Professional Documents
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EQUITY RESEARCH
The Book
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SECTION I: OVERVIEW
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TWP Equity Research Analysts’ “Best Ideas for 2008” (see page 45 for selection criteria and individual write-ups):
Large Cap (+ $10bn) Mid Cap ($1.5 - $10bn) Small Cap (< $1.5bn)
Company Ticker Company Ticker Company Ticker
The Western Union Co. WU Expedia, Inc. EXPE Wolverine World Wide, Inc. WWW
Abercrombie & Fitch Co. ANF Texas Roadhouse, Inc. TXRH
Penske Automotive Group, Inc. PAG
Large Cap (+ $10bn) Mid Cap ($1.5 - $10bn) Small Cap (< $1.5bn)
Company Ticker Company Ticker Company Ticker
CVS Caremark Corp. CVS Masimo Corporation MASI Sciele Pharma, Inc. SCRX
Thermo Fisher Scientific, Inc. TMO Array BioPharma Inc. ARRY
Large Cap (+ $10bn) Mid Cap ($1.5 - $10bn) Small Cap (< $1.5bn)
Company Ticker Company Ticker Company Ticker
MEMC Electronic Materials Inc. WFR Ixia XXIA
Rockwell Collins, Inc. COL
Large Cap (+ $10bn) Mid Cap ($1.5 - $10bn) Small Cap (< $1.5bn)
Company Ticker Company Ticker Company Ticker
NII Holdings, Inc. NIHD GSI Commerce, Inc. GSIC
Regal Entertainment Group RGC
Large Cap (+ $10bn) Mid Cap ($1.5 - $10bn) Small Cap (< $1.5bn)
Company Ticker Company Ticker Company Ticker
Research In Motion RIMM Flextronics International Ltd. FLEX Verigy Ltd. VRGY
Nvidia Corporation NVDA Amdocs Limited DOX ARRIS Group, Inc. ARRS
Affiliated Computer Services, Inc. ACS Netezza Corporation NZ
On Semiconductor Corporation ONNN O2Micro Interntational Ltd. OIIM
Digital River Inc. DRIV NetLogic Microsystems, Inc. NETL
Technology
We expect technology spending to continue at a steady, solid pace in 2008 with year-over-year
worldwide growth of approximately 5-6%. Many of the growth drivers in tech are a
continuation of themes that should be sustainable over the next several years. Higher capacity,
smaller footprint hard disk drives, lucid LCD displays, more-powerful processors, the continued
proliferation of wireless data networks and lower selling prices are all driving strong demand for
mobile processors including notebook PCs, 3G handsets and smartphones. We estimate 27% growth
in mobile shipments in 2008, and expect the number of annual notebook shipments to exceed
desktop shipments by 2009. Storage needs will continue to accelerate with the digital content
invasion of social networks, digital networks, high-definition DVRs and digital music stores.
“Triple play” spending on voice, data and video by telco and cable operators should continue to
fuel demand for IP Networking and Communications Component Equipment and services
in 2008. Aggressive competition from telco and satellite operators touting faster broadband
speeds and expanded HDTV offerings will continue to put pressure on cable operators to
maintain healthy capital expenditure outlooks, especially for advanced services. Bigger, faster
networks require upgrades to faster routers, including the trend toward 10 GigE routers, with
more access points capable of supporting higher bandwidth. This positive virtuous cycle also
drives demand for more-intensive digital content, including traditional broadcasts, mobile
applications, mobile games, on-demand video and on-demand TV functionality.
Strong demand for software as a service model should continue in 2008, on the heels of a very strong
2007. Such models enable telesales and indirect sales models, which in turn have enabled
penetration into small- and medium-sized markets. In addition, the offering of term- and
subscription-based licenses continues to be viewed very favorably by customers.
Internet
The secular shift to e-Commerce remains robust as more merchants expand their online
offerings and consumers become increasingly comfortable with online shopping. This shift
shows little sign of slowing down as U.S. e-commerce grew 19% year over year in 3Q07
compared to a 20% increase in 3Q06. We view this rapid growth as sustainable over the long
term as U.S. e-commerce sales still account for only 3.8% of total retail sales, up from 3.4% last
year. While the United States continues to be strong, international growth is still even more
robust as broadband and e-commerce in those markets are generally at an earlier growth phase
relative to that in the United States.
Consumer
Given macroeconomic headwinds and a forecast of a slowdown in consumer spending, we are
cautious overall on the consumer segment. There are, however, several themes that may
provide selective opportunities. In Softlines, we believe teen retailers will outperform, while we
expect women’s retailers and department stores to struggle. In Hardlines, we favor companies
offering differentiated services such as decorating services and entertaining consulting for the
home. We also favor diversified distribution platforms that seamlessly integrate retail selling space
with catalog and/or e-commerce offerings. In addition, we favor companies with globally
diverse profit streams with a track record of setting conservative expectations that consistently
deliver.
In e-Travel, a softer domestic economy could weigh on domestic travel demand, but we view
the e-Travel segment as better situated than the hotel or gaming groups based on the superior
secular trends favoring online distribution. We estimate that over $50 billion in sales are
researched online, yet booked offline—a huge opportunity. The group also derives 30% of its
sales outside of the United States, where growth is above 40%, and penetration in Europe and
Asia are only 30% and 15%, respectively.
Healthcare
According to the U.S. Census Bureau, by 2020, the number of Americans over age 65 and age
85 is expected to increase over 40% and 30%, respectively.
Chronic disease and aesthetic companies will continue to outperform, along with those offering
products that increase profit to physicians or require direct payment from patients.
Pharmaceutical companies are generally defensive and non-cyclical. In a declining economy,
spending on treatments for serious medical conditions will be unaffected. Aesthetic companies
could be seen as vulnerable to declines in consumer discretionary spending, but we believe less-
expensive, non-invasive treatments on visible parts of the body will not be affected.
In Biotech, the average 2008E P/E multiple of large-cap biotechnology companies is 22x. This
is in comparison to an average P/E multiple of 30-35x over the past five years. Considering the
last two times (2003 and 2005) P/E multiples reached trough levels the biotechnology sector
recovered, we expect the average P/E multiple to approach the low end of the historical range
of 30-35x.
In Pharmaceutical Services, pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs), retail and mail-order pharmacies
continue to benefit from increasing generic utilization and conversions. Lower acquisition costs
help to drive margin expansion and overall profitability. As existing generics (from conversions
earlier in 2007) continue to gain traction and new generics come to market, we believe PBMs
should experience increasing generic dispensing rates and expanding operating margins.
The Medical Device sector will be at a crosscurrent of two macroeconomic forces. The first is
a lack of exposure to the economy or consumer spending, which may be a positive. The
second, a headwind, is the 2008 election cycle in which containment of healthcare costs may
come into focus. If the economy is headed into a downturn, we think medical device stocks will
be well positioned because the space is broadly counter-cyclical. Hospital pricing is accelerating,
which benefits all medical device players but especially the orthopedic companies, which are
highly sensitive to price. In Diagnostics, an aging population, better disease management and
pathogen detection will drive robust growth through 2008. The large Life Science and
Diagnostic companies are diversified by end markets and geography, spreading their revenue
base and protecting them from sector weakness. Four out of five key markets are growing
above their average pace; diagnostics, pharmaceuticals, industrial and environmental markets
show no signs of deceleration.
Conclusion
The coming year should see positive GDP growth—slowing from current levels in the first half,
but reaccelerating in the second half. Expectations for GDP growth of 2.0-2.5% represent a
modest deceleration from recent quarterly rates of 3.9%, but are certainly within a range that has
fueled positive market performance over the last four years. S&P 500 earnings growth estimates
in the 7-9% range also appear to be reasonable barring any major dislocations, such as negative
geopolitical events or significant unforeseen credit losses. Therefore, market appreciation of 6-
8% should be attainable, in our view. Moreover, on a comparative basis, a 6-8% return on
stocks is certainly attractive versus 10-year Treasury yields of approximately 4%. As modest
growth continues, we look for strength in areas such as technology, healthcare and alternative
energy to continue, and still see niche opportunities in areas facing economic headwinds. May
2008 be a happy, healthy, prosperous New Year for all of us.
Figure 1
5.5 4.9
4.8
4.5
4.5
Percentage Growth Rates
3.5
2.6
2.4
2.0
2.5 2.0
1.5
0.5
-0.5
Real GDP inflation unemployment rate Real Non-Residential
Fixed Investment
N.B. for inflation, Blue Chip is GDP deflator, FED is core PCE deflator
Source: Blue Chip Economic Indicators and the Federal Reserve
The biggest concern is that the sharp retrenchment (from an admittedly unsustainable bubble)
in housing construction not only continues, but spreads well beyond the obvious closely related
goods, such as appliances and other items, that go into new homes. With housing prices
declining from inflated levels, a negative wealth effect will hit consumer spending. To that is
added a series of related issues in financial markets, centered on but not confined to financial
services, due to the subprime mortgage situation. Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke is hoping these
sectors stabilize soon, preventing the need for a new series of continuous interest rate cuts.
Even in the best-case scenario, at least one more Fed rate cut is likely. If the economy slides
close to recession, expect several more such cuts, a Fed funds rate of 3% or so. Fortunately,
core (excluding energy and food) inflation is running below the upper end of the Fed’s 1-2%
target range, expectations are well-anchored, giving the Fed room to maneuver. The continued
rise in energy prices—and looking beyond the current short-run situation to a possible new era
of resource economics, given the rapid growth in demand for commodities from oil to metals
from China, India and other emerging markets at a time of slow growth of supply—is another
concern and another headwind for the American economy. With oil priced in dollars, the dollar
depreciating and the greater reliance on long auto commutes, the percentage impact of oil prices
on American consumers is far greater than that in Europe or Japan.
The base-case forecast depends on what might be called the “sector rotation gamble”: that a
pickup in net exports will cushion a likely slowdown in consumption. While there is potential
upside to our forecast (as the economy has proved quite resilient to other problems and there is
no guarantee that the current issues must exact a major toll soon), the possibility of a sharper
slowdown or even recession (the odds of which I place at 30%-plus) must also be considered.
Expansions do not just die of old age, or “run out of gas”. Fortunately, there are several strong
positive forces as well. First, the rapid growth abroad and the depreciation of the dollar are
finally turning the change in (at least non-oil) net exports in our favor. This sector rotation is
expected to provide crucial insurance to mitigate the risks from the expected slowdown from
the beleaguered consumer. Second, job growth remains good, if at a slower pace than 2006,
unemployment is low and real wages are rising; so, despite the widely hyped middle-class anxiety
trumpeted by the media, the labor market thus far appears in good shape for most workers.
Thus, a period of ambiguity and anxiety, with oscillating indicators week to week, month to
month and quarter to quarter, should be expected, but once through a period of slow growth,
we should return to trend growth of close to 3% or so (see discussion of productivity below) as
2008 progresses. In this base-case scenario, inflation pressures are contained and the Fed, after
another 25-50bp cut, need not reverse course on interest rates anytime soon.
In the base-case scenario, real private nonresidential investment will grow about 5-6%; corporate
profits on a National Income and Product Accounts basis would increase about 5-6% (S&P
operating earnings a couple of percentage points more). The unemployment rate would inch up
slightly, and core inflation would remain under control at below the upper end of the Fed’s
target 2% range. This base-case scenario of a relatively soft landing would likely be
accompanied at some point by a slightly steepening yield curve.
It is important to emphasize that there is a prospect of stronger growth next year as well as the
risk of slow growth or even recession. A quicker stabilization of housing construction and
prices, a more rapid improvement in the external (trade) deficit with solid growth abroad, a
pickup in consumer and/or business technology spending with new product cycles could all
strengthen growth above forecast.
It is useful to retain the perspective that forecasting turning points in business cycles is
notoriously difficult. Economists tend to follow the data down, and if it keeps going down, they
miss the onset of recession. Many economists give too little weight to problems in financial
markets. Recall the 1990-1991 recession was missed by many economists, including those at the
Fed, giving insufficient weight to the credit crunch accompanying the S&L resolution and new
bank capital rules (Basle I). Financial markets, discounting future outcomes, have a tendency to
overshoot. As the saying goes, “The stock market called nine of the last five recessions.” Recall
that the American economy grew for three years after the October 1987 stock market crash.
What does this mean for equity prices? Durable expansions tend to be accompanied and
reinforced by solid corporate earnings growth, which is pivotal to equity market performance.
This base-case outlook should be mildly constructive for equity prices, once the ambiguity of
the severity of the slowdown begins to resolve itself. Of course, the recent retreat in equity
prices suggests that the markets had underpriced macroeconomic as well as credit risk.
Continued depreciation of the dollar is expected. If gradual and modest, it is unlikely foreign
investors will abandon dollar assets wholesale. A falling value heightens concerns of further
decline, however, and investors will rebalance portfolios in response to expectations of lower
returns in their home currency.
The keys to the strength and durability of the economic expansion, to the risk of recession and
to opportunities for growth, which I have elaborated on episodically in various versions of The
Green Book (see The Green Book, January 2004, pp. 9-25; December 2004, pp. 9-26; and December
2007, pp. 7-30), have not changed. But the expansion now has progressed for six years; more
problems are evident, such as those in housing construction and home prices as well as credit
conditions and oil prices. The labor market was tightening, but now job growth is slowing, in
part due to demographics. The risks and concerns in various areas have changed considerably
over the last year. As one example, a year ago, crude oil futures had fallen to $60 per barrel and
it looked as though consumers might get some relief at the pump, a situation that quickly
reversed and dramatically worsened.
Figure 2
17% 5%
83% 95%
10/1949-11/1982 11/1982-11/2007
Figure 3
7.0
Seasonally adjusted annual growth rates
6.0
5.0
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
-1.0
-2.0
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007-I
2007-II
2007-III
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA)
Figure 4
14.00
10.0
change in core CPI over preceding 12 months
12.00
8.0
unemployment rate
10.00
8.00 6.0
6.00
4.0
4.00
2.0
2.00
0.00 0.0
Jan-60
Jul-61
Jan-63
Jan-66
Jul-82
Jul-85
Jul-94
Jul-67
Jan-69
Jul-70
Jan-72
Jul-73
Jan-75
Jan-78
Jul-79
Jan-81
Jan-84
Jan-87
Jan-90
Jul-91
Jan-93
Jan-96
Jul-97
Jan-99
Jan-02
Jul-06
Jul-03
Jan-05
Jul-64
Jul-76
Jul-88
Jul-00
Why is the Fed keeping such a nervous eye on inflation and inflation expectations as it tries to
cushion the potential fallout from the housing and related credit problems? Modern
economics and much historical evidence suggest it is very risky for the labor market to drive
the unemployment rate below the so-called NAIRU, or natural rate of unemployment. The
NAIRU is the level below which unemployment cannot go without accelerating inflation.
Worse yet, the lower unemployment rate will not persist, but even with the higher inflation,
will drift back up to the natural rate. The jump in core inflation in 2000 as the unemployment
rate hovered in the low 4% range is suggestive in this regard. The illusory permanent trade-off
between (higher) inflation and lower unemployment of the so-called Philip’s Curve turns out
to be brief and ephemeral. And, in any event, the Volcker and Greenspan Feds produced a
quarter-century of simultaneously falling inflation and unemployment thought by many
economists of the time (I was not one of them) to be impossible (see Figure 4).
History and Federal Reserve experience demonstrated the substantial lags in the effectiveness
of monetary policy. Since it takes a while for inflation to take hold and drive up inflation
expectations, which then feed back on actual inflation, and since it takes several quarters for
tighter monetary policy to have much effect on output and, usually only later, prices, the Fed
has to be forward-looking, concerned about where the economy, growth and inflation will be
over the next several quarters, at the least. If it waits to see actual evidence of rising inflation
and/or slowing output in the data, which are backward-looking and may be revised, it can find
itself well behind the curve and have to take far more draconian action.
In brilliantly engineering a sharp reduction in interest rates down to 1% in the aftermath of the
bursting stock market bubble, recession and terrorist attack, the Greenspan Fed took out
substantial insurance against a Japanese-style fall in prices—outright deflation. Historical
experience indicates that deflations are extremely difficult to reverse, because, among other
reasons, the falling prices make it impossible for the Fed to engineer negative real interest rates.
Once it was clear that the economy was through that problem, the Fed raised rates so slowly
over such a long period of time that it gave a booster shot to the housing price bubble. As I
said at the time, the Fed should have raised rates more quickly to 4% and then reconnoitered.
By turning the real rate of interest positive, it would lessen the incentive for massive
speculative activity, most notably but not only in real estate, fueled by initially very low interest
rates. Unfortunately, as it did not do so, we are now reaping a worse housing construction
retrenchment, housing price reversal and credit crunch.
As can be seen from Figure 4 above, unemployment eventually falls low enough late in
expansions that inflation starts to rise. For example, from 1986 to 1988, the unemployment
rate fell from 7.0% to 5.5%, and the core inflation rate went from 3.8% to 4.7%. (Although
these inflation rates seem high by today’s standards, at the time they were thought a relief from
the double-digit 1979-1980 rates. It is also worth remembering that President Nixon imposed
wage and price controls when inflation rose to 4%.) Analogously, from 1999 to 2000, the
unemployment rate continued a long decline down to 4.0%, but core inflation rose from 1.9%
to 2.6%.
The view of most economists is that the economy was operating beyond its potential in both
cases and that to try to keep unemployment at those levels (5.5% in 1988, 4.0% in 2000) would
have resulted in rising inflation. This last point is subtle but very important. It is not just that
the unemployment rate would have caused a small rise in inflation and that the economy could
continue with stable 4% unemployment and 2.6% inflation, but rather that an unemployment
rate below the NAIRU was creating pressure for inflation to keep rising, which in turn would raise
inflation expectations and feed back into yet higher actual inflation. Such a process caused, or
at least accommodated, the serious inflation from the late 1960s to the early 1980s; hence the
Fed’s concern with a core inflation rate running one-half of one percentage point above its
target range. (For more on the natural rate of unemployment and the economy’s potential, see
The Green Book, December 2006.)
It is more likely that the Fed will be lowering rates in 2008 than raising them or keeping them
on hold. While there is a risk of the onset of higher inflation, causing the Fed to raise rates, I
believe this is less likely than the softness in the economy causing the Fed to stay on hold or
lower rates through mid-year. The Fed would like to cease lowering rates as soon as it is
confident the economy is stable.
While the attention of economists usually focuses on monetary policy and interest rates, credit
conditions also matter. An economy with readily available credit to potential borrowers—from
home buyers to private equity firms—will be more robust at similar interest rates than one with
lenders calling loans and imposing tighter covenants to comply with new regulations and
market conditions. Every so often—at least once a decade recently—a sharp credit tightening
throws sand in the gears of the financial side of the economy. This happened in the 1980s’
Third World debt crisis, and the savings and loan fiasco that culminated in the early 1990s, and
is now evident in subprime mortgages. In each case, an exuberant market chased good returns
and financial institutions borrowed short and lent long. The Third World debt crisis clobbered
money center banks, some of which appeared almost insolvent marked to market. The banks
thought they had a soft put via the U.S. government’s relationship with the Latin American
countries and were indeed following explicit American foreign policy in their lending. In the
case of the S&Ls, there was a hard put, via deposit insurance, on the U.S. Treasury (i.e.,
taxpayers). Make risky loans. If they pay off, you win; if not, taxpayers lose. In the subprime
case, collateralized subprime mortgages, originating increasingly with no income verification,
little if any down payment and very low starting teaser rates, were marketed as relatively safe
bundles. Consider a potential subprime borrower. Housing prices are rising rapidly. You are
being told—not just by potential lenders, but by your colleagues at work and your spouse–that
if you do not get in to a house now, you will never be able to afford it. Some of your work
colleagues tell you they made more on their home last year than they did in their job. And with
no money down and no income verification, if housing prices continue to rise, you win; if not,
return the keys.
The financial firms failed to adequately identify, price and hedge the risk. Complex structures
were used. In one case, a German bank loaned off-balance sheet with no reserves required to
an offshore entity to purchase collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). The chairman of the
Executive Committee of Citibank said this summer that he had not even heard of some of
these arrangements before they went bad. Once the problems started to occur, financial
markets could not readily identify who was liable for what. So much more of the lending was
unregulated and some of the banks had transformed themselves from relying 70% on deposits
to 70% on the commercial paper market to fuel growth that rumors were rampant and lots of
double, triple and quadruple counting occurred. For example, while the losses are the loans
less any recoveries, we were hearing about subprime losses, then losses from collateralized debt
obligations (CDOs), then from hedge funds or other vehicles, and then from the banks, as if
they were additive. Of course, the banks lent to the vehicles to buy the CDOs, which were the
packaged subprimes. So we are tracing the same loss through this chain. How big is the loss?
