War Crimes Against Humanity

Japanese Imperial Army's Unit 731 killed thousands oI Chinese and Russians held prisoner in
Japanese-occupied Manchuria, in experiments to develop chemical and biological weapons.
In the autumn oI 1945, MacArthur acceded to granting immunity to members oI Unit 731 in
exchange Ior data oI research on biological warIare. "The value to the U.S. oI Japanese BW data
is oI such importance to national security as to Iar outweigh the value accruing Irom war crimes'
prosecution." The BW inIormation obtained Irom Japanese sources should be retained in 'top
secret' intelligence channels and not be employed as war crimes evidence and not be Iallen into
the Soviet hands. The State Department disagreed over a two year period and the topic simply
disappeared.
Why did the US lose interest in pursuing the issue oI war criminals? China became communist,
Japan was a required base Ior operations in Korea, and Japan became a major trading partner and
economic power in the East.
Unit 731
O 1925 -- Japan reIuses Geneva Convention ban on biological weapons.
O 1932 -- Japanese troops invade Manchuria. Shiro Ishii, a physician and army oIIicer who
was intrigued by germ warIare, begins preliminary experiments.
O 1936 -- Unit 731, a biological-warIare unit disguised as a water-puriIication unit, is
Iormed. Ishii builds huge compound -- more than 150 buildings over six square
kilometers -- outside the city oI Harbin, Manchuria. Some 9,000 test subjects eventually
die at the compound.
O 1942 -- Ishii begins Iield tests oI germ warIare on Chinese soldiers and civilians. Tens oI
thousands die oI bubonic plague, cholera, anthrax and other diseases. U.S. soldiers
captured in Philippines are sent to Manchuria.
O 1945 -- Japanese troops blow up the headquarters oI Unit 731 in Iinal days oI PaciIic war.
Ishii orders 150 remaining 'subjects' killed to cover up their experimentation.
O 1946 -- U.S. makes a deal with Ishii Ior germ warIare data based on human
experimentation in exchange Ior immunity Irom war-crimes prosecution.

Sources. Factories of Death, by Sheldon H. Harris (Rutledge, 1994)
and Prisoners of the Japanese. POWS of World War II in the Pacific, by Gavan Daws
(William Morrow, 1994).
Japan's biological weapons program was born in the 1930s, in part because Japanese oIIicials
were impressed that germ warIare had been banned by the Geneva Protocol oI 1925. II it was so
awIul that it had to be banned under international law, the oIIicers reasoned, it must make a great
weapon. Establishment oI two biological warIare Units 731 and 100 in Manchuria in 1933
because oI the number oI test subjects available. Harbin in Manchuria was the headquarters oI
Unit 731. Ishii promoted to Iull colonel with 3,000 Japanese working under him. In addition oI
bacteriological warIare, studies were also conducted on human damage done by burns, Ireezing,
high pressure, and bullets. Former members oI the unit say that at least 3,000 people and by
some accounts several times that number were killed in the medical experiments in which none
survived.
"AIter inIecting him, the researchers decided to cut him open to see what the disease does to a
man's inside. I cut him open Irom the chest to the stomach and he screamed terribly and his Iace
was all twisted in agony. made this unimaginable sound, he was screaming so horribly. This was
all in a day's work Ior the surgeons, but it really leIt an impression on me because it was my Iirst
time."
The human experimentation did not take place just in Unit 731, nor was it a rogue unit acting on
its own. Prince Mikasa, toured Unit 731's headquarters in China and wrote in his memoirs that he
was shown Iilms showing how Chinese prisoners were "made to march on the plains oI
Manchuria Ior poison gas experiments on humans." Premier Tojo personally presented an award
to Ishii Ior his contribution to developing biological weapons.
The Japanese army regularly conducted Iield tests to see whether biological warIare would work
outside the laboratory. Planes dropped plague-inIected Ileas over Ningbo in eastern China and
over Changde in north-central China and plague outbreaks were later reported.
Japanese troops also dropped cholera and typhoid cultures in wells and ponds, but the results
were oIten counterproductive. In 1942, germ warIare specialists distributed dysentery, cholera
and typhoid in Zhejiang Province in China. but Japanese soldiers themselves became ill and
1,700 died oI the diseases. An estimated 440,000 Chinese died oI this germ warIare.
Planned Bacterial Attack on the United States.
Proposals included use oI these weapons against the United States. They proposed using balloon
bombs to carry disease to America and they had a plan in the summer oI 1945 to use kamikaze
pilots to dump plague inIected Ileas on San Diego.
Some Japanese generals proposed loading the balloons with weapons oI biological warIare, to
create epidemics oI plague or anthrax in the United States. Other army units wanted to send
cattle plague virus to wipe out the American livestock industry or grain smut to wipe out the
crops. As it happened, 9,000 balloons each carried Iour incendiary and one antipersonnel bomb
across the PaciIic on the jet stream to create Iorest Iires and terror Irom Oregon to Michigan.
As the end oI the war approached in 1945, Unit 731 embarked on its wildest scheme; codenamed
Cherry Blossoms at Night, the plan was to use kamikaze pilots to inIest CaliIornia with the
plague.
Toshimi Mizobuchi, who was an instructor Ior new recruits in Unit 731, said the idea was to use
20 oI the 500 new troops who arrived in Harbin in July 1945. A submarine was to take a Iew oI
them to the seas oII Southern CaliIornia, and then they were to Ily in a plane carried on board the
submarine and contaminate San Diego with plague-inIected Ileas. The target date was to be Sept.
22, 1945. As it happened, the Ileet oI submarine seaplane carriers that assembled was assigned
to launch torpedoes at the locks in the Panama canal, but that was changed to attack the US Ileet
at Ulith just as the war ended.
Cover up.
As the Japanese army retreated Irom China as the war was ending, plague-inIected animals were
released and caused outbreaks oI the plague that killed at least 30,000 people in the Harbin area
Irom 1946 through 1948.
"Iishi and his colleagues received immunity Irom prosecution and ... in exchange they provided a
great deal oI inIormation to U.S. authorities." In particular, they provided the results oI "Iield
tests" in which hundreds oI thousands oI civilians in China and eastern Russia were exposed to
and died Irom deadly germs such as anthrax and plague.
Poison Gas
At the outbreak oI the Wusung-shanghai campaign on August 13, 1937, the Japanese army used
poison gas against Chinese troops. In the succeeding eight years oI war, Japan had used poison
gases 1,131 times in 14 Chinese provinces.
Biological WarIare.
On at least Iive occasions during the Iirst two years the Japanese armed Iorces tried to employ
bacteriological warIare in China. They have tried to produce epidemics oI plague in Free China
by scattering plague-inIected materials with airplanes.
These Iive times are: October 4, 1940, when Japanese airplane dropped plague bacteria at
Chuhsien in Chechiang province which caused the deaths oI 21 people. On the 29th oI the same
month, Japanese airplane spread plague bacteria at Ningpo, Chechiang which caused the deaths
oI 99 people. On November 28 oI the same year, Japanese airplanes dropped a large quantity oI
germs at Chinhua but no deaths were reported. In January 1941 Japan spread plague germs in
Suiyuan and Ninghsia provinces and again in Shansi that caused serious epidemic outbreaks oI
plague in these areas. When too many Japanese soldiers also died, the attacks were suspended.
Japan Admits Dissecting WW-II POWs
On May 5, 1945, an American B-29 bomber was knocked down over southern Japan. Eight
American airmen prisoners were made available Ior medical experiments at Kyushu Imperial
University. The eight were dissected organ by organ while they were still alive.
This is the only site where Americans were incontrovertibly used in dissections and the only
known site where experiments were done in Japan. Kyushu University, Fukuoka, is midway
between Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Trial.
Thirty people were brought to trial by an Allied War Crimes Tribunal in Yokohama, Japan, on
March 11, 1948. Charges included vivisection and wrongIul removal oI body parts; 23 were
Iound guilty oI various charges. Five oI the guilty were sentenced to death. one of the death
sentences was carried out. By 1958, all those convicted were free. The Soviet Union also held
trials. Sentences there were carried out.
War Crimes Trial
High-level Japanese war criminals were tried by the International Military Tribunal Ior the Far
East. The prosecution team was made up oI justices Irom eleven Allied nations: Australia,
Canada, China, France, Great Britain, India, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, the
Soviet Union and the United States oI America. The Tokyo trial lasted two and a halI years, Irom
May 1946 to November 1948. The principle charges were making aggressive war and allowing
atrocities against POWs and civilians.
The Verdict
Two oI the twenty-eight deIendants died oI natural causes during the trial. One had a mental
breakdown on the Iirst day oI trial, was sent to a psychiatric ward and was released in 1948. The
remaining twenty-Iive were Iound guilty. Seven were sentenced to death by hanging, sixteen to
liIe imprisonment, and two to lesser terms. All seven sentenced to death were Iound to be guilty
oI inciting mass-scale atrocities, among other counts, and hanged Dec. 23. Three oI the sixteen
sentenced to liIe imprisonment died in prison. The remaining thirteen were paroled between
1954 and 1956, with less than eight years in prison Ior their crimes against millions oI people.



