual intercourse may not produce any new hymenal injury. Lalican denied raping SHINE. He recounted that on the previous day, July 9, 2005, he attended the wake of a friend's mother. He returned to his house at around 6:00 a.m. on the following day. After cooking food, he went to the bathroom. Before he could fully shut the door close, the door of SHINE's room opened. Her boyfriend, Francis, walked out and left the house. After taking a bath, Lalican went upstairs to sleep but because it was humid hot, he went down and slept on a make-shift bed near the door of SHINE's room. At around 10:00 a.m., some policemen woke him up and invited him to go to the police station. Genie Suarez corroborated Lalican's testimony. Suarez said that he was with the accused at a wake on the previous day. Suarez accompanied Lalican home and left him to sleep on a make-shift bed on the ground floor of the house. Suarez then went to a nearby store. At 7:00 a.m. he saw Francis go out of the house and around 10:00 a.m. he saw SHINE leave the house and later return in the company of policemen. The RTC found Lalican guilty of raping SHINE and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided by law.[3] The RTC ordered him to pay P50,000.00 as indemnity to SHINE without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the cost. On October 28, 2009 the Court of Appeals (CA) rendered judgment in the case,[4] affirming the decision of the RTC with modifications. The CA affirmed the finding of guilt of the RTC but included the payment of an additional P50,000.00 as moral damages. Lalican appealed to this Court.

The Issue Presented The sole issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in finding accused Lalican guilty beyond reasonable doubt of raping SHINE. The Court's Ruling Courts have to be cautious in assessing the evidence of rape. By the nature of rape, it is hardly committed before the eyes of witnesses. In true cases of rape, witnesses are shut out either because the offender has put enough terror and fear of death in his victim such that, psychologically, she has lost the will to resist or, the place of commission being far remote from people who can hear and rescue his victim, the offender uses brute force to overcome her resistance. In false cases of rape, prompted by some ill motive, the supposed victim claims rape when it did not happen or when she cooperated with the offender in the supposed rape. Whether it is true rape or false rape, the victim usually testifies alone. Consequently, care is taken in examining what she says.[5] Here, SHINE testified on direct that when Lalican forced her door open and entered, he poked a knife on her neck, grabbed her, undressed her, took his own clothes off, pushed her down the floor, and violated her.[6] Lalican points out that SHINE cannot be believed since this version is inconsistent with her testimony on cross that he made her lie down first before he undressed her.[7] Lalican also assailed the inconsistencies in her statements concerning where he placed the knife that he threatened her with during the time he was abusing her. But must the victim's testimony dovetail in every respect regarding the precise movement of the offender from beginning to end such as which foot he used in stepping into the victim's room or what hand he used for undressing her and himself? Violent crimes usually fill their victims with dread and terrible fear for their lives. Rarely would they mentally record details of the startling events as they happen with the expectation that they would get some subpoena in some future time to testify in some future court. Reality is not like that. What is important is that the core of SHINE's testimony that Lalican, her lessor, barged into her room, threatened to butcher her with a knife if she resisted, and forced himself into her, had remained unchanged. Perfect testimonies, repeated with precision in the same language, in the course of crossexamination usually indicate coaching and rehearsals. It is here that the trial judge's face-to-face appreciation of the complainant's testimony makes a lot of difference. He can see the movement of the eyes, the tremor of the lips, or the turn of the head that only the sum total of human experience brought to bear can interpret. The Court is robbed of that opportunity. Consequently, except where the trial judge's error is so obvious, the Court will, as in this case, defer to his appreciation of the credibility of the witness. It does not help the case of Lalican that he has not shown proof that SHINE was prompted by some sinister motive in accusing him of rape. She had been his tenant the last seven months. Admittedly, he had been observing her since he even spoke of seeing SHINE's boyfriend come out of her rented room that morning. And Lalican admittedly chose to sleep on a make-shift bed near her door. An opportunity for lechery clearly presented itself. What is more, it was quite unlikely that SHINE would spontaneously walk to the police station shortly after to voice her outrage and convince the policemen to come with her to investigate the matter if she had no genuine cause to gripe about. WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS in its entirety the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC 03382 dated October 28, 2009 which affirmed with modification the trial court's conviction of the accused Luisito Lalican y Arce of the crime of rape. SO ORDERED. Carpio, (Chairperson), Peralta, Perez,* and Mendoza, JJ., concur. Endnotes: Designated as additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, per Special Order 967 dated February 28, 2011.
* [1]

Branch 21. Pursuant to Republic Act 9262, otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their

[2]

Children Act of 2004" and its implementing rules, the real name of the victim, together with the real names of her immediate family members, is withheld and fictitious initials instead are used to represent her, both to protect her privacy (People v. Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693, 502 SCRA 419, 421426 [2006]).
[3]

Decision dated March 10, 2008, records, pp. 256-261. Docketed as CA-G.R. CR-HC 03382. People v. Bidoc, G.R. No. 169430, October 31, 2006, 506 SCRA 481, 495. TSN, September 14, 2005, pp. 6-7. TSN, September 28, 2005, p. 9.

[4]

[5]

[6]

[7]

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 176389 January 18, 2011

ANTONIO LEJANO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x G.R. No. 176864 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB, ANTONIO LEJANO, MICHAEL A. GATCHALIAN, HOSPICIO FERNANDEZ, MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ, PETER ESTRADA and GERARDO BIONG, Appellants. RESOLUTION ABAD, J.: On December 14, 2010 the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals (CA) and acquitted the accused in this case, Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada, and Gerardo Biong of the charges against them on the ground of lack of proof of their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. On December 28, 2010 complainant Lauro G. Vizconde, an immediate relative of the victims, asked the Court to reconsider its decision, claiming that it "denied the prosecution due process of law; seriously misappreciated the facts; unreasonably regarded Alfaro as lacking credibility; issued a tainted and erroneous decision; decided the case in a manner that resulted in the miscarriage of justice; or committed grave abuse in its treatment of the evidence and prosecution witnesses."1 But, as a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because it places the accused under double jeopardy. The Constitution provides in Section 21, Article III, that: Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. x x x To reconsider a judgment of acquittal places the accused twice in jeopardy of being punished for the crime of which he has already been absolved. There is reason for this provision of the Constitution. In criminal cases, the full power of the State is ranged against the accused. If there is no limit to attempts to prosecute the accused for the same offense after he has been acquitted, the infinite power and capacity of the State for a sustained and repeated litigation would eventually overwhelm the accused in terms of resources, stamina, and the will to fight. As the Court said in People of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan:2 [A]t the heart of this policy is the concern that permitting the sovereign freely to subject the citizen to a second judgment for the same offense would arm the government with a potent instrument of oppression. The provision therefore guarantees that the State shall not be permitted to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to

embarrassment, expense, and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty. Societys awareness of the heavy personal strain which a criminal trial represents for the individual defendant is manifested in the willingness to limit the government to a single criminal proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in the enforcement of criminal laws.3 Of course, on occasions, a motion for reconsideration after an acquittal is possible. But the grounds are exceptional and narrow as when the court that absolved the accused gravely abused its discretion, resulting in loss of jurisdiction, or when a mistrial has occurred. In any of such cases, the State may assail the decision by special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65.4 Here, although complainant Vizconde invoked the exceptions, he has been unable to bring his pleas for reconsideration under such exceptions. For instance, he avers that the Court "must ensure that due process is afforded to all parties and there is no grave abuse of discretion in the treatment of witnesses and the evidence."5But he has not specified the violations of due process or acts constituting grave abuse of discretion that the Court supposedly committed. His claim that "the highly questionable and suspicious evidence for the defense taints with serious doubts the validity of the decision"6 is, without more, a mere conclusion drawn from personal perception. Complainant Vizconde cites the decision in Galman v. Sandiganbayan7 as authority that the Court can set aside the acquittal of the accused in the present case. But the government proved in Galman that the prosecution was deprived of due process since the judgment of acquittal in that case was "dictated, coerced and scripted."8 It was a sham trial. Here, however, Vizconde does not allege that the Court held a sham review of the decision of the CA. He has made out no case that the Court held a phony deliberation in this case such that the seven Justices who voted to acquit the accused, the four who dissented, and the four who inhibited themselves did not really go through the process. Ultimately, what the complainant actually questions is the Courts appreciation of the evidence and assessment of the prosecution witnesses credibility. He ascribes grave error on the Courts finding that Alfaro was not a credible witness and assails the value assigned by the Court to the evidence of the defense. In other words, private complainant wants the Court to review the evidence anew and render another judgment based on such a re-evaluation. This is not constitutionally allowed as it is merely a repeated attempt to secure Webb, et als conviction. The judgment acquitting Webb, et al is final and can no longer be disturbed. WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES for lack of merit complainant Lauro G. Vizcondes motion for reconsideration dated December 28, 2010. For essentially the same reason, the Court DENIES the motions for leave to intervene of Fr. Robert P. Reyes, Sister Mary John R. Mananzan, Bishop Evangelio L. Mercado, and Dante L.A. Jimenez, representing the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption and of former Vice President Teofisto Guingona, Jr. No further pleadings shall be entertained in this case. SO ORDERED. ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice WE CONCUR:

I vote to grant the M.R. RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice No part, prior inhibition ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice No part due to relastionship to a party PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice I vote to grant the motion for reconsideration TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice No part MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice No part; filed pleading as Sol Gen ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice Same vote as J. Villarama ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice I vote to grant the motion for reconsideration MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA Associate Justice

See concurring Opinion MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO Associate Justice CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court. RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice

Footnotes
1

Private Complainants Motion for Reconsideration, p. 8. G.R. Nos. 168188-89, June 16, 2006, 491 SCRA 185. Id. at 207. Castro v. People, G.R. No. 180832, July 23, 2008, 559 SCRA 676, 683-684.

Supra note 1, at 7. Id. at 12. 228 Phil. 42 (1986). Id. at 89.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

CONCURRING OPINION SERENO, J.: The Motion for Reconsideration assails the majority for failing to uphold the trial courts conclusions. The simple fact is that the evidence tends to demonstrate that Hubert Webb is innocent. The simple fact also is that the evidence demonstrates that not only had Jessica Alfaro failed to substantiate her testimony, she had contradicted herself and had been contradicted by other more believable evidence. The other main prosecution witnesses fare no better. This is the gist of the Decision sought to be reconsidered. While this Court does not make a dispositive ruling other than a pronouncement of "guilt" or "non-guilt" on the part of the accused, the legal presumption of innocence must be applied in operative fact. It is unfortunate that statements were made that sought to dilute the legal import of the majority Decision. A pronouncement of this Court that the accused has not been proven to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt cannot be twisted to mean that this Court does not believe in the innocence of the accused when the reasoning of the Court demonstrates such belief. A careful reading of the majority Decision, as well as the concurring opinions, is required to determine whether the accused were acquitted solely becausethere was lingering doubt as to their guilt of the crime charged or whether the accused were acquitted not only because of doubt as to their guilt but also because the evidence tends to establish their innocence. In the case of Hubert Webb, the evidence tends to establish his innocence. On the other hand, the testimony of Jessica Alfaro was wholly rejected by the majority as not believable. In his Motion for Reconsideration, private complainant asserts that this Court should have respected the trial courts resolve to give full credence to the testimony of Jessica Alfaro. While as a general rule, a trial judges findings as to the credibility of a witness are entitled to utmost respect as he has had the opportunity to observe their demeanor on the witness stand, this holds true only in the absence of bias, partiality, and grave abuse of discretion on the part of the judge.1 The succeeding discussion demonstrates why this Court has no choice but to reject the trial courts findings. The mistaken impression that Alfaro was a credible witness was, in significant measure, perpetrated by the trial courts inappropriate and mismatched attribution of rights to and duties of the accused vis-a-vis the principal witness in a criminal proceeding. As discussed in the promulgated Decision of the Court in this case, the trial court failed to recognize the accuseds right to be presumed innocent. Instead, the trial courts Decision indicated a preconceived belief in the accuseds guilt, and as a corollary, that witness Alfaro was telling the truth when she testified to the accuseds guilt. In excessively protecting Alfaro, the trial court improperly ascribed to her the right reserved for an accused. It also unreasonably imposed severe limitations on the extent of the right of the defense to cross-examine her. During Alfaros cross examination, the defense counsel tried to impeach her credibility by asking her about her 28 April 1995 Affidavit, which markedly differs from her 22 May 1995 Affidavit. The prosecution objected and moved that the questions be expunged from the records on the basis

of the inadmissibility of the evidence obtained allegedly without the assistance of counsel, pursuant to Article III Section 12(1) and (3) of the 1987 Constitution.2This constitutional right, however, is a right reserved solely for the accused or a "person under investigation for the commission of an offense." The prosecutions objection had no legal basis because Alfaro was clearly not the accused in the case. Alfaro was a witness who had a legal duty to "answer questions, although his (her) answer may tend to establish a claim against him (her)."3 Notwithstanding this, the lower court sustained the prosecutions objection. The law does not confer any favorable presumption on behalf of a witness. It is precisely due to the absence of any legal presumption that the witness is telling the truth that he/she is subjected to cross-examination to "test his accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all important facts bearing upon the issue."4 The Rules provide that "the witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party as to any matters stated in the direct examination, or connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom."5] A witness may be impeached "by contradictory evidence, by evidence that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad, or by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present testimony."6 The right to cross-examine a witness is a matter of procedural due process such that the testimony or deposition of a witness given in a former case "involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party" provided the adverse party "had the opportunity to cross-examine him."7 Notwithstanding the right of the accused to fully and freely conduct a thorough cross examination, the trial court set undue restrictions on the defense counsels cross examination of Alfaro, effectively denying the accused such right. The length of the cross-examination is not as material in the determination of the credibility of the witness as much as whether such witness was fully tested by the defense when demanded to be tested on cross-examination for honesty by contradictory evidence of a reputation for dishonesty, for inconsistency, or for possible bias or improper motive. To establish Alfaros bias and motive for testifying in the case, the defense counsel sought to ask Alfaro about her brother, Patrick. Alfaro admitted that Patrick was a drug addict and had been arrested once by the NBI for illegal possession of drugs, but that he was presently in the United States. The theory of the defense was that Patricks liberty was part of a deal that Alfaro had struck with the NBI in exchange for her services. When defense counsel inquired about the circumstances of Patricks departure for the United States, the prosecution objected to the questions on the ground of irrelevance. Respondent judge sustained the objection, thus foreclosing a significant avenue for testing Alfaros "freedom from interest or bias." The defense counsel tried to cross-examine Alfaro regarding her educational attainment as stated in her sworn statements. The defense presented her college transcript of records to prove that she only enrolled for a year and earned nine (9) academic units, contrary to her claim that she finished second year college. Notably, Alfaro misrepresented her educational attainment in both of her affidavits her 28 April 1995 Affidavit which she claimed was executed without assistance of counsel, and her subsequent 22 May 1995 Affidavit which was admittedly executed with the assistance of counsel. Apparently, Alfaros lie under oath about her educational attainment persisted even after being given counsels assistance in the execution of the second affidavit, as well as more time to contemplate the matter. Unfortunately, the lower court sustained the prosecutions objection to the question on the ground of irrelevance when the line of testing could have tested Alfaro's penchant for "accuracy and truthfulness." Ironically, notwithstanding the trial courts disallowance of the defenses attempts to impeach Alfaro's character, and the rule that "(e)vidence of the good character of a witness is not admissible until such character has been impeached,"8 the trial court allowed the prosecution to present Atty. Pedro Rivera9 to testify positively on Alfaros character. Worse yet, the trial court

disallowed the defense from presenting Atty. Riveras earlier statement to impeach the latters credibility; again, this was disallowed on the ground of immateriality. When a proffer of evidence10 was made by the defense following such disallowance, the trial court struck the proffer from the record on the ground that it was allegedly improper on cross-examination. The notion that witness Alfaro was able to withstand her cross examination appears sustainable in large part because her cross examination was so emasculated by the trial courts inordinate protection of her, which went so far as to improperly accord her the right reserved for an accused. Taken together with repeated instances of unwarranted exertion of effort to wipe the record clean of some entries that cast doubt on Alfaros credibility, the trial courts actions show that it had a bias towards upholding the truthfulness of Alfaros testimony. The trial courts treatment of documentary evidence also suffered from mismatched ascription discarding legal presumptions without evidence to the contrary while giving evidentiary weight to unsubstantiated speculation. For instance, in rejecting Webbs alibi defense, the trial court used mere speculation that the accuseds family influenced the production of false entries in official documents to defeat the legal presumption of said documents accuracy and regularity of issuance. Notably, the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (US INS) Certification, which confirmed that Webb was in the United States from March 1991 until October 1992, was authenticated by no less than the Office of the U.S. Attorney General and the U.S. State Department. Furthermore, this official certification of a sovereign state. having passed through formal diplomatic channels, was authenticated by the Department of Foreign Affairs. As discussed in the main decision, such official documents as the authenticated U.S. INS Certification enjoy the presumption of accuracy of the entries therein.11 Official documents are not infallible, but the presumption that they are accurate can only be overcome with evidence. Unfortunately, in the mind of the trial court, pure conjecture and not hard evidence was allowed to defeat a legal presumption. Clearly, the trial courts decision in this case was, in significant measure, the product of switched attributions as to who should enjoy certain rights and what should be presumed under the law. This behavior on the part of the trial court and the effect it had on the factual conclusions on the credibility of Jessica Alfaro and on the presence of Hubert Webb in the Philippines at the time of the commission of the crime cannot be upheld. MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO Associate Justice

Footnotes
1

People v. Dizon, G.R. Nos. 126044-45, 2 July 1999, 309 SCRA 669.

"SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
2

xxx

xxx

xxx

"(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible in evidence against him."
3

Rules of Court, Rule 132. Section 3.

Rules of Court, Rule 132, Section 6. Rules of Court, Rule 132, Section 6. Rules of Court, Rule 132, Section 11. Rules of Court, Rule 130, Section 47. Rules of Court, Rule 132, Section 14.

Notably, in the Motion for Reconsideration in Intervention filed by the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption (VACC), Fr. Roberto Reyes, Sister Mary John Mananzan and Bishop Evangelio Mercado, they attach a copy of Atty. Pedro Rivera's Affidavit to once again resuscitate Alfaro's credibility.
9

Rules of Court, Rule 132, Section 40 provides that "(i)f documents or things offered in evidence are excluded by the court, the offeror may have the same attached to or made part of the record. If the evidence excluded is oral, the offeror may state for the record the same and other personal circumstances of the witness and the substance of the proposed testimony."
10 11

Citing Antillon v. Barcelona, 37 Phil. 148 (1917).

FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 192649, March 09 : 2011]

HOME GUARANTY CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. R-II BUILDERS INC., AND NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, RESPONDENTS. DECISION PEREZ, J.: Primarily assailed in this petition for review filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is the Decision dated 21 January 2010 rendered by the Former Fifteenth Division of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 111153,[1] the dispositive portion of which states as follows: WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Orders, dated March 3, 2009 and September 29, 2009, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 22 are hereby AFFIRMED. Consequently, the injunction earlier issued on December 4, 2009, restraining the proceedings in Civil Case No. 05-113407, is hereby DISSOLVED.[2] The Facts On 19 March 1993, a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) was entered into between respondents National Housing Authority (NHA) and R-II Builders, Inc. (R-II Builders) for the implementation of the Smokey Mountain Development and Reclamation Project (SMDRP). Amended and restated on 21 February 1994[3] and 11 August 1994,[4] the JVA was aimed at implementing a two-phase conversion of the Smokey Mountain Dumpsite "into a habitable housing project inclusive of the reclamation of the area across Radial Road 10 (R-10)".[5] By the terms of the JVA, R-II Builders, as developer, was entitled to own 79 hectares of reclaimed land and the 2.3 hectare commercial area at the Smokey Mountain. Aslandowner/implementing agency, NHA, on the other hand, was entitled to own the 2,992 temporary housing units agreed to be built in the premises, the cleared and fenced incinerator site consisting of 5 hectares, 3,520 units of permanent housing to be awarded to qualified on site residents, the industrial area consisting of 3.2 hectares and the open spaces, roads and facilities within the Smokey Mountain Area.[6] On 26 September 1994, NHA and R-II Builders, alongside petitioner Housing Guaranty Corporation (HGC) as guarantor and the Philippine National Bank (PNB) as trustee, entered into an Asset Pool Formation Trust Agreement which provided the mechanics for the implementation of the project.[7] To back the project, an Asset Pool was created composed of the following assets: (a) the 21.2 hectare Smokey Mountain Site in Tondo, Manila; (b) the 79-hectare Manila Bay foreshore property in the name of the NHA; (c) the Smokey Mountain Project Participation Certificates (SMPPCs) to be issued, or their money proceeds; (d) disposable assets due to R-II Builders and/or its proceeds as defined in the JVA; (e) the resulting values inputted by R-II Builders for pre-implementation activities and some start-up works amounting to P300,000,000.00; (f) the 2,992 temporary housing facilities/units to be constructed by R-II Builders; and, (g) all pertinent documents and records of the project.[8] On the same date, the parties likewise executed a Contract of Guaranty whereby HGC, upon the call made by PNB and conditions therein specified, undertook to redeem the regular SMPPCs upon maturity and to pay the simple interest thereon to the extent of 8.5% per annum.[9] The foregoing agreements led to the securitization of the project through the issuance of 5,216 SMPPCs upon the Asset Pool, with a par value of 1 Million each, classified and to be redeemed by the trustee or, in case of call on its guaranty, by HGC, in the following order of priority: a) Regular SMPPCs worth P2.519 Billion, issued for value to the general public at specified interests and maturity dates. These were to be redeemed by the PNB which was obliged to exhaust all liquid assets of the Asset Pool before calling on the HGC guarantee; b) Special SMPPCs worth P1.403 Billion, issued exclusively to the NHA for conveyance of the Smokey Mountain Site and Manila Bay foreshore property to the Asset Pool, redeemable upon turnover of the developed project; and c) Subordinated SMPPCs worth P1.294 Billion, issued exclusively to R-II Builders for its rights and interests in the JVA, redeemable with the turnover of all residual values, assets and properties remaining in the Asset Pool after both the Regular and Special SMPPCs are redeemed and all the obligations of the Asset Pool are settled.[10]

Subsequent to R-II Builders' infusion of P300 Million into the project, the issuance of the SMPPCs and the termination of PNB's services on 29 January 2001, NHA, R-II Builders and HGC agreed on the institution of Planters Development Bank (PDB) as trustee on 29 January 2001.[11] By 24 October 2002, however, all the Regular SMPPCs issued had reached maturity and, unredeemed, already amounted to an aggregate face value of P2.513 Billion. The lack of liquid assets with which to effect redemption of the regular SMPPCs prompted PDB to make a call on HGC's guaranty and to execute in the latter's favor a Deed of Assignment and Conveyance (DAC) of the entire Asset Pool, consisting of: (a) 105 parcels of land comprising the Smokey Mountain Site and the Reclamation Area, with a total area of 539,471.47 square meters, and all the buildings and improvements thereon; (b) shares of stock of Harbour Centre Port Terminal, Inc. (HCPTI); and, (c) other documents.[12] On 1 September 2005, R-II Builders filed the complaint against HGC and NHA which was docketed as Civil Case No. 05-113407 before Branch 24 of the Manila Regional Trial Court, a Special Commercial Court (SCC). Contending that HGC's failure to redeem the outstanding regular SMPPCs despite obtaining possession of the Asset Pool ballooned the stipulated interests and materially prejudiced its stake on the residual values of the Asset Pool, R-II Builders alleged, among other matters, that the DAC should be rescinded since PDB exceeded its authority in executing the same prior to HGC's redemption and payment of the guaranteed SMPPCs; that while the estimated value of Asset Poolamounted to P5,919,716,618.62 as of 30 June 2005, its total liabilities was estimated at P2,796,019,890.41; and, that with the cessation of PDB's functions as a trustee and HGC's intention to use the Asset Pool to settle its obligations to the Social Security System (SSS), it was best qualified to be appointed as new trustee in the event of the resolution of the DAC. Assessed docket fees corresponding to an action incapable of pecuniary estimation, the complaint sought the grant of the following reliefs: (a) a temporary restraining order/preliminary and permanent injunction, enjoining disposition/s of the properties in the Asset Pool; (b) the resolution or, in the alternative, the nullification of the DAC; (c) R-II Builders' appointment as trustee pursuant to Rule 98 of the Rules of Court; (d) HGC's rendition of an accounting of the assets and the conveyance thereof in favor of R-II Builders; and, (e) P500,000.00 in attorney's fees.[13] On 26 October 2005, Branch 24 of the Manila RTC issued the writ of preliminary injunction sought by RII Builders which, upon the challenge thereto interposed by HGC, was later affirmed by the CA in the 17 December 2007 decision rendered in CA-G.R. SP No. 98953.[14] Having filed its answer to the complaint, in the meantime, HGC went on to move for the conduct of a preliminary hearing on its affirmative defenses which included such grounds as lack of jurisdiction, improper venue and the then pendency before this Court of G.R. No. 164537, entitled Francisco Chavez vs. National Housing Authority, et al., a case which challenged, among other matters, the validity of the JVA and its subsequent amendments. [15] On 2 August 2007, R-II Builders, in turn, filed a motion to admit[16] itsAmended and Supplemental Complaint which deleted the prayer for resolution of the DAC initially prayed for in its original complaint. In lieu thereof, said pleading introduced causes of action for conveyance of title to and/or possession of the entire Asset Pool, for NHA to pay the Asset Pool the sum of P1,803,729,757.88 representing the cost of the changes and additional works on the project and for an increased indemnity for attorney's fees in the sum of P2,000,000.00.[17] Consistent with its joint order dated 2 January 2008 which held that R-II Builders' complaint was an ordinary civil action and not an intra-corporate controversy,[18] Branch 24 of the Manila RTC issued a clarificatory order dated 1 February 2008 to the effect, among other matters, that it did not have the authority to hear the case.[19] As a consequence, the case was re-raffled to respondent Branch 22 of the Manila RTC (respondent RTC) which subsequently issued the 19 May 2008 order which, having determined that the case is a real action, admitted the aforesaid Amended and Supplemental Complaint, subject to R-II Builders' payment of the "correct and appropriate" docket fees.[20] On 15 August 2008, however, R-II Builders filed a motion to admit it Second Amended Complaint, on the ground that its previous Amended and Supplemental Complaint had not yet been admitted in view of the non-payment of the correct docket fees therefor.[21] Said Second Amended Complaint notably resurrected R-II Builders' cause of action for resolution of the DAC, deleted its causes of action for accounting and conveyance of title to and/or possession of the entire Asset Pool, reduced the claim for attorney's fees to P500,000.00, sought its appointment as Receiver pursuant to Rule 59 of the Rules of Court and, after an inventory in said capacity, prayed for approval of the liquidation and distribution of the Asset Pool in accordance with the parties' agreements.[22] On 2 September 2008, HGC filed its opposition to the admission of R-II Builders' Second Amended Complaint on the ground that respondent RTC had no jurisdiction to act on the case until payment of the correct docket fees and that said pleading was intended for delay and introduced a new theory inconsistent with the original complaint and the Amended and Supplemental Complaint. Claiming that R-II Builders had defied respondent court's 19 May 2008 order by refusing to pay the correct docket fees, HGC additionally moved for the dismissal of the case pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[23] On 24 November 2008, R-II Builders also filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion

for Annotation of Lis Pendens on the titles of the properties in the Asset Pool, on the ground that HGC had sold and/or was intending to dispose of portions thereof, in violation of the writ of preliminary injunction issued in the premises.[24] Finding that jurisdiction over the case was already acquired upon payment of the docket fees for the original complaint and that the Second Amended Complaintwas neither intended for delay nor inconsistent with R-II Builders' previous pleadings, respondent RTC issued its first assailed order dated 3 March 2009 which: (a) denied HGC's motion to dismiss; (b) granted R-II Builders' motion to admit its Second Amended Complaint; and, (c) noted R-II Builders'Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Annotation of Lis Pendens, to which the attention of the Manila Register of Deeds was additionally called.[25] Undaunted, HGC filed its 22 March 2009 motion for reconsideration of the foregoing order, arguing that: (a) the case is real action and the docket fees paid by R-II Builders were grossly insufficient because the estimated value of properties in the Asset Pool exceeds P5,000,000,000.00; (b) a complaint cannot be amended to confer jurisdiction when the court had none; (c) the RTC should have simply denied the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Annotation of Lis Pendens instead of rendering an advisory opinion thereon. In addition, HGC faulted R-II Builders with forum shopping, in view of its 10 September 2008 filing of the complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 08-63416 before Branch 91 of the Quezon City RTC, involving a claim for receivables from the NHA.[26] In turn, R-II Builders opposed the foregoing motion[27] and, on the theory that the Asset Pool was still in danger of dissipation, filed an urgent motion to resolve its application for the appointment of a receiver and submitted its nominees for said position.
[28]

On 29 September 2009, respondent RTC issued its second assailed order which (a) denied HGC's motion for reconsideration; (b) granted R-II Builders' application for appointment of receiver and, for said purpose: [i] appointed Atty. Danilo Concepcion as Receiver and, [ii] directed R-II Builders to post a bond in the sum of P10,000,000.00.[29] Imputing grave abuse of discretion against the RTC for not dismissing the case and for granting R-II Builders' application for receivership, HGC filed the Rule 65 petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 111153 before the CA[30] which, thru its Former Special Fifteenth Division, rendered the herein assailed 21 January 2010 decision,[31]upon the following findings and conclusions: a) Irrespective of whether it is real or one incapable of pecuniary estimation, the action commenced by R-II Builders indubitably falls squarely within the jurisdiction of respondent RTC; b) From the allegations of R-II Builders' original complaint and amended complaint the character of the relief primarily sought, i.e., the declaration of nullity of the DAC, the action before respondent RTC is one where the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation; c) R-II Builders need not pay any deficiency in the docket fees considering its withdrawal of its Amended and Supplemental Complaint; d) A receiver may be appointed without formal hearing, particularly when it is within the interest of both parties and does not result in the delay of any government infrastructure projects or economic development efforts; e) Respondent RTC's act of calling the attention of the Manila Registrar of Deeds to R-II Builders' Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Annotation of Lis Pendens is well-within its residual power to act on matters before it; and f) The withdrawal of R-II Builders' Amended and Supplemental Complaint discounted the forum shopping imputed against it by HGC.[32] HGC's motion for reconsideration of the foregoing decision[33] was denied for lack of merit in the CA's resolution dated 21 June 2010, hence, this petition. The Issues HGC urges the affirmative of the following issues in urging the grant of its petition, to wit: "Did the Honorable Court of Appeals Seriously Err When It Failed to Rule That: I. The Regional Trial Court a quo had no jurisdiction to proceed with the case considering that:

(1) the original court was without authority to hear the case and; (2) despite an unequivocal order from the trial court a quo, Private Respondent (R-II Builders) failed and refused to pay the correct and proper docket fees, whether it be for a real or personal action, based on the values of the properties or claims subject of the complaints. II. Since the Honorable Court of Appeals had characterized the case as a personal action, the action before the Regional Trial Court a quo should have been dismissed for improper venue. III. The order appointing a receiver was made with grave abuse of discretion as amounting to lack of jurisdiction for having been issued under the following circumstances: (1) It was made without a hearing and without any evidence of its necessity; (2) It was unduly harsh and totally unnecessary in view of other available remedies, especially considering that Petitioner HGC is conclusively presumed to be solvent; (3) It effectively prevented the performance of HGC's functions in recovering upon its guaranty exposure and was in contravention of Presidential Decree Nos. 385 and 1818, Republic Act No. 8927 and Supreme Court Circular Nos. 2-91, 13-93, 68-94 and Administrative Circular No. 11-00."[34] Acting on HGC's motion for resolution of its application for a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction,[35] the Court issued the resolution dated 23 August 2010, enjoining the enforcement of respondent RTC's assailed orders.[36] The Court's Ruling We find the petition impressed with merit. Jurisdiction is defined as the authority to hear and determine a cause or the right to act in a case.[37] In addition to being conferred by the Constitution and the law,[38] the rule is settled that a court's jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the relevant allegations in the complaint,[39] the law in effect when the action is filed,[40] and the character of the relief sought irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted.[41] Consistent with Section 1, Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides that the prescribed fees shall be paid in full "upon the filing of the pleading or other application which initiates an action or proceeding", the well-entrenched rule is to the effect that a court acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the payment of the prescribed filing and docket fees.[42] The record shows that R-II Builders' original complaint dated 23 August 2005 was initially docketed as Civil Case No. 05-113407 before Branch 24 of the Manila, a designated Special Commercial Court.[43] With HGC's filing of a motion for a preliminary hearing on the affirmative defenses asserted in its answer[44] and R-II Builders' filing of its Amended and Supplemental Complaint dated 31 July 2007, [45] said court issued an order dated 2 January 2008 ordering the re-raffle of the case upon the finding that the same is not an intra-corporate dispute.[46] In a clarificatory order dated 1 February 2008,[47] the same court significantly took cognizance of its lack of jurisdiction over the case in the following wise: At the outset, it must be stated that this Court is a designated Special Commercial Court tasked to try and hear, among others, intra-corporate controversies to the exclusion of ordinary civil cases. When the case was initially assigned to this Court, it was classified as an intra-corporate case. However, in the ensuing proceedings relative to the affirmative defences raised by defendants, even the plaintiff conceded that the case is not an intra-corporate controversy or even if it is, this Court is without authority to hear the same as the parties are all housed in Quezon City. Thus, the more prudent course to take was for this Court to declare that it does not have the authority to hear the complaint it being an ordinary civil action. As to whether it is personal or civil, this Court would rather leave the resolution of the same to Branch 22 of this Court. (Italics supplied). We find that, having squarely raised the matter in its Rule 65 petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 111153,[48] HGC correctly faults the CA for not finding that Branch 24 of the Manila RTC had no authority to order the transfer of the case to respondent RTC.[49] Being outside the jurisdiction of Special Commercial Courts, the rule is settled that cases which are civil in nature, like the one commenced by R-II Builders, should be threshed out in a regular court.[50] With its acknowledged lack of jurisdiction over the case, Branch 24 of the Manila RTC should have ordered the dismissal of the

complaint, since a court without subject matter jurisdiction cannot transfer the case to another court.[51] Instead, it should have simply ordered the dismissal of the complaint, considering that the affirmative defenses for which HGC sought hearing included its lack of jurisdiction over the case. Calleja v. Panday,[52] while on facts the other way around, i.e., a branch of the RTC exercising jurisdiction over a subject matter within the Special Commercial Court's authority, dealt squarely with the issue: Whether a branch of the Regional Trial Court which has no jurisdiction to try and decide a case has authority to remand the same to another co-equal Court in order to cure the defects on venue and jurisdiction. Calleja ruled on the issue, thus: Such being the case, RTC Br. 58 did not have the requisite authority or power to order the transfer of the case to another branch of the Regional Trial Court. The only action that RTC-Br. 58 could take on the matter was to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction. Certainly, the pronouncement of Br. 24, the Special Commercial Court, in its Joint Order of 2 January 2008 that the case is not an intracorporate controversy, amplified in its Order of 1 February 2008 that it "does not have the authority to hear the complaint it being an ordinary civil action" is incompatible with the directive for the re-raffle of the case and to "leave the resolution of the same to Branch 22 of this Court." Such a directive is an exercise of authority over the case, which authority it had in the same breath declared it did not have. What compounds the jurisdictional error is the fact that at the time of its surrender of jurisdiction, Br. 24 had already acted on the case and had in fact, on 26 October 2005, issued the writ of preliminary injunction sought by herein respondent R-II Builders. At that point, there was absolutely no reason which could justify a re-raffle of the case considering that the order that was supposed to have caused the re-raffle was not an inhibition of the judge but a declaration of absence of jurisdiction. So faulty was the order of re-raffle that it left the impression that its previously issued preliminary injunction remained effective since the case from which it issued was not dismissed but merely transferred to another court. A re-raffle which causes a transfer of the case involves courts with the same subject matter jurisdiction; it cannot involve courts which have different jurisdictions exclusive of the other. More apt in this case, a re-raffle of a case cannot cure a jurisdictional defect. Prescinding from the foregoing considerations, and to show that the proceedings below was error upon error, we find that the CA also gravely erred in not ruling that respondent RTC's (Branch 22, the regular court) jurisdiction over the case was curtailed by R-II Builders' failure to pay the correct docket fees. In other words, the jurisdictionally flawed transfer of the case from Branch 24, the SCC to Branch 22, the regular court, is topped by another jurisdictional defect which is the non-payment of the correct docket fees. In its order dated 19 May 2008 which admitted R-II Builders' Amended and Supplemental Complaint, respondent RTC distinctly ruled that the case was a real action and ordered the recomputation and payment of the correct docket fees.[53] In patent circumvention of said order, however, R-II Builders filed its 14 August 2008 motion to admit its Second Amended Complaint which effectively deleted its causes of action for accounting and conveyance of title to and/or possession of the entire Asset Pool and, in addition to reducing the claim for attorney's fees and seeking its appointment as a receiver, reinstated its cause of action for resolution of the DAC.[54] Acting on said motion as well as the opposition and motion to dismiss interposed by HGC,[55] respondent RTC ruled as follows in its assailed 3 March 2009 order,[56] to wit: 1. The docket fees of the original complaint has been paid, thus, the Court already acquired jurisdiction over the instant case. The admission of the Amended and Supplemental Complaint, is subject to the payment of docket fees pursuant to the Order of this Court dated May 18, 2008. The non-payment of the docket fees stated in the Order dated May 18, 2008 will result only in the non-admission of the Amended and Supplemental Complaint, which means that the Original Complaint remains. However, since the Amended and Supplemental Complaint is being withdrawn and in lieu thereof a new Amended Complaint is sought to be admitted, there is no more need to pay the docket fees as provided for in the said Order. 2. It is settled that once jurisdiction is acquired and vested in a Court, said Court maintains its jurisdiction until judgment is had (Aruego, Jr., et al. vs. CA). Such acquired jurisdiction is not lost by the amendment of a pleading that raises additional/new cause(s) of action. The jurisdiction of a Court is not even lost even if the additional docket fees are required by reason of the amendment. Indeed, the Supreme Court held in PNOC vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 107518, October 8, 1998) that: "Its failure to pay the docket fee corresponding to its increased claim for damages under the

amended complaint should not be considered as having curtailed the lower court's jurisdiction. Pursuant to the ruling in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion, the unpaid docket fees should be considered as a lien on the judgment even though private respondent specified the amount of P600,000.00 as its claim for damages in its amended complaint. Thus, even on the assumption that additional docket fees are required as a consequence of any amended complaint, its non-payment will not result in the court's loss of jurisdiction over the case.[57] Distinctly, the principal reference remained to be the "original complaint," in which R-II Builders itself submitted that the case "is a real action as it affects title and possession of real property or interest therein." It was precisely this submission which was the basis of the conclusion of the SCC court, Br. 24 that the case is not an intra-corporate controversy and therefore is outside its authority. We see from the assailed Order that the regular court accepted the case on the reason that "the docket fees of the original complaint has been paid," so that, furthermore, the Amended and Supplemental Complaint may be admitted "subject to the payment of docket fees." When the required fees were not paid, the court considered it as resulting in the non-admission of the Amended and Supplemental Complaint such that "the original complaint remains." That remaining original complaint can then be amended by "a new Amended Complaint" which is no longer subject to the conditions attached to the unadmitted Amended and Supplemental Complaint. The Order of 3 March 2009, with its logic and reason, is wholly unacceptable. In upholding the foregoing order as well as its affirmance in respondent RTC's 29 September 2009 order,[58] the CA ruled that the case - being one primarily instituted for the resolution/nullification of the DAC - involved an action incapable of pecuniary estimation. While it is true, however, that R-II Builder's continuing stake in the Asset Pool is "with respect only to its residual value after payment of all the regular SMPPCs holders and the Asset Pool creditors",[59] the CA failed to take into account the fact that R-II Builders' original complaint and Amended and Supplemental Complaint both interposed causes of action for conveyance and/or recovery of possession of the entire Asset Pool. Indeed, in connection with its second cause of action for appointment as trustee in its original complaint,[60] R-II Builders distinctly sought the conveyance of the entire Asset Pool[61] which it consistently estimated to be valued at P5,919,716,618.62 as of 30 June 2005.[62] In its opposition to HGC's motion to dismiss, R-II Builders even admitted that the case is a real action as it affects title to or possession of real property or an interest therein.[63] With R-II Builders' incorporation of a cause of action for conveyance of title to and/or possession of the entire Asset Pool in its Amended and Supplemental Complaint,[64] on the other hand, no less than respondent RTC, in its 19 May 2008 order, directed the assessment and payment of docket fees corresponding to a real action. Admittedly, this Court has repeatedly laid down the test in ascertaining whether the subject matter of an action is incapable of pecuniary estimation by determining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. While a claim is, on the one hand, considered capable of pecuniary estimation if the action is primarily for recovery of a sum of money, the action is considered incapable of pecuniary estimation where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, the money claim being only incidental to or merely a consequence of, the principal relief sought.[65] To our mind, the application of foregoing test does not, however, preclude the further classification of actions into personal actions and real action, for which appropriate docket fees are prescribed. In contrast to personal actions where the plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal property, the enforcement of a contract, or the recovery of damages, real actions are those which affect title to or possession of real property, or interest therein.[66] While personal actions should be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff,[67] the venue for real actions is the court of the place where the real property is located.[68] Although an action for resolution and/or the nullification of a contract, like an action for specific performance, fall squarely into the category of actions where the subject matter is considered incapable of pecuniary estimation,[69] we find that the causes of action for resolution and/or nullification of the DAC was erroneously isolated by the CA from the other causes of action alleged in R-II Builders' original complaint and Amended and Supplemental Complaint which prayed for the conveyance and/or transfer of possession of the Asset Pool. In Gochan v. Gochan,[70] this Court held that an action for specific performance would still be considered a real action where it seeks the conveyance or transfer of real property, or ultimately, the execution of deeds of conveyance of real property. More to the point is the case of Ruby Shelter Builders and Realty Development Corporation v. Hon. Pablo C. Formaran III[71] where, despite the annulment of contracts sought in the complaint, this Court upheld the directive to pay additional docket fees corresponding to a real action in the following wise, to wit:

x x x [I]n Siapno v. Manalo, the Court disregarded the title/denomination of therein plaintiff Manalo's amended petition as one for Mandamus with Revocation of Title and Damages; and adjudged the same to be a real action, the filing fees for which should have been computed based on the assessed value of the subject property or, if there was none, the estimated value thereof. The Court expounded in Siapno that: In his amended petition, respondent Manalo prayed that NTA's sale of the property in dispute to Standford East Realty Corporation and the title issued to the latter on the basis thereof, be declared null and void. In a very real sense, albeit the amended petition is styled as one for"Mandamus with Revocation of Title and Damages", it is, at bottom, a suit to recover from Standford the realty in question and to vest in respondent the ownership and possession thereof. In short, the amended petition is in reality an action in res or a real action. Our pronouncement in Fortune Motors (Phils.), Inc. vs. Court of Appeals is instructive. There, we said: A prayer for annulment or rescission of contract does not operate to efface the true objectives and nature of the action which is to recover real property. (Inton, et al., v. Quintan,81 Phil. 97, 1948) An action to annul a real estate mortgage foreclosure sale is no different from an action to annul a private sale of real property. (Muoz v. Llamas, 87 Phil. 737, 1950). While it is true that petitioner does not directly seek the recovery of title or possession of the property in question, his action for annulment of sale and his claim for damages are closely intertwined with the issue of ownership of the building which, under the law, is considered immovable property, the recovery of which is petitioner's primary objective. The prevalent doctrine is that an action for the annulment or rescission of a sale of real property does not operate to efface the fundamental and prime objective and nature of the case, which is to recover said real property. It is a real action.[72] Granted that R-II Builders is not claiming ownership of the Asset Pool because its continuing stake is, in the first place, limited only to the residual value thereof, the conveyance and/or transfer of possession of the same properties sought in the original complaint and Amended and Supplemental Complaint both presuppose a real action for which appropriate docket fees computed on the basis of the assessed or estimated value of said properties should have been assessed and paid. In support of its original complaint's second cause of action for appointment as trustee and conveyance of the properties in the Asset Pool, R-II Builders distinctly alleged as follows: 5.12. As the Court-appointed Trustee, R-II Builders shall have and exercise the same powers, rights and duties as if [it] had been originally appointed, having the principal duty of redeeming and buying back the Regular SMPPC's and thereafter liquidating the Asset Pool, which are also the end goals of the Agreement. 5.12.1. R-II Builders, as the Trustee, shall have the power and right to invest, transfer, convey or assign any of the assets of the Asset Pool, whether funds, receivables, real or personal property, in exchange for shares of stocks, bonds, securities, real or personal properties of any kind, class or nature, provided that any such investment, transfer, conveyance or assignment shall not impair the value of the Asset Pool. 5.12.2. R-II Builders, as the Trustee, shall have the power and right to sell, change, assign or otherwise dispose of any stocks, bonds, securities, real or personal properties or other assets constituting the Asset Pool. 5.12. 3. R-II Builders, as the Trustee, shall have the power and right to enter into lease agreements as lessor or any other related contract for the benefit of the Asset Pool; and 5.12.4. It is understood that the aforecited powers and rights of R-II Builders as the court-appointed Trustee, are non-exclusive; and is deemed to include all the rights and powers necessary and incidental to achieve the goals and objectives of the Agreement.[73] From the foregoing allegations in its original complaint, it cannot be gainsaid that R-II Builders was unquestionably seeking possession and control of the properties in the Asset Pool which predominantly consisted of real properties. Having admitted that "the case is a real action as it affects title to or possession of real property or (an) interest therein",[74] R-II Builders emphasized the real nature of its action by seeking the grant of the following main reliefs in the Amended and Supplemental Complaint it subsequently filed, to wit: 5. After trial on the merits, render judgment: (i) Declaring the annulment of the Deed of Assignment and conveyance executed by PDB in favor of

HGC; or in the alternative, declaring the nullity of the said instrument; (ii) Appointing R-II Builders as the Trustee of the Asset Pool Properties, with powers and responsibilities including but not limited to those stated in 5.12.1, 5.12.2, 5.12.3 and 5.12.4 herein and those spelled out in the Re-Stated Smokey Mountain Asset Pool Formation Trust Agreement; (iii) Ordering HGC to render an accounting of all properties of the Asset Pool transferred thereto under the Deed of Assignment and Conveyance and thereafter convey title to and/or possession of the entire Asset Pool to R-II Builders as the Trustee thereof which assets consist of, but is not limited to the following: (a) 105 parcels of land comprising the Smokey Mountain Site, and, the Reclamation Area, consisting of the 539,471.47 square meters, and all the buildings and improvements thereon, with their corresponding certificates of title; (b) shares of stock of Harbour Center Port Terminal, Inc. which are presently registered in the books of the said company in the name of PDB for the account of the Smokey Mountain Asset Pool; and (c) other documents as listed in Annex E of the Contract of Guaranty. (iv) Ordering NHA to pay the Asset Pool the amount of Php1,803,729,757.88 including the direct and indirect cost thereon as may be found by this Honorable Court to be due thereon; (v) Making the injunction permanent; (vi) Ordering HGC and the NHA to pay Attorney's fees in the amount of P2,000,000 and the costs of suit.
[75]

For failure of R-II Builders to pay the correct docket fees for its original complaint or, for that matter, its Amended and Supplemental Complaint as directed in respondent RTC's 19 May 2008 order, it stands to reason that jurisdiction over the case had yet to properly attach. Applying the rule that "a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court" in the landmark case of Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[76] this Court ruled that jurisdiction over any case is acquired only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee which is both mandatory and jurisdictional. To temper said ruling, the Court subsequently issued the following guidelines in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Hon. Maximiano Asuncion,[77] viz.: 1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. 2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. 3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee. True to the foregoing guidelines, respondent RTC admitted R-II Builder's Amended and Supplemental Complaint and directed the assessment and payment of the appropriate docket fees in the order dated 19 May 2008. Rather than complying with said directive, however, R-II Builders manifested its intent to evade payment of the correct docket fees by withdrawing its Amended and Supplemental Complaintand, in lieu thereof, filed its Second Amended Complaint which deleted its cause of action for accounting and conveyance of title to and/or possession of the entire Asset Pool, reduced its claim for attorney's fees, sought its appointment as Receiver and prayed for the liquidation and distribution of the Asset Pool. [78] In upholding the admission of said Second Amended Complaint in respondent RTC's assailed 3 March 2009 Order, however, the CA clearly lost sight of the fact that a real action was ensconced in R-II Builders' original complaint and that the proper docket fees had yet to be paid in the premises. Despite the latter's withdrawal of its Amended and Supplemental Complaint, it cannot, therefore, be gainsaid that respondent RTC had yet to acquire jurisdiction over the case for non-payment of the correct docket fees.

