Code Number 112

I :

^ t J b

c
! J DMiii -i

IR - 1933

fi " H
INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH STUDY

c -

I . O . I.- O .' I .3 C. .*

< o

PRINCIPLES AND METHODS

OF
PURSUIT BY DIRECT PRESSURE
AS ILLUSTRATED BY
THE SECOND DIVISION (U.S.)
IN THE
THIPD PHASE OF THE MEUSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE
1-11 NOVEMBER, 1938

'.''' ' f'i *",{

- I. i ' r i r i

f: iC i;! i^ U

Submitted^by

The Comnand and General Staff School

Fort Leavenworthj Kansas

Fort Leavenworth, Kan/ias,

12 May, IO33.

MEMORANDUM FOR*

The Direotor Second Year Class, The Command and

General Staff Sohool, Fort Leavenrrorth, Kansas*
Prinoiplee and Methods of Pursuit by Direot Pres sure as illustrated by the Seoond Division (U.S.)
in the Third Phase of the Meuse-Argonne Offensive,
1-11 November, 1918.

SUBJECTt

I. PAPERS ACCOMPANYING!
1. A Bibliography for this study.
2. Plate It General Situation, American First Army,

1 November 1918,
3. Plate II: Daily Position of Front Lino, American
First Array. 1-H November, 1918.
U Plate III! Extract of Operations Map, 2d Division,
1-3 November, 1918,
5. Plate IV! Extract of Operations Map, 2d Division,
U-ll November, 1913.
6. Plate Vi Formation Employed by the 2d Division in

Night Pursuit by Direot Pressure*

II* THE STUDY PRESENTED. The subjeot, "Prinoiples and
methods of pursuit by direot pressure as illustratod by the 2d Div ision (U.S.) in the third phase of the Meueo-Argonne Offensive", is
approaohed with the followinc objeets in view!
To determine tho outstanding lessons that ore
illustrated in the pursuit phase of the operation.
To see whether those outstanding Iosson6 oon firra or disprove the prinoiples described in Field
Servloe Regulations, United States Army, 1923* and
in the Command and General Staff Sohool texts on
-1

"Tftotical Principles and Decisions", and "Taotical and Strategical* studies". To compile material that may form a basis for a hietorioal leoture, or a part thereof, illustrating the outstanding lessons found, / brief study is made of the general situation, of the plan of the American First Army, and of tho terrain in order to show how the 2d Division dovetailed Into tho genoral soheme. A short descrip tion is given prior to and after the pursuit in order to complete the pioture. In lieu of presenting enemy information tihioh is now known from Geraan souroes, only such information that was known at the time the estimate of the sitvmtion \vtvs ?mdo is recorded. Detailed looation

and description of certain units have been purposely omitted in the revision of this paper* On the other hand, some faots, that are

not a part of the historical documents to whioh the author has had aocess, may appear extraneous to the conclusions roaohed, but are presented in this study as a natter of reoord* III. HISTORICAL FACTS RELATIN3 TO THE SUBJECT 1, GENERAL, & General situation, (1) Prior to 1 Novembor, 1916, Bulgaria had been granted an Armistice, Turkey had been van quished, and tho Austrian Array was defeatod and hastily retreating* Germany was orumbling but as yet her armies had not boon decisively (1) 8-Bnf39l4,398 Fro,275-277 (2) 8 Bn, 3O9J Fro, 277 defeated, *(1) The generalissimo of the Allied forces had gained the offensive all along the line. (2) (2) The Amerioan First Army had been steadily wearing down the enemy sinco 26 September in tho first and second phases of the MeusoArgonne Offensive* The enemy had inoreaaod tho nunbor of divisions (1) See key in Bibliography,

-2

to defend this area. Many Gorman prisoners and guns had been cap tured* (5) 8-Per, 51,52
7-FO 88, First
Army.
Several enemy divisions had been practically annihilated)
(3)

others were somewhat nixed up and in confusion.

(3) The front oooupied by the American First Army prior to the
attaok on 1 November is shown in Plate I.
b. General plan. (1) The main objootlve of the American

First Array, in oonjunotlon with the Frenoh Fourth Army, oonsisbed of

severing the communications of the German Armies through the darignqn
Sedan--Mesieres Railroad* (U) 8-Per, 50; How,
The Frenoh Fourth Army was to be assisted
(U)

across the Aisne and a junction betvreen the two armies tffeoted* (2) The immediate object of the American First Army was to
pieroe the line through Landres et St. Georges and form a wedge in
the vicinity of Fosse, in order to break the backbone of the enemy
resistance west of the Meuse, and^foroe the retreat of the enemy to
the east of the Meuse.

The important heights of Barrioourt were to

be oarrifrd, the Dourgogne forest turned, and oontaot established

(5) 8-P*r, 50|
6-Letter CO,
First Array
(6) 3-Letter CO,
V Corps.
6-Letter CO,
First A m y .
with the Frenoh Fourth Army near Bnult-aux-Bois. (5)

(3) The 2d Division was seleoted to overoome the critical part

of the enemy*s defenso and to lead the advance of the Army. (6)

o# Looatfon of the 2d Division. Tho 2d Division, whieh had

reoently fought with the Fronoh Fourth Army In the Champagne, was

(7) 1-FO hkt U5, 2

ordored, on 21 Ootober, 191B, to join the American First Army. (7)

Dlv
3-0p Rpt, 2 Div.
It was subsequently assigned to the V Corps to take part in an attaok
on D-day at H-hour, (1 November, 1918 at 5<3O AM) near St. Georges

(8) 7-FO 90, V Corps

1-FO l6, Tont
Plan, 0-3
Memo, 2 Div,

and Landres-et-St. Georges. shown in Plates I and III.

(8)

Tho tone of action assigned is

2, TERRAIN. -- a^. General featuros. -- The terrain in front

of the Aroerioan First Army was varied and rugged, (See Plate ll)

To the east, the Meuse river afforded protection to the left flank
of the Germans. The heights on the east bank offered observation

-5

points and positions for tho enemy to deliver flanking fire on the
(9) 8-How, 381i
Per, I I 1 4
(10)8-How,
His 89 Div,179
right of the American First Array* (9) In the right^jonter, the

key position of the front was the wooded heights of Barricouvt, (10)
These heights formed a part of the ridge from near Dun-sur-Meuse
which ran northwest through Fosse and Stonne. Farther north, a
series of woods, lneludii^ -ae Bois de Bel?*l crossed the front from
Wiseppe to the northwest. Those woods wore continuous except for a
small gap near Storvne. To the west, the Bois de Bourgogne was a

(11) 8-Rpt First

Army 81;
How, I4OI

formidable obstacle.

(11)

b. Terrain in zone of action of 2d Division, (l) The terrain

was favorable for defense by the enemy. (See Plate II) In the

immediate front the enemy held tho high ground just south of St.
Georges and Landrs-et-St, Georges * This was ooverod by partially
completed trenches, machine gun emplacements, and some wire of the
portion of the Xriemhilde Stellung that had not yet been oaptured.
The Bols des Hatois and Bois l'Epasse were good positions for strong
points* The southern edges had been organised by oonnootinc a line

of shell holes. North of Lrndrns-et-St, Georges, Cote 253, covered

here and there with woods, offered exoellent observation points for
watohing the ground over whloh the 2d Division had to advanoe. Far ther to the north the high ground northwest of Bayonville-et-Chennery
and Cote 313 formed a part of the Barrioourt Crest* Tho Bois de
Parrioourt east of Bayonville-et-Chennery and the Bois de la Folle
south of Fosse afforded exoollent plaoes for ooneaallng reserves for
a oountorattaok, (12)
(12) 8-Rpt First
Army! 81t
(2) From Fosse to Boaunont was a repetition of ridges, spurs*
7-Op Rpt, V
Corps
3-Op Rpt,2 Div.
valleys and woods favorable for delaying action or a stubborn defense*
Of particular importance was the forest with lakes and marshes soat terod here and there, whloh formed a part of tho continuous woods
that ran aoross the army front* (See Platos II end IV) This unln

terrupted obstaole in the tone of the 2d Division inoluded the Bois

de Belval, Bois de VauxDieulet, Bois du Four, Bois du Port Geraoha
(13) 3-Op Rpt 2 Div,
and other smaller woods* (13) The hill in the Boi* de Four and
A 3 Brig
the open spaoo near Bois de Vaux-Dieulet were exoellent points for
the defense of the road that ran through the woods to the open ground
south of Beauravnt. The heights south of Beaumont dominated the nor (lU) 9-Lt Col.Corey,
t h e m exits of this wooded obstaole*
Haj Bruoe
(3) Weat of the Ueuse River, the Bois de la Vaohe, the heights
east and southeast of Beaumont, the Bois Failly, the Bois de 1*1108*
pioe, the Bois du Fond de Limon, all on high groundv were favorable
for covering a retirement aoross the river* (See Plate IV) The

narrow flat valley of the Mouse, with its tortuous course, oould be
swept with flanking fire at praotioally all points. The high and
wooded ground east of the river offered exoellent positions for ar tillery, maohine guns, and other weapons to fire on a foroe advancing
(15) 9-Lt Col Corey,
to, oroasing, and progressing beyond the river. MaJ Bruoe
(15)

(U) It is evident that oareful preparations and skillful attaoks

were necessary in order to viako an initial advanoe; and that the ter rain oould be of material assl. tance to the enemy in delaying aotion
or for making a determined stand at key points*
3, THE ATTACK ON 1 NOVEMBER. a.. Enemy in front of 2d Divi sion. Only slight gains had been made against the enemy for several
(16) 7-Op Rpt, V
days prior to the attaok on 1 November* (16) Tho German Ulst Divi Corps
3-Op Rpt, 2 J)iv
aion held the ground near Landres-et-St* Georges* This division was
in the proeoss of being relieved by the German J52d Division on the
night 31 Ootober-1 November. The Bavarian 15th Division held the
(17) 7-S V 6-S 2 ground around St. Georges and reports indioated it had orders to
of I,No,),
Corps
hold at all costs* (17)
of I,No.108,
Div
Jb, Operations of the 2d Division* (1) After relieving the ld
Division on the nights of 30-31 Oetober and 31 Ootober-1 Noveabor,
the 2d Division attacked on A front of 1*000 meters at 5130 AM, 1
(18) 7-0p Rpt,V Corps
3-0p Rpt,2 Div
November* (18) The lino of departure, tone of aotion, objectives

and formations are shown in. Plate III*

(2) An intensive preparation for tiro hours preceded the attaok*
Every effort was made to gain and maintain fire superiority. Sinoe
a great deal of the corps and array artillory were assigned targets
in the zone of action of the 2d Division, in addition to organio and
attaohed divisional artillery, it nay be said about 320 guns of all
\
calibers furnished artillery support during the initial stages of
(19) 7-0p P.pt.V Corps
86he,lii8-182
the attack. (19) Maohine guns of reserve* units of the 2d and l(2d

