COALITION TO STOP THE USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS

Briefing Paper: Child Recruitment and Use in Southern Thailand December 2008

Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers 9 Marshalsea Road London SE1 1EP United Kingdom Tel: +44 (0) 20 7367 4110 Fax: +44 (0) 20 7367 4129 info@child-soldiers.org

The Coalition considers a child soldier to be any person under the age of 18 who is a member of or attached to government armed forces or any other regular or irregular armed force or armed political group, whether or not an armed conflict exists. Child soldiers perform a range of tasks including: participation in combat; laying mines and explosives; scouting, spying, acting as decoys, couriers or guards; training, drill or other preparations; logistics and support functions, portering, cooking and domestic labour. Child soldiers may also be subjected to sexual slavery or other forms of sexual exploitation and abuse.

The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers unites national, regional and international organizations and Coalitions in Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and the Middle East. Its Steering Committee members are Amnesty International, Defence for Children International, Human Rights Watch, International Federation Terre des Hommes, International Save the Children Alliance, Jesuit Refugee Service, and the Quaker United Nations Office-Geneva.

www.child-soldiers.org

Table of Contents
1. 2. 3. 4. Summary ................................................................................................................ 1 Methodology .......................................................................................................... 2 Background to the insurgency in southern Thailand ............................................. 2 The impact of hostilities on children ..................................................................... 5 Attacks on schools and teachers ............................................................................ 7 5. BRN-Coordinate and the new insurgency ............................................................. 8 6. Childrens involvement in armed groups ............................................................... 9 Indoctrination and selection through schools and mosques ................................... 9 Recruitment and training...................................................................................... 12 Use of children by armed groups ......................................................................... 15 Case Study: Karim, a child soldier from Narathiwat province ............................ 16 7. Recruitment of children into civilian defence groups .......................................... 17 8. The response by the Thai authorities ................................................................... 18 Arbitrary detention of children ............................................................................ 19 Arbitrary detention of nine teenage boys ............................................................. 19 Concerns about detention of children under martial law and the Emergency Decree .................................................................................................................. 20 Rehabilitation and reintegration of children associated with armed groups ........ 22 9. Thailands responsibilities under international law ............................................. 23 10. Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 25 11. Recommendations ................................................................................................ 26 Recommendations to the Thai Government ........................................................ 26 Recommendations to non-state armed groups ..................................................... 28 Recommendations to the international community..........28

Briefing Paper: Child Recruitment and Use in Southern Thailand 1. Summary

The century-old insurgency by ethnic Malay Muslims in southern Thailand, thought by authorities to be effectively over by the end of the 1990s, re-ignited in 2004. Armed attacks on police and military targets have escalated since then, while a new, more radical Islamist ideology lies behind terrorist tactics such as the murder of Buddhist civilians and the indiscriminate bombing of public areas, killing Buddhists and Muslims alike. Non-state armed groups are thought to be responsible for much of the violence and for many grave abuses of human rights in the South. However, serious human rights violations by Thai security forces against individuals suspected of involvement in armed groups have been also been documented. They include arbitrary detention, torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, enforced disappearances and unlawful killings.1 Analysts agree that such actions have contributed to further alienating the Muslim minority and perpetuating the violence. Now into its fourth year, the revived insurgency, which has claimed more than 3,000 lives since 2004, continues to grow. The situation has impacted severely on the lives of children. They have been among the victims of bombings, unlawful killing and other violent attacks by armed groups. On occasions they have also been the victims of lethal force and unlawful killings and by the Thai security forces. Access to education has been disrupted by the persistent targeting of government schools, teachers and, in some cases, pupils by armed groups and also by raids on Muslim schools by Thai security forces. Research by the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers (the Coalition) also indicates that children are being systematically targeted for recruitment by armed groups - in particular the National Revolutionary Front-Coordinate (Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Koordinasi, BRN-C) - and that under-18s have been used by them in a variety of roles, including to support armed attacks. There are no reports of recruitment of under-18s by either the Thai military or police.2 However, in 2007 there were reports that children, possibly as young as eight years old, were being recruited into an unofficial civilian self-defence group supported by the Thai police. The group is alleged to have been responsible for violent attacks on Muslims.
1

See for example: Amnesty International (AI), If You Want Peace, Work for Justice, January 2006, AI Index: ASA 39/001/2006; Human Rights Watch (HRW), It was Like Suddenly my Son No Longer Existed, Enforced Disappearances in Thailands Southern Border Provinces, March 2007; International Crisis Group (ICG), Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad, 18 May 2005; Thailands Emergency Decree: No Solution, 18 November 2005; Southern Thailand: The Problem with Paramilitaries, 23 October 2007; The Working Group on Justice for Peace, Human Rights under Attack, Overview of the human rights situation in Southern Thailand, March 2008. 2 Under Thai law, the minimum age of voluntary recruitment into the armed forces is 18 and compulsory recruitment is 20. See: Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Child Soldiers Global Report 2008, www.childsoldiersglobalreport.

Child Recruitment and Use in Southern Thailand

The Coalition is concerned that the Thai authorities have yet to take adequate measures to protect children in the South from recruitment and use by armed groups or by civilian defence groups and that programs have not been implemented to assist the release, rehabilitation and reintegration of children already in the ranks of such groups. Rather, the Coalition is concerned that no apparent distinction is made between adults and children suspected of belong to armed groups and that children are among those who have been arbitrarily detained following arrest by the security forces during the course of sweep operations that began in 2007.

2.

Methodology

The purpose of this briefing paper is to provide a preliminary overview of patterns of recruitment and use of child soldiers in southern Thailand within the broader context of insurgency-related human rights abuses against children. Poor security conditions make it difficult to gather detailed information. However, there is sufficient data to indicate that child recruitment and use constitutes a serious problem in southern Thailand and human rights abuses against children are also common. The briefing paper is based on a variety of primary and secondary sources. Information on child soldier recruitment and use by separatist armed groups is primarily from research conducted by the Coalition in southern Thailand between September 2007 and January 2008. It is based on interviews with 24 people, including current and former members of separatist armed groups; community and religious leaders; teachers and employees of Islamic schools; human rights defenders and student activists; and representatives of the local Thai authorities in the southern provinces of Yala, Narathiwat, Pattani and Songkhla. For reasons of security the names and other information that could identify sources are not included. The research was conducted by two researchers from southern Thailand whose names have also been withheld to protect their security. Additional information is taken from secondary public sources. Information on cases of other human rights abuses against children by both armed groups and government security forces is based on a range of published reports by organizations working on southern Thailand primarily Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, International Crisis Group and the Thai-based coalition of human rights organizations, the Working Group on Justice for Peace, as well as media sources and interviews and correspondence with observers of the situation. A copy of this briefing was transmitted to the Government of Thailand in September 2008 to provide an opportunity for the authorities to respond to the findings. As of 1 December 2009 no response had been received. 3. Background to the insurgency in southern Thailand

Tensions in southern Thailand date back more than a century to the annexation of the Sultanate of Patani, which included the present-day Pattani, Narathiwat, and Yala provinces, as well as parts of Songkhla, by the Kingdom of Siam. Approximately 80% of the population in this region are ethnic Malay Muslims, who speak a local dialect 2

Child Recruitment and Use in Southern Thailand of Malay rather than Thai, and who are ethnically, culturally and religiously distinct from the majority Theravada Buddhist Thai population. Opposition to the annexation began almost immediately and continued for most of the twentieth century. Economic and political neglect, combined with harsh policies of suppression and assimilation, interspersed by efforts towards conciliation, by the Thai authorities served to fuel local resentment and resistance. However, up until the 1960s, resistance was largely non-violent and demands mostly limited to some degree of autonomy and improved respect for minority rights. But as the early opposition groups disintegrated, new organisations such as the National Patani Liberation Front (Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani, BNPP), the National Revolutionary Front (Barisan Revolusi Nasional, BRN) and the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) emerged and began to couple active armed resistance with calls for independence.3 Armed resistance in rural areas of the southern provinces increased through the late 1960s and 1970s, primarily through attacks on police posts and government buildings, including schools. These were increasingly met with military operations by the Thai authorities. But again, the dominant armed groups were eventually to fracture only for more radical groups to emerge. 4 By the 1990s, Thailand was undergoing a political transformation. Democracy was taking hold. With it came increased participation by Malay Muslims in political life and a more sophisticated response to the problems in the South. Membership of the armed groups decreased as successful amnesty and reintegration programmes were offered, whilst Malaysia co-operated in apprehending key separatist leaders based there.5 By 2001, when Thaksin Shinawatra was elected Prime Minister, the insurgency was considered by Thaksin and others to be over, and any residual violence in the South regarded as little more than turf wars between criminal gangs.6 The insurgency, however, had not gone away. Key separatist armed groups had been using the so-called quiet time of the 1990s to regroup and radicalise. While still remaining at a relatively low level, the number of attacks showed a gradual increase from 2001 to 2003.7 The sign that the quiet time was over for good came abruptly on 4 January 2004, when armed men stormed a weapons depot of the Fourth Engineering Battalion at the Narathiwat Rajanakarin Camp. On the same day, elsewhere in the province there were simultaneous arson attacks against schools and police posts and, on the following day, there were explosions in Pattani. The armed attacks continued throughout the year, and it soon became apparent that the South was witnessing a new era of violence.8 The violence escalated and became characterised by targeted attacks on government officials, school teachers and other civilians linked to the state; indiscriminate bombings; beheadings, burning and hacking to death with machetes of Buddhist monks and novices;
3 4

ICG, Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad, 18 May 2005. ICG, Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad, 18 May 2005. 5 ICG, Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad, 18 May 2005. 6 Marc Askew, Conspiracy, Politics, and a Disorderly Border: The Struggle to Comprehend Insurgency in Thailands Deep South, East-West Center, Policy Studies, No.29, 2007. 7 ICG, Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad, 18 May 2005. 8 HRW, No One Is Safe, August 2007.

