Complaint To AG

P.O.
Box 87491
Houston 77287
August 15, 2008
Office of the Attorney General

Attn: Criminal Investigation Division
PO Box 12548
Austin, TX 78711-2548 Cert. Mail # 7008 1140 0000 5315 3352, R.R.R.
Dear Sir or Madam
This is a complaint against and request for investigation of the Galveston County
Criminal District Attorney and the Galveston County Sheriff.
The cause of this complaint is the refusal of the Galveston County Criminal District
Attorney’s office to adhere to the procedures of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure for filing
criminal complaints resulting my being subjected to the criminal actions of various individuals
and entities using perjury, fabrication of evidence, tampering with governmental records, and
criminal conspiracy to achieve their ends. This irregular procedure seems to be the usual
practice of the office. Documents are included that identify this practice and that indicate that
this practice is unwritten and not kept as any record of the office. Complaint against the Sheriff
is due to that office’s concealment of video evidence showing one of the district attorney’s staff
committing an overt criminal act.
Facts stated herein are proved by the affidavit of Danny Royce Murphy. See Exhibit A.
I was involved in a lawsuit and became aware that various documents being used in court
against me were the product of perjury, fabrication, and tampering with governmental records.
This case was in regard to a foreclosure action, the right to foreclose being based on the
foreclosing party being the holder of the note secured by the property. During the course of the
case, documents were discovered and a deposition obtained showing that the note had been sold
long before the foreclosure action took place. The foreclosing party was not the holder of the
note as was claimed in affidavits and other documents. I believe that I sufficiently brought this
to the attention of the court, but no relief was granted.
Eventually, I prepared a number, 58, of formal criminal complaints describing the

criminal acts and identifying the locations in the court records that documented these acts. These
records are in the pleading and evidence files held by the District Clerk of Galveston County for
cause number 02CV0624, Danny Royce Murphy v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., et. al. The
primary basis for these complaints, other than those against officials, was that Countrywide and
it agents had used perjury, fabrication, and tampering with governmental records to make its case
in court. These complaints were sworn before a notary public, and I mailed these complaints in
September of 2006 to the members of the grand jury sitting in Galveston County in care of the
Criminal District Attorney. See Exhibit B. All indications now are that the District Attorney’s
office failed to file these complaints with a magistrate and have them brought before the grand
jury.
Nearly a year after this set of complaints was receive by the District Attorney’s office, I
prepared set of additional complaints. These complaints were delivered into the hands of
Assistant District Attorney Angela Taylor at the District Attorney’s office. She proceeded to
explain that the district attorney’s office does not accept complaints directly from the public, and
she referred me to the Galveston Police Department. I replied that she could call the police, and
they would be glad to investigate for her. I turned to leave. She followed and continued to insist
that I take back the complaints. I told her that the documents had been delivered to government
and were then governmental records that I could not have. I proceeded on, and when I opened
the door to go into the hall, she tossed the complaints through the doorway and onto the hall
floor. She then retreated through a door into the secure areas of the District Attorney’s offices.
My actions in the matter of these complaints were guided by provisions of the Code of
Criminal Procedure and the Penal Code. Article 20.09 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
provides for any credible person informing a grand jury of crimes liable to indictment. Articles
2.04 and 2.05 impose a duty upon the attorneys to take complaints brought to them, and to file
those complaints with a magistrate or, for misdemeanors, to prepare an information and file it
with the proper court. No provision has been made for complaints to be refused until an
investigation is done. The meaning for governmental record intended here is that given by Penal
Code Section 31.07(2)(A).
The refusal of the District Attorney’s office to accept complaints is irregular procedure.
That this is the usual practice in the Galveston County Criminal District Attorney Office is
shown in my included affidavit and paragraph 5 of the affidavit of attorney Steven A. Leyh. See
Exhibit C. That this practice is unwritten and not kept as a record in the office is indicated by
the response to a Public Information Act request. See Exhibit D. The statements and actions of
Ms. Taylor are consistent with this irregular practice.
This practice appears to be designed to have complainants remove their complaints from
the District Attorney’s office so that there are no records left with that office to show that it
failed to perform a duty. This practice also provides a subtle means for the machinery of
government to be used as a political tool to support privilege over law.
After Ms. Taylor left, I gathered up the complaints and took them home with me where I
proceeded to prepare complaints against Ms. Taylor for tampering with a governmental record,
official oppression, and criminal conspiracy. I took these complaints and filed them with the
Galveston Police Department.
I talked by telephone several times with the police investigator who was assigned. Early
on he indicated that he was waiting for a call from the District Attorney. I asked if he could give
an estimation of how long this process might take. He replied that he expected it to be “A while.
A long while.” Policy and procedure of the Galveston Police Department includes consulting
with the District Attorney’s office about proceeding in an investigation. See Exhibit E. Records
obtained from the police department indicate that a Special Prosecutor was assigned to this case.
This Special Prosecutor never interviewed me. Upon advise from this Special Prosecutor, the
police closed the investigation. The police did not produce any records showing what is the
regular office of this prosecutor or anything in writing from this prosecutor. See Exhibit F.
Documents obtained from the Fourteenth Court of Appeals and the Texas Bar Association
indicate that this special prosecutor is a former associate of the Galveston County Criminal
District Attorney’s Office and has been in private practice since at least 2003. See Exhibit G
The Galveston County Criminal Justice Center, which houses the offices of the District
Attorney, is a relatively new building with surveillance cameras throughout. The surveillance
equipment is operated by personnel of the Galveston County Sheriff. I made several attempts to
use the Public Information Act to obtain copies of video recordings that would show the acts of
Ms. Taylor. The totality of responses from the Sheriff indicate that there are personnel who
operate the video equipment, that the sheriff’s office does not have or maintain the requested
recordings, it has no records of any agency or contractor that maintains the recordings, and it has
no forms or procedures for obtaining copies of recordings. See Exhibit H. These responses are
incredulous and appear to be, at best, violations of policy enacted by the Legislature as stated at
Section 552.001, Government Code.
Eventually, I realized that the only evidence I had that the first set of complaints was
received by the District Attorney’s office was the return receipt for certified mail, and that is no
proof of the contents. I then prepared a new set of complaints and had them sworn and
notarized. I enlisted the aid of two people to examine the complaints and then deliver them to
the offices of the Galveston County Criminal District Attorney. These two people made
affidavits to prove this. See Exhibit I. Copies of complaints identified in those affidavits are
included herein. See Exhibit J. A response from the District Attorney’s office to an information
request shows that these complaints have not been filed with a magistrate of the county. See
Exhibit K.
The District Attorney’s failure to follow procedures as prescribed by Texas law resulted
in the perpetrators being allowed to use the force and color of authority of the Galveston County
Sheriff’s Office to unlawfully deprive me of property.
Because of the facts stated herein and supported by included affidavits and other
documents, I allege that:
1. the Galveston County Criminal District Attorney’s Office has intentionally failed
to perform duties imposed upon it by Texas law,
2. the failure of the Galveston County Criminal District Attorney’s Office to

perform these duties is the result of a private unwritten but openly acknowledged
policy of refusing to take criminal complaints from the public, which conflicts
with the requirements of Articles 2.04 and 2.05 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure,
3. this policy of the Galveston County Criminal District Attorney’s Office has
promoted the concealment of criminal allegations from the magistrates and grand
juries of Galveston County,
Exhibit A
Exhibit A
Affidavit of Danny Royce Murphy.

STATE OF TEXAS §
COUNTY OF HARRIS §
Affidavit of Danny Royce Murphy
Before me, the undersigned notary, on this day, personally appeared Danny Royce
Murphy, a person whose identity is known to me. After I administered an oath to him, upon his
oath, he said:
“My name is Danny Royce Murphy. I am capable of making this affidavit. The facts
stated in this affidavit are within my personal knowledge and are true and correct.
I was the plaintiff in the case, Danny Royce Murphy v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,
et. al., cause number 02CV0624 filed with the 405th District Court in May of 2002. This suit
was filed to challenge the right of Countrywide to foreclose on my home.
During the suit, attorney for Countrywide brought an affidavit to court with a copy of the
original note attached attesting to the note and stating that Countrywide was the owner and
holder of the note. A copy of this affidavit and the note can be found in the files for this case as
an attachment to Defendant’s No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment, file stamped 03 JAN
30.
During discovery I was provided copy of the note showing that it had been endorsed by
an officer of Countrywide, and I obtained a copy of a letter showing that the note and letter had
been sent to another entity within days of the date of making the note. In the deposition Denise
Elvir, branch manager for Branch 151 of Countrywide, it is stated that the note and other
documents are packaged together and sent to the bank, not Countrywide’s bank, which then
wires money to Countrywide. Copy of the endorsed note, the letter, and the deposition are in the
evidence file for this case.
On the basis of this information, I prepared numerous criminal complaints and mailed
them by certified mail, return receipt requested, to the members of the grand jury in care of the
Galveston County Criminal District Attorney. The mailing label named each individual grand
juror and alternate. Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of the return mail receipt.
This case went on appeal and upon return a writ of possession was issued. I filed for a
temporary restraining order and temporary injunction on the basis, in part, of the fraudulent
documents and criminal acts used in this case. The response, Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,
Defendants Response to Plaintiff’s Application for Stay of Execution and Defendant’s Motion
to Dissole Temporary Restraining Order, filed on or about July 27, 2007, included an affidavit by
attorney Steven A. Leyh. Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of that affidavit.
On August 31, 2007 I delivered a set of 9 new complaints into the hands of Assistant
District Attorney Angela Taylor at the offices of the Galveston County Criminal District
Attorney. She began to explain how the District Attorney’s office does not accept complaints
and that the complaints need to go to the police or some other law enforcement agency for
investigation before they are taken up by the District Attorney’s office. I told Ms. Taylor that
she could have the police investigate, and I began to leave. She tried to make me take the
complaints back. I told her that the documents had been delivered to government and that they
were then governmental records that I could not have. Ms. Taylor followed me to the door while
insisting that I take the complaints back. When I opened the door, she tossed the complaints
through the doorway and onto the floor of the hallway outside. Ms. Taylor then made herself
unavailable by retreating back into the restricted area of the District Attorney’s office from
which she had come.
I picked up the complaints and took them back home with me where I began preparing
complaints against Ms. Taylor. I took all of the complaints to the Galveston Police Department.
An officer met with me and took my statement and the complaints. He indicated that an
investigator would be assigned the next day and that he would probably give me a phone call
around noon the next day.
The next day I found a phone message from Sergeant John Owens informing me that he
had been assigned to the case with my complaints, and he asked me to give him a call. I spoke
with Sergeant Owens on September 7th. I asked if there was anything that I could do to help.
He said that he had put a call into the District Attorney’s office about this case, and he was
waiting for a call back. A later telephone message indicated that the investigation had been
terminated.
Police reports concerning this case were acquired at a later time and indicate that a
Special Prosecutor was assigned to this case. This prosecutor never contacted me. Exhibit F is a
true and correct copy of a Public Information Act request dated July 15, 2008 made to the
Galveston Police Department and the response that included the police reports of this case.
The police reports indicated the name of the Special Prosecutor to be Richard Branson.
A search of the State Bar’s website found a Richard Branson with the same telephone number as
one of those listed in the police reports. A general search on the name Richard Branson turned
up a document on the website for the Fourteenth Court of Appeals indicating Richard H. Branson
as having been counsel for the State in appeals of criminal cases from courts in Galveston
County. Exhibit G consists of true and correct copies of these documents.
I attempted to obtain surveillance video recordings that would show Assistant District
Attorney Angela Taylor throwing the complaints out the door of the district attorney’s office
through the use of Public Information Act requests to the Galveston Sheriff’s Office. Exhibit H
consists of true and correct copies of opinion OR2007-15325 from the Attorney General related
to one of these requests and of a request dated April 25, 2008 and one dated July 10, 2008 along
with relevant portions of the responses.
I then prepared a new set of complaints and had them sworn and notarized. I enlisted the
aid of John Ramey and Mary Haley to examine the complaints and then deliver them to the
offices of the Galveston County Criminal District Attorney. Exhibit I consists of true and correct
copies of their affidavits.
Exhibit B
Exhibit B
Certified mail receipt showing delivery accepted at the Galveston County Criminal District
Attorney’s office.
Exhibit C
Affidavit of attorney Steven A. Leyh, paragraph 5 of which is relevant to this complaint.
Exhibit C
Exhibit D
Public Information Act request and response on behalf of the District Attorney’s office showing
that that office has no records of a policy for receiving and processing criminal complaints. This
is indicated in the last paragraph of a letter from the Galveston County Legal Department.
Remainder of the response has been omitted as irrelevant to this complaint.
Exhibit D
Exhibit E
Response from the Galveston Police Department to a Public Information Act request concerning
its policies and procedures for taking complaints, investigating complaints, filing complaints, and
preservation of records.
The response indicates that the police department does involve the District Attorney’s office in
its investigations through number 10 under “Follow Up Investigation” under “Major Case
Investigation”, next to last page of response, denoted by “*” toward right margin.
Exhibit E
*
Exhibit F
Response from the Galveston Police Department to a Public Information Act request concerning
complaints that it received against Angela Taylor. Involvement of a special prosecutor is
indicated in the last two pages of this response.
Note that the Galveston Police Department has been requested to correct its records for this case
that show a complaint of counterfeiting rather than criminal conspiracy.
Exhibit F
Exhibit G
Information about the individual named as the Special Prosecutor in the police report of
Exhibit F.
Information from the State Bar website............................................................................... Tab G-1
Information obtained from the State Bar of Texas website for Richard Hugh
Branson showing a private practice with a telephone number matching that given
by the Special Prosecutor to the police investigator and showing that the statutory
profile was last certified on 08/07/2003.
Information from the Fourteenth Court of Appeals website................................................ Tab G-2
Information indicating that in 1999 Richard H. Branson acted as appellate counsel

