Professional Documents
Culture Documents
K)Ki
The Director, fjecond *ear ulKga, 1930-31, Ocmm/md and General staff School, Port Leavenworthj, Kansas.
3* Maps* Idap Map Map Map Map No No ho )io No 1 2 3 * 6 wrtteneral - yhowing - allowing - yhovdng - shoeing map of the bat T* area and the ftpproaohes thereto tho pl*n of advmoe of ?.d i/ivision* situation as of 11:00 JM,18 duly*1918 situation as of 7j00 Afc,19 duly,1918. situation *s of 11*00 Fid, 19 duly,1918*
The division oommander and the chief of staff preceded the division,
going via 10th Army Headquarters to the headquarters of the 20th
Army Corps and there received copies or tho oorpw orders .for the
attack on the 18th and sane maps. At that time,night 16-17 July,
the division commander did not know when,where,or in what order
the division would arrive in the trucks and debuos* Then the division
commander and chief of staff went to the headquarters of the III Corps
(US) arriving there about midnight (night 16-17 duly) where they fouijui
General Bullard end part of his staff with scow office facilities*
Here General harbord received a brief description of the ground over
which the attack was to be made from a French officer with lii Corps
headquarters* This description together with the maps was the only
information available from whioh to prepRre the division orders for
the attaok* Reconnaissance by division commander and staff could
be made in time* ueneral harbord and his chief of staff,Colonel
Preston Brown, spent tho remainder of the night studying the maps,
and preparing ahd mimeographing the division attack order They had
no information as to the occupied areas,enemy strength,roads,traffic
oontrol, or arrival of the division* They started back about; daylight
on the 17th in a motor car to find the division end distribute the
orders* They found the 2d irield Artillery Brigade,whioh had arrived
some time before,near carrefour - d e - Nemours ready for the attack*
They met part of the troops on tha road and sent out officers to finl
others, iunued orders to concentrate units on their battle positions
The assembly and attack had to be nade to fit an order prepared at
a time when the location and order of arrival of the division were
not known to the division commander* Th^ remainder of the 17th v/ag
spend by the division commander and staff in locating elements of
the division,directing their movements to positions,getting ammuniti|3n
for the troops )
After debus sing on the morning of 17 July the troops learned that they
were to participate in the attack of the 10th inrenoh Army the next
day* They were now several kilometers behind their attack positions
and in a very, congested rear area* They spent the remainder of the
day marching toward the front* Orders were received during the march
for the attacking units* The march was difficult. Part of it was mad*
during a heavy rain,darkness, without prior roconnaisoanoe by oanma
ers,lack of information and instructions as to their destination in
many cases, misdirections,over congested and blocked roads Some trojops
marched for hours along sides of roads and in ditches(6)*
The latter part of the movement to attack positions on the night 17-18
July was particularly difficult due to darkness#blocked roads,un familiar routes and terrain,rain,mud,delays. The mops available
showed only approximate positions and boundaries* The division was
not responsible for traffic control, in addition the troops were
very tired having had no sleep for two nights (16-17, 17-18),no
water except what the men carried , only reserve rations carried on
the men since separation from their trains on 16 July, loaded with
packs and ammunition, and they had been almost constantly on the
move sinoe evening of the 16th# The division commander and staff
and the brigade and regimental commanders were doing their utmost
to get the troops through the strange,dark, Foret de Ketc to their
positions* Machine gun units and trains had not arrived* T^e infantxjy
trains did not arrive in time for the battje. Evacuation establishments
and equipment were delayed (6)*
Under these conditions and with great exertion on tho part ofcammandex s
and troops, the attacking infantry units renohed their attack positions
in time to follow the barrage, some units moving at double time for
hundreds of yards to do it. Machine gun units did not got up in time
for the attack* A small-arms ammunition dump was found in the foresH
and ammunition issued to the men as they passedV7)
(4) (5) (6) (7) (1-f* 2-a* 4-317,318,319,320,321,323* 6-217).