In the 15 February 2011 Resolution issued in the case of David Lu v. Paterno Lu Ym, Sr.,[79] this Court, sitting En Banc, had occasion to rule that an action for declaration of nullity of share issue, receivership and corporate dissolution is one where the value of the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Subsequent to the trial court's rendition of a decision on the merits declared to be immediately executory and the CA's denial of their application for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order to enjoin enforcement of said decision, the defendants questioned the sufficiency of the docket fees paid a quo which supposedly failed take into consideration the value of the shares as well as the real properties involved for which the plaintiff additionally caused notices of lis pendens to be annotated. Finding that defendants were already estopped in questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court on the ground of non-payment of the correct docket fees, the Court discounted intent to defraud the government on the part of the plaintiff who can, at any rate, be required to pay the deficiency which may be considered a lien on the judgment that may be rendered, without automatic loss of the jurisdiction already acquired, in the first instance, by the trial court. The factual and legal milieus of the case at bench could not, however, be more different. While R-II Builders styled its original complaint and Amended and Supplemental Complaint as one primarily for the resolution and/or declaration of the DAC, it simultaneously and unmistakably prayed for the conveyance, possession and control of the Asset Pool. Alongside the fact that HGC has consistently questioned the sufficiency of the docket fees paid by R-II Builders, estoppel cannot be said to have set in since, the lapse of more than five years from the commencement of the complaint notwithstanding, it appears that the case has yet to be tried on the merits. Having admitted that its original complaint partook the nature of a real action and having been directed to pay the correct docket fees for itsAmended and Supplemental Complaint, R-II Builders is, furthermore, clearly chargeable with knowledge of the insufficiency of the docket fees it paid. Unmistakably manifesting its intent to evade payment of the correct docket fees, moreover, R-II Builders withdrew its Amended and Supplemental Complaint after its admission and, in lieu thereof, filed its' Second Amended Complaint on the ground that said earlier pleading cannot be considered admitted in view of its non-payment of the docket and other fees it was directed to pay. In so doing, however, R-II Builders conveniently overlooked the fact that the very same argument could very well apply to its original complaint for which - given its admitted nature as a real action - the correct docket fees have also yet to be paid. The importance of filing fees cannot be over-emphasized for they are intended to take care of court expenses in the handling of cases in terms of costs of supplies, use of equipment, salaries and fringe benefits of personnel, and others, computed as to man-hours used in the handling of each case. The payment of said fees, therefore, cannot be made dependent on the result of the action taken without entailing tremendous losses to the government and to the judiciary in particular.[80] For non-payment of the correct docket fees which, for real actions, should be computed on the basis of the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated value thereof as alleged by the claimant,[81]respondent RTC should have denied admission of R-II Builders' Second Amended Complaint and ordered the dismissal of the case. Although a catena of decisions rendered by this Court eschewed the application of the doctrine laid down in the Manchester case,[82] said decisions had been consistently premised on the willingness of the party to pay the correct docket fees and/or absence of intention to evade payment of the correct docket fees. This cannot be said of R-II Builders which not only failed to pay the correct docket fees for its original complaint and Amended and Supplemental Complaint but also clearly evaded payment of the same by filing its Second Amended Complaint. By itself, the propriety of admitting R-II Builders' Second Amended Complaint is also cast in dubious light when viewed through the prism of the general prohibition against amendments intended to confer jurisdiction where none has been acquired yet. Although the policy in this jurisdiction is to the effect that amendments to pleadings are favored and liberally allowed in the interest of justice, amendment is not allowed where the court has no jurisdiction over the original complaint and the purpose of the amendment is to confer jurisdiction upon the court.[83] Hence, with jurisdiction over the case yet to properly attach, HGC correctly fault the CA for upholding respondent RTC's admission of R-II Builders'Second Amended Complaint despite non-payment of the docket fees for its original complaint andAmended and Supplemental Complaint as well as the clear intent to evade payment thereof. With the determination of the jurisdictional necessity of the dismissal of the complaint of R-II Builders docketed as Civil Case No. 05-113407, first before Br. 24 and later before Br. 22 both of the RTC of Manila, we no longer find any reason to go into a discussion of the remaining issues HGC proffers for resolution. In view, particularly, of its non-acquisition of jurisdiction over the case, respondent RTC clearly had no authority to grant the receivership sought by R-II Builders. It needs pointing out though that the prayer for receivership clearly indicates that the R-II Builders sought the transfer of possession of property consisting of the assets of the JVA from HGC to the former's named Receiver. As already noted, said transfer of possession was sought by respondent R-II Builders since the very start, overtly at the first two attempts, covertly in the last, the successive amendments betraying the deft maneuverings to evade payment of the correct docket fees.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated 21 January 2010 is REVERSED andSET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, another is entered NULLIFYING the regular court's, RTC Branch 22's Orders dated 3 March 2009 and 29 September 2009 as well as the SCC's, RTC Branch 24's Order dated 26 October 2005 which was rendered void by the SCC's subsequent declaration of absence of authority over the case. The complaint of R-II Builders docketed as Civil Case No. 05-113407 first before Br. 24 and thereafter before Br. 22 both of the RTC of Manila is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. Corona, C.J., (Chairperson), Velasco, Jr., Leonardo De-Castro, and Del Castillo, JJ., concur. Endnotes:
[1]

Rollo, pp. 139-165. Id. at 165. Id. at 1063-1077. Id. at 1078-1087. Id. at 1063. Id. at 1068-1069. Id. at 1088. Id. at 19-20 and 1094. Id. at 1112-1117. Id. at 20-22, 354, 142-143 and 505. Id. at 22 and 356. Id. at 1118-1119. Id. at 348-376. Id. at 24 and 146. Id. at 1416-1423. Id. at 440-445. Id. at 446-489. Id. at 435-437. Id. at 438-439. Id. at 490-495. Id. at 496-500. Id. at 496-538. Id. at 539-549. Id. at 585-590. Id. at 325-332. Id. at 613-656.

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[6]

[7]

[8]

[9]

[10]

[11]

[12]

[13]

[14]

[15]

[16]

[17]

[18]

[19]

[20]

[21]

[22]

[23]

[24]

[25]

[26]

[27]

Id. at 775-793. Id. at 823-827. Id. at 333-347. Id. at 178-313. Id. at 139-165. Id. at 154-165. Id. at 1375-1415. Id. at 40-41. Id. at 1451-1484. Id. at 1485-1488.

[28]

[29]

[30]

[31]

[32]

[33]

[34]

[35]

[36]

Union Bank of the Philippines v. Securities and Exchange Commission, G.R. No. 165382, 17 August 2006, 499 SCRA 253, 263.
[37] [38]

Proton Pilipinas Corporation v. Republic, G.R. No. 165027, 16 October 2006, 504 SCRA 528, 540. General Milling Corporation v. Uytengsu III, G.R. No. 160514, 30 June 2006, 494 SCRA 241, 245. Bokingo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 161739, 4 May 2006, 489 SCRA 521, 530.

[39]

[40]

AC Enterprises, Inc. v. Frabelle Properties Corporation, G.R. No. 166744, 2 November 2006, 506 SCRA 625, 654-655.
[41] [42]

Lacson v. Reyes, G.R. No. 86250, 26 February 1990, 182 SCRA 729, 733. Rollo, pp. 348-377. Id. at 1416-1423. Id. at 446-487. Id. at 435-437. Id. at 438-439. Id. at 211-217. Id. at 41-47.

[43]

[44]

[45]

[46]

[47]

[48]

[49]

Atwell v. Concepcion Progressive Association, Inc., G.R. No. 169370, 14 April 2008, 551 SCRA 272, 281.
[50] [51]

Igot v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150794, 17 August 2004, 436 SCRA 668, 676. G.R. No. 168696, 28 February 2006, 483 SCRA 680, 693. Rollo, pp. 490-495. Id. at 496-538. Id. at 539-549. Id. at 325-332. Id. at 327-328. Id. at 333-347.

[52]

[53]

[54]

[55]

[56]

[57]

[58]

[59]

Id. at 157-158. Id. at 364-371. Id. at 376. Id. at 357-358. Id. at 436. Id. at 460-463. Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 435 Phil. 62, 66 (2002). Marcos-Araneta v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 154096, 22 August 2008, 563 SCRA 41, 62-63. Davao Light and Power Co, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 415 Phil. 630-631 (2001). Infante v. Aran Builders, Inc., G.R. No. 156596, 24 August 2007, 531 SCRA 123, 129-130. Russel v. Hon. Augustine A. Vestil, 364 Phil. 392, 400 (1999). 423 Phil. 491, 501 (2001). G.R. No. 175914, 10 February 2009, 578 SCRA 283. Id. at 302-303. Rollo, pp. 369-370. Id. at 436. Id. at 485-486. 233 Phil. 579, 584 (1987). G.R. Nos. 79937-38, 13 February 1989, 170 SCRA 274, 285. Rollo, pp. 501-538. En Banc Resolution, G.R. Nos. 153690 and 157381.

[60]

[61]

[62]

[63]

[64]

[65]

[66]

[67]

[68]

[69]

[70]

[71]

[72]

[73]

[74]

[75]

[76]

[77]

[78]

[79]

Suson v. Court of Appeals, 343 Phil. 820, 825 (1997) citing Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 171 SCRA 674.
[80] [81]

Serrano v. Delica, 503 Phil. 73, 77 (2005).

Negros Oriental Planters Association, Inc. v. Presiding Judge of RTC-Negros Occidental, Br. 52, Bacolod City, G.R. No. 179878, 24 December 2008, 575 SCRA 575, 587 ; Spouses Go v. Tong, 462 Phil. 256 (2003); Soriano v. Court of Appeals, 416 Phil. 226 (2001); Yambao v. Court of Appeals, 399 Phil. 712 (2000); Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Mangubat, 371 Phil. 393, (1999) ; Ng Soon v. Hon. Alday, 258 Phil. 848 (1989).
[82] [83]

Tirona v. Hon. Alejo, 419 Phil. 285, 300 (2001).

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Baguio City EN BANC G.R. No. 191002 April 20, 2010

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Petitioner, vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, Respondents. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x G.R. No. 191032 JAIME N. SORIANO, Petitioner, vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC), Respondent. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x G.R. No. 191057 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), Petitioner, vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC), Respondent. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC IN RE APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 15, ARTICLE VII OF THE CONSTITUTION TO APPOINTMENTS TO THE JUDICIARY, ESTELITO P. MENDOZA, Petitioner, x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x G.R. No. 191149 JOHN G. PERALTA, Petitioner, vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC). Respondent. PETER IRVING CORVERA; CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM; ALFONSO V. TAN, JR.; NATIONAL UNION OF PEOPLES LAWYERS; MARLOU B. UBANO; INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES-DAVAO DEL SUR CHAPTER, represented by its Immediate Past President, ATTY. ISRAELITO P. TORREON, and the latter in his own personal capacity as a MEMBER of the PHILIPPINE BAR; MITCHELL JOHN L. BOISER; BAGONG ALYANSANG BAYAN (BAYAN) CHAIRMAN DR. CAROLINA P. ARAULLO; BAYAN SECRETARY GENERAL RENATO M. REYES, JR.; CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCE-MENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE) CHAIRMAN FERDINAND GAITE; KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYANG MAHIHIRAP (KADAMAY) SECRETARY GENERAL GLORIA ARELLANO; ALYANSA NG NAGKAKAISANG KABATAAN NG SAMBAYANAN PARA SA KAUNLARAN (ANAKBAYAN) CHAIRMAN KEN LEONARD RAMOS; TAYO ANG PAG-ASA CONVENOR ALVIN PETERS; LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS)

CHAIRMAN JAMES MARK TERRY LACUANAN RIDON; NATIONAL UNION OF STUDENTS OF THE PHILIPPINES (NUSP) CHAIRMAN EINSTEIN RECEDES; COLLEGE EDITORS GUILD OF THE PHILIPPINES (CEGP) CHAIRMAN VIJAE ALQUISOLA; and STUDENT CHRISTIAN MOVEMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES (SCMP) CHAIRMAN MA. CRISTINA ANGELA GUEVARRA; WALDEN F. BELLO and LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES; WOMEN TRIAL LAWYERS ORGANIZATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by YOLANDA QUISUMBING-JAVELLANA; BELLEZA ALOJADO DEMAISIP; TERESITA GANDIONCOOLEDAN; MA. VERENA KASILAG-VILLANUEVA; MARILYN STA. ROMANA; LEONILA DE JESUS; and GUINEVERE DE LEON; AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR.;Intervenors. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x G.R. No. 191342 ATTY. AMADOR Z. TOLENTINO, JR., (IBP Governor-Southern Luzon), and ATTY. ROLAND B. INTING (IBPGovernor-Eastern Visayas), Petitioners, vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC), Respondent. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x G.R. No. 191420 PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner, vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL and HER EXCELLENCY GLORIA MACAPAGALARROYO, Respondents. RESOLUTION BERSAMIN, J.: On March 17, 2010, the Court promulgated its decision, holding: WHEREFORE, the Court: 1. Dismisses the petitions for certiorari and mandamus in G.R. No. 191002 and G.R. No. 191149, and the petition for mandamus in G.R. No. 191057 for being premature; 2. Dismisses the petitions for prohibition in G.R. No. 191032 and G.R. No. 191342 for lack of merit; and 3. Grants the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC and, accordingly, directs the Judicial and Bar Council: (a) To resume its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill the vacancy to be created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010; (b) To prepare the short list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice; (c) To submit to the incumbent President the short list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice on or before May 17, 2010; and

(d) To continue its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill other vacancies in the Judiciary and submit to the President the short list of nominees corresponding thereto in accordance with this decision. SO ORDERED. Motions for Reconsideration Petitioners Jaime N. Soriano (G.R. No. 191032), Amador Z. Tolentino and Roland B. Inting (G.R. No. 191342), and Philippine Bar Association (G.R. No. 191420), as well as intervenors Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Davao del Sur (IBP-Davao del Sur, et al.); Christian Robert S. Lim; Peter Irving Corvera; Bagong Alyansang Bayan and others (BAYAN, et al.); Alfonso V. Tan, Jr.; the Women Trial Lawyers Organization of the Philippines (WTLOP); Marlou B. Ubano; Mitchell John L. Boiser; and Walden F. Bello and Loretta Ann P. Rosales (Bello, et al.), filed their respective motions for reconsideration. Also filing a motion for reconsideration was Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., whose belated intervention was allowed. We summarize the arguments and submissions of the various motions for reconsideration, in the aforegiven order: Soriano 1. The Court has not squarely ruled upon or addressed the issue of whether or not the power to designate the Chief Justice belonged to the Supreme Court en banc. 2. The Mendoza petition should have been dismissed, because it sought a mere declaratory judgment and did not involve a justiciable controversy. 3. All Justices of the Court should participate in the next deliberations. The mere fact that the Chief Justice sits as ex officio head of the JBC should not prevail over the more compelling state interest for him to participate as a Member of the Court. Tolentino and Inting 1. A plain reading of Section 15, Article VII does not lead to an interpretation that exempts judicial appointments from the express ban on midnight appointments. 2. In excluding the Judiciary from the ban, the Court has made distinctions and has created exemptions when none exists. 3. The ban on midnight appointments is placed in Article VII, not in Article VIII, because it limits an executive, not a judicial, power. 4. Resort to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission is superfluous, and is powerless to vary the terms of the clear prohibition. 5. The Court has given too much credit to the position taken by Justice Regalado. Thereby, the Court has raised the Constitution to the level of a venerated text whose intent can only be divined by its framers as to be outside the realm of understanding by the sovereign people that ratified it. 6. Valenzuela should not be reversed. 7. The petitioners, as taxpayers and lawyers, have the clear legal standing to question the illegal composition of the JBC.