for the State in three criminal appeals taken from courts in Galveston County.
Relevant entries designated by “*” toward right margin.
Exhibit G
State Bar of Texas | Member Directory http://www.texasbar.com/Template.cfm?Section=Member_Directory...
search
Home About the State Bar Member Directory
Detailed Result
Richard Hugh Branson
Bar Card Number*: 02899200
Work Address PO Box 1534

League City, TX, 77574-1534
Work Phone Number (281) 316-2233
Primary Practice LEAGUE CITY , Texas

Location
Current Member Status

Leadership
Eligible To Practice In Texas
Rules and Procedures
State Bar Departments
License Information
Events
State Bar Card Number*: 02899200
Member Directory
Texas Licensed*: 06/01/1982
Center for Legal History
Employment Opportunities Practice Information
Contact Us
Firm: No information reported by attorney
Staff Directory Firm Size: Solo
Occupation: Private Law Practice
Primary Practice No information reported by attorney
Areas:
Services Provided:
No information reported by attorney
Assistance available in languages:

Courts of Admittance:
Federal Courts of Admittance:
No Federal Courts reported by attorney
Other Courts of Admittance:
Other States Where authorized to practice:
Bar Card # Tennessee
First Name
1 of 2 8/6/2008 8:31 AM
State Bar of Texas | Member Directory http://www.texasbar.com/Template.cfm?Section=Member_Directory...
Last Name
Education and Certification History
Law Schools:
Need a Lawyer?
Law School Graduation Date Degree Earned
Get a Referral
06/1975 Doctor of
University Of Tennessee Jurisprudence/Juris
Doctor (J.D.)
Texas Board of Legal Specialization Certifications:
No profile data on file for Texas Board of Legal Specialization
Print this page Certification
Bookmark
Tell a friend Public Disciplinary History
Public Disciplinary History - Texas*:
*NOTE: Only Texas disciplinary sanctions within the past 10 years are displayed. For sanction information beyond 10 years, please contact
the Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel at (877)953-5535.
Public Disciplinary History - Other:

Statutory Profile Last Certified On: 08/07/2003
For information about a specific disciplinary sanction listed above, please call (877)953-5535.
The Texas Attorney Profile provides basic information about Attorneys licensed to practice in Texas. Attorney profile information is
provided as a public service by the State Bar of Texas as outlined in Section 81.115 of the Texas Government Code. The information
contained herein is provided "as is" with no warranty of any kind, express or implied. Neither the State Bar of Texas, nor its Board of
Directors, nor any employee thereof may be held responsible for the accuracy of the data. Much of the information has been provided by
the attorney and is required to be reviewed and updated by the attorney annually. The information noted with an asterisk (*) is provided by
the State Bar of Texas. Texas grievance/disciplinary information will not appear on the profile until a final determination is reached.
Access to this site is authorized for public use only. Any unauthorized use of this system is subject to both civil and criminal penalties.
This does not constitute a certified lawyer referral service.
Back to search results
Home Calendar Shopping Cart Contact Us Site Map
© 1996-2008 State Bar of Texas. Privacy Policy Disclaimer Advertise With Us
2 of 2 8/6/2008 8:31 AM
weekly http://www.14thcoa.courts.state.tx.us/Case/Opinions/102899/index.htm
Opinions
The Court's opinions may be viewed, saved, or printed in Adobe Acrobat Reader® which is available free of charge at
www.adobe.com
Click here to return to this week's opinions.
Opinions delivered on October 28, 1999:

Civil
Published:
14-97-00596-CV In Re: Estate of Garland Fredderick Wells, Deceased, Sametrius Wells, Individually and as Next
Friend of Denzel Wells, A Minor Child, and as Administratrix of the Estate of Garland Fredderick
Wells
v.
Great Dane Trailers, Inc.
REVERSED AND REMANDED
Opinion by: Hon. Paul C. Murphy
Trial court: Harris County Probate Court No. 2 (Hon. Mike Wood)
For appellant: Thomas K. Brown
For appellee: Robert M. Schick and Demetrios Anaipakos
14-97-00820-CV W. M. Riddick
v.
Quail Harbor Condominium Association, Inc.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED AND RENDERED IN PART
Opinion by: Hon. D. Camille Hutson-Dunn (sitting by assignment)
Trial court: 125th District Court (Hon. Don Wittig)
For appellant: William S. Chesney, III
For appellee: Teri A. Walter and Craig Von Sternberg
14-97-01206-CV In the Matter of Jon Grafton Hawk, Sr., Deceased

AFFIRMED
Opinion by: Hon. Kem Thompson Frost
Trial court: Brazoria County Court at Law No. 1 (Hon. Jerri Lee Mills)
For appellant: Timothy A. Hootman and John E. Russo
For appellee: Jim Wiginton
14-98-00293-CV Glenda Davis Andress, et al.

v.
MacGregor Medical Association, P.A., et al.
AFFIRMED
Opinion by: Hon. J. Harvey Hudson
Trial court: 190th District Court (Hon. John Devine)
For appellant: Scott Rothenberg
1 of 9 8/6/2008 9:09 AM
For appellee: H. Kent Twining, John B. Wallace, and Linda J. Cole
14-98-00464-CV Roy Stallman, et al.

v.
Katherine T. Newman
REVERSED AND RENDERED
Trial court: 2nd and 25th District Courts (Hon. Gus J. Strauss)
For appellant: Randy M. Clapp
For appellee: Sidney Levine
Unpublished: (Opinions not designated for publication have no precedential value and must not be cited as authority. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.7)
14-94-00368-CV Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation
v.
David M. McClung and Evelyn M. McClung
DISMISSED (Per curiam)
Trial court: 80th District Court (Hon. Scott Link)
For appellant: John R. Hawkins, Mark A. Perry, Kevin F. Risley, and N. Terry Adams, Jr.
For appellee: Steve Kherkher, Richard N. Countiss, and John E. Williams, Jr.
14-95-00606-CV Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation

v.
Jim T. Cortinas, et ux.
Trial court: 151st District Court (Hon. Carolyn Garcia)
For appellant: Kevin F. Risley, N. Terry Adams, Jr., and Roger E. Podesta
For appellee: Denman Heard and Richard N. Countiss
14-98-00113-CV Norma L. Kiefer, Robert Kiefer, and Mills, Shirley, Eckel & Bassett, L.L.P.
v.
Continental Airlines, Inc.
AFFIRMED
Opinion by: Hon. Joe L. Draughn (sitting by assignment)
Trial court: 129th District Court (Hon. Patrick Mizel)
For appellant: George W. Vie, III
For appellee: Winstol D. Carter, Jr., Richard B. Stilwell, and Reagan M. Brown
14-98-00148-CV Ronald Gene Nachtman

v.
Myriam Carey
AFFIRMED
Trial court: 309th District Court (Hon. Mary Ann Hicks)
For appellant: Pros se
For appellee: Charles J. Michael
14-98-00322-CV Regina Hardy Smith

v.
Chowdary Yalamanchili, et al.
REVERSED AND REMANDED
2 of 9 8/6/2008 9:09 AM
Opinion by: Hon. Richard H. Edelman

Trial court: Harris County Civil Court at Law No. 3 (Hon. Lynn Bradshaw-Hull)
For appellant: Marshall B. Brown
For appellee: Terry Lea Elizondo, Jay D. Hirsch, Tina Snelling, and Fred L. Shuchart
14-98-00429-CV Vicente R. Velasquez

v.
Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation
AFFIRMED
Trial court: 295th District Court (Hon. Tracy Christopher)
For appellant: George M. Bishop
For appellee: Steven A Leyh
14-98-00847-CV City of Houston

v.
Joe Aldaco
VACATED AND DISMISSED
Trial court: 190th District Court (Hon. John P. Devine)
For appellant: Rose Garcia Moriarty
For appellee: Richard H. Cobb
14-98-01163-CV Donald Eubanks

v.
Hal McCabe, Independent Executor of the Estate of Ethel McCabe Trevitt, Deceased
Trial court: Galveston Probate and County Court (Hon. Jerome Jones)
For appellant: J. Michael Fieglein
For appellee: Grand Gealy and George W. Vie, III
14-98-01413-CV A.V.W., Inc.

