Tanada vs Angara, 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997

Facts : This is a petition seeking to nulliIy the Philippine ratiIication oI the World Trade
Organization (WTO) Agreement. Petitioners question the concurrence oI herein respondents
acting in their capacities as Senators via signing the said agreement.

The WTO opens access to Ioreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the
reduction oI tariIIs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides
new opportunities Ior the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more
investment in the country. These are the predicted beneIits as reIlected in the agreement and as
viewed by the signatory Senators, a 'Iree market espoused by WTO.

Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits, restricts and impair
Philippine economic sovereignty and legislative power. That the Filipino First policy oI the
Constitution was taken Ior granted as it gives Ioreign trading intervention.

Issue : Whether or not there has been a grave abuse oI discretion amounting to lack or excess oI
jurisdiction on the part oI the Senate in giving its concurrence oI the said WTO agreement.

Held: In its Declaration oI Principles and state policies, the Constitution 'adopts the generally
accepted principles oI international law as part oI the law oI the land, and adheres to the policy
oI peace, equality, justice, Ireedom, cooperation and amity , with all nations. By the doctrine oI
incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles oI international law, which
are considered automatically part oI our own laws. Pacta sunt servanda international
agreements must be perIormed in good Iaith. A treaty is not a mere moral obligation but creates a
legally binding obligation on the parties.
Through WTO the sovereignty oI the state cannot in Iact and reality be considered as absolute
because it is a regulation oI commercial relations among nations. Such as when Philippines
joined the United Nations (UN) it consented to restrict its sovereignty right under the 'concept oI
sovereignty as autolimitation. What Senate did was a valid exercise oI authority. As to
determine whether such exercise is wise, beneIicial or viable is outside the realm oI judicial
inquiry and review. The act oI signing the said agreement is not a legislative restriction as WTO
allows withdrawal oI membership should this be the political desire oI a member. Also, it should
not be viewed as a limitation oI economic sovereignty. WTO remains as the only viable structure
Ior multilateral trading and the veritable Iorum Ior the development oI international trade law. Its
alternative is isolation, stagnation iI not economic selI-destruction. Thus, the people be allowed,
through their duly elected oIIicers, make their Iree choice.
Petition is DISMISSED Ior lack oI merit.




CCMMlSlCnL8 Cl CuS1CMS vS LAS1L8n
Treaties vs Executive Agreements

EST was a shipping company charged in the importation Irom Japan oI onion and garlic into the
Philippines. In 1956, the Commissioner oI Customs ordered the seizure and IorIeiture oI the
import goods because EST was not able to comply with Central Bank Circulars 44 and 45. The
said circulars were pursuant to EO 328 w/c sought to regulate the importation oI such non-dollar
goods Irom Japan (as there was a Trade and Financial Agreement b/n the Philippines and Japan
then). EST questioned the validity oI the said EO averring that the said EO was never concurred
upon by the Senate. The issue was elevated to the Court oI Tax Appeals and the latter ruled in
Iavor oI EST. The Commissioner appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the EO is subject to the concurrence oI at least 2/3 oI the Senate.

HELD: No, executive Agreements are not like treaties which are subject to the concurrence oI at
least 2/3 oI the members oI the Senate. Agreements concluded by the President which Iall short
oI treaties are commonly reIerred to as executive agreements and are no less common in our
scheme oI government than are the more Iormal instruments treaties and conventions. They
sometimes take the Iorm oI exchanges oI notes and at other times that oI more Iormal documents
denominated 'agreements' or 'protocols'. The point where ordinary correspondence between this
and other governments ends and agreements whether denominated executive agreements or
exchanges oI notes or otherwise begin, may sometimes be diIIicult oI ready ascertainment. It
would be useless to undertake to discuss here the large variety oI executive agreements as such,
concluded Irom time to time. Hundreds oI executive agreements, other than those entered into
under the trade- agreements act, have been negotiated with Ioreign governments. . . . It would
seem to be suIIicient, in order to show that the trade agreements under the act oI 1934 are not
anomalous in character, that they are not treaties, and that they have abundant precedent in our
history, to reIer to certain classes oI agreements heretoIore entered into by the Executive without
the approval oI the Senate. They cover such subjects as the inspection oI vessels, navigation
dues, income tax on shipping proIits, the admission oI civil aircraIt, customs matters, and
commercial relations generally, international claims, postal matters, the registration oI trade-
marks and copyrights, etc. Some oI them were concluded not by speciIic congressional
authorization but in conIormity with policies declared in acts oI Congress with respect to the
general subject matter, such as tariII acts; while still others, particularly those with respect to the
settlement oI claims against Ioreign governments, were concluded independently oI any
legislation.

USAFFE v. Treasurer of the Philippines (1959)
USAFFE VETERANS ASSOCIATION, INC. v TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET.
AL. (June 30, 1959) Appeal Irom a judgment oI the CFI oI Manila

FACTS:
Romulo-Snyder Agreement (1950): RP Govt undertook to return to the US Govt in 10 annual
installments, a total oI about $35M advanced by the US to, but unexpended by, the Nat`l DeIense
Forces oI the RP.
Oct 1954: The UsaIIe Veterans Associations Inc prayed in its complaint beIore the CFI that
said Agreement be annulled; that payments thereunder be declared illegal; & that deIendants as
oIIicers oI RP be restrained Irom disbursing any Iunds in the Nat`l Treasury in pursuance oI said
Agreement.
UsaIIe Veterans Iurther asked that the moneys available, instead oI being remitted to the US,
should be turned over to the Finance Service oI the AFP Ior the payment oI all pending claims oI
the veterans represented by plaintiII.
3 PROPOSITIONS OF PLAINTIFF IN COMPLAINT: 1) that the Iunds to be 'returned under
the Agreement were Iunds appropriated by the US Congress Ior the RP Army, actually delivered
to the RP Govt & actually owned by the said Government; 2) that U.S Secretary Snyder oI the
Treasury, had no authority to retake such Iunds Irom the RP Govt; 3) The RP Foreign Secretary
Carlos P. Romulo had no authority to return or promise to return the aIoresaid sums oI money
through the Agreement.
The court eventually upheld the validity oI the Agreement. PlaintiII appealed.
July 26, 1941: Foreseeing the War in the PaciIic, Pres Roosevelt, called into the service oI the
US Armed Forces, Ior the duration oI the emergency, all organized mil Iorces oI the
Commonwealth. (His order was published here by Proc No 740 oI Pres Quezon on Aug 10,
1941)
October 1941: By 2 special orders, MacArthur, Commanding Gen oI USAFFE, placed under
his command all the RP Army units including Phil Constabulary.
Thus, US Congress provided in its Appropriation Act oI Dec 17, 1941 (Public Law No. 353):
'For all expenses necessary Ior the mobilization, operation & maintenance oI the RP Army,
including expenses connected w/ calling into the service RP mil Iorces.$269,000.00; to remain
available til June 30, 1943, w/c shall be available Ior payment to the Commonwealth upon its
written request, either in advance oI or in reimbursement Ior all or any part oI the estimated or
actual costs, as authorized by the USAFFE Commanding Gen, oI the necessary expenses Ior the
purposes aIoresaid.
Pursuant to the power reserved to him under Public Law 353, Roosevelt issued EO 9011: '2(a)
Necessary expenditures Irom Iunds in the Phil Treasury Ior the purposes authorized by Public
Law 353, will be made by disbursing oIIicers oI the RP Army on the approval oI authority oI the
Commandign General, USAFFE, & such purposes as he may deem proper.
P570,863,000.00 was transIerred directly to the AFP by means oI vouchers w/c stated
'Advance oI Funds under Public Law 353 & EO 9011 This was used mostly to discharge in RP
the monetary obligations assumed by the US as a result oI the induction oI the AFP into the US
Army, & its operations beginning in 1941.
There remained unexpended & uncommitted $35M in the possession oI the AFP as oI Dec 31,
1949. Bec the RP Govt then badly needed Iunds, Pres Quirino, through CB Gov Cuaderno,
proposed to US oIIicials the retention oI the $35M as a loan, & Ior its repayment in 10 annual
installments. This was the Romulo-Snyder Agreement, signed in Washington on Nov 6, 1950 by
RP Foreign AIIairs Sec Romulo, & US Sec oI Treasury, John Snyder.
PRESENT ACTION: UsaIIe`s arguments 1) the money delivered by the US to the AFP were
straight payments Ior mil services; ownership thus vested in RP Govt upon delivery, &
consequently, there was nothing to return, nothing to consider as a loan; 2) the Agreement was
void bec there was no loan to be repaid & bec it was not binding on the RP Govt Ior lack oI
authority oI the oIIicers who concluded it.