U-b,i,p,q,s* 4-323,325} 8-a,b,o,d,eJ
(l-J,pfq,s* 4-323,324,325* 8-a,b,o,d,e)
(l-q,r,8,t,u* 3-n,b,c,d,e* 4-323* 6-215 to 217* 8-*,o).
j j! i] j|
I | ! j : | j jj ]j jj I]
The fcd Division was tho right flank division of the FrenchfcOthiirmy Corps* The French 30th Army oorpc attacked on the right of the division and the French First Moroccan Division on i t s l e f t . The division tone of action was about l miles wide, in general,the j south boundary was from south of Uhavigny-Ferme-VauDcoastille-Hartennei at Taux-, ftnd the north boundary fenorftlly the lineiViviores-Le rransjon rerme-ville ivionterie, attacking in the general direction of Tigny and Droizy* This necessitated a change of direction during the attack as the attnck i n i t i a l l y wa north of east and changed to southeast after about 8^ miles advance* jthe normnl objective of the f i r s t ett&ek was a goner*1 nofcth < n south line through the eastern edge of vierty, a vd depth of about 5 milee* with two intermediate objectives wean of t l o t line* Tho Una of departure was the existing front line, the division to relieve or pas3 through French troops then holding it* The time of attach was 4t36 Ak,10 July* Tho 3d Brigade,on the right, attacked with 23d Inf and 9th Inf nbroast from right to left in the order given, eaoh regiment i n i t i a l l y in column of tittalions* Tho 6th Marines attaokod on l e f t of 3d Brigade* The6th Marines in corps reserve, and tho 2d Knflneers and 4th Kaohine Gun Battalion in division reserve* Tho 2d Field Artillery brigade with a regiment of French artillery f<ttn.che<3 supporter1 the attack* The 11th indl2!:h oroupings of Tanks ^French) assisted the attack^)* The Jit'ack started at 4:35 AM, 18 )uly, the infantry precodod by an artillery barrage and accompanied by French tnnks In the f i r s t wav** Rapid progress vras made in the i n i t i a l stages* ttnomy artillery fire was weak. The effect of surprioo vms evident* By 6:00 AM,Beaupaire b't\?m was captured and tho division had suffered only slight, casualties so far* By lljOO A ras^ult elomonts had ro^ched a nortli and south M line through v*uxcastille* Continuing rapid progress by liOO PM, the normal objeotivo for the f i r s t attack had been raaohed except part of tho tov/n of Vieray on the south* U to this point losses p had not been s3ver'j*Here tho onemy resistance stiffened and the fighting for Vierzy continuing during the afternoon* The attack slowed down beforo 4:00 PM#^nd tho troops ht\& be cane intermingled* The 5th Marines on the l e f t of the division had been delayed for time at Vierre Fieuilles Forme but overcame this resistance (9)*
The division commander issued orders, the written order is dated 1:30
18 July, for a renewal of the attack-* This became known as the soconjl
attack* The objectivo was ftartennes et Ta\-Bois de Oonoroia* Oeneval
81jfji5d Brigade* on his wry back to the division command post to ixiform
the division commander of the situation met the latter enroute and j
from him received the order for the second attack* The written order
of the division prescribed that the attack be mada on receipt of the
order* tfenerai Ely made his way back over the congested road to
the location of his regimental commanders *iv';Beftup^ire Farm and ther
issued his orders for \ho second attack between 4j00 and 6:00 PM,
the orders prescribing that the attack be made*JL* soon as possible
and not later than 6jC0 PM8* Due to the battlefield congestion,
mixture of units, and lack of communications, i\: was impossible to
get orders to tho troops quickly* The orders did not reach all of
the units concerned until som e time after 6:00 PM* The division
The 3d Brigade
artil ry had displaced forward early in the dayv attacked on the whole division front; 23d Infantry on the rightfindI
9th Infantry on the left* The 5th Marines,originally attacking on the
left of 3d Brigade,and now pinched out, were attached to the brig^deL
I
one battalion,the 2d weia attached to nnd Joined9th Infantry ond participated in the fight* The 1st battalion waa attached to 23d Infkntry
but did not join the regiment in tho attack* Later, on orders of th
brigade commander, it advaned through Vieray about tho s*me time ate
the 23d Infantry got thoough there. The 3d Battalion had been ordered in
brigade reserve but it had been used up in reinforcing the otherA
M
