SELECTED NEWS AND VIEWS COLLECTED BY YE KYAW SWA

No 1 - Tuesday, June 28, 2011

This is the combination or the continuation of the blog named http://mahathuriya.blogspot.com/

News,Views & Opinions

In which we said ..

Saturday, January 1, 2011 HAPPY NEW YEAR ! ( 2011) Hello Dear ! Wishing you a happy new year ! This 2011 A.D. will be hoped to be the very first year of making the political ideology of General Reformation instead of any kind of revolution to the Burmese Society though there has been still existed plenty of unsolved issues in almost all fields. The bigger issues might be named as democratic reform and internal peace to be concluded by means of cooperation, not subordination, between military organization

and political forces. We do strongly believe that there shall be no way of success without cooperation between military and civilians. No personality cult, no sectionalism, no vandalism and no vendetta would be favored by us to achieve Democracy, Peace and Prosperous Society for future Burma (Myanmar). This blog will be pushed toward "The True Reform for Burma by means of co-operation" in the coming new Hluttaw and the new government. Thank you so much for reading this. Saturday, January 01, 2011. Yangon Myanmar ( Burma )

And also stated that

Thursday, February 10, 2011 Memorandum (1/2011) Memorandum (1/2011) February 10,2011

This blog is intended to prepare the collections of reference resources for supporting academic study as well as policy analysis concerning U.S. foreign policy toward Asia or

the East. China, Japan and Asia-Pacific region, South-East Asian nations, the Indian Sub-continent and the Russian Federation are the targeted Geo-political parts of this study to understand the real meaning and the true purpose of the U.S. foreign policy toward Asia or the East. Under that title, such a policy toward Burma (Myanmar) is fundamentally and necessarily included for the sake of shaping future relationship, between the two countries, Burma and United States of America, which had been infertile since after the stepping down of General Ne Win. As reformers, we always propose to make a talk directly only between the two governments, U.S and Burma (Myanmar) to achieve good understanding for the smooth relationship in coming days, months and years. U.S. has also openly said that a policy of pragmatic engagement with the Burmese authorities holds the best hope for advancing our goals.* *U.S. Policy Toward Burma : Kurt Campbell (Assistant Secretary of State) Sunday, November 7, 2010 Suggestions and Opinions are welcome. Please post in the reader comments. Thanks. Posted by mahathuriya : at 6:52 PM Email This BlogThis! Share to Twitter Share to Facebook Share to Google Buzz

In addition, there was also shortly declared that ..

Tuesday, October 19, 2010

Either evolution or eformation.... ()... .. ..

.. Revolution Reformation .. .. .? .? .. Revolution is failed. ... .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. ..

October 19, 2010 9:01 PM Posted by mahathuriya : at 11:08 PM Email This BlogThis! Share to Twitter Share to Facebook Share to Google Buzz

Tuesday, June 28, 2011

NO 1

China Welcomes 'New Channel' for Dialogue With US Cambodia: First hearing ex-Khmer Rouge leaders' trial The beginning of the end or the end of the beginning? By Yuriko Koike U.S. Policy Regarding Burma By Phil Robertson MYANMAR: US Policy of Pragmatic Engagement By C. S. Kuppuswamy Testimony of Joseph Yun - Deputy Assistant Secretary - U.S. Department of State

News June 27, 2011 China Welcomes 'New Channel' for Dialogue With US VOA News

Photo: ASSOCIATED PRESS

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, right, and Shanghai Party Secretary Yu Zhengsheng shake hands during their meeting at World Expo site Saturday, May 22, 2010 in Shanghai, China. (AP Photo/Eugene Ho China is welcoming the opening of a "new channel" of communications with the United States after talks in Hawaii where South China Sea tensions were discussed. A commentary Sunday in the official Xinhua news agency said the talks resulted from Washington's strategic emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region and China's growing global influence. It said China welcomes America's enhanced role in the region as long as it is constructive for peace and development. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell said after the talks on Saturday with Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Cui Tiankai that the two had "candid and clear" discussions about the South China Sea disputes. He said the United States wants tensions to subside and that it seeks a dialogue among all the key players in the disputes. Both Vietnam and the Philippines have protested recent actions by Chinese naval vessels in waters the two countries claim as their exclusive economic zones. The two have sought U.S. support in the conflicts, prompting China to warn the United States against outside interference. China and Vietnam agreed at a meeting Saturday in Beijing to peacefully resolve their dispute through negotiations and friendly consultations. The Philippines last week won assurances from Secretary of State Hillary Clinton that the United States remains committed to a 60-year-old mutual defense treaty with Manila. Despite the tensions, Campbell said the talks in Hawaii helped the the United States and China achieve a better understanding of each other's intentions, policies and actions.

Xinhua quoted Cui as saying the talks had been "friendly, candid and constructive."

The consultations grew out of the third round of a China-U.S. strategic and economic dialogue in May. China says they reflect an agreement between Presidents Barack Obama and Hu Jintao to build a positive, cooperative and comprehensive relationship. Further meetings are planned at a date that has not been determined. Ref: http://www.voanews.com/english/news/China-Welcomes-New-Channel-for-DialogueWith-US-124580784.html

Cambodia: First hearing ex-Khmer Rouge leaders' trial

All four suspects denied the accusations

Continue reading the main story Khmer Rouge Trials

Khmer Rouge tribunal in disarray "Brother Number Two" Chum Mey: Tuol Sleng survivor Duch: Symbol of horror

A UN-backed tribunal in Cambodia is holding its first hearing in the trial of four former top Khmer Rouge leaders. The defendants include the "number two" in Pol Pot's regime, Nuon Chea. They face charges of genocide and crimes against humanity over the deaths of up to two million Cambodians in 1975-79. They all deny the accusations, and the trial is likely to last for years. Last July, former Khmer Rouge member Kaing Guek Eav, known as Comrade Duch, was jailed for 35 years. But because of time already served and compensation for a period of illegal detention, Duch - the former head of a notorious prison where some 15,000 died - will be free in 19 years. Led by Pol Pot, who died in 1998, the Maoist Khmer Rouge regime was ousted from power by Vietnamese forces in 1979. 'Second Nuremberg' The four defendants appeared at the initial hearing at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Court of Cambodia (ECCC) in Phnom Penh on Monday morning. Besides Nuon Chea, they include former head of state Khieu Samphan, former foreign minister and international face of the regime Ieng Sary, and his wife Ieng Thirith, who was minister for social affairs.

The four showed no emotion as opening statements were read out before the court and a packed gallery, in proceedings screened on national television.