Divisions, a total of 255, added their fire power for the support
(20) 3-0p Rpt, 2 Div
9-Uaj Waller
of the advance* (20) An attaohed gas oompar.y used 80 projectors
(21) 3-0p Rpt, 2 Div
and 12 lvinoh Stokes Mortars. (21)
1-FO 1+9, 2 Div
(3) With 15 light tanks atUohed (22) and the powerful sup (22) 1-FO 1*9* 2 Div
9-Uaj brett port of a l l weapons, the division advanoed rapidly and reached their objectives on tine* It drove a flying wedge of 9 kilonetors in and (23) 6-Letter C O through the enemy16 position and "opened the way for the rapid advance First Army
7-0p Kpt,V Corps of the army". (23) (See Plate II)
3-Op Rpt, 2 Div
o Operations of neighboring units, (1) On the right, the
_ 89th Division reached its third objective about I41OO PM which placed
(21;) 7-0p Rpt,Y Corps
8-His 69 Div,
it abreast of the 2d Division* (2i> (See Plate II)
188
(2) On the loft, the 80th Division was not so sueoessful as the
(23) 8-Th, 339t
Lej, 386
89th Division due to its own left flank being refused, (23) The

left flank of the 2d Division was thus expoeod to an enemy countor attaok from the direotion of Butanoy. It was neoessary to so place
(26) 3-0p Rpt, 2 Div units of the 2d Division to proteot this flank* it U Brig

li-Op Rpt 9 Inf

(26)

li. SITUATION 2 NOVFXBER. . Eneny s i t u a t i o n , (1) The i n tense preparation and barrage on 1 Kovomber had somewhat pamlysed

(27) 7-Op Kpt.V Corps the enemy and shaken his morale* (27) The preparation had oaught 6-She, 1148-182 the German 52d Division i n tho process of r e l i e v i n g the German Jilst

(28) ?-S of I,No,l[2,

V Corps Division and had added to their confusion* (28) The eneny resla-
6-S of I,KoJ06,
2 Div tanoe had been comparatively slight in the tone of aotion of the 2d

(29) 3-Op Rpts, 5 *

U Briga

Division,

(89) Up to noon, 2 November, 6 pieoes of 77ra*artillery

and an ostimatod aggregate of 1339 prisoners had boen captured. Re ports indicated that the enemy had withdrawn a. large portion of his
artillery to a rear position in the vicinity of Buzaney, tillery aotivity had boon slight* known due to poor visibility* Enemy ar

No other enemy movements were

No counterattacks had been launohed

against the 2d Division despite the faot the terrain and exposod
(30) 7-S of I,No,lg,
U3, V Corps
position of the division was favorable for suoh aotion, (30)
6-S of I,No.108,
109, 2 Div
(See Plato III)
(2) A oaptured undated map A indicated three positions the oneny
might use<
A, Along the highwayi Gemont--Bar--ButanoyEarricourtj

B, St. Pierrenont"Sommauthe--Vauxen-DieuletHarbeau mont Pme|

C, Along the hignwayt (31) 7-S of J,No.lj2,
V Corps
6-S of I,No,lC9,
2 Div
La bayiolle (south of La Besaoo)- . . .
Beaumontcrossroads west of Cesse. (3l)(See Plate III)

On 2 Noverirer, tho 2d Division was on the portion of the enemy posi

tion A ',.W, was in its cone of aotion* On the right, the 89th Division
(32) and on the left the 80th Division, hav (32) 7-0p Rpt,V Corps had flanked Barrioourt 8-His 89 Div,
190 ing brought some of their troops forward in truoks, had taken the
(33) 7*0p Rpt,V Corps town of Rutanoy* (33) (See Plate IX) Position A, thorefore,
3-0p Rpt,2 Div
was untenable*
(3) On tho afternoon 2 November, the general impression in the
2d Division was that the enemy was retreating to rear positions
oovered by rear guards, that his morale was materially shaken, and
that ho probably would movo the bulk of his foroos to the rear dur (3l*J 9-Lt Col ','orey,
Kail it
ing the night* Bruce
(3I1)

b, 2d Division situation, (1) After reaching its objoctive on

1 November, several orders and oounter-orders followed. Tho first
order from tho Corps was for the division to oontinuo to tho oxploita tlon line on 2 Kovem1>or, to organize against a oounterattaok, and to

-7

(35) 7"F0 108, V

Corps
3-0p Rpt, 2 Div

develop the enemy*

(35) In addition to the mi66lone assigned in

the first order, the next order providod for an atiaok by tho reserve
brigade of t . e 2d Division diagonally across the front of the 80th
'i

(36) 7-FO 109, V

Corps

Division to soiee the heights along the FosseBueanoy road,

(36)

3-0p Rpt, 2 Div A third order provided for an extension of tho front of the 2d Divi sion to the Sivry-les-BueanoyButanoy road. (37) 7-FO 110, V
Corps
3-0p Rpt,2 Div
(38) 7-FO 111, V
Corps
3-0p Rpt,2 Div
(39) 3-0p Rpts, 3 * U Brigs Th,*3Ul up, and many ohanges of orders caused some oonfueion and much delay*(39) 5. PURSUIT B DIRECT PRESSURE STARTBD NIGHT 2-3 NOVB'.BHt. a. Y The 89th Division was

to extend its front to include part of the original front of the 2d Division, (37) After shifting troops around, the laot two orders
. (38)

were revoked during tho morning of 2 November*

(2) During the day of 2 November, the division remained in plaoe

preparing for another advance* This was necesoary as the division had
advanoed so far during the previous day, rear elements had to be brought

Pursuit plan ofr the 24 Division, - - The plan, in brief, was to pass the 3d Brigade through the Ijth Brigade under cover of darknosc, the Ijth Brigade remaining in plaoe and reverting to division roserve. The 3^ Brigade was to oontinue the advance at night to the limited (l|0) 1-FO 1, 2 Div objectives heights noar NouartFoasej and attaok at 6t00 AM, 2 Nov F h5 $ Brig ember to seise the heights southeast of Vaux-en-Dieulet* O 36, h Brig 2-FO t (ho) Tho

2-FO fe, 3

l^th Uaohine Gun Battalion was to assemble i t s trucks near Landreville (I4I) 2-FO Ii5,3 Brig
9-Uaje Hall &
Bruce
prepared to go forward in truoks and establish oontaot with tho enemy in ease no enemy was found on the exploitation line* (1*1) (See Plate III)
b. Operations of tho 2d Division, (l) The 9th Infantry of the

3d Brigade advanced in oolumn of battalions, oaoh battalion in column

of twos, one file on eaoh side of the road* (See Plate V) An ad

vance guard with a seleoted point with soldiers able to speak the
German language, preceded the regimental oolunn. There mts practically

-8

no distance between the elements of the oolurm on aooount of tho ex (142) 3-0p Rpt,3 Brig l*0p Rpt,9 Inf treme darkness and rain, (l2) The dimotion of tho wind was not 9-Lt Col Corey rooorded nor was i t recalled, (JJ3) The eneny outguards were en (Iv3) 9-Kaj Bruce countered but were reduced by the advanoo guard either by a ruse, by
fire, or by flanking bayonet attaoks* Yfhen tho enemy opened fire on
advanced elements, rear units halted and in some oases used tho
ditches and folds in the ground for cover. After overcoming the sur prised eneny, the exploitation line waft reached by daylight, with
J-Op Rpt,3 Brig slight losses* (Uu) ii-Op Rpt,9 Inf (2) In a similar manner the 23d Infantry of the 3d Brigade ad (1*5) An 05) 3-0p Rpt,3 Brig vanced to Fosse and the heights just north of tho town, U-Op Rpt,23 Inf example of the success of this operation WAS reported by this regi ment 1 the oapture of 50 prisoners, 2 batterios of 77 wi guns, 11 horses, 5 wagons, and many naohine guns. The total casualties in (50) b-Op Rpt,23 Inf the regiment were 1 nan killed and 3 wounded. 6, (50)

O E C MN RESISTANCE O 3 N V M E . a* The leading VR O I G H OE BR

brigade. The 3d Brigade having reaohod the exploitation lino, jumped off about daybreak under cover of a fog, On the right, the 9th Infantry advanoed rapidly* (See Plate III) The first part of

the attack seemed like a peace time maneuver as s t i f f resistance was not offered by the enemy* The heights south of Bois de Eelval were soon reaohed but here the southern edges of the woods fairly sputtered with enemy naohino gun f i r e . Enemy minenwerfers and 68 m guns in m Many casualties occurred,

creased the fire on the advanced infantry*

and the regiment was foroed to dig in on the reverse slope of the h i l l in i t s front* (51) 14-Op Rpt,9 Inf 9-Lt Col Corey In the afternoon, the 15th Field Artillery came

up and knooked out some of the enemy's maohine guns and minenwerfers and foroed many baok into the woods, (51) On the l e f t , the 23d Infantry likewise reoeived l i t t l e resistance at f i r s t . Tho heights

running southeast of Vaux-en-Dieulet were taken at 9CO A and hold M (52) 3-0p Rpt,2 Div li-Op Rpt,23 Inf throughout the day, (52)

-9

Rear un

In the meantime, the Uth Brigado moved for

ward) t h e 5th Marines t o the Le Champy Haut-Novart area, the 6th Marines in and t o the north of Fosse* The Ijth Maohine Gun Battalion

advanced to j u s t south of Posso, t h e i r trucks being used t o haul &yoh (53) h"O? Rpt, 5 it 6 Kar 5-0p Rpt, k UG Bn needed ammunition, 7 (53) (See Plate IZZ)

A DARING ADVANCE, KIGHT 3-h NOVEMBER, AND HOLDING G O N RUD Enemy s i t u a t i o n , (1) On 1 Novomber i t had

GAINED J4 NOVEMBER, a_.

been thought that position B, ( S t , Pierremont--SomnauJ~hc--Vaux-en Dioulet--Harbeaumont Fme) (See Plate I I I ) , indloated i n the captured enemy dooument mentioned in paragraph h a, (2) supra, t o be "merely a holding position 1 1 to delay an advance. way t Position C, (along the high

La BagnolleBeaunontorossroads west of Cesse) had been e s

timated t o be an enemy position t h a t possibly would be used t o make a "last stand west of the Ueuse t o defend his main l i n e of coimurtica tlons (Carignan--Sedanlierieres railway), basing his defense on the long s t r e t o h of forest which extends fron the Canal des Ardennes to (5k) 7-S of I,No,i(2, the Uouse", (5h) >Yas the enemy able to carry out suoh a plan and V Corps 6*S of I,No,109, how oould i t be prevented, were natural questions, 2 Div (2) In the tone of aotion of the 2d Division, the enemy had apparently oocupled position B (high ground near Vaux-en-Dieulet and southern edge of Bole de Relval), but had been foroed back on part of the f r o n t . The heavily wooded obstaole with lakes and marshes whloh

has been described in paragraph 2 b_ (2) supra, was s t i l l held by the enemy, (See Plates III and IV) On 3 November, i t was evident that There were no signs of

the enemy was oonduoting rear guard a c t i o n s . a oounterattaok.