Child Recruitment and Use in Southern Thailand attacks on Thai and ethnic Malay Muslims suspected of collaborating with the Thai authorities; as well as destruction of schools, public health centres, and other infrastructure.9 Despite some set-backs following security sweep operations since June 2007, in which hundreds of people have been arrested and detained, armed groups are reported to maintain a presence or wield influence in hundreds of villages in the southern provinces.10 Areas designated by the Thai authorities as red zones, (areas classified by the army as rebel strongholds), were reported to have increased from 215 at the end of 2004 to 320 by February 2008.11 The insurgency has claimed several thousand lives since 2004. According to one Thai organization monitoring the situation in the South, combined death and injury figures rose from 1,438 in 2004 to 1,643 in 2005, 1,877 in 2006 and 2,295 in 2007.12 In March 2008, the Thai police announced that the death toll in the insurgency since January 2004 had passed 3,000. The vast majority of the victims are reported to be civilians. The Thai government responded to the January 2004 attacks with a massive mobilization of the security forces and the imposition of martial law. Serious human rights violations, including extrajudicial executions, enforced disappearances, torture or other ill-treatment are reported to have been committed by government security forces in the course of security operations. Martial law was replaced in July 2005 when the Emergency Decree on Government Administration in States of Emergency, B.E. 2548 (Emergency Decree) was imposed on Narathiwat, Pattani, Yala.13 The Emergency Decree provoked negative reactions from human rights organizations and others who were critical, among other things, of the extensive powers given to police and civilian authorities to restrict certain basic rights and the broad immunity from prosecution granted to the security forces.14 The Emergency Decree has been repeatedly renewed at three-month intervals. Martial law, reinstated throughout the country in September 2006 following the coup, remains in force in the southern provinces. In 2007, there was evidence of growing communal violence between Muslim and Thai Buddhists in the South and concerns that this could escalate into civil war. Such violence was reported to have been incited by militant attacks on Buddhist targets and exacerbated by the establishment in Buddhist communities of self-defence groups

See for example, HRW, No One Is Safe, August 2007; ICG, Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad, 18 May 2005 & Southern Thailand: The Problem with Paramilitaries, 23 October 2007. 10 Thailand: Imams Killing Highlights Army Abuse in South, HRW, 26 March 2008. 11 Insurgency Hotbeds Increase in Thailand, Associated Press, 23 February 2008. 12 Deep South Watch, cited in Nonviolence International, Charged!: Updates from Southern Thailand, January/February 2008, 21 March 2008. 13 Martial law was reintroduced on 19 September 2006 and remains in place in parallel with the Emergency Decree. 14 See for example: International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), More Power, Less Accountability: Thailands New Emergency Decree, August 2005 and ICG, Thailands Emergency Decree: No Solution, 18 November 2005.

Child Recruitment and Use in Southern Thailand which are alleged to have carried out vigilante-style attacks on Muslims.15 The frequency of attacks between the two communities is reported to have decreased in 2008.16

4.

The impact of hostilities on children

Children have been the victims of a range of serious human rights abuses by both non-state armed groups and the Thai security forces. To the Coalitions knowledge there has been no research specifically on the impact of the situation in the South on the rights of children. However, reports by various international and national human rights organizations have included individual cases of abuses against children. A selection of these are reproduced below to illustrate the vulnerability of children to abuses and the urgent need for parties involved in the hostilities to take all feasible measures to protect civilians and other noncombatants, including children. A feature of the revived insurgency has been bombings by armed groups of markets and other public places such as commercial banks, department stores and hotels where civilians, including children are present. Indiscriminate attacks against the security forces that do not distinguish between civilians and combatants are also common. Children have also been among the victims of such attacks. Examples include the bombing by insurgents, on 28 May 2007, of the Buddhist section of the market in Saba Yoi in Songkhla province. Four people were killed including two girls aged two and eight.17 The attack followed several others the previous night, in which the youngest victim was eight.18 Earlier the same month, on 5 May 2007, a bomb hidden under a bridge in Yala province was detonated. According to media reports, the target appeared to be border patrol officers, two of whom were killed, but a two-year-old Muslim girl was also fatally injured.19 In August 2008, two young children were reported to have been killed when armed men, suspected to have been militants, opened fire on a truck driven by their father who was also killed in Narathiwat province.20 Also, in August 2008 in Narathiwat province, three boys, aged 12, 17 and 18, were reported to have been injured during a shooting at a motorcycle repair show in Rangae district. According to the police separatist armed groups were responsible, but there is no independent verification of this.21 Children have in some cases been specifically targeted in attacks by armed groups. In March 2007, two teenage girls were among eight people shot dead in an attack allegedly carried out by insurgents on a bus carrying Buddhist civilians in Yaha district, Yala province. All eight victims of the attack, including the two girls, were reported to have been shot in the head at point blank range.22 In May 2006, a 15-year15

ICG, Southern Thailand: The Problem with Paramilitaries, 23 October 2007 and HRW, Government-Backed Militias Enflame Violence, 18 April 2007. 16 ICG, Thailand, Political Turmoil and the Southern Insurgency, 28 August 2008. 17 HRW, No One Is Safe, August 2007. 18 Explosions rock Hat Yai, The Nation, May 28, 2007. 19 9 killed in southern Thailand bomb attack, ABC News, 6 May 2007. 20 Two children, father killed in restive Thai south, AFP, 12 August 2008. Other media reported that one child died. 21 Students wounded in attack, Bangkok Post, 9 August 2008. 22 ICG, Southern Thailand: The Problem with Paramilitaries, 23 October 2007.

Child Recruitment and Use in Southern Thailand old Muslim student, Abdulloh Daha-ara, was stabbed and hacked to death by alleged separatist militants in Yi Ngo district, Narathiwat province.23 In January 2004 it was reported that a 13-year-old Buddhist novice at Wat Waluwan Temple, Tambon Sataeng, Muang district, Yala, was hacked to death. The same month, a 15-year-old Muslim student was attacked on his way home from school. Although badly injured he survived. His father, who was a village chief, told Human Rights Watch that the attack may have been intended to send a message to him not to oppose the militants.24 Children have also been among the victims of lethal force and unlawful killings that are alleged to have been carried out by the Thai security forces, paramilitaries or government-backed civilian militias. In some cases, although by no means all, these children had been placed in situations of unacceptable risk because of their association, or suspected association, with separatist armed groups. Under-18s were among the victims of two of the most infamous examples of the state response to the revived insurgency in 2004 the battle of Krue Se Mosque and the Tak Bai protest on 28 April and 25 October 2004 respectively. Both events are well documented elsewhere, but it is worth recalling children were among those killed. At Krue Se Mosque, Thai security forces were reported to have killed 31 militants, aged from 17 to 63 years old who were hiding in the mosque following a series of attacks on nearby security checkpoints. A series of other clashes between militants and the security forces took place the same day. During one, at Saba Yoi market, 19 people between the ages of 16 and 30 were killed. The International Crisis Group reported that 15 of the victims had gunshot wounds in the back of the head and some had scars on their wrists apparently from being tied up.25 At Tak Bai in Narathiwat province, the security forces were responsible for the deaths of 85 people. A 14-year-old boy was among those shot and injured when soldiers opened fire on a crowd of some 1,500 people ostensibly demonstrating against the detention of six village defence volunteers. Children were also among those arrested and who subsequently died, mainly through asphyxiation, while being transported to an army camp in Pattani province.26 More recently, on 9 March 2007, 15-year-old Abulkari Kasor was shot in the stomach and side when troops reportedly from the paramilitary rangers27 opened fire on the car in which he was travelling in Muang district, Yala province.28 Abulkari Kasor died the next day in hospital. On the 9 April 2007, a 12-year-old boy was amongst four people shot dead when members of the civilian defence militia the Village Defence Unit

23 24

HRW, No One Is Safe, August 2007. HRW, No One Is Safe, August 2007 25 ICG, Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad, 18 May 2007. 26 For detailed descriptions of these events see ICG: Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad, 18 May 2005. No officials have been prosecuted in relation to these events. 27 The paramilitary ranger force (Thahan Phran) was set up in 1978 as part of counter-insurgency operations against communist fighters. More recently it has been used extensively in the South to support military operations against armed groups. See, ICG, The Problem with Paramilitaries, 23 October 2007. 28 Working Group on Justice for Peace, Human Rights Under Attack: Overview of the human rights situation in Southern Thailand, March 2008 and ICG, Southern Thailand: The Problem with Paramilitaries, 23 October 2007.