ISSUES
Basic issue: Validity oI the Romulo-Snyder Agreement Court can`t pass judgment
1. WON there is obligation to repay - YES
2. WON the oIIicers who promised to repay had authority to bind this Govt YES

RATIO:

1. YES
Note that the $269M appropriated in Public Law 353 (see 8th bullet) expressly said that the
money is to be handed to the RP Govt either in advance oI or in reimbursement thereoI.
In any system oI accounting, advances oI Iunds Ior expenditures contemplate disbursements to
be reported, & credited iI approved, against such advances, the unexpended sums to be returned
later. Congressional law itselI required accounting 'in the manner prescribed by US Pres - & said
Pres in EO 9011, outlined the procedure whereby advanced Iunds shall be accounted Ior.
It also requires as a condition sine qua non that all expenditures shall Iirst be approved by the
USAFFE Commanding Gen.
These ideas oI 'Iunds advanced to meet expenditures oI the Phil Army as may be approved by
the USAFFE Comm-Gen, in connection w/ the accounting requirement, evidently contradict
appellant`s thesis that the moneys represented straight payments to RP Govt Ior its armed
services, & passed into the absolute control oI such Govt
Instead oI returning such amount into one lump sum, our Exec Dept arranged Ior its repayment
in 10 annual installments. Prima Iacie such arrangement should raise no valid objection, given
the obligation to return.

2. YES (They have authority to bind Govt even w/o Senate concurrence)
There is no doubt Pres Quirino approved the negotiations. And he had the power to contract
budgetary loans under RA 213, amending RA 16.
The most impt argument, however, rests on the lack oI ratiIication oI the Agreement by RP
Senate to make it binding on the Govt.
The II explanation oI the deIendant was considered persuasive by the Court.
7 The agreement is not a treaty` as that term is used in CONSTI. However, a treaty is not the
only Iorm that an int`l agreement may assume. For the grant oI treatymaking power to the
Executive & the Senate does not exhaust the power oI the govt over int`l relations.
Executive agreements may be entered into w/ other states7 & are eIIective even w/o
concurrence oI Senate.
7 In int`l law, there`s no diIIerence bet`n treaties & executive agreements in their binding eIIect
upon states concerned as long as the negotiating Iunctionaries have remained w/n their powers.
The distinction bet`n executive agreements7 & treaties is purely a const`l one & has not int`l
legal signiIicance.
7 Altman v. US: An int`l compact negotiated bet`n the reps oI 2 sovereign nations & made in the
name or behalI oI the contracting parties & dealing w/ impt commercial rel`ns bet`n the 2
countries, is a treaty both internationally although as an executive agreement it is not technically
a treaty requiring the advice & consent oI the Senate
7 2 classes oI Executive Agreements: 1) agreements made purely as executive acts aIIecting
external relations & independent oI or w/o legislative authorization, w/c may be termed as pres`l
agreements; 2) agreements entered into in pursuance oI acts oI Cong, w/c have been designated
as Congressional-Executive Agreements
The Romulo-Snyder7 Agreement may Iall under any oI these 2 classes Ior on Sept 18, 1946, RP
Congress authorized the RP Pres to obtain such loans or incur such indebtedness w/ the US.
Even granting there`s no leg authorization,7 the Agreement was legally & validly entered into to
conIorm to the 2nd category, namely, as agreements entered into purely as executive acts w/o leg
authorization`, w/c usu includes money agreements.
The Agreement was not submitted to the US Senate either. But the Phil Senate`s Resolution
No. 15 practically admits the validity & binding Iorce oI such Agreement.
Further, the acts oI Congress appropriating Iunds Ior the yearly installments necessary to
comply w/ such Agreement constitute a ratiIication thereoI, W/C PLACES THE QUESTION OF
VALIDITY OUT OF THE COURT`S REACH, NO CONST`L PRINCIPLE HAVING BEEN
INVOKED TO RESTRICT CONGRESS` PLENARY POEWR TO APPROPRIATE FUNDS
LOAN OR NO LOAN.

HELD: PlaintiII Iailed to make a clear case Ior the relieI demanded. Petition DENIED


ase Digest on Bayan v. Zamora {Visiting Forces Agreement] C.R. NU.
8 {Uctober . ]
November 10, 2010

The Visiting Forces Agreement, Ior which Senate concurrence was sought and received on May
27, 1999, is the subject oI a number oI Constitutional challenges.
Issue 1: Do the Petitioners have legal standing as concerned citizens, taxpayers, or legislators to
question the constitutionality oI the VFA?
Petitioners Bayan Muna, etc. have no standing. A party bringing a suit challenging the
Constitutionality oI a law must show not only that the law is invalid, but that he has sustained or
is in immediate danger oI sustaining some direct injury as a result oI its enIorcement, and not
merely that he suIIers thereby in some indeIinite way. Petitioners have Iailed to show that they
are in any danger oI direct injury as a result oI the VFA.
As taxpayers, they have Iailed to establish that the VFA involves the exercise by Congress oI its
taxing or spending powers. A taxpayer`s suit reIers to a case where the act complained oI
directly involves the illegal disbursement oI public Iunds derived Irom taxation. BeIore he can
invoke the power oI judicial review, he must speciIically prove that he has suIIicient interest in
preventing the illegal expenditure oI money raised by taxation and that he will sustain a direct
injury as a result oI the enIorcement oI the questioned statute or contract. It is not suIIicient that
he has merely a general interest common to all members oI the public. Clearly, inasmuch as no
public Iunds raised by taxation are involved in this case, and in the absence oI any allegation by
petitioners that public Iunds are being misspent or illegally expended, petitioners, as taxpayers,
have no legal standing to assail the legality oI the VFA.
Similarly, the petitioner-legislators (Tanada, Arroyo, etc.) do not possess the requisite locus
standi to sue. In the absence oI a clear showing oI any direct injury to their person or to the
institution to which they belong, they cannot sue. The Integrated Bar oI the Philippines (IBP) is
also stripped oI standing in these cases. The IBP lacks the legal capacity to bring this suit in the
absence oI a board resolution Irom its Board oI Governors authorizing its National President to
commence the present action.
Notwithstanding, in view oI the paramount importance and the constitutional signiIicance oI the
issues raised, the Court may brush aside the procedural barrier and takes cognizance oI the
petitions.
Issue 2: Is the VFA governed by section 21, Art. VII, or section 25, Art. XVIII oI the
Constitution?
Section 25, Art XVIII, not section 21, Art. VII, applies, as the VFA involves the presence oI
Ioreign military troops in the Philippines.
The Constitution contains two provisions requiring the concurrence oI the Senate on treaties or
international agreements. Section 21, Article VII reads: '|n|o treaty or international agreement
shall be valid and eIIective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds oI all the Members oI the
Senate. Section 25, Article XVIII, provides:|a|Iter the expiration in 1991 oI the Agreement
between the Republic oI the Philippines and the United States oI America concerning Military
Bases, Ioreign military bases, troops, or Iacilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except
under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratiIied by a
majority oI the votes cast by the people in a national reIerendum held Ior that purpose, and
recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.
Section 21, Article VII deals with treaties or international agreements in general, in which case,
the concurrence oI at least two-thirds (2/3) oI all the Members oI the Senate is required to make
the treaty valid and binding to the Philippines. This provision lays down the general rule on
treaties. All treaties, regardless oI subject matter, coverage, or particular designation or
appellation, requires the concurrence oI the Senate to be valid and eIIective.
In contrast, Section 25, Article XVIII is a special provision that applies to treaties which involve
the presence oI Ioreign military bases, troops or Iacilities in the Philippines. Under this
provision, the concurrence oI the Senate is only one oI the requisites to render compliance with
the constitutional requirements and to consider the agreement binding on the Philippines. Sec 25
Iurther requires that 'Ioreign military bases, troops, or Iacilities may be allowed in the
Philippines only by virtue oI a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate, ratiIied by a majority oI
the votes cast in a national reIerendum held Ior that purpose iI so required by Congress, and
recognized as such by the other contracting state.
On the whole, the VFA is an agreement which deIines the treatment oI US troops visiting the
Philippines. It provides Ior the guidelines to govern such visits oI military personnel, and Iurther
deIines the rights oI the US and RP government in the matter oI criminal jurisdiction, movement
oI vessel and aircraIt, import and export oI equipment, materials and supplies.
Undoubtedly, Section 25, Article XVIII, which speciIically deals with treaties involving Ioreign
military bases, troops, or Iacilities, should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent, however,
the provisions oI Section 21, Article VII will Iind applicability with regard to determining the
number oI votes required to obtain the valid concurrence oI the Senate.
It is specious to argue that Section 25, Article XVIII is inapplicable to mere transient agreements
Ior the reason that there is no permanent placing oI structure Ior the establishment oI a military
base. The Constitution makes no distinction between 'transient and 'permanent. We Iind
nothing in Section 25, Article XVIII that requires Ioreign troops or Iacilities to be stationed or
placed permanently in the Philippines. When no distinction is made by law; the Court should not
distinguish. We do not subscribe to the argument that Section 25, Article XVIII is not controlling
since no Ioreign military bases, but merely Ioreign troops and Iacilities, are involved in the VFA.
The proscription covers 'Ioreign military bases, troops, or Iacilities. Stated diIIerently, this
prohibition is not limited to the entry oI troops and Iacilities without any Ioreign bases being
established. The clause does not reIer to 'Ioreign military bases, troops, or Iacilities collectively
but treats them as separate and independent subjects, such that three diIIerent situations are
contemplated a military treaty the subject oI which could be either (a) Ioreign bases, (b)
Ioreign troops, or (c) Ioreign Iacilities any oI the three standing alone places it under the
coverage oI Section 25, Article XVIII.
Issue 3: Was Sec 25 Art XVIII`s requisites satisIied to make the VFA eIIective?
Section 25, Article XVIII disallows Ioreign military bases, troops, or Iacilities in the country,
unless the Iollowing conditions are suIIiciently met: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty
must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by Congress, ratiIied by a
majority oI the votes cast by the people in a national reIerendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty
by the other contracting state. There is no dispute as to the presence oI the Iirst two requisites in
the case oI the VFA. The concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in
accordance with the Constitution, as there were at least 16 Senators that concurred.
As to condition (c), the Court held that the phrase 'recognized as a treaty means that the other
contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the US to submit
the VFA to the US Senate Ior concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict
meaning to the phrase. Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution
are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, in which case
the signiIicance thus attached to them prevails. Its language should be understood in the sense
they have in common use.
The records reveal that the US Government, through Ambassador Hubbard, has stated that the
US has Iully committed to living up to the terms oI the VFA. For as long as the US accepts or
acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itselI Iurther to comply with its treaty obligations,
there is indeed compliance with the mandate oI the Constitution.
Worth stressing too, is that the ratiIication by the President oI the VFA, and the concurrence oI
the Senate, should be taken as a clear and unequivocal expression oI our nation`s consent to be
bound by said treaty, with the concomitant duty to uphold the obligations and responsibilities
embodied thereunder. RatiIication is generally held to be an executive act, undertaken by the
head oI the state, through which the Iormal acceptance oI the treaty is proclaimed. A State may
provide in its domestic legislation the process oI ratiIication oI a treaty. In our jurisdiction, the
power to ratiIy is vested in the President and not, as commonly believed, in the legislature. The
role oI the Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the
ratiIication.
WlLh Lhe raLlflcaLlon of Lhe vlA lL now becomes obllgaLory and lncumbenL on our parL under prlnclples
of lnLernaLlonal law (pacLa sunL servanda) Lo be bound by Lhe Lerms of Lhe agreemenL 1hus no less
Lhan SecLlon 2 ArLlcle ll declares LhaL Lhe hlllpplnes adopLs Lhe generally accepLed prlnclples of
lnLernaLlonal law as parL of Lhe law of Lhe land and adheres Lo Lhe pollcy of peace equallLy [usLlce
freedom cooperaLlon and amlLy wlLh all naLlons