Capture of prisoners had oontinued and questioning

indicated that the enemy was s t i l l shaken and had had no time for reorganisation. They had s t a t e d , a retirement t o the east of the

Ueuse was in progress and that the orier to retreat had been given about 3100 PU, 2 Novombor, Enemy a r t i l l e r y a o t i v i t y had been ooopara -10

tively feeble, Prisoners reported seeing heavy guns retiring to the

rear* Enemy movements were somewhat obsoure, but the H I Corps had
reported roads paoked with troops, artillory, and truok* east of the
Keuse* No enemy movement* (either forward or to the rear) had beon
noted in the Foret-de-Dleulet* Fires were reported in Verj>el, Frag

ments of new enemy units wore identified in front of an adjacent

division but their position and questioning of prisoners indicated
they were being thrown into the lino pieceneal, in an effort to slow
(55) 7-S of I#No.W4,
CE, Op Rpt, up the rapid advance of the Amerioan troops* (55)
V Corps
6-S of I,No,110, (3) On the afternoon 3 Novonber the general impression in the
2 Div
8-Lt Col Corey k 2d Division wns that the enemy was retreating to the east of the Maj Hall tt that he would attempt to offer a s t i f f resistance in the for est in front of the 2d Division on \\ November in order to oover this retroat} that his morale oontinued to be lowj that confusion in his lines s t i l l existed} that the enemy would be engaged on the night 3-b November in attempting to reotify this oonfusionj and that while new units might be brought into tho lino, they would l urJWille.r with the terrain and would not be organised before the morning of U (56) 9-Lt Col Corey, Itajs Hall * Eruoe November. (56)

b, 2d Division situation, (1) The location 0? troops late on the afternoon of 3 November is shown in Plata III*
(2) The troops were extremely tired* They had made long marches

prior to their entry into aotion and had wide large gains with little
(57) 3-0p Rpts,2 Div, rest siroe the attack started (57) Fever, influenia, dysentery,
5 4 U Brigs.
poor water, oontinual living in the open in oold rain, sleeping in
ruddy fox and sholl holos, and laoJc of food, sapped the strength of
(56} lj-Op Rpt,9 Inf many* (50) In some lnstanoos, slightly wounded men normally sent
9-Lt Col Corey
fetta,1flrueeto tho rear by walking, died on the way baok, from tho oomb 1 nation
(59) 9-VaJ Bruoe 4 Capt VTestover
of wounds, exposure, fatigue and dyscntiry* (59) It ws nofved,

-11

however, ther" exiacod a determlnntlon to push the success to tho (60) li-Op Rpt,9 I>'f Kajs Hall 4
Bnice
utmost and morale WHS high* (&"')

(3) The unnetaled roads, rain and the enoruous amount of trans portation to be brought forward caused congestion in the rear* In

addition to the organio transportation of the 2d Division, the 1st Division in corps reserve and a groat portion of corps and artsy ar t i l l e r y used the roads of tho 2d Divielon that was leading the ad vurtce* The roads became a raoracs* Anlrcals died in traces tyring to

pull the loads through* tiMoVs, vlllAgns*

Tractors were being used to pull out stalled

Large vehicles would beoome stuck in the narrow streete. of Knowing the pursuit nun<; go on, extraordinary efforts The iru^ntry of the 1st Division narohed over Other units, including mohine gun Uilltary pollco workod

were nade to keep up*

land a great deal of the tins*

oarts and light a r t i l l e r y , did likowifte*

without r*lif in directing tr*fflo in ooooHance with engineer road circulation plans, (6l) 'i-Th, p #i2 Cupt iiyde Ui^innttrn wro push*'! fron the rear to the front (6l)

Rr.i ytorVm) to th point 0? ox}i&-.ietion to keep wheels moving,

The tro*>~,o of the roar oohelono wore also pushing in the pursuit* * Plat. Cor continuing the pursuit* (1) The V Corps order

for 3 November had assigned to ihe 2d Division tho tiission of oapturiG tho rid/jo stiuthoast of Vaux-tn-Die'ilet and pushing "strong rocon 7-FO 112, V Corps 3-Op Rpt, 2 Div nalsucnoos" towurds Eeauivmt* (62) l/*te in the afternoon, the

f i r s t pert of the mission had heon accomplished, A mesa age w a sent & by the Colonol of the 9th Inf'uitry to the 3<* brigade sug^estinc a night advance* (63) Tho ojsplote plan was fomilnted at & con

h P t,9 9 I

ference at 3d Bride 'toadquarters to adrance the brigp^ft at night 3-Op in two coltiina on rot^a at that tlr shown on the mp* (6I|) This

plan was spprove 1 ~>y tlie Division Conraander, and orders were lsnuod fcr th 3 d brigade, supported by a r t i l l e r y , to advance through the h in the ProrA arS. soltn n poeltlon In 'hr vicinity of P

-12

and the /jth iris*** to nVo up a poijlt'nr. "^n our todays' oV'Jeottvo." 1-FO i,UtP. M v (6^/ Ti.e J*th j.&chir^ '/un J;aU niton w&i ftUac'-.^d to Uie 3d Eri^tuJe (66)

tut did not reoiv ?ho order until the rooming of U Ho7e-toer. (66) 1-i'O 5/4,2 Dlv 9-*J Eruce

(2) The V Corps Her, in strict oonplianco with tho First Aroy order, dlreotod tho 1st Division to purauo at daylight / Jfovcmberj
the 2d drtl O^th Division to fee assonblod reedy to march aftor tho
pase&^a of the let Dirislon* Tiiin order apparently did not roaoh

the ?'i Division before i^n plar. Jutt described had been put into
(67) 7-KO 95, First & (67) Arsqv, F 11U, er.eo'jtion. The order w e lat^r re/okod, O ^ Op Hpt,V Corps O ^ l f ^ ^ D l l l a night 3*/> I'oyerJ>or (1) At dusk, 3 Wovesfcer, the 9th Infunfcry started tho aulranoe on the road (68) 3-Op Rpt,3 Brig W p Hpt,9 Inf BelvolBois-des-DtaesU Forge Fe3(uino:tt9 (68) (See Plate IV)

Led by the 54 &'itt*llon the formation was similar to that adopted in the advance wi the night 2-3 '>07*ber, wis sli^jtly delayed by a barricade in (See Plate V)
P^1T*1, A

The advance

cold dritrly rain

added to the alsory of the iaen but i t added to the surprise olenent ot the ad-rii-ice, 8ilene TI preserved In the oolunn "only shuff Snail tm*ny parties novinr; to their Bietty naohine

llnj; of feet coild be hoard",

front for the noxt day's battle ivere quietly Uken in*

Gunnero, worn out frf the constant fighting, were found asleep and awoke as prisoners* The point of the advance guard answered tho *xwvr/1* ohallen&cs in their lenguoge* this rise* Son wvre taken prisoners by

Others fired, v-nt flanking patrols soon reduced then

ZTJSITJ

with the bayonet* to the rear*

bsttGrics on the f'xanxs were heard firing

La Jorge ?r rru* riaohed and quietly nrreminded, re*

suiting in/.ho capture of prisoners ih*t had slight res'; and shelter frow the cold jraln, A halt occurred, when on erway infantry battalion was surprised while digging positions in the southern edge of Hols dv 'erit-Meulflt. A bayonet attei': 6top^'1 4>i*s 'li,*(-5.r^# Ibe entire

force wfcs apfro^cfd.% erhaisvlon and i t was with difficulty that

* sow* of th tvm were kept awnko* f>iddenly, the open ground south -13

of Beaumont was roaohed. Soon afterwards la Tuilerie Fne, discovered

with lights burning, wao surrounded, and enony personnel reading and
playing cards wcro dumbfounded when ordered .o cur render. The advance
halted before midnight, 3 Novonber, and a line of defense -was con solidated abon4: 200 meters north of La Tuilerie Fine that extended
(69) 3-0p Rpt, 2 Div
about 500 meters east-wan1 from the Beaumont Road. (69) (See Plate IV)
& 3 Brig
UOp Rpt, 9 Inf
(2) In the meantime, aftor the advanoo started, only one passable
8-Lej 391,392;
road was found whieh foroed the 23d Infantry to follow the 9th In Jno,337-3^0
9-Lt Col Corey,
Majs Janda h
f&ntry. Using a similar formation to that of the 9th Infantry, the
Hall
leading battalion reached the open ground south of Beaumont arid dug
in on the heights running east and west of Beausejour Too, Prisoners
were t*ken all during the night
(3) A penetration of six kilometers through and in rear of the
German lines was effooted* A "bridgehead" was established through

the heavy forest that extended several miles to the east and treat,
the last natural obstaole to the heights of Sedan* (See Plate II)

Many historians, too numerous to record, characterize this advance

ac a daring and skillfully executed maneuver* Even histories that

treat the war in a general way record this operation. Suoh expres sions as, "remarkable", "brilliant", "daring", "worthy of Jackson",
(70)8-!.fc, 216; Har,
265; Bn, U0I4

and

*no **k e

Are

often used,

,
v
(70)