Child Recruitment and Use in Southern Thailand (Chor Ror Bor) - fired on mourners returning from a funeral.29 Two children, aged 13 and 14, were killed and another three injured in mid-August 2007 when a unit of 11 soldiers on their way to inspect a torched mobile phone tower opened fire on a group of unarmed Muslim boys playing by the roadside in Muang district, on their way home from a weekend market.30 In May 2007, a 14-year-old girl was among four members of a Malay Muslim family from Patae sub-district in Yala province, shot dead in their homes by armed men that locals believe were paramilitary rangers.31
Attacks on schools and teachers

Education has historically been the focus of dissent in southern Thailand. Attempts by successive governments to impose Thai language and culture on the South through control of the education system have met with protest. Violent attacks on schools, among other government buildings, were a feature of resistance through the 1960s and 1970s, but never before have schools, teachers and, in some cases, students been targeted at the levels observed in the revived insurgency according to Human Rights Watch, since 2004 separatist armed groups have put the Thai education system as the primary target.32 The violence has forced the temporary closure of hundreds of schools.33 According to Ministry of Education figures, a total of 102 educational personnel, including teachers, retired teachers and janitors were killed by insurgents between January 2004 and 31 July 2008. Another 99 were injured. The Ministry of Education has also recorded a total of 299 schools that have been set on fire. These attacks peaked in 2007, with 164 schools being burnt, and appear to have reduced significantly in 2008, with just nine such attacks recorded up to 10 August. In some cases, attacks on schools by armed groups are alleged to be in direct retaliation for the killing of Muslim teachers or other human rights violations committed by Thai security forces. There have also been reported killings of Islamic religious teachers (ustadz) and attacks on Islamic religious schools by local Buddhist Thais in revenge for insurgent attacks on government schools and teachers.34 Moreover, the close association of the militants with the Islamic schooling system from which hundreds of young people are believed to have been recruited (see section 6 below) has also led both traditional Islamic boarding schools (ponoh) and private schools teaching Islam to be viewed as a threat to national security.35 This has resulted in raids and in some cases violent attacks against Muslim schools by Thai security forces or associated groups.

29 30

ICG, Southern Thailand, The Problem with Paramilitaries, 23 October 2007. Working Group on Justice for Peace, Human Rights under Attack, March 2008 & HRW, Government-Backed Militias Enflame Violence, 18 April 2007. 31 The authorities have blamed local militants dressed in ranger uniforms. See: ICG, Southern Thailand: The Problem with Paramilitaries, 23 October 2007. 32 HRW, No One Is Safe, August 2007. 33 See for example, PM gives up, closes southern schools, Thai News Agency, 18 June 2007 and Thailand closes schools in troubled south, ABC, 3 July 2008. 34 HRW, Thailand: Education in the South Engulfed in Fear, 14 June 2007. 35 Traditional ponoh provide only an Islamic education whereas the private schools teaching Islam teach a mixed secular and curriculum. The quality of the secular education and the facilities in the private schools are, however, said to be lower than that in government schools.

Child Recruitment and Use in Southern Thailand School children have also been the target of attacks according to Ministry of Education figures, 30 students have been killed up to 31 July 2008. The majority of the killings (20) were in 2007. In March 2007, following a series of attacks against school children in which five were killed and 12 injured, UNICEF and UNESCO issued a joint appeal for an end to violence against children in southern Thailand.36 While most of the attacks may be attributed to insurgents, in other cases the identity of the perpetrators is less clear. In one case in March 2007, three school boys were killed and eight others wounded at the Islahuddin Islamic Boarding School in Songkhla province. Various theories as to who was responsible have been proffered. They include paramilitary rangers; a group intending to stir up communal tensions; or armed separatists, although the latter is considered unlikely given the schools alleged association with insurgent activity.37 In another incident the involvement of the security forces was clearer. Following the 9 March 2007 shooting of Abulkari Kasor (see above), a group of paramilitary rangers is reported to have come to the nearby Ta Seh Islamic boarding school to which he had been taken by his brother-in-law who was also injured in the attack. The rangers were reported to have fired shots into the male dormitory area. Some 90 male students were ordered on to the sports field where they were forced to strip to their underwear and lie face down on the ground some were hit and kicked.38

5.

BRN-Coordinate and the new insurgency

It is difficult to say with certainty which group or groups are behind the new wave of violence. More than one group is believed to be involved, and the insurgents do not claim responsibility for individual attacks.39 Several former groups are reported to be still operational in the South, including New PULO (Patani United Liberation Organisation), an offshoot of the once-powerful PULO group, and GMIP (Gerakan Mujahidin Islam Patani or Patani Islamic Mujahidin Group), established by Afghanistan veterans in 1995 and committed to an independent Islamic state.40 However, the BRN-C has been described as the backbone of the new generation of separatist armed groups, and is regarded by many as the main group responsible for the current unrest. The violent tactics employed by BRN-C, in particular the targeting of the civilian population, has earned it the condemnation of many elders from other separatist groups.41 BRN-C is reported to be organized in five levels that correspond with the existing Thai administrative structure. The most significant are the village level cells, known
36

UN, Thailand: UN pleas to end deadly attacks on school children, 21 March 2007, http://www.crin.org/resources/infoDetail.asp?ID=12850&flag=news. 37 The head of the school was suspected by security forces of harbouring militants, see: ICG, Southern Thailand: The Problem with Paramilitaries, 23 October 2007. 38 Working Group on Justice for Peace, Human Rights Under Attack, March 2008 & ICG, Southern Thailand: The Problem with Paramilitaries, 23 October 2007. 39 See for example: AI, If You Want Peace, Work for Justice, January 2006, AI Index: ASA 39/001/2006. 40 ICG, Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad, 18 May 2005. 41 HRW, No One Is Safe, August 2007.

Child Recruitment and Use in Southern Thailand as ayah, which has several sub-divisions or units among which is pemuda or youth. Pemuda is reportedly responsible for controlling children and young adults in the community. Each ayah is also reported to control a small armed unit, sometimes known as Patani Freedom Fighters (Pejuang Kemerdekaan Pantani) or by the Thai military as small patrol unit (Runda Kumpulan Kecil, RKK). The age of armed unit members, according to Coalition sources, is usually between 16 and 30.42 In 2007, Human Rights Watch reported that there were estimated by the Thai authorities to be militant cells in two thirds of the 1,574 villages across the southern border provinces and more than 7,000 pemuda or youth members of BRN-C.43 Hundreds of these youths are believed to have been recruited through the education system.44 Childrens involvement in armed groups

6.

BRN-C may not be the only armed group in southern Thailand that recruits and uses child soldiers, but there are indications that its targeting of children is highly organized. The way in which children, from a very young age, are indoctrinated, identified, recruited, assessed, trained and deployed is indicative of a meticulously planned, well developed and strictly compartmentalised strategy by BRN-C to draw children into its ranks and to train them to undertake a variety of different roles. Although the majority of the information gathered by the Coalition relates to the recruitment and use of boys, there are indications that girls may also be associated with armed groups and that they may also participate in armed attacks.45 According to one person interviewed by the Coalition, recruitment of girls takes place during informal gatherings in the home rather than in schools or mosques as is the case with many boys.46 However, further research is needed to verify this and to gain a picture of the role that girls play.
Indoctrination and selection through schools and mosques

The process of indoctrination and selection of boys appears to be conducted primarily through schools and mosques some of the most important institutions in the Muslim villages and is reported to begin at a very early age. It is important to stress that the majority of both traditional and private Islamic schools in the southern border provinces are not believed to be recruiting centres for armed groups. But it appears that a minority, particularly those in red zones, are either controlled by the insurgents or have individual teachers who exploit their position to indoctrinate and recruit children. Although the actual scale of the recruitment is not known, the pattern seems clear and suggests that the numbers of children involved are significant.

42 43

Coalition interview with religious leader and former militant leader in Pattani, September 2007. HRW, No One Is Safe, August 2007. 44 ICG, Insurgency Not Jihad, 18 May 2005. 45 For example, according to a media report on the 11 August 2008, three teenagers including one girl were arrested by the police on 2 August 2008 in connection with possible links to bomb attacks in Songkhla earlier in the month. See, School torched in Narathiwat, Bangkok Post, 11 August 2008. 46 Coalition interview with a local politician, Yala province, November 2007.