Projeot Baokground and 0oals
I|c goal oi t|is :o|cct is to u:cc:sta:c t|c i::c: wo:|i:gs oi u:it !1, a aa:csc uilita:, uccical tcau
:oto:ious io: :csca:c| o: |iological wa:ia:c cu:i:g t|c 1-!0s a:c 1-+0s. l soug|t to illust:atc t|c
uotivatio: oi t|c aa:csc io: co:cucti:g t|c uost cou:c|c:sivc lW :og:au cvc: to |avc cxistcc. l: a
la:gc: sc:sc, u:it !1`s sto:, is also tclli:g oi t|c iuo:ta:cc oi ct|ics i: scic:cc. l, loo|i:g at |ow u:it
!1 was co:cuctcc a:c ultiuatcl, iailcc, l a:al,zcc |ow c:so:alitics, logistics, a:c u:co:cciva|lc
cxc:iuc:ts ;o:c oi t|c |cst cocuuc:tcc cascs oi |uua: cxc:iuc:tatio:, la,cc iuo:ta:t :olcs i: t|is
govc::uc:t oc:atio:.
l:iua:, ccclassiiicc uilita:, cocuuc:ts o|tai:cc i:ou t|c :atio:al A:c|ivcs a:c t|c li|:a:, oi o:g:css
wc:c c:itical io: t|is ukl :o|cct, as uuc| oi t|c toic :cuai:s co:t:ovc:sial to t|is ca,. i:cc u:it !1
was a: o:ga:izatio: s|:ouccc i: scc:cc,, t|is ukl also |ccauc a :acticc i: i:tc::cti:g |ow to wo:|
wit| co:ilicti:g a:c i:coulctc :cco:cs.

Projeot Results
l cxaui:cc two asccts oi cocuuc:ts :clatcc to u:it !1. li:st, l co:clucc t|at t|c lac| oi a govc::i:g
|oc, i: its scic:tiiic :csca:c| lcc to oo: qualit, co:t:ol a:c |c:cc its iailu:c to :ocucc ciicctivc |iological
wcao:s. l: accitio:, a: acviso:, |oc, i:ccc:cc:t oi t|c scic:tists was :cvc: csta|lis|cc, allowi:g :o
ossi|ilit, io: t|c qucstio:i:g t|c ct|ics |c|i:c u:it !1`s :csca:c|. cco:c, l ccuo:st:atc |ow coui:ati:g
c:so:alitics i: scic:tiiic :csca:c| uust |c cow:la,cc |, cxlai:i:g t|c va:ious wa,s i: w|ic| u:it
:csca:c| iocus coulc |avc |cc: s|iitcc to accouuocatc uo:c :atio:al, iuucciatc wa:tiuc goals. li:all,, l
i:tcg:atc |ot| asccts togct|c: |:icil, to ciscuss t|c co:ti:ui:g :ccc io: st:ict scic:tiiic :cvicw |oa:cs
cscciall, i: t|c uccical iiclcs, ccsitc all its i:ciiicic:cics.