, Operations of the 2d Division, h November. (1) The next

morning found the 3 d Brigade in a diffioult position. The enemy held
the high ground south of Beaumont, Many enemy maohine guns and minen werfers were found to be in position* (71) MaJ Brett,
Capt Bolan
Tanks were needed to reduoe

the enemy resistance but had been either knooked out or sent to the
rear for ropairs on 1 November, (71) At 93O AM, two battalions
of tho 9th Infantry and one battalion of the 23d Infantry started in
the attack* Some ground was gained, but the advance was soon stopped
due to tho concentration of enemy maohine gun and artillery fire on
thoir front and flanks* 8iemy hoavy artillery from the heights east

of the Mouse, and airplanes with bombs and machine guns added their
fire on the exposed position* Reserves and the main road to the

rear were continually harassed. The number of casualties wero ex (72) J-Op Rpts, 2
Div & 3 Brig
li-Op Rpt, 9 &
23 Inf
tremely high. (72)

(2) During the night 3-h November and J4 November rear elements
were brought up as rapidly as possible* During the night a battery
of the 15th Field Artillery went into position near La Forge Fme and

(73) 3-0p Rpt,2 Div

& 3 Brig
8-Lej, 393
(7I4) 3-0p Rpt,2 Div
8-Ma, 216

in the morning was Joined by the remainder of the battalion*

(73)

Other artillery was pushing forward, inoluding heavy guns to fire on

the stations of the QarignonSedan--Meieres railway, (Jk) The !|th
MaohinojGun Battalion moved forward in its truoks, passed an inter mittantly heavily shelled orossroads between salvos with one oasualty,
went into position in the northern part of Bois du Port Gerache, and

(75) 5-0p Rpt, U UQ

Bn
9-Maj Bruce
(76) 3-0p Rpt, 3
Brig
I*-Op Rpt,5 Mar
(77) 3-0p Rpt, h
Brig
8-Lej, 39U

was held in readiness to meet a oounterattack*

(75) The 2d Bat

talion, 5th Marines, -yras moved to a position 500 meters south of La

Tuillerie Frae in support of the 3d Brigade* (76) In the morning,

elements of the 14th Brigade were ordered to the right front to oonneot
the 3d Brigade with the 89th Division. f. Movement on flanks (77)

(1) On 3 November the divisions on

tho right and left reaohed the lines as shown on Plate II* On h Nov ember, the 89th Division reaohed a position north of a portion of the
(78) 8-Hi8 89 Div,
199
3-0p Rpt,2 Div
Foret de Dieulet near the LaneuvilleBwaumont vRoad. (78)
(2) On visiting the 3d Bripado Headquarters at La Forge Fme on
the morning of h November, the Division Commander, 2d Division.ob served elements of the 80th Division slowly advanolng against deter mined rear guard resistance north of Vaux-en-Dioulet. Hostile naohine
guns oooupied positions in the Bois des Uurots noar the Heaumont
Sommauthe road in the 80th Division sootor* The Division Commander,

by phone, offered tho Coi.vnand5ng General, 80th division, the use of

the La Forge FmeSoaunont road to march a detachment without opposi tion to a position to make a flank attaok to oause the evacuation of
tho woods in front of the 60th Division* 8-Le$9j-395 V
(79) The offer was not aooopted.

Tho line by nightfall is shown in Plate II.

-15

8. THE ADVANCE TO THE MEUSE. . Enemy situation, h November,

(l) In the front of the 2d Division the enemy had oooupied Position C
(along the highwayi La Bagnolle-Eeaumont--orossroadB west of Cease)

(See Plate III), indicated in the oaptured enemy document mentioned

in paragraphs J4 a^ (2) and 7 , (l) supra* His resistance on this posi

tion had been stubborn and it was not unlikely that he -would continue
this defense in order to oover his withdrawal to the east of the
Mouse*
(2) On the other hand, there were indications that the enemy was
still unorganised as a whole and that, in front of the 2d Division,
he night withdraw to a new line* The 89th Division dominated the
ground near the orossroads west of Cesse* (See Plate II) In view

of tho pooket formed by the Iteuse Rivor it was felt that it was not
inconceivable for tho enomy to build up a line north of Beaumont with
tho flank resting on the lieu a e near the woods, B.Failly, were still being oaptured* Prisoners

Questioning revealed that machine gunners

apparently did not havo orders to hold at all costs; that the enemy
infantry was a defeated one; that prisoners of the l*59th Regiment,
236th Division oapturod early in the morning I4 November, had been
rushed from Stenay to Piermont by camion on 2 November and put into
aotion on 3 November; that prisoners of the U57+h Regiment, 236th
Division, oonfirmed this report and stated they were oapturod while
moving forward to support the leading regiment; and that prisoners,
inoluding officers, agreed that the rapidity of the advance had broken
up organised resistance and caused their capture* Heavy enemy traffio
was reported to be on the Mouzon-Carignan road, the road to the
north of It, and aorrss the fields in the direotion of Carignan*
(80) 7-S of I,No.l45# Beaumont appeared to be desertod, the eastern part of the town being
V Corps
6-S of I,No.Ill, on firo* Fires were reported to the northwest of Poauraont, (80) 2 Div 3-0p Rpt, 3 Brig -16

(3) By nightfall U November, the general impreaaion in the 2d

Division was that the enemy might withdraw during the night, that he
was not yot thoroughly organised, that contact should not be lost,
and that a night advanoe would result in leas casualties than a day
(81) 9-Lt Col Corey,
advanoe. Majs Hall &
Bruoe
(81)

b_, 2d Division situation, h November. -- The general disposition

of the division is shown in Plate IV, The oold and rain oontinued*

The strength of the men was becoming lower and lower from ceaseless
operations, exposure, and dysentery* In one oase a battalion head It was somewhat

quarters was established under a oonorete culvert*

orowded, and while snatohing a brief rest, tho feet of the battalion
(82) 9-!laj Bruoe &
commander slipped into the running water* He slept on undisturbed* (82)
Capt Westiver
o* Wight advanoe. U-5 November* It was deoided to pass the
2Jd Infantry. 3d Brigade, with the ijth Maohine Gun Battalion attaohed,
(83) 3-Op Rpts, 2
Div & 3 Brig
through the 9th Infantry and advanoe on the Meuse River, (83) The
battalions advanood independently, eaoh with looal protection* The
heights east and southeast of Beaumont, Hill 251 and the Bo is de la
Vache were seized* (See Plato V) Despite provious night marohes,

the enemy was again surprised*

In one case a maohine gun platoon was

oapturod while drawn up in line being inspeoted preparatory to chang ing positions* In the early morning Letanne and Beaumont were mopped

(8U) 3-Op Rpts, 2

up and patrols searched for orossings over the Meuse River* Only 2
Div & 3 Brig
U-Op Rpt,23 Inf casualties oocurred in the 23d Infantry, (8I4) The hth Maohino
6-S of I,No*112
2 Div Gun Battalion oooupied positions on Hill 2J51 (85) and harassed
(85) 3-Op Rpt # 2 Div
5-Op Rpt,U M Bn the enemy on the east bank of the Mouse Rivor with captured enemy G maohine guns and ammunition in order to conserve their own aranuni (86) 9-Maj Bruoe (87) It-Op Rpt,5 Mar 3-Op Rpt,2 Div
tion* (86) The 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, at 9iOO P U November, M

moved to the vioinity of Foe de Belle Tour and sent patrols to the east and northeast* (87) -17

d Mopping up, 5 November, -- The day was spent in mopping up

_ and in reeonnoitering the river for crossings; the Ijth Brigade oooper ating with the 89th Division in cleaning out the Forot de JauLnay.
The rivor was found to be unfordable and all bridges destroyed* It
(88) 3-0p Rpt, 2
was impossible to oross without bridgo material. (88)
Div & J Brig
e Night advance, 5~6 November, -- The V Corps order for 6
li-Op Rpt,23 Inf
November direoted the 1st Division to advance at 53O AM, 6 November,
on the left of the 2d Division in the directioni (69) 7-FO 118, V
Corps
3-0p Rpt,2 D5.v
YonoqMouRonj the
(89)

2d Division to proteot the right flank of the let Division.

The 9th Infantry, 3d Brigade, made the fourth night advance of the
division, the estimate of the enemy situation not having ohanged*
Moving through Beaumont soon after midnight it captured the line as
shown in Plate IV to seize a reported bridge near La Sartelle Fme,
(that later was found not to exist) and to protect the right of the

(90) 3-0p Rpt,2 Div ij-Op Rpt,9 Inf 1st Division, (90) The 1st Division relieved the 80th Division

on the morning of 6 November and advanced, taking the towns of Yonoq, (91) 8-Per, Map & His 1 Div, 228 (92) 7-S of I,Nos hi, 1*8, V Corps 6-S of I-Nos 113,llf|,2 Div 3-0p Rpt, 2 Div (93) 3-Op Rpt,2 Div 8-Lej, 398 (9k) 7**FO 120-1224, V Corps
3-0p Rpts, 2
Div, 3 &k
trigs
8-Loj, 597-399
(95) 3-0p Rpt,2 Div
8-Lej, 390
Villemontry, and a position opposite Mouzon, (91)

9. SUBSEQUENT OPERATION, a.. Period before river oroasinfi, The 2d Division was now confronted with an unfordable stream defended by snipers, maohine guns, and a r t i l l e r y . (92) Pontoons for t h i s

division were not available* (93) From the Division viewpoint, the pursuit phase of the aotion was ended by the Ueuse River, From 6 to 8 November, orders and counter-orders were received verbally and in formal field orders, and movements and counter-movements were made* At one time tho division prepared to mar oh on Sedan, (9I4)
b . Crossing the Meuso, (l) Orders were received to oross the

Meuse on the night 9**10 November but were postponed on aooount of

lack of bridge material, (95)
(2) On the night 10-11 November, though falling at one point,
the orossing of the Meuse River vras suocessful north of Letanne, but

-1R

(96) 3-Op Rpts, 2 Div ic h Brig 1+-Op Rpt,9 Inf 8-His 89 Div, 233 (97) 7-Op Rpt, V Corps
3-Op Rpt,2 Div

at a terrible ooot in casualties*

(96) A bridgehead was established

by lit00 AM, 11 November 1918 as shown in Plate IV, and hostilities

ceased. (97)
10. BRIEF SUNMARY OF RESULTS OF 013RATI0NS. , In the opera

tions of the 2d Division from 1-11 November 1918, the division advanced
about 29 kilometers* Over half of this ground, about 16 kilometers,

was gained at nightj 9 kllomotere were captured with an unusually

powerful artillery support; leaving h kilometers taken during tho day
(98) 3-Op Rpt,2 Div
8-Per Map
under average conditions* (98) Approximately 1,712 prisoners, 105

light and heavy artillery guns, 17 ralnonwerfers, 500raaohineguns,

many rifles, thousands of rounds of ammunition, and quantities of
(99) 3-Op Rpt,2 Div
to-S of I, No,
13k, 2 Div
(100) 6-00, 2 Div
b. The penetration of the enemy's line on 1 November, by the 2d
(101) 3-0p Rpt, 3
Division, with the 89th Division, caused the enemy to withdraw from
Brig
U-Op Rpt,9 Inf,
in front of the flanks of tho First Army, and star'od tho eneny'u
23 Inf
(102) 6-Letler CO,