Please turn on JavaScript. Media requires JavaScript to play. The BBC's Guy De Launey said the defendants will argue that they should not be on trial at all Moments later, Nuon Chea - who was dressed in a ski hat and sweatshirt - complained he was not well and felt cold and left the courtroom. "I'm ready to come back when the court discusses my requests," he said. The hearing will run for a maximum of four days, and no evidence will be given. Instead, the hearing is expected to focus on witness and expert lists and preliminary legal objections. The trial proper is expected to open later this year, possibly in September. "There hasn't been a case as large and complex as this since Nuremberg," international co-prosecutor Andrew Cayley told the AFP news agency in a recent interview, referring to the historic Nazi trials after World War II. The head of the Cambodian Center for Human Rights said the start of the second case was a "cathartic moment". The crimes "remain ingrained in Cambodia's collective psyche. I hope that this trial... provides all victims with some sense of justice, however delayed that justice may be", Ou Virak said in a statement. Theary Seng, who lost both her parents to the Khmer Rouge, told the BBC: "This is the heart of the matter - this is the case that we have been anticipating for many years, since the operation of the court in 2006.

"It will allow a lot of information to surface which will help to chip away at the repeatedly-asked questions of why did it happen?" Theary Seng is one of almost 4,000 "civil parties" to the case - victims who will have a voice in court alongside the prosecution and defence. Health concerns At least one of the defendants - Ieng Sary - is expected to argue that he should not be on trial at all, the BBC's Guy De Launey in Phnom Penh says. Continue reading the main story Who were the Khmer Rouge?

Maoist regime that ruled Cambodia from 1975-1979 Led by Saloth Sar, better known as Pol Pot Abolished religion, schools and currency in effort to create agrarian utopia Up to two million people thought to have died of starvation, overwork or were executed Defeated in Vietnamese invasion in 1979 Pol Pot fled and remained free until 1997 - he died a year later Brutal Khmer Rouge regime

The former foreign minister received a royal pardon 15 years ago as part of the deal which produced the final surrender of the Khmer Rouge. The defendants are all in or near their 80s and some have been in bad health, so there is a real danger that not all of them may live to see the end of the trial, our correspondent adds. The suspects have been kept in detention since their arrests in 2007. Parts of court proceedings will be broadcast on TV, but hundreds of people from all over Cambodia are still expected to travel to the court to see the accused.

The current Cambodian government has repeatedly opposed efforts to widen the tribunal's inquiries, and insisted that there should be no further trials after that of the four leaders.

Ref: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-13922564

The beginning of the end or the end of the beginning? By Kamal Hyder in

Asia

on Thu, 06/23/2011 - 08:30.

Photo by GALLO/GETTY In less than a months time, US forces will begin pulling out of Afghanistan. Even though the move will be more symbolic and not a total withdrawal, it will pave the way forward for an eventual handover of Afghan security to the Afghan National Army (ANA) by 2014. It is a daunting task, by any stretch of the imagination. Afghanistan was bigger than Iraq and was even more rugged and suitable for a long drawn out guerilla war.

The Afghan Taliban, the main adversary in the conflict, had already made its position clear when it said it wanted a total withdrawal of all foreign forces from Afghanistan before any talks could begin. Now US President Barack Obama has made his plans public and that means an almost 30 per cent reduction by the autumn of 2012. The Americans and their allies are hoping they will be able to hand over the task to the fledgling ANA which is already near the 300,000 mark. It is hoped that by 2014 the Afghan army would have sufficient boots on the ground to take over control of their territory. The issue is not just that they will have to have sufficient numbers, however, but that they will need to be well-trained and well-equipped enough to fight against the Taliban, who are more organised and stronger than at any time since the invasion of Afghanistan almost ten years ago. If the past is anything to go by, the real test of the Afghan army will be maintaining the loyalties of its various ethnic groups. During the civil war after the Russians forces pulled out in 1989, many soldiers deserted and switched sides. The Afghan army crumbled like a house of cards and despite attempts to beef up loyalists like Najeebullah in Kabul, Moscow was not able to keep the army intact as a coherent fighting force. The likelihood of such an eventuality repeating itself cannot be brushed aside. The feeling is that once the Americans tone down their presence in Afghanistan, the Afghan army may not be able to cope with the fight. While it is easy for the Americans to shoot their opponents (whether suspected or real), the Afghan army may not be in a position to afford that luxury.

They will be aware that their opposition lives within the same territoriy, and is always within striking distance . As the fighting against the Taliban has intensifies, there have already been numerous cases of desertions within the army. In the eyes of some senior analysts, the present Afghan army was cannon fodder for the US and NATO forces. The policy of pitting Afghans versus other Afghans was always likely to fuel the probability of a civil war, the ultimate benefactors of which will likely be the Afghan Taliban. No wonder there was talk of the need for a political solution to the crisis. In the eyes of one senior US diplomat, the talking should actually have begun years ago. The Americans had already made the blunder of lumping the Taliban in with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. The fact is that no Taliban or Afghan was directly or indirectly involved in the attacks on the World Trade Centre towers and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, and the Americans went after both. While they may now be more confident about winning the their battle against al-Qaeda, they are far from winning the war against the Taliban. The Americans may be looking at this summer as the beginning of the end, with the withdrawal of 10,000 troops, but the Afghan Taliban are just getting started with their summer offensive. The Americans figured that they had the watches, but the truth is that it was the Taliban who have always had the time. It remains unclear, therefore, whether this is the beginning of the end, or the end of

the beginning of a new era of chaos for the region. The real fear here remains that with the US and NATO leaving, will the other regional states be sucked once more into a proxy war? Ref : http://blogs.aljazeera.net/asia/2011/06/23/beginning-end-or-end-beginning

Opinion

Asia after the Afghan war

The US withdrawal of its troops will test the will of Asia's power brokers to build a secure regional order. Yuriko Koike Last Modified: 24 Jun 2011 10:08

At the recent Shangri La Dialogue in Singapore - in the presence of Chinese Minister of Defence - US Defence Secretary Robert Gates outlined his

ideas for continuing US military operations in and with Asia

July will mark two milestones in America's sometimes-tortured relations with Asia. One is the beginning of the end of the nearly decade-long struggle in Afghanistan - the longest war in United States history - as President Barack Obama announces the first troop withdrawals. The other is the 40th anniversary of Henry Kissinger's