unlL 731 and Lhe !apanese lmperlal Army's 8lologlcal Warfare rogram
8y 1sunelshl kellchl

1ranslaLed by !ohn !unkerman

Iopoos uolt 7J1 temolos ceottol to tbe fletcely cootesteJ cblooIopoo coottovetsy ovet wot
ctlmes ooJ wot memoty ooJ to tbe lotetootloool Jebote oo scleoce ooJ etblcs wltb o stoff of
mote tboo 10000 locloJloq mooy of Iopoos top meJlcol scleotlsts 7J1 ooJ lts offllloteJ oolts
cooJocteJ bomoo expetlmeots locloJloq vlvlsectloo oo cbloese ooJ otbet vlctlms lo
Moocbokoo ooJ tbtooqboot cbloo betweeo 19JJ ooJ 1945 1be expetlmeots testeJ omooq
otbet tbloqs tbe letbollty of bloloqlcol weopoos ooJ sooqbt to Jetetmloe tbe oblllty of tbe
bomoo boJy to sotvlve lo tbe foce of votloos potboqeos ooJ lo cooJltloos socb os extteme colJ

1sooelsbl kellcbl ls Iopoos leoJloq speclollst oo blowotfote nls volomlooos stoJles cooJocteJ
ovet tbltty yeots lo Iopoo cbloo tbe uolteJ 5totes ooJ otope bove ptovlJeJ cote motetlol fot
oll wtltloq bltbetto oo tbe lsbll Netwotk lo tbe followloq cotefol tesom essoy be cooceottotes
oo otqoolzotloo ooJ fooctloo omlttloq mocb of tbe bottlflc Jetoll coveteJ elsewbete utowloq
oo Iopooese mllltoty tecotJs tbls stoJy Jocomeots tbe Jeotbs of 850 vlctlms lo tbe yeots op to
194J tbe lotqest oombet lofecteJ wltb ploqoe cboleto ooJ eplJemlc bemottboqlc fevet lt olso
mokes ose of Ametlcoo tecotJs ooJ lotetvlews

uolt 7J1 oot ooly cooJocteJ tests bot olso leJ tbe woy lo woqloq bloloqlcol wotfote oo
oometoos occosloos tbtooqboot tbe wot tbe best JocomeoteJ beloq ottocks oo Nloqbo ooJ
tbtooqboot 2bejlooq ptovloce As lo tbe cose of tbe Noojloq Mossocte ooJ tbe comfott
womeo cosoolty flqotes temolo cootesteJ 1be flqote of J000 petsoos extetmlooteJ ot
lloqfoo tbe mojot expetlmeot slte of tbe lsbll Netwotk ls wlJely occepteJ omooq speclollsts fot
tbe petloJ eoJloq lo 1945 1be postsotteoJet Jesttoctloo by tbe Iopooese ootbotltles botb of
tbe teseotcb sltes ooJ tbe mllltoty Jocomeots bos moJe pteclse cosoolty estlmotes Jlfflcolt

As 1sooelsbl Jocomeots ottocks lo 2bejlooq tesolteJ lo mote tboo 10000 Iopooese mllltoty
cosooltles locloJloq tbe Jeotb of 1700 Iopooese solJlets teveolloq tbe Jlfflcolty of woqloq
effectlve blowotfote No estlmote ls ptovlJeJ bete of cbloese Jeotbs o temloJet of
cootempototy ptoctlce lo ptovlJloq ooly Ametlcoo boJy cooots lo ltop bot olso of tbe Jlfflcolty
of estobllsbloq cbloese cosooltles

Iopoos qtlm expetlmeot wltb blowotfote poles lo compotlsoo wltb tbe estlmoteJ 10J0 mlllloo
cbloese wbo JleJ os o tesolt of wot ooJ ossocloteJ cooJltloos of fomloe lo tbe yeots 19J145
8ot tbe floJloqs of lsbll ooJ bls colleoqoes wete lmpottoot eoooqb fot Ametlcoo ootbotltles to
qtoot lmmoolty ftom ptosecotloo lo excbooqe fot evlJeoce of tbe teseotcb floJloqs of uolt 7J1
1be 7J1 scleotlsts wbo wete evocooteJ to Iopoo ptlot to tbe Jefeot cootlooeJ tbelt coteets os
emloeot flqotes lo tbe postwot meJlcol ooJ scleotlflc estobllsbmeot ms

1he lshll neLwork

unlL 731 was Lhe common name of a secreL unlL of !apan's Manchurlabased kwanLung Army
whose offlclal name was Lhe Lpldemlc revenLlon and WaLer Supply ueparLmenL 1 1he leader
of Lhe unlL was lshll Shlro who held Lhe rank of lleuLenanL general aL Lhe end of World War ll
1he unlL eplLomlzed Lhe exLenslve organlzaLlon for Lhe developmenL of blologlcal weapons
wlLhln Lhe lmperlal army whlch was referred Lo beglnnlng ln Lhe laLe 1930s as Lhe lshll
neLwork

1he neLwork lLself was based aL Lhe Lpldemlc revenLlon 8esearch LaboraLory esLabllshed ln
1932 aL Lhe !apanese Army MlllLary Medlcal School ln 1okyo unlL 731 was Lhe flrsL of several
secreL deLached unlLs creaLed as exLenslons of Lhe research lab Lhe unlLs served as fleld
laboraLorles and LesL slLes for developlng blologlcal weapons culmlnaLlng ln Lhe experlmenLal
use of blologlcal weapons on Chlnese clLles 1he Lrlal use of Lhese weapons on urban
populaLlons was a dlrecL vlolaLlon of Lhe 1923 Ceneva roLocol whlch ouLlawed Lhe use of
blologlcal and chemlcal weapons ln war lL was also undersLood by Lhose lnvolved LhaL Lhe use
of human sub[ecLs ln laboraLory and LesL slLe experlmenLs was lnhumane 1hls was why lL was
deemed necessary Lo esLabllsh unlL 731 and Lhe oLher secreL unlLs