First Array 8-Jno, 332 9-Cen Eurt

engineer material were captured* casualties,

(99) It suffered a total of 3#233

(100) the greatest part of them during daylight* (101)

retreat. (102)
0. On the night of 2-3 Novombor, the attaok of the 3d Brigade
enabled tho division to more rnpidly press the pursuit,
d^ The night advanco of six kilometers, through and in rear of
the enony'e line on 3-h November, had far reaohing rosults. It saved
several days hard fighting to conquer the last natural obstaolo before
Sedanj hastened the retreat of tho Germans eastward across the Ueuse
River and to Sedan} assisted the advance of units on the ri^ht and
loft of the 2d Division, particularly the I Corpsj and pornihted the

(103) 8-Ua, 211|

Bn, liOljj
9-Gen Burt

movement of long range guns to firo on the Carignan--Rodim'Mesieros

railroad to interrupt the enony'r. main line of conrsunioation. (103)
, On the night I4-5 November the advanoe out the German poni La Bagnollo--Eeavmontcro68ro6ds went of Cesee. (10l|)

Jno,3353U5

(1010 7-0p Rpt, V

tloni Corps
3-Op Rpt.2 Div
8-Jno, 3l5

-19

f. O tho ni^ht ^-G November the Advance tnaurcd tho protection n (105) 7-Or K P t i V Corps of the ri^ht flank of tho lac Division ir. i t s subsequent advance (105) 3-0p fcpt,2 Div , On the night 10-11 November w A 11 liovomhor i t firrtly esUvb (106) J-Lotter CO, V Corps, A O Rpt,2 Div p lished a bridgehead across tho Meuce Kiver. h, (106)

Ilato II shows that the 26 Divicion practically led tho ad

vance of tho First .rny until tho division rouched the Loune Hiver. 11. arisosi ANALYSIS A D CHITICISi.'.. - - . (1) The academic qvJCBtion h Doeo the oportticn of the 2d Division from 1-11 November Since the German

1918, contain a phase that illustrates pursuit?

forces were attenptinc to oooupy successive positions and did s k i l l fully enploy rear tiT1Rr^s strong In naohino guns and a r t i l l e r y , to slow up the American advanoo, the action night be terned, "a follow up of an eneny retrogrado woveirjenft On tho other hand, viewed from

the standpoint that the oneny had been forced to retire, that he had no prepared positions to f a l l book on, thut the bulk of hie forces mere dieorg&nieed and of low morale, that no counterattacks were made, and that the four reserves available were somewhat desperately thrown piecomeal into the line to covor his retreat, i t was a pursuit in the tone of action of tho 2d Division. It wn not n pursuit in tho

r.rnse that i t was a chase after ft completely routed oncny, lnaving lar&e quantities of booty* (2) Since the 2d Division TAB a part of an interior corps of an, amy with restricted maneuver room, there VBR no opporturlty of send ing out an enoiroliri force, end only direct proscure could be and was used, b. It night be said that the 2d Division lacked ag^rooniveneso Advances were made on the right and The delay was

during, the day of 2 Kovonbor.

l o f t and yot this division did not movo forward.

oausod by preparations made to oomply with % order to make a sharp , n change ir. direction in attaok. The order was subsequently revoked

and i t was nooeosory to reorganise for tho original dirootion of at -80

taok*

In view of the rapid and doop advance of 1 Novembor, it was

better to place coraparutively fresh reserves in the front for another

advance*
o* The night advance of 2-3 November was made in accordance
with the plun evolvod, and was successful, A correct estimate of
the situation was made and Justified the action taken.
d_. (1) The results of the night attack of 3-U Novembor show
that it was one of the outstanding feats of American arms. Yet there
were adverse conditions, some of which are repeated. The terrain was
woody, hilly, and marshy. The reoonnaissanoe of the objeotive and
rotes thereto, oould not be made* was found* Only one route through the woods

The night was dark and rainy. The troops were extremely

tired, some verging on physical exhaustion* Thore was congestion in

the rear and supply and evaouation units woro unable to keep up* The
division had met stubborn resistance during the day and was unable to
advanoe without systematic artillery support* Eheny reserves had ap

peared in front of the division on the right and were expeoted in

front of the 2d Division* The divisions on the right and left would
The southern edge of the

not be abreast at the end of the maroh.

woods oould have been tactically sealed by the enemy and the brigade
out off for a time*
(2) Why was the night attaok a success? Because a oorreot esti mate of the situation was made* Because it was realised that the

woods and laok of routos would also hamper ener.y movenentsj that the
ground was just as unfamiliar to the enemy reserves ooming into the
line for defense as it was to the attaokerei that fatigue, oongestion
in the rear, and other adverse conditions of the defeated enemy were
probably equal to or greater than that of the pursuerj and that morale
of the pursuer was better than that of the pursued* Beoauso the night

attaok made the pursuit relentless with oonstant pressure day and night,
- A comparison might be made between the Gorman Army of 19l)i and 1910.
Granting thero was a marked differenoo, this comparison is unnooos sary as the low morale of prisonors was noted in the estimate of
the situation and was a faotor in the decision to pursue, - The auth or,
-21

despite the faot that stubborn enemy resistance had just held up
the attaokorfit Beoause the advance penetrated the enony'e covering

forces and broke up the oneiay plans for resistance the next day.
Becauoe the plan for the attack was daringly oonoeived and boldly
executed*
(3) Several dayc of hard fighting wero eavod by the 3d Brigade
in advancing through tho woods. fact but a glance at the map Not only do historians record this

(See Platos III and IV) is sufficient

to confirm this opinion. Bearing the condition of roads alone in

mind, it would have taken at least one day to organise a coordinated
attack by the division and several days for the Corps and A m y to
launch such an attack*
{U) One criticism of this night attack that night be offeredt
and it is a minor ono considering the cirounstanoes, is that the
heights just south of Beaumont should have been seited, and both
flanks refused on the high ground near the Beaumont--Pme do Belle Tour
road and near the Beaumont-Somroauthe road. (Seo Plates III and IV)
There was sufficient tine before daylight to have accomplished this
action. A firmer hold in the eneny's lines would have thus been gained, e (1) Pressure was kopt up on U November, and steps were taken

to reorganise the division and bring up reserves to meet an enemy

counterattack*
(2) On this day, the position of the 2d Division WAS cuch that
an opportunity had been created for envelopment of the enemy. The

division on the left failed to use this opportunity, although it was

pointed out| lost time in owning up abreast of tho 2d Division, and
probably suffered moro casualties,
(1) The night advanoes of h-5 November and 5-6 November were

also based on oorreot estimates of tho situation, Tho results of all

of tho night attaoke of the 2d Division show that they were successful*

-22.

It should be remembered that those night operations were in the pur suit and not against highly organ!ted positions defended by troops
with good morale, thoroughly familiar with the plan of defense*
(2) In analysing all of the night operations, soveral points
were noted* Advances were made both on open and close terraint

Thore was no moonlight or starlight, but instead, the nights were

very dark and usually rainy, whioh assisted in gaining the element
of surprise and provented observed machine gun fire. The direotion
of the wind was not recalled* Objectives or routes thereto oould

not be reconnoitered. Casualties were far loss at night than in the

day* In this oonneotion, the 2d Division was unable to advance

against resistance strong in maohine guns and artillery, on 3 and U

Novembor, but was able to advance at night* Advantage was taken of
the enemy's habits of retiring, or of organizing defensive points
at night*
(3) The formation adopted enabled the 2d Division to rapidly
advance with sufficient forces initially to hold the objective. The
men of the mass of the forces, by advanoing in oolumns of twos, one
side on eooh side of the road, were able to take oover in the ditches
or noarby folds in the ground when firod upon* was confined to the advance guard* The aotual fighting

The seleoted point with roenbors

able to speak the eneiy language assisted in surprising the eneiay.

The rapid use of flanking detachments attacking with the bayonet,
successfully overcone enemy maohine guns that offered resistance*
Those advances were probably made with loss diffioulty than an advance
would have been made had tho enemy had machine guns properly laid for
night firing with local protection of a few determined riflemen* In

any event, maohine guns are less effeotive at night than in the day time* It is apparent that silence in all ranks was nooessary for

surprise*

-23

12. OUTSTANDING LESSONS IK PURSUIT PHASE OF OPERATIOJIS. There

are many lessons to be learned in the operations of the 2d Division,
1-11 November 1918. There is a phase In this aotlon that illustrates
pursuit by direct pressure by a division* Numerous details of value
may be illustrated by the pursuit phase of the action, but the out standing lessons of this phase aret
a. Plans for the pursuit by direct pressure should be daringly
conceived and 'coldly executed to penetrate the enemy's covering for cos,
seize terrain essential to him and frustrato his attempts to organize
his retreat or reconstitute his defense* This should be attempted
despite the risk of the smaller unit being out off for a tintt because
it irill be more effeotlve than the coordinated attack of a nuoh larger
unit delivered at a later date.
b. Since the enemy will probably oontirue to retreat or reor ganizo under oover of darkness, pursuit by dlreot pressure should be
oontinued at night despite enemy resistance during tho day*
o* Pursuit by direct pressure should be relentlessly pushed by
night as well as by day, without regard to such adverse conditions
as laok of a saroful reoonnaissonoe of ground, terrain obstaolos,
poor weather, exposure of flanks, disorganization in rear eloaents,
fatigue of troops, and the like, slnoe the conditions of the pursued
are equal to or probably worse than those of the pursuer.
d. One formation that nay be used for night pursuit by direct
pressure is as shown in Plate V*
IV. COMPARISON OF OUTSTANDING LESSONS FROM HISTORICAL FACTS WITH
FIELD SERVICE REGULATIONS AND TEXTS OF THE COUMAND AND GENERAL STAFF
SCHOOL RELATING TO THE SUBJECT.
* Notei For convenience of reference an extra copy of tho outstanding
lessons that can be unfolded alongside this comparison is
found on page 31
This comparison is arranged in tho order tho author investi gated the subject, first, with tho viewpoint of a student
having just completed tho First Year Courao, and lator,
as a student having oorapleted the subjeot natter in tho
Second Yoar Course of the Cormand and General Staff Sohool,
in ordor to show how oortaln oonolusions wore roached after
completing notes for the historical resoaroh.