As in previous episodes, it is both difficult to say and will depend upon the state of the
economy and other factors over the next several years. The $300 billion estimate by the
OECD seems as good as any, however, deriving from both direct measures of losses (grossed
up to add losses outside subprimes) and estimates of the decline in equity value of the financial
firms involved. Back in the S&L crisis, the original estimates were around $100 billion, with
some headline seekers estimating $1 trillion, whereas the final cost to taxpayers to cover the
losses was roughly $200 billion. Expect more wild estimates of the losses in the current mess.
And this time, the costs will be borne, appropriately, primarily by the equity holders of the
lenders. In a $14 trillion economy, such losses can be absorbed, but if in the process of doing
so, much other financing is delayed (commercial and industrial lending and commercial paper
outstanding are both down sharply), the harm can spread to the general economy and its firms
and workers. That is what the Fed, and other central banks abroad, will act to try to prevent.
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
7/2/2007
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
10.0
12.0
Jan-86
Figure 6
Figure 5
7/9/2007 Sep-86
May-87
7/16/2007
Jan-88
Sep-88
7/23/2007
May-89
7/30/2007 Jan-90
Sep-90
8/6/2007
May-91
Jan-92
8/13/2007
Source: Federal Reserve Statistical Release
Sep-92
8/20/2007 May-93
Jan-94
8/27/2007 Sep-94
May-95
Sep-96
9/10/2007
May-97
9/17/2007 Jan-98
Sep-98
9/24/2007
May-99
Jan-00
10/1/2007
Sep-00
10/8/2007 May-01
Jan-01
10/15/2007 Sep-02
Monthly Interest Rates for Federal Funds
May-03
10/22/2007
Jan-04
Spread Between 3-Month Libor and Treasury Yields
10/29/2007
Sep-04
May-05
11/5/2007 Jan-06
Sep-06
11/12/2007
May-07
Figure 7
1.2
1.15
1.1
1.05
trillions
1
0.95
0.9
0.85
0.8
Jan-07 Feb-07 Mar-07 Apr-07 May-07 Jun-07 Jul-07 Aug-07 Sep-07 Oct-07
The Consumer
Consumption is two-thirds of GDP and, while consumer spending is far less volatile than
business capital spending, even modest swings up or down reverberate throughout the
economy (see Figure 8). After all, much business capital spending is for capacity expansion to
meet consumer demand. Consumption was given a booster shot in recent years by the wealth
effect of higher housing and equity values. At its peak, well over one-half-trillion dollars a year
was taken out of homes through mortgage refinancings, home equity loans and the like. The
good news on the consumer front is that the labor market has remained relatively strong (see
Figure 9). Employment gains averaged about 100,000 per month in 2007, and while down
from a year ago, they are still likely to be positive, though they may slow further. And of
course, real disposable incomes continue to rise (see Figure 10). The value of household real
estate grew from $12.5 trillion in 2001 to $21.0 trillion in 2Q07. Even adjusting for inflation,
this is more than a 50% real increase. Fueled by exceptionally low short-term interest rates that
promised to stay low for quite a while, entry-level mortgages were remarkably attractive,
including subprime lending and speculative buying of multiple homes. The mortgage
originators pushed through all the products they could, as historically have occurred in housing
booms. As new starts and permits plunge, housing prices, which have risen far beyond
incomes and rents, are falling and have some additional falling to do (see Figure 11).
Figure 8
15
0
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007-I
2007-II
2007-III
-5
Durables Non-Durables
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA)
Figure 9
0.30%
0.25%
percentage change from previous month
0.20%
0.15%
0.10%
0.05%
0.00%
May-05
Nov-05
May-06
Nov-06
May-07
Nov-07
Jan-05
Mar-05
Jul-05
Sep-05
Jan-06
Mar-06
Jul-06
Sep-06
Jan-07
Mar-07
Jul-07
Sep-07
Figure 10
Growth of Real Disposable Personal Income
6.0
5.0
4.0
% change
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007-I
2007-II
2007-III
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA)
Figure 11
Percent Change in Housing Price Index
20.0%
15.0%
% change from 12-month earlier
10.0%
5.0% rising
0.0%
-5.0%
falling
-10.0%
1996-IV
1999-IV
2002-IV
2005-IV
1998-II
2001-II
2004-II
2007-II
1996-I
1997-III
1999-I
2000-III
2002-I
2003-III
2005-I
2006-III
So far, the spillovers from the housing bubble collapse have been modest. Not all consumers
have marked to market and adjusted their consumption accordingly. Even with the substantial
decline, and the likely additional decline to come, some consumers still have substantial
unrealized capital gains, as the data above suggest. Those who entered the market late are
suffering capital losses. Worse yet, the long period of very low short-term interest rates has left
a sizeable number of households (estimates center around two million) with subprime
adjustable rate mortgages (ARMS) vulnerable to interest rate resets eating into their budgets,
and for some, foreclosure. These resets will continue for another couple of years. Thus, we
have gone from housing wealth effects giving a booster shot to consumer spending to housing
prices and interest costs moving to the negative side of the ledger. Add increased foreclosures
to this list. How large is this effect likely to be? Even if two million modest income
consumers reduce their spending a sizeable 25%, the result is only about 0.3% of consumption.
The consumption drag must extend far more broadly (e.g., though general negative wealth
effects from housing prices) to be a major macroeconomic event as opposed to distress
confined to a narrow group and a small subset of products. Of course, subprime mortgages
are unlikely to be the end of the story. For example, the same people who will struggle with
mortgage interest resets have credit cards, the receivables from which are also collateralized.
And some prime mortgages and other lending are troubled.
The removal of the strong positive wealth effects of housing in favor of what is a negative
wealth effect was offset by the strong performance of equities in 2006 through mid-2007. The
last couple of months have reversed that picture as well, removing one shock absorber from
some household balance sheets. Recall, however, that ownership of equities, while widespread,
is far more concentrated in upper income groups than is home ownership, which suggests that
it is the broad middle class, and especially the lower middle class that recently moved from
renter to owner, who will have its consumption affected most.
The traditionally measured household saving rate has been quite low for several years, in part
due to the capital gains in housing and equities that allowed consumers to avoid saving out of
their paychecks. The National Income and Product Accounts measures saving as income
minus spending (i.e., as a residual). So measurement errors in income or spending spill over,
dollar for dollar, into measurement errors in the much smaller saving number. This likely
understates true household saving, on average, over time however.
Figure 12
Saving as a Percentage of Disposable Income
(n.b. NIPA measures understate saving)
%
12.0
10.0
8.0
6.0
4.0
2.0
0.0
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2007-III
2007-I
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA)
The biggest problem is that real capital gains are not included in the saving rate, when in fact
they constitute wealth accumulation. Real capital losses are not deducted, either. Recall also that
the saving rate is actual positive saving minus borrowing. Hence, with housing values declining
and equity markets off their highs, we might expect consumers to raise their savings out of their
paychecks, or just stop borrowing as much, although the exact timing of this adjustment
remains to be seen.
Energy prices have risen appreciably, more than retracing their decline of 2006. While the full
rise in crude oil prices has not been seen at the pump (witness the decline in refining margins at
major oil firms), the rise has been substantial nonetheless. Some consumers will have to spend
less on other goods and services.
It is not clear how much of disposable income will be spent, how much will be saved or how
much will be used to pay down debt. It is likely that until consumers become convinced that
the risks surrounding the economy, housing values and equity prices are reduced, a sizeable
portion will go to strengthen consumer balance sheets. Look for real consumer spending
growth to slow to the 2-2.5 % range.
Figure 13
25
Annual Growth Rates
15
-5
-15
-25
1989
1990
1991
1993
1994
1996
1997
1998
2000
2001
2003
2004
2005
1988
1992
1995
1999
2002
2006
2007-III
2007-I
2007-II
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product
Figure 14
Housing Starts and Permits
1 ,8 00
1 ,7 00
1 ,6 00
1 ,5 00
1 ,4 00
1 ,3 00
1 ,2 00
1 ,1 00
Aug-06
Aug-06
Sep-06
Oct-06
Nov-06
Dec-06
Jan-07
Feb-07
Apr-07
Jun-07
Jul-07
Aug-07
Sep-07
Mar-07
May-07
ho us ing s ta rts , in t ho us a nd s p erm its in th ou s an ds
The keys to business capital spending for the next few quarters and into 2009 is the continued
growth, and expected productivity growth, of corporate profits, which itself depends on decent
economic growth. The economic outlook in the United States and abroad is closely correlated
with investment opportunities and the interest rate and capital markets environment. Corporate
profits should continue growing at decent, if unspectacular, rates (see Figure 15). After several
years in a row of double-digit S&P 500 earnings growth, which brought the corporate profit
share of GDP to multi-decade highs (see Figure 16), top-line revenue growth is weakening and
earnings growth will be down a notch in late 2007 into 2008. With the slowing economy, expect
earnings growth estimates for next year to be revised downward. In any event, many
corporations continue to be in strong cash positions. Corporate cash flow will slow somewhat
from the pace of recent years, when corporate profits as a share of GDP were the highest since
the mid-1960s. Businesses will have plenty of internal cash to finance investment, which is the
source of financing for the majority of business investment. Note that equity values have grown
less rapidly than profits, in contrast to the late 1990s bubble (see Figure 17).
Figure 15
NIPA Corporate Profit Growth
30%
Annualized percent change from preceding period
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
-5%
-10%
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007-I
2007-II
2007-III
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA)
Figure 16
Profit Share of GDP
14 .0 %
12 .0 %
10 .0 %
8 .0 %
6 .0 %
4 .0 %
2 .0 %
0 .0 %
2006-I
1966-I
1968-I
1970-I
1972-I
1980-I
1982-I
1984-I
1986-I
1996-I
1998-I
2000-I
2002-I
1960-I
1962-I
1964-I
1974-I
1976-I
1978-I
1988-I
1990-I
1992-I
1994-I
2004-I
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA)
Figure 17
Corporate Profits and the Stock Market
3000
2500
2000
Q1 1960 = 100
1500
1000
500
corp. profit (NIPA)
S&P 500 index
0
2005-I
2006-III
1960-I
1961-III
1963-I
1964-III
1966-I
1967-III
1969-I
1970-III
1972-I
1973-III
1975-I
1976-III
1978-I
1979-III
1981-I
1982-III
1984-I
1985-III
1987-I
1988-III
1990-I
1991-III
1993-I
1994-III
1996-I
1997-III
1999-I
2000-III
2002-I
2003-III
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts
(NIPA); Standard & Poor’s
The manufacturing sector has certainly been slowing, especially in the United States and Japan,
albeit less so in Europe, although the strong euro will tilt that relative profile somewhat. With
residential construction and related sectors plus domestic autos in difficulty, manufacturing
activity in the United States has been weakening.
Likewise, there has been a boom/bust cycle in durable goods orders (see Figure 18) following
big swings in transportation, especially aircraft, orders. We can expect continued sluggishness
in the short run.
Figure 18
11.0
6.0
annualized % change
1.0
-4.0 8
-2
-9.0 -4
-6
-8
-10
Jan-07 Feb-07 Mar-07 Apr-07 May-07 Jun-07 Jul-07 Aug-07 Sep-07
-14.0
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Source: U.S. Census Bureau
The good news in this glass half-full/ glass half-empty story is on the demand side. It appears
that demand growth continues to be decent, if unspectacular, for manufacturing output,
including strong growth abroad (see below). In the meantime, however, with the retrenchment
in residential construction, the manufacturing adjustment and problems in autos, some goods-
producing industries will continue to experience weakness well into 2008. As mentioned
above, one unexpected bright spot has been Europe. Although the actual data (net of timing
quirks) are mixed and there are some signs of slowing, business capital spending remains
decent in Europe and in much of the rest of the world.
The substantial depreciation of the dollar will increase dollar-denominated earnings for U.S.
multinationals with sizeable sales abroad, which will help curtail the decline in S&P operating
earnings growth, in addition to tilting demand toward U.S. exports.
As noted above, we see a relatively benign interest rate environment, barring the unexpected
case of rising inflation. The yield curve may steepen somewhat once growth accelerates.
The picture in growth abroad, outside of Japan, looks reasonable, if not as strong as the past
year. Europe has been in an upswing despite the strengthening euro, but is now slowing.
Expect world GDP growth (including Europe and Japan) to slow from its golden era of the
past five years of record strong growth, however. All these puts and takes lead to a base-case
outlook of real (inflation-adjusted) nonresidential business investment spending, increasing
about 5-6% in 2008.
Figure 19
Balance on Current Account
(% of GDP)
2.0%
1.0%
0.0%
-1.0%
-2.0%
-3.0%
-4.0%
-5.0%
-6.0%
-7.0%
-8.0%
2005-III
1981-III
1984-III
1987-III
1989-I
1990-III
1992-I
1993-III
1995-I
1996-III
1998-I
1999-III
2001-I
2002-III
2004-I
2007-I
1980-I
1983-I
1986-I
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA)
Figure 20
La test Rea l GDP Grow th Rates fo r Se lec ted Co un tries
La s t 1 2 Mo nths to 3 rd Q ua rter, 2 00 7
12.0% 11.5%
10.0% 9 .3 %
8.8 %
8 .7 %
8.0%
6.0% 5.4 % 5 .3 %
5.2 %
3.9 %
4.0% 3. 3% 3 .6 %
3.2 % 3.2%
2 .6 % 2 .9 % 2. 8%
2 .5 % 2 .5%2 .8%
2. 1% 1 .9% 2 .1 %
2.0% 1. 5% 1 .4 %
0.0%
UK
Italy
India (Q2)
Canada
Germany
France
Argentina
US
China
South Korea
Brazil (Q2)
Mexico (Q2)
Japan
(Q2)
la st 1 2 mo nths to Q3, 20 07 Q3 , 2 00 7
Figure 21
November 2007 Blue Chip International Consensus Forecast
(Real GDP Growth, 2007 & 2008)
12 .0
1 1. 3
10 .2
10 .0
8 .0
percentage change
6 .0
4. 8 5 .0 4. 7
4 .4
4 .0
3 .3
3 3. 0
2. 4 2 .5 2 .5 2 .6
2 .1 2. 2 2 .1
1 .9 2 .0 2 .0 2 .0
2 .0
0 .0
Canada
Germany
Brazil
Japan
Mexico
United States
France
China
South Korea
United Kingdom 2 00 7 2 00 8
There does seem to be a structural imbalance, however. In recent years, the United States has
had roughly twice the propensity to consume imported goods as income grows as have our
trading partners had the propensity to consume our exports as their incomes grow. Whether
this is a permanent fact of life due to the product composition in trade or something that is
likely to reverse anytime soon is pure guesswork at this stage. The dollar depreciation should,
however, lead to some improvement in our (non-oil) external imbalance. It would, however,
be wise to be cautious about the extent of any likely reversal, given the stubborn persistence of
a large trade imbalance in the United States. This in part reflects the desire of the rest of the
world to be holding safe, liquid dollar-denominated assets, and some of their excess saving
being invested in the United States (i.e., the capital flows have in part driven trade flows). In
any event, the sizeable subtraction from GDP growth in recent years of the growing trade
imbalance should attenuate, offsetting some of the drag from housing and consumption.
Concerns continue about foreign investment in the United States, as foreign assets in this
country now exceed U.S. assets abroad. Since the returns on U.S. assets abroad have exceeded
those on foreign assets in the United States, the income flows are much closer to balance.
Recent and expected future depreciation of the dollar (see Figure 22) has decreased the rate of
return in home currency terms and that decreases the incentive for foreign investment here.
The United States cannot fund a decent rate of investment from its low domestic national
saving, and it will eventually be difficult to attract enough foreign capital to fill the gap without
raising domestic interest rates, but so far that has not occurred.
Figure 22
Trade Weighted Dollar Indexes
140
130
120
110
indexes
100
90
80
70
60
1/4/1995
7/4/1995
1/4/1996
7/4/1996
1/4/1997
7/4/1997
1/4/1998
7/4/1998
1/4/1999
7/4/1999
1/4/2000
7/4/2000
1/4/2001
7/4/2001
1/4/2002
7/4/2002
1/4/2003
7/4/2003
1/4/2004
7/4/2004
1/4/2005
7/4/2005
1/4/2006
7/4/2006
1/4/2007
7/4/2007
source: FED of San Louis
major currencies all currencies
The flow of foreign investment, positive or negative, increasing or decreasing, depends on the
economic outlook for the United States, dollar interest rates and expected exchange rates, and
the economic and profit outlook abroad. There have been rumblings of some major holders
of dollar assets in Asia and the Middle East seeking to rebalance their portfolios to be less
reliant on dollar assets.
If foreigners feel there are insufficient investment opportunities in their home countries, the
high saving rate countries will still want to invest somewhere, and while at the margin more is
likely to flow elsewhere, I do not see the flows into the United States collapsing. But some
savvy people, such as Robert Rubin, are deeply concerned about this issue and seem to believe
that the twin deficits—the federal budget deficit and the trade deficit—have a fairly high
probability of causing a currency crisis-induced financial and economic panic and/or collapse.
While this is certainly possible, my own view is that the likelihood of such an event is not high.
More likely is a slowing in the rate of net foreign flows of capital to the United States.
Moreover, while forecasting exchange rates is what economists do least well, one would
conjecture that over the longer term, there will be net continued dollar depreciation. It is also
worth remembering that markets, especially the foreign exchange markets, are prone to
“overshooting”, an overadjustment in rates that must subsequently be adjusted.
Oil prices are part of the recurring current account deficit outlook. The rise in prices to over
$90 per barrel certainly worsens the current account balance (the U.S. imports about 60% of its
oil). There are many puts and takes, and I will discuss the economic risk from higher oil prices
below, but it is worth mentioning that substantial inventories of crude oil did not lead to prices
falling in 2007.
Unless oil rises still further, however, it is likely that the net impact of the trade balance on
economic growth will improve in 2008.
Figure 23
7.0
Non-Farm Productivity Growth
6.0
annualized percent change from preceding peirod
5.0
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
-1.0
-2.0
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2007-I
2007-III
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
In fact, productivity growth not only continued during the recent recession, but boomed to its
highest level in 50 years early in the recovery. The pace of productivity gains will determine
the future path of U.S. economic growth, given that labor force growth is slowing (more on
that below), and hence profit growth over the medium and longer term. Long-term potential
GDP expands at the rate of labor force plus productivity growth. Labor force growth is
primarily demographically determined, although it can be affected by tax and welfare policies.
However, 2008 is also the first year the baby boom generation reaches 62, an age when more
people collect their first Social Security check than do so at age 65, and labor force growth will
slow considerably thereafter, by a quarter of a percentage point or more per year.
The deep conceptual question about the improvement in productivity growth in the late 1990s,
through the recession and early recovery, is the extent to which this was permanent or
transitory. The computer and Internet revolutions (and other factors) can be viewed as having
shifted the economy from one level of productivity to a higher level. The earlier level is
consistent with a slower underlying rate of productivity growth, and after the transition to the
higher level would then revert to the old rate of productivity growth. There is a long transition
period when the new technology is deployed, adopted and leads to transformation in how
businesses are organized, processes accomplished, labor freed up for other uses, and capital
deployed more efficiently. The rate of productivity growth will be high during the transition,
equal to the slope of the line connecting the two levels.
So the big question—how much of this is temporary and how much is permanent—reflects
how much of the transition has already occurred and what new developments occur. That in
turn reflects: (1) how far along are the deployments in existing firms (certainly further than six
or eight years ago, but many large firms have been rolling the new technologies through
different plants or divisions and smaller firms are adopting later); (2) the spread of the new
technology to new firms (indeed, the new technology enabling the growth of the new firms);
and (3) the development of new applications of the new technology or improvements in the
technology that lead to additional productivity improvements, e.g., next-generation Web
services.
On all of these, the best anyone can do is speculate. My view is that we are likely to have an
era of 2% productivity growth, down from the boom in the late 1990s, recession and early
recovery, but still well above the paltry levels of the 1970s through early 1980s, and a bit above
the levels of the 1980s through early 1990s. This is partly because the prospects of
productivity growth will fuel business capital investment, which leads to investment in R&D
and the actual productivity enhancement. It also provides the wherewithal for profit growth,
even as wages rise, without triggering inflation; and lays the groundwork for gains in labor
income which, except at the top, has grown slowly in the last two decades, primarily because of
the addition of huge pools of labor to the global labor force with the opening of China and the
former Soviet sphere. An eventual more rapid rise in wages to reflect productivity growth is
good in itself, of course, and it would help take some of the pressure off of potentially
economically damaging legislation to over-tax and over-regulate capital.