[GALLO/GETTY] secret mission to Beijing, a turning point in the Cold War and the first step on China's road to modernisation - but at the time a huge shock to Asia, particularly Japan. The looming Afghan withdrawal recalls, at least for some Asians, a third, even more traumatic event: America's chaotic exit from Saigon in April 1975. Back then, that debacle seemed to presage a broader US withdrawal from Asia, with a war-weary American public seeking the supposed comforts of isolationism. Today's Asian nervousness exists not only because isolationism appears to be gaining ground once more in America, but also because Afghanistan's stability remains in doubt, while China's power is rising in the absence of any pan-Asian consensus or institutional structure. The US did, indeed, turn inward following the fall of Saigon, and its neglect of Afghanistan following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 led to chaos and al-Qaeda's neartakeover of the country. So it is not surprising that many Asian leaders are asking themselves what commitments the US will maintain once its troops leave Afghanistan. Perhaps equally as important, many people in Asia are also debating whether the region would be able to rebalance itself, should the US scale back its military presence. Fortunately, US Secretary of Defence Robert Gates has reassured America's Asian friends and allies that regional disengagement is not being contemplated. At the recent Shangri La Dialogue in Singapore - indeed, in the presence of Chinese Minister of Defense General Liang Guanglie - Gates outlined his ideas for continuing US cooperation in and with Asia. Gates promised to increase the number of US warships deployed to Singapore as part of the US-Singapore Strategic Framework Agreement; increase the number of US Navy calls in Asian ports; hold more joint naval exercises; and improve multilateral military cooperation.

Even more reassuring were the principles that will, according to Gates, guide America's future Asian strategy: free and open commerce; support for the rule of law and the rights, responsibilities, and sovereignty of Asia's states; open access to Asian and global sea lanes, airspace, and cyberspace; and peaceful resolution of all conflicts. These principles matter, because Australia, Japan, South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, India, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, New Zealand, Vietnam, and even Mongolia all regard a US military presence in the region as essential to counterbalancing China's increasing might. Gates, however, is due to step down from his post shortly, which is unfortunate, because the Obama administration's apparent lack of any explicit Asia strategy means that Gates' reassurances might not reassure for very long. Nowadays, US policy on Asia needs the type of strategic vision and insight that guided Kissinger's discussions with Mao Zedong and Zhou En-lai four decades ago. Without a clear and convincing doctrine, at least some Asian leaders are likely to remain dubious of America's ability to remain Asia's dominant military force, particularly given its economic woes, projected fiscal retrenchment, and other overseas commitments. This lack of clarity may become particularly troublesome should China's leaders underestimate the enduring quality of America's Asian commitments. Securing a structure of peace in Asia, however, is not solely America's responsibility. America's friends and allies need to think hard about what sort of regional order they want, and they must begin to collaborate in order to breathe life into a structure of peace within which all of Asia can prosper and feel secure. Japan's government in particular needs to identify a coherent Asia strategy and stick to it, instead of leaning towards China one minute, and America the next. In constructing a viable strategy, deepening Japan's partnerships with Asia's great democracies - India, Indonesia, and South Korea - must be a priority. But the biggest question concerns China's place in a consensual Asian order, and its willingness to collaborate with its neighbours, as well as with the US, in creating it. The doubts that many Asians now hold about China's intentions are well grounded, given the secretive nature of China's military build-up, and its leaders' increasingly aggressive

tone in territorial disputes with India, Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam. China's unconditional support for North Korea's wayward regime, despite its repeated crimes against peace, is also a cause for concern about whether China will treat its neighbours' security concerns with respect. Today's Asia-Pacific region has now become the focus of the global economy. According to the World Bank, three of the top five economic powers will be Asian powers (China, Japan, and India) within this decade. The boom that has brought this shift occurred because America's military presence in the region provided stability and predictability. America's withdrawal from Afghanistan must not be allowed to call this stability into question. What happens in Afghanistan as America begins to draw down its troops will test the willingness of all of Asia's powers to work together to build a secure regional order. In Afghanistan, their long-term interests are essentially in harmony, as none - including China - wants to see Afghanistan become a haven for terrorism once again. But only a strong regional consensus on Afghanistan's future can avert the prospect of a renewed struggle for mastery there. If such a consensus can be forged, however, it will provide a foundation for further collaboration in building a pan-Asian order based on consent, not military might.

Yuriko Koike, Japan's former Minister of Defense and National Security Adviser, is Chairman of the Executive Council of the Liberal Democratic Party. The article above was first published by Project Syndicate. The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's editorial policy.
Ref: http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/06/2011621132915825211.html .

U.S. Policy Regarding Burma By Phil Robertson, October 11, 2005

Key Points

A world-class human rights abuser, Burmas military junta is condemned both by the UN Human Rights Commissionevery year since 1989and by the International Labor Organization for its systematic use of forced labor.

The SPDC continues to refuse to recognize the results of the 1990 elections, won overwhelmingly by the National League for Democracy (NLD), and has imprisoned over 55 NLD parliamentarians.

Economic sanctions by the U.S. and other nations continue to pressure the SPDC regime, despite a recent ruling by the Supreme Court overturning the Massachusetts Burma law.

Springing from obscurity to Americas editorial pages, college campuses, city councils, and state legislatures, Burma has become a major foreign policy issue seemingly out of proportion to its relatively limited ties to the United States. Ruled by a series of harsh military regimes since 1962, Burma serves as a test case for U.S. policy on several fronts: human rights; a growing worldwide heroin epidemic; the role of U.S. state and local governments in relation to international trade policy and practice; forced labor, international labor standards, and the new prominence of the International Labor Organization (ILO) in the era of globalization; and the role of multinational corporations in supporting dictatorships. U.S. verbal commitments to promote human rights and democracy are being put to the test as an embattled democracy movementled by 1991 Nobel Peace Prize winner, Aung San Suu Kyifaces a relentless campaign of arrests and intimidation by the State Law and Order Restitution Council (SLORC) military junta, renamed the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in November 1997.

SLORC came to power in September 1988, when it commanded the Burmese army to smash a nationwide democracy movement by gunning down more than 3,000 protesters in Rangoon and thousands more in smaller cities and towns. Nine consecutive years of UN General Assembly resolutions condemning the junta demonstrate that little has changed since then. The UN Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) has criticized the SPDC for extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, death in custody, torture, arbitrary and politically motivated arrest and detention, absence of due process of law, severe restrictions on freedom of opinion, expression, movement, assembly, and association, including portering for the military. The use of forced labor by the SPDC affects as many as 800,000 Burmese daily, according to the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). In November 2000, the ILO will likely employfor the first timeArticle 33 of its constitution and call on member states to take action against the junta. The ILO is demanding that the SPDC scrap legal authority for the use of forced labor, order all government authorities to cease using it, and prosecute those responsible, especially the military. Attempting to legitimize its rule, SLORC/SPDC organized a multiparty election on May 27, 1990. The move turned out to be a huge miscalculation, as Suu Kyis National League for Democracy (NLD) party won a landslide victory, taking 392 of 485 seats in the Parliament. The official military party won just 10 seats, and the military promptly refused to honor the results of the election. When the SPDC employed mass arrests to prevent the convening of the elected Parliament in August 1998, the NLD announced the formation of the Committee epresenting the Peoples Parliament. Civil society groups continue to be totally repressed. Only in July 2000 did the SPDC reopen universities shuttered since 1996 to prevent student gatherings. The dominance of military spending has relegated Burmas once-proud health service to 190th (out of 191) in overall health system performance, according to the World Health Organization. The SPDC has consolidated control over ethnic groups in border areas by employing the infamous four cuts strategy, designed to cut off insurgents from food, funds, intelligence, and recruits. The result has been forced relocations and human suffering that rivals anything seen during ethnic cleansing in Bosnia or Kosovo. Detailed research