Child Recruitment and Use in Southern Thailand Indoctrination can start in the tadika an elementary Koranic school attached to the village mosque for children between the age of seven and 12 years old, and continues in some Islamic religious schools (ponoh) and private Islamic boarding schools. An informant described how teachers in tadika put children and youth in touch with the ideology of the armed groups. While they were taught to love Patani, the students were recruited and implanted with a hatred of the government officials.47 According to an imam from Narathiwat province, [r]ecruitment of children is an old phenomenon. They recruit by propaganda and instilling Malay ethnic pride. They approach students in ponoh, Islamic private schools and villages through religious leaders, community and youth leaders.48 Others explained that children are taught that Muslims must fight oppression by the Thai State and are provided with examples of Thai repression of Muslims such as the April 1948 Dusun Nyur uprising,49 the killings at Krue Se Mosque and deaths resulting from Tak Bai demonstrations in 2004, and of other grievances such as the enforced disappearances of Muslims and migration of Thai Buddhists to the South.50 A village chief in Pattani described to Human Rights Watch how children and teenagers were drawn into armed groups through teaching at the local ponoh. He explained how the arrival of a new ustadz was initially welcomed, but that he began to notice something dangerous in the teaching when his own children told him that it was their Islamic duty to take up arms and fight for the liberation of Pattani from occupation by the infidels. He went on to explain: He [the ustadz] became popular and influential among young people in our village and beyond. He recommended many children from our village to have further education at Thamma Witthaya School.51 In return, he invited many graduates from that school, including those with higher degree from Indonesia, to come to teach in this ponoh. Some of them came here and began to teach young children [often from eight to 12-years old] in tadika. Eventually, both ponoh and tadika fell under control of this group of ustadz. They then began to show their true face. They were militants. They recruited our children to be trained as militants. Each year, six or ten boys about 15 to 17-years old, were chosen. For months, they disappeared in the evening with the ustadz to have military training in the mountains. When they came back, those boys became very different. Their thoughts were rigid, with visible hatred of Buddhists. They said our homeland must be rid of Buddhists. They also warned us not to associate with Buddhists. It is terrifying now that we are being intimidated and controlled by these young men. I know that they will not spare us if they think that we disobeyed them.52
47 48

Coalition interview with a community leader in Pattani, October 2007. Coalition interview with an imam from Narathiwat province, October 2007. 49 The Dusun Nyur uprising took place on 26-28 April 1948 during which hundreds of ethnic Malay Muslims in Narathiwat were rounded up and killed by Thai security forces. 50 Coalition interview with religious leader and former militant from Pattani, September 2007 and with a former militant from Pattani, October 2007. 51 The head of Thamma Witthaya Foundation School in Yala was reported to have played a significant role in the coordinating the expansion of BRN-C. See HRW, No One Is Safe, August 2007. 52 HRW interview in Pattani, 10 July 2007 published in, No One Is Safe, August 2007.

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Child Recruitment and Use in Southern Thailand

Insurgents appear to single out students who meet certain criteria for recruitment. According to a former member of an armed group, [t]hey would select children who are good mannered, well arranged, religious they do not recruit mischievous students.53 The practice of targeting better behaved, more pious students was stressed by other sources including an administrator in a private Islamic school in Pattani who noted that the militant teachers look for students who are hardworking, wise and well-mannered Wayward students are not their targets. He went on to add that school administrators are not always sufficiently careful about who they employ. Administrators give a chance for ustadz to teach extra subjects such as Arabic language without checking their ideology. They take this opportunity to recruit students.54 A militant involved in recruiting and overseeing the activity of members of BRN-C in Narathiwat interviewed by Human Rights Watch in 2006 noted that: The recruitment process takes time and we want to make sure they are really committed. We watch them for many years often since they were studying in tadika or ponoh. We only recruit those who are truly committed to Islam and their Islamic duty to fight for the liberation to join us.55 Other informants were uncertain about how children are selected, but were convinced that there is a formal process and that recruiters are able to assume the authority of Islam to deliver propaganda on behalf of militants. According to a community leader in Pattani province most of the recruiters were religious persons who explain the Quran and the words of the Prophet Mohammed and that [n]obody can refuse their ideology because they cite the Quran. He went on: I do not know how they select and brainwash children, I only know that there is a selection process. Most of the selected children are religious or ponoh students. Apart from teaching villagers and selected children to do training, the armed groups also recruit via a Friday khutbah (sermon prior to prayers). One time in my village, when it was time for the khutbah reading, a militant immediately went to the mimbar (platform to deliver sermons). Nobody kept him from doing that due to security concerns. The khutbah that he read was an explanation about the armed groups.56 Another community leader from Yala province described how villagers are recruited at the mosque after evening prayers. He claimed that they are divided up into small groups, five in each, by the BRN-C coordinator in the village. Then the ustadz and BRN-C representatives from other villages came to teach them.57 The selection of children through mosques and their subsequent indoctrination was also described by a former recruiter for the BRN-C:

53 54

Coalition interview with a history scholar and former militant leader, Pattani province, October 2007. Coalition interview with Islamic private school administrator, Pattani province, September 2007. 55 HRW, No One Is Safe, August 2007. 56 Coalition interview with community leader in Pattani province, October 2007. 57 Coalition interview with community leader in Yala province, September 2007.

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Child Recruitment and Use in Southern Thailand Recruited children were generally between the age of eight and nine. They were first instilled with hatred toward Thai authorities at a mosque. Most childrens parents did not know their children were recruited because they trusted me and asked me to teach their children religious studies. My duties were to persuade and select children to join the armed groups. After that, I sent them to my younger brother for training. He also noted: The means of recruitment is based on teaching about Patani history. The purpose is to instil the children and youth with hatred toward Thai authorities and aspirations to liberate Patani. I taught them that killing Buddhist people was not a sin. 58 He went on to explain that he selected children who were prompt, but that drug addicts were also recruited but must first stop using drugs. He also noted that villagers with no religious studies were particularly easy to recruit. Out of school sessions of religious study and political discussion are used to intensify the process of indoctrination. A religious leader from Narathiwat province described how, once identified, children are offered extra after-hours classes. According to him, the ustadz selected students from the schoolroom and then visited their houses or invited them to attend after-school lessons. He described how they are divided into small groups according to their ability and taught history and stories about Islamic insurgencies elsewhere in the world.59
Recruitment and training

Current and former militants as well as others interviewed by the Coalition emphasized the voluntary nature of the recruitment, claiming that the indoctrination is so persuasive that children will readily join. The idea of voluntary recruitment was described as being important for ensuring the loyalty to the insurgents. As one religious teacher in Pattani province explained: Children who participate in the armed groups are volunteers. If they are forced, they cannot keep a secret. They join the armed forces because of their ideological belief.60 The notion of voluntarism is, however, is false. Formal recruitment often follows years of indoctrination so that informed choice does not exist in any real sense. In the words of a former militant: Children are so indoctrinated with Malay ethnic nationalism that finally they voluntarily join the armed groups. A religious leader and former militant also described the process leading to children volunteering. When they join the armed groups they cannot withdraw. All recruited children accept its principles. It is not forced but voluntary. They were recruited by teaching them about the armed struggles since they were young.61

58 59

Coalition interview with former militant recruiter in Yala province, September 2007. Coalition interview with religious leader in Narathiwat province, September 2007. 60 Coalition interview with religious teacher in Pattani province, October 2007. 61 Coalition interview with religious leader and former militant in Pattani province, September 2007.

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Child Recruitment and Use in Southern Thailand A 28-year old militant from Songkhla province described how he joined BRN-C at the age of 18 having graduated from an Islamic school in Pattani where he was taught about separatism. My parents know what I have done. They have tried to prevent me but I disobeyed them. A community leader also tried to prevent me, but I am willing to lay down for syahid (martyr) and sacrifice my life for religion. He went on to become a religious teacher in a tadika in his home village where he began to persuade children and youth to take part in the movement. He was arrested in late 2007, but later released.62 The high levels of fear and the very real threat of violence prevents many parents and the broader community from discouraging children from joining the armed groups. A community leader from Pattani described how, in his village, there are many militants but that he was unable to prevent children from being recruited by them. It is different from bad boys or drug addicts. These children we can warn and advise them because it is wrong. For militants they believe they are right to fight against the Thai authorities. If we prevent them from being involved, we will face a problem.63 A resident in a red zone village in Pattani said that he thought most parents knew that their children were associated with armed groups, but they dont know at what level and they cannot prevent them. According to him, [i]f they prohibit them, they would be threatened by the armed groups from other villages.64 A similar analysis was provided by a community leader from a red zone village in Yala province. He noted that there are not many villagers who are openly against the armed groups or who will submit complaints to the authorities. If the armed groups know, these villagers would be killed. He went on to add: For those who have tried to protect children from being recruited by the armed groups they too would be threatened and killed.65 Once recruited, it is difficult for members of the armed groups to leave. On joining, newly-recruited children must take an oath of loyalty and secrecy, called supah. The oath binds them to the group, in some cases reportedly on pain of death. One religious leader from Pattani province described how, after taking the oath, the children cannot withdraw, [o]therwise, other members will kill them without guilt, because this is an act of betrayal to religion by munafiq (treachery).66 It is not known if this threat has been carried out, but the supah is a powerful oath that few would be willing to break. There are indications that some children may have been forced to join the militants. In 2006, Human Rights Watch interviewed a 17-year old ethnic Malay Muslim student who told them that a message had been sent through the imam telling him that he would eventually have to join the movement or be killed. He explained that he did not want to join, but wished to finish school and take his family away from the violence.67
62 63

Coalition interview with a militant leader from Songkhla province, January 2008. Coalition interview with community leader in Pattani province, October 2007. 64 Coalition interview with resident of red zone village, Pattani, September 2007. 65 Coalition interview with a community leader/village head and former militant from Yala province, September 2007. 66 Coalition interview with religious leader in Pattani province, September 2007. 67 See interview with Sori, Narathiwat, 12 November 2006 in HRW, No One is Safe, August 2007.