v.
C.E.K. de Centroamerica, S.A.
AFFIRMED
Trial court: 269th District Court (Hon. John T. Wooldridge)
For appellant: Russell J. Ramsey
For appellee: Kenneth T. Fibich, Beverly Bell Godbey, and Stacy R. Obenhaus
14-99-00557-CV Ann Elizabeth Webb and Paul LeRoy Crist

v.
HCM Claim Management Corporation and The Hertz Corporation
Trial court: Harris County Civil Court at Law No. 3 (Hon. Lynn Bradshaw-Hull)
For appellant: Ann Elizabeth Webb
For appellee: Wesson H. Tribble and Mark A. Sanders
14-99-00694-CV Joan K. Galway

v.
Ogilvie Products, Inc.
3 of 9 8/6/2008 9:09 AM

Trial court: 281st District Court (Hon. Jane Bland)
For appellant: Alden D. Holford
For appellee: Carolyn Stamper Schultz
14-99-01092-CV Angela Ratisseau

v.
Steven Ratisseau
Trial court: 257th District Court (Hon. Linda Motheral)
For appellant: Felicia Harris Kyle
For appellee: Mary Louise Callier
14-99-01107-CV Magdalena Adamski Sullins

v.
Fred Sullins
Trial court: 257th District Court
For appellant: Pro se
For appellee: Chad Blasingame
Criminal
Published:
No published opinions were issued this week.
Unpublished: (Opinions not designated for publication have no precedential value and must not be cited as authority. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.7)
14-96-01470-CR Carlos Johan Mejia
v.
The State of Texas
AFFIRMED (Per curiam)
Trial court: 180th District Court (Hon. D. M. Stricklin)
For appellant: Stephen Morris
For appellee: Kimberly Aperauch Stelter
14-97-00515-CR Stephen Mark Triplett

v.
The State of Texas
AFFIRMED
Opinion by: Hon. Norman Lee (sitting by assignment)
Trial court: 262nd District Court (Hon. Doug Shaver)
For appellant: Belinda Johnson Chagnard
For appellee: Kelly Ann Smith
14-97-00658-CR John Albert Cook
4 of 9 8/6/2008 9:09 AM
v.
The State of Texas
Trial court: Fort Bend County Court at Law No. 2 (Hon. Walter S. McMeans)
For appellant: Johnell Williams
For appellee: John F. Healey, Jr.
14-97-00857-CR Marlous Barnard Ferguson

v.
The State of Texas
AFFIRMED
Opinion by: Hon. Norman Lee (sitting by assignment)
Trial court: 337th District Court (Hon. A. D. Azios)
For appellant: Jay T. Karahan
For appellee: Carmen Castillo Mitchell
14-97-00887-CR Henry Dee Gilmore, III

v.
The State of Texas
AFFIRMED
Majority Opinion by: Hon. Richard H. Edelman
*
Concurring Opinion by: Don Wittig
Trial court: 122nd District Court (Hon. Henry G. Dalehite)
For appellant: Linda J. Nickelson
For appellee: B. Warren Goodson, Jr. and Richard H. Branson
14-97-01062-CR Garrick Deon Beck

v.
The State of Texas
AFFIRMED
Opinion by: Hon. Joe L. Draughn (sitting by assignment)
Trial court: 337th District Court (Hon. Jim Barr)
For appellant: Mark A. Goldberg
For appellee: Kelly Ann Smith
14-97-01200-CR Willie James Johnson

v.
The State of Texas
AFFIRMED
Opinion by: Hon. Don Wittig
*
Trial court: 56th District Court (Hon. Norma Venso)
For appellant: Robert A. Monks
For appellee: Richard H. Branson
14-97-01223-CR Mike Rivera Hernandez

v.
The State of Texas
AFFIRMED
Opinion by: Hon. Ross A. Sears (sitting by assignment)
Trial court: 272nd District Court (Hon. John Delaney)
For appellant: Bruno A. Shimek
For appellee: James W. Locke
5 of 9 8/6/2008 9:09 AM
14-97-01250-CR Aracelia Zamora

v.
The State of Texas
Trial court: 208th District Court (Hon. Denise Collins)
For appellant: Gary M. Polland
For appellee: Eric Kugler
14-97-01283-CR Terry Bradley Dickson

14-97-01284-CR v.
The State of Texas
AFFIRMED
Trial court: Harris County Criminal Court at Law No. 4 (Hon. James Anderson)
For appellant: Richard Haynes and Donald W. Rogers, Jr.
For appellee: Alan Curry
14-97-01295-CR Sergio Escobar

v.
The State of Texas
AFFIRMED
Opinion by: Hon. Ross A. Sears (sitting by assignment)
Trial court: 268th District Court (Hon. J. Bradley Smith)
For appellant: J. Sidney Crowley
For appellee: John Harrity, III
14-97-01369-CR Clayton John Guillory

v.
The State of Texas
AFFIRMED
Opinion by: Hon. D. Camille Hutson-Dunn (sitting by assignment)
Trial court: 262nd District Court (Hon. Doug Shaver)
For appellant: Jake Perret
For appellee: Dan McCrory
14-98-00060-CR Demetrio Lopez

v.
The State of Texas
AFFIRMED
Trial court: 208th District Court (Hon. Lee Duggan, Jr.)
For appellant: Mary E. Conn
For appellee: Dan McCrory
14-98-00064-CR Anthony Shiner

14-98-00065-CR v.
The State of Texas
AFFIRMED AS REFORMED
Trial court: 351st District Court (Hon. Mark Ellis)
For appellant: Leora Teicher Kahn
For appellee: Carmen Castillo Mitchell
6 of 9 8/6/2008 9:09 AM
14-98-00069-CR Michael Glenn Erskine

v.
The State of Texas
AFFIRMED
Opinion by: Hon. Don Wittig
Trial court: 212th District Court (Hon. H. G. Dalehite)
*
For appellant: Terri Tipton Holder
For appellee: B. Warren Goodson, Jr. and Richard H. Branson
14-98-00737-CR Curtis Sheard

v.
The State of Texas
Trial court: 337th District Court (Hon. J. Hughes)
For appellee: Calvin A. Hartmann
14-98-00895-CR Edward George Lewis

14-98-00896-CR v.
The State of Texas
Trial court: 339th District Court (Hon. A. D. Azios)
14-99-00192-CR Juan Calvillo Barron

v.
The State of Texas
Trial court: 240th District Court (Hon. Thomas R. Culver, III)
For appellant: Gordon M. White
For appellee: John Harrity, III
14-99-00353-CR Robert Clayton Swanson

v.
The State of Texas
Trial court: 337th District Court (Hon. Jon Hughes)
For appellant: William W. Burge
For appellee: Alan Curry
14-99-00586-CR Karim Abdul Aziz

14-99-00587-CR v.
The State of Texas
Trial court: 177th District Court (Hon. Curt Steib and Hon. Carol Davies)
For appellant: Murphy S. Klasing
7 of 9 8/6/2008 9:09 AM
14-99-00808-CR Richard Wright Jr.

v.
The State of Texas
Trial court: 268th District Court (Hon. J. Bradley Smith)
For appellant: Logene L. Foster
For appellee: Shelly Dawn Strimple
8 of 9 8/6/2008 9:09 AM
9 of 9 8/6/2008 9:09 AM
Exhibit H
Public Information Act requests aimed at obtaining copy of the surveillance video recording
showing Assistant District Attorney Angela Taylor removing records from the District
Attorney’s office.
Attorney General Open Records Opinion OR2007-15325.................................................. Tab H-1
Paragraph 2 shows that Sheriff’s office has represented to Attorney General that it
does not maintain the surveillance videos itself.
Response on behalf of Sheriff for PIA request dated April 25, 2008 .................................. Tab H-2
Letter indicates that the Sheriff’s office has no records of any contractors or
agencies that maintain surveillance video recordings of areas of the Galveston
County Courthouse and that it has no forms or procedures for obtaining copies of
surveillance video recordings made by its personnel. Portions of the response not
relevant to this complaint are omitted.
Response on behalf of Sheriff for PIA request dated July 10, 2008.................................... Tab H-3
Letter indicates that the Sheriff’s office has no surveillance video recordings of
areas of the County Galveston County Criminal Justice Center and that it has no
records of any contractors or agencies that maintain surveillance video recordings
Exhibit H
of areas of the County Galveston County Criminal Justice Center.
Exhibit I
Affidavits showing that sixty-nine (69) criminal complaints were delivered to the Galveston
County District Attorney’s office.
Affidavit of John Martin Ramey............................................................................................Tab I-1
Affidavit of Mary Haley ........................................................................................................Tab I-2
Note that subsequent to these affidavits being made, for technical reasons, complaints against
George C. Hanks, Jr., Evelyn Keyes, Wayne J. Mallia, and Tim Taft were withdrawn.
Exhibit I
Exhibit J
Copies of criminal complaints delivered to the Galveston County Criminal District Attorney and
identified in the affidavits of Exhibit I, excepting complaints that have been withdrawn. These
are only single complaints against various offenders arranged alphabetically, but each complaint
describes all offenses that were being charged against that particular offender.
BARRETT, BURKE, WILSON, CASTLE, DAFFIN, & FRAPPIER, LLP........................ Tab J-1
Griffin Burke......................................................................................................................... Tab J-2
Frank T. Carmona ................................................................................................................. Tab J-3
COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC............................................................................. Tab J-4
Samuel Daffin, II .................................................................................................................. Tab J-5
Diane DeLoney ..................................................................................................................... Tab J-6
LEYH & PAINE LLP........................................................................................................... Tab J-7
Steven Leyh .......................................................................................................................... Tab J-8
Sylvia Loredo........................................................................................................................ Tab J-9
Angela Taylor ..................................................................................................................... Tab J-10
Exhibit J
BARRETT BURKE WILSON CASTLE DAFFIN & FRAPPIER, L.L.P.
(Charge 1 of 8) –– Misapplication of Fiduciary Property p. 1 of 8
IN THE NAME AND BY AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF TEXAS:
I, Danny Royce Murphy, being duly sworn, do state upon my oath that I have
personal knowledge and good reason to believe and do believe based upon the
following information, most of which is evident in records held by the District
Clerk of Galveston County in the file for cause number 02CV0624, Danny Royce
Murphy v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., et. al.:
In order to stop a planned non-judicial foreclosure action against my home by

Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., I brought suit against Countrywide and the
substitute trustee for the foreclosure action, Samuel Daffin, II, in the 405th District
Court of Galveston County in May of 2002. Wayne J. Mallia was the regularly
sitting judge in the 405th District Court.
Mr. Daffin was part of the law firm BARRETT BURKE WILSON CASTLE
DAFFIN & FRAPPIER, L.L.P., which was attorney for COUNTRYWIDE HOME
LOANS, INC. for the foreclosure action that Countrywide was taking against my
property. Documents filed into the court case indicate that Mr. Daffin was acting as
agent for the law firm in the foreclosure action.
While this suit was ongoing, Samuel Daffin, II, conducted a supposed foreclosure
sale of the property in the lobby of the Galveston County Courthouse on October 1,
2002. He signed a Substitute Trustee’s Deed and had it notarized on October 1,
2002 in Harris County, Texas. Mr. Daffin caused the Substitute Trustee’s Deed to
be filed and recorded into the Official Public Records of Real Property of Galveston
County on October 7, 2002. A copy of this Substitute Trustee’s Deed was attached
to and used as evidence for Defendant’s Amended Motion for Summary Judgment
as to Possession, and this motion was filed with the District Clerk of Galveston
County, file stamp 04 JAN –8.
This substitute trustee’s deed indicated that the property had been sold on October
1, 2002 to Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation for an amount of $60,300.00,
that the Grantors were Danny R. Murphy and Sandra G. Cruz, and that the
Current Beneficiary was Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. The body of the substitute
trustee’s deed indicated that the Beneficiary had declared that Grantor defaulted
performing the obligations of the Deed of Trust, that all duties and obligations of
the Beneficiary were lawfully performed, and that the Substitute Trustee acted
under the authority conferred by the Current Beneficiary and the Deed of Trust.
Mr. Daffin knew that material facts stated in the Substitute Trustee’s Deed were
false. The primary material fact falsely stated was that the Current Beneficiary was
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., and second that the Substitute Trustee acted under
the authority conferred by the Current Beneficiary and the Deed of Trust.
During the discovery process of the lawsuit, I was provided copies of documents that
showed that, years prior to the foreclosure sale, Countrywide had given up
ownership and possession of the note upon which it supposedly based its right to
foreclose to recover amounts still owed to it. Mr. Daffin’s attorneys, LEYH &
PAYNE, L.L.P., provided me with a copy of the note displaying an endorsement
signed by an officer of Countrywide and a letter dated 12/18/97 stating that the Note
was enclosed with the letter and that the original note had been “endorsed in
blank”. This letter was addressed to First Chicago National Processing Corporation
in Pasadena, California. In endorsing the note and delivering possession of it to
another, Countrywide gave up all rights it had in the note and deed of trust.
Mr. Daffin was an attorney and, as such, is presumed to have been knowledgeable in
the law, and he regularly acted in the capacity of a substitute trustee in foreclosure
actions. Since Countrywide had given up the note years prior to Mr. Daffin
conducting the foreclosure sale and making the Substitute Trustee’s Deed, Mr.
Daffin could not possibly have found documentation sufficient to support his
statement that Countrywide was the Current Beneficiary or that he had conducted
the foreclosure sale “by authority conferred by the Current Beneficiary and by the
Deed of Trust.”
Mr. Daffin had a fiduciary responsibility as a trustee to insure that the property
entrusted to him was dealt with in the manner prescribed by the Deed of Trust. The
acts of Mr. Daffin were done in a manner contrary to the agreed Deed of Trust, and
he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly misapplied the property that he held as a
fiduciary in a manner that involved substantial risk of loss to the owner of the
property, in violation of Texas Penal Code §32.45:
§32.45 Misapplication of Fiduciary Property or Property of Financial Institution
(a) For purposes of this section:
(1) "Fiduciary" includes:
(A) trustee, guardian, administrator, executor, conservator, and receiver;
...
(2) "Misapply" means deal with property contrary to:
(A) an agreement under which the fiduciary holds the property; or
(B) a law prescribing the custody or disposition of the property.
(b) A person commits an offense if he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly

misapplies property he holds as a fiduciary or property of a financial
institution in a manner that involves substantial risk of loss to the owner of
the property or to a person for whose benefit the property is held.
(c) An offense under this section is:
(1) Class C misdemeanor if the value of the property misapplied is less than
$20;
...
(5) felony of the third degree if the value of the property misapplied is
$20,000 or more but less than $100,000;
...
Mr. Daffin was a defendant in the lawsuit and knew that the lawsuit was an official
proceeding in progress, and he made the Substitute Trustee’s Deed with knowledge
of its falsity and with intent to affect the course or outcome of the lawsuit in
violation of Texas Penal Code §37.09:
§37.09 Tampering With or Fabricating Physical Evidence
(a) A person commits an offense if, knowing that an investigation or official

proceeding is pending or in progress, he:
(1) alters, destroys, or conceals any record, document, or thing with intent
to impair its verity, legibility, or availability as evidence in the investigation or
official proceeding; or
(2) makes, presents, or uses any record, document, or thing with

knowledge of its falsity and with intent to affect the course or outcome of the
investigation or official proceeding.
(b) This section shall not apply if the record, document, or thing concealed is
privileged or is the work product of the parties to the investigation or official proceeding.
(c) An offense under Subsection (a) or Subsection (d)(1) is a felony of the third
degree. An offense under Subsection (d)(2) is a Class A misdemeanor.
(d) …[Not applicable to this complaint]
Mr. Daffin made the Substitute Trustee’s Deed, with knowledge of its falsity, and
caused it to be filed and recorded into the governmental records held by the County
Clerk of Galveston County in violation of Section 37.10 Texas Penal Code:
§37.10. Tampering With Governmental Record.

(a) A person commits an offense if he:
(1) knowingly makes a false entry in, or false alteration of, a governmental
record;
(2) makes, presents, or uses any record, document, or thing with knowledge
of its falsity and with intent that it be taken as a genuine governmental
record;
(3) intentionally destroys, conceals, removes, or otherwise impairs the verity,

legibility, or availability of a governmental record;
(4) possesses, sells, or offers to sell a governmental record or a blank

governmental record form with intent that it be used unlawfully;
(5) makes, presents, or uses a governmental record with knowledge of its

falsity;
Mr. Daffin carried out his acts of misapplication of fiduciary property, fabrication
of evidence, and tampering with governmental records in agreement with and with
aid of others in violation of Texas Penal Code §15.02:
§15.02. Criminal Conspiracy.
(a) A person commits criminal conspiracy if, with intent that a felony be
committed:
(1) he agrees with one or more persons that they or one or more of them
engage in conduct that would constitute the offense; and
(2) he or one or more of them performs an overt act in pursuance of the

agreement.
(b) An agreement constituting a conspiracy may be inferred from acts of the

parties
...
Mr. Daffin’s choice to join with others in the furtherance of the conspiracy makes
him culpable for his own acts and those of his co-conspirators,
§7.01 Texas Penal Code, Parties to offenses:

(a) A person is criminally responsible as a party to an offense if the offense is

committed by his own conduct, by the conduct of another for which he is
criminally responsible, or by both.
(b) Each party to an offense may be charged with commission of the offense.
(c) All traditional distinctions between accomplices and principals are

abolished by this section, and each party to an offense maybe charged and
convicted without alleging that he acted as a principal or accomplice.
§7.02 Texas Penal Code, Criminal responsibility for conduct of another:
(a) A person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the

conduct of another if:
(1) having a legal duty to prevent commission of the offense and action
with intent to promote or assist its commission, he fails to make a
reasonable effort to prevent commission of the offense.
(2) If, in the attempt to carry a conspiracy to commit one felony, another
felony is committed by one of the conspirators, all conspirators are
guilty of the felony actually committed, though having no intent to
commit it, if the offense was committed in furtherance of the unlawful
purpose and was one that should have been anticipated as a result of
the carrying out of the conspiracy.
Also employed by the law firm and acting as an agent for the law firm during the
course of foreclosure action was Sylvia Loredo, whose unlawful acts are described
hereinafter.
While the lawsuit was ongoing and in connection with a foreclosure sale of the
property, Sylvia Loredo signed an Affidavit of Mortgagee and had it notarized on
October 1, 2002 in Dallas County, Texas. Ms. Loredo caused the Affidavit of
Mortgagee to be filed and recorded into the Official Public Records of Real
Property of Galveston County on October 7, 2002. A copy of this Affidavit of
Mortgagee was attached to and used as evidence for Defendant’s Amended Motion
for Summary Judgment as to Possession, and this motion was filed with the District
Clerk of Galveston County, file stamp 04 JAN –8.
This Affidavit of Mortgagee indicated that Ms. Loredo was an employee of

BARRETT BURKE WILSON CASTLE DAFFIN & FRAPPIER, L.L.P., attorney
for COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC., that the affidavit was made with
respect to the foreclosure of that certain Deed of Trust dated December 16, 1997,
recorded CLERK’S FILE NO. 9748599, Real Property Records, GALVESTON
County, TEXAS … to secure payment of a Note to COUNTRYWIDE HOME
LOANS, INC., that COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC. was the holder of the
debt or agent for the holder of the indebtedness secured by the Deed of Trust, and
“At the instructions and on behalf of the holder of the debt or its agent” certain acts
were performed as required by law.
Ms. Loredo knew that she did not know certain material facts stated in the affidavit
were true. The primary material fact falsely stated and without any reservation or
qualification was that Countrywide was the holder of the debt or agent for the
holder of the indebtedness secured by the Deed of Trust.
foreclose to recover amounts still owed to it. At the offices of LEYH & PAYNE,
L.L.P., I was provided with a copy of the note displaying an endorsement signed by
an officer of Countrywide and a letter dated 12/18/97 stating that the Note was
enclosed with the letter and that the original note had been “endorsed in blank”.
This letter was addressed to First Chicago National Processing Corporation in
Pasadena, California. A copy of the endorsed note and letter are attached to
Plaintiff’s Second Amended Petition, file stamped 02 NOV 19. In endorsing the
note and delivering possession of it to another, Countrywide gave up all rights it had
in the note and deed of trust.
During the course of the Lawsuit, Countrywide never provided any documentation
or even an assertion to show that it was acting as an agent for any other entity.
Ms. Loredo could not possibly have received any documentation sufficient to show
the truthfulness of statements that she made in the Affidavit of Mortgagee.
False statements of material facts knowingly made by Ms. Loredo in the Affidavit of
Mortgagee were made in connection with the official proceeding of the foreclosure
sale and constitute a violation of Section 37.03 Texas Penal Code:
§37.02 Perjury
(a) A person commits an offense if, with intent to deceive and with knowledge
of the statement's meaning:
(1) he makes a false statement under oath or swears to the truth of a false
statement previously made and the statement is required or authorized
by law to be made under oath; or
(2) he makes a false unsworn declaration under Chapter 132, Civil Practice
and Remedies Code.
(b) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor.
§37.03 Aggravated Perjury
(a) A person commits an offense if he commits perjury as defined in Section