1he Lpldemlc revenLlon 8esearch LaboraLory was creaLed under Lhe lnlLlaLlve of lshll Shlro
afLer he reLurned from Lwo years of fleld sLudy of Amerlcan and Luropean research faclllLles lL
was seL up wlLh Lhe approval of Loplevel army auLhorlLles as a faclllLy Lo develop blologlcal
weapons lL ls sald LhaL lshll flrsL became convlnced of Lhe need Lo develop blologlcal weapons
wlLh Lhe slgnlng of Lhe Ceneva roLocol ln 1923

1he blologlcal weapons lshll soughL Lo develop had humans as Lhelr LargeL and unlL 731 was
esLabllshed wlLh Lhls goal ln mlnd ln order Lo produce blologlcal weapons as qulckly as
posslble lshll consldered lL essenLlal Lo have a human experlmenLaLlon slLe aL Lhe dlsposal of
hls research laboraLory !apan had occupled norLheasLern Chlna and ln 1932 Lhe puppeL sLaLe of
Manchukuo was esLabllshed WlLhln Lhls safe zone" lshll seL up whaL was called Lhe 1ogo unlL
based ln Lhe vlllage of 8elylnhe abouL 100 kllomeLers souLh of Parbln Puman experlmenLaLlon
began Lhere ln Lhe fall of 1933 1he 1ogo unlL was a secreL unlL under Lhe vlce chlef of sLaff of
Lhe kwanLung Army lL was seL up Lo deLermlne wheLher lL was posslble Lo conducL human
experlmenLs ln norLheasLern Chlna and lf lL was posslble wheLher Lhe experlmenLs would
produce useful resulLs 1he launchlng of Lhls feaslblllLy sLudy reflecLs Lhe dellberaLe naLure of
lshll as Lhe organlzer of Lhe research and you could say lL was marked wlLh hls characLer All of
Lhose lnvolved ln Lhls research and developmenL were mlllLary docLors buL Lhey all used false
names AL Lhls sLage Lhe scale of Lhe pro[ecL lnvolved abouL Len docLors along wlLh a sLaff of
abouL one hundred

1he lnauguraLlon of unlL 731

unlL 731 was offlclally esLabllshed ln 1936 lLs esLabllshmenL ls reflecLed ln a memo daLed Aprll
23 1936 enLlLled Cplnlon 8egardlng Lhe 8elnforcemenL of MlllLary lorces ln Manchurla"
from Lhe chlef of sLaff of Lhe kwanLung Army Lo Lhe vlce mlnlsLer of Lhe MlnlsLry of War
(conLalned ln Lhe MlnlsLry of War !ournal for Lhe army ln Manchurla 8lkuman MlLsudalnlkkl)
under Lhe headlng LsLabllshmenL and Lxpanslon of Lhe kwanLung Army Lpldemlc revenLlon
ueparLmenL" Lhe memo sLaLes LhaL Lhe deparLmenL wlll be newly esLabllshed" ln 1936 and
one parL of Lhe deparLmenL wlll be expanded ln flscal 1938" 1hls ls Lhe oldesL offlclal
documenL concernlng unlL 731 LhaL has been found Lo daLe

ln addlLlon Lo lnauguraLlng unlL 731 Lhls memo also lald Lhe foundaLlon for esLabllshlng Lwo
oLher unlLs lL called for Lhe esLabllshmenL of an addlLlonal blologlcal weapons developmenL
unlL lndependenL of lshll's unlL whlch was called Lhe kwanLung Army MlllLary Porse Lpldemlc
revenLlon Workshop (laLer referred Lo as Manchurla unlL 100) and for preparaLlons Lo seL up
a chemlcal weapons developmenL unlL called Lhe kwanLung Army 1echnlcal 1esLlng ueparLmenL
(laLer referred Lo as Manchurla unlL 316)

Several monLhs laLer Lhe memo's recommendaLlons were approved by Lmperor PlrohlLo Lhe
Lwo unlLs were esLabllshed and preparaLlons began for creaLlng Lhe 1esLlng ueparLmenL 1he
MlnlsLry of War !ournal for May 21 1936 recorded Lhls developmenL under Lhe headlng
lmperlal Pearlng on MlllLary lorce lmprovemenL ConsequenL upon 8udgeL Approval" 1he
[ournal noLed unlLs concerned wlLh epldemlc prevenLlon Cne unlL each ls esLabllshed for
epldemlc prevenLlon among humans and horses"

Pavlng been offlclally esLabllshed unlL 731 moved lLs faclllLles from 8elylnhe Lo a newly
esLabllshed laboraLory aL a hosplLal ln Parbln 1hls laboraLory served as a fronLllne
headquarLers whlle Lhe unlL's permanenL faclllLles were belng bullL ln lngfan ouLslde of Lhe
clLy of Parbln 1hese faclllLles were compleLed and capable of conducLlng research ln Lhe fall of
1939 afLer Lhe hosLlllLles aL nomonhan (on Lhe border beLween Manchurla and Mongolla) had
ended

WlLh Lhe consLrucLlon of Lhe lngfan faclllLles Lhe prlmary research sLaff changed ln
composlLlon from Lhe mlllLary docLors of Lhe 1ogo unlL Lo prlvaLesecLor medlcal researchers
afflllaLed wlLh unlverslLles and oLher lnsLlLuLlons 1he flrsL group Lo be posLed Lo Lhe unlL was a
Leam of elghL asslsLanL professors and lnsLrucLors from kyoLo lmperlal unlverslLy ln Lhe sprlng
of 1938 1he group conslsLed of Lwo bacLerlologlsLs Lhree paLhologlsLs Lwo physlologlsLs and
one researcher speclallzlng ln experlmenLs uslng anlmals WlLhln a year a second group had
arrlved aL Lhe faclllLy and Lhe research sLaff had expanded conslderably 1he promlnence of
researchers ln paLhology and physlology ln Lhe developmenL of blologlcal weapons reflecLed
Lhe need for speclallzed [udgmenL ln assesslng Lhe resulLs of human experlmenLaLlon