Philippine Bar Association 1. The Courts strained interpretation of the Constitution violates the basic principle that the Court should not formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than what is required by the precise facts of the case. 2. Considering that Section 15, Article VII is clear and straightforward, the only duty of the Court is to apply it. The provision expressly and clearly provides a general limitation on the appointing power of the President in prohibiting the appointment of any person to any position in the Government without any qualification and distinction. 3. The Court gravely erred in unilaterally ignoring the constitutional safeguard against midnight appointments. 4. The Constitution has installed two constitutional safeguards:- the prohibition against midnight appointments, and the creation of the JBC. It is not within the authority of the Court to prefer one over the other, for the Courts duty is to apply the safeguards as they are, not as the Court likes them to be. 5. The Court has erred in failing to apply the basic principles of statutory construction in interpreting the Constitution. 6. The Court has erred in relying heavily on the title, chapter or section headings, despite precedents on statutory construction holding that such headings carried very little weight. 7. The Constitution has provided a general rule on midnight appointments, and the only exception is that on temporary appointments to executive positions. 8. The Court has erred in directing the JBC to resume the proceedings for the nomination of the candidates to fill the vacancy to be created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno with a view to submitting the list of nominees for Chief Justice to President Arroyo on or before May 17, 2010. The Constitution grants the Court only the power of supervision over the JBC; hence, the Court cannot tell the JBC what to do, how to do it, or when to do it, especially in the absence of a real and justiciable case assailing any specific action or inaction of the JBC. 9. The Court has engaged in rendering an advisory opinion and has indulged in speculations. 10. The constitutional ban on appointments being already in effect, the Courts directing the JBC to comply with the decision constitutes a culpable violation of the Constitution and the commission of an election offense. 11. The Court cannot reverse on the basis of a secondary authority a doctrine unanimously formulated by the Court en banc. 12. The practice has been for the most senior Justice to act as Chief Justice whenever the incumbent is indisposed. Thus, the appointment of the successor Chief Justice is not urgently necessary. 13. The principal purpose for the ban on midnight appointments is to arrest any attempt to prolong the outgoing Presidents powers by means of proxies. The attempt of the incumbent President to appoint the next Chief Justice is undeniably intended to perpetuate her power beyond her term of office.

IBP-Davao del Sur, et al. 1. Its language being unambiguous, Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution applies to appointments to the Judiciary. Hence, no cogent reason exists to warrant the reversal of the Valenzuela pronouncement. 2. Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution provides for presidential appointments to the Constitutional Commissions and the JBC with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Its phrase "other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution" is enough proof that the limitation on the appointing power of the President extends to appointments to the Judiciary. Thus, Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 of Article VII apply to all presidential appointments in the Executive and Judicial Branches of the Government. 3. There is no evidence that the framers of the Constitution abhorred the idea of an Acting Chief Justice in all cases. Lim 1. There is no justiciable controversy that warrants the Courts exercise of judicial review. 2. The election ban under Section 15, Article VII applies to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Court and to other appointments to the Judiciary. 3. The creation of the JBC does not justify the removal of the safeguard under Section 15 of Article VII against midnight appointments in the Judiciary. Corvera 1. The Courts exclusion of appointments to the Judiciary from the Constitutional ban on midnight appointments is based on an interpretation beyond the plain and unequivocal language of the Constitution. 2. The intent of the ban on midnight appointments is to cover appointments in both the Executive and Judicial Departments. The application of the principle of verba legis (ordinary meaning) would have obviated dwelling on the organization and arrangement of the provisions of the Constitution. If there is any ambiguity in Section 15, Article VII, the intent behind the provision, which is to prevent political partisanship in all branches of the Government, should have controlled. 3. A plain reading is preferred to a contorted and strained interpretation based on compartmentalization and physical arrangement, especially considering that the Constitution must be interpreted as a whole. 4. Resort to the deliberations or to the personal interpretation of the framers of the Constitution should yield to the plain and unequivocal language of the Constitution. 5. There is no sufficient reason for reversing Valenzuela, a ruling that is reasonable and in accord with the Constitution. BAYAN, et al. 1. The Court erred in granting the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, because the petition did not present a justiciable controversy. The issues it raised were not yet ripe for adjudication, considering that the office of the Chief Justice was not yet vacant and that

the JBC itself has yet to decide whether or not to submit a list of nominees to the President. 2. The collective wisdom of Valenzuela Court is more important and compelling than the opinion of Justice Regalado. 3. In ruling that Section 15, Article VII is in conflict with Section 4(1), Article VIII, the Court has violated the principle of ut magis valeat quam pereat (which mandates that the Constitution should be interpreted as a whole, such that any conflicting provisions are to be harmonized as to fully give effect to all). There is no conflict between the provisions; they complement each other. 4. The form and structure of the Constitutions titles, chapters, sections, and draftsmanship carry little weight in statutory construction. The clear and plain language of Section 15, Article VII precludes interpretation. Tan, Jr. 1. The factual antecedents do not present an actual case or controversy. The clash of legal rights and interests in the present case are merely anticipated. Even if it is anticipated with certainty, no actual vacancy in the position of the Chief Justice has yet occurred. 2. The ruling that Section 15, Article VII does not apply to a vacancy in the Court and the Judiciary runs in conflict with long standing principles and doctrines of statutory construction. The provision admits only one exception, temporary appointments in the Executive Department. Thus, the Court should not distinguish, because the law itself makes no distinction. 3. Valenzuela was erroneously reversed. The framers of the Constitution clearly intended the ban on midnight appointments to cover the members of the Judiciary. Hence, giving more weight to the opinion of Justice Regalado to reverse the en banc decision in Valenzuela was unwarranted. 4. Section 15, Article VII is not incompatible with Section 4(1), Article VIII. The 90-day mandate to fill any vacancy lasts until August 15, 2010, or a month and a half after the end of the ban. The next President has roughly the same time of 45 days as the incumbent President (i.e., 44 days) within which to scrutinize and study the qualifications of the next Chief Justice. Thus, the JBC has more than enough opportunity to examine the nominees without haste and political uncertainty.
1avvphi1

5. When the constitutional ban is in place, the 90-day period under Section 4(1), Article VIII is suspended. 6. There is no basis to direct the JBC to submit the list of nominees on or before May 17, 2010. The directive to the JBC sanctions a culpable violation of the Constitution and constitutes an election offense. 7. There is no pressing necessity for the appointment of a Chief Justice, because the Court sits en banc, even when it acts as the sole judge of all contests relative to the election, returns and qualifications of the President and Vice-President. Fourteen other Members of the Court can validly comprise the Presidential Electoral Tribunal. WTLOP

1. The Court exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering the JBC to submit the list of nominees for Chief Justice to the President on or before May 17, 2010, and to continue its proceedings for the nomination of the candidates, because it granted a relief not prayed for; imposed on the JBC a deadline not provided by law or the Constitution; exercised control instead of mere supervision over the JBC; and lacked sufficient votes to reverse Valenzuela. 2. In interpreting Section 15, Article VII, the Court has ignored the basic principle of statutory construction to the effect that the literal meaning of the law must be applied when it is clear and unambiguous; and that we should not distinguish where the law does not distinguish. 3. There is no urgency to appoint the next Chief Justice, considering that the Judiciary Act of 1948 already provides that the power and duties of the office devolve on the most senior Associate Justice in case of a vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice. Ubano 1. The language of Section 15, Article VII, being clear and unequivocal, needs no interpretation 2. The Constitution must be construed in its entirety, not by resort to the organization and arrangement of its provisions. 3. The opinion of Justice Regalado is irrelevant, because Section 15, Article VII and the pertinent records of the Constitutional Commission are clear and unambiguous. 4. The Court has erred in ordering the JBC to submit the list of nominees to the President by May 17, 2010 at the latest, because no specific law requires the JBC to submit the list of nominees even before the vacancy has occurred. Boiser 1. Under Section 15, Article VII, the only exemption from the ban on midnight appointments is the temporary appointment to an executive position. The limitation is in keeping with the clear intent of the framers of the Constitution to place a restriction on the power of the outgoing Chief Executive to make appointments. 2. To exempt the appointment of the next Chief Justice from the ban on midnight appointments makes the appointee beholden to the outgoing Chief Executive, and compromises the independence of the Chief Justice by having the outgoing President be continually influential. 3. The Courts reversal of Valenzuela without stating the sufficient reason violates the principle of stare decisis. Bello, et al. 1. Section 15, Article VII does not distinguish as to the type of appointments an outgoing President is prohibited from making within the prescribed period. Plain textual reading and the records of the Constitutional Commission support the view that the ban on midnight appointments extends to judicial appointments.

2. Supervision of the JBC by the Court involves oversight. The subordinate subject to oversight must first act not in accord with prescribed rules before the act can be redone to conform to the prescribed rules. 3. The Court erred in granting the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, because the petition did not present a justiciable controversy. Pimentel 1. Any constitutional interpretative changes must be reasonable, rational, and conformable to the general intent of the Constitution as a limitation to the powers of Government and as a bastion for the protection of the rights of the people. Thus, in harmonizing seemingly conflicting provisions of the Constitution, the interpretation should always be one that protects the citizenry from an ever expanding grant of authority to its representatives. 2. The decision expands the constitutional powers of the President in a manner totally repugnant to republican constitutional democracy, and is tantamount to a judicial amendment of the Constitution without proper authority. Comments The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the JBC separately represent in their respective comments, thus: OSG 1. The JBC may be compelled to submit to the President a short list of its nominees for the position of Chief Justice. 2. The incumbent President has the power to appoint the next Chief Justice. 3. Section 15, Article VII does not apply to the Judiciary. 4. The principles of constitutional construction favor the exemption of the Judiciary from the ban on midnight appointments.
1awph!1

5. The Court has the duty to consider and resolve all issues raised by the parties as well as other related matters. JBC 1. The consolidated petitions should have been dismissed for prematurity, because the JBC has not yet decided at the time the petitions were filed whether the incumbent President has the power to appoint the new Chief Justice, and because the JBC, having yet to interview the candidates, has not submitted a short list to the President. 2. The statement in the decision that there is a doubt on whether a JBC short list is necessary for the President to appoint a Chief Justice should be struck down as bereft of constitutional and legal basis. The statement undermines the independence of the JBC. 3. The JBC will abide by the final decision of the Court, but in accord with its constitutional mandate and its implementing rules and regulations.

For his part, petitioner Estelito P. Mendoza (A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC) submits his comment even if the OSG and the JBC were the only ones the Court has required to do so. He states that the motions for reconsideration were directed at the administrative matter he initiated and which the Court resolved. His comment asserts: 1. The grounds of the motions for reconsideration were already resolved by the decision and the separate opinion. 2. The administrative matter he brought invoked the Courts power of supervision over the JBC as provided by Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, as distinguished from the Courts adjudicatory power under Section 1, Article VIII. In the former, the requisites for judicial review are not required, which was whyValenzuela was docketed as an administrative matter. Considering that the JBC itself has yet to take a position on when to submit the short list to the proper appointing authority, it has effectively solicited the exercise by the Court of its power of supervision over the JBC. 3. To apply Section 15, Article VII to Section 4(1) and Section 9, Article VIII is to amend the Constitution. 4. The portions of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission quoted in the dissent of Justice Carpio Morales, as well as in some of the motions for reconsideration do not refer to either Section 15, Article VII or Section 4(1), Article VIII, but to Section 13, Article VII (on nepotism). Ruling We deny the motions for reconsideration for lack of merit, for all the matters being thereby raised and argued, not being new, have all been resolved by the decision of March 17, 2010. Nonetheless, the Court opts to dwell on some matters only for the purpose of clarification and emphasis. First: Most of the movants contend that the principle of stare decisis is controlling, and accordingly insist that the Court has erred in disobeying or abandoning Valenzuela.1 The contention has no basis. Stare decisis derives its name from the Latin maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere, i.e., to adhere to precedent and not to unsettle things that are settled. It simply means that a principle underlying the decision in one case is deemed of imperative authority, controlling the decisions of like cases in the same court and in lower courts within the same jurisdiction, unless and until the decision in question is reversed or overruled by a court of competent authority. The decisions relied upon as precedents are commonly those of appellate courts, because the decisions of the trial courts may be appealed to higher courts and for that reason are probably not the best evidence of the rules of law laid down. 2 Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria that must control the actuations, not only of those called upon to abide by them, but also of those dutybound to enforce obedience to them.3 In a hierarchical judicial system like ours, the decisions of the higher courts bind the lower courts, but the courts of co-ordinate authority do not bind each other. The one highest court does not bind itself, being invested with the innate authority to rule according to its best lights.4

The Court, as the highest court of the land, may be guided but is not controlled by precedent. Thus, the Court, especially with a new membership, is not obliged to follow blindly a particular decision that it determines, after re-examination, to call for a rectification.5 The adherence to precedents is strict and rigid in a common-law setting like the United Kingdom, where judges make law as binding as an Act of Parliament.6 But ours is not a common-law system; hence, judicial precedents are not always strictly and rigidly followed. A judicial pronouncement in an earlier decision may be followed as a precedent in a subsequent case only when its reasoning and justification are relevant, and the court in the latter case accepts such reasoning and justification to be applicable to the case. The application of the precedent is for the sake of convenience and stability. For the intervenors to insist that Valenzuela ought not to be disobeyed, or abandoned, or reversed, and that its wisdom should guide, if not control, the Court in this case is, therefore, devoid of rationality and foundation. They seem to conveniently forget that the Constitution itself recognizes the innate authority of the Court en banc to modify or reverse a doctrine or principle of law laid down in any decision rendered en banc or in division.7 Second: Some intervenors are grossly misleading the public by their insistence that the Constitutional Commission extended to the Judiciary the ban on presidential appointments during the period stated in Section 15, Article VII. The deliberations that the dissent of Justice Carpio Morales quoted from the records of the Constitutional Commission did not concern either Section 15, Article VII or Section 4(1), Article VIII, but only Section 13, Article VII, a provision on nepotism. The records of the Constitutional Commission show that Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr. had proposed to include judges and justices related to the President within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity among the persons whom the President might not appoint during his or her tenure. In the end, however, Commissioner Davide, Jr. withdrew the proposal to include the Judiciary in Section 13, Article VII "(t)o avoid any further complication,"8 such that the final version of the second paragraph of Section 13, Article VII even completely omits any reference to the Judiciary, to wit: Section 13. xxx The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not during his tenure be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. Last: The movants take the majority to task for holding that Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments in the Judiciary. They aver that the Court either ignored or refused to apply many principles of statutory construction. The movants gravely err in their posture, and are themselves apparently contravening their avowed reliance on the principles of statutory construction. For one, the movants, disregarding the absence from Section 15, Article VII of the express extension of the ban on appointments to the Judiciary, insist that the ban applied to the Judiciary under the principle of verba legis. That is self-contradiction at its worst. Another instance is the movants unhesitating willingness to read into Section 4(1) and Section 9, both of Article VIII, the express applicability of the ban under Section 15, Article VII during the period provided therein, despite the silence of said provisions thereon. Yet, construction cannot supply the omission, for doing so would generally constitute an encroachment upon the field of the Constitutional Commission. Rather, Section 4(1) and Section 9 should be left as they are, given that their meaning is clear and explicit, and no words can be interpolated in

them.9 Interpolation of words is unnecessary, because the law is more than likely to fail to express the legislative intent with the interpolation. In other words, the addition of new words may alter the thought intended to be conveyed. And, even where the meaning of the law is clear and sensible, either with or without the omitted word or words, interpolation is improper, because the primary source of the legislative intent is in the language of the law itself.10 Thus, the decision of March 17, 2010 has fittingly observed: Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court. We cannot permit the meaning of the Constitution to be stretched to any unintended point in order to suit the purposes of any quarter. Final Word It has been insinuated as part of the polemics attendant to the controversy we are resolving that because all the Members of the present Court were appointed by the incumbent President, a majority of them are now granting to her the authority to appoint the successor of the retiring Chief Justice. The insinuation is misguided and utterly unfair. The Members of the Court vote on the sole basis of their conscience and the merits of the issues. Any claim to the contrary proceeds from malice and condescension. Neither the outgoing President nor the present Members of the Court had arranged the current situation to happen and to evolve as it has. None of the Members of the Court could have prevented the Members composing the Court when she assumed the Presidency about a decade ago from retiring during her prolonged term and tenure, for their retirements were mandatory. Yet, she is now left with an imperative duty under the Constitution to fill up the vacancies created by such inexorable retirements within 90 days from their occurrence. Her official duty she must comply with. So must we ours who are tasked by the Constitution to settle the controversy. ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration are denied with finality. SO ORDERED. LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice WE CONCUR: REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA Associate Justice CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court. REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice

Footnotes In Re Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the Regional Trial Court of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively, A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC, November 9, 1998, 298 SCRA 408.
1 2

Price & Bitner, Effective Legal Research, Little, Brown & Co., New York (1962), 9.7. Caltex (Phil.), Inc. v. Palomar, No. L-19650, September 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 247 E.g., Dias, Jurisprudence, Butterworths, London, 1985, Fifth Edition, p. 127.

Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118509, September 5, 1996, 261 SCRA 464.
5

See Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes, Harvard University Press, p. 4 (1982) and endnote 12 of the page, which essentially recounts that the strict application of the doctrine of stare decisis is true only in a common-law jurisdiction like England (citing Wise, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis, 21 Wayne Law Review, 1043, 1046-1047 (1975). Calabresi recalls that the English House of Lords decided in 1898 (London Tramways Co. v. London County Council, A.C. 375) that they could not alter precedents laid down by the House of Lords acting as the supreme court in previous cases, but that such precedents could only be altered by an Act of Parliament, for to do otherwise would
6

mean that the courts would usurp legislative function; he mentions that in 1966, Lord Chancellor Gardiner announced in a Practice Statement a kind of general memorandum from the court that while: "Their Lordships regard the use of precedent as an indispensable foundation upon which to decide what is the law," they "nevertheless recognize that too rigid adherence to precedent may lead to injustice in a particular case and also unduly restrict the proper development of the law. They propose, therefore, to modify their present practice and, while treating former decisions of this House as normally binding, to depart from a previous decision when it appears right to do so." (Calabresi cites Leach, Revisionism in the House of Lords: The Bastion of Rigid Stare Decisis Falls, 80 Harvard Law Review, 797 (1967).
7

Section 4 (2), Article VIII, provides: xxx (3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case, without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc; Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.

Record of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, Vol. 2, July 31, 1986, RCC No. 44. pp. 542-543.
8 9

Smith v. State, 66 Md. 215, 7 Atl. 49. State ex rel Everding v. Simon, 20 Ore. 365, 26 Pac. 170.

10

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

DISSENTING OPINION CARPIO MORALES, J.: No compelling reason exists for the Court to deny a reconsideration of the assailed Decision. The various motions for reconsideration raise hollering substantial arguments and legitimately nagging questions which the Court must meet head on. If this Court is to deserve or preserve its revered place not just in the hierarchy but also in history, passion for reason demands the issuance of an extended and extensive resolution that confronts the ramifications and repercussions of its assailed Decision. Only then can it offer an illumination that any self-respecting student of the law clamors and any adherent of the law deserves. Otherwise, it takes the risk of reeking of an objectionable air of supreme judicial arrogance. It is thus imperative to settle the following issues and concerns: Whether the incumbent President is constitutionally proscribed from appointing the successor of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno upon his retirement on May 17, 2010 until the ban ends at 12:00 noon of June 30, 2010

1. In interpreting the subject constitutional provisions, the Decision disregarded established canons of statutory construction. Without explaining the inapplicability of each of the relevant rules, the Decision immediately placed premium on the arrangement and ordering of provisions, one of the weakest tools of construction, to arrive at its conclusion. 2. In reversing Valenzuela, the Decision held that the Valenzuela dictum did not firmly rest on ConCom deliberations, yet it did not offer to cite a material ConCom deliberation. It instead opted to rely on the memory of Justice Florenz Regalado which incidentally mentioned only the "Court of Appeals." The Decisions conclusion must rest on the strength of its own favorable Concom deliberation, none of which to date has been cited. 3. Instead of choosing which constitutional provision carves out an exception from the other provision, the most legally feasible interpretation (in the limited cases of temporary physical or legal impossibility of compliance, as expounded in my Dissenting Opinion) is to consider the appointments ban or other substantial obstacle as a temporary impossibility which excuses or releases the constitutional obligation of the Office of the President for the duration of the ban or obstacle. In view of the temporary nature of the circumstance causing the impossibility of performance, the outgoing President is released from non-fulfillment of the obligation to appoint, and the duty devolves upon the new President. The delay in the fulfillment of the obligation becomes excusable, since the law cannot exact compliance with what is impossible. The 90-day period within which to appoint a member of the Court is thus suspended and the period could only start or resume to run when the temporary obstacle disappears (i.e., after the period of the appointments ban; when there is already a quorum in the JBC; or when there is already at least three applicants). Whether the Judicial and Bar Council is obliged to submit to the President the shortlist of nominees for the position of Chief Justice (or Justice of this Court) on or before the occurrence of the vacancy. 1. The ruling in the Decision that obligates the JBC to submit the shortlist to the President on or before the occurrence of the vacancy in the Court runs counter to the Concom deliberations which explain that the 90-day period is allotted for both the nomination by the JBC and the appointment by the President. In the move to increase the period to 90 days, Commissioner Romulo stated that "[t]he sense of the Committee is that 60 days is awfully short and that the [Judicial and Bar] Council, as well as the President, may have difficulties with that." 2. To require the JBC to submit to the President a shortlist of nominees on or before the occurrence of vacancy in the Court leads to preposterous results. It bears reiterating that the requirement is absurd when,inter alia, the vacancy is occasioned by the death of a member of the Court, in which case the JBC could never anticipate the death of a Justice, and could never submit a list to the President on or before the occurrence of vacancy. 3. The express allowance in the Constitution of a 90-day period of vacancy in the membership of the Courtrebuts any public policy argument on avoiding a vacuum of even a single day without a duly appointed Chief Justice. Moreover, as pointed out in my Dissenting Opinion, the practice of having an acting Chief Justice in the interregnum is provided for by law, confirmed by tradition, and settled by jurisprudence to be an internal matter. The Resolution of the majority, in denying the present Motions for Reconsideration, failed to rebut the foregoing crucial matters.

I, therefore, maintain my dissent and vote to GRANT the Motions for Reconsideration of the Decision of March 17, 2010 insofar as it holds that the incumbent President is not constitutionally proscribed from appointing the successor of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno upon his retirement on May 17, 2010 until the ban ends at 12:00 noon of June 30, 2010 and that the Judicial and Bar Council is obliged to submit to the President the shortlist of nominees for the position of Chief Justice on or before May 17, 2010. CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BRION, J.: The Motions for Reconsideration After sifting through the motions for reconsideration, I found that the arguments are largely the same arguments that we have passed upon, in one form or another, in the various petitions. Essentially, the issues boil down to justiciability; the conflict of constitutional provisions; the merits of the cited constitutional deliberations; and the status and effect of the Valenzuela1 ruling. Even the motion for reconsideration of the Philippine Bar Association (G.R. No. 191420), whose petition I did not expressly touch upon in my Separate Opinion, basically dwells on these issues. I have addressed most, if not all, of these issues and I submit my Separate Opinion2 as my basic response to the motions for reconsideration, supplemented by the discussions below. As I reflected in my Separate Opinion (which three other Justices joined),3 the election appointment ban under Article VII, Section 15 of the Constitution should not apply to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court whose period for appointment is separately provided for under Article VIII, Section 4(1). I shared this conclusion with the Courts Decision although our reasons differed on some points. I diverged fully from the Decision on the question of whether we should maintain or reverse our ruling in Valenzuela. I maintained that it is still good law; no reason exists to touch the ruling as its main focus the application of the election ban on the appointment of lower court judges under Article VIII, Section 9 of the Constitution is not even an issue in the present case and was discussed only because the petitions incorrectly cited the ruling as authority on the issue of the Chief Justices appointment. The Decision proposed to reverse Valenzuela but only secured the support of five (5) votes, while my Separate Opinion in support of Valenzuela had four (4) votes. Thus, on the whole, the Decision did not prevail in reversing Valenzuela, as it only had five (5) votes in a field of 12 participating Members of the Court. Valenzuela should therefore remain, as of the filing of this Opinion, as a valid precedent. Acting on the present motions for reconsideration, I join the majority in denying the motions with respect to the Chief Justice issue, although we differ in some respects on the reasons supporting the denial. I dissent from the conclusion that the Valenzuela ruling should be reversed. My divergence from the majoritys reasons and conclusions compels me to write this Concurring and Dissenting Opinion. The Basic Requisites / Justiciability

One marked difference between the Decision and my Separate Opinion is our approach on the basic requisites/justiciability issues. The Decision apparently glossed over this aspect of the case, while I fully explained why the De Castro4 and Peralta5 petitions should be dismissed outright. In my view, these petitions violated the most basic requirements of their chosen medium for review a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The petitions commonly failed to allege that the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) performs judicial or quasi-judicial functions, an allegation that the petitions could not really make, since the JBC does not really undertake these functions and, for this reason, cannot be the subject of a petition for certiorari; hence, the petitions should be dismissed outright. They likewise failed to facially show any failure or refusal by the JBC to undertake a constitutional duty to justify the issuance of a writ of mandamus; they invoked judicial notice that we could not give because there was, and is, no JBC refusal to act.6 Thus, the mandamus aspects of these petitions should have also been dismissed outright. The ponencia, unfortunately, failed to fully discuss these legal infirmities. The motions for reconsideration lay major emphasis on the alleged lack of an actual case or controversy that made the Chief Justices appointment a justiciable issue. They claim that the Court cannot exercise the power of judicial review where there is no clash of legal rights and interests or where this clash is merely anticipated, although the anticipated event shall come with certainty.7 What the movants apparently forgot, focused as they were on their respective petitions, is that the present case is not a single-petition case that rises or falls on the strength of that single petition. The present case involves various petitions and interventions,8 not necessarily pulling towards the same direction, although each one is focused on the issue of whether the election appointment ban under Article VII, Section 15 of the Constitution should apply to the appointment of the next Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Among the petitions filed were those of Tolentino (G.R. No. 191342), Soriano (G.R. No. 191032) and Mendoza (A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC). The first two are petitions for prohibition under Section 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.9While they commonly share this medium of review, they differ in their supporting reasons. The Mendoza petition, on the other hand, is totally different it is a petition presented as an administrative matter (A.M.) in the manner that the Valenzuela case was an A.M. case. As I pointed out in the Separate Opinion, the Court uses the A.M. docket designation on matters relating to its exercise of supervision over all courts and their personnel.10 I failed to note then, but I make of record now, that court rules and regulations the outputs in the Courts rulemaking function are also docketed as A.M. cases. That an actual case or controversy involving a clash of rights and interests exists is immediately and patently obvious in the Tolentino and Soriano petitions. At the time the petitions were filed, the JBC had started its six-phase nomination process that would culminate in the submission of a list of nominees to the President of the Philippines for appointive action. Tolentino and Soriano lawyers and citizens with interest in the strict observance of the election ban sought to prohibit the JBC from continuing with this process. The JBC had started to act, without any prodding from the Court, because of its duty to start the nomination process but was hampered by the petitions filed and the legal questions raised that only the Supreme Court can settle with finality.11 Thus, a clash of interests based on law existed between the petitioners and the JBC. To state the obvious, a decision in favor of Tolentino or Soriano would result in a writ of prohibition that would direct the JBC not to proceed with the nomination process. The Mendoza petition cited the effect of a complete election ban on judicial appointments (in view of the already high level of vacancies and the backlog of cases) as basis, and submitted the question as an administrative matter that the Court, in the exercise of its supervisory authority over the Judiciary and the JBC itself, should act upon. At the same time, it cited the "public discourse and controversy" now taking place because of the application of the election ban on the appointment of the Chief Justice, pointing in this regard to the very same reasons mentioned

in Valenzuela about the need to resolve the issue and avoid the recurrence of conflict between the Executive and the Judiciary, and the need to "avoid polemics concerning the matter."12 I recognized in the Separate Opinion that, unlike in Valenzuela where an outright defiance of the election ban took place, no such obvious triggering event transpired in the Mendoza petition.13 Rather, the Mendoza petition looked to the supervisory power of the Court over judicial personnel and over the JBC as basis to secure a resolution of the election ban issue. The JBC, at that time, had indicated its intent to look up to the Courts supervisory power and role as the final interpreter of the Constitution to guide it in responding to the challenges it confronts.14 To me, this was "a point no less critical, from the point of view of supervision, than the appointment of the two judges during the election ban period in Valenzuela."15 In making this conclusion, I pointed out in my Separate Opinion the unavoidable surrounding realities evident from the confluence of events, namely: (1) an election to be held on May 10, 2010; (2) the retirement of the Chief Justice on May 17, 2010; (3) the lapse of the terms of the elective officials from the President to the congressmen on June 30, 2010; (4) the delay before the Congress can organize and send its JBC representatives; and (5) the expiration of the term of a non-elective JBC member in July 2010.16 All these juxtaposed with the Courts supervision over the JBC, the latters need for guidance, and the existence of an actual controversy on the same issues bedeviling the JBC in my view, were sufficient to save the Mendoza petition from being a mere request for opinion or a petition for declaratory relief that falls under the jurisdiction of the lower court. This recognition is beyond the level of what this Court can do in handling a moot and academic case usually, one that no longer presents a judiciable controversy but one that can still be ruled upon at the discretion of the court when the constitutional issue is of paramount public interest and controlling principles are needed to guide the bench, the bar and the public.17 To be sure, this approach in recognizing when a petition is actionable is novel. An overriding reason for this approach can be traced to the nature of the petition, as it rests on the Courts supervisory authority and relates to the exercise of the Courts administrative rather than its judicial functions (other than these two functions, the Court also has its rulemaking function under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution). Strictly speaking, the Mendoza petition calls for directions from the Court in the exercise of its power of supervision over the JBC,18 not on the basis of the power of judicial review.19 In this sense, it does not need the actual clash of interests of the type that a judicial adjudication requires. All that must be shown is the active need for supervision to justify the Courts intervention as supervising authority. Under these circumstances, the Courts recognition of the Mendoza petition was not an undue stretch of its constitutional powers. If the recognition is unusual at all, it is so only because of its novelty; to my knowledge, this is the first time ever in Philippine jurisprudence that the supervisory authority of the Court over an attached agency has been highlighted in this manner. Novelty, per se, however, is not a ground for objection nor a mark of infirmity for as long as the novel move is founded in law. In this case, as in the case of the writ of amparo and habeas data that were then novel and avowedly activist in character, sufficient legal basis exists to actively invoke the Courts supervisory authority granted under the Constitution, no less as basis for action. To partly quote the wording of the Constitution, Article VIII, Section 8(1) and (5) provide that "A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court It may exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it." Supervision, as a legal concept, more often than not, is defined in relation with the concept of control. 20 In Social Justice Society v. Atienza,21 we defined "supervision" as follows: [Supervision] means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other

hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer ha[s] done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. Under this definition, the Court cannot dictate on the JBC the results of its assigned task, i.e., who to recommend or what standards to use to determine who to recommend. It cannot even direct the JBC on how and when to do its duty, but it can, under its power of supervision, direct the JBC to "take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties," if the duties are not being performed because of JBCs fault or inaction, or because of extraneous factors affecting performance. Note in this regard that, constitutionally, the Court can also assign the JBC other functions and duties a power that suggests authority beyond what is purely supervisory. Where the JBC itself is at a loss on how to proceed in light of disputed constitutional provisions that require interpretation,22 the Court is not legally out of line as the final authority on the interpretation of the Constitution and as the entity constitutionally-tasked to supervise the JBC in exercising its oversight function by clarifying the interpretation of the disputed constitutional provision to guide the JBC. In doing this, the Court is not simply rendering a general legal advisory; it is providing concrete and specific legal guidance to the JBC in the exercise of its supervisory authority, after the latter has asked for assistance in this regard. That the Court does this while concretely resolving actual controversies (the Tolentino and Soriano petitions) on the same issue immeasurably strengthens the intrinsic correctness of the Courts action. It may be asked: why does the Court have to recognize the Mendoza petition when it can resolve the conflict between Article VII, Section 15 and Article VIII, Section 4(1) through the Tolentino and Soriano petitions? The answer is fairly simple and can be read between the lines of the above explanation on the relationship between the Court and the JBC. First, administrative is different from judicial function and providing guidance to the JBC can only be appropriate in the discharge of the Courts administrative function. Second, the resolution of the Tolentino and Soriano petitions will lead to rulings directly related to the underlying facts of these petitions, without clear guidelines to the JBC on the proper parameters to observe vis--vis the constitutional dispute along the lines the JBC needs. In fact, concrete guidelines addressed to the JBC in the resolution of the Tolentino/Soriano petitions may even lead to accusations that the Courts resolution is broader than is required by the facts of the petitions. The Mendoza petition, because it pertains directly to the performance of the JBCs duty and the Courts supervisory authority, allows the issuance of precise guidelines that will enable the JBC to fully and seasonably comply with its constitutional mandate. I hasten to add that the JBCs constitutional task is not as simple as some people think it to be. The process of preparing and submitting a list of nominees is an arduous and time-consuming task that cannot be done overnight. It is a six-step process lined with standards requiring the JBC to attract the best available candidates, to examine and investigate them, to exhibit transparency in all its actions while ensuring that these actions conform to constitutional and statutory standards (such as the election ban on appointments), to submit the required list of nominees on time, and to ensure as well that all these acts are politically neutral. On the time element, the JBC list for the Supreme Court has to be submitted on or before the vacancy occurs given the 90-day deadline that the appointing President is given in making the appointment. The list will be submitted, not to the President as an outgoing President, nor to the election winner as an incoming President, but to the President of the Philippines whoever he or she may be. If the incumbent President does not act on the JBC list within the time left in her term, the same list shall be available to the new President for him to act upon. In all these, the Supreme Court bears the burden of overseeing that the JBCs duty is done, unerringly and with utmost dispatch; the Court cannot undertake this supervision in a manner consistent with the Constitutions

expectation from the JBC unless it adopts a pro-active stance within the limits of its supervisory authority. The Disputed Provisions The movants present their arguments on the main issue at several levels. Some argue that the disputed constitutional provisions Article VII, Section 15 and Article VIII, Section 4(1) are clear and speak for themselves on what the Constitution covers in banning appointments during the election period.23 One even posits that there is no conflict because both provisions can be given effect without one detracting against the full effectiveness of the other,24 although the effect is to deny the sitting President the option to appoint in favor of a deferment for the incoming Presidents action. Still others, repeating their original arguments, appeal to the principles of interpretation and latin maxims to prove their point.25 In my discussions in the Separate Opinion, I stated upfront my views on how the disputed provisions interact with each other. Read singly and in isolation, they appear clear (this reading applies the "plain meaning rule" that Tolentino advocates in his motion for reconsideration, as explained below). Arrayed side by side with each other and considered in relation with the other provisions of the Constitution, particularly its structure and underlying intents, the conflict however becomes obvious and unavoidable. Section 15 on its face disallows any appointment in clear negative terms ("shall not make") without specifying the appointments covered by the prohibition.26 From this literal and isolated reading springs the argument that no exception is provided (except that found in Section 15 itself) so that even the Judiciary is covered by the ban on appointments. On the other hand, Section 4(1) is likewise very clear and categorical in its terms: any vacancy in the Court shall be filled within 90 days from its occurrence.27 In the way of Section 15, Section 4(1) is also clear and categorical and provides no exception; the appointment refers solely to the Members of the Supreme Court and does not mention any period that would interrupt, hold or postpone the 90-day requirement. From this perspective, the view that no conflict exists cannot be seriously made, unless with the mindset that one provision controls and the other should yield. Many of the petitions in fact advocate this kind of reading, some of them openly stating that the power of appointment should be reserved for the incoming President.28 The question, however, is whether from the viewpoint of strict law and devoid of the emotionalism and political partisanship that permeate the present Philippine political environment this kind of mindset can really be adopted in reading and applying the Constitution. In my view, this kind of mindset and the conclusion it inevitably leads to cannot be adopted; the provisions of the Constitution cannot be read in isolation from what the whole contains. To be exact, the Constitution must be read and understood as a whole, reconciling and harmonizing apparently conflicting provisions so that all of them can be given full force and effect,29 unless the Constitution itself expressly states otherwise.30 Not to be forgotten in reading and understanding the Constitution are the many established underlying constitutional principles that we have to observe and respect if we are to be true to the Constitution. These principles among them the principles of checks and balances and separation of powers are not always expressly stated in the Constitution, but no one who believes in and who has studied the Constitution can deny that they are there and deserve utmost attention, respect, and even priority consideration. In establishing the structures of government, the ideal that the Constitution seeks to achieve is one of balance among the three great departments of government the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary, with each department undertaking its constitutionally-assigned task

as a check against the exercise of power by the others, while all three departments move forward in working for the progress of the nation. Thus, the Legislature makes the laws and is supreme in this regard, in the way that the Executive is supreme in enforcing and administering the law, while the Judiciary interprets both the Constitution and the law. Any provision in each of the Articles on these three departments31 that intrudes into the other must be closely examined if the provision affects and upsets the desired balance. Under the division of powers, the President as Chief Executive is given the prerogative of making appointments, subject only to the legal qualification standards, to the checks provided by the Legislatures Commission on Appointments (when applicable) and by the JBC for appointments in the Judiciary, and to the Constitutions own limitations. Conflict comes in when the Constitution laid down Article VII, Section 15 limiting the Presidents appointing power during the election period. This limitation of power would have been all-encompassing and would, thus, have extended to all government positions the President can fill, had the Constitution not inserted a provision, also on appointments, in the Article on the Judiciary with respect to appointments to the Supreme Court. This conflict gives rise to the questions: which provision should prevail, or should both be given effect? Or should both provisions yield to a higher concern the need to maintain the integrity of our elections? A holistic reading of the Constitution a must in constitutional interpretation dictates as a general rule that the tasks assigned to each department and their limitations should be given full effect to fulfill the constitutional purposes under the check and balance principle, unless the Constitution itself expressly indicates its preference for one task, concern or standard over the others,32 or unless this Court, in its role as interpreter of the Constitution, has spoken on the appropriate interpretation that should be made.33 In considering the interests of the Executive and the Judiciary, a holistic approach starts from the premise that the constitutional scheme is to grant the President the power of appointment, subject to the limitation provided under Article VII, Section 15. At the same time, the Judiciary is assured, without qualifications under Article VIII, Section 4(1), of the immediate appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, i.e., within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy. If both provisions would be allowed to take effect, as I believe they should, the limitation on the appointment power of the President under Article VII, Section 15 should itself be limited by the appointment of Members of the Court pursuant to Article VIII, Section 4(1), so that the provision applicable to the Judiciary can be given full effect without detriment to the Presidents appointing authority. This harmonization will result in restoring to the President the full authority to appoint Members of the Supreme Court pursuant to the combined operation of Article VII, Section 15 and Article VIII, Section 4(1). Viewed in this light, there is essentially no conflict, in terms of the authority to appoint, between the Executive and Judiciary; the President would effectively be allowed to exercise the Executives traditional presidential power of appointment while respecting the Judiciarys own prerogative. In other words, the President retains full powers to appoint Members of the Court during the election period, and the Judiciary is assured of a full membership within the time frame given. Interestingly, the objection to the full application of Article VIII, Section 4(1) comes, not from the current President, but mainly from petitioners echoing the present presidential candidates, one of whom shall soon be the incoming President. They do not, of course, cite reasons of power and the loss of the opportunity to appoint the Chief Justice; many of the petitioners/intervenors oppose the full application of Article VIII, Section 4(1) based on the need to maintain the integrity of the elections through the avoidance of a "midnight appointment." This "integrity" reason is a given in a democracy and can hardly be opposed on the theoretical plane, as the integrity of the elections must indeed prevail in a true democracy. The statement, however, begs a lot of questions, among them the question of whether the appointment of a full

Court under the terms of Article VIII, Section 4(1) will adversely affect or enhance the integrity of the elections. In my Separate Opinion, I concluded that the appointment of a Member of the Court even during the election period per se implies no adverse effect on the integrity of the election; a full Court is ideal during this period in light of the Courts unique role during elections. I maintain this view and fully concur in this regard with the majority. During the election period, the court is not only the interpreter of the Constitution and the election laws; other than the Commission on Elections and the lower courts to a limited extent, the Court is likewise the highest impartial recourse available to decisively address any problem or dispute arising from the election. It is the leader and the highest court in the Judiciary, the only one of the three departments of government directly unaffected by the election. The Court is likewise the entity entrusted by the Constitution, no less, with the gravest election-related responsibilities. In particular, it is the sole judge of all contests in the election of the President and the VicePresident, with leadership and participation as well in the election tribunals that directly address Senate and House of Representatives electoral disputes. With this grant of responsibilities, the Constitution itself has spoken on the trust it reposes on the Court on election matters. This reposed trust, to my mind, renders academic any question of whether an appointment during the election period will adversely affect the integrity of the elections it will not, as the maintenance of a full Court in fact contributes to the enforcement of the constitutional scheme to foster a free and orderly election. In reading the motions for reconsideration against the backdrop of the partisan political noise of the coming elections, one cannot avoid hearing echoes from some of the arguments that the objection is related, more than anything else, to their lack of trust in an appointment to be made by the incumbent President who will soon be bowing out of office. They label the incumbent Presidents act as a "midnight appointment" a term that has acquired a pejorative meaning in contemporary society. As I intimated in my Separate Opinion, the imputation of distrust can be made against any appointing authority, whether outgoing or incoming. The incoming President himself will be before this Court if an election contest arises; any President, past or future, would also naturally wish favorable outcomes in legal problems that the Court would resolve. These possibilities and the potential for continuing influence in the Court, however, cannot be active considerations in resolving the election ban issue as they are, in their present form and presentation, all speculative. If past record is to be the measure, the record of past Chief Justices and of this Court speaks for itself with respect to the Justices relationship with, and deferral to, the appointing authority in their decisions. What should not be forgotten in examining the records of the Court, from the prism of problems an electoral exercise may bring, is the Courts unique and proven capacity to intervene and diffuse situations that are potentially explosive for the nation. EDSA II particularly comes to mind in this regard (although it was an event that was not rooted in election problems) as it is a perfect example of the potential for damage to the nation that the Court can address and has addressed. When acting in this role, a vacancy in the Court is not only a vote less, but a significant contribution less in the Courts deliberations and capacity for action, especially if the missing voice is the voice of the Chief Justice. Be it remembered that if any EDSA-type situation arises in the coming elections, it will be compounded by the lack of leaders because of the lapse of the Presidents term by June 30, 2010; by a possible failure of succession if for some reason the election of the new leadership becomes problematic; and by the similar absence of congressional leadership because Congress has not yet convened to organize itself.34 In this scenario, only the Judiciary of the three great departments of government stands unaffected by the election and should at least therefore be complete to enable it to discharge its constitutional role to its fullest potential and

capacity. To state the obvious, leaving the Judiciary without any permanent leader in this scenario may immeasurably complicate the problem, as all three departments of government will then be leaderless. To stress what I mentioned on this point in my Separate Opinion, the absence of a Chief Justice will make a lot of difference in the effectiveness of the Court as he or she heads the Judiciary, sits as Chair of the JBC and of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, presides over impeachment proceedings, and provides the moral suasion and leadership that only the permanent mantle of the Chief Justice can bestow. EDSA II is just one of the many lessons from the past when the weightiest of issues were tackled and promptly resolved by the Court. Unseen by the general public in all these was the leadership that was there to ensure that the Court would act as one, in the spirit of harmony and stability although divergent in their individual views, as the Justices individually make their contributions to the collegial result. To some, this leadership may only be symbolic, as the Court has fully functioned in the past even with an incomplete membership or under an Acting Chief Justice. But as I said before, an incomplete Court "is not a whole Supreme Court; it will only be a Court with 14 members who would act and vote on all matters before it." To fully recall what I have said on this matter: The importance of the presence of one Member of the Court can and should never be underestimated, particularly on issues that may gravely affect the nation. Many a case has been won or lost on the basis of one vote. On an issue of the constitutionality of a law, treaty or statute, a tie vote which is possible in a 14 member court means that the constitutionality is upheld. This was our lesson in Isagani Cruz v. DENR Secretary. More than the vote, Court deliberation is the core of the decision-making process and one voice is less is not only a vote less but a contributed opinion, an observation, or a cautionary word less for the Court. One voice can be a big difference if the missing voice is that of the Chief Justice. Without meaning to demean the capability of an Acting Chief Justice, the ascendancy in the Court of a permanent sitting Chief Justice cannot be equaled. He is the first among equals a primus inter pares who sets the tone for the Court and the Judiciary, and who is looked up to on all matters, whether administrative or judicial. To the world outside the Judiciary, he is the personification of the Court and the whole Judiciary. And this is not surprising since, as Chief Justice, he not only chairs the Court en banc, but chairs as well the Presidential Electoral Tribunal that sits in judgment over election disputes affecting the President and the VicePresident. Outside of his immediate Court duties, he sits as Chair of the Judicial and Bar Council, the Philippine Judicial Academy and, by constitutional command, presides over the impeachment of the President. To be sure, the Acting Chief Justice may be the ablest, but he is not the Chief Justice without the mantle and permanent title of the Office, and even his presence as Acting Chief Justice leaves the Court with one member less. Sadly, this member is the Chief Justice; even with an Acting Chief Justice, the Judiciary and the Court remains headless. 35 Given these views, I see no point in re-discussing the finer points of technical interpretation and their supporting latin maxims that I have addressed in my Separate Opinion and now feel need no further elaboration; maxims can be found to serve a pleaders every need and in any case are the last interpretative tools in constitutional interpretation. Nor do I see any point in discussing arguments based on the intent of the framers of the Constitution now cited by the parties in the contexts that would serve their own ends. As may be evident in these discussions, other than the texts of the disputed provisions, I prefer to examine their purposes and the consequences of their application, understood within the context of democratic values. Past precedents are equally invaluable for the lead, order, and stability they contribute, but only if they are in point, certain, and still alive to current realities, while the history of provisions, including the intents behind them, are primarily important to ascertain the purposes the provisions serve. From these perspectives and without denigrating the framers historical contributions, I say that it is the Constitution that now primarily speaks to us in this case and what we hear are its direct