37.02, and the false statement:
(1) is made during or in connection with an official proceeding; and
(2) is material.
(b) An offense under this section is a felony of the third degree.
Ms. Loredo stated in the affidavit that the affidavit was being made with respect to
the foreclosure that was taking place, showing that she knew that an official
proceeding was pending or taking place. She made the Affidavit of Mortgagee with
foreclosure process in violation of Section 37.09 Texas Penal Code, Tampering With
or Fabricating Physical Evidence, text included above.
Ms. Loredo made the Affidavit of Mortgagee, with knowledge of its falsity, and
Clerk of Galveston County in violation of Section 37.10 Texas Penal Code,
Tampering With Governmental Record, text included above.
Ms. Loredo carried out her acts of aggravated purjury, fabrication of evidence, and
tampering with governmental records in agreement with and with aid of others in
violation of Section 15.02 Texas Penal Code, Criminal Conspiracy, text included
above.
Documents filed into court indicate that BARRETT BURKE WILSON CASTLE
DAFFIN & FRAPPIER, L.L.P. was the attorney for Countrywide in the foreclosure
action. BARRETT BURKE WILSON CASTLE DAFFIN & FRAPPIER, L.L.P. is
an association for the purposes of the Texas Penal Code,
§1.07 Definitions
(a) In this code:
(6) "Association" means a government or governmental subdivision or

agency, trust, partnership, or two or more persons having a joint or
common economic interest.
…
The acts of Mr. Daffin and Ms. Loredo were in the capacity of agent for the
association,
§7.21 Definitions
In this subchapter:
Griffin Pivateau Burke (Charge 1 of 3) –– Tampering With or Fabricating Physical Evidence p. 1 of 4

Countyrwide Home Loans, Inc., I brought suit against Countrywide and the
A hearing was set in the 405th District Court to be heard on March 20, 2003 on
Defendant’s No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment, file stamped 03 JAN 30,
which was prepared by Defendants’ attorney’s law firm, LAYH & PAYNE, L.L.P.,
and personally signed by attorney Griffin Pivateau Burke, Texas Bar No. 16055950.
Attached to this motion was an affidavit by Diane DeLoney, in which she states that
she was the “custodian of Countrywide’s records” and in which she states, without
reservation or qualification, on the second page of the affidavit that “Countrywide
is the Owner and Holder of the Note and Deed of Trust.”
More than two months prior to Defendant’s No-Evidence Motion for Summary
Judgment being filed with the court, I filed with the court and provided a copy to
Mr. Burke of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Petition, file stamped 02 NOV 19.
Attached to this petition was a copy of the Note referred to in the DeLoney affidavit
displaying an endorsement signed by an officer of Countrywide and a letter dated
12/18/97 stating that the Note was enclosed with the letter and that the original note
had been “endorsed in blank”. This letter was addressed to First Chicago National
Processing Corporation in Pasadena, California. In endorsing the note and
delivering possession of it to another entity, Countrywide gave up all rights it had in
the note and deed of trust. The endorsed note and letter show that material
statements made in the DeLoney affidavit were false. The copy of the note attached
to the DeLoney affidavit does not show this endorsement, but the copy attached to
petition filed on November 19, 2002 does.
Further I obtained copies of the endorsed note and this letter from the law firm of
LAYH & PAYNE, L.L.P. I was personally handed the file containing these
documents by Mr. Burke at the offices of LAYH & PAYNE, L.L.P. These
documents were being provided to me as part of the discovery process of the
lawsuit.
Mr. Burke was provided actual knowledge of the falsity of the DeLoney affidavit.
Copies of the endorsed note and the letter were readily available to him in files kept
at the offices of LAYH & PAYNE, L.L.P.; he was provided another copy of the
endorsed note and letter as attachments to Plaintiff’s Second Amended Petition;
discrepancies with the copy of the note previously provided to the court by Mr.
Burke were pointed out in paragraph 8 of this petition; and the significance of the
endorsed note and letter were pointed out in paragraph 27 of this petition. In spite
of this, Mr. Burke still brought the DeLoney affidavit to court again to use as
evidence in asserting claims in the lawsuit.
Mr. Burke knew that the lawsuit was an official proceeding in progress, and he
presented the DeLoney affidavit with knowledge of its falsity and with intent to
affect the course or outcome of the lawsuit in violation of Texas Penal Code §37.09:


Having knowledge that his client lacked the original note, Mr. Burke knew that his
client did not have a valid claim to collect on the note and foreclose on the security
named in the deed of trust. Mr. Burke still filed a claim into court against the
property and me knowing that the claim of his client was baseless, frivolous, and
without authority and that he was therefore acting without authority when he filed
Defendant’s First Amended Original Counterclaim, file stamped 02 DEC –9, in
§38.12 Barratry and Solicitation of Professional Employment

(a) A person commits an offense if, with intent to obtain an economic benefit the
person:
(1) knowingly institutes a suit or claim that the person has not been authorized
to pursue;
...
(f) An offense under Subsection (a) or (b) is a felony of the third degree.
… [Remainder of §38.12 not relevant to this complaint]
Mr. Burke carried out his acts of fabrication of evidence and barratry in agreement
with and with aid of others in violation of Texas Penal Code §15.02:
committed:

agreement.

parties
Mr. Burke’s choice to join with others in the furtherance of the conspiracy makes


Frank T. Carmona (Charge 1 of 2) – Tampering With Governmental Record p. 1 of 3
I, Danny Royce Murphy, being duly sworn, do state upon my oath that I have personal
knowledge and good reason to believe and do believe based upon the following
information, most of which is evident in records held by the District Clerk of Galveston
County in the file for cause number 02CV0624, Danny Royce Murphy v. Countrywide
Home Loans, Inc., et. al.:
I had filed suit in the 405th District Court to stop a non-judicial foreclosure action by
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. that was being taken against my home.
A hearing was set in the 405th District Court to be heard on March 20, 2003 on Defendant’s
No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment. On March 20, 2003 Frank T. Carmona sat on
the hearing as the Judge Presiding by assignment from Olen Underwood, Presiding Judge,
Second Administrative Judicial Region. On that date Carmona signed a “Final Summary
Judgment” granting the motion and effectively dismissing my lawsuit. This signed judgment
was entered into the court records.
Subsequently, I requested the office of the Secretary of State of the State of Texas to provide
me with a copy of the Statement of Officer and Oath of Office for Frank T. Carmona as any
th
type of judge of the 405 District Court. In response, I obtained a letter under seal
indicating that a diligent search of the records of that office had failed to find a Statement of
Officer or an Oath of Office for Frank T. Carmona as Judge of the 405th Judicial District.
Copy of this letter may be found in the court files as Exhibit 2 attached to Plaintiff’s Motion
to Set Aside the Summary Judgment of March 20, 2003, file stamped 04 JAN 23.
Defendants placed into the court record what appears to be every Statement of Officer and
Oath of Office subscribed by Frank T. Carmona and filed into the records of the Secretary
of State as attachments to their Defendants’ Response to Motion for New Trial, file stamped
03 MAY 23. These records show that Carmona properly filed Statements of Officer and
Oaths of Office for two terms as the regular district judge of the 122nd Judicial District.
These records also show a Statement of Elected/Appointed Officer for Carmona for a
position of Visiting Senior District Judge filed in the Office of the Secretary of State on JAN
6 2003, but there is no Oath of Office that covers his tenure with the 405th District Court.
Carmona served two terms as a district court judge and is presumed to be knowledgeable in
the law. That Carmona properly subscribed to and filed the necessary Statements of Officer
and Oaths of Office to assume the office of District Judge demonstrates that he was familiar
with the documentation and procedures necessary to assume the office of judge.
Texas courts have long held that without taking the constitutionally required oath of office, a
person can not become a judge, and he is without authority to act. This requirement was
more recently upheld by the Texas Court of Appeals in the case of Prieto Bail Bonds v. State,
978 S.W.2d 574, (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
While appearing as a judge but knowing that he was acting without the authority of a judge,
Frank T. Carmona (Charge 1 of 2) – Tampering With Governmental Record p. 2 of 3
Carmona signed the “Final Summary Judgment” with an indication that he was the Judge
Presiding giving the appearance of a valid governmental record and had the same entered
into the court record, in violation of Section 37.10 Texas Penal Code:
Sec. 37.10. Tampering With Governmental Record.

(1) knowingly makes a false entry in, or false alteration of, a governmental record;
(2) makes, presents, or uses any record, document, or thing with knowledge of its
falsity and with intent that it be taken as a genuine governmental record;
…
(5) makes, presents, or uses a governmental record with knowledge of its falsity;
…
Carmona’s actions show intent that the judgment that he signed be regarded as a valid
judgment with the effect of dismissing my suit against the defendants and denying me the
protection of the court against an unlawful dispossession of my home and impeding my right
to access the court. Such actions constitute the offense of Official Oppression in violation of
Texas Penal Code Section 39.03,
39.03 Official Oppression:

(a) A public servant acting under color of his office or employment commits an
offense if he:
(1) intentionally subjects another to mistreatment or to arrest, detention, search,
seizure, dispossession, assessment, or lien that he knows is unlawful;
(2) Intentionally denies or impedes another in the exercise or enjoyment of any
right, privilege, power, or immunity, knowing his conduct is unlawful; or
(3) Intentionally subjects another to sexual harassment
(b) For purposes of this section, a public servants acts under color of his office or
employment if he acts or purports to act in an official capacity or takes advantage
of such actual or purported capacity.
(c) (defines “sexual harassment”)
(d) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor.
I charge that heretofore, and before the making and filing of this complaint, on or about the
20th day of March 2003 and within the boundaries of Galveston County, Texas,
COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC
(Charge 1 of 19) –– Securing Execution of Document by Deception p. 1 of 14
In 1997 I applied for a loan with Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. to buy my home.
A note, deed of trust and other papers were signed at the closing on December 16,
1997. The first monthly payment was scheduled for February of 1998. I made the
first payment, and I continued to be billed for and make monthly payments for
several years.
Some time during the year 2000, I began to learn of certain practices of banks and
other commercial lenders that indicate that there are significant aspects of the loan
agreement and transaction that is not revealed to borrowers.
I paid a monthly payment to Countrywide in December of 2001, and in January of