on internally displaced peoples (IDPs) among ethnic groups has found that over 300,000 Shan, more than 200,000 Karen, and over 30,000 Karenni citizens have been forced from their homes. Hundreds of villages have been turned into free-fire zones, in which heavily armed SPDC battalions, using civilians as forced porters and minesweepers, wreak havoc. Another 100,000 refugees have fled to Thailand. The Peoples epublic of Chinathe SPDCs closest ally and primary diplomatic supporterhas provided $1.8 billion in military equipment for the SPDCs military modernization drive. The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, a coalition of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), recently revealed that Burma has one of the highest numbers of child soldiers in the world. Yet Western and Asian multinationals continue to invest with government ministries or entities like the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings, controlled by military officers. Successful efforts by activists to pass Burma selective purchasing legislation in two states (Massachusetts and Vermont) and 21 cities (including New York and Los Angeles) have pressured at least 39 international companies to withdraw from Burma. But on June 19, 2000, the Supreme Court upheld the National Foreign Trade Council challenge to the Massachusetts Burma law, marking a counterattack by a coalition of Americas largest businesses, who oppose any restrictions on foreign trade.

Problems with Current U.S. Policy

Key Problems

Current U.S. sanctions are inadequate, because they only ban new investments allowing most existing projects to continue unimpededand do not address imports into the United States.

The Clinton administration has opposed state- and local-level sanctions as barriers to trade.

U.S. policy has failed to respond sufficiently to SPDC complicity in heroin trafficking networks.

In 1995, after her release from six years of house arrest, Aung San Suu Kyi challenged the military regime to enter into a dialoguewith no preconditionsto craft a final political settlement in Burma. This call, repeated hundreds of times by NLD leaders since then, has been consistently ignored by the junta. The SPDC has instead mounted an intensifying campaign to dismantle the NLD through arrests of its elected parliamentarians and members, seizures of property, and junta-organized noconfidence rallies against NLD parliamentarians in their constituencies. An SPDCappointed constitutional drafting convention waits in the wings, at work on a document that most observers believe will permanently enshrine military rule. With their backs to the wall, Suu Kyi and the NLD have called for international economic sanctions against the SPDC, an international tourism boycott, and no new foreign investment in Burma. Following a strategy reminiscent of the African National Congress during its struggle against apartheid in South Africa, the NLD believes that international sanctions will deprive the SPDC and its cronies of opportunities to enrich themselves and will contribute to pressure for an unconditional, tripartite dialogue between the SPDC, the NLD, and the leaders of the ethnic nationalities. In May 1997, a concerted grassroots campaign in the U.S. finally persuaded the Clinton administration to impose economic sanctions to ban future U.S. investment. The measure takes aim both at actions to facilitate investment (including those by foreign nationals) and attempts to evade the investment prohibitions. But all investment contracts signed by U.S. companies before that date are considered legal. In a test case to hold U.S. corporations accountable, Burmese directly affected by forced labor in the building of the Yadana Gas pipeline have joined forces with two U.S. NGOs to use the Alien Torts Claims Act to sue the Unocal oil company for human rights abuses stemming from its partnership with the SPDC. Unfortunately, Washington balks at the next logical stepbanning all Burmese imports into the United States, which are not covered by the May 1997 sanctions. In fact, the National Labor Committee found that between 1995 and 1999, apparel imports from

Burma soared 272%. In the year 2000, U.S. companies will import more than $340 million worth of garments from Burma, including those produced in factories owned by drug traffickers. U.S. activists have vowed that selective purchasing and corporate accountability campaigns will continue, despite opposition from free trade acolytes in the current administration, who played a critical role in persuading the Justice Department to side with U.S. businesses in arguments before the Supreme Court. Washingtons reluctance to ban Burmese imports is even harder to understand, now that it is clear that the SPDC is profiting from collaboration with narcotraffickers. The Drug Enforcement Agency estimated in 1998 that 14% of heroin entering the U.S. is from Southeast Asia and Burma ranks as the worlds second largest producer of heroin. Burmas banks can accept foreign currency deposits of any size with no questions asked, as long as a 30% tax is paid. Cheap amphetamines produced by ethnic groups like the Wa, who have a close relationship with a top SPDC official, Gen. Khin Nyunt, are flooding into Thailand. Yet the U.S. only responds with the same old drug war interdiction efforts, treating the symptoms rather than taking concerted political action against the SPDC regime, which condones these activities. SPDC intransigence has scuttled good faith international efforts to create a road map for political reform that would involve guarantees of aid in exchange for reform. Meanwhile the Clinton administration, while taking commendable steps to unilaterally stop new U.S. investments in Burma, has failed to use its leadership to lobby Australia, Canada, and key European countries to deepen Burmas diplomatic and economic isolation. As a result, the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) policy of constructive engagement toward the SPDC, primarily composed of forging commercial links and defending the SPDC from external criticism, continues largely unchallenged. Moreover, Japan is now moving to resume partial overseas development assistance to the SPDC. Another problem is the lack of adequate humanitarian assistance from the U.S. and other nations. The intensifying military campaign against ethnic nationalities along Burmas borders has created a humanitarian crisis that continues to be largely ignored by the international community. Hundreds of thousands of internally displaced Burmese

remain trapped, hiding in the jungles. Yet only a pittance of international assistance reaches them. Meanwhile, Thailand continues to insist on an overly narrow definition of a refugee as someone who is fleeing from fighting, has declined to accede to the 1951 UN Convention on the Status of Refugees, and refuses to consider setting up refugee camps for ethnic Shans. Between 700,000 and 1.5 million illegal migrant workersmany of whom could qualify as refugeeswork in the underground economy in Thailand.

Toward a New Foreign Policy

Key Recommendations

The U.S. must develop a proactive policy to deal comprehensively with the humanitarian needs of internally displaced persons in Burma and refugees in Thailand.