1he unlL 731 8ulldlng
8econsLrucLed as a
Museum aL lngfanWlLh Lhe expanslon of Lhe war fronL LhroughouL Chlna afLer 1937 slsLer
unlLs afflllaLed wlLh unlL 731 were esLabllshed ln ma[or Chlnese clLles 1hese unlLs were also
called Lpldemlc revenLlon and WaLer Supply ueparLmenLs (unlL 1833 was esLabllshed ln
8el[lng on lebruary 9 1938 unlL 1644 ln nan[lng on Aprll 18 1939 and unlL 8604 ln
Cuangzhou on Aprll 8 1939) LaLer afLer !apan occupled Slngapore a slmllar unlL (unlL 9420)
was esLabllshed Lhere on March 26 1942 1hese afflllaLes comprlsed Lhe scope of Lhe lshll
neLwork Lhrough Lhe end of Lhe war As of Lhe end of 1939 (LhaL ls before Lhe esLabllshmenL of
Lhe Slngapore unlL) Lhe neLwork had a LoLal sLaff of 10043 of whlch 4898 were asslgned Lo
Lhe core unlLs ln 1okyo and lngfan

Puman LxperlmenLaLlon

Puman experlmenLaLlon Look place aL all of Lhe unlLs of Lhe lshll neLwork buL lL was conducLed
sysLemaLlcally by unlL 731 and unlL 1644 Cf Lhese Lwo Lhere are exLanL reporLs from a uS
Army survey of human experlmenLaLlon by unlL 731 so Lhe general ouLllne of lLs program ls
known


LxLerlor remalns of
unlL 731 aL lngfan

1he followlng Lable was complled from Lwo sources a reporL Lo uS occupaLlon auLhorlLles
daLed uecember 12 1947 by Ldwln Plll and !oseph vlcLor concernlng human experlmenLaLlon
by unlL 731 and relaLed faclllLles and a llsL of speclmens broughL back Lo !apan by a unlL 731
paLhologlsL ln !uly 1943 Aslde from lshll and anoLher unlL leader klLano Masa[l Lhe names of
lndlvldual researchers do noL appear Lhey are ldenLlfled as mlllLary personnel (M prlmarlly
mlllLary docLors) (C) clvlllan Lechnlclans conducLlng research wlLhln Lhe mlllLary and (1) parL
Llme researchers worklng ouLslde of Lhe mlllLary

1he number of speclmens reflecLs Lhe number of sub[ecLs who dled as a resulL of human
experlmenLaLlon as of !uly 1943 ConsequenLly Lhe LoLal number of vlcLlms of human
experlmenLaLlon aL Lhe Llme of !apan's surrender Lwo years laLer would be hlgher Lhan Lhese
flgures 1he flgures also do noL lnclude vlcLlms of germ bomb LesLs aL Lhe Anda fleld LesL slLe or
from oLher experlmenLs

Sub[ecL 8esearcher 1oLal Speclmens Medlcally usable Speclmens
anLhrax M 36 31
boLullnus lshll 2 0
brucellosls lshll M C M 3 1
CC polsonlng 1 0
cholera C C 133 30
dysenLery M M 1 1 M 21 12
glanders lshll C 22 20
menlnglLls lshll C 3 1
musLard gas 16 16
plague lshll C M C 180 42
plague (from Lhe Shlnkyo Changchun epldemlc) 66 64
polson 2 0
salmonella M C 14 11
Songo (epldemlc hemorrhaglc fever) C klLano C 101 32
smallpox lshll C 4 2
sLrepLococcus 3 1
sulclde 30 11
LeLanus lshll 1 C 32 14
Llck encephallLls C klLano 2 1
LsuLsugamushl (scrub Lyphus) C 2 0
Luberculosls C lshll 82 41
Lyphold C C 63 22
Lyphus C M C klLano C 26 9
vacclne 2 2
1oLal 830 403

1echnlclans who were clvlllan employees of Lhe army were LreaLed as offlcers 1he sLaLus of
clvlllan employees ranged from lnfanLryclass Lo generalclass buL Lechnlclans were LreaLed as
lleuLenanLs and above 8anklng below Lhe Lechnlclans were operaLors clerks and sLaff lor Lhe
mosL parL Lhe lshll neLwork Look on unlverslLy researchers as Lechnlclans 1he parLLlme
researchers were parLLlme employees of Lhe MlllLary Medlcal School Lpldemlc revenLlon
8esearch LaboraLory Lhey were professors aL 1okyo and kyoLo lmperlal unlverslLles who were
conLracLed Lo perform research ln Lhelr own laboraLorles ln shorL a large number of clvlllan
researchers were moblllzed

8lologlcal Warfare 1rlals

lor Lhe mosL parL Lhe use of Lhe blologlcal weapons developed by Lhe lshll neLwork amounLed
Lo fleld Lrlals

1he flrsL of Lhese Lrlals Look place durlng Lhe nomonhan lncldenL ln 1939 ln AugusL Loward Lhe
end of Lhe hosLlllLles paLhogens LhaL cause gasLrolnLesLlnal dlsease were placed ln Lhe PolsLen
8lver a LrlbuLary of Lhe Palha 8lver LhaL Lhe SovleL Army used as lLs source of waLer lL ls noL
clear how many SovleL soldlers suffered from Lhls aLLack buL lL ls LhoughL LhaL casualLles were
noL wldespread 1hls was because Lhe Lyphold baclllus and Lhe oLher paLhogens LhaL were used
lose Lhelr lnfecLlvlLy when placed ln waLer 1hls facL was known Lo lshll's group lL ls LhoughL
LhaL Lhey noneLheless carrled ouL Lhe aLLack because Lhey wanLed Lo conducL a fleld LesL of
blologlcal weapons ln combaL Whlle Lhere were llkely few SovleL casualLles aL leasL one
!apanese soldler became lnfecLed when he spllled llquld from a drum fllled wlLh conLamlnaLed
waLer whlle dumplng lL lnLo Lhe rlver Pe dled of Lyphold fever aL an army hosplLal ln Pallar

uurlng Lhe followlng year 1940 larger scale fleld Lrlals were conducLed ln cenLral Chlna uslng
blologlcal weapons dropped from alrplanes 1he paLhogens were culLlvaLed by unlL 731 and
shlpped Lo unlL 1644 ln nan[lng whlch served as Lhe forward base for Lhe aLLacks whlch
conLlnued unLll 1942 uurlng Lhe flrsL Lwo years Lhese aLLacks were carrled ouL ln clLles along
Lhe Chang 8lver Cf Lhese Lhe largescale aLLack on Lhe clLy of nlngbo on CcLober 27 1940 ls
well documenLed and has also been Lhoroughly lnvesLlgaLed by Lhe Chlnese

