G.R. No.

L-21676

February 28, 1969

VICENTE ALDABA, ET AL., petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CESAR ALDABA, ET AL., respondents. Rodas and Almeda for petitioners. Dakila F. Castro and Associates for respondents. ZALDIVAR, J.: This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals in case CA-G.R. No. 27561-R, entitled "Vicente Aldaba, et al., plaintiffs-appellants, versus Cesar Aldaba, et al., defendants-appellees", affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila in its Civil Case No. 41260. When Belen Aldaba, a rich woman of Malolos, Bulacan, died on February 25, 1955, she left as her presumptive heirs her surviving husband Estanislao Bautista, and her brother Cesar Aldaba. Belen Aldaba was childless. Among the properties that she left were the two lots involved in this case, situated at 427 Maganda Street, Santa Mesa, Manila. Petitioners Dr. Vicente Aldaba and Jane Aldaba, father and daughter, respectively, lived during the last war in their house in Malate, Manila. Belen Aldaba used to go to their house to seek the advice and medical assistance of Dr. Vicente Aldaba. When the latter's house was burned during the liberation of Manila in 1945, Belen Aldaba invited Dr. Aldaba and his daughter, who was then a student in medicine, to live in one of her two houses standing on the lots in question, and the Aldaba father and daughter accepted the offer of Belen and they actually lived in one of those two houses until sometime in 1957 when respondent Emmanuel Bautista filed an ejectment case against them in the city court of Manila. Dr. Vicente Aldaba continued to act as a sort of adviser of Belen and Jane, after becoming a qualified doctor of medicine, became the personal physician of Belen until the latter's death on February 25, 1955. On June 24, 1955, the presumptive heirs Estanislao Bautista and Cesar Aldaba, executed a deed of extrajudicial partition of the properties left by the deceased Belen Aldaba, by virtue of which deed the two lots in question were alloted to Cesar Aldaba. Subsequently, on August 26, 1957, herein respondents Cesar Aldaba and Emmanuel Bautista, the latter being a grandson of Estanislao Bautista by his first marriage, executed a deed whereby the two lots that were alloted to Cesar Aldaba were ceded to Emmanuel Bautista in exchange of the latter's lot situated at San Juan, Rizal. By virtue of the deed of extra-judicial partition and the deed of exchange, Transfer certificates of Title Nos. 1334 and 1335, respectively, covering lots Nos. 32 and 34 now in question both in the name of Belen Aldaba, were cancelled by the Register of Deeds of Manila, and Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 49996 and 49997 in the name of Emmanuel Bautista were issued in lieu thereof. Emmanuel Bautista then required Dr. Vicente Aldaba to vacate the lots in question and, upon the latter's refusal, filed an ejectment case against him in the City Court of Manila. Without awaiting the final result of the ejectment case, herein petitioners filed, on August 22, 1959, a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed as Civil

