Sps. Lago vs. Judge Abul, Jr.

Facts: Complainants were the defendants in a civil action for Preliminary Injunction, Easement of Road Right of Way, and Attorneys Fees, with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), filed by Christina M. Obico. Complainants assert that the civil complaint was never raffled, and that no notice of raffle was ever served upon them, yet the case went directly to Branch 43, where respondent judge is the acting presiding judge. Complainants claim that this is violative of Section 4(c), Rule 58 of the Rules of Court. On July 7, 2009, respondent judge issued an Order directing the issuance of a TRO effective seventy two (72) hours from date of issue, without requiring Obico to put up a bond. Complainants allege that at that time, they were not yet in receipt of the summons and copy of the complaint, as well as Obicos affidavit and bond. On July 14, 2009, respondent judge issued an Order extending the 72-hour TRO, which had already expired, for another period provided that the total period should not exceed twenty days. Again, respondent judge failed to require Obico to put up a bond. In his Resolution dated August 11, 2009, respondent judge ordered, among others, the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction conditioned upon the application of a bond by Obico in the amount of P100,000.00. Issue: Whether or not the preliminary injunction is properly issued as provided in Rule 58 of the Rules of Court. Held: Respondent judge have been grossly and deliberately ignorant of the law and procedure for violation of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, specifically by means of the following acts: (1) When the civil complaint with prayer for the issuance of a TRO was filed on July 2, 2009, respondent judge assumed jurisdiction thereon and, without the mandated raffle and notification and service of summons to the adverse party, issued a 72-hour TRO on July 7, 2009. Respondent Judge disregarded the mandatory requirements of Section 4(c), Rule 58, relative to the raffle in the presence of the parties, and service of summons. (2) When respondent judge set the case for summary hearing on July 14, 2009, purportedly to determine whether the TRO could be extended for another period, when the hearing should be set within 72 hours from the issuance of the TRO. Section 5, Rule 58 is explicit that such summary hearing must be conducted within the said 72-hour period. (3) When he eventually granted an extension of an already expired TRO to a full 20-day period. An already expired TRO can no longer be extended. (4) When he issued a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of Obico without prior notice to herein complainants and without the required hearing. Moreover, respondent judge committed another blunder when he ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction without the required hearing and without prior notice to the defendants, herein complainants. Again, Rule 58, as amended, mandates a full and comprehensive hearing for the determination of the propriety of the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, separate from the summary hearing for the extension of the 72-hour TRO. Respondent judge railroaded the entire process by treating the summary hearing for the extension of the TRO as the very same hearing required for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.

Archbishop of San Fernando vs. Soriano, et.al., G.R. No. 153829, August 17, 2011 Facts: The RCA of San Fernando, Pampanga, filed an ejectment case against several individuals unlawfully occupied the disputed land and refused to vacate despite repeated demands. On the other hand, defendants countered that the RCA has no cause of action against them because its title is spurious. They contended that the subject land belonged to the State, but they have already acquired the same by acquisitive prescription as they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in continuous possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years. MCTC rendered decision on September 28, 2001 in favor of the RCA. Defendants appealed to the Regional Trial Court and CA were likewise denied hence, the decision ejecting the defendants from the premises became final. Seeking to enjoin the implementation of the writ of execution and the notice to vacate, Guinto filed the instant Petition for Injunction with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). Meanwhile, during the pendency of the ejectment case at the MCTC filed a case against the RCA for Quieting of Title and Declaration of Nullity of Title before the RTC of Macabebe, Pampanga. They claimed that they are in actual possession of the land in the concept of owners and alleged that OCT No. 17629 in the name of RCA is spurious and fake. Before filing its Answer, the RCA moved to dismiss the case on grounds of noncompliance with a condition precedent, laches, and for being a collateral attack on its title. In an Order dated June 4, 2001, the RTC denied the motion to dismiss. Thereafter, the RCA filed with the CA a petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction. CA promulgated the assailed Decision dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by RCA. Issues: Whether the CA erred in not holding that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to dismiss filed by the RCA. Held: To be entitled to the injunctive writ, the applicant must show that there exists a right to be protected which is directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined. Furthermore, there must be a showing that the invasion of the right is material and substantial and that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. The applicant's right must be clear and unmistakable. In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the writ constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Where the applicant's right or title is doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of an actual existing right is not a ground for injunction. There must be a patent showing by the applicant that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be directed are violative of said right. In this case, the defendants in the ejectment case possess no such legal rights that merit the protection of the courts through the writ of preliminary injunction. The MCTC has already rendered a decision in favor of the RCA and ordered the defendants therein to vacate the premises. Their appeal to the RTC was dismissed and the decision has become final. Evidently, their right to possess the property in question has already been declared inferior or inexistent in relation to the right of the RCA in the MCTC decision which has already become final and executory.