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Child Recruitment and Use in Southern Thailand

The insurgents are not, however, without support and there is reportedly active encouragement by peers, family, neighbours and teachers for some children to join. As in other situations where the human rights situation is poor, others may join to seek revenge for violations committed by state security forces that they have experienced or witnessed. Once recruited, levels of ability, ideology and potential are assessed. A former militant from Pattani province described how [t]hose who have participated in the armed groups were first given psychological training to test their minds, religious beliefs and iman [knowledge of, and belief in, Islamic principles].68 The same process was explained by others including another former militant, also from Pattani: Of course, recruited children and youth would be given psychological training at the first stage to test their minds, religion, beliefs and iman. They then would be trained in the next step that is, testing their courage for work. If they failed, they could not be trained in the next level. It is step-by-step and systematic work.69 Physical training follows. A senior government official in Yala province familiar with militant training methods explained, [t]hey test their health. For example, after evening prayers, the armed groups order them to walk in the forest, and then climb trees using one hand and then do push-ups.70 After passing the physical training, the new recruits move on to military-style training. One informant suggested that under-17s did not receive military training, but rather the focus was on developing their hatred of the Thai authorities. However, this conflicts with data provided by a former militant trainer who described the specialized training that he provided to children, including planting bombs, and with the testimony of a 17-year-old member of an armed group who had received such training. It was explained by an informant that the first stage of training for new recruits involves training using imitation guns and close-quarters weapons. Only later, it appears, are selected youth divided into groups of up to 15 members each from a different village and none of whom know each other for training using real weapons.71 A former member of the BRN-C who had been involved in training children explained: During training, there were three trainers and six recruited children. They were trained privately in other villages. I acted as a basic trainer, teaching how to scatter spikes and plant bombs. Later, when individuals actually had to plant bombs, one person would dig a hole and then others would plant the bombs. My duty was to train recruited children. They were selected before I trained. I did not know other details.
68 69

Coalition interview with militant activist in Pattani province, September 2007. Coalition interview with former militant in Pattani province, October 2007. 70 Coalition interview with government official in Yala province, November 2007. 71 Coalition interviews with government officials and former militants in Pattani and Yala provinces, September-November 2007.

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Child Recruitment and Use in Southern Thailand

He also described how he had been recruited. I was easily recruited because of my low education. When someone used religion to recruit me, I easily believed them. They told that it was jihad, but I did not even know what that meant, only that it was about knowledge of Islam. I did not have much knowledge of Islam and only knew how to perform basic religious practices in daily life. 72
Use of children by armed groups

There is limited information on how children are used by armed groups. However, it is clear that the roles of all combatants are strictly controlled by the groups and that the role of under-18s is graduated, beginning with propaganda activities to test their bravery and then progressing to vandalism and destruction of state property before selected youth may take part in militant attacks on the security forces or other targets. There is some evidence that children from the age of 16 may join in armed units and participate directly in armed attacks.73 However, in most cases, children under 18 appear to be deployed in secondary roles, for example, assisting the escape of armed units following attacks by scattering spikes on roads or felling trees. They may also be called upon to conduct arson attacks or otherwise damage to state property. 74 Children are thought to be used extensively in espionage whether to spy on government forces or internally within the Muslim communities. They are also reported to be employed to distribute leaflets and other propaganda for the militants, as well as raising awareness of the groups and promoting them amongst their friends.75 Children who have not been formally recruited by the insurgents may also be pressed into action in support of the cause, in particular by joining mass demonstrations. There are cases in which large numbers of Muslim women and children have assembled to confront Thai authorities, usually following arrests or alleged violations by state security forces in the area. The Tak Bai protest in 2004, in which children were among the demonstrators and among those who were arrested and died of asphyxiation, is a case in point. Other examples documented by human rights organizations include a protest of almost 100 people, mostly women and children, who gathered to prevent government officials from entering the village after the imam of Lahan village in Narathiwat Province was shot dead by unknown attackers on 29 August 2005.76 On 15 February 2007, it was reported that some 200 women and children blocked the Raman-Ban Tha Tong road with felled trees and demanded the military withdraw after a local youth was allegedly
72 73

Coalition interview with former militant trainer in Yala province, September 2007. For example, a 17-year-old was reportedly among four youths who surrendered after participating in attacks on a sub-district office, a police station and a military base in Krong Pinang, Yala on 28 April 2004. See ICG, Southern Thailand, Insurgency, Not Jihad, 18 May 2005. 74 Coalition interview with former militant in Pattani province, September 2007, and community leader in Pattani province, October 2007. 75 Coalition interview with student activist in Pattani province, October 2007. 76 Amnesty International, If You Want Peace, Work for Justice, January 2006, AI Index: ASA 39/001/2006.

15

Child Recruitment and Use in Southern Thailand shot by soldiers.77 And on 15 March 2007, some 50 Muslim women and children blocked the road in Patae sub-district, Yala, claiming state security forces were behind an attack at Almubaroh Mosque.78 In March 2007, the International Crisis Group reported the emergence of a pattern of protests led by women since December 2006 to demand the release of suspects, to block access to an area by Thai officials or force security forces to withdraw from a given area.79 According to a religious leader from Pattani province interviewed by the Coalition, such demonstrations are often on the direct instructions of the village-level militant cell. In the case of women and children that you see marching in protest against the government, that is the work of ayah, he explained. 80 A local politician from Yala province explained that women actively recruited others to join protests. When protests happened, women persuaded villagers to join by recruiting them house-to-house, and they were in the protest within three hours. He claimed that the protestors were paid 200 baht81 each. 82 While children who participate in such protests may not be formally a part of armed groups, their indirect association with the groups or their cause, which participation in demonstrations, rightly or wrongly implies, places them in situations of risk. Any strategies developed by the authorities to protect children must therefore not only address their formal recruitment and use by members of militant armed groups, but also this more informal phenomenon, of childrens involvement in protests.
Case Study: Karim, a child soldier from Narathiwat province83

Karim (not his real name), a 17-year old boy from a red zone village in Narathiwat, was recruited at the age of 13. He continues to be active in the militant movement whilst studying at an Islamic private school. He explained his experiences of being recruited: I was recruited by an ustadz in school, when I studied Ibtida-i (elementary Islamic studies) there in 2004. He was from the same village as me, and my friends and I respected him for his bravery. He did not tell us which separatist group he was a part of whether it was PULO, BRN, or RKK, for instance. He only said that it was the Patani Liberation Youth Organization. The ustadz gave me some sacred words from the Quran, called azimat. It was an amulet, a protection. He told me to read these words after saying my morning and afternoon prayers, praying six hours or 2,000 times a day. He said If you follow these instructions, enemies will not be able to see, kill or stab you. He played a video for us to watch that
77 78

Villagers demand armys removal, Bangkok Post, 16 February 2007. Mob protests against security officers, Thai Post, 17 March 2007, cited in ICG, Southern Thailand: The Problem with Paramilitaries, 23 October 2007. 79 ICG, Southern Thailand: The Impact of the Coup, 15 March 2007. 80 Coalition interview with religious leader and former militant in Pattani province, September 2007. 81 One US dollar equals approximately 33 Thai Baht. 82 Coalition interview with local politician in Yala province, November 2007. 83 Coalition interview, Narathiwat province, January 2008.