2002, I began to make inquiries to Countrywide concerning the loan that I had been
paying and the location of the note. Informative answers were not forthcoming, so
I ceased making further payments until I had located the note and verified that
Countrywide was the holder of the note and the proper party to be paid.
I continued to make requests to Countrywide, and it continued to provide

uninformative and evasive answers. Countrywide began to send me notices in
preparation for foreclosure proceedings. Eventually a foreclosure sale was set for
the first Tuesday of June of 2002.
To stop the foreclosure sale, I brought suit in the 405th District Court of Galveston
County against Countrywide and Samuel Daffin, II, the substitute trustee for the
foreclosure action. During the course of the lawsuit, I obtained a copy of the note
and a letter that showed that Countrywide had signed away its rights in the note
and given possession and ownership of the note to another entity two days after the
note was signed.
In the early stages of the lawsuit, attorney for Countrywide brought in an affidavit
from the Keeper of Records for Countrywide to show that Countrywide was the
owner of the note. This affidavit had a copy of the note attached to it, and the
affidavit identified the copy as a true and correct copy of the note.
During the discovery process of the lawsuit, attorney for Countrywide provided me
with copies of documents that I had requested from Countrywide. Among those
was a copy of the note displaying an endorsement signed by an officer of

Countrywide and a letter dated 12/18/97 stating that the Note was enclosed with the
letter and that the original note had been “endorsed in blank”. This letter was
addressed to First Chicago National Processing Corporation in Pasadena,
California. In endorsing the note and delivering possession of it to another,
Countrywide gave up all rights it had in the note and deed of trust.
Copy of the note originally brought to court by Countrywide may be found as an

attachment to Defendant’s No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment, file
stamped 03 JAN 30. A copy of the endorsed note and letter may be found as
attachments to Plaintiff’s Second Amended Petition, file stamped 02 NOV 19.
Countrywide’s own records showed that it had given up ownership and possession
of the note two days after the note was made. Countrywide still sent bills to me
through the United States Postal Service for payments on this note every month.
Countrywide did not let me know that it had disposed of the note and no longer had
possession, ownership or interest in the note. Sending bills to me was a
misrepresentation of a debt owed to it. Because of this deception, I paid the
monthly billing 47 times by execution of a check, money order, authorization for
credit card payment, or by some other means of payment for total payment of more
than $30,000 and less than $40,000. I would not have made these payments except
for this deception. Countrywide’s actions in this matter constituted a criminal
episode in violation of Texas Penal Code §32.46:
§32.46 Securing Execution of Document by Deception

(a) A person commits an offense if, with intent to defraud or harm any person, he, by
deception:
(1) causes another to sign or execute any document affecting property or service
or the pecuniary interest of any person; or
…
(b) An offense under Subsection (a)(1) is a:
…
(5) felony of the third degree if the value of the property, service, or pecuniary
interest is $20,000 or more but less than $100,000;
During the course of the lawsuit various individuals and law firms took actions on
behalf of Countrywide. These actions indicate that these individuals and law firms
had duties of such a level of responsibility that these individuals and law firms were
high managerial agents of Countrywide,
§7.21 Definitions
In this subchapter:
(1) "Agent" means a director, officer, employee, or other person authorized to act in
behalf of a corporation or association.
(2) "High managerial agent" means:
(A) a partner in a partnership;
(B) an officer of a corporation or association;
(C) an agent of a corporation or association who has duties of such responsibility

that his conduct reasonably may be assumed to represent the policy of the
corporation or association.
Countrywide is responsible for the offenses committed by it agents on its behalf,
§7.22 Criminal Responsibility of Corporation or Association
(a) If conduct constituting an offense is performed by an agent acting in behalf of

a corporation or association and within the scope of his office or
employment, the corporation or association is criminally responsible for an
offense defined:
(1) in this code where corporations and associations are made subject
thereto;
...
The following concerns the acts of the individuals Diane DeLoney, Griffin Pivateau
Burke, Steven A. Leyh, Samuel Daffin, II, Sylvia Loredo, and the law firms LEYH
& PAYNE, L.L.P. and BARRETT BURKE WILSON CASTLE DAFFIN &
FRAPPIER, L.L.P. in the capacity of agents for Countrywide.
________________________________________________
Defendant’s No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment, file stamped 03 JAN 30.
is the Owner and Holder of the Note and Deed of Trust.” She states that true and
correct copies of the note and deed of trust are attached to the affidavit. The first
paragraph of the affidavit indicates that DeLoney knew that the affidavit was going
to be used with a motion for summary judgment for the defendants. The affidavit
indicates that it was signed on August 29, 2002 and made in Collin County, Texas.
As part of the discovery process of the lawsuit, I was given access to a file of
documents supplied by defendant Countrywide and being held by defendants’
attorneys at the offices of LAYH & PAYNE, L.L.P. From that file, I obtained a
copy of the Note referred to in the DeLoney affidavit displaying an endorsement
in Pasadena, California.
The copy of the Note attached to the DeLoney affidavit and identified by her as
being a true and correct copy did not display this endorsement. In endorsing the
note and delivering possession of it to another entity, Countrywide gave up all rights
it had in the note and deed of trust; it ceased being “the Owner and Holder of the
Note and Deed of Trust.” The copy of the endorsed note and letter show that
material statements made in the DeLoney affidavit were false.
Statements made by DeLoney in the affidavit constitute a violation of Texas Penal

Code §37.03:
§37.02 Perjury
and Remedies Code.

(2) is material.
Ms. DeLoney knew, as indicated in her affidavit, that an official proceeding was in
progress, and she made the affidavit with knowledge of its falsity and with intent to


Ms. DeLoney committed her acts of perjury and fabrication of evidence in

agreement with others in violation of Texas Penal Code §15.02:
committed:

agreement.

parties
Ms. DeLoney’s choice to join with others in the furtherance of the conspiracy makes
her culpable for her own acts and those of her co-conspirators,



guilty of the felony actually committed, thought having no intent to
____________________________________________
Court documents indicate that defendants hired the law firm LEYH & PAYNE,
L.L.P. as attorneys for defendants for this lawsuit. Individual attorneys from this
law firm who signed documents filed into court and who appeared in court for the
defendants were Griffin Pivateau Burke, Texas Bar No. 16055950, and Steven A.
Leyh, Texas Bar No. 12318300.
which was prepared by Defendants’ attorney’s law firm, LEYH & PAYNE, L.L.P.,
and personally signed by attorney Griffin Pivateau Burke. Attached to this motion
was an affidavit by Diane DeLoney, in which she states that she was the “custodian
of Countrywide’s records” and in which she states, without reservation or
qualification, on the second page of the affidavit that “Countrywide is the Owner
and Holder of the Note and Deed of Trust.”
LEYH & PAYNE, L.L.P. I was personally handed the file containing these
documents by Mr. Burke at the offices of LEYH & PAYNE, L.L.P. These
lawsuit.
at the offices of LEYH & PAYNE, L.L.P.; he was provided another copy of the
affect the course or outcome of the lawsuit in violation of Texas Penal Code §37.09,
described previously in this complaint as Tampering With or Fabricating Physical
Evidence.
person:
to pursue;
...
with and with aid of others in violation of Texas Penal Code §15.02, described
previously in this complaint as Criminal Conspiracy.
Steven A. Leyh signed Defendant’s Amended Motion for Summary Judgment as to

Possession, and this motion was filed with the District Clerk of Galveston County,
file stamp 04 JAN –8. Attached to this motion and referred to as summary
judgment evidence on page 3 of the motion was a copy of a Substitute Trustee’s
Deed.
1, 2002 to Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, that the Grantors were
Danny R. Murphy and Sandra G. Cruz, and that the Current Beneficiary was
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. The body of the substitute trustee’s deed indicated
that the Beneficiary had declared that Grantor defaulted performing the obligations
of the Deed of Trust, that all duties and obligations of the Beneficiary were lawfully
performed, and that the Substitute Trustee acted under the authority conferred by
the Current Beneficiary and the Deed of Trust.
Also attached to Defendant’s Amended Motion for Summary Judgment as to

Possession was an Affidavit of Mortgagee. This affidavit stated that Countrywide
Home Loans, Inc. was “the holder of the debt or agent for the holder of the
indebtedness secured by the Deed of Trust”. This affidavit also stated that “at the
instructions and on behalf of the holder of the debt or its agent” certain necessary
actions had been taken.
Mr. Leyh knew that material facts stated in the Substitute Trustee’s Deed and the
Affidavit of Mortgagee were false. The material facts falsely stated in these
documents were that the Current Beneficiary was Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.
and that Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. was “the holder of the debt or agent for
the holder of the indebtedness secured by the Deed of Trust”.
Documents made available to Mr. Leyh and filed into court more than a year prior
to his filing of Defendant’s Amended Motion for Summary Judgment as to
Possession provided him the knowledge that Countrywide had endorsed the note
and transferred possession of it to another, and, thereby, it gave up all rights that it
had in the note and the deed of trust.
More than year prior to Defendant’s Amended Motion for Summary Judgment as
to Possession being filed with the court, I filed with the court and provided a copy to
another attorney in Mr. Leyh’s law firm of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Petition, file
stamped 02 NOV 19. Attached to this petition was a copy of the Note displaying an
endorsement signed by an officer of Countrywide and a letter dated 12/18/97 stating
that the Note was enclosed with the letter and that the original note had been
“endorsed in blank”. This letter was addressed to First Chicago National
delivering possession of it to another, Countrywide gave up all rights it had in the
note and deed of trust. Copies of the Note previously submitted to court by
Countrywide did not display this endorsement.
Additionally, I provided a copy of the endorsed note and the letter to Mr. Leyh as
attachments to my Plaintiff’s Answer to Defendant’s Amended Motion for
Summary Judgment as to Possession, file stamped 04 JAN 23. Also, Mr. Leyh was
present when a copy of the endorsed note and the letter was entered into evidence in
open court on or about December 22, 2003. The issue of Countrywide’s lack of
ownership of the note upon which it was taking action to collect was brought up to
Mr. Leyh several times during the year 2003.
I obtained copies of the endorsed note and this letter from the law firm of LEYH &
PAYNE, L.L.P. I was handed the file containing these documents at the offices of
LEYH & PAYNE, L.L.P. These documents were being provided to me as part of
the discovery process of the lawsuit.
Mr. Leyh was provided actual knowledge of the falsity of the Substitute Trustee’s
Deed and the Affidavit of Mortgagee. Copies of the endorsed note and the letter
were readily available to him in files kept at the offices of LEYH & PAYNE, L.L.P.;
he had available to him another copy of the endorsed note and letter as attachments
to Plaintiff’s Second Amended Petition; discrepancies with the copy of the note
previously provided to the court by Mr. Leyh’s law firm were pointed out in
paragraph 8 of this petition; and the significance of the endorsed note and letter
were pointed out in paragraph 27 of this petition. In spite of this, Mr. Leyh still
brought the Substitute Trustee’s Deed and the Affidavit of Mortgagee to court to
use as evidence in asserting claims in the lawsuit.
Mr. Leyh knew that the lawsuit was an official proceeding in progress, and he
presented the Substitute Trustee’s Deed and the Affidavit of Mortgagee with
knowledge of the falsity each and with intent to affect the course or outcome of the
lawsuit in violation of Texas Penal Code §37.09, described previously in this
complaint as Tampering With or Fabricating Physical Evidence.
Mr. Leyh presented the Substitute Trustee’s Deed and the Affidavit of Mortgagee to
court, with knowledge of the falsity each, as certified copies of governmental records
held by the County Clerk of Galveston County in violation of Section 37.10 Texas
Penal Code:
record;
record;