ABAYA vs. EBDANE
Facts:

The Government oI Japan and the Government oI the Philippines, through their respective
representatives, namely, Mr. Yoshihisa Ara, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary oI
Japan to the Republic oI the Philippines, and then Secretary oI Foreign AIIairs Domingo L.
Siazon, have reached an understanding concerning Japanese loans to be extended to the
Philippines. These loans were aimed at promoting our country`s economic stabilization and
development eIIorts.

The assailed resolution recommended the award to private respondent China Road & Bridge
Corporation oI the contract Ior the implementation oI civil works Ior Contract Package No. I (CP
I), which consists oI the improvement/rehabilitation oI the San Andres (Codon)-Virac-Jct. Bago-
Viga road, with the length oI 79.818 kilometers, in the island province oI Catanduanes.The
DPWH caused the publication oI the 'Invitation to PrequaliIy and to Bid Ior the implementation
oI the CP I project, in two leading national newspapers, namely, the Manila Times and Manila
Standard on November 22 and 29, and December 5, 2002.

A total oI twenty-three (23) Ioreign and local contractors responded to the invitation by
submitting their accomplished prequaliIication documents on January 23, 2003. In accordance
with the established prequaliIication criteria, eight contractors were evaluated or considered
eligible to bid as concurred by the JBIC. Prior to the opening oI the respective bid proposals, it
was announced that the Approved Budget Ior the Contract (ABC) was in the amount oI
P738,710,563.67.

The bid goes to private respondent China Road & Bridge Corporation was corrected Irom the
original P993,183,904.98 (with variance oI 34.45 Irom the ABC) to P952,564,821.71 (with
variance oI 28.95 Irom the ABC) based on their letter clariIication dated April 21, 2004.

The petitioners anchor the instant petition on the contention that the award oI the contract to
private respondent China Road & Bridge Corporation violates RA 9184, particularly Section 31
thereoI which reads:

SEC. 31. Ceiling Ior Bid Prices. The ABC shall be the upper limit or ceiling Ior the Bid prices.
Bid prices that exceed this ceiling shall be disqualiIied outright Irom Iurther participating in the
bidding. There shall be no lower limit to the amount oI the award.

The petitioners insist that Loan Agreement is neither an international nor an executive agreement
that would bar the application oI RA 9184. They point out that to be considered a treaty, an
international or an executive agreement, the parties must be two sovereigns or States whereas in
the case oI Loan Agreement No. PH-P204, the parties are the Philippine Government and the
JBIC, a banking agency oI Japan, which has a separate juridical personality Irom the Japanese
Government.

The respondents however contend that Ioreign loan agreements, including Loan Agreement No.
PH-P204, as executive agreements and, as such, should be observed pursuant to the Iundamental
principle in international law oI pacta sunt servanda. The Constitution, the public respondents
emphasize, recognizes the enIorceability oI executive agreements in the same way that it
recognizes generally accepted principles oI international law as Iorming part oI the law oI the
land.34 This recognition allegedly buttresses the binding eIIect oI executive agreements to which
the Philippine Government is a signatory. It is pointed out by the public respondents that
executive agreements are essentially contracts governing the rights and obligations oI the parties.
A contract, being the law between the parties, must be IaithIully adhered to by them. Guided by
the Iundamental rule oI pacta sunt servanda, the Philippine Government bound itselI to perIorm
in good Iaith its duties and obligations under Loan Agreement.


Issue :

Whether or not the the loan agreement violates RA 9184.


Ruling:

The court ruled in Iavor oI the respondents.

SigniIicantly, an exchange oI notes is considered a Iorm oI an executive agreement, which
becomes binding through executive action without the need oI a vote by the Senate or Congress.
executive agreements, They sometimes take the Iorm oI exchange oI notes and at other times that
oI more Iormal documents denominated 'agreements or 'protocols.

The Iundamental principle oI international law oI pacta sunt servanda, which is, in Iact,
embodied in Section 4 oI RA 9184 as it provides that '|a|ny treaty or international or executive
agreement aIIecting the subject matter oI this Act to which the Philippine government is a
signatory shall be observed, the DPWH, as the executing agency oI the projects Iinanced by
Loan Agreement No. PH-P204, rightIully awarded the contract Ior the implementation oI civil
works Ior the CP I project to private respondent China Road & Bridge Corporation.


Province of North Cotabato vs GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain
ester abal:a recommends is visitors to please read te original & full text of te case cited.
Xie xie'

Province of North Cotabato vs GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain
C.R. Ao. 1833591,
October 14, 28

Decision:

RPIO MOR$, 1.:

$ubfect of tese consolidated cases is te extent of te powers of te President in pursuing te
peace process. Wile te facts surrounding tis controversy center on te armed conflict in
Mindanao between te government and te Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), te legal
issue involved as a bearing on all areas in te country were tere as been a long-standing
armed conflict. Yet again, te ourt is tasked to perform a delicate balancing act. It must
uncompromisingly delineate te bounds witin wic te President may lawfully exercise er
discretion, but it must do so in strict aderence to te onstitution, lest its ruling unduly restricts
te freedom of action vested by tat same onstitution in te ief Executive precisely to enable
er to pursue te peace process effectively.


Facts:

On August 5, 2008, the Government oI the Republic oI the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF,
through the Chairpersons oI their respective peace negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a
Memorandum oI Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect oI the GRP-MILF
Tripoli Agreement on Peace oI 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

The signing oI the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF was not to materialize, however,
Ior upon motion oI petitioners, speciIically those who Iiled their cases beIore the scheduled
signing oI the MOA-AD, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the GRP
Irom signing the same.

The MOA-AD was preceded by a long process oI negotiation and the concluding oI several prior
agreements between the two parties beginning in 1996, when the GRP-MILF peace negotiations
began. On July 18, 1997, the GRP and MILF Peace Panels signed the Agreement on General
Cessation oI Hostilities. The Iollowing year, they signed the General Framework oI Agreement
oI Intent on August 27, 1998.