1J. FIELD SHiVICE REGULATIONS. -- . Soao of the outstanding lessons learned from the historical facts relating to the subject are found In Field Service Regulations United States Amy, 1923. They

aret (1) "Only by moans of a relentless pursuit of the beaten enewy can the full fruits of victory be obtained* Pursuit of a decisively defeated enemy oust be pushed to the utaost U n i t of the physical en durance of the troops and no opportunity giren him to reorganize his (107) 10-FSR, par forces and reconstitute his defense." (107) (2) "Bffeotive pursuit requires the impulsion of leadership and the exorcise of initiative in all echelons of ooanand to the highest (106) 10-FSR, par 1(91 degree." (106) (3) "Troops before whon the eneay is giving way attack him on the front and send in their reserves to gain his flank and rear or (109) 10-FSR, par
Ii92 (I4) "The eneny's attempts to organize his rotreat under the cover of darkness must be frustrated. Units whioh have advanced without

break through his covering troops." (109)

serious opposition during the day continue their march during the night. (110) 10-FSR, par Other units organise successive Halted attacks against the (110)

enemy in their front."

1*92 b. It is realised that Field 8ervlee Regulations necessarily are brief and do not oorer every problem found in battle. But, the (111) 10-FSR, pars subject of "Pursuit" (111) whioh lnoludes the quotations just

U9O-I+9?
given, does not forolbly convey the spirit of that aggressiveness, boldness, even daring found successful in the pursuit operations of the 2d Division. o Extraote of foreign Field Service Regulations are quoted for eonparisom (1) In Geraan regulations are found, "The impulsion of leador -25

hip and the exercise of the Initiative are required to the highest degre** Boldness of action it e l l the more justified, since the enercy has only om intention, the*, i s , to ev*de th* action of the
(112) 1C-O*>K, 96

rietor."

(112)

"Pursuit is checked only on orders from high con (113)

(113) 1C-CFSK, 99

i t mrver stop* in front of an obstacle in the terrain**

(?) Fr'*> Prenoh reeM^^^^^e, "If the beaten eneny abaridons th* and withdraws In disorder, the purcuit coBcaenoee*
(112/) 10-TFL'J, 95

Zt should be

continuous, audacious, and relentless*"

(Hh)

(3) British reculatlons contain, 'All pursuing troops should act with the greatest boldness, and be prepared to accept risks whioh
(115) 1O-B?*R, 152

would not be Justifiable *t other tine*.'

(1)5)

(U) A search of Japanese regulation* reveals, "As it is usual for the enoity intending to retreat to sake us* of nirJbt tine, the troops oust daringly ctrry out pursuit to the utnoet even at ni^ht,"
(116) 10-JFSR, 51

(116)

"Upon dltoorerlnt the retreat of the enemy, erery coprattder "At tHs U M If eyen a sajl body can

will erry out the pursuit*"

penetrate the eney' D M deep ry bol norer*nt, i t will be possible

(117) 10-JPSK, 52

to throw hit into confusion and achiere a great success**

(11?)

d# A sumaation of foreign Field Service Rofulatlons shows that they do brlft out the spirit of aggressIreness, boldness, eren daring. In tho pursuit, e Our Field Service HeguLatlons Mention ni&ht attacks but do not cover the conduct of night attacks in the discussion on "Pursuit"*
( U 8 ) 1C-FS*, par

(116)

Zt is necessary, therefore, for the First Yesr student to turn

to, "Night Operatlcns" and the following quotations are found* (1) "Might operations i&ay be resorted to for pressing a
(119) 10-PSK, pr

pursuit . . .

(119)

559

(2) "The Rortl value c" f-ho troops and the quality of tho leader ship, especially in the subordinate grades, rfather thnn nunhers, are likely to < sure the success attained* ranlfestntton o* an a<;.jre6R'vc \tKterthlj!, -26 lii^ht attacks are often tho V-.ich, nndlsnayed by fore

*er difficulties, is determined to brine about conclusions without (VcO) 10-fSfc, par delay." (120)

O ) "After victorious conbat, it in of especial lrfortance to

frustrate by an early attack the attempts of the defeated force to
ilci) 10-F6*, par
organise its withdrawal at nightfall." (121)
(U) Other paragraphs on "Hlght Oport-tions" discuss suoh elenente
as surprise, effectiveness of fire, and the like comon to all night
attacks. It nay be said, in general, the paragraphs exclusive of
those just quoted, do not give nuoh light on formations for night at tacks in pursuit. The spirit of aggressiveness however, is nore
(122) 1C-FSK, par
forcibly brou&tt out under thw heading of "Night Operations" (1*2)

than finder the t i t l e of "Pursuit", ll*. TACTICAL PHXXCIPLES A!.'D DECISIONS, TKE COMWtV AlfD OEJEKAL

557-^*5

STAi-F SCliCOL, a_, (12J) 10-TFD, ZYI, (1) In Chapter XVI, 1930, of Tactical Principles and Decisions,

The Co-rand and Genere.1 Staff School, on pursuit, i s found the anpli fixation of ttie e x t r a c t s quoted fron Field Service Regulations. (123)

1,2,3,6,7,6 In addition, there is found, "The successful loader in battle is one (1J;) 1C-TFD, XVI, 2 who combines boldnoss with aggressiveness." (l^M "Troops pressing

the *r*ny directly oust take steps of tholr own, such as bold at (125) 10-TPD, r/I, 6 tacka . . . " (125)

(2) This chapter does not brine out fully the outstanding lessons learned in the operations of the 2d Division. Nothing is rventiored

of pushing units forward dospite the rJsV. of b5r^ out off for a time, despite cnecy resistance during the day, and, except for fatigue, despite ether adverse conditions. b. The First Your student must turn to Chapter XXI for a din

eussion of night attacks, as l i t t l e is said on this subject in Chap ter XVI, ) 1C-TIL, /JJ, 2 (1) "Yith referor.ee to roeoniai*tince, "Thorough reoorraisennce
vrA prfpurtt?.on nri i;ecoss&ry"i (126} "It, (the objective) and the

approaches thereto, should be such as to permit of thorough reoon ^7) 1O-TF-D, XXI,

naissance prior to the attack";

(127) and other discussions are

found, A thorough reconnaissance is highly desirable but is not so

important in tho purcuit,
(2) Paragraph 8 of this Chapter on "Irifluonco of Terrain" in ono
respeot, apparently does not apply to pursuit. (120.) 1O-TPD, XXI, "History shows that

night atbaoks by largo bodies of troops ovor heavily wooded", or

and mountainous country almost invariably have failed." (128) What
is meant by "large bodies of troops" is not knowijUut since this toxt
is used in the study of the division by the Fi.st Year Class, it night
be inferred that a division is meant. The 2d Division tvua succoecfijl
in attacking through heavily wooded, hilly, and marshy terrain, al though only one brigado actually taade the advanoo. It is believed an
attaok by brigades abreast on a broader front would have been suoooss ful in the particular situation of the night j5-lj November,
(3) "Vi'ch reference to weather ib is noted, "Dark and rainy nights
raako movements and coordination most difficult but are most favorable
for surprise attacks, especially by small commands over terrain that
is thoroughly known"j and again, "A bright night with ground hard and
covered with a light snow, and wiHi the wind coming fron the direction
of tho enemy, offers most favorable oondibions for rapidity of advance

(129) 10-TPD, XXI,

and maintenance of oonnootlon."

(129)

No objeotion is found to

these quotations for night att&oks against an organised position but

little consideration of weather should be made in pursuit.
(U) The formations for night attaoks discusood in this chapter
do not inolude tho formation found suooesaful in tho night advances
of the 2d Division,
(5) By referring to a few of the points oontalned in Chapter XXI
it i3 apparent that this text is of little nssistanoo in planning a
night ittaok in tho pursuit in situations such nc were found by the
2d Division*
-20

c. (1) In Goarohing for information as to how to conduct tho

pursuit by dlroot prossure, tho First Yo&r student may turn to tho
problems givon in tho Sohool during tho First Year Course to illuo trate the text on "Tactical Prinoiplos and Deoisions". In reviewing
problems written in a period of several years, it was found that tho
pursuit by enoircling forooa was stressed and little attention was
paid to pursuit by direot prosoure. No speoifio missions for night

pursuit by direct preosure were found except in one problom that in 11-a, Prob
volved a very limited objootive on a moonlight night, (130)

(2) In reviewing problems on night attack, it was found that ob jeotives were very limited. With regard to weather, with ono oxoep tion, and then the night vas d e a r , the moon oame up and the wind was
(131) 11-b, Prob
in the proper direotion. 0-31) Those problems were not designed

for night pursuit, and would have to be disoarded by the First Year
student in his searoh for information on night attacks in pursuit*
(5) No attempt was made to review the problems to question their
soundness or go into minutae of detail. It was found, however, that
the problems reviewed did not illustrate the outstanding lessons of
the pursuit phase of the operations of the 2d Division.
15. TACTICAL AND STRATEGICAL STUDIES, THE COMMAND AND GENERAL
STAFF SCHOOL.
a. Constantly bearing in mind the outstanding lessons of tho
2d Divieion pursuit operations, the Seoond Year student turns to his
text on pursuit. In oasually rouding Choptor XXIII, 1927* "The Army

Pursues", a change in the spirit of the discussion of pursuit is noted.