battalions of theregiment # provos$ guards and carrying patties* left the brigade without a. reserve in the seoond nttaok 110)*
The 20th Army Corps ordered f resumption of the attack for 4|00 All, 19
t July to aeoure the final objective of the 10bh Army attack* The
order waa received at headquarters of the 2d Division at 2jOO AM, 19th*
orders could not be issued and the troops prepared for the attaok at
the time given consequently the attack waa dolayed for some hours*
Due to the existing dispositions, exhausted condition, and losses, :
the troops employed in the battle on the 18th were not included in the
attack on the 19th* This left the 6th Marines and 2d engineers
available to resume the attack* The division cannwnder regarded this
force as inadequate but the attack was ordered* The objective waa
tho Bois de hartennes-Bois de Concrois,both inclusive* The infantry
attaok to be m^de by 6th Marines and 6th Machine Gun Battalion, with
the 1st Battalion of the 2d Engineers in reserve* Available tanks
^French) were attached to *asault units* Th attacking troops were
ordered to effeot passage of front lines at 7tOO All, the troops then
in line to remain in position until passed through* The 6th Marines
nd 2d Engineers received these orders between 5t00 and 6s 00 AM on
19th*
The attacking troaps passed through the 3d Brigade after 7s00 AM and
advanced on their objective* They met strong resistance early and
it continued* Th uerraans had superiority of the iir and their planet
operating at low altitudes over the division sone attacked the troops
rnd directed artillery fire* The enemy artillery and machine guns we'r
very active all dny and thoir fire effective* Karly in the morning
a liorman counterattack agrvinst the left of the 9th Infnmtry was re pulsed* Advancing against strong enemy resistance, especially from
vicinity of Tigny, and suffering severe casualties, by Is00 Hi, the
6th Marines had gained a line, generally north and south, just west
of Tigny* They could advance no farther* All supports *nd reserves
of. -thfrnregiment had been put in the line* Finding that farther advande
oould not be made, the attacking troops dug in and held their po3itioi^#
Th* losses of the 6th Marines in this attack were estimated as 40 per
cent of effectives* Th tanks (French) assisted tha attaok and sustain ed heavy losses The 1st Battalion of the 2d Engineers,which had
been in division reserve, first took a position in rear to support thi
attack, but later moved up end assisted in consolidating the position
gained by the attacking line* The 4th aia^hine gun bBttalian remained
behind tho position of the 3d Brigade* The 3d Brigade and 6th Marin remained on the saiue general line held by them whon passed through*Th<
division oonunfcnder 3ent a battalion to protect the left flnnk Again
the flanks of the division were exposed until tho J*'irat Moroooan
Division moved up on th* left about 3tOO HI, and a French cavalry
brigade covered the right of the division during the afternoon*(15)*
Again the communications ware poor, and in some oases failed altogether
During the day *bher were many conflicting reports of the looations
and status of units .Evacuation of casualties did not meet the re quirements du to insufficient personnel, transportation,equipage,
and the congested traffio conditions*Map No 5 shows the locations of
the troop8 at the end of the fight on the 19th 16)
The infantry and marines lost heavily in battle casualties, estimated
at the time as over 60 peroent in 9th and 23d Infantry and 40 percent
in the 6th Marine*, the numbers and percentages for the other units
not being given* What appears to be the best ovidence of the losses
of ths whole divlaion during thebattle is the war diary of the
division* x^e vmr diary for 17 July shows a total of 1149 officers
and 24006 men available for duty, and th<* war diary for 21 July shows
867 officers and 19657 men available for duty{17)*
1#qtrf 2-f* 3-t* 4-327,328* 8-a,b*o)
l-l f p # q # r* 3-w,x,,*a 4-326f327* 8-f
3-s,t,u#x,aa* 4-327,328# 16-367,371)
l-i,q,s,w* 8-a,b,o,d,e* 16-371*