words, not merely the recorded isolated debates reflecting the personal intents of the constitutional commissioners as cited by the parties to fit their respective theories. The voice speaking the words of the Constitution is our best guide, as these words will unalterably be there for us to read in the context of their purposes and the nations needs and circumstances. This Concurring and Dissenting Opinion hears and listens to that voice. The Valenzuela Decision The ponencias ruling reversing Valenzuela, in my view, is out of place in the present case, since at issue here is the appointment of the Chief Justice during the period of the election ban, not the appointment of lower court judges that Valenzuela resolved. To be perfectly clear, the conflict in the constitutional provisions is not confined to Article VII, Section 15 and Article VIII, Section 4(1) with respect to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court; even before the Valenzuela ruling, the conflict already existed between Article VII, Section 15 and Article VIII, Section 9 the provision on the appointment of the justices and judges of courts lower than the Supreme Court. After this Courts ruling in Valenzuela, no amount of hairsplitting can result in the conclusion that Article VII, Section 15 applied the election ban over the whole Judiciary, including the Supreme Court, as the facts and the fallo of Valenzuela plainly spoke of the objectionable appointment of two Regional Trial Court judges. To reiterate, Valenzuela only resolved the conflict between Article VII, Section 15 and appointments to the Judiciary under Article VIII, Section 9. If Valenzuela did prominently figure at all in the present case, the prominence can be attributed to the petitioners mistaken reading that this case is primary authority for the dictum that Article VII, Section 15 completely bans all appointments to the Judiciary, including appointments to the Supreme Court, during the election period up to the end of the incumbent Presidents term. In reality, this mistaken reading is an obiter dictum in Valenzuela, and hence, cannot be cited for its primary precedential value. This legal situation still holds true as Valenzuela was not doctrinally reversed as its proposed reversal was supported only by five (5) out of the 12 participating Members of the Court. In other words, this ruling on how Article VII, Section 15 is to be interpreted in relation with Article VIII, Section 9, should continue to stand unless otherwise expressly reversed by this Court. But separately from the mistaken use of an obiter ruling as primary authority, I believe that I should sound the alarm bell about the Valenzuela ruling in light of a recent vacancy in the position of Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan resulting from Presiding Justice Norberto Geraldezs death soon after we issued the decision in the present case. Reversing the Valenzuela ruling now, in the absence of a properly filed case addressing an appointment at this time to the Sandiganbayan or to any other vacancy in the lower courts, will be an irregular ruling of the first magnitude by this Court, as it will effectively be a shortcut that lifts the election ban on appointments to the lower courts without the benefit of a case whose facts and arguments would directly confront the continued validity of the Valenzuela ruling. This is especially so after we have placed the Court on notice that a reversal of Valenzuela is uncalled for because its ruling is not the litigated issue in this case. In any case, let me repeat what I stressed in my Separate Opinion about Valenzuela which rests on the reasoning that the evils Section 15 seeks to remedy vote buying, midnight appointments and partisan reasons to influence the elections exist, thus justifying an election appointment ban. In particular, the "midnight appointment" justification, while fully applicable to the more numerous vacancies at the lower echelons of the Judiciary (with an alleged current lower court vacancy level of 537 or a 24.5% vacancy rate), should not apply to the Supreme Court which has only a total of 15 positions that are not even vacated at the same time. The most number of vacancies for any one year occurred only last year (2009) when seven (7) positions were vacated by retirement, but this vacancy rate is not expected to be replicated at any time within the next decade. Thus "midnight appointments" to the extent that they were understood in Aytona36 will not occur in the vacancies of this Court as nominations to its vacancies are all

processed through the JBC under the publics close scrutiny. As already discussed above, the institutional integrity of the Court is hardly an issue. If at all, only objections personal to the individual Members of the Court or against the individual applicants can be made, but these are matters addressed in the first place by the JBC before nominees are submitted. There, too, are specific reasons, likewise discussed above, explaining why the election ban should not apply to the Supreme Court. These exempting reasons, of course, have yet to be shown to apply to the lower courts. Thus, on the whole, the reasons justifying the election ban in Valenzuela still obtain in so far as the lower courts are concerned, and have yet to be proven otherwise in a properly filed case. Until then, Valenzuela, except to the extent that it mentioned Section 4(1), should remain an authoritative ruling of this Court. CONCLUSION In light of these considerations, a writ of prohibition cannot issue to prevent the JBC from performing its principal function, under the Constitution, of recommending nominees for the position of Chief Justice. Thus, I vote to deny with finality the Tolentino and Soriano motions for reconsideration. The other motions for reconsideration in so far as they challenge the conclusion that the President can appoint the Chief Justice even during the election period are likewise denied with finality for lack of merit, but are granted in so far as they support the continued validity of the ruling of this Court in In Re: Valenzuela and Vallarta, A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC, November 9, 1998. My opinion on the Mendoza petition stands. ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice

Footnotes A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC, November 9, 1998, 298 SCRA 408. This A.M. involves the constitutional validity of the appointment of two (2) RTC Judges on March 30, 1998 a date that falls within the supposed ban under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution. We nullified the appointments.
1 2

G.R. No. 191002 and companion cases, promulgated on March 17, 2010. Justices Diosdado M. Peralta, Mariano C. Del Castillo and Jose Catral Mendoza. G.R. No. 191002, Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus. G.R. No. 191149, Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus.

The JBC reiterates its position in its Comment (dated April 12, 2010) on the motions for reconsideration that it is still acting on the preparation of the list of nominees and is set to interview the nominees.
6 7

See, for instance, the motion for reconsideration of intervenor Alfonso Tan, Jr. The docketed petitions were seven; the petitions-in-intervention were ten.

A prohibition petition seeks to stop the proceedings of a tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions if any of its act
9

is without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
10

Separate Opinion, p. 16. The JBC position states: xxxx Likewise, the JBC has yet to take a position on when to submit the shortlist to the proper appointing authority, in light of Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, which provides that vacancy in the Supreme Court shall be filled within ninety (90) days from the occurrence thereof, Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution concerning the ban on Presidential appointments "two (2) months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term" and Section 261(g), Article XXIII of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines. 12. Since the Honorable Supreme Court is the final interpreter of the Constitution, the JBC will be guided by its decision in these consolidated Petitions and Administrative Matter. [Emphasis supplied.]

11

12

Mendoza Petition, pp. 5-6. Separate Opinion, pp. 16-17. Supra note 11. Id. at 17. Separate Opinion, pp. 19-22: A first reality is that the JBC cannot, on its own due to lack of the proper authority, determine the appropriate course of action to take under the Constitution. Its principal function is to recommend appointees to the Judiciary and it has no authority to interpret constitutional provisions, even those affecting its principal function; the authority to undertake constitutional interpretation belongs to the courts alone. A second reality is that the disputed constitutional provisions do not stand alone and cannot be read independently of one another; the Constitution and its various provisions have to be read and interpreted as one seamless whole, giving sufficient emphasis to every aspect in accordance with the hierarchy of our constitutional values. The disputed provisions should be read together and, as reflections of the will of the people, should be given effect to the extent that they should be reconciled. The third reality, closely related to the second, is that in resolving the coverage of the election ban vis--vis the appointment of the Chief Justice and the Members of the Court, provisions of the Constitution other than the disputed provisions must be taken into account. In considering when and how to act, the JBC has to consider that: 1. The President has a term of six years which begins at noon of June 30 following the election, which implies that the outgoing President remains President up to that time. (Section 4, Article VII). The President

13

14

15

16

assumes office at the beginning of his or her term, with provision for the situations where the President fails to qualify or is unavailable at the beginning of his term (Section 7, Article VII). 2. The Senators and the Congressmen begin their respective terms also at midday of June 30 (Sections 4 and 7, Article VI). The Congress convenes on the 4th Monday of July for its regular session, but the President may call a special session at any time. (Section 15, Article VI) 3. The Valenzuela case cited as authority for the position that the election ban provision applies to the whole Judiciary, only decided the issue with respect to lower court judges, specifically, those covered by Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution. Any reference to the filling up of vacancies in the Supreme Court pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII constitutes obiter dictum as this issue was not directly in issue and was not ruled upon. These provisions and interpretation of the Valenzuela ruling when read together with disputed provisions, related with one another, and considered with the May 17, 2010 retirement of the current Chief Justice bring into focus certain unavoidable realities, as follows: 1. If the election ban would apply fully to the Supreme Court, the incumbent President cannot appoint a Member of the Court beginning March 10, 2010, all the way up to June 30, 2010. 2. The retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice May 17, 2010 falls within the period of the election ban. (In an extreme example where the retirement of a Member of the Court falls on or very close to the day the election ban starts, the Office of the Solicitor General calculates in its Comment that the whole 90 days given to the President to make appointment would be covered by the election ban.) 3. Beginning May 17, 2010, the Chief Justice position would be vacant, giving rise to the question of whether an Acting Chief Justice can act in his place. While this is essentially a Supreme Court concern, the Chief Justice is the ex officio Chair of the JBC; hence it must be concerned and be properly guided. 4. The appointment of the new Chief Justice has to be made within 90 days from the time the vacancy occurs, which translates to a deadline of August 15, 2010. 5. The deadline for the appointment is fixed (as it is not reckoned from the date of submission of the JBC list, as in the lower courts) which means that the JBC ideally will have to make its list available at the start of the 90-day period so that its process will not eat up the 90-day period granted the President. 6. After noon of June 30, 2010, the JBC representation from Congress would be vacant; the current representatives mandates to act for their principals extend only to the end of their present terms; thus, the JBC shall be operating at that point at less than its full membership. 7. Congress will not convene until the 4th Monday of July, 2010, but would still need to organize before the two Houses of Congress can send

their representatives to the JBC a process may extend well into August, 2010. 8. By July 5, 2010, one regular member of the JBC would vacate his post. Filling up this vacancy requires a presidential appointment and the concurrence of the Commission on Appointments. 9. Last but not the least, the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII is that "a President or Acting President shall not make appointments." This prohibition is expressly addressed to the President and covers the act of appointment; the prohibition is not against the JBC in the performance of its function of "recommending appointees to the Judiciary" an act that is one step away from the act of making appointments. The Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel Ancestral Domain, G.R. Nos. 183591, 183791, 183752, 183893, 183951 and 183962, October 14, 2008.
17

By virtue of its power of administrative supervision, the Supreme Court oversees the judges and court personnels compliance with the laws, rules and regulations. It may take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation. See Ampong v. CSC, G.R. No. 107910, August 26, 2008, 563 SCRA 293. The Constitution separately provides for the Supreme Courts supervision over the JBC. See Article VIII, Section 8 of the CONSTITUTION.
18

Judicial Review is the power of the courts to test the validity of executive and legislative acts for their conformity with the Constitution, Garcia v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 157584, April 2, 2009.
19

Control is the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. It is distinguished from supervision in that the latter means overseeing, or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties, and if the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, then the former may take such action or steps as prescribed by law to make them perform these duties. Nachura, J., Outline Reviewer in Political Law, 2006 ed., p. 276.
20 21

G.R. No. 156052, February 13, 2008, 545 SCRA 92. Supra notes 11 and 14.

22

Philippine Bar Association (PBA), Women Trial Lawyers Organization of the Philippines (WTLOP), Atty. Amador Z. Tolentino, Atty. Roland B. Inting, Peter Irving Corvera and Alfonso V. Tan, Jr.
23 24

See PBAs Motion for Reconsideration.

See the Motions for Reconsideration for PBA, WTLOP, Atty. Amador Z. Tolentino, Atty. Roland B. Inting, Peter Irving Corvera and Alfonso V. Tan, Jr.
25 26

CONSTITUTION, Article VII, Section 15: Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except

temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
27

CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Section 4(1): (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or, in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof. xxxx

See Petition on Intervention of WTLOP, as cited in the decision in the above-captioned cases; see also: PBAs motion for reconsideration.
28

Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003, 415 SCRA 44, citing Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 (1994); Peralta v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 47771, March 11, 1978, 82 SCRA 30 (1978); Ang-Angco v. Castillo, G.R. No. 17169, November 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 619 (1963).
29

Macalintal v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003, 310 SCRA 614, citing Chiongbian v. De Leon, 82 Phil 771 (1949).
30

Article VI for the Legislature, Article VII for the Executive, and Article VIII for the Judiciary.
31

See Matibag v. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002, 380 SCRA 49; where the court resolved the clash between the power of the President to extend ad interim appointments and the power of the Commission on Appointments to confirm presidential appointments.
32 33

Ibid. Supra note 13. Separate Opinion, p. 32. Aytona v. Castillo, G.R. No. 19315, January 19, 1962, 4 SCRA 1.

34

35

36

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION A.M. No. RTJ-10-2220 February 7, 2011 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 08-3053-RTJ) PIO ANGELIA, Complainant, vs. JUDGE JESUS L. GRAGEDA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, Panabo City Respondent. RESOLUTION MENDOZA, J.: Before this Court is a verified Complaint filed on November 7, 2008, by complainant Pio Angelia (Angelia) against respondent Judge Jesus L. Grageda (Judge Grageda) of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, Panabo City, (RTC),for the delay in the resolution of motions relative to Civil Case No. 54-2001, entitled Pio Angelia v. Arnold Oghayan. Angelia averred that Civil Case No. 54-2001 was filed way back on August 8, 2001. After numerous postponements, pre-trial was finally set on December 6, 2007. On December 20, 2007, counsel for complainant received an order dated December 6, 2007 dismissing the case for failure to prosecute. On December 28, 2007, Angelia filed a motion for reconsideration reasoning out that the failure to prosecute could not be attributed to him. On July 28, 2008, he filed his Urgent Motion for the Early Resolution of said December 2007 Motion for Reconsideration. He claimed that despite the lapse of a considerably long period of time, no action was taken by Judge Grageda. In his Comment dated February 12, 2009, Judge Grageda attributed the delay in the resolution of the case to numerous resettings and repeated absences of the parties. He also stated that immediately upon receipt of the 1st Indorsement dated December 16, 2008, from the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), he lost no time in resolving the Motion for Reconsideration. He further averred that he performed his duties and functions devotedly despite having to act on 800 cases in his sala, which was further exacerbated by the inflow of new cases every month. Judge Grageda also admitted that while there was an apparent failure on his part to resolve the motion earlier, such delay was not intentional but simply brought about by the sheer volume of work in his sala, as there were many times that he was the only acting RTC Judge within his district, comprising of 2 cities and 3 municipalities in Davao del Norte. He offered his sincere apology to Angelia and to this Court for the delay, and pleaded humanity and compassion, with a promise to work harder and better for the remainder of his service. Judge Grageda compulsorily retired from the service on November 25, 2009. OCA recommended that Judge Grageda be fined in the amount of P5,000.00.

The findings and recommendations of the OCA are well-taken. In consonance with the Constitutional mandate that all lower courts decide or resolve cases or matters within three (3) months from their date of submission, the Code of Judicial Conduct in Rule 1.02 of Canon 1 and Rule 3.05 of Canon 3, provide: Rule 1.02 A judge should administer justice impartially and without delay. Rule 3.05 A judge should dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within the required periods. In line with the foregoing, this Court has laid down administrative guidelines to ensure that the mandates on the prompt disposition of judicial business are complied with. Thus, SC Administrative Circular No. 13-87 provides in part: 3. Judges shall observe scrupulously the periods prescribed by Article VIII, Section 15 of the Constitution for the adjudication and resolution of all cases or matters submitted in their courts. Thus, all cases or matters must be decided or resolved within twelve months from date of submission by all lower collegiate courts while all other lower courts are given a period of three months to do so. xxx Furthermore, SC Administrative Circular No. 1-88 dated January 26, 1988 states: 6.1 All Presiding Judges must endeavor to act promptly on all motions and interlocutory matters pending before their courts. x x x This Court has consistently held that failure to decide cases and other matters within the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanction against the erring magistrate. Such delay is clearly violative of the above-cited rules. Delay in resolving motions and incidents pending before a judge within the reglementary period of ninety (90) days fixed by the Constitution and the law is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency.1 As a trial judge, Judge Grageda was a frontline official of the judiciary and should have at all times acted with efficiency and with probity.
1avvphil

Judge Grageda himself admitted his fault in the delay of the resolution of the December 28, 2007 Motion for Reconsideration filed by Angelia which was only resolved after he received the 1st Indorsement from this Court, more than a year later. In an order dated January 28, 2009, said motion was granted. The Court, however, finds no merit in Judge Gragedas explanation that the reason for the delay in resolving the motion was the pressure from equally urgent matters in connection with the 800 pending cases before his sala. Firstly, he is duty-bound to comply with the above-cited rules under the Canons in the Code of Judicial Conduct, and the administrative guidelines laid down by this Court. Secondly, as this Court is not unmindful of the circumstances that may delay the speedy disposition of cases assigned to judges, respondent Judge Grageda should have seasonably filed a request for an extension to resolve the subject motion. For failing to do so, he cannot evade administrative liability. Judges must decide cases and resolve matters with dispatch because any delay in the administration of justice deprives litigants of their right to a speedy disposition of their case and undermines the peoples faith in the judiciary. Indeed, justice delayed is justice denied.

Under Section 9, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision or order is considered a less serious offense. Pursuant to Section 11 of the same rule, such offense is punishable by: 1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or 2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00. As earlier stated, the OCA recommended a fine of P5,000.00. Considering the volume of his work, the Court deems the recommendation to be well-taken. WHEREFORE, retired Judge Jesus L. Grageda is hereby found GUILTY of undue delay in resolving a motion in violation of Rule 1.02, Canon 1 and Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. He is hereby ordered to pay a FINE in the amount of FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS, to be deducted from his retirement benefits. Let a copy of this resolution be forwarded to the Office of the Court Administrator. SO ORDERED. JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA Associate Justice WE CONCUR: ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice Chairperson ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice

Footnotes
1

Prosecutor Visbal v. Judge Buban, 443 Phil. 705, 708 (2003).