1he aLLack Look place aL 7 am from heavy bombers flylng a lowalLlLude run aL 200 meLers 1he
bombers dropped fleas graln and sLrlps of coLLon on Lhe sLreeLs ln Lhe cenLer of Lhe clLy 1he
fleas were lnfecLed wlLh Lhe plague 1hey had lngesLed blood from plaguelnfecLed raLs and
were called plague fleas" 1he plague bacLerla were noL dlsslpaLed dlrecLly as lL was
consldered more effecLlve Lo lnfecL Lhe carrler fleas and release Lhem ln order Lo LargeL a
speclflc area wlLh a focused aLLack lL was also expecLed LhaL Lhe bacLerla would llve longer ln
Lhe bodles of Lhe fleas 1he fleas were dropped wlLh graln and coLLon Lo ensure LhaL Lhey
reached Lhe LargeL area and lL was also LhoughL LhaL Lhe coLLon would absorb some of Lhe
shock of lmpacL on Lhe ground

1he flrsL deaLh was recorded on Lhe fourLh day CcLober 30 and casualLles lncreased rapldly ln
Lhe days LhaL followed 8y november 2 lL was clear LhaL Lhe dlsease was an epldemlc and Lhe
area was sealed off as dlseaseconLamlnaLed 1he nexL day lL was deLermlned LhaL Lhe dlsease
was Lhe plague 8y Lhen 37 deaLhs had been reporLed 1he quaranLlne lmposed on Lhe area
slowed Lhe spread of Lhe epldemlc

1he plague epldemlc ended on uecember 2 wlLh Lhe deaLh of Lhe lasL Lwo vlcLlms ueaLhs
LoLaled 106 people 1hese flgures were reporLed ln a survey conducLed by Lwo nlngbo
researchers and publlshed ln March 1994 by uongnan unlverslLy ress 1hls hlsLorlcal accounL
of Lhe epldemlc Lracked down all of Lhe vlcLlms and llsLed Lhem by name and lL ls Lhus a very
valuable documenL

1hls aLLack kllllng more Lhan one hundred people was Lhe mosL leLhal ln Lhls serles of aLLacks
on Chlnese clLles Powever when one conslders LhaL Lhe aLLack was carrled ouL by heavy
bombers on a rlsky lowalLlLude run Lhese resulLs have Lo be consldered a mlllLary fallure

1here were Lwo prlmary reasons for Lhls fallure llrsL Lhe bacLerla used was so lnfecLlous LhaL lL
lmmedlaLely seL off alarms among lLs vlcLlms Second Lhe efforL suffered from exaggeraLed
expecLaLlons of Lhe ablllLy Lo arLlflclally spark an epldemlc ln lebruary 1941 lshll reporLed Lo hls
superlor offlcer LL Cen ka[lLsuka 8yu[l chlef of Lhe medlcal deparLmenL of Lhe kwanLung
Army lL ls noL as easy as some people Lhlnk and as l once LhoughL Lo dellberaLely spread
lnfecLlous dlsease Whlle lnfecLlous dlsease spreads readlly ln naLural clrcumsLances numerous
obsLacles are encounLered when arLlflclally spreadlng lnfecLlon and someLlmes greaL palns
musL be Laken Lo overcome Lhese" 2 lL was expecLed LhaL paLhogens dropped ln a densely
populaLed area llke nlngbo would qulckly spread person Lo person buL Lhese expecLaLlons
were beLrayed

CreaL lallures

ln november 1940 Lhe monLh afLer Lhe aLLack on nlngbo Lhe Chlnese began Lo Lake
counLermeasures ln response Lo blologlcal warfare aLLacks on urban populaLlons Cn november
28 Lhe cenLral Chlnese clLy of !lnhua suffered an aLLack 1he resulL was a fallure Accordlng Lo a
Chlnese MlnlsLry of PealLh documenL AL Lhe Llme LhaL Lhe plague epldemlcs were conLlnulng
ln nlngbo and lLs vlclnlLy Lhree !apanese alrplanes flew over !lnhua and dropped a large
number of small granules Lhe slze of small shrlmp eggs 1hese sLrange ob[ecLs were gaLhered
and examlned aL a local hosplLal 1hey showed Lhe physlcal characLerlsLlcs of Lhe bacLerla
LhaL cause Lhe plague ln any case Lhe plague dld noL break ouL ln !lnhua and as far as Lhls Lown
was concerned Lhe !apanese experlmenL ln germ warfare ended ln fallure"

no efforL was made Lo collecL Lhe maLerlal dropped from Lhe alrplanes on nlngbo buL one
monLh laLer Lhe ob[ecLs dropped on !unhua were gaLhered and analyzed 1here had been rapld
progress ln securlng evldence ln response Lo Lhe aLLacks lL ls also llkely LhaL Lownspeople were
warned Lo sLay lnslde Lhelr houses As a resulL Lhe !apanese experlmenL was deemed a fallure

8lologlcal weapons are noL only useful as poLenL means of war Lhelr use can also be
accompanled by an lmporLanL elemenL of sLraLeglc dlslnformaLlon lf lL ls clalmed LhaL Lhe
enemy lLself used Lhem or lf lL ls lmplled LhaL Lhey were used ln reLallaLlon ln Lhls sense when
blologlcal weapons are used one LacLlc ls Lo cause confuslon as Lo wheLher Lhey were used or
noL buL lf Lhe enemy deems Lhe Lrlal uses a fallure Lhe LacLlc lLself falls declslvely

noneLheless Lhe Lrlal use of blologlcal weapons on cenLral Chlnese clLles conLlnued ln Lhe fall of
1941 Cne of Lhe LargeLs was Lhe clLy of Changde abouL 1000 kllomeLers easL of Shanghal ln Lhe
Chlnese lnLerlor 1he Chlnese applled Lhe lessons Lhey learned Lhe prevlous year and were able
Lo keep casualLles ln Lhe slngle dlglLs 1hus Lhe resulLs of Lhe Lrlals Lhrough Lhe end of 1941
lndlcaLed LhaL dropplng plague fleas from alrplanes as a means of aLLacklng urban areas was
qulLe lneffecLlve