On July 23, 2008, the Province oI North Cotabato and Vice-Governor Emmanuel Piol Iiled a
petition, docketed as G.R. No. 183591, Ior Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer Ior the
Issuance oI Writ oI Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Invoking the right
to inIormation on matters oI public concern, petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose
and Iurnish them the complete and oIIicial copies oI the MOA-AD including its attachments, and
to prohibit the slated signing oI the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure oI the contents oI the
MOA-AD and the holding oI a public consultation thereon. Supplementarily, petitioners pray
that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional.

Issues:

1. Whether the petitions have become moot and academic

(i) insoIar as the mandamus aspect is concerned, in view oI the disclosure oI oIIicial copies oI
the Iinal draIt oI the Memorandum oI Agreement (MOA); and

(ii) insoIar as the prohibition aspect involving the Local Government Units is concerned, iI it is
considered that consultation has become Iait accompli with the Iinalization oI the draIt;

2. Whether the constitutionality and the legality oI the MOA is ripe Ior adjudication;

3. Whether respondent Government oI the Republic oI the Philippines Peace Panel committed
grave abuse oI discretion amounting to lack or excess oI jurisdiction when it negotiated and
initiated the MOA vis-a-vis ISSUES Nos. 4 and 5;

4. Whether there is a violation oI the people's right to inIormation on matters oI public concern
(1987 Constitution, Article III, Sec. 7) under a state policy oI Iull disclosure oI all its transactions
involving public interest (1987 Constitution, Article II, Sec. 28) including public consultation
under Republic Act No. 7160 (LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991)|;|

II it is in the aIIirmative, whether prohibition under Rule 65 oI the 1997 Rules oI Civil Procedure
is an appropriate remedy;

5. Whether by signing the MOA, the Government oI the Republic oI the Philippines would be
BINDING itselI

a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a
juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;

b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conIorm to the MOA;

c) to concede to or recognize the claim oI the Moro Islamic Liberation Front Ior ancestral
domain in violation oI Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT
OF 1997), particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION, RECOGNITION OF
ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)|;|

II in the aIIirmative, whether the Executive Branch has the authority to so bind the Government
oI the Republic oI the Philippines;

6. Whether the inclusion/exclusion oI the Province oI North Cotabato, Cities oI Zamboanga,
Iligan and Isabela, and the Municipality oI Linamon, Lanao del Norte in/Irom the areas covered
by the projected Bangsamoro Homeland is a justiciable question; and

7. Whether desistance Irom signing the MOA derogates any prior valid commitments oI the
Government oI the Republic oI the Philippines.

Held:

The main body oI the MOA-AD is divided into Iour strands, namely, Concepts and Principles,
Territory, Resources, and Governance.

The power oI judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies. Courts decline to issue
advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or Ieigned problems, or mere academic questions.
The limitation oI the power oI judicial review to actual cases and controversies deIines the role
assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation oI power, to assure that the courts will not
intrude into areas committed to the other branches oI government.

As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are oI paramount public interest or oI
transcendental importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and
intervening respondents the requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo.

Contrary to the assertion oI respondents that the non-signing oI the MOA-AD and the eventual
dissolution oI the GRP Peace Panel mooted the present petitions, the Court Iinds that the present
petitions provide an exception to the "moot and academic" principle in view oI (a) the grave
violation oI the Constitution involved; (b) the exceptional character oI the situation and
paramount public interest; (c) the need to Iormulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the
bar, and the public; and (d) the Iact that the case is capable oI repetition yet evading review.

The MOA-AD is a signiIicant part oI a series oI agreements necessary to carry out the GRP-
MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace signed by the government and the MILF back in June 2001.
Hence, the present MOA-AD can be renegotiated or another one drawn up that could contain
similar or signiIicantly dissimilar provisions compared to the original.

That the subject oI the inIormation sought in the present cases is a matter oI public concern Iaces
no serious challenge. In Iact, respondents admit that the MOA-AD is indeed oI public concern.
In previous cases, the Court Iound that the regularity oI real estate transactions entered in the
Register oI Deeds, the need Ior adequate notice to the public oI the various laws, the civil service
eligibility oI a public employee, the proper management oI GSIS Iunds allegedly used to grant
loans to public oIIicials, the recovery oI the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth, and the identity
oI party-list nominees, among others, are matters oI public concern. Undoubtedly, the MOA-AD
subject oI the present cases is oI public concern, involving as it does the sovereignty and
territorial integrity oI the State, which directly aIIects the lives oI the public at large.

In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse oI discretion when
he Iailed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic
Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The Iurtive process by which the MOA-AD was
designed and craIted runs contrary to and in excess oI the legal authority, and amounts to a
whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereoI. It illustrates a gross
evasion oI positive duty and a virtual reIusal to perIorm the duty enjoined.

The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its speciIic
provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned
between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, Ior the concept presupposes that the
associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.

The Memorandum oI Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect oI the GRP-MILF Tripoli
Agreement on Peace oI 2001 is declared contrary to law and the Constitution



CASE DIGEST
PImenteI vs. DffIce of the ExecutIve Secretary
July 6, 2005
%S:

ThIs Is a petItIon for mandamus fIled by petItIoners to compel the DffIce of the
ExecutIve Secretary and the 0epartment of ForeIgn AffaIrs to transmIt the sIgned copy
of the Fome Statute of the nternatIonal CrImInal Court to the Senate of the
PhIlIppInes for Its concurrence In accordance wIth SectIon 21, ArtIcle 7 of the 1987
ConstItutIon.

The Fome Statute establIshed the nternatIonal CrImInal Court whIch "shall have the
power to exercIse Its jurIsdIctIon over persons for the most serIous crImes of
InternatIonal concern xxx and shall be complementary to the natIonal crImInal
jurIsdIctIons." ts jurIsdIctIon covers the crIme of genocIde, crImes agaInst humanIty,
war crImes and the crIme of aggressIon as defIned In the Statute

The PhIlIppInes sIgned the Statute on 0ecember 28, 2000 through Charge d' AffaIrs
EnrIque A. |analo of the PhIlIppIne |IssIon to the UnIted NatIons. ts provIsIons,
however, requIre that It be subject to ratIfIcatIon, acceptance or approval of the
sIgnatory states

PetItIoners fIled the Instant petItIon to compel the respondents - the DffIce of the
ExecutIve Secretary and the 0epartment of ForeIgn AffaIrs - to transmIt the sIgned
text of the treaty to the Senate of the PhIlIppInes for ratIfIcatIon.

t Is the theory of the petItIoners that ratIfIcatIon of a treaty, under both domestIc
law and InternatIonal law, Is a functIon of the Senate. Hence, It Is the duty of the
executIve department to transmIt the sIgned copy of the Fome Statute to the Senate
to allow It to exercIse Its dIscretIon wIth respect to ratIfIcatIon of treatIes. |oreover,
petItIoners submIt that the PhIlIppInes has a mInIsterIal duty to ratIfy the Fome
Statute under treaty law and customary InternatIonal law. PetItIoners Invoke the
7Ienna ConventIon on the Law of TreatIes enjoInIng the states to refraIn from acts
whIch would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when they have sIgned the
treaty prIor to ratIfIcatIon unless they have made theIr IntentIon clear not to become
partIes to the treaty.

Fespondents argue that the executIve department has no duty to transmIt the Fome
Statute to the Senate for concurrence.
SSUE:

hether the ExecutIve Secretary and the 0epartment of ForeIgn AffaIrs have a
mInIsterIal duty to transmIt to the Senate the copy of the Fome Statute sIgned by a
member of the PhIlIppIne |IssIon to the UnIted NatIons even wIthout the sIgnature of
the PresIdent.
EL0:
SC rule In the negatIve.

n our system of government, the PresIdent, beIng the head of state, Is regarded as
the sole organ and authorIty In external relatIons and Is the country's sole
representatIve wIth foreIgn natIons. As the chIef archItect of foreIgn polIcy, the
PresIdent acts as the country's mouthpIece wIth respect to InternatIonal affaIrs.
Hence, the PresIdent Is vested wIth the authorIty to deal wIth foreIgn states and
governments, extend or wIthhold recognItIon, maIntaIn dIplomatIc relatIons, enter
Into treatIes, and otherwIse transact the busIness of foreIgn relatIons. n the reaIm of
treaty-makIng, the PresIdent has the soIe authorIty to negotIate wIth other states.

Nonetheless, whIle the PresIdent has the sole authorIty to negotIate and enter Into
treatIes, the ConstItutIon provIdes a lImItatIon to hIs power by requIrIng the
concurrence of 2/J of all the members of the Senate for the valIdIty of the treaty
entered Into by hIm. SectIon 21, ArtIcle 7 of the 1987 ConstItutIon provIdes that "no
treaty or InternatIonal agreement shall be valId and effectIve unless concurred In by
at least twothIrds of all the |embers of the Senate." The 19J5 and the 197J
ConstItutIon also requIred the concurrence by the legIslature to the treatIes entered
Into by the executIve. SectIon 10 (7), ArtIcle 7 of the 19J5 ConstItutIon provIded:

Sec. 10. (7) The PresIdent shall have the power, wIth the concurrence of twothIrds of
all the |embers of the Senate, to make treatIes xxx.