Finally, in the very short run, productivity growth tends to reflect cyclical movements in output
to some degree. Thus, productivity growth was strong in mid-2007 when output grew rapidly,
but is likely to decline as output growth decelerates in the next quarter or two, before
rebounding again.
Oil Prices and Other Commodities: Stabilization, Slide or Increase? A New Era
in Resource Economics?
Oil still plays a large role in all economies. While the United States uses only about one-half as
much oil per dollar GDP than it did in the 1970s, we now import about 60% of our oil, and
Japan virtually all of its oil. Hence the sharp run-up in crude oil (and also natural gas) prices,
which in inflation-adjusted terms (see Figures 24-25) reached the levels of the first oil shock in
1973-1974, created a large transfer of income to oil-producing countries, acting like a tax on
the American economy, knocking perhaps one percentage point off of growth. As supply
increasingly comes from geopolitically difficult areas (Iraq, Iran, Russia, the Caspian Sea,
Nigeria, Venezuela, etc.), a large supply disruption risk premium was built into crude oil prices.
The 2006 decline from the high $70s to about $60 per barrel of crude oil and concomitant
large decline in retail gasoline prices at the pump in the United States were like a tax cut, raising
real personal income. The sharp reversal to $90 is now a big tax on the economy. Because the
economy uses roughly one-half as much oil per dollar of GDP as it did in the 1970s, the
economic impact of this rise has thus far not been as disruptive. The flexibility of the
economy and better monetary policy have also helped mitigate the impact. Budgets have to
bind eventually, however, and if such high prices continue or worsen, they will add
considerably to the recession risk. There is still some risk of a terrorist act damaging oil
supplies or transportation routes, or of a severe enough geopolitical disruption potentially
raising prices considerably, even from this level, but a more likely scenario is that oil prices will
decline modestly through 2008 and 2009 as the futures market predicts. There is even a risk
that they will fall abruptly in response to some combination of warm weather and accelerated
supply additions, slower demand and OPEC’s limited ability to enforce “reductions”.
Figure 24
NYMEX Crude Oil Futures
Figure 25
Commodity and Gasoline Price Index
180 300
175 250
170 200
index (1982=100)
index (1982=100)
165 150
160 100
155 50
150 0
May-06
May-07
Nov-06
Jan-06
Feb-06
Mar-06
Apr-06
Jun-06
Jul-06
Aug-06
Sep-06
Oct-06
Dec-06
Jan-07
Feb-07
Mar-07
Apr-07
Jun-07
Jul-07
Aug-07
Sep-07
Oct-07
There is increasing talk of a new era in resource economics—of a prolonged period of growing
scarcity of oil, metals, some crops, etc., as demand grows rapidly and supply slowly, driving up
prices. While this has certainly been the case lately, and on balance is probably correct, recall
that higher prices often lead, after a lag, to new supply and, depending on timing of any short-
run swings in demand, could lead to periods of falling prices, as happened when oil plunged to
$10 per barrel a decade ago.
Fiscal Policy: Taxes, Spending and Deficits, the New Congress and the Next
President
Fiscal policy provided a much-needed stimulus early in the recession, from Defense and
Homeland Security spending and tax cuts, augmented by acceleration of the tax cuts and the
dividend and capital gains tax cuts in the second half of 2003. Combined with temporary
bonus depreciation and higher expensing limits for small businesses, these tax cuts helped
underpin decent capital spending early in the recovery and gave a much-needed boost in 2003
when the economy finally achieved high enough growth to be self-sustaining.
The combination of the increased spending (see Figure 26)—including substantial increases
outside of defense and homeland security spending—and tax cuts have heightened concern
about the medium- and longer-term impact of the budget deficits (see Figure 27) (although, in
the short term, while deficits were large in 2001-2003, this was one of the best-timed uses of
counter-cyclical fiscal policy in history). The fiscal policy substantially reinforced the aggressive
monetary response and the economy’s impressive natural flexibility, dynamism and resilience in
the face of recession and other shocks). Focusing on the headline dollar value of deficits can
be quite misleading. In a $14 trillion economy, even a $140 billion deficit only amounts to 1%
of GDP, a primary surplus (the deficit net of interest payments). In the last fiscal year, 2007,
the deficit was 1.2% of GDP, a level consistent with a slightly declining debt-GDP ratio. The
CBO baseline shows the debt-GDP ratio declining, although it predicts substantial spending
restraint, along with the expiration of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts. In any event, the debt-GDP
ratio is below the historical average and far below that of Euroland and Japan.
Figure 26
Real Government Spending
(inflation-adjusted)
10
8
Percentage change from preceding period
-2
-4
-6
-8
1980
1981
1982
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1998
1999
2000
2001
2004
2005
2006
2007-III
1983
1984
1990
1996
1997
2002
2003
2007-I
2007-II
Government consumption expenditures and gross investment Federal State and local
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA)
Figure 27
Projected Position of the U.S. Federal Budget
(CBO Baseline Estimates, % of GDP)
1.00
0.50
0.00
% of GDP -0.50
-1.00
-1.50
-2.00
-2.50
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
Source: U.S. Congressional Budget Office, August 2007
Figure 28
National Debt as Percentage of GDP
120.0
100.0
80.0
Percent
60.0
40.0
20.0
0.0
1940
1943
1949
1952
1955
1964
1967
1970
1973
1979
1982
1985
1994
1997
2000
2003
2006
2009
2012
2015
1946
1958
1961
1976
1988
1991
Source: U.S. Congressional Budget Office, U.S. Office of Management and Budget
The change in control of both Houses of Congress has substantially altered the balance of
power toward a desire for more domestic spending and less defense spending, a likely attempt
to reorient the tax cuts more toward lower- and middle-income people and to raise taxes on
those at the upper end of the income ladder and on capital income. Despite the rhetoric,
Congress did not deliver on these goals. Much of the gains the Democrats made were by
conservative to moderate Democrats defeating moderate Republicans, and the new leadership
has had a very modest populist agenda. Even that more moderate agenda, of course, will have
to get through both houses of Congress (and therefore must generally garner 60 votes in the
Senate) and a potential Presidential veto. While President Bush has been unable to do much
other than sustain his policy in Iraq, he and Congressional Republicans have thus far thwarted
attempts to move aggressively on an agenda to raise taxes or spend on social programs.
Much of the Democrats’ story line in the last election was the “middle-class squeeze”, the
notion that only the rich have become better off in recent years and that wages have stagnated.
And while this claim is exaggerated, it is true that the before-tax incomes of the wealthiest
Americans have grown more rapidly than that of other groups, although their taxes went up by
a larger percentage than their incomes did. IRS data reveal that in 2005, the top decile’s share
of federal income taxes had risen to 70.3% from 64.9% in 2001, whereas their income share
had risen by a smaller percentage (continuing a long-standing trend), thereby making the
federal income tax slightly more progressive despite the rhetoric.
Democrats reinstituted the pay-go budget rules that expired in 2002, and that were put in place
originally in 1990 by the first President Bush and the Democratic-controlled Congress and
renewed under President Clinton. These rules require that any tax cuts or discretionary
spending increases and new entitlements be offset elsewhere in the budget. Many Republicans
objected to these rules once the budget position improved because they made tax cuts more
difficult; some members of both parties objected because of the spending restraint they
imposed. The tax share of GDP, already somewhat above the historical average, rises
automatically, and in fact will reach about 20% by the end of the decade and about 24% a
decade or two later, because of real bracket creep, the alternative minimum tax and other
factors. Since the pay-go rules make legislating tax cuts more difficult, tax increases are
virtually preordained, at about $3 trillion over the next 10 years between the expiration of the
Bush tax cuts and the growth of the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT). My own view is that
sound public policy requires far more stringent control of spending growth and legislated tax
reduction and reform that stabilizes the federal tax share of GDP close to the historical average
of around 18.2%. The pay-go advocates do have a point: had they still been in force, the new
Medicare Part D prescription drug program would have been more targeted, affordable and
financed. In general, however, the divided government is most likely to lead to some
reorientation on the margins and much debate as we head into the 2008 elections, not much
new tax and spending legislation or even specific proposals.
One exception is the proposal by House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Charles
Rangel (D-NY) to eliminate the AMT and raise tax rates on the “wealthy”. Figure 29 shows
the effect of the Rangel plan plus the proposal by many leading Democrats to “uncap” the
earnings subject to Social Security payroll taxes (as is done with Medicare). The result is very
substantial—a $3-4 trillion hike relative to current tax rates; tripling the federal taxes on
dividends, almost doubling the tax on capital gains, with the potential to sharply reduce work
and investment incentives. The long boom of the last quarter century was underpinned by low
inflation and low tax rates. Further, the Europeans’ mediocre performance attests to the
dangers of high taxes and bloated social spending.
Chairman Rangel’s plan not only allows the Bush tax cuts to expire, which would raise the top
marginal tax rate on income and dividends to 39.6% and capital gains to 20%, but would add
an extra 4.6% on adjusted gross (not taxable) income. Thus, the higher (Rep. Rangel calls
them “replacement”) rates exclude all deductions and include capital gains. Plus, phase-outs of
deductions would be reinstated on the regular rates. So, higher-income taxpayers whose
deductions throw them into the Alternative Minimum Tax pool with a top rate of 28% will
now find themselves with a rate of 44.2% with deductions limited. When combined with the
proposal to uncap the earnings limit on Social Security payroll taxes and state income taxes
(currently fully deductible) are factored in, the combined top marginal tax rate reaches almost
70%, which is back to levels of the 1970s.
On the corporate side, Rep. Rangel would lower the corporate rate to 30.5% from 35%; a great
idea, but take that back with a variety of provisions, some focused on particular industries.
When combined with the increases in personal rates on dividends and capital gains (some
Democrats want to hike capital gains rates still further), the return per dollar of corporate
source income would decline by about one-third. I believe this would be an impediment to
capital formation and economic growth, and hence future wages. It would also increase
incentives for debt versus equity and for share repurchases versus dividends.
Figure 29
Finally, the long-run deficits in Social Security (see Figure 30) and Medicare are projected to be
enormous. These programs could be made far more efficient and effective with little or no
additional taxes, but the divided government is both an opening to reform (which is not
possible in such large, important and political popular programs in a purely partisan way) and a
recipe for likely paralysis and delay, which makes the eventual reforms more likely to be abrupt
and to require substantial tax increases, as each year that passes raises the ratio of voters who
are (net) recipients of government transfers to (net) taxpayers.
Figure 30
Social Security Income & Cost
(% of taxable payroll, historical and projected)
20
19
16
Operating deficit
15
14
13
2008
The year 2008 will be an important year for many reasons. First, the earlier dalliance with
possibly below-NAIRU unemployment rates, the risk of wage inflation accelerating and the
Bernanke Fed’s balancing act should all be even more clarified as we move through the year.
So far, of course, core inflation has abated. Next, the first baby boomers reach age 62 in 2008.
In recent decades, more people have collected their first Social Security check at age 62 than
they have at age 65, accepting reduced annual benefits in exchange for earlier retirement. But
so large was the baby boom that, starting with the retirement of the first cohort in 2008, the
rate of labor force expansion will start to decelerate, thereby slightly reducing the economy’s
potential GDP in subsequent years by perhaps one-quarter of one percentage point, growing
to one-half of one percentage point as time moves on. This will have to be factored into
everything from our estimates of likely GDP growth to Fed monetary policy to the NAIRU,
and beyond. Further, 2008 is the first year the Social Security budget surplus, which has been
used to finance general government, will begin to shrink, and hence the first small step toward
pressure for reform.
The pace of housing price decline, the eventual stabilization of residential construction, the
improvement in net exports, all should come into greater focus. This in turn will guide
business capital spending and hiring decisions, corporate profits and asset returns.
And, of course, 2008 is a presidential election year and another battle over control of Congress.
We can expect a lot of hyperbole about the economy, some silly legislative proposals and,
perhaps, increased anti-business, anti-globalization and anti-capital rhetoric. Barring a big
change in the composition of Congress (e.g., a 60-vote Democratic Senate), however, this
should mostly be digestible. Some activity will likely be accelerated into late 2008 (e.g.,
realizing capital gains or other income), though, to hedge against possible higher taxes in 2009
and beyond.
But if the base-case outlook generally plays out in 2008, we should see a cyclical pickup back to
trend growth of around 3% as we head into 2009.
JOHN GRANDY
MANAGING DIRECTOR & HEAD OF RESEARCH
WESTWIND PARTNERS
Introduction
The global resource sector appears to be at the beginning of a multi-decade, technology-driven
revolution in productivity. This revolution is likely to be characterized by a shift in focus in
resource extraction technologies from improvement in discovery processes into enhancements
in recovery processes. These investments are likely to improve yields, reduce the marginal cost
of extraction, enhance the financial position of resource companies and generate sustainable,
and substantial, investment returns. We view this as a classic secular investment cycle, or more
precisely, a long-term series of cycles, in which investment in technology drives down marginal
costs, generates substantial returns and, in turn, attracts additional investment capital.
The marriage of technology and new industries has been repeated throughout modern economic
history, creating major, multi-decade productivity revolutions and enormous investment
opportunities. From textiles in the early 1800s, to farming in the 1830s, to manufacturing in the
late 19th century to the transportation, communication and data processing revolutions of the
20th century, technology has transformed what were previously viewed as mundane, high
marginal cost industries—or created entirely new industries. These disruptive declines in
marginal costs and new revenue opportunities have also created large profit opportunities,
which have subsequently attracted major inflows of investment capital and generated abnormal
positive returns.
Over the last 40 years, global demand for resources has increased dramatically. During this
same period, there have been no major petroleum, mineral or metal discoveries. Recovery
technology has seen incremental improvements, but they have not been nearly enough to enable
supply to keep pace with demand. This combustible combination has fueled (so to speak) a
corresponding spike in resource prices of historic proportions, and is generating enormous
profits for resource providers. Thus, we have in place all the ingredients for the next
technology-driven productivity revolution—a revolution that we believe will attract enormous
amounts of capital, significant investment in technology and the opportunity for outstanding
investment returns.
The reasons why technology and resource stocks appear to be counter-cyclical seem
straightforward:
• Resource stocks generally require large amounts of capital; they therefore tend to be in favor
when money is cheap and bank and stock market financing is readily available. In contrast,
technology stocks are often cash-flow positive from day one, with the initial public offering
being the only liquidity event for the company.
• Resource stocks tend to be more profitable in periods of increasing inflation, whereas
deflationary periods encourage a greater investment in technology.
• By the same token, technology stocks are more recession resistant.
We might argue, however, that there are greater synergies between the technology and resource
sectors than this conventional viewpoint would recognize. No longer are resource companies
dumb “hewers of wood and drawers of water.” The global resource sector is rapidly becoming
one of the most sophisticated users of advanced technology. Consider the following:
• Three-dimensional geophysical seismic mapping is now a standard requirement in all major
mining as well as oil and gas extraction projects.
• Experimental hydrometallurgical processes are under development to extract mineral ore
from a number of previously uneconomical mines in North and Central America.
• The use of fiberoptic and satellite technologies are now standard practice in the energy
industry, relaying data from oil and gas wells back to central locations, where the data are then
consolidated and uploaded into Web-based analysis programs.
• Development of the massive Canadian oil sands and similar heavy oil resources worldwide
will require new carbon sequestration technology and potentially the use of nuclear
technology to heat underground oil reservoirs.
• The emerging alternative energy industry, focused on renewable and low-carbon emissions
technologies, spans pure technology stocks and resources (wind, water, nuclear and geomass).
Without advanced technology, the alternative energy industry would not exist.
In short, resource industries today are far more dependent on advanced technology than ever
before. Communications and data processing technologies, together with advanced chemical
and physical processes, are required to capitalize on increasingly marginal resources worldwide.
We expect this trend to intensify. Consider that in 2006, Exxon Corporation alone spent $733
million on research and development.
This conclusion does not negate the fact that resource and technology stocks tend to be
counter-cyclical. It does, however, suggest that there are synergies to be had in the two sectors.
It is impossible today to be an educated investor in resource stocks without being able to assess
advanced technologies.
We noted above that technology stocks tend to outperform resource stocks in a recession. In
the current environment, there is some urgency to review this observation, as the U.S. economy
stands on the brink of a potential new recession. Will history repeat itself? We think not.
While the United States remains by far the largest national economy, and will continue to be for
the foreseeable future, it is no longer the largest driver of global economic growth, a role it has
played since 1914. This mantle has been taken over by Southeast Asia. The International Energy
Agency (IEA) estimates that between today and 2030, China and India alone will account for
45% of the entire global increase in demand for energy, contributing to a 1.8% annual rate of
growth in real demand (see “World Energy Outlook 2007 – China and India Insights”). China
will replace the United States as the largest user of energy in the world shortly after 2010. By
2030, the number of automobiles in China is expected to grow by seven times, with the number
of new vehicle sales exceeding those in the United States by 2015. The implications of this
growth for demand not only for energy, but also for steel, aluminum, nickel, copper and heavy
metals are obvious. The average passenger vehicle contains 260 pounds of aluminum, 44
pounds of copper and 44 pounds of nickel. The steel used in each vehicle’s construction
requires 2,200 pounds of iron ore and 880 pounds of coking coal. (Source: BHP Billiton;
reference courtesy of U.S. Global Investors Inc.) China cannot meet its internal demand for
these resources; therefore, imports of energy and of coal are forecast to increase rapidly. China
and India combined already account for 49% of global iron ore consumption.
The IEA notes that the picture for India is essentially identical to that of China. The growth
projections for these two countries will ensure that even in the event of consumer-driven
recessions in North America or Europe, global demand for resources will remain solid. As
shown in Figure 1, the World Bank’s most recent forecast (which takes into account the recent
U.S. housing slowdown) looks to China to maintain close to its current 11% growth rate next
year.
Whether these short-term economic forecasts prove out or not, it is clear that over the next few
decades, solid demand for commodities is reasonably assured as China and India rapidly
improve their per-capita living standards. It is doubtful that the planet contains enough
resources to permit these countries ever to achieve North American standards of living, but if
they fail, it will not be for lack of trying.
This long-term trend of growth in demand is currently being obscured by volatility in metals
prices, which are now coming off the historically high levels achieved over the last year. For
example, the price of zinc on the London Metal Exchange has fallen exactly 50% from its high
achieved in November 2006. Prices of other base metals have been under similar pressure.
Despite their recent declines, however, the prices of copper and nickel have each increased
200% since 2004, while zinc has risen approximately 300%.
As shown in Figure 2, one of the key drivers for long-term strength in commodity prices is the
marginal cost of extraction and dwindling global supplies. The “easy” discoveries have all been
made; new mines are typically more expensive to exploit and contain less resource than has
historically been the case. This trend is well-known in relation to crude oil; its relevance to base
and precious metals is perhaps less well understood.
1.2
10
1.0
8
0.8
6
0.6
4 0.4
2 0.2
0 0
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Years of Reserves % Copper Grade
55 1.00
0.95
50
0.90
45 0.85
40 0.80
0.75
35 0.70
30 0.65
0.60
25
0.55
20 0.50
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Source: International Copper Study Group
Similar charts could be prepared for almost any other base metal as well as for gold, silver and
platinum group metals.
Precious metal prices are driven by factors other than the fundamentals of the real economy.
Rather, it is the lack of confidence in the U.S. currency that is the primary driver of today’s
record (in nominal terms) price of gold. Whether this trend reverses will depend more on
actions taken by the U.S. Congress and current and future Administrations than on any external
factors. Nonetheless, the same cost pressures we have reviewed in relation to base metals will
also affect the prices of precious metals. So, long as demand for gold continues to be solid,
rapid increases in the marginal cost of gold extraction worldwide—based on cost pressures
similar to those noted above for copper—will continue to support the current price of this
metal.
Gold mine production fell 3% in 2006 to a 10-year low (Source: GFMS Limited, Gold Survey
2007). This decline was certainly not due to a low price for the metal; rather, it was driven by
scarcity. The average cash costs per ounce of gold produced increased $45… in a single year.
No end to this trend is in sight. These statistics tell us that the price of gold must remain high;
otherwise, the metal will be impossible to produce at a profit.
It is these increasing costs, and the diminishing returns, from mining and petroleum extraction
worldwide that drive the need to invest in technology. The most extraordinary example of this
to date is perhaps undersea mineral extraction, which is being pursued by a handful of
innovative companies.
To achieve this, we are witnessing the use of revolutionary technology, including remotely
operated submersible vehicles and electromagnetic survey equipment. Exploration is conducted
using side-scan sonar bathymetry and mapping, deep tow magnetic and electrical geophysical
methods, and sea bottom gravity methods.
Few, even 20 years ago, would have imagined that the world’s needs for metals would become
so extreme that it would become economical to extract these resources from the ocean floor.