Dolmar Real Estate vs. CA,

G.R. No. 172990, February 27, 2008

Spouses Philip and Nancy Young filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against Dolmar Real Estate Development Corporation, et.al.. The complaint also prayed that a TRO and a preliminary injunction be issued ordering petitioners to: (a) cease and desist from further violating the provisions of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) dated March 4, 2003 and the Shareholders Agreement dated May 16, 2003 executed by the parties; (b) comply with their obligations and duties stipulated in the said agreements by restoring to respondents-spouses Young their authority to manage the corporation; (c) abide by the quorum and consensus rules established in the said agreements governing the exercise of corporate acts and powers; and (d) desist from holding the meeting of the Board of Directors of the corporation scheduled on June 3, 2005. On June 2, 2005, the trial court issued a 72-hour restraining Order preventing the holding of the Board of Directors meeting on June 3, 2005. On June 17, 2005, after a summary hearing, the trial court issued the TRO prayed for by respondents-spouses Young and set the hearing on the prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction on June 21, 2005. The trial court likewise approved the bond in the amount of P100,000.00 posted by said respondents. The trial court issued an Order granting the preliminary injunction filed by Sps. Young. Petitioners then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the status quo ante Order for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals issued a Resolution denying the petition for certiorari. Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals, in issuing the assailed Resolutions, acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Held: The sole object of a writ of preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve the status quo and prevent further injury on the applicant until the merits of the main case can be heard. The status quo is the last actual peaceable uncontested status which preceded the controversy. The injunctive writ may only be resorted to by a litigant for the preservation and protection of his rights or interests during the pendency of the principal action. The grant or denial of an application for a writ of preliminary injunction rests upon the sound discretion of the issuing court. For grave abuse of discretion to exist as a valid ground for the nullification of the grant or denial of the injunctive writ, as contemplated by Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, there must be capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. An order granting a preliminary injunction, whether mandatory or prohibitory, is interlocutory and unappealable. However, it may be challenged by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The Court cannot disturb the sound discretion exercised by the Court of Appeals sustaining the trial court status quo ante Order, unless there is a patent abuse of discretion. The instant petition is denied for lack of merit.

Civil Service Commission vs. CA, G.R. No. 159696, November 17, 2005 Facts: A Complaint for Grave Misconduct and Moonlighting with Urgent Prayer for Preventive Suspension and Disarming was filed by the stockholders and board members of United Workers Transport Corp. (UWTC) against SPO1 Rimando Gannapao before the Philippine National Police, Inspectorate Division, Camp Crame, Quezon City. Pursuant to NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No. 96-010 dated July 21 1996, a Summary Hearing was conducted by the Office of the Legal Service of the National Headquarters PNP against respondent for the alleged moonlighting. Records show that prior to the investigation conducted by the Office of Legal Service, however, another pre-charge investigation had been held for the same case by the Headquarters Support Services also of the National Headquarters of the PNP. The investigation appears to have been dismissed upon the recommendation of Atty. Joselito Casugbu, who found the complaint to be one of pure harassment. On November 26, 1997, the Philippine National Police Chief Recaredo A. Sarmiento II rendered a Decision imposing the three (3) months suspension of respondent. Respondent appealed the PNP Resolution to the National Appellate Board (NAB), National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) and DILG. The appeal was likewise dismissed by NAPOLCOM and DILG. Respondent appealed to the Civil Service Commission rendered a decision that the suspension of Gannapao for a period of three (3) months is modified to dismissal from the service. On May 30, 2002, Gannapao filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals issued a Resolution granting Gannapaos motion for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining, restraining and prohibiting CSC from implementing its assailed CSC Resolution No. 020487 dated April 3, 2002 dismissing respondent. The CA based its ruling on the probability that the immediate execution of the CSC Decision might cause injustice and irreparable damage to petitioner. Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the Motion for the Issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction in favor of Respondent Gannapao. Helad: Petitioner attacks the CA for issuing the Writ of Preliminary Injunction despite the Commissions finding that private respondent was guilty of misconduct. Having appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the CSC, the CA clearly has the discretion to issue an ancillary writ of preliminary injunction to secure the rights of private respondent pending appeal of his dismissal. Absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, the exercise of judgment by the courts in injunctive matters should not be interfered with. In the present controversy, however, the assailed Order does not state the basis for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. The CA made no findings of fact or law indicating that any of the elements essential for the grant of an injunctive writ existed. Nevertheless, in the interest of justice and fair play, this Court scrutinized the records of the case and, indeed, found sufficient grounds for the grant of the injunctive Writ. Prior to the finality of the CSC Decision dismissing him, private respondent has a clear and unmistakable right to his current position in the police service. Moreover, the immediate implementation of the not yet final penalty of dismissal from the service would surely cause private respondent (and his family) irreparable damage. The case against him had already been dismissed in an earlier PNP pre-charge investigation. When the case was reopened by the PNP Office of Legal Service, he allegedly moved for the dismissal of the suit on the ground of res judicata. Under the above circumstances, it appears that private respondent, without prejudging his case on its merits, has raised a prima facie defense of lack of due process. That the CA saw it fit to issue the questioned Writ to

protect his rights in the interim was within the reasonable exercise of its judicial discretion. The Supreme Court found no arbitrariness or capriciousness.