SectIon 14 (1) ArtIcle 7 of the 197J ConstItutIon stated:
Sec. 14. (1) Except as otherwIse provIded In thIs ConstItutIon, no treaty shall be valId
and effectIve unless concurred In by a majorIty of all the |embers of the 8atasang
Pambansa.

The partIcIpatIon of the legIslatIve branch In the treatymakIng process was deemed
essentIal to provIde a check on the executIve In the fIeId of foreIgn reIatIons. 8y
requIrIng the concurrence of the legIslature In the treatIes entered Into by the
PresIdent, the ConstItutIon ensures a healthy system of checks and balance necessary
In the natIon's pursuIt of polItIcal maturIty and growth.

n fIlIng thIs petItIon, the petItIoners Interpret SectIon 21, ArtIcle 7 of the 1987
ConstItutIon to mean that the power to ratIfy treatIes belongs to the Senate.

SC dIsagree.

JustIce saganI Cruz, In hIs book on nternatIonal Law, descrIbes the treatymakIng
process In thIs wIse:
The usual steps In the treatymakIng process are: negotIatIon, sIgnature,
ratIfIcatIon, and exchange of the Instruments of ratIfIcatIon. The treaty may then
be submItted for regIstratIon and publIcatIon under the U.N. Charter, although thIs
step Is not essentIal to the valIdIty of the agreement as between the partIes.

f and when the negotIators fInally decIde on the terms of the treaty, the same Is
opened for sIgnature. ThIs step Is prImarIIy Intended as a means of authentIcatIng
the Instrument and for the purpose of symbolIzIng the good faIth of the partIes; but,
sIgnIfIcantly, It does not IndIcate the fInaI consent of the state In cases where
ratIfIcatIon of the treaty Is requIred. The document Is ordInarIly sIgned In
accordance wIth the alternat, that Is, each of the several negotIators Is allowed to
sIgn fIrst on the copy whIch he wIll brIng home to hIs own state.

PatIfIcatIon, whIch Is the next step, Is the formaI act by whIch a state confIrms and
accepts the provIsIons of a treaty concIuded by Its representatIves. The purpose of
ratIfIcatIon Is to enable the contractIng states to examIne the treaty more closely and
to gIve them an opportunIty to refuse to be bound by It should they fInd It InImIcal to
theIr Interests. t Is for thIs reason that most treatIes are made subject to the scrutIny
and consent of a department of the government other than that whIch negotIated
them.

x x x

The last step In the treatymakIng process Is the exchange of the Instruments of
ratIfIcatIon, whIch usually also sIgnIfIes the effectIvIty of the treaty unless a dIfferent
date has been agreed upon by the partIes. here ratIfIcatIon Is dIspensed wIth and no
effectIvIty clause Is embodIed In the treaty, the Instrument Is deemed effectIve upon
Its sIgnature.

PetItIoners' arguments equate the sIgnIng of the treaty by the PhIlIppIne
representatIve wIth ratIfIcatIon. t should be underscored that the sIgnIng of the
treaty and the ratIfIcatIon are two separate and dIstInct steps In the treatymakIng
process. As earlIer dIscussed, the sIgnature Is prImarIly Intended as a means of
authentIcatIng the Instrument and as a symbol of the good faIth of the partIes. t Is
usually performed by the state's authorIzed representatIve In the dIplomatIc mIssIon.
PatIfIcatIon, on the other hand, Is the formal act by whIch a state confIrms and
accepts the provIsIons of a treaty concluded by Its representatIve. t Is generaIIy heId
to be an executIve act, undertaken by the head of the state or of the government.
Thus, ExecutIve Drder No. 459 Issued by PresIdent FIdel 7. Famos on November 25,
1997 provIdes the guIdelInes In the negotIatIon of InternatIonal agreements and Its
ratIfIcatIon. t mandates that after the treaty has been sIgned by the PhIlIppIne
representatIve, the same shall be transmItted to the 0epartment of ForeIgn AffaIrs.
The 0epartment of ForeIgn AffaIrs shall then prepare the ratIfIcatIon papers and
forward the sIgned copy of the treaty to the PresIdent for ratIfIcatIon. After the
PresIdent has ratIfIed the treaty, the 0epartment of ForeIgn AffaIrs shall submIt the
same to the Senate for concurrence. Upon receIpt of the concurrence of the Senate,
the 0epartment of ForeIgn AffaIrs shall comply wIth the provIsIons of the treaty to
render It effectIve.




CcL 19 2008
AKBAYAN vs. Aquino
Gk No 170S16 Iu|y 16 2008

O LA
O lplomaLlc negoLlaLlons are rlvlleged
O LxecuLlve rlvllege an LxcepLlon Lo Congress ower of lnqulry
O 1reaLymaklng ower
O LxecuLlve rlvllege vs eoples 8lghL Lo lnformaLlon

IAC1S

1hls ls regardlng Lhe LA Lhe bllaLeral free Lrade agreemenL raLlfled by Lhe resldenL wlLh apan
concernlng Lrade ln goods rules of orlgln cusLoms procedures paperless Lradlng Lrade ln servlces
lnvesLmenL eLc

rlor Lo resldenL's slgnlng of LA ln SepL 2006 peLlLloners nongovernmenL organlzaLlons
Congresspersons clLlzens and Laxpayers soughL vla peLlLlon for mandamus and prohlblLlon Lo obLaln
from respondenLs Lhe full LexL of Lhe LA lncludlng Lhe hlllpplne and apanese offers submlLLed
durlng Lhe negoLlaLlon process and all perLlnenL aLLachmenLs and annexes LhereLo arLlcularly
Congress Lhrough Lhe Pouse CommlLLee are calllng for an lnqulry lnLo Lhe LA buL aL Lhe same Llme
Lhe LxecuLlve ls refuslng Lo glve Lhem Lhe sald coples unLll Lhe negoLlaLlon ls compleLed

ISSULS
O WheLher or noL peLlLloners have legal sLandlng
O WheLher or noL Lhe hlllpplne and apanese offers durlng Lhe negoLlaLlon process are prlvlleged
O WheLher or noL Lhe resldenL can valldly exclude Congress exerclslng lLs power of lnqulry and
power Lo concur ln LreaLles from Lhe negoLlaLlon process

kULING

SLandlng

ln a peLlLlon anchored upon Lhe rlghL of Lhe people Lo lnformaLlon on maLLers of publlc concern whlch ls
a publlc rlghL by lLs very naLure peLlLloners need noL show LhaL Lhey have any legal or speclal lnLeresL ln
Lhe resulL lL belng sufflclenL Lo show LhaL Lhey are clLlzens and Lherefore parL of Lhe general publlc
whlch possesses Lhe rlghL As Lhe presenL peLlLlon ls anchored on Lhe rlghL Lo lnformaLlon and
peLlLloners are all sulng ln Lhelr capaclLy as clLlzens and groups of clLlzens lncludlng peLlLlonersmembers
of Lhe Pouse of 8epresenLaLlves who addlLlonally are sulng ln Lhelr capaclLy as such Lhe sLandlng of
peLlLloners Lo flle Lhe presenL sulL ls grounded ln [urlsprudence

LA A MaLLer of ubllc Concern

1o be covered by Lhe rlghL Lo lnformaLlon Lhe lnformaLlon soughL musL meeL Lhe Lhreshold requlremenL
LhaL lL be a maLLer of publlc concern xxx

lrom Lhe naLure of Lhe LA as an lnLernaLlonal Lrade agreemenL lL ls evldenL LhaL Lhe hlllpplne and
apanese offers submlLLed durlng Lhe negoLlaLlons Lowards lLs execuLlon are maLLers of publlc concern
1hls respondenLs do noL dlspuLe 1hey only clalm LhaL dlplomaLlc negoLlaLlons are covered by Lhe
docLrlne of execuLlve prlvllege Lhus consLlLuLlng an excepLlon Lo Lhe rlghL Lo lnformaLlon and Lhe pollcy
of full publlc dlsclosure

rlvlleged CharacLer of lplomaLlc negoLlaLlons 8ecognlzed

1he prlvlleged characLer of dlplomaLlc negoLlaLlons has been recognlzed ln Lhls [urlsdlcLlon ln dlscusslng
valld llmlLaLlons on Lhe rlghL Lo lnformaLlon Lhe CourL ln Chavez v CCC held LhaL lnformaLlon on
lnLergovernmenL exchanges prlor Lo Lhe concluslon of LreaLles and execuLlve agreemenLs may be
sub[ecL Lo reasonable safeguards for Lhe sake of naLlonal lnLeresL"