On 19 July, hour not indicated, the division oommnder, General Harbord in a report to the uommanding ueneral, 20th Army Corps, stated that the troops engaged i n the fight on the 18th were exhausted and that i t was neoessary to mala* tha ati;aok on the 19th with the 6th Marines supported by a battalion of the 2d engineer<s, which he regarded as an inadequate force* ha further stated that the line then was approximately north and south through rigny nd was held up, that his l e f t flank was threatened by being exposed and that jnrenoh troops were not yet im posession of paroy-xigny on the right of the division but did not oon sider the right flank i n danger beoaus* of trench cavalry being between the d i v i s i o n s right and the *renoh 56th Division. This report contained the following! M I do not anticipate that my division w i l l not be able to hold what i t has already gained, but I desire to i n s i s t most strongly1 that they should not be oalled upon for further offensive effort* [ 7hn followed a resume of the conditions under *fchioh the troops entarea the battle, the lack of food # water, r e s t , eto, end the report ended irith the follcmring recommendation? 11 I t i s earnestly recommended that this condition, whioh e x i s t s as a result of no fault of anyone oonxieoted with tMs division, bo reoognized and the further prosecution of the offensive on our front be done by divisions in IJthe second l i n e , passing them through our present p03itiori8 438) # /. copy of thin report i s pppended to t h i s study Appendix Z)% At about 5*00 PM,19 uuly, the division received orders for i t s r e l i e f
by the jrrenoh 68th Uolcmial uivision* The r e l i e f wae mede the night
19-20 July, the division ^less the 2d uield Artillery Brigade;, moving
to v i c i n i t y of rierrefonds ?nd Tallefontaine in army reserve The
artillery brigade remained in positions nnj later continuedto support
the attack until the nipht 25-26 Uuly, when i t was relieved and
rejoined the division' (16)
;
(19J
(i-r)
l l
liiatribution of the orddr was difficult due to the short time available
widlaok of ctamunioationa facilities* The march to position* over
muddy end pongested roads might be considered as normal, but in this
oase it was over unfamiliar routes over which the division exeroised
no control of traffic and under confusion and lack of direction* The
subordinate commanders, particularly regimental and battalion, had
little or no time for reconnaissance, and scant time for issue of thejlr
orders Yrfhile seme of the leading elements had a little time to
prepare for the attack others had to move at double time in order to
follow the barrage when it started* The troops were tired v/hen they
started the attack on the morning of the 18th* The rapid advance
made communication difficult, especially in the forward areas* The
failure of oontact on flunks with mrench troops addod to the difficulties
of the attack.
blBLIOGRAPbX.
3 . Reoords of the Second DiTision (Re b ular), Field Messages, 2d DiT., 2d FA Brig,,3d Inf Brig.,4th Inf Brig., 1918, Volume 4 . a* Messages 17 July,1918, fron Offioer in Charge of Trine t o trains and machine gun u n i t s . b. Message No 1,156 AM, 18 July, from CO,23d Inf., to CG,2d DiT. 0. Telephone oonTersation C of S,2d DiT#,to Hq.2Oth Army Corps,
2 f 00 AM, IS July.
d. Message from M*jor Hall,3d Brig.,(apparently to 2d DiT),6126 AM,
18 July.
e. f. g. h. 1. j . k. 1* m. n. o. p. /( q. r. s . t . u. T. yr. x. y. . aa. Message from CO,23d I n f . , t o CG,3d Brig and 2d DiT.,6:36 AM, 18 Julj Message from C0,23d I n f . , t o C 3d Brig and 2d DiT.,6jll AM,18 Julj G Message from Major Hall,3d Brig.,6x00 AM,18 July, Message from O "A",5*50 AM, 18 July. P Message No 4 from Mai Hall,Adjt.,3d Urig.,to 2d DiT.,8i30 AM,18 Ji Message ( l e t t e r form; 2d Engineers,9t25 PM,18 July. Messages from brig G^n A.JJ3owley,2d FA B r i g . , t o 2d DiT.,3$05 PM,' 18 July. Message from C0,2d Engrs.,to C of S.,2d DiT.,9:25 PM,18 July, Message (No l)CG,3d Brig.,to CG>?d DiT.,9*30 PM,18 July, Message Cren Ely,3d Brig.,to C of S.,2d DiT (for CG),9:30 PM,18 Jul|y. (I) Message, Upton,9th I n f . , t o 2d DiTHq,12j30 PM,18 July,1918. (2) Message Hq 23d Inf,to CG,2d DiT.,Reod 8s26 PM,18 July, 1918. Memo for Col Brown,4:50 PM,18 July,from AC of S.,G-3. Memo for Col Brovm,8:25 pM,18 July from AC of a,G-3.
toemo for C of S.,8:30 PM,19 July,from A of S.,G-3
C Message from Upton (9th Inf) to Ctr,2d DiT.,1:116 PM,18 July, Message from 4th ^rig.msigned fKeyser, 11*30 AM, 18 July. Message (No 4) C0,2d Engrs,to 0 of S,2d DiT.,2ilO AM, 19 July, Message (No 5) C0,2d Kngrs.,to C of 8,6t00 AM,19 July, Message C0,2d Gngrs,to C of S,2d DiT.,10|37 AM,19 July. Message,CO,6th Marines,to C0,2d DiT., 11*45 AM, 19 July.