Case No. 41260, against herein respondents Cesar Aldaba and Emmanuel Bautista and the Register of Deeds of Manila, alleging that they had become the owners of the two lots in question, and praying that the deed of partition entered into by Estanislao Bautista and Cesar Aldaba be declared null and void with respect to Lot No. 32, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1334, and lot No. 34 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No 1335; that said lots be declared the property of therein plaintiffs (herein petitioners); and that the Register of Deeds of Manila be ordered to cancel TCT Nos. 49996 and 49997 in the name of Emmanuel Bautista and in lieu thereof issue two new TCTs in the name of therein plaintiffs. After hearing, the court a quo rendered a decision dismissing the complaint, and declaring, among others, that if the deceased Belen Aldaba intended to convey the lots in question to Vicente Aldaba and Jane Aldaba, by way of donation, the conveyance should be considered a donation inter vivos, for the validity of which a public instrument was necessary pursuant to Article 749 of the Civil Code. The dispositive portion of the decision of the trial court reads as follows: IN VIEW WHEREOF both complaint and counterclaim dismissed; the Court holds Emmanuel Bautista to be the absolute owner of the property in question, land and improvement, but with the right of plaintiffs to stay until they should have been reimbursed of P5,000.00 but without any obligation, until such reimbursement, to pay any rental unto defendant Emmanuel Bautista. No pronouncement as to costs. From this decision, therein plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the latter court rendered a decision, on June 21, 1963, raising from P5,000 to P8,000 the amount to be reimbursed to plaintiffs-appellants, but affirming in all other respects the decision of the lower court. Herein petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the decision having been denied by the Court of Appeals, they forthwith filed the present petition in this Court. Before this Court, petitioners now contend that the Court of Appeals erred: (1) in affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance; (2) in holding that the donation, as found by the Court of First Instance of Manila, was a simple donation inter vivos and not a donation "con causa onerosa and so it was void for it did not follow the requirements of Article 749 of the Civil Code; (3) in not holding that the property in question had already been donated to herein petitioners in consideration of the latter's services; (4) in not declaring petitioners to be the absolute owners of the property in dispute; and (5) in considering testimonies which had been stricken out. The errors assigned by petitioners being interrelated, We are going to discuss them together. Petitioners contend that petitioners Dr. Vicente Aldaba and Jane Aldaba had rendered services to the deceased Belen Aldaba for more than ten years without receiving any compensation, and so in compensation for their services Belen Aldaba gave them the lots in dispute including the improvements thereon. It is the stand of petitioners that the property in question was conveyed to them by way of an onerous donation which is governed by Article 733, and not Article 749, of the Civil Code. Under Article 733 of the Civil Code an onerous donation does not have to be done by virtue of

a public instrument. The petitioners point to the note, Exhibit 6, as indicating that a donation had been made, which note reads as follows: June 18, 1953 Jane, Huag kayong umalis diyan. Talagang iyan ay para sa inyo. Alam nila na iyan ay sa inyo. Belen A. Bautista. Petitioners maintain that the note, although it could not transmit title, showed, nevertheless, that a donation had already been made long before its writing, in consideration of the services rendered before the writing and to be rendered after its writing. And the donation being with an onerous cause, petitioners maintain that it was valid even if it was done orally. Petitioners further maintain that if Exhibit 6 labors under some ambiguity, this ambiguity is cured by Exhibit 7, which reads as follows: June 27, 1956 Dear Nana Tering, Narito po ang notice tungkol sa amillaramiento na pagbabayaran diyan sa lupa at bahay na kinatatayuan ninyo. Sa Malolos po ito tinanggap. Ang pagbabayaran po ng Inkong ay bayad na. Gumagalang, "Cely." The addressee, Tering, was the wife of Dr. Vicente Aldaba, and the sender, Cely was the wife of respondent Emmanuel Bautista. This note, petitioners argue, proves that respondents had recognized the ownership of the petitioners of the house and lot, for, otherwise, Cely should have sent the notice of real estate tax to respondent Cesar Aldaba, to whom was alloted the property in question by virtue of the extra-judicial partition. Respondents, Cesar Aldaba and Emmanuel Bautista, on the other hand, contend that the evidence of the plaintiff does not disclose clearly that a donation had been made. Respondents point out that the note, Exhibit 6, as worded, is vague, in that it could not be interpreted as referring to the lots in question, or that which was given therein was given for a valuable consideration. And finally, respondents contend that if the property had really been given to petitioners, why did they not take any step to transfer the property in their names? The Court of Appeals, in its decision, made the following findings and conclusions:

(1) The note Exhibit 6 did not make any reference to the lots in question, nor to the services rendered, or to be rendered, in favor of Belen. The note was insufficient is a conveyance, and hence could not be considered as evidence of a donation with onerous cause. This note can be considered, at most, as indicative of the intention to donate. (2) There is no satisfactory explanation why from 1945 to 1955, no notarial document was executed by Belen in favor of petitioners who were educated persons. The reason given was "extremada delicadeza" which reason the Court of Appeals considered as unsatisfactory. (3) The evidence regarding the value of the services (P53,000.00) rendered by petitioners (father and daughter) to Belen does not improve the proof regarding the alleged donation. If petitioners believed that the gratuitous use of the property was not sufficient to compensate them for their services, they could have presented their claims in the intestate proceedings, which they themselves could have initiated, if none was instituted. The conclusion of the Court of Appeals, as well as that of the trial court, that there was no onerous donation made by Belen Aldaba to petitioners is based upon their appreciation of the evidence, and this Court will not disturb the factual findings of those courts.lawphi1.nt The question to be resolved in the instant case is: Was there a disposition of the property in question made by the deceased Belen Aldaba in favor of herein petitioners? The note, Exhibit 6, considered alone, was, as held by the Court of Appeals, confirming the opinion of the lower court, only an indication of the intention of Belen Aldaba to donate to the petitioners the property occupied by the latter. We agree with this conclusion of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. The note, in fact, expressed that the property was really intended for the petitioners, "talagang iyan ay para sa inyo." If the property was only intended for petitioners then, at the time of its writing, the property had not yet been disposed of in their favor. There is no evidence in the record that such intention was effectively carried out after the writing of the note. Inasmuch as the mere expression of an intention is not a promise, because a promise is an undertaking to carry the intention into effect, 1 We cannot, considering Exhibit 6 alone, conclude that the deceased promised, much less did convey, the property in question to the petitioners. That the note, Exhibit 6, was only an indication of an intention to give was also the interpretation given by petitioners themselves, when they said in their memorandum, dated February 2, 1960, in the lower court 2 thus: Legally speaking, there was a contractual relation created between Belen Aldaba and the plaintiff since 1945 whereby the former would give to the latter the two parcels of land, together with the house standing thereon, upon the rendition of said services. This fact can be gleaned from the note (Exh. "6", Plaintiffs) which in part says: TALAGANG IYAN AY PARA SAINYO We have said that Exhibit 6 expressed only the intention to donate. Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that previous to the writing of the note there had already been a disposition of the property in favor of the petitioners. This disposition

alone, would not make the donation a donation for a valuable consideration. We still have to ask: What was the consideration of such disposition? We do not find in the record that there had been an express agreement between petitioners and Belen Aldaba that the latter would pay for the services of the former. If there was no express agreement, could it not be at least implied? There could not be an implied contract for payment because We find in the record that Jane did not expect to be paid for her services. In the memorandum of counsel for the petitioners in the trial court We find this statement: For all she did to her aunt she expected not to be paid.3 When a person does not expect to be paid for his services, there cannot be a contract implied in fact to make compensation for said services. However, no contract implied in fact to make compensation for personal services performed for another arises unless the party furnishing the services then expected or had reason to expect the payment or compensation by the other party. To give rise to an implied contract to pay for services, they must have been rendered by one party in expectation that the other party would pay for them, and have been accepted by the other party with knowledge of that expectation. (58 Am. Jur. p. 512 and cases cited therein). In the same manner when the person rendering the services has renounced his fees, the services are not demandable obligations. 4 Even if it be assumed for the sake of argument that the services of petitioners constituted a demandable debt, We still have to ask whether in the instant case this was the consideration for which the deceased made the (alleged) disposition of the property to the petitioners. As we have adverted to, we have not come across in the record even a claim that there was an express agreement between petitioners and Belen Aldaba that the latter would give the property in question in consideration of the services of petitioners. All that petitioners could claim regarding this matter was that "it was impliedly understood" between them. 5 How said agreement was implied and from what facts it was implied, petitioners did not make clear. The question of whether or not what is relied upon as a consideration had been knowingly accepted by the parties as a consideration, is a question of fact, 6 and the Court of Appeals has not found in the instant case that the lots in question were given to petitioners in consideration of the services rendered by them to Belen Aldaba. We find, therefore, that the conditions to constitute a donation cum causa onerosa are not present in the instant case, and the claim of petitioners that the two lots in question were donated to them by Belen Aldaba cannot be sustained. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, with costs against the petitioners. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. 116896 May 5, 1997 PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MA. TERESA S. RAYMUNDO-ABARRA, JOSE S. RAYMUNDO, ANTONIO S. RAYMUNDO, RENE S. RAYMUNDO, and AMADOR S. RAYMUNDO, respondents. DAVIDE, JR., J.: This petition for review on certiorari has its roots in Civil Case No. 53444, which was sparked by petitioner's refusal to pay the rentals as stipulated in the contract of lease 1 on an undivided portion of 30,000 square meters of a parcel of land owned by private respondents. The lease contract, executed on 18 November 1985, reads in part as follows: 1. TERM OF LEASE This lease shall be for a period of five (5) years, commencing on the date of issuance of the industrial clearance by the Ministry of Human Settlements, renewable for a like or other period at the option of the LESSEE under the same terms and conditions. 2. RATE OF RENT LESSEE shall pay to the LESSOR rent at the monthly rate of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00), Philippine Currency, in the manner set forth in Paragraph 3 below. This rate shall be increased yearly by Five Percent (5%) based on the agreed monthly rate of P20,000.00 as follows: Monthly Rate Period Applicable P21,000.00 Starting on the 2nd year P22,000.00 Starting on the 3rd year P23,000.00 Starting on the 4th year P24,000.00 Starting on the 5th year 3. TERMS OF PAYMENT The rent stipulated in Paragraph 2 above shall be paid yearly in advance by the LESSEE. The first annual rent in the amount of TWO HUNDRED FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P240,000.00), Philippine currency, shall be due and payable upon the execution of this Agreement and the succeeding annual rents shall be payable every twelve (12) months thereafter during the effectivity of this Agreement. 4. USE OF LEASED PROPERTY It is understood that the Property shall be used by the LESSEE as the site, grounds and premises of a rock crushing plant and field office, sleeping quarters and canteen/mess hall.