Applylng Lhe prlnclples adopLed ln Ml v Manglapus lL ls clear LhaL whlle Lhe flnal LexL of Lhe LA
may noL be kepL perpeLually confldenLlal slnce Lhere should be ample opporLunlLy for dlscusslon
before a LreaLy ls approved" Lhe offers exchanged by Lhe parLles durlng Lhe negoLlaLlons conLlnue Lo
be prlvlleged even afLer Lhe LA ls publlshed lL ls reasonable Lo conclude LhaL Lhe apanese
represenLaLlves submlLLed Lhelr offers wlLh Lhe undersLandlng LhaL hlsLorlc confldenLlallLy" would
govern Lhe same lscloslng Lhese offers could lmpalr Lhe ablllLy of Lhe hlllpplnes Lo deal noL only wlLh
apan buL wlLh oLher forelgn governmenLs ln fuLure negoLlaLlons

A rullng LhaL hlllpplne offers ln LreaLy negoLlaLlons should noL be open Lo publlc scruLlny would
dlscourage fuLure hlllpplne represenLaLlves from frankly expresslng Lhelr vlews durlng negoLlaLlons
Whlle on flrsL lmpresslon lL appears wlse Lo deLer hlllpplne represenLaLlves from enLerlng lnLo
compromlses lL bears noLlng LhaL LreaLy negoLlaLlons or any negoLlaLlon for LhaL maLLer normally
lnvolve a process of quld pro quo and ofLenLlmes negoLlaLors have Lo be wllllng Lo granL concesslons ln
an area of lesser lmporLance ln order Lo obLaln more favorable Lerms ln an area of greaLer naLlonal
lnLeresL

lplomaLlc negoLlaLlons Lherefore are recognlzed as prlvlleged ln Lhls [urlsdlcLlon Lhe LA
negoLlaLlons consLlLuLlng no excepLlon lL bears emphasls however LhaL such prlvllege ls only
presumpLlve lor as SenaLe v LrmlLa holds recognlzlng a Lype of lnformaLlon as prlvlleged does noL
mean LhaL lL wlll be consldered prlvlleged ln all lnsLances Cnly afLer a conslderaLlon of Lhe conLexL ln
whlch Lhe clalm ls made may lL be deLermlned lf Lhere ls a publlc lnLeresL LhaL calls for Lhe dlsclosure of
Lhe deslred lnformaLlon sLrong enough Lo overcome lLs LradlLlonally prlvlleged sLaLus

oes Lhe excepLlon apply even Lhough LA ls prlmarlly economlc and does noL lnvolve naLlonal
securlLy?

Whlle Lhere are cerLalnly prlvlleges grounded on Lhe necesslLy of safeguardlng naLlonal securlLy such as
Lhose lnvolvlng mlllLary secreLs noL all are founded Lhereon Cne example ls Lhe lnformer's prlvllege"
or Lhe prlvllege of Lhe CovernmenL noL Lo dlsclose Lhe ldenLlLy of a person or persons who furnlsh
lnformaLlon of vlolaLlons of law Lo offlcers charged wlLh Lhe enforcemenL of LhaL law 1he suspecL
lnvolved need noL be so noLorlous as Lo be a LhreaL Lo naLlonal securlLy for Lhls prlvllege Lo apply ln any
glven lnsLance CLherwlse Lhe prlvllege would be lnappllcable ln all buL Lhe mosL hlghproflle cases ln
whlch case noL only would Lhls be conLrary Lo longsLandlng pracLlce lL would also be hlghly pre[udlclal
Lo law enforcemenL efforLs ln general

Also lllusLraLlve ls Lhe prlvlleged accorded Lo presldenLlal communlcaLlons whlch are presumed
prlvlleged wlLhouL dlsLlngulshlng beLween Lhose whlch lnvolve maLLers of naLlonal securlLy and Lhose
whlch do noL Lhe raLlonale for Lhe prlvllege belng LhaL a frank exchange of exploraLory ldeas and
assessmenLs free from Lhe glare of publlclLy and pressure by lnLeresLed parLles ls essenLlal Lo proLecL
Lhe lndependence of declslonmaklng of Lhose Lasked Lo exerclse resldenLlal LeglslaLlve and udlclal
power

ln Lhe same way LhaL Lhe prlvllege for [udlclal dellberaLlons does noL depend on Lhe naLure of Lhe case
dellberaLed upon so presldenLlal communlcaLlons are prlvlleged wheLher Lhey lnvolve maLLers of
naLlonal securlLy

lL bears emphasls however LhaL Lhe prlvllege accorded Lo presldenLlal communlcaLlons ls noL absoluLe
one slgnlflcanL quallflcaLlon belng LhaL Lhe LxecuLlve cannoL any more Lhan Lhe oLher branches of
governmenL lnvoke a general confldenLlallLy prlvllege Lo shleld lLs offlclals and employees from
lnvesLlgaLlons by Lhe proper governmenLal lnsLlLuLlons lnLo posslble crlmlnal wrongdolng" 1hls
quallflcaLlon applles wheLher Lhe prlvllege ls belng lnvoked ln Lhe conLexL of a [udlclal Lrlal or a
congresslonal lnvesLlgaLlon conducLed ln ald of leglslaLlon

Closely relaLed Lo Lhe presldenLlal communlcaLlons" prlvllege ls Lhe dellberaLlve process prlvllege
recognlzed ln Lhe unlLed SLaLes As dlscussed by Lhe uS Supreme CourL ln nL88 v Sears 8oebuck Co
dellberaLlve process covers documenLs reflecLlng advlsory oplnlons recommendaLlons and dellberaLlons
comprlslng parL of a process by whlch governmenLal declslons and pollcles are formulaLed noLably Lhe
prlvlleged sLaLus of such documenLs resLs noL on Lhe need Lo proLecL naLlonal securlLy buL on Lhe
obvlous reallzaLlon LhaL offlclals wlll noL communlcaLe candldly among Lhemselves lf each remark ls a
poLenLlal lLem of dlscovery and fronL page news" Lhe ob[ecLlve of Lhe prlvllege belng Lo enhance Lhe
quallLy of agency declslons

1he dlplomaLlc negoLlaLlons prlvllege bears a close resemblance Lo Lhe dellberaLlve process and
presldenLlal communlcaLlons prlvllege lL may be readlly percelved LhaL Lhe raLlonale for Lhe confldenLlal
characLer of dlplomaLlc negoLlaLlons dellberaLlve process and presldenLlal communlcaLlons ls slmllar lf
noL ldenLlcal

1he earller dlscusslon on Ml v Manglapus shows LhaL Lhe prlvllege for dlplomaLlc negoLlaLlons ls
meanL Lo encourage a frank exchange of exploraLory ldeas beLween Lhe negoLlaLlng parLles by shleldlng
such negoLlaLlons from publlc vlew Slmllar Lo Lhe prlvllege for presldenLlal communlcaLlons Lhe
dlplomaLlc negoLlaLlons prlvllege seeks Lhrough Lhe same means Lo proLecL Lhe lndependence ln
declslonmaklng of Lhe resldenL parLlcularly ln lLs capaclLy as Lhe sole organ of Lhe naLlon ln lLs
exLernal relaLlons and lLs sole represenLaLlve wlLh forelgn naLlons" And as wlLh Lhe dellberaLlve
process prlvllege Lhe prlvllege accorded Lo dlplomaLlc negoLlaLlons arlses noL on accounL of Lhe conLenL
of Lhe lnformaLlon per se buL because Lhe lnformaLlon ls parL of a process of dellberaLlon whlch ln
pursulL of Lhe publlc lnLeresL musL be presumed confldenLlal

Clearly Lhe prlvllege accorded Lo dlplomaLlc negoLlaLlons follows as a loglcal consequence from Lhe
prlvlleged characLer of Lhe dellberaLlve process

oes dlplomaLlc prlvllege only apply Lo cerLaln sLages of Lhe negoLlaLlon process?

ln Chavez v LA and Chavez v CCC Lhe CourL held LhaL wlLh regard Lo Lhe duLy Lo dlsclose deflnlLe
proposlLlons of Lhe governmenL" such duLy does noL lnclude recognlzed excepLlons llke prlvlleged
lnformaLlon mlllLary and dlplomaLlc secreLs and slmllar maLLers affecLlng naLlonal securlLy and publlc
order

1reaLymaklng power of Lhe resldenL

xxx Lhey (peLlLloners) argue LhaL Lhe resldenL cannoL exclude Congress from Lhe LA negoLlaLlons
slnce whaLever power and auLhorlLy Lhe resldenL has Lo negoLlaLe lnLernaLlonal Lrade agreemenLs ls
derlved only by delegaLlon of Congress pursuanL Lo ArLlcle vl SecLlon 28(2) of Lhe ConsLlLuLlon and
SecLlons 401 and 402 of resldenLlal ecree no 1464

1he sub[ecL of ArLlcle vl SecLlon 28(2) of Lhe ConsLlLuLlon ls noL Lhe power Lo negoLlaLe LreaLles and
lnLernaLlonal agreemenLs buL Lhe power Lo flx Larlff raLes lmporL and exporL quoLas and oLher Laxes
xxx