Message C (Harbord) to 0G,3d brig, 11%45 AM, 19 July.
G ttsssag* CO,3d urig.j-ho CG,2d DiT.,12 : 40 PM,19 July, Message of C of S (Preston Brow) 1:50 P 19 July. M Message CO,4th Brig.,to 2d DiT., 11-36 PM,19 July,
Message CG,3d Brig., to CG,2d DiT., 4:25 PM,19 July.
4* Leaves 1*TGBI a War idary, By w ajor General Oames G. Harbord,U.S.Army, Retired List. Dodd,Mead and Company, New York, 1916. 5. Personalities And Remirdsioenoe* of the War, By Roberl Lee Bullard, Major ueneral,U.S.A., Retired. Doubleday, Page & Company, wew York, 1926. 6. A.E.F. (Ten Years Ago in France), By Mftjor (ieneral Hunter Liggett. Dodd, Mead, & Company, New York, 1928. 7. A Guide To The American Battlefields In Europe. Prepared by The American Battle Monuments Commission. U.S.GoTernment Printing Office, Washington, 1927. 8. Reoords of the Second DiTision (Regular), Operations lv eportt, War
Diaries, patrol Reports; 9th Infantry, 23d Infantry, 6th and 6th
Uarines*2d Jttngineers, 1918, Volume 7.
a. Report of Operations,23d Infantry,July 17,18,19,1918# . b. Report of Operations,2d Engineers,July 16-21,1918. o. Report 9th Infantry, battle of beaupaire Farm, 18 July, 1918, aad same 21, July. d. Reports,5th Marines 1st Battalion, Operations 16-20 July, 1918 2d battalion, Attack northeast of Viersy,18-19 July,1918. 3d Battalion, dated 21 July,1918, ueoent Operations. 5th Marines, Operations 16-20 July,1918 8th Machine Gun Compary - Mepot of Operations* e. Reports and *eoords,6th Marines History of 2d Battalion, July 13-26,1918* Military history,3d battalion, June 1-August 10,1918. Report of Operations^H^adquarters CcmpAny, 19-July. Synopsis of Attack on Tigny by 74th uompftor#la^ Battalion. AdTanoe of 2d Battalion,6th Marines, 19 July. f. Report,00 2d ngrs # to C 3d brig.,Operations of 2d Engineers G under oommnnd of 3d Brig. > History of lv M,9th Inf., Soissons-Reims OffensiTe.
Co Operations eport f oo 1,9th Inf^oissons Seotor.
to
9. Records of the Second Division (Regular), Field Brderg 3d and 4th Brigades. 1918-1919,Volume 2 #
a* Field orders No 26, Td brigade,18 July 1918, 4*30 PM.
10 xteoords of the Second Division (Regular)Operatione reports And War Diajbios, 12th Ml, 16th FA, 17th FA,4th M Bn,6th M Bn,6th *iG B n . , l s t Field SigjBnt, O O 2d T n8 , 1918, Volume 8* * War Diary,4th M Bn,vJuly 19,1918* O b# Operations deport,Go A,4th M Bn#yApril 6-<July 29,1918* O o. War Diary,4th M Bn,19 July,1018# O d Report of Operations!6th M Bn>,dated 21 duly,1918,to UG,3d G Brig # 1U Records of thefcleocmdDivision (Regular), Field Messages of 9th Inf#,
23d Inf # ,6th and 6th Marines,12th FA,15th FA,17th *A,2d Kngrs#4th
6th 6th M Bns#,1918, Volume 6*
O & Message 2d Bn,5th Marines,to CO,5th M arineo, lOiOO P 18 July M 12 Monograph Soissons*
a # Book 7, Order Ho 1262/3,2pth Army Oorps, 18 duly*
13 9th b 9 ginfantry In The World war, published at Niefwied,Germany,Feb
and M 1 U
14 Official History,Second Engineers and Seoond engineer Train, U.S .Army,
in the World War (Publishers and date not given)
15. The United States Marines in the World War, by Edwin N MoClellan,
toajor,UtS#Marines, Washington, Government Printing Offio9il920
16c The Medical Apartment of the United States Army in the World War,
Prepared uAder the direction of the Surgeon ueneralf Washington,
Government printing Offioe#1926#
A Military History of the World War, by Colonel O.R.Hcfwland, Infantijy
U^S.Amy,Volumes I and II, The uenaral Service Schools Preti,
Fort Leavenworth,Kansa, 1923#
A l l sources were obtained from the library of the Command and General
Staff School, Fort ^earenworth, Kansas*
11
Appendix 2*
A copy of report ^letter) Iron ucannanding *eneral,2d Division, to O C M *
Branding General,20th Army Oorps, 19 July, 1918* Jiartracted trcm Keoord*
of Second idvisiou Regular; # 1918 # volume 6* Appended because pf its
direct bearing on answers to the questions residing in the subjeot of
the study*
HKADQUAKTKKti H&WHL) DIVISION
19 uly 1918
Major ueneral,n#A*
! {' -n'
Ho 1 . -i pro*ehl
To <ccai^ -ny n A Study Of The . Id Divi-sion On 10 J u l y , 1911,. nyi l e f i o l d s In E by Tl.n .neric'.n B' 1'- I onucwnt Coti i s ^ i ^ n . Ubtind frc ^i\a o (iSS.