The U.S. needs to expand efforts to delegitimize the SPDC internationally and must work with allies to apply economic and political pressure on the junta. Unilaterally, the U.S. should ban imports from Burma.

The U.S. should support stronger action at the United Nations, including toughened multilateral sanctions, in concert with the forthcoming ILO call for governments to critically review their relationships with the SPDC regime.

One of the first steps the U.S. should take is to increase resources for cross-border humanitarian assistance (food and medicine) to the internally displaced population while marshalling greater international attention to the plight of the ethnic peoples of Burma. Washington should also proactively work with the Royal Thai government to broaden its definition of a refugee, allow Shan camps to be established, and ensure that no involuntary repatriations occur. U.S. policy correctly urges a tripartite dialogue between equalsthe SPDC, the NLD, and ethnic leaders. As Aung San Suu Kyi recently wrote in the Washington Post, this dialogue should be aimed at achieving a negotiated settlement acceptable to major

political forces in our country. The problem is that this call, echoed by the international community, has been met by the SPDC with shrill rhetoric, the jailing of NLD representatives, and further repression. The main issue for U.S. foreign policy is how to use political and economic leverage to accomplish a sustained dialogue leading to a just settlement. It is still clear that with economic and military backing from China as well as diplomatic support from ASEAN, the SPDC believes it can bide its time and selectively dismantle the NLD. The U.S. must intensify political and economic pressure to deny legitimacy and resources to the SPDC junta. The ILO Commission of Inquiry into Forced Labor, headed by three respected international jurists, found systematic use of forced labor in every state and division in Burma. A 1996 report by the U.S. embassy in Rangoon found that 3% of Burmas GDP comes from forced labor. In order to ensure that no products produced with or benefiting from forced labor (which is often used to build transportation infrastructure such as ports and roads) reach American consumers, the U.S. should immediately ban the import of all goods from Burma. Such a move would directly impact sectors closely tied to the Burmese military (like garment production and teak harvesting) and would uphold American principles against forced labor anywhere in the world. At the same time, the current administration must recognize the legitimacy of U.S. state and local governments refusing to do business with companies operating in Burma. Given the flood of heroin entering the U.S. from Burma, the administration should invoke a national security exemption (citing the Government Procurement Agreement) with regard to the World Trade Organization to fend off future attempts to overturn selective purchasing laws. Grassroots activists will certainly continue a concerted campaign of trade-related tactics to target U.S., European, and Asian companies invested in Burma, and the U.S. government should not put obstacles in their way, based on misguided appeals to free trade. At the United Nations, the General Assemblys annual resolutions on Burma are increasingly ignored by specialized UN agencies. In the first half of 2000, both the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and UNESCO held major conferences with the SPDC

government in Rangoon, lending international legitimacy to the junta. Although there is merit in the efforts of some activists in lobbying for suspension of the SPDC as the legitimate representative of Burma at the UN, Chinas veto in the UN Security Council will make that politically impossible. Instead, the U.S. and its allies should undertake an effort to forbid all UN agencies from conducting regional meetings in Burma and should urge the UN secretary-general to critically review all UN programs in Burma in light of the General Assemblys policy decision to promote human rights and the restoration of democratic rule. The U.S. should also call a session of the UN Security Council to pass a resolution condemning Burmas continued failure to transfer power to the winners of the 1990 election, forcing China to protect its client on the international stage, and further undermining the SPDCs independence in the eyes of its own people. The U.S. should continue its policy of blocking loans and assistance to Burma from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and should do likewise at the Asian Development Bank (ADB). An ADB project, the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) program, is being used to foster transportation, trade, and investment links between Burma and its neighbors. At the ADB annual meeting in May 2000 in Chiang Mai, invitees included at least two Burmese bankers with direct ties to drug traffickers. Initiatives like a GMS Business Forum, which would help foster closer links between SPDC companies and corporations in neighboring countries, are wholly inappropriate at this time. The U.S. should work with its European counterparts on the ADB board to insist on excluding Burma from all GMS projects or, failing that, should defund the program in its entirety. The U.S. must hold the line as a consistent supporter of the restoration of democratic rule, based on the 1990 election. Without U.S. influence in the international community, promoting a comprehensive policy of economic pressure and political persuasion to push for final political status negotiations, the SPDC may continue its record of grave human rights abuse and repression for many more years. Phil Robertson is the Mainland Southeast Asia Representative of the American Center for International Labor Solidarity, based in Bangkok, Thailand. These are the personal

views of the author and do not necessarily represent the views or policies of either the American Center for International Labor Solidarity or the AFL-CIO. Recommended Citation: Phil Robertson, "U.S. Policy Regarding Burma" (Washington, DC: Foreign Policy In Focus, October 11, 2005) Ref: http://www.fpif.org/reports/us_policy_regarding_burma

Paper no. 4539

10-June-2011

MYANMA : US Policy of Pragmatic Engagement -Not So Pragmatic

By C. S. Kuppuswamy In 2009 the US, on realising that its policy on Myanmar has not had the desired impact, embarked on a two-track strategy of engagement with the Myanmar authorities and at the same time continue with the economic sanctions to push for reforms. This is now being often referred to as pragmatic engagement. Even with this pragmatic engagement, US has made no headway in its relations with Myanmar. Expectations were high after the general elections and when the military junta 0n 30 March 2011 dissolved the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). A civilian government was put in place with former Prime Minister Thein Sein as

President. A Voice of America report then said that the US dismissed the so called transfer of power in Burma as immaterial as the military leaders continue to remain in control. A major development since then has been the appointment of a special envoy to Myanmar and a flurry of visits by US officials to Myanmar. Derek Mitchell, the Principal assistant secretary of Defense for Asian & Pacific Security affairs, has been nominated as a special envoy to Burma. The appointment is still to be confirmed. On this appointment Suu Kyi remarked I am a cautions optimist perhaps hinting that it would not make things any better. In view of the fact that the UN envoys could not do much in the last decade or so, the task is not going to be in anyway easy for the US envoy. Kurt Campbell, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia along with his deputy Scot Marciel visited Myanmar in November 2009 and had talks with the ruling Generals and Aung San Suu Kyi. They were the first high ranking American diplomats to visit Myanmar since 1995. Kurt Campbell visited Myanmar again in May 2010,when he was allowed to meet Suu /kyi at a state guest house in Rangoon. He warned that the election will lack international legitimacy and that Burmas arms deals with North Korea are against UN sanctions that prohibit buying arms from North Korea. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian & Pacific affairs, Joseph Y. Yun had visited Myanmar in December 2010 and again in May 2011. US Senator John McCain visited Myanmar from 01-03 June 2011. After meeting some government officials he said it was clear that the new Government wanted a better relationship with the United States. He had also met Suu Kyi and pledged to support efforts to foster democracy. He had also warned in a press meet that Myanmar could face a Middle East-style revolution if the new government fails to implement democratic reforms.