Yet this is the world in which we find ourselves today. The future will, with near certainty,
demand more resources and require even greater investment in advanced technology.
A marriage is taking place between technology and resources. Investors will find many
opportunities to profit.
To be included in this Green Book as a “Best Idea for 2008”, a stock must be rated Overweight. When an analyst rates a stock
Overweight, he/she is advising our clients to carry a position in the stock that is in excess of its weighting relative to the stocks
either in that analyst’s coverage or an index identified by the analyst that includes, but is not limited to, stocks covered by that
analyst.
In selecting one name for 2008 from all Overweight-rated stocks in his/her coverage for inclusion in this publication, the analyst is
suggesting that, at this time, this stock represents his/her most attractive Overweight-rated stock in the context of the industry
theme or trend described in the accompanying write-up for the year ahead.
120%
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
RGC
WWW
PAG
TMO
ONNN
MASI
EXPE
WU
CVS
ARRS
ANF
NVDA
XXIA
SCRX
DRIV
OIIM
WFR
TXRH
GSIC
NETL
NIHD
NZ
FLEX
RIMM
Source: FactSet, Standard & Poor’s and Thomas Weisel Partners LLC
75%
65%
55%
45%
35%
25%
15%
5%
-5%
MASI
WWW
S&P 500
PAG
RGC
NVDA
ANF
ONNN
TMO
ARRS
WU
GSIC
NETL
DRIV
CVS
FLEX
SCRX
TXRH
EXPE
WFR
OIIM
XXIA
-15%
-25%
Source: FactSet, Standard & Poor’s and Thomas Weisel Partners LLC
BUSINESS SERVICES........................................................................................................................................................................... 50
Emerging Market Returns in Money Transfer and Continued Penetration of Cards Globally to Drive Service
Volumes
The Western Union Company (WU)
2007 May Have Been Premature, But 2008 Appears Likely to Benefit from International Growth in Revenue and
Income While Mexico Stability Lessens Overall Pressure
INTERACTIVE MARKET SERVICES ..............................................................................................................................................51
e-Travel – Continue to See Healthy Global Growth Prospects as Travel Moves Online
Expedia, Inc. (EXPE)
Top Pick in e-Travel with Recovery Gaining Steam and New Focus on Building Ad-Based Biz
LIFESTYLES/SPORTS RETAILERS ................................................................................................................................................52
Mounting U.S. Consumer Spending Headwinds to Keep Pressure on the U.S. Dollar, Internationally
Wolverine World Wide, Inc. (WWW)
A Globally Diversified Entity with Strong Return Metrics, Positioned to Benefit from U.S. Dollar Weakness
RESTAURANTS.........................................................................................................................................................................................53
Expect Continued Pressure on Casual Dining Demand into 2008
Texas Roadhouse, Inc. (TXRH)
Expect TXRH to Gain Share in Difficult Environment
RETAILING: HARDLINES...................................................................................................................................................................54
Macro Headwinds and Frothy 2008 Estimates Leave Us Cautious; Differentiation Will Be Key
Penske Automotive Group, Inc. (PAG)
Recent Trends Remain Very Strong; Multiple Catalysts in 2008
RETAILING: SOFTLINES ....................................................................................................................................................................55
We Expect the Difficult Macroeconomic Environment to Continue into 2008 and Believe the Street Estimates Are too
Bullish on a Turn in the Environment
Abercrombie & Fitch Co. (ANF)
The Safest Place To Be in Retail, in Our View, Due to Its Solid Growth and Ability to Manage Expenses
The Western Union Company (WU: $22.60) Mkt. Cap.: $17,343.2mn Overweight
2007 May Have Been Premature, But 2008 Appears Likely to Benefit from International Growth in Revenue
and Income While Mexico Stability Lessens Overall Pressure
• International expansion leading revenue growth: WU growth to emerging locations (especially India) continues to drive
overall volumes. India volume growth (in excess of 69% each of the last four quarters) has significantly outpaced overall market
expansion (20% in 2006 to $25.7bn—largest global market). Other growing markets such as Russia (increased inflows of over
125% since 2003) and the Philippines (estimated that 25% of Filipino workforce is working abroad) represent significant
growth opportunities within money transfer space.
• Margin “mix shift” issue significantly smaller than expected: Prior expectations that international margin pressure would
dampen net returns has subsided (somewhat) as management noted international margins in mid-20s and growing. The
diminished gap between the return from domestic/Mexico volumes and international business will eliminate concerns that fast
growth may result in reduced profitability. Additional benefits from improved Vigo or domestic volumes will likely help boost
margin expectations versus bearish prognostications.
• Mexico “issues” stabilizing and lessening drag effect: Expectations of small domestic growth (low single digits) and
merging between Mexican-based transactions and revenue growth (starting 4Q) should help remove
immigration/economy/pricing overhang from channel.
Catalysts/Milestones: Emerging market strength and Mexican stabilization (at least for 2H07) coupled with a leading market
presence in a growing money transfer market will drive WU in 2008. Additional benefit from continued weak U.S. dollar as over
60% of revenue is a result of non-U.S. business.
Risks: Pricing pressure from competition/technology shifts may affect revenue on a channel-specific basis. Mexico-based
pressures (economy, immigration) may dampen returns in the channel while any negative immigration or transfer legislation may
temporarily dampen volume flows.
Valuation: We are reiterating our 12-month price target of $28 per share based on a blended analysis of discounted cash flow, free
cash flow and P/E valuations. Our price target implies a 2008E EPS multiple of 21.1x versus current trading levels of 17.0x and
processing comparables at 20.4x. We believe that long-term market concerns (technology shift) do not properly acknowledge the
benefits of WU’s agent network and ability to access the lower income market.
Estimates: Dec. '07 Rev.: $4875.5mnE EPS: $1.12E Dec. '08 Rev.: $5486.2mnE EPS: $1.33E
Price is as of the close, November 30, 2007. Mark Sproule 212.271.3839
e-Travel – Continue to See Healthy Global Growth Prospects as Travel Moves Online
• We maintain a favorable bias on e-Travel based on three themes: (1) a strong secular growth argument in the domestic market;
(2) the emergence of international markets has provided a new leg to the story; and (3) a wave of innovation could spark
evolution of new advertising-based models. While a softer domestic economy could weigh on domestic travel demand, the
e-Travel group is better situated than the hotel or gaming groups based on the superior secular trends favoring online
distribution.
• Although penetration in the domestic market should hit 50-55% this year, we still expect online sales to outpace the underlying
industry (five-year CAGR 10-15% versus 3-5%). There are still big opportunities to drive above-industry growth. Agency sites
convert less than 5% of traffic and we estimate that over $50bn in sales are researched online and closed offline. Better
understanding of the customer and use of that knowledge to improve merchandising should help address those opportunities.
• The group derives 30% of sales outside of the United States, where growth is above 40%. International markets are less mature
with penetration in Europe under 30% and in Asia Pacific at 15%. At comparable penetration, sales in Europe and Asia Pacific
could be to two times the size of the domestic market. Look for further consolidation as penetration rises.
• The ability to monetize research activity represents an untapped revenue opportunity. Agency sites may only convert 5% of
traffic, but the research done by the other 95% has potentially great value. Look for sites to pursue alternative advertising-based
revenue models more aggressively over the next 12-24 months.
Catalysts/Milestones: (1) New technology platforms could lead to material near-term conversion and upside relative to top-line
expectations; and (2) there are several potentially material acquisition opportunities that could surface over the next year.
Risks: In addition to the demand-side risk presented by a slower domestic economy, we see top-line risk in the group’s exposure
to booking fees in the face of recent no fee sales.
Mounting U.S. Consumer Spending Headwinds to Keep Pressure on the U.S. Dollar, Internationally
• Headwinds for the U.S. consumer stiffen into 2008: Recent inflection points and resulting directional trends in job growth,
wage growth, mortgage delinquencies and revolving credit usage point to mounting pressures on consumer discretionary
spending and U.S. GDP into 2008.
• Expect the dollar to remain under pressure: Election-year political influences could inspire policy that delays the economic
consequence but exacerbates the systemic issues creating headwinds for consumer spending. Given this, we expect the dollar to
remain weak through 2008.
• Multiples remain closer to the median than the trough: Excluding young growth companies, approximately 50% of stocks
in our universe are currently trading closer to the historical median forward P/E than to the historical trough. Amidst concerns
about the resilience of the consumer, we expect increased investor attention to free cash flow.
Catalysts/Milestones: We suspect uninspiring holiday sales and the manifestation of the impact of the mortgage fallout in
macroeconomic numbers in coming months will make consumer spending headwinds more tangible.
Risks: Benign inflation, further rate cuts and policy protecting homeowners could buttress consumer spending and stock
multiples into 2008.
Wolverine World Wide, Inc. (WWW: $24.77) Mkt. Cap.: $1,342.5mn Overweight
A Globally Diversified Entity with Strong Return Metrics, Positioned to Benefit from U.S. Dollar Weakness
• Appropriate characteristics for the current macro environment: Given the mounting pressures on U.S. consumers and our
expectations for lingering weakness in the U.S. dollar, we favor companies that both (1) have globally diverse profit streams,
and (2) set conservative expectations and consistently deliver. In our universe, Wolverine World Wide is a standout in both
categories.
• Diversified revenue stream, positioned to benefit from U.S. dollar weakness: At 36.7% of the total in 2006, Wolverine
World Wide’s international revenue contribution continues to grow as a percentage of the mix. What is lost on many investors,
however, is that international contributes approximately 60% of operating profit behind a consistent stream of international
distributor license royalties.
• Improving return metrics and strong free cash flow remain WWW hallmarks: Behind (1) a mix shift to higher-margin
businesses, (2) ongoing margin benefits from U.S. dollar weakness and (3) ongoing improvements in working capital efficiency,
Wolverine World Wide is both improving return metrics (ROIC from 19.1% in 2006 to 22.2% in 2008E) and free cash flow
(we estimate $1.85 per share representing a 7.5% free cash flow yield).
Catalysts/Milestones: Continued growth of international as a percentage of the mix and ongoing health of fundamentals is
likely to lead investors to view Wolverine World Wide as a safe haven in a challenging domestic consumer spending environment.
Risks: Slowing job growth in the U.S. housing industry could be a headwind for the Wolverine franchise (high teens as a
percentage of revenue).
Valuation: Our 12-month price target of $31.50 represents the straight average of the peer group CY08E P/E using WWW 2008
estimates and our five-year discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis. There are always risks that the price target for any security will not
be realized. In addition to general market and macroeconomic risks, for WWW, these risks include, among other things, regulatory
risk, risk related to government contracts, increasing competition and failure to achieve growth targets.
Estimates: Dec. '07 Rev.: $1203.3mnE EPS: $1.65E Dec. '08 Rev.: $1261.5mnE EPS: $1.83E
Price is as of the close, November 30, 2007. Jim Duffy 415.364.5974
RESTAURANTS Neutral
• Heading into 2008, gasoline and energy costs are ascending amid a weakening housing market, which should mute discretionary
spending and potentially alter consumer behavior.
• Commodity and labor cost pressures will require slightly higher than normal same-store sales (SSS) gains to maintain margins.
On the heels of 2007’s large menu price increases, we do not see much more headroom for further increases.
• We see most risk in the bar & grill space given exposure to the low- to middle-income consumer and relative dependence on
the lunch day part, which has seen increased competition from quick serve restaurant (QSR) and fast casual chains. While
valuations look inexpensive on historical ranges, we think for the most part the correction was warranted as it reflects the
maturity and slower growth ahead for certain subcategories in the restaurant space. Accordingly, we expect many “cheap”
restaurant stocks to remain “cheap.”
Catalysts/Milestones: Greater consolidation and reinvestment into existing stores in place of expansion. Macro relief for the
consumer historically has been a near-term catalyst, such as a drop in gasoline prices.
Risks: Aggressive pricing and overexpansion remain the greatest controllable risks for the restaurant sector. A consumer
recession would put current 2008 top-line expectations at risk and compressed multiples further.
Macro Headwinds and Frothy 2008 Estimates Leave Us Cautious; Differentiation Will Be Key
• It is easy to be bearish on retail as we exit 2007, with a number of macro issues exerting pressure on the U.S. consumer, most
notably the deceleration in housing turnover (down 15% y/y on a trailing six-month basis and down 26% on a two-year trend),
declining home prices, disruption in the credit markets, rising energy and commodity prices, the weak dollar, and a volatile
equity market. Positive catalysts have become increasingly scarce as the private equity boom winds down, although this
provides an opening for an increase in strategic M&A transactions going forward.
• Street estimates for 2008 remain frothy, in our view. Our analysis of over 100 retailers shows that 2008 earnings estimates have
declined about 11% since the beginning of the year, but still call for 14.8% y/y growth (compared to 6.1% estimated for 2007).
While an acceleration of this magnitude would be surprising given the headwinds mentioned above, this may be somewhat
reflected in current valuations with the group trading at a median PEG ratio of only 0.86 (versus the S&P at 1.28).
• When times are tough in retail, we think it is important to focus on subsectors and companies with structural advantages. This
might include: (1) differentiated consumer services, which increase store productivity and create brand loyalty (in our coverage
universe this means grooming and hotels for pets, and decorating tips and entertaining consulting for the home); and (2) a
multi-channel distribution platform that seamlessly integrates retail selling space with catalog and/or e-commerce. In addition,
companies with non-U.S. exposure and clean balance sheets are more likely to emerge from a slowdown unscathed.
Catalysts/Milestones: The 2007 holiday season will be a key gauge for the health of the U.S. consumer, and so far things are off
to a decent (but highly promotional) start. In 2008, we will continue to closely monitor commodity and product prices, unit labor
costs, energy prices, interest rates, exchange rates and weather patterns (particularly after two mild winters in a row). In addition,
2008 is a presidential election year, which brings added potential for disruption and certainly higher marketing expense.
Risks: Risks include a sharp decline in consumer spending based on the macro issues mentioned above.
Penske Automotive Group, Inc. (PAG: $20.00) Mkt. Cap.: $1,892.3mn Overweight
Recent Trends Remain Very Strong; Multiple Catalysts in 2008
• Recent data points show continued strength: Penske Automotive’s growth has accelerated in recent quarters, and we are
encouraged by recent data that its premium luxury brands remain strong. In October, premium luxury brand vehicle sales
increased 6% in the United States (up from rises of 3% and 1% in August and September, respectively) and 14% in the United
Kingdom (versus up 5% in both August and September).
• Multiple catalysts bring potential upside to 2008 estimates: Our 2008 EPS estimate of $1.69 (10.5% growth) does not
account for a number of potential catalysts in the upcoming year: (1) the smart car launch, which will hit showroom floors in
early 1Q; (2) improving profits at refurbished Inskip and Turnersville campuses; and (3) the recent acquisition of Rallye Motors,
which adds $700mn in annualized revenue. Furthermore, we estimate gross capital expenditures will decline to $139mn versus
the trailing five-year average of $212mn, driving a significant increase in free cash flow.
• Relative insulation from U.S. consumer issues: In our view, PAG is uniquely positioned to weather the storm: (1)
international operations account for 38% of total revenue and 40% of operating profit year to date; and (2) the vehicle brand
mix is weighted toward marques that are gaining share (95% foreign and high-line import brands).
Catalysts/Milestones: We will continue to monitor the smart car launch, acquisition announcements, progress at Inskip and
Turnersville, as well as industry sales and inventory trends in both the United States and the United Kingdom.
Risks: Risks to Penske Automotive include general market and macroeconomic risks, a less successful than expected launch of
smart cars in the United States and foreign currency exposure.
Valuation: Our 12-month price target for PAG shares of $25 is based on a two-tier framework utilizing: (1) relative 2008E P/E
valuation versus peers and (2) relative 2008E EV/EBITDA valuation versus peers. PAG is currently trading at 13.3x our 2007E
EPS versus its peers at 9.7x and 11.8x our 2008E EPS. On an adjusted 2007 EV/EBITDA basis, the shares trade at 8.1x versus the
peer group average of 7.0x, and 7.7x our 2008 estimate. We believe that PAG deserves a premium to the peer group based on its:
(1) foreign brand mix (95% import/65% luxury); (2) potential for margin expansion; (3) diversified geographic footprint with
international exposure (38% of revenues); and (4) smart car distributorship. We also calculate that the current stock price implies an
approximate 9% free cash flow yield, using our 2007 estimates. Risks to our price target include, but are not limited to, general
market and macroeconomic risks, a less successful than expected launch of smart cars in the U.S. and foreign currency exposure.
Estimates: Dec. '07 Rev.: $12940.5mnE EPS: $1.51E Dec. '08 Rev.: $13598.8mnE EPS: $1.69E
Price is as of the close, November 30, 2007. Matt Nemer 415.364.5901
Abercrombie & Fitch Co. (ANF: $82.04) Mkt. Cap.: $7,476.6mn Overweight
The Safest Place To Be in Retail, in Our View, Due to Its Solid Growth and Ability to Manage Expenses
• Our top pick for 2008 is teen retailer Abercrombie & Fitch. We see credible 10% square-footage growth, which could be
even higher if new concepts are successful. We also see Abercrombie’s international and flagship real estate strategy driving
higher returns, productivity and profitability. Comp trends at the core Abercrombie division turned positive in 3Q07, and we
expect Hollister to follow in 4Q07 or 1Q08.
• ANF has one of the highest and the most stable operating margins in the softlines group. We see 300-400bp of
additional operating margin opportunity over time at ANF due to improvements in the company’s use of technology. The
company has driven sales and earnings strictly on the strength of its product and is behind competitors in terms of systems.
Merchandise optimization, store replenishment systems and visual merchandising system are among the systems being
implemented. We see the benefit of these systems in 2008 and beyond.
• In addition, ANF’s balance sheet is strong and we expect returns to increase in 2008. Inventories are in great shape,
down 15% per foot y/y at the end of 3Q07 as the company aggressively takes markdowns to clear merchandise. As of 3Q07,
ANF had $361mn in cash and equivalents and no debt. We believe the strong balance gives ANF flexibility, including the
ability to opportunistically repurchase shares.
Catalysts/Milestones: In 2008, we expect ANF to successfully launch its fifth concept and open at least one additional flagship
store. We expect the company to continue to report solid earnings, while others in the group continue to be affected by
macroeconomic headwinds.
Risks: In addition to general market and macroeconomic risks, for Abercrombie & Fitch, risks include, among other things,
customer reaction to fashion trends, the risk of new competition, the risk associated with new ventures, the risk of management
departures and the company’s ability to find attractive retail locations.
Valuation: Abercrombie & Fitch shares are trading at 15.8x our FY07 EPS estimate of $5.20 and 13.6x our FY08 EPS estimate of
$6.05. This is well below the group average multiple of 20.3x FY07E and a discount to our five-year growth rate estimate of 17%.
The stock is trading at a discount to its historical multiple of 15.7x. The shares are trading at 7.7x FY07E EBITDA and 6.7x FY08E
EBITDA as well as 9.5x FY07E EBIT and 8.2x FY08E EBIT. We have established a 12-month price target of $100, based on
16.5x FY08E EPS, or 1.0x our long-term growth rate estimate.
Estimates: Jan. '08 Rev.: $3804.0mnE EPS: $5.20E Jan. '09 Rev.: $4358.7mnE EPS: $6.05E
Price is as of the close, November 30, 2007. Liz Dunn 212.271.3806
BIOTECHNOLOGY.................................................................................................................................................................................58
Strong Fundamentals and Attractive Valuations Could Drive Recovery in 2008
Array BioPharma Inc. (ARRY)
Robust Pipeline and Favorable Partnership Environment Key to Success in 2008
LIFE SCIENCE AND DIAGNOSTICS ..............................................................................................................................................59
Robust End Markets and M&A Environment to Provide Tailwinds in 2008
Thermo Fisher Scientific, Inc. (TMO)
Exposure to the Brightest End Markets; Margin Upside with Strong Cash Flow Generation
MEDICAL DEVICES................................................................................................................................................................................60
Counter-Cyclical at 10,000 Feet; Technology Specific in Close-Up
Masimo Corporation (MASI)
High-Quality, High-Visibility Name with Big Product Cycle and 2008 Catalyst
PHARMACEUTICAL SERVICES........................................................................................................................................................61
Continued Generic Conversions Should Drive Profitability for the PBM Industry in 2008
CVS Caremark Corp. (CVS)
CVS Remains the Best-Positioned Business Model in the PBM Industry for 2008
PHARMACEUTICALS: SPECIALTY .................................................................................................................................................62
Aging Baby Boomers Benefit Industry; Democratic President Could Result in Sweeping Changes
Sciele Pharma, Inc. (SCRX)
Sular Generic Concern Set to Disappear in Early 2008; Deep Pipeline to Drive Growth in 2008 and Beyond
BIOTECHNOLOGY Favorable
• Large-cap biotechnology valuations near all-time lows: The average 2008E P/E multiple of large-cap biotechnology
companies is 22x. This is in comparison to an average P/E multiple of 30-35x over the past five years. Considering the last two
times (2003 and 2005) P/E multiples reached trough levels the biotechnology sector recovered, we expect the average P/E
multiple to approach the low end of the historical range of 30-35x.