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Child Recruitment and Use in Southern Thailand showed the human rights violations by Thai authorities during the 2004 Tak Bai and Krue Se mosque incidents. We also watched videos of human rights abuses in the Muslim world that included incidents in Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine. As we watched the videos, the ustadz explained about the brute force of the incidents and related them to the abuses by Thai authorities in the area. This took place at least once a week, and then later the ustadz would select students to join a camp. I decided to take part in the armed groups because many young people in my village had already become involved. There are 15 members in my group, coming from different villages, and most of them are aged 16 to 18 years old. Each group has clear functions, and the members have specific roles - all members have to conduct their work in a strict manner. I am currently responsible for scattering spikes, spraying on roads and signboards, destroying state property, and conducting arson attack in villages. Karim went on to explain that despite his association with the armed group he still goes about his everyday activities, including going to school. His parents do not know that he takes part in the activities of the armed group.

7.

Recruitment of children into civilian defence groups

In 2007 several media reports referred to the recruitment and training of children, possibly as young as eight or ten years old, by an unofficial, police-backed militia group called Ruam Thai (Thais United) or Ruam Thai Team (RTT). Ruam Thai was established in 2005 by a local police official, Major-General Phitak Iadkaew, who was at the time chief of investigation in Yala province. According to the International Crisis Group, as of September 2007, General Phitak claimed to have trained more than 6,000 members, primarily Buddhists. Members were reported to be organized into 23 local groups at the village and sub-district level, mostly in Yala, but also southern Pattani, western Songkhla and some parts of Narathiwat. General Phitaks insisted that the group was established purely for self-defence. However, Ruam Thai members are alleged to have been involved in vigilante-style attacks against Muslims.84 A media report in August 2007 described the two-day basic self-defence training given to Ruam Thai recruits. According to a report by Associated Press, special courses were run for children between the ages of 10 and 15. In methods paralleling those used by militant recruiters, General Phitak is reported to have shown Buddhist men attending the training courses photos of hooded Muslims in the Middle East training children to use guns. He was also quoted as saying: "Since they can train their kids, we can train ours."85 Another article that appeared in the Thai press in January 2008 reported that training for Ruam Thai families, especially the children between 8-10 years old had increased. According to the report there are nearly 300
84 85

ICG, Southern Thailand: The Problem with Paramilitaries, 23 October 2007. Buddhists suspected in Thai raids, Associated Press, 7 September 2007.

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Child Recruitment and Use in Southern Thailand children involved and most had joined a special training course called Kumarn Thong or Golden Children. According to the article: RKK teach children to know the gun and we also teach the youth (RTT) in the same way. The children who have already been trained can use guns, and can fight with their own hands.86 In addition to Ruam Thai, there are a variety of more formal civilian defence volunteer groups in the South. They include the Volunteer Defence Corps (commonly known as Volunteers (Or Sor) and the Village Development Volunteer Unit (Chor Ror Bor) both under the interior ministry; and the Village Protection Volunteer (Or Ror Bor) project, founded in 2004 by Queen Sirikit.87 It is not known whether the membership of these groups includes under-18s. It is also unclear whether Ruam Thais training for children continues today. However, all of these groups are the responsibility of the state and the state is responsible for ensuring that children are neither recruited nor used by them. 88

8.

The response by the Thai authorities

Thailands most recent report on its implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, dated May 2005, stated that; Thailand has neither internal nor external armed conflicts and hence there have not been children in armed conflicts or children in recovery and social reintegration89 In its concluding observations on the report, the Committee on the Rights of the Child expressed concern that the violence and civil unrest in the southern provinces of the country have had severe consequences on children and their families, and endangered the right of the child to life, survival and development. The Committee also noted with particular concern the lack of rehabilitation, counselling and other assistance programmes for child survivors and witnesses of violence in these provinces.90 The Committee urged Thailand to: make every effort to reinforce protection of the right to life, survival and development of all children within the State party, particularly with respect to former child soldiers and to children in the southernmost provinces of the country, through targeted policies, programmes and services. to protect all children from the consequences of the civil
86

RTT Law Officers protect the place where people fight for their lives and to protect their native land, Association of Thai Newspapers Institutions, 27 January 2008 (unofficial translation). 87 For a detailed description of the various groups and their roles see: ICG, Southern Thailand: The Problem with Paramilitaries, 23 October 2007. 88 More generally, while analysts recognize that the Buddhist minority in the South feels threatened and are frustrated by the governments inability to protect them, concern has been raised that the proliferation of poorly trained, ill-disciplined militias is counterproductive and heightens the risk human rights violations being committed and of inciting communal violence. See: ICG, Southern Thailand, The Problem with Paramilitaries, 23 October 2007. 89 Second periodic report of Thailand to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child on implementation of the Convention of the Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/83/Add.15, 31 May 2005. 90 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, Consideration of report submitted by Thailand, Concluding observations: UN Doc. CRC/C/THA/CO/2, 17 March 2006.

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Child Recruitment and Use in Southern Thailand unrest and to ensure their reintegration in society. to develop, in collaboration with non-governmental and international organizations, a comprehensive system of psychosocial support and assistance for children affected by violence and conflict. 91 The Coalition is concerned that the Thai authorities have yet to take adequate measures to protect children in the South from recruitment and use by armed groups (or police-backed civilian defence groups), or to assist the release, rehabilitation and reintegration of children already in the ranks of such groups. Rather, the evidence suggests that no distinction is made by the security forces between children and adults, and that children suspected of affiliation with militant armed groups have been subjected to human rights violations, including unlawful killing and arbitrary detention.
Arbitrary detention of children

Hundreds of suspected militants, some of them under the age of 18, have been arrested and detained by Thai security forces under martial law and the Emergency Decree.92 Under-18s were also among those who were required to participate in military-run vocational training programs in 2007. Thailand has a functioning juvenile justice system which includes a range of safeguards to protect and ensure the best interests of children in conflict with the law. However, the security forces appear to regard detention under martial law and the Emergency Decree as distinct from detention under the criminal justice system. As such they do not consider that detainees have the rights accorded to them under the criminal procedure code or under juvenile justice laws a position that is inconsistent with international human rights law and standards including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the Convention on the Rights of the Child; the United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juvenile Deprived of their Liberty; and the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (The Beijing Rules).
Arbitrary detention of nine teenage boys

Dozens of people have been charged and brought to trial for security related crimes in the South. It is not known whether this includes any under-18s. However, the Coalition is aware of nine teenage boys, aged between 15 and 17, who were arrested in June and July 2007. Three were detained during sweeping operations in Bannangsta District, Yala Province on 18 June 2007 and three others were detained in SungaiPadi District, Narathiwat Province on 23 June 2007. The six were initially held in Rattanapon military camp in Songkhla.93 The remaining three are believed to have

91

UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, Consideration of report submitted by Thailand, Concluding observations: UN Doc. CRC/C/THA/CO/2, 17 March 2006. 92 Between June and December 2007 alone, 1,947 people were arrested during sweeping operations. See: ICG, Thailand: Political Turmoil and the Southern Insurgency, 28 August 2008. 93 Working Group on Justice for Peace, Briefing Note on the human rights situation in the South of Thailand, August 2007.

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Child Recruitment and Use in Southern Thailand been detained during joint civilian, military and police searches in July 2007 and held initially at the militarys Ingkayuth Camp in Pattani.94 As with adult detainees, the nine teenagers were held initially for seven days under martial law and a further 30 days under the Emergency Decree. They were then among several hundred people who were sent to military camps in Chumporn, Ranong and Surat Thani provinces to take part in vocational and attitude adjustment training. The authorities claimed that attendance at the training was voluntary. In practice there appears to have been little option detainees being offered the choice between being charged with a serious criminal offence or attending a four-month training and requests by some detainees to camp commanders to return home were reportedly denied.95 Six of the boys were released in August 2007 as a result of advocacy efforts by local NGOs. Another three were released in October 2007 after a court ruling on habeas corpus petitions submitted by relatives of the detainees. According to a submission by the Army Commander for Surat Thani Province in one of the habeas corpus hearings, [t]he program to vocationally train and adjust attitudes of the suspects was set up with the consent of suspects, following an announcement temporarily prohibiting 384 individuals, including at least three who were under the age of 18, from entering or residing in the provinces of Yala, Pattani, Narthawat and Songkla. The submission argued that if the suspects were not detained, controlled or taken care of, they could sneak into the area to perpetrate incidents again.96
Concerns about detention of children under martial law and the Emergency Decree

A variety of concerns about arrests and detentions under martial law and the Emergency Decree have been raised by human rights organizations and others. Under martial law, the military may arrest without a warrant and detain for seven days for interrogation or other military purposes any person suspected of causing actions that may be potentially harmful to the kingdom or violate any provisions of the martial law as well as the order of the army. Under the Emergency Decree an individual may be arrested and detained as a preventative measure or to engender cooperation with the authorities for up to 30 days. Concern has been expressed that the grounds for detention under Martial Law and the Emergency Decree are so broad and vague as to be open to abuse. It has also been pointed out by legal experts that, although international law does not prohibit administrative detention, it should be an extraordinary and temporary measure and
94 95

Correspondence with ICJ, October 2007. Working Group on Justice for Peace, Briefing Note on the human rights situation in South of Thailand, 20 August 2007 and correspondence with the ICJ, October 2007. According to private correspondence with an independent trial observer the witness for the 4th Army Region testified during cross-examination at Surat Thani Provincial Court that detainees were not free to leave when asked by counsel for the detainees if they were free to leave he said: "mai dai" (which in Thai means "cannot"). 96 Unofficial translation of excerpts from submission of the Surat Thani Province Army Commander in habeas corpus case, Surat Thani Provincial Court, 11 October 2007.