The LESSORS hereby grant to the LESSEE the right to erect on the Leased Property such structure(s) and/or improvement(s) necessary for or incidental to the LESSEE's purposes. xxx xxx xxx 11. TERMINATION OF LEASE This Agreement may be terminated by mutual agreement of the parties. Upon the termination or expiration of the period of lease without the same being renewed, the LESSEE shall vacate the Leased Property at its expense. On 7 January 1986, petitioner obtained from the Ministry of Human Settlements a Temporary Use Permit 2 for the proposed rock crushing project. The permit was to be valid for two years unless sooner revoked by the Ministry. On 16 January 1986, private respondents wrote petitioner requesting payment of the first annual rental in the amount of P240,000 which was due and payable upon the execution of the contract. They also assured the latter that they had already stopped considering the proposals of other aggregates plants to lease the property because of the existing contract with petitioner. 3 In its reply-letter, petitioner argued that under paragraph 1 of the lease contract, payment of rental would commence on the date of the issuance of an industrial clearance by the Ministry of Human Settlements, and not from the date of signing of the contract. It then expressed its intention to terminate the contract, as it had decided to cancel or discontinue with the rock crushing project "due to financial, as well as technical, difficulties." 4 Private respondents refused to accede to petitioner's request for the pretermination of the lease contract. They insisted on the performance of petitioner's obligation and reiterated their demand for the payment of the first annual rental. 5 Petitioner objected to private respondents' claim and argued that it was "only obligated to pay . . . the amount of P20,000.00 as rental payments for the one-month period of lease, counted from 07 January 1986 when the Industrial Permit was issued by the Ministry of Human Settlements up to 07 February 1986 when the Notice of Termination was served" 6 on private respondents. On 19 May 1986, private respondents instituted with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig an action against petitioner for Specific Performance with Damages. 7 The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 53444 at Branch 160 of the said court. After the filing by petitioner of its Answer with Counterclaim, the case was set for trial on the merits. What transpired next was summarized by the trial court in this wise: Plaintiffs rested their case on September 7, 1987 (p. 87 rec.). Defendant asked for postponement of the reception of its evidence scheduled on August 10, 1988 and as prayed for, was reset to August 25, 1988 (p. 91 rec.) Counsel for defendant again asked for postponement, through representative, as he was presently indisposed. The case was reset,