• M&A activity expected to continue: In the back half of 2007, M&A activity in the sector has picked up with a number of
acquisitions initiated by large-cap biotechs (Celgene/Pharmion, Biogen Idec exploring strategic alternatives) and major pharmas
(Glaxo/Reliant Pharmaceuticals). We believe this is the result of historically low valuations coupled with the large sums of cash
available on the balance sheets of large-cap biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies. In addition, pharmaceutical
companies need to augment their pipelines as patents on existing products expire, which we believe will continue to drive this
trend into 2008.
Catalysts/Milestones: Strong 4Q07 earnings and continued M&A activity are expected to drive recovery of the biotechnology
sector into 2008.
Risks: Healthcare is expected to be a major issue in the 2008 presidential election, which could put downward pressure on drug
prices as well as increase pressure to develop a clear regulatory path for generic biologics.
• Multiple data points suggest primary end markets will be robust in 2008: Pharma and biotech R&D spending growth
through 3Q was 12.9%, matching the robust growth of 2006 and without indication of a slowdown. In India, biotech and
pharmaceuticals outsourcing of research and clinical trials are driving international growth for the life science market. In
energy, oil and gas, capital expenditures are growing over 20% y/y. In environmental testing, stricter regulation for imports
and lower-cost sourcing is driving demand. In diagnostics, an aging population, better disease management and pathogen
detection will drive robust growth through 2008. Geographically, China continues to demonstrate strong production growth,
with industrial production growth averaging 17.5% year to date.
• Diversified companies are accelerating with strength in multiple end markets: The large life science and diagnostic
companies are diversified by end markets and geography, spreading their revenue base and protecting them from sector
weakness. Four out of five key markets are growing above their average pace: diagnostics, pharmaceuticals, industrial, and
environmental markets show no signs of deceleration. Basic research, outside international markets, awaits reacceleration.
• M&A will play an integral part in shaping the market place: Life science technology companies with strong balance sheets
will continue their bolt-on acquisition strategies. Both the life science and diagnostic markets continue to be fragmented, and large
multinational companies such as GE, Siemens and Danaher are moving into the market, creating further tailwinds for growth.
The early to mid-stage diagnostic industry is the most fragmented. We expect further convergence of life science and diagnostics.
Catalysts/Milestones: Catalysts include industrial production and GDP data from emerging nations, R&D spending from
pharmaceuticals and the uptake of new diagnostic tests.
Risks: Asia-Pacific has been fueling a significant portion of growth; a slowdown will hamper the revenue and earnings growth.
Declines in energy and pharmaceutical spending could also affect the industry.
Thermo Fisher Scientific, Inc. (TMO: $57.64) Mkt. Cap.: $24,588.1mn Overweight
Exposure to the Brightest End Markets; Margin Upside with Strong Cash Flow Generation
• Thermo’s diversified end markets are working: Thermo Fisher’s end-market exposure enables it to benefit from the current
growth in the pharma, industrial, energy and diagnostic end markets. Furthermore, Thermo’s diversification hedges it from
downside risk. Thermo will benefit from heightened environmental regulations, particularly in the areas of water and air
testing. Thermo also benefits from growth in China, which is experiencing strong trends in industrial production and QA/QC
testing. As well, pharmaceutical spending is a tailwind as pharmaceuticals consolidate their suppliers, expand overseas
capabilities and need new, innovative technologies.
• Margin expansion and cash generation: We believe multiple expansion will come from operating margin leverage as it
drives EPS growth. Operating margin grew 150bp in the most recent quarter, and we feel the company is on track to reach its
long-term operating margin goal of 19-20% with at least 100bp in improvement per year. Furthermore, we expect Thermo to
generate over $1bn in cash, to fuel share repurchases and industry consolidation as well as reduce debt.
• Tuck-in acquisitions and further consolidation synergies: Fisher Scientific remains a mostly separate business unit; we
believe a significant source of margin leverage will come from the consolidation of Fisher’s prior acquisitions. Furthermore, we
expect Thermo to start driving consolidation in the fast-growing, fragmented industries such as the diagnostic space, cellular
screening and anatomical pathology.
Catalysts/Milestones: We expect Thermo to post organic growth of 5-7% with operating margin expansion leveraging EPS
through 2008. We anticipate management will continue to explore internal and external consolidation, which could provide
higher visibility to our estimates.
Risks: A slowdown in demand from China and the Asia-Pacific region will hamper growth. There may be pricing pressure in the
United States and Europe. Consolidation in the pharma and biotech industries could lead to disruptions in research and
development funding.
Valuation: We view price to earnings as the relevant trading metric for diversified life science technology companies. Our 12-
month price target of $63.00 is based on 21.0x our 2008 EPS estimate of $3.00. There are always risks that the price target for any
security will not be realized. In addition to general market and macroeconomic risks, for Thermo Fisher these risks include, among
other things, a deceleration in R&D spending in the life science and industrial end markets, and unforeseen difficulties in the
integration of Fisher.
Estimates: Dec. '07 Rev.: $9625.3mnE EPS: $2.57E Dec. '08 Rev.: $10325.0mnE EPS: $3.00E
Price is as of the close, November 30, 2007. Peter Lawson, Ph.D. 212.271.3859
• Medical device stocks will be at a cross-current of two macroeconomic forces. The first is a lack of exposure to the economy
or consumer spending, which may be a positive. The second, a headwind, is the 2008 election cycle in which containment of
healthcare costs may come into focus.
• If the economy is headed into a downturn, medical device stocks may be well positioned because the space is broadly counter-
cyclical. Hospital pricing is accelerating, which benefits all medical device players but especially the orthopedic companies,
which are highly sensitive to price.
• The focus of the election campaign trail could turn to containment of healthcare spending, which would be a headwind for the
entire industry. In this case, we expect technology selection to play a key role in supporting valuations. Stocks of companies
entering big product cycles with differentiated technologies can outperform, which should benefit the likes of Masimo (MASI),
among others.
Catalysts/Milestones: The tenor of election-related rhetoric toward the healthcare industry will be important through the
November 2008 presidential election. The direction of the broader economy will be a factor as well, and could benefit the
counter-cyclical, med-tech space on a relative basis.
Risks: The impact of a potential election-driven focus on healthcare cost containment could be stronger than we expect, which
could cause multiples to contract even in the face of coming product cycles. If a downturn in the U.S. economy reduces demand
for U.S. equities, the counter-cyclical nature of the space may be insufficient to support and drive valuations.
• We believe that Masimo can become the dominant provider in the more than $1bn pulse oximetry market. Masimo has a
product that has been proven superior in over 100 published studies, and barriers to competitive entry are high. After many
years of IP litigation, Masimo’s patents were upheld in court, leading to a cessation of sales for Nellcor, the market leader, as
well as $263mn in damages and a substantial ongoing royalty payment.
• Visibility on growth for Masimo is uncommonly high. With approximately 20% share of disposables (“blades”) and 40% of the
new socket placements (“razors”), visibility on 40% share of disposables is high. Assuming no further share gains in socket
placements, this implies at least a doubling of revenues over the next six or seven years, or 20% annual growth.
• Announcement of a hemoglobin monitoring parameter could be a catalyst in the near to medium term. The company is
currently developing the ability to non-invasively monitor hemoglobin, which today can only be measured via a blood test. If
successful, we believe the market for this application could be equal in size to the $1bn pulse oximetry market. Conversion of
20% of Masimo’s existing oximetry business to a hemoglobin sensor (roughly four times the price of a standard oximeter)
would lead to a 60% increase in revenues—at very high margins. The company has stated that it intends to commercialize a
hemoglobin application within the next two years, however, we believe that the announcement of the intention to launch could
come much sooner and that it will be a meaningful catalyst for the stock.
Catalysts/Milestones: Hemoglobin announcement as early as 1Q08.
Risks: Failure or delays in the commercialization of a hemoglobin parameter could remove some of the upside in the stock.
Price pressure, which could become a factor as Nellcor—the dominant market player—loses share, could present downside to
our estimates. As with all medical device companies, recalls, product failures and litigation are all risks that could cause us to
reevaluate our stance on the stock, all else being equal.
Valuation: Our 12-month price target of $38 is based on the comparable group 5x 12-month forward EV/sales multiple on an
average of our 2011 and 2012 product revenue estimates of $449mn, discounted back at 20% for one year and 12% for two years,
for a 2008E value of $1.64bn. To this we add the Nellcor royalty as cash, which we discount back at 10% for a present value of
$102mn, for a total value of $1.74bn, or $28 per share. We have quantified the potential announcement of the hemoglobin
parameter as worth $10 to the share price.
Estimates: Dec. '07 Rev.: $250.2mnE EPS: $0.63E Dec. '08 Rev.: $276.5mnE EPS: $0.47E
Price is as of the close, November 30, 2007. Robert Faulkner 212.271.3760
Continued Generic Conversions Should Drive Profitability for the PBM Industry in 2008
• Pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs), retail and mail-order pharmacies continue to benefit from increasing generic utilization
and conversions. Lower acquisition costs help to drive margin expansion and overall profitability. As existing generics (from
conversions earlier in 2007) continue to gain traction and new generics come to market, PBMs should experience increasing
generic dispensing rates and expanding operating margins. After a lull in 2008, 2009 and 2010 are expected to be big years for
new generics.
• The PBMs have historically experienced greater profitability from their mail-order business, rather than retail claim processing.
The continued adoption of mail-order and specialty pharmacies should result in increasing EBITDA per script.
• The hybrid combination of a large drug retail chain with a PBM (i.e., CVS/Caremark) has the potential to redefine both the
drug retail and PBM industries. The hybrid model allows for diversification across retail, mail and specialty operations and can
offer many different services to consumers and health plans. The combination allows for a higher degree of customization and
flexibility for employers and health plans to better serve their constituencies. It remains to be seen if the first major retail/PBM
combination will result in further consolidation. The other major retail chains have smaller PBM, mail-order and specialty
pharmacy operations.
Catalysts/Milestones: It will take at least another year before we see the effects of the hybrid model in the market place. While
generic conversions are likely to moderate next year, we expect increasing utilization coupled with declining sourcing costs to
drive profitability. The years 2009 and 2010 are expected to be very strong for new generic conversions. We believe the PBMs
were expecting a light year in 2008, and renewed many of their contracts early to lock in profits. Upon contract renewal, margins
decline as pricing is lower than previous contracts, but margins expand over time as sourcing costs decline for mature generics.
Risks: Risks for the PBM industry include: declining pharmaceutical utilization, the transition to AMP-based Medicaid
reimbursement and greater legislative restrictions and regulatory regulations (after the 2008 Presidential election).
• While some investors may view moderated revenue growth in the company’s PBM segment negatively, it is important to note
that generic conversions are helping to drive overall profitability. In addition, from a retail perspective, CVS indicated that there
has been no change in reimbursement from payers since the beginning of 2007. This is unique, as other retail pharmacies,
notably Walgreen, attributed a recent earnings disappointment to falling generic reimbursement and profitability. We have not
seen this issue surface at CVS/Caremark and its large PBM competitors.
• CVS Caremark’s retail/PBM hybrid model is likely to combine the best elements of each business model to afford PBM
customers greater flexibility to CVS customers. Over time, it should enable the company to offer payers unique benefit
structures. Specifically, the company can probably extract more favorable sourcing terms from drug distributors. CVS is also
benefiting from better generic purchasing trends from manufacturers. In addition, when dealing with smaller PBM’s, CVS has
been more aggressive in its reimbursement negotiations, forcing these companies to maintain higher reimbursement levels to
CVS retail pharmacies. This is due to the need for smaller PBMs to include CVS’s 6,250 retail stores in the PBM networks.
• From a valuation perspective, CVS shares trade a discount to the peer group on a year-end 2008 basis. CVS shares currently
trade at 17.3x our 2008 EPS estimate of $2.32, which is below its PBM competitors at 22.5x.
Catalysts/Milestones: Any positive indications concerning the integration of the Caremark acquisition should strengthen our
long-term confidence in the company. In addition, CVS indicated that it will provide 2008 guidance during its 4Q07 conference
call on January 31, 2008, which could be a significant near-term catalyst for the shares.
Risks: Risks for CVS include: the successful integration of the Caremark acquisition; competition from traditional PBMs and
drugstores; the failure to retain clients and win new contracts; and the macroeconomic risks to front-store business.
Valuation: Our year-end 2008 price target for CVS shares is $51. This estimate is based on our discounted cash flow model,
assuming normalized growth of 3%, and a discount rate of 8.7%.There are always risks that a price target for any security will not
be realized. In addition to general market and macroeconomic risks, for CVS Caremark these risks include, among other things,
declining pharmaceutical utilization, increased regulatory scrutiny, contract cancellations and the success of its recent merger.
Estimates: Dec. '07 Rev.: $75772.6mnE EPS: $1.91E Dec. '08 Rev.: $85928.4mnE EPS: $2.32E
Price is as of the close, November 30, 2007. Steven Halper 212.271.3807
Resilient End-Market R&D Spending; Intact Drivers for Next-Generation Communication Rollouts
• Several near- and long-term positives: Test and measurement companies in our Applied Technologies universe are
benefiting from: (1) resilient and robust technology R&D spending growth (7-8% y/y for bellwether companies in the last four
quarters) despite volatile global macroeconomic conditions; (2) intact drivers for next-generation communication technology
rollouts with accelerating global interest in FTTx and IP convergence, proliferation of triple-play/multimedia/video as well as
burgeoning consumer and enterprise broadband capacity requirements; and (3) stronger international macro conditions and a
weaker U.S. dollar positioning U.S. Applied Technologies companies favorably to leverage their leading-edge intellectual
property investments into an even stronger global market position and drive exports (that already comprise almost 60% of sales
for T&M companies in our coverage).
• Leading T&M companies appear well positioned to benefit from robust R&D spending, ongoing and imminent
technology upgrade cycles, demand for higher-margin products, an improving competitive environment, streamlined costs
structures, more balanced product portfolios, and stronger balance sheets and cash flows relative to prior cycles. While current
T&M gross margins have already expanded above prior cyclical peaks, significant potential for operating margin expansion
remains.
• T&M stocks currently trade with valuations below or close to historical averages despite lower sales and margin
volatility, improved financial metrics (margins, cash flows, balance sheets), and more sustainable end-market drivers of demand.
Catalysts/Milestones: Bellwether technology company R&D spending growth in the coming quarters across communications,
computer and storage and semiconductor OEMs; telecom service provider spending trends and outlook; foreign exchange trends;
global PMI data.
Risks: Potential cutbacks in consumer and enterprise spending resulting from soft housing markets (in the United States) and
tightening credit globally could result in a slowdown in technology spending or delays in technology upgrade cycles; a reversal in
currently favorable foreign exchange trends.
• Defense budgets (and defense stocks) tend to do well in presidential election years. We see continued growth in base budgets at
least through the FY10 budget, which will be the last to be formulated under the Bush administration. Even under the new
administration, “perception of threat” will remain elevated while defense spending as a percentage of GDP will remain near 60-
year trough levels, supporting continued growth in modernization funding.
• We expect the Army to continue to increase budget share at the expense of the Navy and Air Force, driven by: (1) “reset” of
Army equipment deployed in Iraq/Afghanistan; (2) the influence of ground forces-centric “lessons learned” on future spending
plans; and (3) investment in new equipment to support the Army’s planned addition of 74,000 soldiers by 2010.
• The year 2007 marked the commercial aerospace industry’s third consecutive year of record orders, providing backlog visibility
supporting our outlook for a sustained up-cycle. We believe orders peaked in 2007 but deliveries will not peak before 2012. The
resumption of buying by domestic mainline carriers in 2008 could further extend the up-cycle and prove a catalyst for the
aerospace sector.
• In our coverage, the soft spot remains homeland security. Funding is available, but large technology initiatives have been slow
to move forward. We blame continued organizational changes, shifting requirements and rapidly evolving technology. We see
“rifle shot” investment opportunities among our small- and mid-cap coverage, but remain wary of the timing of the promised
inflection points.
Catalysts/Milestones: On the defense side, the next major catalyst should be passage of the FY08 supplemental budget in
December or January, followed by the FY09 budget submittal in early February, which we expect to be in line with or better than
consensus expectations. On the commercial aerospace side, catalysts are likely to include economic data and Boeing’s progress
toward 787 development and production milestones.
Risks: Defense risks include: a change in budget priorities that would shift funding away from defense; a faster-than-expected
decline in operating tempo in Iraq and Afghanistan; and potential policy changes under a new administration. Commercial
aerospace risks include economic growth, high fuel prices and successful development of new aircraft like the 787.
Healthy and Growing U.S. E-Commerce Market with Secular Shift Remains Strong
• E-commerce growth remains robust as secular trends remain strong: U.S. e-commerce grew 19% in 3Q07, which
compared to a 20% increase in 3Q06 and a 23% advance in 3Q05, showing remarkable stability of growth. As more merchants
expand their online offerings and consumers become increasingly comfortable with online shopping, e-commerce continues to
take share from the traditional retail channel. According to the U.S. Department of Commerce and factoring in eBay’s U.S.
gross merchandise volume (GMV), e-commerce sales totaled $39bn in 3Q07, and accounted for approximately 3.8% of total
retail sales, up from 3.4% in 3Q06, 3.0% in 3Q05, and 2.6% in 3Q04.
• Multi-channel retailing trends: Multi-channel e-commerce continues to outpace even the rapid growth of general
e-commerce as more retailers develop solutions to take advantage of their existing retail footprints while offering the
convenience of an online shopping environment. Forrester estimates that 16% of all retail sales, or $400bn, are influenced by
online activities, and research suggests an investment in these strategies should pay dividends.
• International expansion: Although the trends in the United States continue to be strong, international growth continues to be
even more robust as broadband and e-commerce are generally at an earlier growth phase of adoption relative to that of the
United States. Specifically, we estimate U.S. e-commerce should grow 19% in 2007, while international e-commerce should
grow 25% over the same period.
Catalysts/Milestones: At 3.8% of share of total commerce, e-commerce is still much less penetrated relative to other Internet
categories. As consumers get more comfortable buying more online particularly in high ASP categories, such as LCD TVs and
diamond jewelry, the robust growth curve should continue.
Risks: With a prevailing credit crunch crisis, a tighter labor market and high oil prices, any major economic downturn may
further weaken the U.S. economy and drain consumer confidence, causing e-commerce sales growth to slow down. An early read
on the holiday trends for 4Q suggests, however, that the customer’s resilience may continue to be strong, staving off concerns
that consumer spending may be slowing down.
• A slowing U.S. economy has weighed on domestic advertising growth in 2H07, particularly among traditional advertising-
driven companies. With recent downgrades in the 2008 macroeconomic outlook, we believe visibility in domestic advertising
plays has become less clear. As such, we direct investors to names with less economic sensitivity or company-specific
opportunities to drive earnings growth.
• We are bullish on theatre operators given the 3-D opportunity. Among advertising-supported businesses, we are more
sanguine on cinema advertising and online advertising. Among traditional media players, we believe TV broadcasters with
retransmission consent payment opportunities as well as Spanish-language demographic tailwinds could fare well in 2008.
• Theatre operators stand to benefit from increased attendance and ticket pricing surrounding 3-D technology. We look for
growing 3-D film announcements in 2008. In cinema advertising, U.S. prices trail those of foreign peers and do not yet reflect
the value delivered to marketers, thus, we expect dollars to continue to flow into the medium despite macro-related headwinds.
Online advertising, while not immune from any economic slowdown, may be better protected against a downturn than more
traditional ad-supported media, given that online ad spending often directly drives revenue. We focus on online properties with
stronger end markets, such as the videogame advertising space, which should benefit from increased penetration of next-
generation gaming consoles, as well as PC end markets, in which ad dollars are shifting online.
Catalysts/Milestones: In 3-D cinema, catalysts include upcoming films in 3-D and studio announcements surrounding 3-D. For
cinema advertising, we believe the consolidation of screens in June 2008 may be a catalyst for higher prices.
Risks: Broad economic weakness could lead marketers to reduce ad budgets. The ongoing Hollywood writers strike, if not
resolved soon, could end up reducing new TV and film content and/or content quality slated for 2008 and 2009.