falsity;
Having knowledge that his client lacked the original note, Mr. Leyh knew that his
named in the deed of trust. Mr. Leyh still filed a claim into court against the
Defendant’s Amended Motion for Summary Judgment as to Possession in violation
of Texas Penal Code §38.12, described previously in this complaint as Barratry.
Mr. Leyh carried out his acts of fabrication of evidence, tampering with
governmental records, and barratry in agreement with and with aid of others in
violation of Texas Penal Code §15.02, described previously in this complaint as
Criminal Conspiracy.
____________________________________________
Mr. Daffin was part of the law firm BARRETT BURKE WILSON CASTLE
DAFFIN & FRAPPIER, L.L.P., which was attorney for COUNTRYWIDE HOME
LOANS, INC. for the foreclosure action that Countrywide was taking against my
property. Documents filed into the court case indicate that Mr. Daffin was acting as
agent for the law firm in the foreclosure action.
Samuel Daffin, II, conducted a foreclosure sale of the property in the lobby of the
Galveston County Courthouse on October 1, 2002. He signed a Substitute Trustee’s
Deed and had it notarized on October 1, 2002 in Harris County, Texas. Mr. Daffin
caused the Substitute Trustee’s Deed to be filed and recorded into the Official
Public Records of Real Property of Galveston County on October 7, 2002. A copy of
this Substitute Trustee’s Deed was attached to and used as evidence for Defendant’s
Amended Motion for Summary Judgment as to Possession, and this motion was
filed with the District Clerk of Galveston County, file stamp 04 JAN –8.
in Pasadena, California. A copy of this endorsed note and letter can be found as
attachments to Plaintiff’s Second Amended Petition. In endorsing the note and
note and deed of trust.
Deed of Trust.”
...


$20;
...
...
Mr. Daffin was a defendant in the lawsuit and knew that the lawsuit was an official
proceeding in progress, and he made the Substitute Trustee’s Deed with knowledge
of its falsity and with intent to affect the course or outcome of the lawsuit in
violation of Texas Penal Code §37.09, described previously in this complaint as
Tampering With or Fabricating Physical Evidence.
Clerk of Galveston County in violation of Section 37.10 Texas Penal Code, described
previously in this complaint as Tampering With Governmental Record.
aid of others in violation of Texas Penal Code §15.02, described previously in this
complaint as Criminal Conspiracy.
Also employed by the law firm of the law firm BARRETT BURKE WILSON
CASTLE DAFFIN & FRAPPIER, L.L.P., and acting as an agent for the law firm
during the course of foreclosure action was Sylvia Loredo.
While the lawsuit was ongoing and in connection with a foreclosure sale of the

sale and constitute a violation of Section 37.03 Texas Penal Code, previously
described in this complaint as Aggravated Perjury.
foreclosure process in violation of Section 37.09 Texas Penal Code, previously
described in this complaint as Tampering With or Fabricating Physical Evidence.
Samuel Daffin, II (Charge 1 of 4) –– Misapplication of Fiduciary Property p. 1 of 5

While this suit was ongoing, Samuel Daffin, II, conducted a supposed foreclosure
sale of the property in the lobby of the Galveston County Courthouse on October 1,
2002. He signed a Substitute Trustee’s Deed and had it notarized on October 1,
2002 in Harris County, Texas. Mr. Daffin caused the Substitute Trustee’s Deed to
be filed and recorded into the Official Public Records of Real Property of Galveston
County on October 7, 2002. A copy of this Substitute Trustee’s Deed was attached
to and used as evidence for Defendant’s Amended Motion for Summary Judgment
as to Possession, and this motion was filed with the District Clerk of Galveston
County, file stamp 04 JAN –8.

attachments to Plaintiff’s Second Amended Petition, file stamped 02 NOV 19. In
endorsing the note and delivering possession of it to another, Countrywide gave up
all rights it had in the note and deed of trust.
Deed of Trust.”
...

$20;
...
...
Mr. Daffin was the substitute trustee for the foreclosure action that was taking
place. He made the Substitute Trustee’s Deed with knowledge of its falsity and with
intent to affect the course or outcome of the trustee’s sale in violation of Texas Penal
Code §37.09. Additionally, Mr. Daffin was a defendant in the lawsuit and knew that
the lawsuit was an official proceeding in progress, and he made the Substitute
Trustee’s Deed with knowledge of its falsity and with intent to affect the course or
outcome of the lawsuit in violation of Texas Penal Code §37.09:



record;
record;



falsity;
aid of others in violation of Texas Penal Code §15.02:
committed:

agreement.

parties
...
Mr. Daffin’s choice to join with others in the furtherance of the conspiracy makes

Diane Deloney (Charge 1 of 3) –– Aggravated Perjury p. 1 of 4

Defendant’s No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment, file stamped 03 JAN 30.
is the Owner and Holder of the Note and Deed of Trust.” She states that true and
correct copies of the note and deed of trust are attached to the affidavit. The first
paragraph of the affidavit indicates that DeLoney knew that the affidavit was going
to be used with a motion for summary judgment for the defendants. The affidavit
indicates that it was signed on August 29, 2002 and made in Collin County, Texas.
As part of the discovery process of the lawsuit, I was given access to a file of
documents supplied by defendant Countrywide and being held by defendants’
attorneys at the offices of LAYH & PAYNE, L.L.P. From that file, I obtained a
copy of the Note referred to in the DeLoney affidavit displaying an endorsement
attachments to Plaintiff’s Second Amended Petition, file stamped 02 NOV 19. In
endorsing the note and delivering possession of it to another, Countrywide gave up
all rights it had in the note and deed of trust.
The copy of the Note attached to the DeLoney affidavit and identified by her as
being a true and correct copy did not display this endorsement. In endorsing the
note and delivering possession of it to another entity, Countrywide gave up all rights
it had in the note and deed of trust; it ceased being “the Owner and Holder of the
Note and Deed of Trust.” The copy of the endorsed note and letter show that
material statements made in the DeLoney affidavit were false.
Statements made by DeLoney in the affidavit constitute a violation of Texas Penal

Code §37.03:
§37.02 Perjury
and Remedies Code.

(2) is material.
Ms. DeLoney knew, as indicated in her affidavit, that an official proceeding was in
progress, and she made the affidavit with knowledge of its falsity and with intent to


Ms. DeLoney committed her acts of perjury and fabrication of evidence in

agreement with others in violation of Texas Penal Code §15.02:
committed:

agreement.

parties
Ms. DeLoney’s choice to join with others in the furtherance of the conspiracy makes



LEYH & PAYNE, L.L.P. (Charge 1 of 7) ––Fabricating Physical Evidence #1 p. 1 of 8

Court documents indicate that defendants hired the law firm LEYH & PAYNE,
L.L.P. as attorneys for defendants for this lawsuit. Individual attorneys from this
law firm who signed documents filed into court and who appeared in court for the
defendants were Griffin Pivateau Burke, Texas Bar No. 16055950, and Steven A.
Leyh, Texas Bar No. 12318300.
which was prepared by Defendants’ attorney’s law firm, LEYH & PAYNE, L.L.P.,
and personally signed by attorney Griffin Pivateau Burke. Attached to this motion
was an affidavit by Diane DeLoney, in which she states that she was the “custodian
of Countrywide’s records” and in which she states, without reservation or
qualification, on the second page of the affidavit that “Countrywide is the Owner
and Holder of the Note and Deed of Trust.”
LEYH & PAYNE, L.L.P. I was personally handed the file containing these
documents by Mr. Burke at the offices of LEYH & PAYNE, L.L.P. These
lawsuit.
at the offices of LEYH & PAYNE, L.L.P.; he was provided another copy of the


person:
to pursue;
...
with and with aid of others in violation of Texas Penal Code §15.02:
committed:

agreement.

parties
Mr. Burke’s choice to join with others in the furtherance of the conspiracy makes



guilty of the felony actually committed, thought having no intent to
Steven A. Leyh signed Defendant’s Amended Motion for Summary Judgment as to

Deed.

had in the note and the deed of trust.
More than year prior to Defendant’s Amended Motion for Summary Judgment as
to Possession being filed with the court, I filed with the court and provided a copy to
I obtained copies of the endorsed note and this letter from the law firm of LEYH &
LEYH & PAYNE, L.L.P. These documents were being provided to me as part of
the discovery process of the lawsuit.
were readily available to him in files kept at the offices of LEYH & PAYNE, L.L.P.;
lawsuit in violation of Texas Penal Code §37.09, which makes tampering with or
fabricating physical evidence an offense.
Penal Code:
record;
record;



falsity;
of Texas Penal Code §38.12, which makes Barratry an offense.
violation of Texas Penal Code §15.02, which makes Criminal Conspiracy an offense.
Court documents indicate that Griffin Pivateau Burke and Steven A. Leyh were
acting in behalf of LEYH & PAYNE, L. L. P. LEYH & PAYNE, L. L. P. is an
association for the purposes of the Texas Penal Code,
§1.07 Definitions
(a) In this code:
(6) "Association" means a government or governmental subdivision or

agency, trust, partnership, or two or more persons having a joint or
common economic interest.
…
The acts of Griffin Pivateau Burke and Steven A. Leyh were in the capacity of an
agent for the association,
§7.21 Definitions
In this subchapter:
(1) "Agent" means a director, officer, employee, or other person authorized to

act in behalf of a corporation or association.
...
As agents for the association, the association is criminally responsible for the offenses
committed by Griffin Pivateau Burke and Steven A. Leyh,
§7.22 Criminal Responsibility of Corporation or Association
(a) If conduct constituting an offense is performed by an agent acting in behalf of

a corporation or association and within the scope of his office or
employment, the corporation or association is criminally responsible for an
offense defined:
(1) in this code where corporations and associations are made subject
thereto;
...
Steven A. Leyh (Charge 1 of 4) –– Tampering With or Fabricating Physical Evidence p. 1 of 6

Steven A. Leyh, Texas Bar No. 12318300, of LAYH & PAYNE, L.L.P., attorneys for
defendants, signed Defendant’s Amended Motion for Summary Judgment as to
Deed.

had in the note and the deed of trust. I filed with the court and provided a copy to
I obtained copies of the endorsed note and this letter from the law firm of LAYH &
LAYH & PAYNE, L.L.P. These documents were provided to me as part of the
discovery process of the lawsuit.
were readily available to him in files kept at the offices of LAYH & PAYNE, L.L.P.;
lawsuit in violation of Texas Penal Code §37.09:



Penal Code:
record;
record;



falsity;
of Texas Penal Code §38.12:
person:
to pursue;
...
committed:

agreement.

parties
Mr. Leyh’s choice to join with others in the furtherance of the conspiracy makes



guilty of the felony actually committed, though having no intent to
I charge that heretofore, and before the making and filing of this complaint, on or
about January 8, 2004 and within the boundaries of Galveston County, Texas,
Steven A. Leyh did then and there unlawfully and willfully violate Section 37.09
Texas Penal Code, against the peace and dignity of the State.
Sylvia Loredo (Charge 1 of 4) –– Aggravated Perjury p. 1 of 5

While this suit was ongoing and in connection with a foreclosure sale of the

sale and constitute a violation of Section 37.03 Texas Penal Code:
§37.02 Perjury
and Remedies Code.