It conveys an inprossion of aggressivenoss, boldness and daring not
found in the toxts heretofore disousood. A study of this chapter
revealai
(1) "Each (unit) pushes forward night and day without regard to
the progress of adjaoont units. Only when a unit is definitely stopped
does coordination of effort again begin. These tactios, though dis

-29

organliing to the pursuit, are still more ao to the pursued. A single

battnlion, or oven a oompany, whioh ponetrates thn eneny's organiza tion and seises ground essential to him, evon if it is itsolf out off
for a time, may render more offeotive service than the coordinated
(1J2) 1O-TS, XXIII,
but delayed action of a muoh larger unit." (1J2)

(2) "/Thatevor tho condition of the pursuing units, that of the

defeated troops is worse* Tho attaoklng and pursuing troops probably
are unfit to overcome organised reslstanoe, but are still adequate
(133) 1O-TS, XXIII,
against defeated troops, provided tho latter are kept on the movo."(l33)

(3) A distinct paragraph on "Hight Pursuit" is oontained in this

ohapter* "At night the vtvrious units whioh have been pushing forward

during the day continue to push forward under cover of darkness* The
advance is in columns rather than in lines, and generally is limited
to road8 or their vicinity* When resisV.anoo is enoountered, it is

overoome as quiokly as possible. The advance of the columns is aided

by artillery fire on the roads ahead of the pursuit* The progress of
eaoh road oolunm is independent of other columns and connootlon is
maintained during tho night only rrhen it is convenient to do so* With
the ooraing of daylight, oonnootion is again sought* In this way, some

deep penetrations may be secured during the night whioh will brook up
(I3I4) 1O-TS, XXIII,
hostile plans for resistance the next day . . . " (13U)

b. The outstanding lessons fron the pursuit by direot pressure

phase of the 2d Division are, in genoral, brought out by this text*
The spirit of aggressiveness, boldness, even daring is implied* It

is the only text investigated that generally desoribes tho formation

f .
used by the 2d Division* A minor point of differenoo is that it is
believed the language of the text doos not dearly convey the lesson
that enemy resistanoo during the day should not prevent an attaok
(135) ll-o, Prob
that night. cu $ #

It was noted that tho illustrative problem in tho text starts

with a continuation of the attaok at night. Problems in tho Sooond Yoar

Course properly stressed pursuit with onolrollng foroos as all of them
involved either the independent oorps or army*

OUTSTANDING LESSONS IN PURSUIT PHASE OF

OPERATIONS.

, Plans for the pursuit by direot pressure should be daringly

conoeived and boldly exeouted to penetrate the enemy's oovering forces,
seise terrain essential to him and frustrate his attempts to organise
his retreat or reconstitute his defense. This should be attemptod
despite the risk of the smaller unit being out off for a time because
it will be more effeotive than the coordinated attaok of a much larger
unit delivered at a later date*
b_. Since the enemy will probably continue to retreat or reor ganize under cover of darkness, pursuit by direot pressure should be
oontinuod at night despite enemy resistance during the day,
o. Pursuit by direct pressure should bo relentlessly pushed by
night as well as by day, without regard to suoh adverse conditions as
laok of a oaroful reoonnaissanoo of ground, terrain obstaolos, poor
weather, exposure of flanks, disorganization in rear elements, fatigue
of troops, and the like, sinoe the conditions of the pursued are equal
to or,probably worse than those of the pursuer,
d* Ono formation that may be used for night pursuit by direot

pressure is as shown in Plate V,

V. CONCLUSIONS 0? THE AUTHOR*

a* The operations of the 2d Division (U.S.) in the third phase
of the Meuse-Argonne Offensive illustrate certain prinoiplos and
methods of pursuit by direot presoure. The outstanding lessons aret

( 1 ) PLANS FOR THE PURSUIT BY DIRECT PRESSURE SHOULD BE DAR INGLY CONCEIVED AND BOLDLY EXECUTED TO PENETRATE THE ENEMY*S COVERING FORCES/ SEIZE TERRAIN ESSENTIAL TO HIM AND FRUSTRATE HIS ATTEMPTS TO ORGANIZE HIS RETREAT OR RECONSTITUTE HIS DEFENSE. THIS SHOULD BE ATTEMPTED

DESPITE THE RISK OF THE SMALLER UNIT BEING CUT OFF FOR A TIME BECAUSE IT WILL BE MORE EFFECTIVE THAN THE CO ORDINATED ATTACK OF A MUCH LARGER UNIT DELIVERED AT A LATER DATE, ( 2 ) SINCE TIE ENEMY VTILL PROBABLY CONTINUE TO RETREAT OR RE ORGANIZE UNDER COVER OF DARKNESS, PURSUIT BY DIRECT PRESSURE SHOULD BE CONTINUED AT NIGHT DESPITE ENEMY RESISTANCE DURING THE DAY, ( 3 ) PURSUIT BY DIRECT PRESSURE SHOULD BE RELSKfLESSLY PUSHED BY NIGHT AS VfELL AS BY DAY; WITHOUT REGARD TO SUCH AD VERSE CONDITIONS AS LACK OF A CAREFUL RECONNAISSANCE OF GROUND, TERRAIN OBSTACLES, POOR WKATHER, EXFOSURE OF FLANKS, DISORGANIZATION IN RE\R ELEMENTS, FATIGUE OF TROOPS, AND THE LIKE, SINCE THE CONDITIONS OF THE PUR SUED ARE EQUAL TO OR PROBABLY V/ORSE THAN THOSE OF THE PURSUKR. (k) ONE FORMATION THAT MAY BE USED FOR NIGHT PURSUIT BY DIRECT PRESSURE IS AS SH01N IN PLATE V, b_ dosoribod The o u t s t a n d i n g l e s s o n s o o n f i r n s o n e of t h e i n :
p r i n c i p l e s

( 1 ) F i e l d S e r v i c e R e g u l a t i o n s , U n i t e d S t a t e s Ar.riy, 1 9 2 3 , p a r a g r a p h s k9Ot 1*91 I J 9 2 , and i95 on " P u r s u i t " and p a r a g r a p h s

?59# 56l and 562 on " N i g h t O p e r a t i o n s " ,

-32

(2) Taotioal Principles and Decisions, The Conmand and General

Staff Sohool, Chapter XVI, 1930 on "Pursuit", and Chapter
XXI, 1930 on'ttight Operations",
(3) Taotioal and Strategical Studies, The Ccmand and General
Staff Sohool, Chapter XXIII, 1927, "The Ar.uy Pursues",
only when theje references are oonsidered together*
No one text fully sets forth the prinoiples illustrated by the
outstanding lessons of the operations of the 2d Division* The para graphs of the Field Service Regulations Just referred to do not con veniently and olearly bring out the spirit of aggressiveness bold

ness, even daring that is justified in the pursuit, nor do they fully
cover lessons 2 and 3 supra* The formation for night pursuit as

shown in Plate V that was i-epeatedly suooesuful is not even briefly

mentioned in "Pursuit" or "Night Operations" in the Field Sorvioe
Regulations. The Chapters on "Pursuit" and "Kight Operations" in
Taotioal Prinoiplos and Decisions are simply an amplification of the
Field Service Regulations and are subjeot to the sane oritioism though
not to so great a degree* The Chaptor on "The Army Pursues" in Tao tioal and Strategioal Studies implies the spirit of aggressiveness,
boldness, and even daring justified in the pursuits generally oovers
lessons 1 and 3 supra) and treats of the formation under lesson U in
a discussion of "Night Pursuit"* This discussion is conveniently
plaoed in the samft chapter* to bring out lesson 2 . The language of the text can bo improved

Since this text is a brief disouasion on

pursuit by the army, reference to Field Service Regulations is neo essary to obtain the full tenor of the outstanding lessons*
ja To consider the revision of Field Servioe Regulations and
sohool texts, and to examino the subjeot of instruction in tho Command
and General Staff Sohool wore not original objeots of this paper* In

the searoh for informtion on "Pursuit", hovrever, certain conclusions

were reached by the author that may be of value and are submitted*

-33

(1) The Field Service Regulations do not contain important sub joot matter found in Tactical and Strategical Studies on "Pursuit",
and in this paper. "Night Pursuit" in yield Servioe Regulations i3
What littloAmattor that does apply is

not sufficiently disouusod*

nob conveniently arranged and is under the soparate heading of "Night

Operations"* Field Servioe Regulations should, therefore, be revised*
(2) In making such a revision, it is not sufficient to oonfino
souroe material for further study to United States publications* For eign Field Service Regulations and texts *jid historical examples
should be investigated*
(3) The First Year student using Field Servioe Regulations and
the text, Taotical Principles and Decisions, as references may obtain
erroneous impressions as to the conduot of the pursuit by direot pres sure, particularly at night* If Field Service Regulations were pro

porly revisod, an amplification of these regulations should not be

nooossary in Tactioal Principles and Decisions. If Field Servlco Regu lations oan not be revised at the present time, the text for the First
Year student should bo revised so as to correct the faults pointed out
in Field Servioe Regulations* The First Year student should not have

to wait until the Seoond Year for learning important basio principles*
(I4) In First Year problems, emphasis appears to be plaoed on the
pursuit by enolroling forces* Bearing in mind the rosults of the
operations of the 2d Division and the outstanding lessons derived
therefrom, it is evident that pursuit by direot pressure should nob
be neglected* Sinoe the principles and methods for the use of enolr

oling foroes may be brought out in problems involving the Independent

oorps and army in the Seoond Year course, the prinoiplos and methods
of pursuit by direot pressure of an interior division may well be
illustrated in the First Year Course*

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS. Aa pointed out before, while not a

part of the original purpose of this paper, these recommendations
are bolieved to be of sufficient importance to be addedt
a. That a revision be made of paragraphs l*90 1*91, k9& and
on "Pursuit", and paragraphs 558, 56lt and 562, on "Night Operations"
in Field Service Regulations, United Statos Army, 19^3*
b_. That a disoussion of "Night Pursuit* be inoluded in the
discussion of "Pursuit" in Field Service Regulations.
e. That Chapter XXIII, 1927 "The Army Pursues" in Taotical
and Strategical Studies, The Coinmand and Ceneral Staff Sohool, for eign Field Service Regulations and texts, this paper on the opera tions of the 2d Division in the third phase of the Ueuse-Argoraie,
and other historical examples be inoluded in the preliminary study
prior to the revision*
d. That, if Field Service Regulations can not be revisod at the
present time. Chapter XVI, 1930 on "Pursuit" in Taotioal Pr.lnoiples
and Decisions, The Conmand and General Staff Sohool be revised along
the lines reoomnended for Field Servioe Regulations,
e* That the prinoiples and methods of pursuit by direot pres sure, inoluding night pursuit, be emphasised in the First Year Course.

-35

IIL .kIP.il ILLLHI

with REFERENCE (KEYi APBREVIAVIONS On l e f t margin)

1. 1-FO 1JU, 2 Div 1-FO 1x5, 2 Div 1-FO I46, 2 Div 1-Tent. Plan, 2 Div 1-Uemo 1, Tent. Plan, 2 Div

RECORDS OF THE SECOND DIVISION'Field Orders, 1918-1919, Volune 1 . Field Ordors No. U4, 2d Division, 22 October,191&, HiOO AM. Field Orders No. 1x5, 2d Division, 22 October,1918, H i 5 5 P1J. Field Orders Ho, I46, 2d Division, 2b October,1918. Fiold Orders
p

Tentative Plan for 2d D i v i s i o n , 25 0otober,1918.