• Wireless telecommunications services are evolving from luxury products and services to essential products and services. This
trend is increasingly evident in Latin America, where penetration levels are on the rise and are significantly greater than wireline
penetration levels. This compares to the United States, where wireless usage is overtaking wireline usage.
• In the United States, we see increasing penetration through services catering toward younger or credit-challenged customers.
Companies specializing in prepaid or youth-oriented services should continue to expand the U.S. wireless market. Both prepaid
and post-paid ARPUs should get a boost as 3G data services become more prevalent and enter the mainstream.
• Companies providing Internet infrastructure are well positioned for growth in 2008. As demand for online services from
businesses, particularly small- and medium-sized ones, increases, services such as application hosting, colocation and content
acceleration will fuel growth in this market segment.
Catalysts/Milestones: Within the United States, user acceptance of increased wireless data speeds and content packages.
Increasing wireless penetration, continued stability and economic prosperity in Latin America.
Risks: An economic slowdown in the United States would prevent subscribers from adding to their monthly wireless spending
and more significantly affect lower-end wireless subscribers, in addition to reducing business spending. Worsening economic
trends in Latin America could also slow subscriber growth, which would, in turn, pressure top-line growth in the region.
SOFTWARE: INFRASTRUCTURE.....................................................................................................................................................84
Cheaper Bandwidth Drives Internet-Centric Solutions: Endpoint Proliferation Drives Demand for Systems
Management While “Winner(s) Takes All” in Growing Datacenters Squeezes Enterprise Vendors
Digital River Inc. (DRIV)
Outsourced Sales and Marketing on the Internet: More Bandwidth and End-Points Enlarge the Overall
E-Commerce Market
Telco and Satellite Footsteps Leave Cable with No Choice But to Spend on Advanced Services
• Competition forcing cable operators' hands: With cable MSO stocks under fire due to slowing revenue generating unit
(RGU) growth, it is clear that telco and satellite competition is taking its toll. DTV has been aggressively marketing a 100-
channel HDTV offering (versus the typical cable operator with 25-30 linear HD channels), while Verizon has been touting its
faster broadband speeds (symmetrical 20Mbps service with FiOS). MSOs are thus faced with the delicate balance of satisfying
Wall Street’s opposing demands: greater free cash flow generation and preservation of current revenue and RGU growth trends.
• Fighting back by rolling out advanced services: Rather than cause cable MSOs to pull back, however, we are confident that
the rising competition will only drive spending on key strategic initiatives that will help MSOs retain subscribers and support
RGU growth. We expect operators to accelerate efforts around (1) switched digital video (SDV) to free up bandwidth for new
HD channels, (2) higher broadband speeds via DOCSIS 3.0 upgrades, (3) commercial services, which go after the highly
lucrative SMB market dominated by telcos, and (4) more aggressive marketing for triple-play subscribers (which churn much
less) along with more double-play options.
• Cable capital expenditure (capex) can still grow in 2008, while declining as percentage of revenue: Many of the MSOs
are trying to soothe Wall Street concerns over capex by claiming that 2007 will be the peak year in terms of capex as a percentage
of revenue. While we do not disagree with this, we still believe that overall capex could grow in the 5-10% range next year for
the top-five MSOs to an estimated $13bn (and drop as a percentage of revenue) if we exclude roughly $500-600mn in 2007
capex related to one-time events such as the 707 set-top mandate and the Adelphia rebuild.
Catalysts/Milestones: We will be looking for signs that the telco and satellite operators are getting more aggressive with respect
to their marketing and rollout of advanced services. We also expect that MSOs will provide preliminary 2008 capex guidance on
their respective 4Q calls with guidance likely reflecting a healthy variable capex outlook, especially for advanced services.
Risks: There are two key risks: (1) if 2008 capex for the top-five MSOs comes in below our expectations and (2) if the MSOs
continue to struggle with subscriber additions, which could negatively affect spending on customer premise equipment.
Expect Mobile PC Demand and Higher Storage Capacity Needs to Trigger IT Spending
• Higher-capacity 2.5-inch HDDs, lucid LCD displays, powerful processors, the continued proliferation of wireless data networks,
and lower ASPs are rendering notebook PCs viable desktop replacements in both the consumer and commercial spaces. We
estimate that CY08 mobile shipments will grow 27% y/y on strong demand, which will positively benefit a number of spaces. By
2009, we estimate that the number of annual notebook shipments will exceed desktop shipments.
• Storage needs will continue to accelerate with the digital content invasion of social networks, digital videos and digital music
stores. One-terabyte drives will become a standard in the data center, and the storage of high definition video on DVRs should
catalyze the growth of consumer electronics HDDs, specifically DVRs.
• While virtualization was the major theme for 2007, deduplication will be a major theme for 2008 as corporations focus on more
efficient storage of their high capacity digital content.
Catalysts/Milestones: Over 34.2% y/y notebook growth is expected to be achieved for 2007, and that momentum should carry
over into 2008. A leading hard drive company announced a 320GB notebook HDD, and 1TB 3.5-inch drive is being configured
for both commercial and consumer use to handle the influx of digital content.
Risks: Falling ASPs could lead to a price war, which would lower the revenue impact from accelerating mobile growth.
• Truly disruptive technology provides big performance edge at reduced cost for the customer: Although traditional data
warehouses are implemented by using server, storage and database management software from separate vendors, Netezza
provides all three products in one appliance called the Netezza Performance Server (NPS), which offers superior performance
and significantly lower TCO. With 8 patents (15 pending), the NPS should be able to maintain its lead over competitors in
terms of performance, ease of use and power savings.
• Large growing market shifting Netezza’s way equals big share gains and top-line growth: The overall datawarehouse
market is not that “sexy,” but it is solid and expected to grow at a 7% CAGR (when including hardware costs) to $13bn by 2009.
This substantial market size and expected share gains by Netezza should provide opportunity for rapid top-line growth (35%-
plus) for at least three to five years.
• Differentiated technology leads to strong financial model: Netezza’s “secret sauce” includes expertise in software as well as
hardware design, a combination that we believe provides unique, highly defensible technology, which when combined with low-
cost components should allow for steady 60% gross margin, providing the ability to leverage operating margin into the 10-15%
range over time. This should result in a long-term top- and bottom-line CAGR of over 35%.
Catalysts/Milestones: With new customer wins, the Netezza Performance Server is building the reputation that it offers
tremendous advantages over using solutions from its leading competitors (which are shedding the reputation of being a datamart
to being an enterprise datawarehouse solution).
Risks: Netezza’s average deal size comprises a significant portion of quarterly revenue, which may lead to lumpiness.
Valuation: Our DCF suggests a 12-month price target of $18. Risks to our price target include competitive response from
incumbent vendors, slower-than-expected growth of the datawarehouse market and push-outs of larger deals beyond the current
fiscal year.
Estimates: Jan. '08 Rev.: $120.7mnE EPS: $0.07E Jan. '09 Rev.: $160.2mnE EPS: $0.24E
Price is as of the close, November 30, 2007. Kevin Hunt, CFA 617.488.4162
Affiliated Computer Services, Inc. (ACS: $41.96) Mkt. Cap.: $4,237.4mn Overweight
Controversy Sets Up Compelling Risk/Reward Opportunity
• While ACS appears well-positioned to benefit from the broader industry trend of cost-cutting through global delivery (the
company has 27% of its employee base located in global delivery centers), the main catalysts for this stock over the next 12
months will be the reacceleration of bookings following the resolution of the change in control and recent boardroom
dissention.
• The boardroom drama and its related impact on new business signings aside, the internal operations are healthier today than
any other time in the past 2-3 years as the company is at the tail end of completing an 18-month overhaul of problem contracts
(two large HR outsourcing contracts, Dept of Education, etc.), recently anniversaried client losses from the Mellon acquisition
and certain restructuring initiatives have been implemented to lower costs.
• Despite potentially weak bookings (down 20% in FY07, down 8% in FY08 and flat in FY09), the company is still capable of
generating 4% internal growth with these assumptions, given its recurring revenue base (85% of revenue), contract duration
(five years on average) and relatively robust customer retention (over 90%), which implies annual free cash flow of $360-400mn
over the next two years.
Catalysts/Milestones: We view the recent change in board members and the execution of the recently authorized share
repurchase program ($200mn authorized and a total of $1bn endorsed) as two key catalysts for the stock. The board issue is
particularly important as it helps curtail the negative headlines and should facilitate management’s efforts to stabilize the company
and reaccelerate growth in new business signings.
Risks: The risks to our thesis include successful execution of the portfolio of contracts, the ability to reaccelerate bookings
growth now that the uncertainty around the buyout is diminished and the ability to maintain margins.
Valuation: The stock is trading at 11.2x our CY08 FCF estimate of approximately $380mn (a 9% FCF yield), which is an 18%
discount to its peer group at 13.7x. Our $60 12-month price target is 15.0x our FY09 (June) free cash flow estimate and is based on
5% and 4% earnings growth in FY08 and FY09, respectively. There are always risks that the price target for any security will not be
realized. In addition to general market and macroeconomic risks, for ACS, these risks include, among other things, successful
execution of the portfolio of contracts, the ability to grow bookings given the uncertainty around the buyout and the ability to
maintain margins.
Estimates: Jun. '08 Rev.: $6099.7mnE EPS: $3.34E Jun. '09 Rev.: $6343.6mnE EPS: $3.66E
Price is as of the close, November 30, 2007. David Grossman 415.364.2541
Expect 4Q08 Recovery in Fab Equipment Orders Following Prolonged Memory Capacity Digestion Period
• We expect semiconductor industry capex to decline 21% y/y in 2008 following a modest 6% y/y increase in 2007. While we
observe evidence of broad-based strength in semiconductor end markets (PCs, handsets, GPS systems), we believe that
declining capacity requirements in the memory segment (60% of 2007 industry capex) will dominate in 2008 over modest
increases in the foundry and logic capex (40% of total). Following a slower-than-expected ramp of MS Vista and healthy fab
yield ramps, oversupply in the DRAM market has led to 83% erosion in DRAM ASPs) from January-December 2007 and
prompted 2008 capex cuts at several DRAM makers. As lower pricing drives higher DRAM content per PC (from 1.4GB in
4Q07 to 2.0MB by 4Q08, we believe), we expect DRAM-related capex to lead a recovery in orders beginning in 4Q08. While
investor sentiment in the space normally improves two to three quarters ahead of an expected trough in orders, we believe
continued uncertainty around consumer spending in 2008 will leave cycle-sensitive stocks in the group range-bound in 1H08.
• We believe bulls in the semiconductor equipment space are misreading evidence of high fab utilization levels at TSMC and
UMC (95% in 4Q07, we estimate) leading competitors as evidence of an impending 1H08 order bonanza for equipment
vendors. While several key logic device manufacturers (TI, Sony) have in 2007 announced plans to abandon captive
manufacturing and technology development for 45nm (and below) and to source wafers at foundry partners, our analysis
suggests that the related increased demand for foundry capacity will be minimal in 2008 but contribute to 15% y/y foundry
capex growth in 2009. We note that 65nm development activity has lagged expectations, resulting in excess leading edge
capacity. Also, early expectations for 45nm design activity appear weak, thus, further depressing demand for leading-edge
equipment in 2009.
• 2008 consensus estimates for semi equipment vendor revenue growth is currently down 2% y/y, suggesting to us that revenue
and EPS estimates will see downward revisions of 15-20% and 25-30%, respectively, over the next 6-12 months. Buy-side
expectations for EPS in the group, we estimate, are more realistic but will also be trimmed by 5-10% from current levels.
Catalysts/Milestones: We expect 2008 capex guidance in 1H08 will support our cautious expectations for equipment orders in
2008. We look for new DRAM demand drivers (e.g., Win 7.0) to drive memory capex growth of 10-20% capex growth in 2009.
Risks: Robust holiday sales of consumer electronics may lead to DRAM price stability earlier than we anticipate (1H08 vs. 2H08),
triggering related capex growth in 2008 (vs. 2009). Penetration of NAND-based PC notebooks also represents potential upside.
• We expect VRGY to increase market share in the $4bn automated test equipment (ATE) industry from 16% in 2006 to 25% in
2011. The key driver is the move to outsourcing of the test and assembly activities of integrated circuit (IC) manufacturing from
approximately 44% of total ICs, we estimate, to 60% by 2011. VRGY is favorably leveraged to this trend as test houses focus
capacity investment on a small number of test platforms capable of performing a wide range of test activities for multiple
customers at unpredictable volumes. Specific applications for VRGY growth include RF, NAND and high-speed DRAM.
• Our checks suggest VRGY’s 93k test platform offers maximum flexibility, scalability and road map extendibility for IC test
customers, suggesting to us that VRGY will emerge as a leading ATE supplier as industry consolidation reduces from six to
seven players to two to three players by 2011. We expect VRGY to deliver 2007-2011 revenue CAGR of 15% versus the peer
average of 8%.
• VRGY went public in 2006 with an outsourcing-targeted model that we believe removes much of the cycle risk that weighs on
semi-cap peers. We expect the gross margin to increase from 46% in F3Q07 to 48% by FY09 and for the operating margin to
average 15-20% during 2007-2012. VRGY delivered a LTM ROIC of 24% and has $424mn ($7.01 per share) in net cash.
Catalysts/Milestones: As VRGY continues to exceed expectations each quarter (every quarter since IPO, guidance has
exceeded expectations), we expect investors to become increasingly comfortable with VRGY’s growth through the cycle strategy.
Risks: Consumer weakness may create oversupply in IC test capacity in 2008, delaying a recovery in equipment demand. VRGY
price target risks include: (1) cyclical risk related to the semiconductor industry; (2) threat of product introductions from
competitors; (3) price competition; (4) potential negative impact of new test technologies; and (5) risk of product obsolescence.
Valuation: Our $35 12-month price target reflects a 17x multiple on our CY08 EPS estimate of $2.04. VRGY currently trades at
12.4x our CY08 EPS estimate, above the 10.7x median for test equipment vendors, but well below key comparable TER at 15.5x.
The 17x P/E multiple associated with our price target compares to a five-year EPS CAGR for VRGY that we estimate will be 20%.
Estimates: Oct. '08 Rev.: $761.6mnE EPS: $1.97E Oct. '09 Rev.: $875.6mnE EPS: $2.77E
Price is as of the close, November 30, 2007. Douglas G. Reid, CFA 212.271.3841
Consumer Product Cycle and Developing Emerging Markets Appear Likely to Sustain Growth of HPA/MS
• Expect consumer and computing market strength to continue and industrial to remain sluggish: We believe many
consumer products—LCD TVs, smartphones, GPS, 802.11n, etc.—could be reaching their respective inflection points for
mass adoption. We also expect demand for notebook computers to remain strong as desktops are increasingly replaced by
notebooks. As such, certain aspects of notebooks may receive added attention than previously given, including better interface
for a plethora of peripherals and improved battery life for multimedia/entertainment applications. One industry source
forecasts the LCD TV and notebook markets to both grow in excess of 20% CAGR from 2007-2011.
• Era of the emerging markets: World market boundaries are diminishing and trade globalization is in full swing. While the
U.S. market may be slowing, we believe demand growth in Asia (more specifically, China) could remain robust. Progress is
brisk in that region, and consumers continue to develop greater sophistication and taste for higher end products. In addition,
due to scarcity of resources, more attention is given to power management and energy efficiency than in the U.S. or Europe.
Thus, we believe companies active overseas, especially those participating in power management, can effectively differentiate
themselves from their peers and could outperform players that mainly serve the North American and European markets.
• Impact from potential slowdown of the U.S. and European market: Traditional analog mixed signal (AMS) companies sell
into a broad array of end markets, and therefore, a slowing U.S. economy with a greater emphasis than Asia and industrial
market segments could have an impact on them. But nimble and smaller players tackling the right end market could experience
above-market or even accelerated growth over the next two to three years.
Catalysts/Milestones: We believe catalysts for the analog and mixed signal industry include the 2008 Olympics in Beijing,
China; continuing demand strength in emerging markets; and stabilization of the U.S. economy and housing market.
Risks: Risks to the analog and mixed-signal industry include global economic downturn that thwarts demand for new innovative
products and increases in geopolitical stability that add to business risks.
• Addresses key growth markets: O2Micro is best known for being a supplier of display backlighting solutions for LCD TVs
and notebook displays (approximately 60% of sales). With retail prices of LCD TVs having declined dramatically, we believe
the LCD TV market could be at the cusp of mass adoption, not only in the United States and Europe but also in developing
countries such as China and India. China, in particular, potentially could be entering a growth cycle ahead of the 2008 Olympics
in Beijing. Less known is O2Micro’s technology and market leadership in multi-cell (4-15) Lithium-ion battery management.
The company targets China’s high-volume, e-bike market with intelligent Li-ion battery management solutions. In addition, we
believe O2Micro is a leading component supplier to growing electric vehicles (EVs) markets. Finally, O2Micro has been
developing and marketing a SOHO VPN firewall solution for the Greater Pacific Rim market. We believe this market has not
received much attention from U.S.- and European-based players and could be an excellent opportunity for the company.
• Focuses on emerging markets: In contrast to traditional analog companies that address diverse end markets and mainly
service the North American and European markets, O2Micro targets emerging markets, especially China, with 100% of sales
overseas and 0% exposure to the U.S. domestic market. Over time, the company has built one of the largest corporate
technology R&D staff in China with 400-plus engineers (600-plus overall).
• Operating leverage remains: Finally, we believe O2Micro’s legal strategy, while not always popular with investors, has been
successful. The company has reached settlements with several firms. The settlements have opened up new opportunities, and
with litigation expenses expected to come down, we believe significant leverage remains in the company’s operating model.
Also, the company recognizes revenues as customers/OEMs draw parts from its hub system, which reduces O2Micro’s
exposure to the part of the semiconductor cyclicality that is attributable to supply chain inventory fluctuation, and O2’s revenue
recognition policy, which is equivalent to sell-through, reflects the company’s conservative stance in accounting.
Catalysts/Milestones: 2008 Olympics in Beijing, accelerated adoption of Li-ion battery technology and growth in PacRIM.
Risks: Risks to our thesis include global economic slowdown, increase in participation from traditional analog players in the
Pacific Rim, change in consumers’ taste/preference, and delay in the adoption of products in O2Micro’s target markets.
Valuation: Our 12-month price target of $25 is based on 25.6x our 2008E non-GAAP EPS, in line with peer group average.
Estimates: Dec. '07 Rev.: $165.4mnE EPS: $0.71E Dec. '08 Rev.: $201.1mnE EPS: $0.98E
Price is as of the close, November 30, 2007. Tore Svanberg 650.688.5261
Demand for Interactivity and Multimedia Content in Mobile Consumer Electronics to Drive Innovation
• The user experience goes mobile: The Apple iPhone and the promise of the Google Android platform illustrate that the
convergence of the 3Cs—computing, consumer, communications—has really kicked off. The current push is to incorporate
technologies that would drive more usage of revenue-generating services and applications by delivering richer multimedia
content, more sophisticated applications, and higher interactivity. The smartphone segment of the handset market is forecasted
to grow from 10% of the market in 2007 to more than 25%, or more than one in four handsets or 1.5bn units by 2012 (IMS
Research). The increasing popularity of mobile gaming and a new crop of gaming-friendly handsets offering high-quality 3D
graphics are expected to drive end-user generated revenues from mobile games to nearly $10bn by 2009 (Juniper Research). We
believe these trends would bring market growth opportunities for semiconductor companies with products that enable this user
experience, including delivering processing power for high-def video recording, mobile gaming, and touch-screen interface.
• Rapid time-to-market requires strong execution: The relentless pace of the consumer electronics product cycle is driving
shorter and more frequent design cycles for semiconductor companies. We believe this not only favors more focused merchant
chip suppliers over captive players, but also those companies with the capital to sustain the ongoing R&D investment and a
track record of solid execution.
• Emerging market demand growth brings new market realities and competitors: The growth in disposable spending in
developing economies has created more opportunities for the consumer electronics industry. For instance, more than 460mn
mobile users are expected to download games by 2009, double the current number, according to Juniper Research, with much
of this growth from emerging markets such as India. However, these regions often demand lower price points. In addition, the
market growth provides fertile ground for low-cost Asian semiconductor suppliers to compete effectively with U.S. and
European players because of their faster and responsive customer support. In our view, only companies with well-established
supply chain relationships and efficient operating structures can remain competitive in this market environment.
Catalysts/Milestones: Catalysts include: continued investment in overseas R&D and support infrastructure; more platform
offerings for mobile computing by semiconductor companies; and integration to drive weaker players out of the market.
Risks: Risks include: consumer demand weakness; increased competition worldwide; potential severe pricing erosion; and
potential disappointing holiday sell-through, which could lead to inventory build in 1Q08 or longer.