intransferable to September 15 and 26, 1988 (p. 94 rec.) On September 2, 1988, the office of the Government Corporate Counsel entered its appearance for defendant (p. 95, rec.) and the original counsel later withdrew his appearance. On September 15, 1988 the Government Corporate Counsel asked for postponement, represented by Atty. Elpidio de Vega, and with his conformity in open court, the hearing was reset, intransferable to September 26 and October 17, 1988, (p. 98, rec.) On September 26, 1988 during the hearing, defendant's counsel filed a motion for postponement (urgent) as he had "sore eyes", a medical certificate attached. Counsel for plaintiffs objected to the postponement and the court considered the evidence of the government terminated or waived. The case was deemed submitted for decision upon the filing of the memorandum. Plaintiffs filed their memorandum on October 26, 1988. (p. 111, rec.). On October 18, 1988 in the meantime, the defendant filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of the court on September 26, 1988 (p. 107, rec.) The motion was not asked to be set for hearing (p. 110 rec.) There was also no proof of notice and service to counsel for plaintiff . The court in the interest of justice set the hearing on the motion on November 29, 1988. (p. 120, rec.) but despite notice, again defendant's counsel was absent (p. 120-A, dorsal side, rec.) without reason. The court reset the motion to December 16, 1988, in the interest of justice. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the court. A second motion for reconsideration was filed and counsel set for hearing the motion on January 19, 1989. During the hearing, counsel for the government was absent. The motion was deemed abandoned but the court at any rate, after a review of the incidents and the grounds relied upon in the earlier motion of defendant, found no reason to disturb its previous order. 8 On 12 April 1989, the trial court rendered a decision ordering petitioner to pay private respondents the amount of P492,000 which represented the rentals for two years, with legal interest from 7 January 1986 until the amount was fully paid, plus attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000 and costs. 9 Petitioner then appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that the trial court erred in ordering it to pay private respondent the amount of P492,000 and in denying it the right to be heard. Upon the affirmance of the trial court's decision 10 and the denial of its motion for reconsideration, petitioner came to this Court ascribing to respondent Court of Appeals the same alleged errors and reiterating their arguments. First. Petitioner invites the attention of this Court to paragraph 1 of the lease contract, which reads: "This lease shall be for a period of five (5) years, commencing on the date of issuance of the industrial clearance by the Ministry of Human Settlements. . . ." It then submits that the issuance of an industrial clearance is a suspensive condition without which the rights under the contract would not be acquired. The Temporary Use Permit is

not the industrial clearance referred to in the contract; for the said permit requires that a clearance from the National Production Control Commission be first secured, and besides, there is a finding in the permit that the proposed project does not conform to the Zoning Ordinance of Rodriguez, (formerly Montalban), Rizal, where the leased property is located. Without the industrial clearance the lease contract could not become effective and petitioner could not be compelled to perform its obligation under the contract. Petitioner is now estopped from claiming that the Temporary Use Permit was not the industrial clearance contemplated in the contract. In its letter dated 24 April 1986, petitioner states: We wish to reiterate PNCC Management's previous stand that it is only obligated to pay your clients the amount of P20,000.00 as rental payments for the one-month period of the lease, counted from 07 January 1986 when the Industrial Permit was issued by the Ministry of Human Settlements up to 07 February 1986 when the Notice of Termination was served on your clients. 11 (Emphasis Supplied). The "Industrial Permit" mentioned in the said letter could only refer to the Temporary Use Permit issued by the Ministry of Human Settlements on 7 January 1986. And it can be gleaned from this letter that petitioner has considered the permit as industrial clearance; otherwise, petitioner could have simply told private respondents that its obligation to pay rentals has not yet arisen because the Temporary Use Permit is not the industrial clearance contemplated by them. Instead, petitioner recognized its obligation to pay rentals counted from the date the permit was issued. Also worth noting is petitioner's earlier letter, thus: [P]lease be advised of PNCC Management's decision to cancel or discontinue with the rock crushing project due to financial as well as technical difficulties. In view thereof, we would like to terminate our Lease Contract dated 18 November, 1985. Should you agree to the mutual termination of our Lease Contract, kindly indicate your conformity hereto by affixing your signature on the space provided below. May we likewise request Messrs. Rene, Jose and Antonio, all surnamed Raymundo and Mrs. Socorro A. Raymundo as Attorney-in-Fact of Amador S. Raymundo to sign on the spaces indicated below. 12 It can be deduced from this letter that the suspensive condition issuance of industrial clearance has already been fulfilled and that the lease contract has become operative. Otherwise, petitioner did not have to solicit the conformity of private respondents to the termination of the contract for the simple reason that no juridical relation was created because of the non- fulfillment of the condition. Moreover, the reason of petitioner in discontinuing with its project and in consequently cancelling the lease contract was "financial as well as technical difficulties," not the alleged insufficiency of the Temporary Use Permit.