US charge d affairs, Larry Dinger, the top diplomat in Myanmar confirmed to the media in Feb 2011 that: Of course, the United States is engaging in a dialogue with Aung Sang Suu Kyi and the NLD about US assistance programmes in Burma," "We also engaged with the authorities in Naypyidaw and other stakeholders on such important issues in the effort to consider all important perspectives in the formulating of US policies toward Burma," There have been calls from some ASEAN countries and political parties in Myanmar for lifting of sanctions in view of the formation of the Civil Government. Rejecting these calls, US on 16 May 2011 has renewed its economic sanctions against Myanmar. President Obama while renewing the sanctions in a formal notice to the Congress said that Burma was taking actions hostile to US interests. While some senators have argued in favour of the stand taken by Aung San Suu Kyi and her party, the National League for Democracy, for continuance of the sanctions, some think tanks and Burma watchers are of the opinion that it is time for the US to rethink as the sanctions have not served the desired purpose. On the contrary they argue that the sanctions have strengthened the regime, weakened the opposition, created a bitterness towards the west and have given China and neighbouring countries a great economic opportunity. Review of US Policy A detailed review of the US Policy on Burma since October 2009 is contained in the opening remarks of Joe Yun, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs made before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on 02 June 2011. It is worth noting some excerpts of his remarks. The Administration firmly believes that easing sanctions at this time (after

transition to the Civilian Government in March 2011) is premature, absence of fundamental reform or other regime actions to address core international concerns, and that Burma's poor economic performance is primarily due to the regimes gross economic mismanagement and pervasive corruption. Burmese authorities continue to express a desire for improved relations with the United States and identified several confidence-building measures that they would like from the United States, including our use of Myanmar instead of Burma as the official name of the country and our direct assistance toward achieving the countrys Millennium Development Goals. The United States clearly and consistently condemned the elections as neither free nor fair. With former regime officials occupying most key positions in all branches of government, the United States is not optimistic that we will see any immediate change in policies or progress on our core concerns. The United States alone cannot achieve progress in Burma. We are tirelessly working with our European allies and our ASEAN and regional partners to urge the Burmese government to constructively engage with the international community and address these long-standing issues. India and China remain important to this issue. This review is a more an action taken report without indicating any progress achieved in US-Myanmar relations and shifts the total blame on to the Myanmar authorities for the current status of relations. Some comments on US Policy At this stage, Aung San Suu Kyi is still a determining factor in U.S. policy towards Burma/ Myanmar. Her status in the post-election period may determine U.S. Policy toward that country for a considerable period. David I. Steinberg.

If the US continues to press the regime about its relationship with Pyongyang, as seems highly likely, tensions between Washington and Naypyidaw are bound to grow, making a constructive dialogue on other issues even more difficult. Should it be discovered that Burma is indeed violating one or more UNSC Resolutions, President Obama would have no option but to revert to a much tougher line. This outcome may satisfy critics of the Administration's current policy, but it will not bring the resolution of Burma's domestic problems any closer. - Andrew Selth, Griffith Asia Institute. "US policy for a long time has been based on an objective that was extremely unlikely to be met - a dialogue between opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi [who was recently released after 17 years in jail and under house arrest] and the junta leading to democratic change. Western sanctions that were put in place to force the dialogue have not bankrupted the government, nor pressured leaders toward political reform. What they have done is severely weaken the position of independent businessmen and the middle classes on whom an open society depends." -Thant Myint-U The US should consider Myanmar through a broader lens with a holistic consideration of its foreign policy interests in the region, including nuclear nonproliferation. Reorienting US policy towards Myanmar does not mean casting aside human-rights issues, which were the initial motivation for imposing economic sanctions. - Shanan Farmer, Alex Roesler and Christina McDonnell (AT online 07 June 2011). Conclusion The US policy is dictated by growing support from Congress for continuance of sanctions, and a strong pro-democracy lobby of the expatriate groups. However it is time for the US to rethink on its policy on Burma. While due deference must be given to Aung San Suu Kyis views, the US should not be obsessed with democracy and human rights and think of the larger interests of the nation, the people and the US interests in the region. A good beginning, although a minor

gesture would be to recognise the new name Myanmar instead of Burma. Though it is said to be a "two track policy", what is seen on the ground is a "one track policy" of continuing the sanctions. Sanctions have not worked and will not work so long as China and India the two large neighbours are not taken on board. These two countries are in no mood to go along with the US on the question of sanctions. A break through is necessary and it is for the US to take the initiative when the new government has indicated its desire to improve its relations.

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Testimony of Joseph Yun Deputy Assistant Secretary Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs

U.S. Department of State Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs June 2, 2011 Block Burmese JADE Act and ecent Policy Developments

Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Mr. Berman, and Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today. I am pleased to have the opportunity to discuss the central aspects of our Burma policy, including elements of our two-track approach that comprises pressure coupled with principled engagement. In light of my recent visits to Burma in December 2010 and again two weeks ago, I would also like to provide an overview on the Administrations efforts to promote democracy and human rights in Burma and on key recent developments in Burma including the release of Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest, the 2010 elections, and the formation of a government headed by former top regime general and now President Thein Sein. After a comprehensive policy review, which Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell outlined for your Committee in October 2009, the United States launched a dual-track Burma policy, combining pressure with direct dialogue with the regime. We are currently pursuing these parallel and complementary tracks in a full-scale effort to advance progress on core concerns of the United States and the international community, including the unconditional release of all political prisoners, respect for human rights, and an inclusive dialogue with the political opposition and ethnic groups that would lead to national reconciliation. We also urge the Government of Burma to respect its international obligations, including adherence to all UN Security Council resolutions on nonproliferation. We have made these representations repeatedly in the context of Burmas nontransparent (2) relationship with North Korea. Although meaningful progress remains elusive, I believe we must continue to bring the full

range of diplomatic tools to bear and use both dialogue and pressure to promote positive change in Burma.