• Turnaround story unfolding through debt reduction, revenue growth, growth margin expansion and positive cash
flow: ON Semi’s management team has orchestrated a rather extraordinary turnaround based on debt reduction and higher
valued product introductions, which we believe the Street is only beginning to acknowledge. We believe the company’s full
pipeline of new products and design wins will continue to expand the gross margins to the 45% range from today’s 38%. ON’s
recent acquisition of ADI’s voltage regulation products should provide an immediate foothold in key power management
designs in NB and server platforms.
• ON Semi’s acquisition of LSI’s Gresham fab should allow margins to continue to trend higher and position the company
uniquely at the 0.13um processing node giving the company leading-edge internal manufacturing, which we believe will give
ON both a cost and technology edge over its competitors.
• ON Semi is undervalued relative to its peer group, in our opinion. The shares are trading at roughly 8.9x our 2008E GAAP
earnings while the peer group is trading at an average of 15.9x. We note that investors have a buying opportunity as, in our
opinion, the ON turnaround story is far from over.
Catalysts/Milestones: Gresham fab transition from foundry to internal product production expected in 2H08 and transition of
newly acquired ADI products to Gresham fab.
Risks: Risks include weakening market demand, fab utilization, market acceptance for new products and currency exchange rate.
Valuation: We believe ONNN shares will continue to benefit from a pipeline of new high-profile design wins in growth markets
allowing for a richer mix of proprietary products expanding gross margins. We believe the Gresham fab will provide internal
leading-edge technology and products beginning in 2008, solidifying the company as an industry leader in the power management
segment of the semiconductor industry. ONNN’s gross margin has expanded to roughly 85% of that of its comp group’s, justifying
a P/E multiple of 85% of the group’s 15.9x, in our opinion; therefore, we base our 12-month $15 price target on 16x our 2008
GAAP EPS estimate of $0.92.
Estimates: Dec. '07 Rev.: $1565.3mnE EPS: $0.79E Dec. '08 Rev.: $1690.0mnE EPS: $0.92E
Price is as of the close, November 30, 2007. Kevin Cassidy 650.688.5264
• While the convergence of wireless, broadband, video and voice within the communications space is by no means a new
development, the release of the iPhone as a potential game-changer earlier this year appears to have intensified the competition
among carriers, which were already seeing heightened competition from cable MSOs encroaching into their territory. Telcos, in
turn, are threatening cable’s traditional pillar of strength in video. Although consolidation and leadership changes at some of
the leading telcos and wireless providers contributed to a more cautious spending environment in 2007, we believe that the
trend of service providers venturing out of their core businesses is likely to benefit broader communications software vendors.
• On-demand software companies have provided much of the excitement for software investors in 2007, with enterprises
embracing the lower-cost Web delivery model, and with high-growth, on-demand vendors being rewarded with multiple
expansion. Lost in all the hype, however, is the fact that traditional communications software multiples have contracted by
about 30% since the beginning of the year on a forward calendar year P/E basis and about 20% on a forward calendar year
TEV/sales basis, which we believe makes for attractive risk/reward scenarios within the communications software space.
• Given the uncertain spending environment, we believe that the market is not currently pricing in any assumed pickup in capital
expenditures in 2008 and that any positive data points should provide a boost to the stocks at currently depressed multiples.
Catalysts/Milestones: We continue to look to carrier commentary on capital spending plans as the key indicator for future
communications software revenue, as it has been the most important indicator in the past, although other metrics such as ARPU,
churn reduction and increased multi-play uptake are also important metrics that could prove to trigger software spending.
Risks: As traditional communications software stocks exit a very difficult 2007, the primary risk for these companies is that
service providers continue to tighten their belts on transformation projects. In addition, the entrance of non-traditional
competitors in hardware and advertising pose potentially significant threats to telecoms and cable providers.
• Amdocs 7.5 could prove to be a company-specific catalyst even if uncertain spending environment continues: We
believe that Amdocs’ next product release, v7.5 (likely due for general release in 1H08), will more tightly integrate and enhance
some of the modular components of Amdocs 7 and could spur action by both telcos and cable companies that have been
holding off on upgrades until now. In particular, we believe that Amdocs 7.5 will be well suited for cable MSOs and that the
company will achieve significant wins in this vertical in 2008.
• Margins likely to show some improvement as Sprint and AT&T managed services contracts are absorbed: With the
Sprint migration in its final stages heading into 2008 and the AT&T contract heading into its third quarter, we think that
Amdocs is likely to see some margin improvement as the front-end costs of the contracts are absorbed and as revenues
associated with the projects increase. We do note, however, that any additional managed services contract wins could offset the
margin benefit of the maturation of the Sprint and AT&T deals, although we see modest margin expansion in 2008.
• Valuation on a price/earnings basis attractive compared to historical multiples: We remind investors that Amdocs has
historically traded at an average forward calendar year multiple of about 19.0x compared to its current multiple of 13.6x. We
believe that Amdocs’ current valuation represents an attractive entry point for value-oriented investors with a longer-term time
horizon, with potential earnings upside and margin expansion in CY08 outweighing the downside risks from these levels. We
also note that earnings are likely to benefit from the $350mn remaining in the company’s stock buyback in CY08.
Catalysts/Milestones: We think that cable and satellite deals in the pipeline in conjunction with the release of Amdocs 7.5 will
prove to be the primary catalysts for Amdocs stock in 2008. We look for the company’s OSS division, Cramer, to continue to
perform well and for geographic strength in Europe to help offset North American weakness.
Risks: The primary risks associated with Amdocs involve slowdowns in carrier spending, any unexpected deployment costs
associated with large-scale projects, and a slower-than-expected adoption of the company’s next upgrade cycle.
Valuation: We hold a 12-month price target of $47.50 on shares of Amdocs. Our price target is based on three valuation
techniques: our discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis, our CY08E price/earnings/growth (P/E/G) multiple and our CY08E P/E
multiple. Amdocs currently trades at 2.1x CY08E TEV/sales and 13.6x P/E based on our CY08 estimates versus its comparable
group, which trades at means of 2.5x and 17.6x, respectively.
Estimates: Sep. '08 Rev.: $3090.0mnE EPS: $2.37 Sep. '09 Rev.: NE EPS: NE
Price is as of the close, November 30, 2007. Tom Roderick 415.364.5952
• With little or no competition, Digital River is a unique provider of outsourced sales and marketing for consumer software on
the Web, allowing small companies to effectively address global markets by removing the complexities of international payment
and tax transactions, as well as compliance standards, such as the recent Payment Card Industry Data Security Standards (PCI
DSS). Its scalable e-commerce platform drives enhanced margins for both Digital River and its customers compared to
traditional solutions.
• We view Digital River as a play on lower-cost bandwidth and endpoint growth, as it supports the secular trend toward
e-commerce.
• Recent sell-off enhances attractive valuation: Since reporting in-line 3Q07 results and maintaining organic guidance on October
25, shares of Digital River have declined 14.3% compared to a 3.3% decline in the NASDAQ. We are estimating 19.5%
revenue growth in 2008 and see potential for upside to our current operating margin estimate of 28.6%. At 17x our 2008 EPS
estimate of $2.27, a discount to the peer group at 22x, we think shares are attractive.
Catalysts/Milestones: 2007 proved to be somewhat of a transition year for the company, with 2008 poised to benefit from
ramping sales of Microsoft Office 2007 and the international Symantec business, with potential for upside from the newer
consumer electronics and gaming verticals.
Risks: Risks to our outlook include: (1) dependence on Symantec business for 38% of revenue; (2) the move from soft goods to
hard goods, which represents a challenge and the outcome is uncertain; and (3) the company strategy that relies on acquisitions,
which decreases organic growth transparency and increases execution risk and/or the risk that the company overpays for acquired
assets.
Valuation: Our 12-month price target of $55 for Digital River is based on the average implied value per share from two valuation
techniques: a P/E of 22x our 2008 EPS estimate of $2.27, which is a discount to the peer group at 25x 2007E; and a multiple of
20x our 2008 free cash flow estimate of $2.96 per share, which is a discount to the peer group at 24x 2007E. There are always risks
that the price target for any security will not be realized. In addition to general market and macroeconomic risks, for Digital River,
these risks include, among others, revenue concentration from a few large customers and the ability to sign new customers to
maintain growth.
Estimates: Dec. '07 Rev.: $348.1mnE EPS: $1.87E Dec. '08 Rev.: $416.0mnE EPS: $2.27E
Price is as of the close, November 30, 2007. Tim Klasell 415.364.2949
"FactSet" is utilized to calculate Op Mgns, BV, Cash, Debt, CFO, NI, FCF, Capex, Depreciation Expense, Capitalization, Consensus EPS, ROC and ROE.
Return on Total Capital (ROC) = (Pretax Income + Interest Exp.) / (Total Assets - Cur. Liabilities) x 100 Tangible Book Value = (Book Value - Goodwill & Intangible Assets)
Return on Equity (ROE) = (Latest 12 month EPS / BV per shr) x 100 Debt / Total Cap = Total Debt / (Total Debt + Shareholders Equity).
FCF = Net Cash Flow from Ops - Capex + Common & Preferred Cash Dividends FCF = Net Cash Flow from Ops - Capex + Common & Preferred Cash Dividends
Current FY Oper.
Cons EPS Margin
Rev Change Most EV/ LTM EV/ Price/ Price/ Debt / Bridge
11/30/07 YTD % P/Rev Growth EPS Since P/E EPS Growth 2007E Recent ROC ROE Div. LTM FCF/ LTM Tang. Net Total Mkt
Company Ticker Rating Price Chg FY08E 2008E FY07E FY08E 1/1/2007 FY07E FY08E FY07E FY08E PEG Quarter % % Yield EBITDA Share FCF Book Cash Cap Cap ($mn)
Consumer
Global Payments, Inc. GPN M $43.22 (7.4) 2.8x 15% $1.76 $1.93 ($0.17) 24.6x 22.4x 14% 10% 1.3x 21.6 16.4 15.1 0.2% 11.8x $2.03 19.6x 10.7x 12.5x 0% $3,410
H&R Block HRB O $19.68 (15.5) 1.4x 10% $1.12 $1.39 ($0.28) 17.6x 14.2x 24% 24% 1.2x (68.8) 12.4 36.9 2.9% NA ($2.67) Neg NA Neg 67% $6,389
Heartland Payment Systems HPY U $32.28 10.9 0.8x 17% $0.99 $1.18 ($0.02) 32.6x 27.4x 30% 19% 0.6x 5.5 19.8 22.4 1.0% 17.1x $0.68 43.2x 12.9x 19.8x 0% $1,210
Jackson Hewitt JTX U $32.25 (8.4) 3.1x 7% $1.97 $2.02 ($0.15) 16.4x 16.0x 18% 3% 1.4x (639.4) 10.5 21.1 2.3% 10.0x $1.58 25.5x NA Neg 58% $972
MasterCard MA M $200.65 105.0 6.0x 10% $5.39 $6.19 $1.47 37.2x 32.4x 55% 15% 1.2x 32.6 27.6 25.4 0.3% 20.7x $5.87 29.4x 10.1x 8.7x 7% $26,434
MoneyGram MGI O $15.44 (52.9) 0.8x 16% $1.54 $1.80 ($0.04) 10.0x 8.6x 13% 17% 0.6x 15.1 14.8 25.1 1.4% 1.2x ($3.64) Neg 24.0x 1.4x 42% $1,276
Nelnet NNI M $13.79 (51.2) 1.1x 1% $1.87 $2.06 ($0.57) 7.4x 6.7x -18% 10% 0.4x 4.9 0.0 1.5 2.1% 20.7x $5.14 NM 2.1x Neg 98% $682
Net 1 UEPS Technologies, Inc. UEPS M $30.96 3.1 6.2x 18% $1.08 $1.32 $0.13 28.7x 23.5x 5% 22% 1.6x 43.0 25.4 20.0 - 12.5x $1.98 13.4x 8.5x 7.5x 1% $1,620
QC Holdings QCCO M $13.89 (14.5) 1.2x 4% $0.90 $1.15 $0.01 15.4x 12.1x 100% 28% 1.0x 2.9 13.4 13.9 2.9% 6.8x $0.71 17.7x 3.0x 34.5x 13% $268
SLM Corporation SLM O $38.08 (24.2) 4.3x 21% $2.53 $3.28 ($1.04) 15.1x 11.6x -12% 30% 1.1x (18.2) 0.6 16.3 - 29.2x $2.97 NM 4.2x Neg 97% $15,765
The First Marblehead Corp. FMD M $30.01 (48.2) 2.8x 16% $3.92 $4.26 $0.24 7.7x 7.0x 66% 9% 0.1x 74.0 44.5 40.2 3.9% 3.0x ($0.37) Neg 2.7x 9.4x 9% $2,806
The Western Union Company WU O $22.60 3.1 3.1x 13% $1.12 $1.33 ($0.00) 20.2x 17.0x -5% 19% 2.0x 26.3 27.5 NM 0.0% 13.6x $1.49 16.5x NA Neg NM $16,971
87
Source: First Call, Baseline, FactSet and Thomas Weisel Partners LLC estimates
88
TWP Research Universe
Current FY Oper.
Cons EPS Margin
Rev Change Most EV/ LTM EV/ Price/ Price/ Debt / Bridge
11/30/07 YTD % P/Rev Growth EPS Since P/E EPS Growth 2007E Recent ROC ROE Div. LTM FCF/ LTM Tang. Net Total Mkt
Company Ticker Rating Price Chg FY08E 2008E FY07E FY08E 1/1/2007 FY07E FY08E FY07E FY08E PEG Quarter % % Yield EBITDA Share FCF Book Cash Cap Cap ($mn)
Restaurants: Matthew DiFrisco
Burger King BKC O $26.30 24.4 1.5x 7% $1.09 $1.29 $0.06 24.1x 20.4x 354% 18% 1.3x 15.9 9.6 20.7 1.0% 11.0x $0.61 52.7x NA Neg 55% $3,556
The Cheesecake Factory CAKE M $23.29 (5.9) 1.0x 15% $1.08 $1.33 ($0.13) 21.6x 17.5x 6% 23% 1.0x 7.4 11.4 13.1 - 10.1x ($0.84) Neg 2.8x Neg 20% $1,661
Caribou Coffee Company CBOU M $4.60 (47.8) 0.3x 5% ($0.92) ($0.69) ($0.65) NA NA NA NA NA (15.9) Neg Neg - 8.2x ($0.42) Neg 1.2x 15.5x 0% $89
CBRL Group CBRL M $33.46 (26.8) 0.3x 4% $2.50 $2.96 ($0.19) 13.4x 11.3x NA 18% 0.9x 9.1 7.3 62.5 2.2% 7.2x $5.83 11.5x 7.5x Neg 88% $794
O'Charley's CHUX U $14.91 (29.9) 0.3x 4% $0.88 $0.97 ($0.17) 16.9x 15.4x 2% 10% 1.5x 2.7 2.2 3.0 1.6% 5.0x $0.58 35.9x 1.3x Neg 29% $331
Brinker International EAT M $23.03 (24.8) 0.7x 1% $1.49 $1.68 ($0.30) 15.5x 13.7x 1% 13% 0.8x 7.5 NA 28.7 1.9% 6.3x $0.10 NM 4.3x Neg 58% $2,424
Kona Grill KONA O $15.75 (23.6) 1.1x 27% ($0.05) $0.04 ($0.04) NA 393.8x NA NA NA 2.1 Neg Neg - 22.6x ($1.20) Neg 2.8x 12.2x 7% $103
McDonald's MCD O $58.47 35.0 3.0x 0% $2.86 $3.16 $0.28 20.4x 18.5x 24% 10% 1.7x 26.7 7.7 12.0 2.5% NA $1.55 41.3x 5.6x Neg 34% $69,156
McCormick & Schmick's MSSR O $14.66 (40.3) 0.5x 21% $0.99 $1.14 ($0.09) 14.8x 12.9x 8% 15% 0.6x 2.8 8.4 8.4 - 7.2x ($0.66) Neg 1.4x Neg 9% $216
SECTION III: TWP VALUATIONS
Peet's Coffee PEET M $26.72 0.1 1.3x 18% $0.66 $0.80 ($0.05) 40.5x 33.4x 5% 21% 1.9x 4.2 5.4 5.2 - 16.6x ($2.55) Neg 2.6x 28.3x 0% $371
P.F. Chang's PFCB M $25.59 (33.0) 0.5x 15% $1.19 $1.40 ($0.19) 21.5x 18.3x -4% 18% 1.1x 2.8 8.3 9.8 - 6.8x ($0.68) Neg 2.2x Neg 11% $665
Red Robin Gourmet RRGB M $39.56 6.7 0.7x 17% $1.87 $2.15 $0.05 21.2x 18.4x 3% 15% 1.0x 7.7 7.7 10.9 - 8.5x $0.45 NM 3.7x Neg 37% $664
Starbucks SBUX O $23.39 (35.6) 1.5x 18% $0.87 $1.03 ($0.06) 26.9x 22.7x 19% 18% 1.1x 8.6 20.8 28.1 - 12.1x $0.29 79.8x 8.2x Neg 36% $17,084
Sonic SONC M $24.40 (0.6) 1.8x 10% $0.95 $1.11 ($0.03) 25.7x 22.0x 8% 17% 1.2x 24.7 10.8 NM - 10.0x $0.17 NM NA Neg NM $1,483
Texas Roadhouse TXRH O $12.59 (6.4) 1.0x 26% $0.54 $0.68 $0.00 23.3x 18.5x 23% 26% 0.8x 9.1 10.5 11.3 - 10.4x ($0.27) Neg 3.7x Neg 17% $942
Metabasis Therapeutics MBRX M $2.87 (62.8) 1.5x 586% ($1.31) ($0.44) ($0.07) NA NA NA NA NA (482.0) Neg Neg - Neg ($1.19) Neg 2.1x 1.9x 13% $88
Neurocrine Bioscience NBIX M $13.02 23.1 11.5x 4054% ($2.95) ($1.84) ($0.40) NA NA NA NA NA (5,338.1) Neg Neg - Neg ($1.91) Neg 2.0x 6.5x 17% $495
Rigel Pharmaceuticals RIGL O $7.16 (40.4) 4.3x 206% ($1.99) ($1.46) ($0.72) NA NA NA NA NA NA Neg Neg - Neg ($1.80) Neg 2.3x 2.0x 2% $222
Telik, Inc. TELK M $3.35 (26.9) NA NA ($0.88) ($1.01) $0.72 NA NA NA NA NA NA Neg Neg - Neg ($1.07) Neg 1.7x 1.7x 0% $176
Theravance THRX O $24.09 (21.3) 21.9x 115% ($2.19) ($1.40) ($0.42) NA NA NA NA NA (613.1) Neg NM - Neg ($1.79) Neg NA 10.8x -1% $1,467
Cubist Pharmaceuticals CBST O $21.24 12.6 3.1x 32% $0.88 $1.00 $0.22 24.1x 21.2x NA 14% 0.7x 19.4 11.1 49.5 - 29.3x $1.44 18.2x 16.6x Neg 88% $1,191
Human Genome Sciences HGSI O $10.41 (17.0) 7.6x 374% ($1.57) ($0.62) $0.03 NA NA NA NA NA (591.8) Neg Neg - Neg ($1.16) Neg 19.9x Neg 95% $1,401
InterMune, Inc. ITMN M $16.24 (48.7) 19.4x -52% ($2.09) ($2.65) ($0.78) NA NA NA NA NA (192.9) Neg NM - Neg $0.19 91.9x NA Neg NM $633
Medarex, Inc. MEDX M $12.70 (18.6) 14.6x 131% ($0.25) ($1.07) $1.28 NA NA NA NA NA (401.4) Neg Neg - Neg ($1.25) Neg 3.1x 13.9x 37% $1,616
MGI Pharma MOGN M $34.61 88.7 5.0x 36% $0.78 $1.08 $0.18 44.4x 32.0x NA 38% 1.1x 11.4 Neg Neg - NM $0.29 NM NM Neg 78% $2,790
Progen Pharmaceuticals Ltd. PGLA O $2.31 (53.4) 82.2x -29% ($0.39) ($0.32) NA NA NA NA NA NA (2,851.5) NA Neg - Neg ($0.29) Neg 4.2x 1.0x 0% $94
ViroPharma, Inc VPHM M $8.94 (41.6) 3.4x -11% $1.21 $0.84 $0.03 7.4x 10.6x 27% -31% NA 54.9 16.7 19.8 - 2.2x $1.60 2.5x 1.7x 2.0x 35% $625
89
90
TWP Research Universe
Current FY Oper.