Second. Invoking Article 1266 and the principle of rebus sic stantibus, petitioner asserts that it should be released from the obligatory force of the contract of lease because the purpose of the contract did not materialize due to unforeseen events and causes beyond its control, i.e., due to the abrupt change in political climate after the EDSA Revolution and financial difficulties. It is a fundamental rule that contracts, once perfected, bind both contracting parties, and obligations arising therefrom have the force of law between the parties and should be complied with in good faith. 13 But the law recognizes exceptions to the principle of the obligatory force of contracts. One exception is laid down in Article 1266 of the Civil Code, which reads: "The debtor in obligations to do shall also be released when the prestation becomes legally or physically impossible without the fault of the obligor." Petitioner cannot, however, successfully take refuge in the said article, since it is applicable only to obligations "to do," and not to obligations "to give." 14 An obligation "to do" includes all kinds of work or service; while an obligation "to give" is a prestation which consists in the delivery of a movable or an immovable thing in order to create a real right, or for the use of the recipient, or for its simple possession, or in order to return it to its owner. 15 The obligation to pay rentals 16 or deliver the thing in a contract of lease 17 falls within the prestation "to give"; hence, it is not covered within the scope of Article 1266. At any rate, the unforeseen event and causes mentioned by petitioner are not the legal or physical impossibilities contemplated in the said article. Besides, petitioner failed to state specifically the circumstances brought about by "the abrupt change in the political climate in the country" except the alleged prevailing uncertainties in government policies on infrastructure projects. The principle of rebus sic stantibus 18 neither fits in with the facts of the case. Under this theory, the parties stipulate in the light of certain prevailing conditions, and once these conditions cease to exist, the contract also ceases to exist. 19 This theory is said to be the basis of Article 1267 of the Civil Code, which provides: Art. 1267. When the service has become so difficult as to be manifestly beyond the contemplation of the parties, the obligor may also be released therefrom, in whole or in part. This article, which enunciates the doctrine of unforeseen events, is not, however, an absolute application of the principle of rebus sic stantibus, which would endanger the security of contractual relations. The parties to the contract must be presumed to have assumed the risks of unfavorable developments. It is therefore only in absolutely exceptional changes of circumstances that equity demands assistance for the debtor. 20 In this case, petitioner wants this Court to believe that the abrupt change in the political climate of the country after the EDSA Revolution and its poor financial condition "rendered the performance of the lease contract impractical and inimical to the corporate survival of the petitioner." This Court cannot subscribe to this argument. As pointed out by private respondents: 21