As Lo Lhe power Lo negoLlaLe LreaLles Lhe consLlLuLlonal basls Lhereof ls SecLlon 21 of ArLlcle vll Lhe
arLlcle on Lhe LxecuLlve eparLmenL

xxx

Whlle Lhe power Lhen Lo flx Larlff raLes and oLher Laxes clearly belongs Lo Congress and ls exerclsed by
Lhe resldenL only be delegaLlon of LhaL body lL has long been recognlzed LhaL Lhe power Lo enLer lnLo
LreaLles ls vesLed dlrecLly and excluslvely ln Lhe resldenL sub[ecL only Lo Lhe concurrence of aL leasL
LwoLhlrds of all Lhe Members of Lhe SenaLe for Lhe valldlLy of Lhe LreaLy ln Lhls llghL Lhe auLhorlLy of
Lhe resldenL Lo enLer lnLo Lrade agreemenLs wlLh forelgn naLlons provlded under 1464 may be
lnLerpreLed as an acknowledgmenL of a power already lnherenL ln lLs offlce lL may noL be used as basls
Lo hold Lhe resldenL or lLs represenLaLlves accounLable Lo Congress for Lhe conducL of LreaLy
negoLlaLlons

1hls ls noL Lo say of course LhaL Lhe resldenL's power Lo enLer lnLo LreaLles ls unllmlLed buL for Lhe
requlremenL of SenaLe concurrence slnce Lhe resldenL musL sLlll enure LhaL all LreaLles wlll
subsLanLlvely conform Lo all Lhe relevanL provlslons of Lhe ConsLlLuLlon

lL follows from Lhe above dlscusslon LhaL Congress whlle possesslng vasL leglslaLlve powers may noL
lnLerfere ln Lhe fleld of LreaLy negoLlaLlons Whlle ArLlcle vll SecLlon 21 provldes for SenaLe
concurrence such perLalns only Lo Lhe valldlLy of Lhe LreaLy under conslderaLlon noL Lo Lhe conducL of
negoLlaLlons aLLendanL Lo lLs concluslon Moreover lL ls noL even Congress as a whlle LhaL has been
glven Lhe auLhorlLy Lo concur as a means of checklng Lhe LreaLymaklng power of Lhe resldenL buL only
Lhe SenaLe

1hus as ln Lhe case of peLlLloners sulng ln Lhelr capaclLy as prlvaLe clLlzens peLlLlonersmembers of Lhe
Pouse of 8epresenLaLlves fall Lo presenL a sufflclenL showlng of need" LhaL Lhe lnformaLlon soughL ls
crlLlcal Lo Lhe performance of Lhe funcLlons of Congress funcLlons LhaL do noL lnclude LreaLy
negoLlaLlon

ld Lhe respondenL's alleged fallure Lo Llmely clalm execuLlve prlvllege consLlLuLe walver of such
prlvllege?

1haL respondenL lnvoked Lhe prlvllege for Lhe flrsL Llme only ln Lhelr CommenL Lo Lhe presenL peLlLlon
does noL mean LhaL Lhe clalm of prlvllege should noL be credlLed eLlLloner's poslLlon presupposes LhaL
an asserLlon of Lhe prlvllege should have been made durlng Lhe Pouse CommlLLee lnvesLlgaLlons falllng
whlch respondenLs are deemed Lo have walved lL

xxx (buL) 8espondenL's fallure Lo clalm Lhe prlvllege durlng Lhe Pouse CommlLLee hearlngs may noL
however be consLrued as a walver Lhereof by Lhe LxecuLlve branch xxx whaL respondenLs recelved
from Lhe Pouse CommlLLee and peLlLlonerCongressman Agu[a were mere requesLs for lnformaLlon And
as prlorly sLaLed Lhe Pouse CommlLLee lLself refralned from pursulng lLs earller resoluLlon Lo lssue a
subpoena duces Lecum on accounL of Lhen Speaker ose de venecla's alleged requesL Lo CommlLLee
Chalrperson Congressman 1eves Lo hold Lhe same ln abeyance

1he prlvllege ls an exempLlon Lo Congress' power of lnqulry So long as Congress lLself flnds no cause Lo
enforce such power Lhere ls no sLrlcL necesslLy Lo asserL Lhe prlvllege ln Lhls llghL respondenL's fallure
Lo lnvoke Lhe prlvllege durlng Lhe Pouse CommlLLee lnvesLlgaLlons dld noL amounL Lo walver Lhereof

Showlng of need" 1esL

ln execuLlve prlvllege conLroversles Lhe requlremenL LhaL parLles presenL a sufflclenL showlng of need"
only means ln subsLance LhaL Lhey should show a publlc lnLeresL ln favor of dlsclosure sufflclenL ln
degree Lo overcome Lhe clalm of prlvllege verlly Lhe CourL ln such cases engages ln a balanclng of
lnLeresLs Such a balanclng of lnLeresLs ls cerLalnly noL new ln consLlLuLlonal ad[udlcaLlon lnvolvlng
fundamenLal rlghLs

xxx Powever when Lhe LxecuLlve has as ln Lhls case lnvoked Lhe prlvllege and lL has been
esLabllshed LhaL Lhe sub[ecL lnformaLlon ls lndeed covered by Lhe prlvllege belng clalmed can a parLy
overcome Lhe same by merely asserLlng LhaL Lhe lnformaLlon belng demanded ls a maLLer of publlc
concern wlLhouL any furLher showlng requlred? CerLalnly noL for LhaL would render Lhe docLrlne of
execuLlve prlvllege of no force and effecL whaLsoever as a llmlLaLlon on Lhe rlghL Lo lnformaLlon because
Lhen Lhe sole LesL ln such conLroversles would be wheLher an lnformaLlon ls a maLLer of publlc concern

8lghL Lo lnformaLlon vlsavls LxecuLlve rlvllege

xxx Lhe CourL holds LhaL ln deLermlnlng wheLher an lnformaLlon ls covered by Lhe rlghL Lo lnformaLlon a
speclflc showlng of need" for such lnformaLlon ls noL a relevanL conslderaLlon buL only wheLher Lhe
same ls a maLLer of publlc concern When however Lhe governmenL has clalmed execuLlve prlvllege
and lL has esLabllshed LhaL Lhe lnformaLlon ls lndeed covered by Lhe same Lhen Lhe parLy demandlng lL
lf lL ls Lo overcome Lhe prlvllege musL show LhaL LhaL lnformaLlon ls vlLal noL slmply for Lhe saLlsfacLlon
of lLs curloslLy buL for lLs ablllLy Lo effecLlvely and reasonably parLlclpaLe ln soclal pollLlcal and
economlc declslonmaklng

Mejoff vs Director of Prisons
Pil 7 $eptember 26, 11


,cts:

This is a second petition Ior habeas corpus by Boris MejoII, the Iirst having been denied in a
decision oI this Court on July 30, 1949. "The petitioner Boris MejoII is an alien oI Russian
descent who was brought to this country Irom Shanghai as a secret operative by the Japanese
Iorces during the latter's regime in these Islands. Upon liberation, he was arrested as a Japanese
spy by U. S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps. ThereaIter, the People's Court ordered his
release. But the Deportation Board taking his case up Iound that having no travel documents,
MejoII was an illegal alien in this country, and consequently reIerred the matter to the
immigration authorities. AIter the corresponding investigation, the Immigration Board oI
Commissioners declared on April 5, 1948 that MejoII had entered the Philippines illegally in
1944, without inspection and admission by the immigration oIIicials at a designated port oI entry
and, thereIore, it ordered that he be deported on the Iirst available transportation to Russia. The
petitioner was then under custody, he having been arrested on March 18, 1948. In October 1948,
aIter repeated Iailures to ship this deportee abroad, the authorities moved him to Bilibid Prison at
Muntinglupa where he has been conIined up to the present time, inasmuch as the Commissioner
oI Immigration believes it is Ior the best interests oI the country to keep him under detention
while arrangements Ior his departure are being made. Two years having elapsed since the
aIoresaid decision was promulgated, the Government has not Iound ways and means oI removing
the petitioner out oI the country, and none are in sight, although, it should be said in Iairness to
the deportation authorities that it was through no Iault oI theirs that no ship or country would
take the petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not Boris MejoII should be released Irom prison pending his deportation.