8eglnnlng ln 1942 !apan began dropplng paLhogens from alrplanes lnLo baLLlefleld zones on a
scale LhaL amounLed Lo a combaL operaLlon ln Aprll !apan launched Lhe Zhe[lang campalgn ln
Lhls campalgn lshll and company carrled ouL masslve blologlcal weapons aLLacks Cholera
bacLerla was Lhe maln paLhogen employed and Lhe aLLacks resulLed ln more Lhan 10000
casualLles lL has also been reporLed LhaL some vlcLlms conLracLed dysenLery and Lhe plague
More Lhan 1700 soldlers dled mosLly from cholera 1hls would have been consldered a greaL
success for Lhe lshll group buL for Lhe facL LhaL all of Lhe vlcLlms were !apanese soldlers

A !apanese medlc capLured by Amerlcan forces aL Lhe end of 1944 descrlbed Lhe casualLles
among Lhe !apanese army durlng hls lnLerrogaLlon When !apanese Lroops overran an area ln
whlch a blologlcal weapons aLLack had been made durlng Lhe Cheklang Zhe[lang campalgn ln
1942 casualLles upward from 10000 resulLed wlLhln a very brlef perlod of Llme ulseases were
parLlcularly cholera buL also dysenLery and pesL bubonlc plague vlcLlms were usually rushed
Lo hosplLals ln rear SLaLlsLlcs whlch CW saw aL WaLer Supply and urlflcaLlon uepL Pq aL
nanklng showed more Lhan 1700 dead chlefly from cholera CW belleves LhaL acLual deaLhs
were conslderably hlgher 'lL belng a common pracLlce Lo pare down unpleasanL flgures'" 3

A new 1ype of 8omb

AfLer Lhe 1942 fallure Lhe !apanese army general sLaff losL all confldence ln Lhe efflcacy of
blologlcal weapons 1he pressure was on Lo flnd a new approach LhaL would ensure Lhe safeLy
of frlendly Lroops and dellver a more rellable more devasLaLlng blow Lo Lhe enemy

1he new approach developed was Lo pack Lhe paLhogens ln bombs or shells whlch would be
dropped from alrplanes or dellvered by arLlllery 1hls would saLlsfy boLh of Lhe requlremenLs Lo
dellver masslve carnage whlle malnLalnlng Lhe safeLy of Lhe aLLacklng Lroops AL Lhe same Llme
Lhe only way Lo prevenL dlsasLers llke LhaL of Lhe Zhe[lang campalgn was Lo lmprove
communlcaLlon among Lhe Lroops

1wo hurdles confronLed Lhe efforL Lo load bombs wlLh paLhogens 1he flrsL was Lhe need Lo
keep Lhe paLhogens allve for long perlods of Llme 1he second was Lhe need Lo develop a bomb
made of maLerlals LhaL would break aparL upon lmpacL uslng llLLle or no exploslves Lhls would
prevenL Lhe paLhogen from belng desLroyed by heaL AlLernaLlvely lf a bombshell could noL be
made of fraglle maLerlal a paLhogen LhaL could wlLhsLand Lhe heaL of an exploslon would have
Lo be selecLed When a bomb or a shell lands people do noL lmmedlaLely gaLher aL Lhe polnL of
lmpacL so lL was necessary Lo convey Lhe paLhogen from LhaL spoL Lo wherever people were
Agaln a llve hosL llke a plague flea LhaL would physlcally carry Lhe paLhogen and lnfecL people
was consldered Lhe besL soluLlon Lo Lhls problem

A bacLerla bomb uslng Lhe plague bacLerla was developed Lo saLlsfy mosL of Lhese
requlremenLs 1he bomb used plague fleas packed ln a shell caslng of unglazed poLLery made
from dlaLomaceous earLh (a sofL sedlmenLary rock conLalnlng Lhe shells of mlcroscoplc algae)
1hls same maLerlal was used ln a waLer fllLer LhaL lshll had developed and paLenLed As Lhls
bomb would break aparL uslng mlnlmal exploslve lL was expecLed LhaL Lhe plague fleas lnslde
would survlve Lhe heaL and scaLLer ln all dlrecLlons Lo blLe people and spread Lhe dlsease 1hls
bomb called Lhe lshll bacLerlal bomb was perfecLed by Lhe end of 1944 ln Lhe beglnnlng of
1943 Lhe collecLlon of raLs wenL lnLo hlgh gear and unlL 731 wenL Lo work culLlvaLlng fleas Lo
be lnfecLed wlLh Lhe plague

!apan's uefeaL

1he maln force of unlL 731 lefL Lhe unlL headquarLers by Lraln soon afLer Lhe !apanese
surrender and reLurned Lo !apan beLween Lhe end of AugusL and early SepLember 1943 Some
members of Lhe unlL and offlcers of Lhe kwanLung Army were capLured by Lhe SovleL mlllLary
1welve of Lhese CWs were Lrled by Lhe SovleL unlon aL a war crlmes Lrlal ln khabarovsk ln
uecember 1949 ln addlLlon Lo members of unlL 731 offlcers of Lhe kwanLung Army and Lhe
army's chlef medlcal offlcer were also charged as responslble parLles All of Lhose charged were
glven prlson senLences ranglng from Lwo Lo LwenLyflve years buL aslde from one man who
commlLLed sulclde [usL before reLurnlng Lo !apan all had been repaLrlaLed by 1936 1he record
of Lhe khabarovsk Lrlal was publlshed ln 1930 as MaLerlals on Lhe 1rlal of lormer Servlcemen of
Lhe !apanese Army Charged wlLh ManufacLurlng and Lmploylng 8acLerlologlcal Weapons
(lorelgn Languages ubllshlng Pouse Moscow)