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Child Recruitment and Use in Southern Thailand that effective legal and practical safeguards must be in place to protect detainees, including the right to go to court to challenge the legality of detention.97 However, provisions under both laws and the manner in which they are implemented are inconsistent with international standards intended to protect individuals in detention, including juveniles deprived of their liberty.98 Concerns include the fact that detainees are held in irregular places of detention such as military camps and police training schools; they are denied access to lawyers, family and medical treatment; judicial oversight of detention is inadequate; reports indicate that they are detained primarily for the purpose of extracting confessions; and there are allegations that some detainees have been tortured and ill-treated.99 Concerns relating to children detained under the Emergency Decree were among those raised by the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) in a letter to the Prime Minister of 6 September 2007. The NHRC noted that the arrest of children or youth under the Emergency Decree constituted a breach of international standards and it recommended that an interdisciplinary team should be involved in overseeing the custody of a child or teenager (whose age is under 18 at the time of arrest).100 In the response provided by the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center (SBPAC),101 quoting replies it had received to its inquiries about the NHRCs concerns from military and police authorities in the South, the NHRCs recommendation was described as irrelevant In the SBPACs response it was argued that detention for questioning under the Emergency Decree cannot be construed as an investigation or interrogation under the Criminal Procedure Code. It is simply an inquiry of suspects related to the unrest or those who have violated Martial Law. And the suspects cannot be confused with alleged offenders who are indicted by criminal charges and have the rights to have lawyers present during the interrogation. The response goes on to note that one of the purposes of the inquiry is to correct the rather corrupt attitude of the persons and so that competent officers can gain more support from local population and get more cooperation. It is thus argued, because it is not a criminal investigation under the Criminal Procedure Code, that social workers or psychologists are not required to be present during the interrogation of children.102

97 98

See ICJ, More Power, Less Accountability: Thailands New Emergency Decree, August 2005. For example: The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); The Convention on the Rights of the Child; The Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment; The United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty; and the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (The Beijing Rules). 99 For a detailed analysis see ICJ. Legal Memorandum: The Implementation of Thailands Emergency Decree, July 2007. 100 Under Thailands Amended Criminal Procedure Code (No.20) of 1999, either a psychologist, social welfare officer, or another person requested jointly by the child and the prosecutor shall be present at the investigation. 101 The SBPAC was originally established in 1981 to help contain the local communist insurgency and later became involved in managing separatist tensions. It was dismantled by Prime Minister Thaksin in 2002, but re-established again in 2006. 102 Unofficial translation of correspondence and accompanying documents to the Chairperson of the National Human Rights Commission from the Secretariat of the Prime Minister, 18 April 2008.

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Child Recruitment and Use in Southern Thailand Under international law and standards there are, however, no exceptions that would make it irrelevant for safeguards to be provided to a child (defined under the international standards and Thai law as any person under the age of 18) in detention, including immediate access to families, lawyers, social welfare or other relevant child protection officials. Article 37 (b)-(d) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child provides a range of safeguards for children deprived of their liberty.103 Children must not be arbitrarily or unlawfully detained, and the detention of a child must be only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest possible time (Article 37 (b)). Detained children must be treated with humanity, dignity and in a manner which takes into account the needs of persons of his or her age (Article 37(c)). Article 37 (c) also provides that child detainees should be separated from adults, and shall have the right to maintain contact with family members, save in exceptional circumstances. Article 37(d) provides for the right to legal assistance, and the right to challenge the lawfulness of detention. Under the UN Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty, deprivation of liberty is defined as any form of detention or imprisonment or the placement of a person in a public or private custodial setting, from which this person is not permitted to leave at will, by the order of any judicial, administrative or other public authority. Detention under martial law and the Emergency Decree fits within this definition and should therefore be subject to safeguards contained in the Rules and other international standards, as well as those contained in Thailands Code of Criminal Procedure and Act of Establishment of Juvenile and Family Courts and Procedure for Juvenile and Family Cases.
Rehabilitation and reintegration of children associated with armed groups

The military-run vocational training programs have also raised concerns. Officially they are claimed to give job opportunities to participants, to keep communities safe by removing those likely to cause violence and to allow for monitoring of suspected insurgents. The International Commission of Jurists, however, has described them as being in reality a form of arbitrary detention under the guise of training, rehabilitation or educational purposes.104 Under international standards states are required to take measures to secure the release of children from armed groups and to provide assistance for their physical, psychological recovery and social reintegration.105 However, on the basis of existing information, the Coalition is concerned that a vocational training program, run by the military and which children are compelled to attend, does not constitute appropriate support for reintegration. Among the principles that must underpin any reintegration program for former child soldiers are: that it should be voluntary; it should not further stigmatize the children; it
103 104

Thailand acceded to the Convention on the Rights of the Child in March 1992. ICJ, Thailand: Legal Memorandum, Vocational Training Camps and Applicable International Standards, October 2007. 105 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict, Article 6.3.

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Child Recruitment and Use in Southern Thailand should be based on the childs best interests; it should build on the resilience of children, enhance their self worth and promote their capacity to protect their own integrity and construct a positive life; and it should be linked to other programs, policies and initiatives that benefit both children who have been associated with fighting forces and children affected by conflict generally.106 Arrests and detentions under martial law and the Emergency Decree continue in the South. In the absence of independent monitoring, including access to military and police facilities where suspects are detained, it is impossible to know if or how many under-18s are among those held. In the meantime, new legislation has also recently been adopted which provides the military with the legal authority to resume the reeducation program suspended after it was challenged via the October 2007 habeas corpus petitions. Under the Internal Security Act suspects in security-related cases may undergo six months of re-education under military supervision if they confess to their wrongdoings. Urgent measures are required to ensure that the rights of under-18s alleged to be associated with armed groups are protected, that they are not subjected to arbitrary detention or other violations of their rights, and that appropriate programs are instituted to assist their release, rehabilitation and reintegration. Thailands responsibilities under international law

9.

A comprehensive framework of international humanitarian law, international criminal law and international human rights law exists to prohibit the recruitment and use of child soldiers. International law also lays out the responsibilities of the state to prevent childrens recruitment or use in hostilities and to ensure the rehabilitation and reintegration of those that are. As a state party to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (the Convention), Thailand is required to take all feasible measures to ensure that person who have not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities (Article 38.2) and to " ensure protection and care of children who are affected by an armed conflict (Article 38.4). Under the Convention it is also required to "take all appropriate measures to promote physical and psychological recovery and social reintegration of a child victim of: any form of neglect, exploitation, or abuse; torture or any other form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; or armed conflicts" (Article 39). The Convention is a human rights treaty which is applicable at all times, in situations of armed conflict and where there is none. In February 2006, Thailand acceded to the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict (the Optional Protocol). The Optional Protocol sets 18 as the minimum age for conscription and obliges states to raise in years the minimum voluntary recruitment age from 15 established by the Convention. The Optional Protocol also explicitly prohibits armed groups from recruiting or using in hostilities any person below the age of 18. Towards
106

See: The Paris Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups, February 2007.

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Child Recruitment and Use in Southern Thailand this end, it places responsibilities on state parties to take measures, including the adoption of legal measures necessary to prohibit and criminalize such practices. (Articles 4.1 & 4.2). The Optional Protocol calls upon state parties to seek to release and to support the reintegration of children associated with armed forces or armed groups. Specifically, the Optional Protocol requires states to take all feasible measures to ensure that persons within their jurisdiction recruited or used in hostilities contrary to this Protocol are demobilized or otherwise released from service and when necessary to accord these persons all appropriate assistance for their physical and psychological recovery and their social reintegration (Article 6.3). Like the Convention, the Optional Protocol is a human rights treaty applicable in both conflict and non-conflict situations. Under it, state parties are required to take all necessary legal, administrative and other measures to ensure its effective implementation (Article 6.1). These preventative and protective measures should be taken regardless of whether or not there is a situation of armed conflict, such that they are in place to protect children from involvement should hostilities develop or conflict break out. Moreover, under the Optional Protocol, the recruitment or use in hostilities of persons under the age of 18 by non-state armed groups is prohibited under any circumstances. Accordingly, state parties are required to take steps to prevent the recruitment of children by armed groups at any time, whether or not an armed conflict exists. In situations of armed conflict, international human rights law coexists with international humanitarian law, while in peacetime, international human rights law applies alone. Where a non-international armed conflict exists, Common Article 3 to the Four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and customary international humanitarian law apply. Article 4.3 of Additional Protocol II prohibits the recruitment by armed forces and armed groups and participation of children under the age of 15. Although Thailand is not party to Additional Protocol II, there is widespread and consistent state practice supporting the prohibition on the recruitment and participation of children in hostilities. The International Committee of the Red Crosss Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law indicates that this is a rule of customary international law applicable in both international and non-international armed conflicts and to both states and armed groups.107 Thailand has signed, although not yet ratified, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) under which the conscription, enlistment and use of children under the age of 15 to participate directly in hostilities constitutes a war crime in both international armed conflicts (Article 8.2.b.xxvi) and non-international armed conflicts (Article 8.2.e.vii). Even though Thailand is not yet a state party to the Rome Statute, individuals who are responsible for conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 into armed forces or armed groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities may still be criminally responsible for acts amounting to war crimes under customary international law.108
107 108

See ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law, rules 136 and 137. In May 2004, the Appeals Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone ruled that the prohibition on recruiting children below the age of 15 had crystallized as customary international law prior to

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Child Recruitment and Use in Southern Thailand

Finally, Thailand is a state party to International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention No. 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labour which prohibits the forced or compulsory recruitment of children under the age of 18 for use in armed conflict.