Cons EPS Margin
Rev Change Most EV/ LTM EV/ Price/ Price/ Debt / Bridge
11/30/07 YTD % P/Rev Growth EPS Since P/E EPS Growth 2007E Recent ROC ROE Div. LTM FCF/ LTM Tang. Net Total Mkt
Company Ticker Rating Price Chg FY08E 2008E FY07E FY08E 1/1/2007 FY07E FY08E FY07E FY08E PEG Quarter % % Yield EBITDA Share FCF Book Cash Cap Cap ($mn)
Life Science Technology: Paul Knight
Affymetrix AFFX M $20.85 (10.5) 3.6x 7% $0.27 $0.30 ($0.02) 77.2x 69.5x NA 11% 3.5x 0.1 1.3 1.6 - 27.8x ($0.07) Neg 3.6x N/M 29% $1,439
Applied Biosystems ABI O $34.16 (7.3) 2.6x 7% $1.41 $1.60 $0.07 24.2x 21.4x 13% 13% 2.1x 15.6 NA 24.7 0.5% 13.2x $2.18 15.6x NA N/M 20% $5,745
Array BioPharma ARRY O $11.07 (12.4) 15.1x -6% ($1.36) ($1.87) ($0.32) NA NA NA NA NA (314.2) Neg Neg - Neg ($0.37) Neg 5.9x 3.5x 14% $522
Caliper Life Sciences CALP M $5.47 (3.0) 1.9x 1% ($0.24) NA ($0.01) NA NA NA NA NA (7.2) Neg Neg - Neg ($0.39) Neg 13.9x 52.4x 8% $260
Dionex Corp. DNEX M $84.47 48.8 4.4x 9% $2.31 $2.62 $0.08 36.6x 32.2x 22% 13% 1.6x 19.4 24.5 24.8 - 19.2x $3.30 25.3x 10.3x 30.7x 9% $1,576
Harvard Bioscience ** HBIO M $4.24 (23.0) 1.4x 12% $0.30 $0.35 $0.03 14.1x 12.1x 15% 17% 0.5x 10.3 9.4 9.3 - 8.6x $0.18 18.8x 2.9x 11.1x 4% $131
Invitrogen IVGN M $97.01 69.4 3.3x 6% $4.00 $4.40 $0.61 24.3x 22.0x 29% 10% 1.5x 13.3 Neg Neg - 19.7x $5.99 22.0x NA Neg 57% $4,517
Metabolix MBLX M $21.52 9.3 17.4x 2538% ($1.33) ($0.65) ($0.06) NA NA NA NA NA (5,434.4) Neg Neg - Neg ($0.55) Neg 4.9x 4.1x 0% $483
Mettler Toledo MTD O $116.36 46.9 2.2x 7% $4.55 $5.20 $0.50 25.6x 22.4x 26% 14% 1.5x 14.4 17.6 29.8 - 16.5x $5.06 24.6x NA Neg 41% $4,196
Milipore ** MIL M $81.88 20.9 2.7x 7% $3.35 NA $0.03 24.4x NA 17% NA NA 15.5 4.6 10.3 - 16.8x $1.86 61.1x NA Neg 63% $4,469
SECTION III: TWP VALUATIONS
PerkinElmer ** PKI O $27.28 22.3 1.7x 10% $1.27 NA ($0.03) 21.5x NA 14% NA NA 10.2 6.8 7.6 1.0% 13.4x $0.93 29.3x NA Neg 14% $3,234
Symix Technology SMMX M $7.66 (65.7) 1.6x 37% ($0.30) ($0.10) ($0.42) NA NA NA NA NA (12.0) 11.4 10.8 - 8.6x $0.19 7.3x 1.1x 1.3x 0% $256
Thermo Electron ** TMO O $57.64 26.5 2.3x 7% $2.40 NA $0.18 24.0x NA 26% NA NA 10.9 5.7 4.0 - NA $2.36 26.6x NA Neg 18% $24,213
Varian VARI O $70.05 58.5 2.2x 7% $2.34 $2.72 $0.24 29.9x 25.8x 24% 16% 1.3x 10.1 10.4 10.1 - 16.1x $2.93 22.0x 5.5x 12.6x 4% $2,132
Suntech Power Holdings STP O $79.17 139.0 4.7x 82% $1.27 $2.68 ($0.12) 62.3x 29.5x 87% 111% NA 14.5 11.8 20.2 - NM ($0.70) Neg 17.4x Neg 54% $11,912
MEMC Electronic Materials WFR O $77.58 93.5 7.5x 23% $3.32 $4.27 $0.75 23.4x 18.2x 62% 29% 0.6x 42.3 42.3 34.6 - 18.8x $2.65 26.1x 10.3x 14.7x 2% $17,775
Verasun Energy VSE M $11.81 (39.2) 0.6x 133% $0.15 $0.55 ($0.80) 78.7x 21.5x -90% 267% 3.2x 4.9 3.8 13.2 - 11.8x ($1.08) Neg 2.0x Neg 55% $1,097
91
92
TWP Research Universe
Current FY Oper.
Cons EPS Margin
Rev Change Most EV/ LTM EV/ Price/ Price/ Debt / Bridge
11/30/07 YTD % P/Rev Growth EPS Since P/E EPS Growth 2007E Recent ROC ROE Div. LTM FCF/ LTM Tang. Net Total Mkt
Company Ticker Rating Price Chg FY08E 2008E FY07E FY08E 1/1/2007 FY07E FY08E FY07E FY08E PEG Quarter % % Yield EBITDA Share FCF Book Cash Cap Cap ($mn)
Media & Broadcasting: Lloyd Walmsley
CNET Networks CNET O $7.58 (18.4) 2.5x 12% $0.07 $0.15 $0.92 108.3x 50.5x -53% 114% 1.4x 2.6 Neg Neg - 19.5x $0.15 48.5x 9.6x N/M 19% $1,152
Digital Theater Systems DTSI M $24.75 2.3 7.5x 16% $0.40 $0.65 ($0.14) 61.9x 38.1x 21% 63% 1.5x 15.1 0.1 0.1 - 41.9x ($0.62) Neg 3.3x 5.0x 0% $436
Entravision EVC O $7.48 (6.4) 2.0x 7% $0.12 $0.15 ($0.11) 62.3x 49.9x -29% 25% 1.7x 19.5 2.1 3.1 - 10.6x $0.55 21.8x NA Neg 41% $617
Gaiam GAIA O $23.55 68.8 1.6x 13% $0.33 $0.50 $0.03 71.4x 47.1x 50% 52% 1.6x 6.0 4.3 4.2 - 30.1x $0.78 23.9x 3.8x 5.5x 0% $457
Infospace INSP M $17.81 (11.9) 4.5x -45% ($0.92) $0.10 ($1.19) NA 178.1x NA NA 11.9x (33.7) Neg Neg - Neg NM Neg 1.4x 2.8x 0% $592
Lamar Advertising LAMR M $52.01 (20.2) 3.8x 6% $0.38 $0.50 ($0.15) 136.9x 104.0x -10% 32% 5.2x 22.2 1.4 4.8 - 14.9x ($2.07) Neg NA Neg 75% $4,914
Lions Gate Entertain LGF O $9.23 (12.2) 0.9x 25% $0.25 ($0.80) ($1.01) 36.9x NA 2400% NA NA (15.7) Neg Neg - 7.3x $0.26 67.2x NA Neg 88% $1,111
National CineMedia NCMI O $27.68 NA 2.9x 19% $0.56 $0.80 NA 49.4x 34.6x 40% 43% 1.4x 55.1 NA NM 2.2% 16.2x NM Neg NA Neg NM $1,163
Netflix, Inc. NFLX O $23.10 (8.0) 1.1x 11% $0.80 $0.85 $0.08 28.9x 27.2x 13% 6% 1.4x 6.5 16.1 14.8 - 4.0x $0.38 46.4x 4.9x 4.0x 0% $1,519
Regal Entertainment RGC O $19.79 (3.6) 1.1x 4% $0.82 $0.92 ($0.09) 24.1x 21.5x 15% 12% 1.4x 12.1 19.3 NM 5.8% 8.8x $1.41 22.2x NA Neg NM $3,032
SECTION III: TWP VALUATIONS
Time Warner TWX O $17.26 (21.3) 1.3x 2% $0.98 $1.10 ($0.04) 17.6x 15.7x 13% 12% 0.8x 16.4 5.0 7.8 1.5% NA $0.78 34.5x NA Neg 39% $62,388
Westwood One WON M $1.91 (73.5) 0.4x 1% $0.30 $0.30 ($0.08) 6.4x 6.4x -27% 0% 0.6x 19.5 Neg Neg - 5.2x $0.63 9.2x NA Neg 62% $167
Technology
Communications Components: Jeremy Bunting
Applied Micro Circuits AMCC M $2.51 (31.2) 2.8x -17% $0.11 ($0.01) ($0.21) 22.8x NA 83% NA NA (24.0) Neg Neg - Neg ($0.07) Neg 2.2x 4.8x 0% $685
Atheros ATHR M $29.49 34.6 3.4x 18% $1.06 $1.26 $0.16 27.8x 23.4x 47% 19% NA 8.8 8.7 7.8 - 30.0x $1.17 20.4x 6.3x 7.6x 0% $1,675
Broadcom BRCM O $26.74 (16.3) 3.3x 15% $1.14 $1.20 ($0.22) 23.5x 22.3x -16% 5% NA 0.7 4.2 4.1 - 90.9x $1.37 16.2x 5.6x 6.2x 0% $14,461
Cavium Networks CAVM M $25.65 NA 11.8x 61% $0.12 $0.46 NA 213.8x 55.8x NA 283% NA 1.3 NA Neg - NM $0.09 NM 9.0x 40.5x 40% $1,019
Centillium CTLM M $1.38 (36.9) 0.9x 56% ($0.50) ($0.22) ($0.24) NA NA NA NA NA (57.1) Neg Neg - Neg ($0.41) Neg 2.6x 1.4x 6% $57
Hittite Microwave Corp. HITT M $43.19 37.2 7.4x 15% $1.77 $1.73 $0.25 24.4x 25.0x 20% -2% NA 45.9 29.3 25.2 - 16.1x $1.54 25.0x 6.8x 8.5x 0% $1,339
Ikanos Communications IKAN M $5.93 (36.1) 1.3x 23% ($0.42) $0.26 ($0.19) NA 22.8x NA NA NA (39.1) Neg Neg - Neg ($0.45) Neg 1.5x 1.6x 0% $173
Marvell MRVL O $14.94 (21.3) 3.1x 26% $0.56 $0.39 ($0.28) 26.7x 38.3x -11% -30% NA (0.8) Neg Neg - Neg ($0.11) Neg 10.7x 71.4x 11% $8,822
Mellanox Technologies MLNX M $17.74 NA 4.8x 32% $0.78 $0.90 NA 22.7x 19.7x 255% 15% NA 26.5 21.8 14.0 - NA $0.62 24.6x 3.4x 10.0x 38% $530
Mindspeed MSPD M $1.40 (31.4) 1.1x 17% ($0.09) $0.06 ($0.02) NA 23.3x NA NA NA (1.1) Neg Neg - Neg ($0.14) Neg 22.0x Neg 86% $163
NetLogic Microsystems NETL O $29.25 32.1 4.4x 31% $1.19 $1.43 $0.07 24.6x 20.5x 1% 20% NA 6.0 5.8 5.6 - 52.8x $1.24 18.7x 5.3x 6.1x 0% $620
PMC Sierra PMCS M $7.02 1.8 2.9x 17% $0.23 $0.37 ($0.06) 30.5x 19.0x -15% 61% NA 6.9 Neg Neg - 61.8x $0.29 24.8x NA Neg 44% $1,524
RF Micro Devices RFMD O $5.78 (15.5) 1.1x -2% $0.51 $0.30 ($0.19) 11.3x 19.3x 132% -41% NA 3.2 11.3 16.8 - 8.9x $0.43 14.5x 1.7x Neg 52% $1,130
Silicon Labs SLAB O $37.14 8.1 5.3x 16% $1.23 $1.54 ($0.03) 30.2x 24.1x 3% 25% NA 11.8 4.4 3.8 - 61.9x $0.11 NM 3.0x 3.2x 0% $2,047
SiRF Technology SIRF O $24.09 (5.8) 3.2x 36% $1.05 $1.40 $0.00 22.9x 17.2x 22% 33% NA (1.3) Neg Neg - 52.5x $0.64 36.5x 7.7x 12.5x 1% $1,446
Skyworks Solutions, Inc. SWKS M $9.08 22.7 1.8x 11% $0.48 $0.59 ($0.11) 18.9x 15.4x 118% 23% NA 9.5 5.6 7.3 - 17.2x $0.21 47.4x 4.8x Neg 38% $1,468
TranSwitch Corp TXCC U $1.02 (30.9) 2.8x 47% ($0.13) $0.01 ($0.10) NA 102.0x NA NA NA (57.5) Neg Neg - Neg ($0.10) Neg 18.2x 8.6x 57% $136
Vitesse VTSS S $0.95 9.8 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA (22.7) Neg NM - Neg ($0.15) Neg 32.1x Neg 45% $210
Sonus Networks SONS O $6.58 (3.8) 4.1x 33% $0.11 $0.25 ($0.30) 59.8x 26.3x -48% 127% 0.9x (12.2) 9.0 8.7 - Neg ($0.02) Neg 3.8x 5.2x 0% $1,766
Starent Networks STAR NA -- No data provided due to regulatory quiet period
Sycamore Networks, Inc. SCMR M $3.85 (1.9) 6.2x 13% $0.08 $0.15 $0.01 48.1x 25.7x -43% 88% 2.6x (5.5) 1.1 0.9 - Neg $0.06 8.6x 1.1x 1.2x 0% $1,090
UTStarcom, Inc. UTSI S $2.90 (67.9) NA NA NA NA ($0.81) NA NA NA NA NA (8.6) Neg Neg - Neg ($1.43) Neg .5x Neg 50% $352
Zhone Technologies Inc. ZHNE NR $1.25 (2.3) 0.9x 15% ($0.12) $0.00 ($0.05) NA NA NA NA NA (15.4) Neg Neg - Neg ($0.11) Neg 2.4x 22.5x 22% $187
93
94
TWP Research Universe
Current FY Oper.
Cons EPS Margin
Rev Change Most EV/ LTM EV/ Price/ Price/ Debt / Bridge
11/30/07 YTD % P/Rev Growth EPS Since P/E EPS Growth 2007E Recent ROC ROE Div. LTM FCF/ LTM Tang. Net Total Mkt
Company Ticker Rating Price Chg FY08E 2008E FY07E FY08E 1/1/2007 FY07E FY08E FY07E FY08E PEG Quarter % % Yield EBITDA Share FCF Book Cash Cap Cap ($mn)
Enterprise Hardware: Kevin Hunt
Apple Computer Inc. AAPL M $182.22 110.8 4.9x 36% $4.13 $5.30 $1.70 44.1x 34.4x 72% 28% 1.7x 17.1 28.5 24.3 - 30.1x $5.41 30.0x 11.1x 10.2x 0% $159,541
Compellent Technologies CML O $12.90 NA 5.1x 59% ($0.30) $0.02 NA NA 645.0x NA NA 25.8x (15.5) NA NM - Neg ($0.42) Neg 31.1x Neg 83% $395
Cray CRAY O $5.83 (50.8) 0.8x 30% $0.02 $0.25 ($0.59) 291.5x 23.3x NA 1150% 1.6x 7.9 3.7 5.3 - 11.8x $0.34 18.4x 2.3x Neg 52% $190
Data Domain DDUP NA -- No data provided due to regulatory quiet period
DELL DELL M $24.54 (4.6) 0.9x 7% $1.22 $1.47 $0.01 20.1x 16.7x -16% 20% 1.4x 5.3 50.0 43.7 - 9.6x $1.31 13.9x 7.7x 4.5x 10% $54,868
EMC Corporation EMC O $19.27 44.2 2.7x 13% $0.80 $0.94 $0.07 24.1x 20.5x 29% 18% 1.0x 13.8 10.7 12.9 - 16.4x $0.99 19.8x 8.8x Neg 37% $40,433
Emulex ELX M $16.75 (15.3) 2.7x 9% $1.13 $1.17 $0.01 14.8x 14.3x 13% 4% 1.6x 10.7 3.6 4.2 - 9.0x $1.31 10.0x 3.4x 5.0x 0% $1,400
Hewlett-Packard HPQ M $51.16 22.5 1.2x 7% $2.84 $3.27 $0.47 18.0x 15.6x 19% 15% 1.6x 9.2 16.1 18.6 0.6% 11.1x $2.02 24.6x 10.3x 44.8x 18% $131,894
Hutchinson Technology HTCH M $26.31 9.3 0.9x 10% $0.29 $1.26 ($0.17) 90.7x 20.9x -61% 334% 2.1x 3.0 0.7 1.2 - 10.4x ($1.45) Neg 1.1x Neg 56% $686
Immersion Corporation IMMR U $13.13 83.0 9.0x 29% ($0.02) $0.19 $4.53 NA 69.1x NA NA 5.8x (30.9) 183.8 99.8 - Neg $3.17 3.0x 3.1x 3.4x 12% $396
SECTION III: TWP VALUATIONS
Intevac, Inc. IVAC O $15.70 (42.4) 1.7x -6% $1.27 $0.91 ($0.08) 12.4x 17.3x -43% -28% 1.2x 16.0 33.4 28.2 - 3.1x $2.37 3.7x 1.8x 2.5x 2% $339
Netezza NZ O $13.22 NA 6.3x 52% ($0.15) $0.07 NA NA 188.9x NA NA 5.4x 1.9 NA Neg - NA $0.08 NM 5.6x 28.4x 43% $757
Network Appliance Corp. NTAP M $24.71 (37.2) 2.7x 18% $1.10 $1.22 ($0.15) 22.5x 20.3x 49% 11% 1.0x 10.1 13.6 17.2 - 20.7x $2.04 11.1x 9.6x 11.4x 16% $8,792
Qlogic QLGC O $13.52 (37.0) 3.2x -1% $0.95 $0.87 ($0.24) 14.2x 15.5x 32% -8% 0.9x 20.5 12.4 12.5 - 8.6x $1.36 8.1x 3.5x 4.8x 0% $1,851
Rackable Systems RACK O $10.65 (66.4) 0.5x 25% ($0.58) $0.23 ($1.35) NA 46.3x NA NA 1.9x (3.1) Neg Neg - Neg ($0.45) Neg 1.3x 1.7x 0% $213
Seagate Technology STX O $25.79 (3.7) 1.1x 12% $1.68 $2.64 $0.06 15.4x 9.8x -16% 57% 0.9x 12.2 17.2 25.1 1.6% 7.6x $1.56 17.7x 5.7x Neg 34% $13,721
Sun Microsystems, Inc. JAVAD M $20.78 (2.4) 1.2x 3% $0.78 $1.20 $0.40 26.6x 17.3x NA 54% 1.4x 5.5 8.6 9.6 - 10.7x $0.72 25.7x 5.5x 9.4x 24% $17,218
Voltaire VOLT O $7.50 NA 2.2x 34% ($0.13) $0.25 NA NA 30.0x NA NA 1.2x 1.2 NA Neg - NA ($0.46) Neg 2.4x Neg 51% $154
Western Digital WDC O $27.63 35.2 0.8x 33% $2.03 $3.10 $0.60 13.6x 8.9x 19% 53% 0.9x 10.4 25.6 30.4 - 8.6x $1.34 21.7x 3.8x Neg 36% $6,081
95
SECTION IV: TWP’S PROPRIETARY LEADING INDICATORS
Please go to the following web address for detailed disclosure information: http://www.tweisel.com/disclose/110800.
This report contains statements of fact relating to economic conditions generally and to parties other than Thomas Weisel
Partners. Although these statements of fact have been obtained from and are based on sources that Thomas Weisel Partners
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opinions and estimates included in this report constitute Thomas Weisel Partners LLC's judgment as of the date of this report and
are subject to change without notice. This report is for information purposes only. It is not intended as an offer or a solicitation
with respect to the purchase or sale of a security, and it should not be interpreted as such. This report does not take into account
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recommendations in this report.
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Private customers should not rely on the contents of this document.
Thomas Weisel Partners International Limited, authorized by the FSA, has approved this document for the sole purpose of the
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© Thomas Weisel Partners LLC, 2007. All rights reserved. Any unauthorized use, duplication or disclosure is prohibited by law
and will result in prosecution.
Communications Equipment:
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Hasan Imam, PhD
himam@tweisel.com 212.271.3698
Thomas Weisel Partners LLC • One Montgomery Street • San Francisco CA 94104 • tel 415.364.2500 • fax 415.364.2695 • www.tweisel.com