Ruling:

The protection against deprivation oI liberty without due process oI law, and except Ior crimes
committed against the laws oI the land, is not limited to Philippine citizens but extends to all
residents, except enemy aliens, regardless oI nationality. Moreover, Sec. 3, Art. II oI the
Constitution oI the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles oI international law as
part oI the law oI the Nation." And in a resolution entitled, "Universal Declaration OI Human
Rights," and approved by the General Assembly oI the United Nations, oI which the Philippines
is a member, at its plenary meeting on December 10, 1948, the right to liIe and liberty and all
other Iundamental rights as applied to all human beings were proclaimed. It was there resolved
that "all human beings are born Iree and equal in degree and rights" (Art. 1); that "everyone is
entitled to all the rights and Ireedom set Iorth in this Declaration, without distinction oI any kind,
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, nationality or social
origin, property, birth, or other status" (Art. 2); that "every one has the right to an eIIective
remedy by the competent national tribunals Ior acts violating the Iundamental rights granted him
by the Constitution or by law" (Art. 8); that "no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest,
detention or exile" (Art. 9 ); etc. Premises considered, the writ will issue commanding the
respondents to release the petitioner Irom custody upon these terms: that the petitioner shall be
placed under the surveillance oI the immigration authorities or their agents in such Iorm and
manner as may be deemed adequate to insure that he keep peace and be available when the
Government is ready to deport him. The surveillance shall be reasonable and the question oI
reasonableness shall be submitted to this Court or to the Court oI First Instance oI Manila Ior
decision in case oI abuse. No costs will be charged.

uroda vs 1alandoni, 83 Phil. 195, L-2662, March 26, 1949
Facts : Shigenori Kuroda, a Iormer Lieutenant-General oI the Japanese Imperial Army and
Commanding General oI the Imperial Forces oI the Philippines was charged beIore a Military
Commission convened by the ChieI oI StaII oI the Armed Forces oI the Philippines. He had
unlawIully disregarded and Iailed to discharge his duties as a commander to control the
operations oI members oI his command.
Petitioner was duly prosecuted Ior acts committed in violation oI the Hague Convention and the
Geneva Convention through the issuance and enIorcement oI Executive Order No. 68.
Executive Order No. 68 provided the organization oI such military commissions, established
National War Crimes OIIice and prescribing rules and regulations governing the trial oI accused
war criminals.
Attorneys Melville Hussey and Robert Port oI the United States oI America participated in the
prosecution oI the case in behalI oI the United States oI America.

Issue : Whether or not Executive Order No. 68 is legal and constitutional.

Held : This court holds that the Executive Order No. 68 is legal and constitutional as provided in
Sec. 3, Art. II oI the Constitution, that-

' The Philippines renounces war as an instrument oI national policy, and adopts the generally
accepted principles oI international law as part oI the law oI the nation.

The participation oI the two American attorneys although under our law, they are not qualiIied to
practice law is valid and constitutional. Military Commission is a special military tribunal
governed by special law not by Rules oI the Court, which govern ordinary civil courts. There is
nothing in Executive Order No.68 which requires counsels need to be qualiIied to practice law in
the Philippines. In Iact, it is common in military tribunals that counsels Ior the parties are usually
military personnel.
Under the doctrine oI incorporation, although the Philippines was not a signatory oI the Hague
and Geneva Conventions, international jurisprudence is automatically incorporated in Philippine
law, thus making war crimes punishable in the Philippines.
The Military Commission having been convened by virtue oI a valid law, with jurisdiction over
the crimes charged which Iall under the provisions oI Executive Order No 68, and having
jurisdiction over the person oI the petitioner by having said petitioner in its custody, the court
will not interIere with the due process oI such Military Commission.
Petition is denied with costs de oIicio.


Agustin vs Edu
22 11 2010






2 voLes
enerally Accepted Principles of International Law
Agustin is the owner oI a Volkswagen Beetle Car. He is assailing the validity oI Letter oI
Instruction No 229 which requires all motor vehicles to have early warning devices particularly
to equip them with a pair oI 'reIlectorized triangular early warning devices. Agustin is arguing
that this order is unconstitutional, harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring public. Cars
are already equipped with blinking lights which is already enough to provide warning to other
motorists. And that the mandate to compel motorists to buy a set oI reIlectorized early warning
devices is redundant and would only make manuIacturers and dealers instant millionaires.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said is EO is valid.
HELD: Such early warning device requirement is not an expensive redundancy, nor oppressive,
Ior car owners whose cars are already equipped with 1) blinking-lights in the Iore and aIt oI said
motor vehicles,` 2) battery-powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles,` 3) built-in
reIlectorized tapes on Iront and rear bumpers oI motor vehicles,` or 4) well-lighted two (2)
petroleum lamps (the Kinke) . . . because: Being universal among the signatory countries to the
said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and visible even under adverse conditions at a distance oI at least
400 meters, any motorist Irom this country or Irom any part oI the world, who sees a
reIlectorized rectangular early warning device installed on the roads, highways or expressways,
will conclude, without thinking, that somewhere along the travelled portion oI that road,
highway, or expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled or disabled which
obstructs or endangers passing traIIic. On the other hand, a motorist who sees any oI the
aIorementioned other built-in warning devices or the petroleum lamps will not immediately get
adequate advance warning because he will still think what that blinking light is all about. Is it an
emergency vehicle? Is it a law enIorcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such conIusion or
uncertainty in the mind oI the motorist will thus increase, rather than decrease, the danger oI
collision.

The Letter oI Instruction in question was issued in the exercise oI the police power. That is
conceded by petitioner and is the main reliance oI respondents. It is the submission oI the Iormer,
however, that while embraced in such a category, it has oIIended against the due process and
equal protection saIeguards oI the Constitution, although the latter point was mentioned only in
passing. The broad and expansive scope oI the police power which was originally identiIied by
ChieI Justice Taney oI the American Supreme Court in an 1847 decision, as 'nothing more or
less than the powers oI government inherent in every sovereignty was stressed in the
aIorementioned case oI Edu v. Ericta thus: 'Justice Laurel, in the Iirst leading decision aIter the
Constitution came into Iorce, Calalang v. Williams, identiIied police power with state authority
to enact legislation that may interIere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the
general welIare. Persons and property could thus be subjected to all kinds oI restraints and
burdens in order to secure the general comIort, health and prosperity oI the state. Shortly aIter
independence in 1948, Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a competence being
reIerred to as the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education,
good order or saIety, and general welIare oI the people.` The concept was set Iorth in negative
terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth decision as that inherent and plenary power
in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtIul to the comIort, saIety and welIare oI
society.` In that sense it could be hardly distinguishable as noted by this Court in MorIe v. Mutuc
with the totality oI legislative power. It is in the above sense the greatest and most powerIul
attribute oI government. It is, to quote Justice Malcolm anew, the most essential, insistent, and
at least illimitable powers,` extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed out to all the great public
needs.` Its scope, ever expanding to meet the exigencies oI the times, even to anticipate the
Iuture where it could be done, provides enough room Ior an eIIicient and Ilexible response to
conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest beneIits. In the language oI Justice
Cardozo: Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present with
the well-being oI the nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the time.` The police power
is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and Iar Irom precisely deIined, rooted in the conception
that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to saIeguard
constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group oI citizens
to obstruct unreasonably the enactment oI such salutary measures calculated to insure communal
peace, saIety, good order, and welIare.

It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by petitioner, compounded by the Iact that the
particular police power measure challenged was clearly intended to promote public saIety. It
would be a rare occurrence indeed Ior this Court to invalidate a legislative or executive act oI
that character. None has been called to our attention, an indication oI its being non-existent. The
latest decision in point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity oI the ReIlector Law, an enactment
conceived with the same end in view. Calalang v. Williams Iound nothing objectionable in a
statute, the purpose oI which was: 'To promote saIe transit upon, and avoid obstruction on roads
and streets designated as national roads . . . As a matter oI Iact, the Iirst law sought to be
nulliIied aIter the eIIectivity oI the 1935 Constitution, the National DeIense Act, with petitioner
Iailing in his quest, was likewise prompted by the imperative demands oI public saIety.

REYES VS. BAGATSING
J.B.L. REYES VS. BAGATSING
125 SCRA 553
Facts:

Justice JBL Reyes filed a petition on behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition to
compel the issuance of a permit for a rally to be held at the Luneta and a
subsequent march to the U.S. Embassy on Roxas Boulevard. The petition
was filed the day before the scheduled assembly as no action had apparently
been taken on the application, although it turned out later that it had been
rejected in a letter sent earlier by ordinary mail. The reasons for the denial
was the mayors fear that the assemblage might be infiltrated by subversive
elements to the prejudice of the public order, and thus the intended rally
would violate a city ordinance implementing the provisions of the Diplomatic
Convention requiring the receiving state to afford adequate protection to
foreign embassies; hence his suggestion that the rally be held at an enclosed
place like Rizal Coliseum for better security.

Issue: Whether the denial of the issuance and modification of the permit is
meritorious and is guaranteed under Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution.

Held:

The court set aside the denial or the modification of the permit sought and
order the respondent official to grant it. The choice of Luneta and U.S.
Embassy for a public rally cannot legally objected to in the absence of clear
and present danger to life or property of the embassy. The Philippines, being
a signatory of Vienna Conventions which calls for the protection of the
premises of a diplomatic mission, adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land as cited in Article II, Section 3
of the Constitution.