10.

Conclusion

Since Thailand submitted its second periodic report on its implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 2005, levels of violence in the South have escalated. In this situation children are extremely vulnerable to human rights abuses by both state armed forces and non-state armed groups, including their recruitment and use in armed violence. On the side of the separatist armed groups there is strong evidence that there exists a long-term strategy to cultivate children for membership from a young age. On the side of the state, as the violence continues it is likely that, without robust safeguards to prevent it, teenagers and younger children may feel compelled to join civilian militias to defend their communities against attack. Moreover, under-18s suspected of association with armed groups are at risk of human rights violations by the Thai security forces and children linked to civilian defence groups are vulnerable to violent reprisals by armed groups. The Coalition recognizes both the seriousness and the complexity of the situation in the South and the difficulty in identifying effective measures to protect children against involvement in the hostilities. However, a first and important step is for the government to acknowledge that the problem exists. Further research is needed to establish the scale and exact nature of the problem. Extensive consultations and coordination will be required to design and implement strategies to protect children against recruitment and to secure the release of those already associated with armed groups, such that the programs are constructive, sensitive to local conditions and do not exacerbate existing tensions. The close involvement of the local administrative structures, community and religious leaders as well as communities, children and youth will be needed to achieve this. Expertise on protecting children from recruitment and use in hostilities should also be sought from national and international child rights and child protection organizations including UNICEF. Education is one important aspect. It is clearly a part of the problem, but should also be seen as an integral part of the solution. There are long-standing concerns about the provision of education in the South. The Committee on the Rights of the Child, for example, expressed its concern about regional disparities especially in the southernmost provinces, in access to social, health and educational services.109

1996, citing the widespread recognition and acceptance of the norm in international instruments such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child and Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions. 109 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, Consideration of report submitted by Thailand, Concluding observations: UN Doc. CRC/C/THA/CO/2, 17 March 2006.

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Child Recruitment and Use in Southern Thailand In the 2006 final report of the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC)110 a body established by the Thaksin administration to find a peaceful solution to the conflict it was noted that nationwide tests by the Ministry of Education showed students in the three border provinces score lower than other regions on every subject except English. The NRC highlighted the way in which the education system in the South had fallen victim to militant violence and to misguided government responses: the government, politicians and civil servants who do not understand the problems often come out to criticise the pondoks, and shut down these educational institutions which are the pride of the Muslim community. While, on the other side: troublemakers seem to choose educational sites and personnel as their targets. At the time, the NRC made a series of detailed recommendations aimed at inter alia reinforcing the diversity of the education system; strengthening integration of religious and secular subjects into public and private Islamic schools; promoting collaboration between Islamic and government schools; and generally improving the quality of education and providing opportunities for tertiary level education to students from the South. Taken together with other recommendations contained in the report, the NRCs proposals on education continue to represent a good starting point for protecting schools against militant influence and, at the same time, addressing some of the cultural and social tensions underlying the insurgency.

11.

Recommendations

Recommendations to the Thai Government

Implementation of the Optional Protocol Take immediate measures to implement the Optional Protocol including explicitly criminalizing the underage recruitment (conscription and enlistment) and use of any person under the age of 18 to participate in hostilities. Ensure that military and police codes, manuals and other directives are in accordance with the provisions of the Optional Protocol. Provide training to the armed forces and police on the provisions of the Optional Protocol and develop systematic awareness-raising, education and training programs for all relevant government and professional groups working with and for children, such as local government officials, health personnel, social workers and teachers. Submit to the Committee on the Rights of the Child at the earliest possible opportunity the initial report on the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict that was due in February 2008.111

110

The NRC was convened in 2005 with a mandate to find a long-term solution to the problem [in the southern border provinces], in order to bring about true reconciliation, peace and justice. Its 50 members included representatives from the southern border provinces; academics and other civil society representatives; representatives of political parties; representatives of government bodies, military and police. Its final report, Overcoming Violence through the Power of Reconciliation, was submitted to the Prime Minister in May 2006. 111 The Coalition was informed in July 2008 that the report was being finalized.

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Child Recruitment and Use in Southern Thailand Disarmament, rehabilitation and reintegration In close consultation with civil society and communities in southern Thailand, and with the support of appropriate national and international child protection agencies, establish a program to identify, release, rehabilitate and reintegrate child soldiers associated with separatist armed groups or civilian defence groups. Recruitment of children by civilian militias Clarify in both law and policy guidelines that the recruitment of under-18s is prohibited not only by the armed forces, but also by paramilitaries, civilian militias and any other armed or self-defence groups associated with the security forces. Monitoring and prevention Together with national and international child rights and child protection organizations, establish a system for monitoring the situation of children in the hostilities in southern Thailand. A mechanism to receive and act on complaints of recruitment and use of children by non-state armed groups or civilian self defence groups should be set up. On the basis of systematic data collection, develop multi-faceted, multi-agency strategies to prevent child recruitment and use by armed groups in the southern provinces involving legal, institutional, social, economic and cultural measures. Invite the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for children and armed conflict to visit Thailand and support ASEANs cooperation with the Special Representative to strengthen regional efforts to protect children in situations of armed conflict. Issue invitations for other UN special procedures to visit the South, including the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention and the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education. Accountability Ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, and criminalize war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in Thai law. Investigate and prosecute individuals suspected of recruiting and using children. Detention of children Ensure that children are not criminalized for the fact of having being recruited or used by armed groups and are not subjected to any form of arbitrary detention, including in the context of vocational training or other similar programs. Ensure that children deprived of their liberty as a consequence of actions committed as a result of their association with armed groups are treated with 27

Child Recruitment and Use in Southern Thailand humanity and with respect for their inherent dignity. They should be detained separate from adults and accorded their rights under relevant national and international law and standards relating to juvenile justice. They should not, under any circumstances, be held in unofficial places of detention such as military camps or police training centres or subjected to torture or other forms of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. If children associated with armed groups are arrested and prosecuted for having committed a crime, trials should strictly follow safeguards and procedures contained in international standards on juvenile justice. The best interests of the child should be prioritised and the objectives of rehabilitation and restorative justice emphasised. Permit independent monitors to make regular, unannounced visits to all places of detention including military and police facilities and vocational training camps. Education Ensure that children attending schools in southern Thailand are protected from extremist political or religious ideology. Consider fully implementing the National Reconciliation Commissions recommendations on education. Notwithstanding the responsibility of separatist armed groups for the majority of the attacks on teachers, students and schools, the government of Thailand should devise and implement a strategy to monitor, prevent and respond to attacks on education in coordination with all relevant institutions including the ministries of education, interior and justice, the army and the police, UNICEF and UNDP.
Recommendations to non-state armed groups

Immediately end the recruitment and use of child soldiers and release all under-18s within their ranks without fear of reprisal. Cease the targeting of children through indoctrination programs in schools, mosques and other locations where children are present. Cease all attacks against civilians and civilian objects including schools and all attacks that do not discriminate between combatants and civilians. Publicly agree to abide by international human rights and humanitarian law, including implementing a prohibition on recruiting and using under-18s.

Recommendations to the international community

Support the Thai government to implement its commitments under the Optional Protocol. Encourage and support initiatives by the Thai government to protect children from recruitment and use by armed groups in southern Thailand, to secure their release from such groups and support their rehabilitation and reintegration.

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Child Recruitment and Use in Southern Thailand Raise concerns with the Thai authorities about the treatment, including arbitrary arrests, of under-18s suspected of association with armed groups. Support NGOs and civil society groups working on the issues of child protection and child rights in southern Thailand.

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COALITION TO STOP THE USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS

www.child-soldiers.org