First, let me start with the pressure side of our policy. We play a leading role in the international community in shining a light on the regime's dismal human rights record and signaling to Burmese authorities that the world is watching. We support an annual resolution at the UN General Assembly on Burma that draws attention to human rights abuses and calls for cooperation with the international community to achieve concrete progress with regard to human rights, fundamental freedoms and political processes. In 2010, this resolution passed by a higher vote margin than in any previous year. More recently, in March of this year, we supported the annual resolution on Burma at the UN Human Rights Council to renew the mandate of the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of Human Rights in Burma, Mr. Tomas Ojea Quintana. We continue to call upon the Burmese government to fully cooperate with Mr. Quintana, including by allowing him to visit the country again, which authorities are refusing. Secretary of State Clinton has also expressed our commitment to pursuing accountability for human rights abuses through establishing a commission of inquiry for Burma in close consultation with our friends, allies, and partners at the United Nations. Coupled with this international pressure, we maintain extensive, targeted sanctions against senior leaders of the Burmese government and military, their immediate family members, their key supporters, and others who abuse human rights. We work closely with our key allies such as the European Union (EU) and its member states, Canada, Australia, Japan, Korea, Southeast Asian nations and others to encourage them to impose sanctions and to press the regime to make meaningful changes. We were pleased that in April 2011, the EU renewed its Common Position on Burma, which authorizes EU sanctions on key regime officials. U.S. sanctions are based on a series of executive orders and key legislation passed over the past 20 years, including the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 and the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (Juntas Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act of 2008. Successive

Administrations have cooperated closely with Congress to ensure that these restrictions, whether economic, financial or travel related, have the same purpose: that the United States will not allow the use of its resources to perpetuate abusive, authoritarian rule. The Block Burmese JADE Act of 2008 is the most recent piece of Burma-specific legislation and it constitutes an important component of the U.S. sanctions regime. There are several key aspects of the JADE Act, which is more than a ban (3) on Burmese jade: it focuses on stopping anti-democratic activities in addition to preventing the regime from profiting from trade in precious gems. The JADE Act includes provisions for financial sanctions and bans the issuance of visas for travel to the United States by former and present leaders of the regime, officials involved in the repression of human rights, other key supporters of the regime, and their immediate family members. These provisions complement already existing economic sanctions and travel restrictions. The JADE Act also required the appointment of a Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma to ensure high-level, dedicated focus on improving the situation in Burma and promoting genuine democratic reform. I am very pleased to highlight that on April 14, the President nominated Derek Mitchell for that position. He is the right candidate for this tough job. He brings a formidable blend of Asia expertise and senior government and civil society experience to the table. If confirmed, we have every confidence that Mr. Mitchell will fully carry out his mandate to advance all aspects of our Burma policy, pursuing both pressure on and engagement with Burmese authorities as warranted by their actions. If confirmed, he will further strengthen ties with key Burmese stakeholders in civil society, including the National League for Democracy (NLD) and ethnic groups, and coordinate our efforts with Congress, allies, and the NGO community for the benefit of the Burmese people. We look forward to his leadership and hope that his Senate hearing and confirmation will take place as soon as possible.

Finally, the JADE Act bans the import of Burmese jadeite, rubies, and related jewelry into the United States, even if transformed in a third country. The first line of defense is our Customs and Border Patrol certification requirements, issued through a joint DHS/Treasury final rule. We have been very successful in enforcing this prohibition through the final rule, which requires every importer to have written certification at the time of import from the exporter affirming that none of the imported jewelry contains jadeite or rubies mined or extracted from Burma. Our prohibition has been most effective for Burmese rubies and jewelry, as the demand for jadeite in the United States is virtually nonexistent. The second line of defense is the jewelry industry itself; industry sources note that the most valuable rubies from Burma are high quality and very distinctive and that no one in the United States is importing rubies or related jewelry from Burma. The Jewelers Vigilance Committee has conveyed to us its confidence that no rubies imported into the United States were mined or extracted from Burma and that no importer in (4 )the U.S. would want to risk losing their goods or reputation by violating what they refer to as a well-known ban. Burmas regime continues to reap significant revenues from its tightly controlled gemstone industry, and the JADE Act does not cut off all international trade in Burmas gemstones. Burma's export of rubies and jadeite is doing well, in particular because Chinas domestic market for jadeite and related jewelry is on the rise. We will continue to call on China and India and other neighboring countries to cooperate with us on this issue. Before I turn to the engagement track, I would like to note that we regularly hear claims from neighboring countries and a variety of other partners that our sanctions negatively affect the Burmese economy and help to impoverish the Burmese people. Following Burma's elections, some Southeast Asian nations as well as some political parties in Burma called on the United States to ease or remove sanctions. The Administration firmly believes that easing sanctions at this time is premature, absent fundamental reform or other regime actions to address core international concerns, and that Burma's poor economic performance is primarily due to the regimes gross

economic mismanagement and pervasive corruption. While sustaining pressure on the Burmese regime, we have initiated efforts to engage in direct dialogue with senior leaders in the Burmese government over the past 18 months. Assistant Secretary of State Campbell traveled to Nay Pyi Taw, Burmas capital, in October 2009 and May 2010 to meet with senior officials and demonstrate our willingness to embark on this new path of principled engagement. He also met with Burma officials on the margins of UN General Assembly sessions in 2009 and 2010 and in several forums held by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). During every visit to Burma, we always consult Aung San Suu Kyi, leaders of the NLD, and other civil society leaders. Building on the dialogue Assistant Secretary Campbell began, I have also made two visits to Burma: one in December 2010 and one more recently, in May 2011. In those meetings, Burmese authorities continue to express a desire for improved relations with the United States and identified several confidence-building measures that they would like from the United States, including our use of Myanmar instead of Burma as the official name of the country and our direct assistance toward achieving the countrys Millennium Development Goals. The Government of Burma, however, has been opposed to taking any of the steps we, the UN, and others have raised to address core human rights concerns and to begin (5) an inclusive dialogue leading to national reconciliation and real democratic reform. The regime continues to insist that all of these issues are internal issues. We are disappointed by the lack of any results from our repeated efforts at dialogue. When we embarked on our dual-track policy, we went in with our eyes wide open and we expected that efforts on engagement and real reform would be a long, slow process. We will continue to try, while also seeking concrete ways to ramp up pressure on the Burmese government both in private and in public, to undertake genuine reform. We expect that the Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma will play an essential role in furthering all aspects of our policy and determining if there is a viable way forward.