(2) is material.
foreclosure process in violation of Section 37.09 Texas Penal Code:


record;
record;



falsity;
Ms. Loredo carried out her acts of aggravated purjury, fabrication of evidence, and
tampering with governmental records in agreement with and with aid of others in
violation of Section 15.02 Texas Penal Code:
committed:

agreement.

parties
...
Ms. Loredo’s choice to join with others in the furtherance of the conspiracy makes



Angela Taylor (Charge 1 of 3) – Tampering With Governmental Record p. 1 of 5
following information:
On August 31, 2007, I went the Galveston County Courthouse to deliver a set of
th
criminal complaints to a magistrate. I went to the 10 District Court with Judge
David E. Garner.
When I arrived at around 9:40 am, there were various criminal hearings taking
place. I waited until those cases were finished. One of the court personnel, who I
believe is the court reporter, came and asked my name and if I had a case in the
court. I explained that I had some brief business needing the attention of the court.
She relayed my information to the judge.
The judge came down from his bench and called me forward. I crossed the bar and
met with him. He inquired about why I was there. I explained that I was a witness
to crimes and that I was bringing criminal complaints to him as a magistrate. He
began to give various reasons why he couldn’t take the complaint and offered to
escort me to the District Attorney’s office to submit them. I agreed.
We went to the District Attorney’s office and after making our presence known one
of the attorneys came out to meet us. Judge Garner explained the situation to her. I
handed my folder of complaints to her, and Judge Garner left. I asked if she had a
card. She said that she did not have a card with her. I asked her name again, and
she replied Angela Taylor. I wrote her name down.
She began to explain how the District Attorney’s office does not accept complaints
and that the complaints need to go to the police or some other law enforcement
agency for investigation before they are taken up by the District Attorney’s office.
However, I knew that such a policy is not consistent with the duties imposed on
attorneys for the state by Articles 2.04 and 2.05 of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure:
Art.2.04. [28] [34] [35] Shall draw complaints

Upon complaint being made before a district or county attorney that an offense
has been committed in his district or county, he shall reduce the complaint to
writing and cause the same to be signed and sworn to by the complainant, and it
shall be duly attested by said attorney.
Acts 1965, 59th Leg., vol. 2, p. 317, ch. 722.
Art.2.05. [29] [35] [36] When complaint is made

If the offense be a misdemeanor, the attorney shall forthwith prepare an

information based upon such complaint and file the same in the court having
jurisdiction; provided, that in counties having no county attorney,
misdemeanor cases may be tried upon complaint alone, without an information,
provided, however, in counties having one or more criminal district courts an
information must be filed in each misdemeanor case. If the offense be a felony,
he shall forthwith file the complaint with a magistrate of the county.
Acts 1965, 59th Leg., vol. 2, p. 317, ch. 722.
I told Ms. Taylor that she could have the police investigate, and I began to leave.
She tried to make me take the folder back. I told her that the documents had been
delivered to government and that they were then governmental records that I could
not have. Governmental record is defined in the Texas Penal Code at §37.01 (2):
(2) "Governmental record" means:

(A) anything belonging to, received by, or kept by government
for information, including a court record;
…
Ms. Taylor followed me to the door while insisting that I take the complaints back.
When I opened the door, she tossed the folder with the criminal complaints through
the doorway and onto the floor of the hallway outside. Ms. Taylor then made
herself unavailable by retreating back into the restricted area of the District
Attorney’s office from which she had come.
I picked up the folder and complaints and took them back home with me where I
began preparing complaints against Ms. Taylor. I decided to take Ms. Taylor’s
advice, and on September 4, 2007 I took all of the complaints to the Galveston Police
Department. An officer met with me and took my statement and the complaints.
He indicated that an investigator would be assigned the next day and that he would
probably give me a phone call around noon the next day.
The next day I found a phone message from Sergeant John Owens informing me
that he had been assigned to the case with my complaints, and he asked me to give
him a call. I spoke with Sergeant Owens on September 7th. I asked if there was
anything that I could do to help. He said that he had put a call into the DA’s office
about this case, and he was waiting for a call back. I asked if he had any kind of
estimate of how long things might take. He said a while, a long while.
This short conversation demonstrates the problem of district attorneys not strictly
adhering to the duty imposed by Article 2.05 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The police investigation of these cases is paused for a phone call from the district
attorney’s office, which may never come in this case. This policy of not accepting
criminal complaints from the public in the district attorney’s office goes against the
duties imposed by laws passed by the Texas Legislature, and it makes the district
attorney’s office more susceptible to political pressure and other undue influence to
use its “discretion” in proceeding with the prosecution of certain cases. The police
get blamed for not investigating while the police are waiting for the go ahead from
the district attorney’s office. The Legislature’s enactment of Articles 2.04 and 2.05
of the Code of Criminal Procedure shows that no such discretion has been provided
to Texas prosecutors.
The situation is created where there are no records in the district attorney’s office to
indicate that that office failed to perform any duty. Generally, someone at the
district attorney’s office convinces a complaining witness to take his or her records
and statements some place else. In this particular case, though, I refused to do so,
and Ms. Taylor took the only course of action that she could conceive at the moment
to enforce the policy of the district attorney’s office and remove those records from
the office.
Ms. Taylor’s position as an experienced Assistant Criminal District Attorney in the

Felony Division of the Galveston County Criminal District Attorney’s office shows
that she is thoroughly knowledgeable of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Penal
Code. That she took such action with formal written sworn and notarized criminal
complaints that she had just received shows that she violated Section 37.10 of the
Texas Penal Code:

…
I had previously mailed sworn criminal complaints to the members of a grand jury
in Galveston County in care of the Galveston County Criminal District Attorney in
September of 2006. The certified mail receipt was returned to me showing that the
package of complaints was received at the district attorney’s office. In July of 2007
I obtained a copy of an affidavit made by attorney Steven A. Leyh in which he
indicated that the Section Chief of the Grand Jury was unaware of those criminal
complaints. This indicated to me that someone in the Criminal District Attorney’s
office was interfering with those criminal complaints being delivered to the grand
jury; the probable purpose being to protect various public officials, attorneys and
others accused in those complaints. Ms. Taylor’s actions showed that she had joined
in this criminal conspiracy to conceal certain criminal complaints from the grand
jury in violation of Texas Penal Code Sec. 15.02:
committed:

agreement.

parties
Ms. Taylor’s choice to join with others in the furtherance of the conspiracy makes
§7.01 Parties to Offenses


abolished by this section, and each party to an offense may be charged and
§7.02 Criminal Responsibility for Conduct of Another

(1) acting with the kind of culpability required for the offense, he
causes or aids an innocent or nonresponsible person to engage in
conduct prohibited by the definition of the offense;
(2) acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the

offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid
the other person to commit the offense; or
(3) having a legal duty to prevent commission of the offense and

acting with intent to promote or assist its commission, he fails to
make a reasonable effort to prevent commission of the offense.
(b) If, in the attempt to carry out a conspiracy to commit one felony,
another felony is committed by one of the conspirators, all
conspirators are guilty of the felony actually committed, though
Exhibit K
Response made on behalf of the Galveston County Criminal District Attorney to a Public
Information Request, which shows that the criminal complaints identified in Exhibit I have not
been filed with a magistrate of the county.
Exhibit K

Complaint To AG

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Complaint To AG

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

P.O.

August 15, 2008

Office of the Attorney General

Dear Sir or Madam

Eventually, I prepared a number, 58, of formal criminal complaints describing the

2. the failure of the Galveston County Criminal District Attorney’s Office to

Affidavit of Danny Royce Murphy.

Affidavit of Danny Royce Murphy

Affidavit of attorney Steven A. Leyh, paragraph 5 of which is relevant to this complaint.

Information from the State Bar website............................................................................... Tab G-1

Information from the Fourteenth Court of Appeals website................................................ Tab G-2

Information indicating that in 1999 Richard H. Branson acted as appellate counsel

Home About the State Bar Member Directory

Richard Hugh Branson

Bar Card Number*: 02899200

Work Address PO Box 1534

Work Phone Number (281) 316-2233

Primary Practice LEAGUE CITY , Texas

Current Member Status

Assistance available in languages:

Public Disciplinary History - Texas*:

Public Disciplinary History - Other:

Back to search results

Home Calendar Shopping Cart Contact Us Site Map

© 1996-2008 State Bar of Texas. Privacy Policy Disclaimer Advertise With Us

Click here to return to this week's opinions.

Opinions delivered on October 28, 1999:

14-97-01206-CV In the Matter of Jon Grafton Hawk, Sr., Deceased

14-98-00293-CV Glenda Davis Andress, et al.

For appellee: H. Kent Twining, John B. Wallace, and Linda J. Cole

14-98-00464-CV Roy Stallman, et al.

14-95-00606-CV Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation

14-98-00148-CV Ronald Gene Nachtman

14-98-00322-CV Regina Hardy Smith

Opinion by: Hon. Richard H. Edelman

14-98-00429-CV Vicente R. Velasquez

14-98-00847-CV City of Houston

14-98-01163-CV Donald Eubanks

14-98-01413-CV A.V.W., Inc.

14-99-00557-CV Ann Elizabeth Webb and Paul LeRoy Crist

14-99-00694-CV Joan K. Galway

DISMISSED (Per curiam)

14-99-01092-CV Angela Ratisseau

14-99-01107-CV Magdalena Adamski Sullins

No published opinions were issued this week.

14-97-00515-CR Stephen Mark Triplett

14-97-00658-CR John Albert Cook

14-97-00857-CR Marlous Barnard Ferguson

14-97-00887-CR Henry Dee Gilmore, III

14-97-01062-CR Garrick Deon Beck

14-97-01200-CR Willie James Johnson

14-97-01223-CR Mike Rivera Hernandez

14-97-01250-CR Aracelia Zamora

14-97-01283-CR Terry Bradley Dickson

14-97-01295-CR Sergio Escobar

14-97-01369-CR Clayton John Guillory

14-98-00060-CR Demetrio Lopez

14-98-00064-CR Anthony Shiner

14-98-00069-CR Michael Glenn Erskine

14-98-00737-CR Curtis Sheard

14-98-00895-CR Edward George Lewis

14-99-00192-CR Juan Calvillo Barron

14-99-00353-CR Robert Clayton Swanson