Cn Lhe oLher hand noL one of Lhe members of unlL 731 who reLurned Lo !apan was Lrled as a
war crlmlnal lnsLead Lhe Amerlcan mlllLary began lnvesLlgaLlng Lhe unlL ln SepLember 1943
and unlL offlcers were asked Lo provlde lnformaLlon abouL Lhelr warLlme research noL as
evldence of war crlmes buL for Lhe purpose of sclenLlflc daLa gaLherlng ln oLher words Lhey
were granLed lmmunlLy from prosecuLlon ln exchange for supplylng Lhelr research daLa 1he
Amerlcan lnvesLlgaLlon conLlnued Lhrough Lhe end of 1947 and resulLed ln four separaLe
reporLs 1he lnvesLlgaLlon Look place ln Lwo phases

1he flrsL phase resulLed ln Lhe Sanders 8eporL (daLed november 1 1943) and Lhe 1hompson
8eporL (daLed May 31 1946) 1hese Lwo reporLs conLalned lnformaLlon on Lhe unlL's bacLerla
bombs buL dld noL address Lhe sub[ecL of human experlmenLaLlon or Lhe Lrlal use of blologlcal
weapons klLano Masa[l who was ln Shanghal aL Lhe Llme of !apan's surrender was
lnLerrogaLed ln !anuary 1946 buL he was lnsLrucLed by LL Cen Arlsue Selzo Lhe !apanese chlef
of lnLelllgence LhaL he should noL Lalk abouL human experlmenLaLlon and blologlcal weapons
Lrlals" klLano laLer Lold Lhls wrlLer ln oLher words unLll LhaL Llme Lhese Lwo sub[ecLs had been
effecLlvely concealed

4 8ody dlsposal aL unlL 731

Powever aL Lhe end of 1946 Amerlcan auLhorlLles recelved noLlce from Lhe SovleLs LhaL Lhey
lnLended Lo Lry cases lnvolvlng human experlmenLaLlon and blologlcal warfare lshll and oLhers
were lnLerrogaLed agaln and Lhey conflrmed Lhe general conLenL of Lhe SovleL clalms 1he
Amerlcan lnvesLlgaLlon began anew headed by new lnvesLlgaLors 1wo addlLlonal reporLs were
produced Lhe lell 8eporL (daLed !une 20 1947) and Lhe Plll and vlcLor 8eporL (daLed
uecember 12 1947) 1hese documenLs descrlbed Lhe human experlmenLs conducLed by unlL
731 and lLs relaLed unlLs based prlmarlly on Lhe lnLerrogaLlon of researchers lnvolved ln Lhe
experlmenLs

1he Plll and vlcLor 8eporL concludes wlLh Lhe followlng evaluaLlon Lvldence gaLhered ln Lhls
lnvesLlgaLlon has greaLly supplemenLed and ampllfled prevlous aspecLs of Lhls fleld lL
represenLs daLa whlch have been obLalned by !apanese sclenLlsLs aL Lhe expendlLure of many
mllllons of dollars and years of work lnformaLlon had accrued wlLh respecL Lo human
suscepLlblllLy Lo Lhose dlseases as lndlcaLed by speclflc lnfecLlous doses of bacLerla Such
lnformaLlon could noL be obLalned ln our own laboraLorles because of scruples aLLached Lo
human experlmenLaLlon"

1he above accounL makes clear Lhe naLure of Lhe crlmes commlLLed by Lhe lshll unlL AL Lhe
same lL ls necessary Lo quesLlon Lhe responslblllLy of Lhe Amerlcan forces who provlded
lmmunlLy from prosecuLlon ln exchange for Lhe producL of Lhese crlmes

1bls essoy wos wtltteo by 1sooelsbl kellcbl fot pobllcotloo lo 5ekol seoso boozol jlteo
(ocyclopeJlo of wotlJ wot ctlmes) (8ooqel 5boojo 2002) eJlteJ by noto lkoblko 5ose
Mosomotl ooJ 1sooelsbl

1sooelsbl kellcbl ls o koooqowo uolvetslty ptofessot speclollzloq lo tbe blstoty of scleoce ooJ
Iopoos leoJloq speclollst oo bloloqlcol wotfote ooJ uolt 7J1

1toosloteJ by Iobo Iooketmoo o Jocomeototy fllmmoket llvloq lo 1okyo nls most teceot fllm
Iopoos leoce coostltotloo wlll be JlsttlboteJ lo Nottb Ametlco by lltst koo lcotos lllms ne ls
o Iopoo locos Assoclote losteJ ot Iopoo locos Novembet 20 2005

Sources

1sunelshl kellchl 731 8uLal SelbuLsu helkl hanzal no shln[lLsu (unlL 731 1he Lrue sLory behlnd
Lhe blologlcal weapons crlmes) (kodansha 1993)
1sunelshl kellchl lgakushaLachl no soshlkl hanzal (1he organlzed crlme of medlcal pracLlLloners)
(Asahl Shlmbun 1994 reprlnLed 1999)
kobayashl Pldeo and ko[lma 1oshlro eds 731 salklnsen buLal Chugoku shln shlryo (1he
bacLerlologlcal war unlL 731 new Chlnese documenLs) (lu[l Shuppan 1993)
1anaka Aklra and MaLsumura 1akao eds 731 8uLal sakusel shlryo (uocumenLs produced by
unlL 731) (lu[l Shuppan 1991)
1sunelshl kellchl MokuLekl lshll (1argeL lshll) (CLsukl ShoLen 1984)

5ootcebttp//jopoofocosotq/1sooelsbl_kellcbl/2194

1he goal of unlL 731 was Lo experlmenL wlLh germ warfare wlLh Lhe ulLlmaLe alm of uslng Lhese
weapons on Lhe unlLed SLaLes durlng Lhe war LxperlmenLs were conducLed on Chlnese clvlllans soldlers
and Amerlcan prlsoners of war 1hey ranged from llve dlssecLlons Lo Lhe dellberaLe lnfecLlon of
surroundlng vlllages wlLh dlseases such as Lhe bubonlc plague