It is a matter of record that petitioner PNCC entered into a contract with private respondents on November 18, 1985. Prior thereto, it is of judicial notice that after the assassination of Senator Aquino on August 21, 1983, the country has experienced political upheavals, turmoils, almost daily mass demonstrations, unprecedented, inflation, peace and order deterioration, the Aquino trial and many other things that brought about the hatred of people even against crony corporations. On November 3, 1985, Pres. Marcos, being interviewed live on U.S. television announced that there would be a snap election scheduled for February 7, 1986. On November 18, 1985, notwithstanding the above, petitioner PNCC entered into the contract of lease with private respondents with open eyes of the deteriorating conditions of the country. Anent petitioner's alleged poor financial condition, the same will neither release petitioner from the binding effect of the contract of lease. As held in Central Bank v. Court of Appeals, 22 cited by private respondents, mere pecuniary inability to fulfill an engagement does not discharge a contractual obligation, nor does it constitute a defense to an action for specific performance. With regard to the non-materialization of petitioner's particular purpose in entering into the contract of lease, i.e., to use the leased premises as a site of a rock crushing plant, the same will not invalidate the contract. The cause or essential purpose in a contract of lease is the use or enjoyment of a thing. 23 As a general principle, the motive or particular purpose of a party in entering into a contract does not affect the validity nor existence of the contract; an exception is when the realization of such motive or particular purpose has been made a condition upon which the contract is made to depend. 24 The exception does not apply here. Third. According to petitioner, the award of P492,000.00 representing the rent for two years is excessive, considering that it did not benefit from the property. Besides, the temporary permit, conformably with the express provision therein, was deemed automatically revoked for failure of petitioner to use the same within one year from the issuance thereof. Hence, the rent payable should only be for one year. Petitioner cannot be heard to complain that the award is excessive. The temporary permit was valid for two years but was automatically revoked because of its non-use within one year from its issuance. The non-use of the permit and the non-entry into the property subject of the lease contract were both imputable to petitioner and cannot, therefore, be taken advantage of in order to evade or lessen petitioner's monetary obligation. The damage or prejudice to private respondents is beyond dispute. They unquestionably suffered pecuniary losses because of their inability to use the leased premises. Thus, in accordance with Article 1659 of the Civil Code, 25 they are entitled to indemnification for damages; and the award of P492,000.00 is fair and just under the circumstances of the case. Finally, petitioner submits that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner the right to be heard.

We disagree. The trial court was in fact liberal in granting several postponements 26 to petitioner before it deemed terminated and waived the presentation of evidence in petitioner's behalf. It must be recalled that private respondents rested their case on 7 September 1987 yet. 27 Almost a year after, or on 10 August 1988 when it was petitioner's turn to present evidence, petitioner's counsel asked for postponement of the hearing to 25 August 1988 due to conflict of schedules, 28 and this was granted. 29 At the rescheduled hearing, petitioner's counsel, through a representative, moved anew for postponement, as he was allegedly indisposed. 30 The case was then reset "intransferable" to September 15 and 26, 1988. 31 On 2 September 1988, the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel, through Atty. Elpidio J. Vega, entered its appearance for the petitioner, 32 and later the original counsel withdrew his appearance. 33 On 15 September 1988, Atty. Vega requested for postponement to enable him to go over the records of the case. 34 With his conformity, the hearing was reset "intransferable" to September 26 and October 17, 1988. 35 In the morning of 26 September 1988, the court received Atty. Vega's Urgent Motion for Postponement on the ground that he was afflicted with conjunctivitis or sore eyes. 36 This time, private respondents objected; and upon their motion, the court deemed terminated and waived the presentation of evidence for the petitioner. 37 Nevertheless, before the court considered the case submitted for decision, it required the parties to submit their respective memoranda within thirty days. 38 But petitioner failed to comply. Likewise, the court was liberal with respect to petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Notwithstanding the lack of request for hearing and proof of notice and service to private respondents, the court set the hearing of the said motion on 29 November 1988. 39 Upon the denial of the said motion for lack of merit, 40 petitioner filed a second motion for reconsideration. But during the hearing of the motion on a date selected by him, Atty. Vega was absent for no reason at all, despite due notice. 41 From the foregoing narration of procedural antecedents, it cannot be said that petitioner was deprived of its day in court. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to he heard. 42 To be heard does not only mean oral arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process. 43 WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the challenge decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto. No pronouncements as to costs. SO ORDERED.