V rr
t ! - r o u t t i U
,.tv
'
W'/CJ
p No Z* Shovln, pl^n of *dvn.nco of tho v& Division* To ncocrmpAny "* Study Of Tho K*Hof of The <d Division on 19 0uly,19l8,*^8on8,/nd J Conditions* neproduod frco sooond Division ubfeinod ffn Library, u&0SSt
(Editor's note: There i s no date on original. Thio .nap applies to Operations of the 3coond Division, July 13 20, 191S. SECTION I
Map reference:
0ULCHY-le-CIUT2AU) ,/
SECTION I I
-J.lt.
t?o
30 T - H CORPS
Map reference:
.. ...ML.
190
AN Oh AOVANJ^iKfe^^v
I
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3O T - H C0PPS
No 3 . Showing the s i t u a t i o n <KS of 11:00 ] ' PM.18 July,1918. To aocampany "A Study Of The Relief Of The 2d Division on 19 July,1918, Kelsons, Conditions. Reproduced from Second Division Kocords. Obtained from Library,C&GSS. c o
IPt. 0 Co.3 0
V1
MG o
3c
177
7?
v" HI
2P1B
Co.E Be aurepa.
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less C08.L&M
VIERZY 3ECT0R Dravm b y direction of Division Engineer SECOND U.S. DIVISION SCALE; 1:20,000 July ?0, 19
UP 10, 3 BATTLE of VIERZY Situation at 11:00 P.J. 16 *uly, 191S. Dravm under Direction of D,vision Engineer 2nd U.S. DIVISION Scale: l:20,o<0
^Y
Infantry & Marines based on best available data M.G. Battalions based on beet available data EngineerH .Germane, outlined
mm) 0mj OB V ^V W
M <A W # MM W
AV ^**
mm> ^m m^
^M
mm a m ^ B m
^ mm mm OM ^ ^ ^ *
UZf
1 Pt 0
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k M 0* G
Pt Co.C
,3>dex\
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Co.Dte
W. y$#\
VIERZY SECTOR Drawn by direction of Division Engineer SECOND U.S. DIVISION
Scale 1:20.000
July 20,1913
4
MAP NO.
to 6 O
7
BATTLE of VIERZY/^ Situation at 7:00 A.M.,*6 July,191S. Drawn under Direction of Division
Engineer
2nd U.Si DIVISION
Scale 1*20,000
L E G E N D
Map i\io 5. Shoving s i t u a t i o n as of 11-00 Vi\ 19 July,1918 lo ao Compaq -A Study Of The KG l i e f Of Vhe 2d Division on 19 duly, 1918, ue*isons,y.nd Conditions* Koproduoort from 8dcond u i v i s i o n Hecords. Obtained from librnry, C&GSS.
CO.D J Vulernori^oir
VauxcastllJJ
ladreri
23Inf
t.Co.A Engrs
TIGNY
VIERZY SECTOR
Drawn by direction of Division Engineer SECOND U.S. DIVISION Soalc 1:20,000 July 30, 1918
BATTLE orf VIERZY S i t u a t i o n a t 11 P.M. 19 J u l y , 1 9 1 S .
Drawn under D i r e c t i o n of Division
Engineer 2nd U.S. DIVISION
Sc al a 1:20,000
1
I'M
L E O J N D