Against this policy backdrop, I will briefly provide an update and assessment on the political dynamics in Burma, highlighting the governments election process and its results, the future role of former regime leader Senior General Than Shwe, and the release of leading opposition figure Aung San Suu Kyi. Burmas 2010 elections were its first in 20 years. These elections were based on a deeply and fundamentally flawed process with highly restrictive regulations that excluded Burmas largest pro-democracy party, the National League for Democracy (NLD). They took place while Aung San Suu Kyi, the NLDs key leader, remained under house arrest, and many other NLD leaders were in prison. The regime cancelled voting in several ethnic minority areas and heavily skewed the playing field in favor of the regimes proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). The few prodemocracy and ethnic political parties that did compete won only a small number of parliamentary seats and mostly at the regional level. Amid widespread media and well-substantiated claims of vote rigging and manipulation, the regimes USDP won the majority of contested Parliamentary seats, while 25 percent of all seats were reserved for military appointees. The United States clearly and consistently condemned the elections as neither free nor fair. Not surprisingly, the elections resulted in a government comprised almost entirely of either active or former military members of the regime. Together with military appointees, regime-affiliated members occupy 89 percent of all seats in the legislative bodies. This legislature convened in Nay Pyi Taw to rubber stamp approval of Burmas President, two Vice Presidents, and key Presidential appointees. With few exceptions, all of those positions were filled by former military leaders and members of the governments proxy party. The formal regime (6) State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) dissolved and President Thein Sein, the former Prime Minister within the SPDC structure and a top regime military leader, assumed power on April 1, 2011. The convening of Parliament and the formation of a so-called civilian government marked the completion of what the regime refers to as its seven-step roadmap to a

disciplined and flourishing democracy. We strongly disagree with this assessment and believe that many questions remain. Specifically, the extent of Senior General Than Shwes influence is still an important question. He previously held simultaneous titles as Chairman of the State Peace and Development Council, Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, and Minister of Defense. In the government announced on April 1, he no longer holds any official title. Some observers believe he will still control the political sphere from behind the scenes while others claim that he has truly retired. Therefore, a significant degree of uncertainty exists regarding Than Shwes role and the respective power of the various institutions that emerged such as the Presidency and cabinet, the Parliament, the United Solidarity and Development Party and the military. With former regime officials occupying most key positions in all branches of government, the United States is not optimistic that we will see any immediate change in policies or progress on our core concerns. There has been some positive rhetoric but it has not translated into concrete action or changes by the regime. In his inaugural address, President Thein Sein used terms such as good governance, transparency, and economic development, a departure from the regimes typical focus on stability and security and threats posed by opposition figures and entities. President Thein Sein's statements have addressed the need for economic reforms and his economic advisors recently organized a National Poverty Alleviation Seminar. Whether any of this seemingly positive rhetoric will eventually transform into concrete action toward poverty reduction and a free, open society is deeply uncertain. There is also the noteworthy development of Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu Kyis release on November 13 from seven-and-one-half years of house arrest. Though welcome, her release came only at the end of a sentence that we always maintained was unjustified. She has spent 15 of the past 23 years in detention or under house arrest. We have pressed the Government of Burma to ensure it provides adequately for Aung San Suu Kyis safety and security as well as for all residents of Burma. Members of the international community, when allowed to visit Burma, are now able to consult with her on a regular basis, as is our Embassy (7) in Rangoon. I have had

the opportunity to discuss a wide range of issues with her during my own visits to Rangoon. Burmese authorities have dissolved Aung San Suu Kyis political party, the National League for Democracy, for refusing to re-register as a political party under Burma's restrictive electoral laws. Although officially disbanded, NLD headquarters remains open and activities continue. Recently, the NLD has become more involved in social welfare activities such as HIV/AIDS support and care, education, and provision of clean water to address humanitarian needs. We are committed to fully supporting Aung San Suu Kyis efforts to seek reinstatement of the NLD as a legal, political party and to hold a direct, meaningful dialogue with senior government authorities.

I would also like to highlight the range of humanitarian assistance activities that we are undertaking inside Burma, which have been authorized consistent with or are exempted from JADE Act sanctions. Managed by USAID and the State Department, we support health and education projects targeting Burmas most vulnerable populations and initiatives to strengthen civil society and promote democracy. Assistance includes livelihoods, water and sanitation projects, a teacher training program and activities to combat infectious diseases and grave public health threats, such as avian influenza, HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria. It is important to mention the effects of the ongoing civil conflict in Burma between government forces and ethnic armies that are fighting for greater autonomy. In the conduct of these wars, the military has destroyed thousands of villages and subjected civilians in these areas to pillage, forced labor, killing and rape. This ongoing internal conflict and the regimes repression have created significant refugee flows and serious burdens on neighboring countries that are hosting Burmese refugees. While regime-created humanitarian crises, large-scale displacement and human suffering will only come to end through political change that promotes genuine democracy and respect for human rights, we must do what we can in the meantime

to provide humanitarian assistance and protection to those who have had to flee their country of origin. For more than 20 years, we have provided crucial support to UNHCR and NGOs for humanitarian assistance and protection to Burmese refugees who have fled from persecution and violence to neighboring countries. Since 2005, the United States has resettled approximately 70,000 Burmese from Thailand, Malaysia, Bangladesh, and India, almost 50,000 of whom (8) were from the Thai-Burma border region. Later this month, the Department of States Assistant Secretary for Population, efugees and Migration will be in Bangladesh to address serious issues of Burmas ethnic Rohingya refugee population in that country. We also support the International Committee of the Red Cross, which facilitates family member visits to political prisoners and provides orthopedic and prosthetic services to landmine victims. These initiatives enable us to tackle immediate humanitarian issues that affect some of the most vulnerable people in Burma. Our challenges in Burma remain daunting and the human rights situation deplorable. Though Aung San Suu Kyi is free, over 2,000 political prisoners languish in detention, the conflicts and the attacks against civilians continue in the ethnic minority areas, and millions of Burmese citizens are denied basic rights including freedom of speech, assembly, and association. The United States alone cannot achieve progress in Burma, and as I noted at the outset of my testimony, we are tirelessly working with our European allies and our ASEAN and regional partners to urge the Burmese government to constructively engage with the international community and address these long-standing issues. India and China remain important to this issue and we regularly discuss our concerns with them about the Burmese regime. We are in complete agreement with the JADE Acts call for a unified and comprehensive approach to promote long-overdue change for the Burmese people aspiring for genuine and meaningful progress. Thank you for inviting me to testify before you today. I welcome the opportunity to answer your questions. N. B. Numbers in brackets are the pages of the original pdf file.

..

China Welcomes 'New Channel' for Dialogue With US Cambodia: First hearing ex-Khmer Rouge leaders' trial The beginning of the end or the end of the beginning? By Yuriko Koike U.S. Policy Regarding Burma By Phil Robertson MYANMA : US Policy of Pragmatic Engagement By C. S. Kuppuswamy Testimony of Joseph Yun - Deputy Assistant Secretary - U.S. Department of State

SELECTED NEWS AND VIEWS COLLECTED BY YE KYAW SWA

No 1 - Tuesday, June 28, 2011