Memo No 1 (To accompany Tentative Plan for 2d Division, 25 Ootobor, 1918) 26 October, 1918, 20 hours,

1-FO kl,

2 Div

Fiold Ordors No. ltf,2d D i v i s i o n , 26 October,1918, 10:30 hours. Field Orders No. 1|8, 2d Division, 30 October, 1918, l 6 t 0 0 hours. Field Orders No. 1*9, 2d D i v i s i o n , 31 October, 1918, 7iOO hours. Field Orders No. 50, 2d Division, 31 October, 1918, 16JOO hours. Field Orders No. 5 1 , 2d Division, 2 Noveribor, 1918, I31OO hours. F i e l d Orders Mo. $.\t 2d Division, 3 November, 1918, lljtOO hours. A.C.of S , , 0-3 Memorandum No.9, 2d D i v i s i o n , 31 Ootobor, 1918. 2. RECORDS OF THE SECOND DIVISIONField Orders Third and Fourth

1-FO ijB, 2 Div 1-FO 1*9, 2 Div 1-?O 50, 2 Div 1-FO 5 1 , 2 Div l - ? 0 5I4, 2 Div 1-0-3 Wemo, 2 Div

Brigades, I 9 I 8 - I 9 I 9 , Volune 2 . 2-FO I45, 3 Brig 2-FO 36, U Eris Fiold Orders No. 1+5, 3d Brigado, November 2d, 1918, 6i27 PM. Fiold Orders No, 36, bth Brigade, Novoaber 2d, 1918, 70O PM.

3. RECORDS OF THE SECOND DIVISION(Regular)Operations Reports, War

Diaries, Journal of 0perationa--2d Division, 2d Field Artillory Erigado, 2d

- 1-FO hh$ 2 Divt Since tho pages of a l l of the souroes aro not numbered tho sy8tm for referonce used i s as follows1 "1" r e f e r s to para graph 1 of Bibliography. MF0 ^4. 2 Div" rofors to Fiold Ordora No. lVi, 2d Division as l i s t e d in paragraph 1 of Eibllonruphy, Another oxariple 1st fl-Por, Uh* "0" rofero to paro^rnph 8 of Bibliography. "Per, h}\" rofere to "Final iioj-ort of Gen. John J. Porshing, Cor-rumdor in-Chief, /jiorioan Expoditionarj" Forces, pftfij l\li

-36

Trench llortar Battery, It Bri^ado, ljth Brigade, 1916, Volume 6. l-Qp Ept, 2 Div Special Oporations Report of tho 2d Division, 7,post of t'to Kon.io, November 1-Noverier 11, 1916, i n c l u s i v e , 3-Letter CG V Corps LetterCommanding Cenoral FIFTH A K CORPS to Commanding Oonoral RY 2d Division, November 2 , 1918 (Ebctraot found i n Op Rpt, 2 Div) 3-0p Rpt, 3 Brig Report of Operations, 3<* Brigade from Octobor 17, 1918 to November 2d # 1918 # 3-0p Kpt, U Brie Oporationo P.epori;, l{th Ericado, Marine*--Covering poriod 2h Ootobor-11 Uovojiibcr 1918. U PECORDS OF TK3 SEC01H DIVISIOirCRegular)Operations Reports, War Diaries, Patrol Reports, 9th-23d Infantry, Jjfth-^tn Marines, 2d Enti r i o e r c 1018, Volunie 7 . li-Op Ppt, 9 Inf Report of Operations of the $bh Infantry, U.S.A., from Koveuber 1st to 11th, 1918, Li-Op Rpt> 23 Inf 1;-Op Rpt, 5 Mar Report of Operations Novetaber l s t - 7 t h , 1918--23d Infantry, Report of Operations Ootobor 17-Noverabor 16, 1918 (inclusive) United Statos liarinet, 5th Regiment. /4-Op Rpt, 6 Mar Report of Operations from 2ljth Ootobor t o 13th Kovember, 1916- Sixth Rosiment, Marine Corps, li-Kesc 9 ^nf Inoludod in Operations Report of the $th Infantry, in Records of 2d D i v i s i o n , Volume 5. Also found

"From CO, 9th Inf,

At La Fontaine Au Crontq Feme, 3 Hovoraber, 1918, Ko. 9, To CO, 3rd Brigade," 5. R^COPDS OF THE SECOND DIVISIOlI--(RegulBT)Oporationc Reports, Vrar

D i a r i e s , 12th-15th-17th Field A r t i l l e r y , I4th-5th-6th l^ohine Gun Battalions, 1st Field Signal Battalion, Second Trains, 1918. 5-Op Rpt, k 0 Bn Volume 8 .

Oporations Report, FOURTH U/.CHIKE G N BATTALION, Ootobor 3 U t , U 1918-KovwAor 11th, 1918.

-37

6.

RECORDS OF THE SECOKD PIVISIOK--(RQul6r>--Genoral Orders, I n t e l yolyxrp. ft.

ligence Reports, Field A r t i l l e r y Date, 191$ 6-00, 2 Div 6-S of I, Ho , 2 t'iv

Genoral Orders No. 66, 2d D i v i s i o n , No (as noted in narrative). Sundry of I n t e l l i g e n c e , 2d Division LotterCor,iaanding Cenoral F i r s t Army t o Comander-in-Chief, G.K.Q., A.E.F., January 16, 1919. 7. Narrative of the V Corps from llovonber l 6 t , 1918. The Comand

6-Letter C F i r s t Amy C

and Goneral Service Schools, Ft, Leavenworth, Xansas. 7-FO 88, First Army Field Orders i b . 88, 1st Army, 27th October 1918, 15x30 (hours). Field Orders Ko, 99, 1st Amy, 3 Novenbor 1918, 12:50 (hours). Field Orders Ko, 90, Fifth Arny Corps, 2J; Ootobor 191881OO o'clock.

7-FO 99, First Army 7-FO 90, V Corps

7-FO 108, V Corps

Field Ordors Ko, 108, Fifth Arny Corps, 1st November, 1916 I61OO o'olock.

7-FO 109, V Corps

Field Orders Ko, 109, Fifth Armc-* Corps, 1st Kovenber, 1918- 22*1:5 o'olock.

7-FO 110, V Corps

Field Orders Ho, 110, Fifth / n y Corps, 2nd Kovembor, 1918 C.30 oolock.

7-FO 111, V Corps

Field Orders Ko, 111, Fifth Array Corps, 2nd tfovembor, 1918 lOtCO o'elcck.

7-FO 112, V Corps

Field Orders To, 112, Fifth Amy Corps, 2nd Kovecbcr, 1918- 17i3O o'elock.

7-KO 115, V Corps

Field Ordors Ko, 115, Fifth Arry Corps, 3rd Koveriber, ^ I S IS 115 o'clock.

7-FO 110, V Corps

Field Orders Ko. 118, Fifth Amy Corps, 5th Xovcniber, 1916 12tlO oolock.

7-FO 120, V Corps

Field Orders Ko. 120, Fifth Amy Corps, 5th Kovenber, 1918 161i40 o'olock,

7-FO 121, V Corps

Fiol(" Orders Ko, 121, Fifth Arn^ Corps, 5th Ifaverafonr, I9I6 l6iitO o'olock.

7-FO 122, V Corps

Field Orders Ko, 122, Fifth Arrr/ Corps* 7th Kovcnbor, 1916

18t00 o'clock,
-36

7-FO 123, V Corps

Field Orders Ko. 123, Fifth Arny Corps, 10th Koveidor, 7tOO o'cloofc,

7-FO 12J, V Corps

Field Orders Ifo. 12I4, Fifth Ar^y Corps, 10th liovwiber, 1?1C 9*00 o'clock.

7-CS

Chronological State&ent of Events by Hours and Days with Rcfer enco to Field Orders upon which aoticns vsere based for the V Corps--From October 16th to Hovenbor 11th, 1918.

7-0p Rpfc, V Corps 7-S of I , No___,Y Corps 8, 8-Bn___

Operation* of the V Corps, Hoveicber 1 - ) 1 , 191& Ko (as noted in narrative) Sunannry of I n t e l l i g e n c e , V Corp*. Historical Books and A r t i e l 6 8 . * Buchan, John: "A History of the Great tfar" - Volume I], Houghtcn

U i f f l i n Co,, Boston, & s s . , 1922* e-Fro^_ Frothingham, Janes G,j "A Guide t o the U i l i t a r y History of the taac, 198

florid .far, 19li4-1918", L i t t l e , Brown k Co., Boston, 6-Har

Harper's - "Pictorial Library of the World .Tar", Voluae V, Harper & Bros., Hew York, N.Y., 1920.

6-How__

Howland, C.R.i

"A U l l i t a r j ' History of the World A r " , General

Service Schools Pres6, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1923* 8-Hls, 1 Div "History of the F i r s t Division" - The John C. Tfinston Conpany, Philadelphia, Pa. (The Society of tho F i r s t Division), 1922, 6-Hic, 89 t i v ^ "Hintory of the 69th Division" - Saith, Brooks Co., Denver, Colorado (English, George H,,Jr.) oJno^ Johnson, Tho&as U.s "iiithout Censor", Tho Eobbs-l>rrlll Coapany,

Indianapolis, Ind., 1926*

3

" *L_

Lo

Lejeune, John A., liajor Generali

"The Rocdnlsoanoes of a Kftrltvo"

Dorranoo and Conpany, Philadelphia, Pa., l?30, 'i"lj^_mm Maurice, Sir F , , General 1 "The Last Four Uonths-Tho End of tho

Vtar i n the >Tect", Cassell 4 Conpany, Ltd*, London, 1919*

- These references rore used for cenernl t t u t e n c n t t . -39

8-Per

"Final Report of Cen. John J . Pershinc, ComaTidor-ln-Chief, Anericon Expeditionary Porces", Government Printing; Office, Washing tern, D , C , 1920.

8-Per lap

Plate 1;"tap of Ueuse Argonno Offensive. Dully Front Linos" found in Final Peporfc of Cen. John J . Perching.

8-F.pt, First Anay

"Report of the First Anay, Aoerican Lxpoditiomry Forces", General John J* Pershit:^ and Lieutenant General Hunter LiggettThe General Service Schools Press, Ft. Loavenworth, Kansas.

6-She___

Shepherd, Lt.Col.:

"The Employment of the A r t i l l e r y V Amy Corps,

Argorjie-laeuse Operations", The Field / r t i l l e r y Journal (1919) The United States Field A r t i l l e r y Association, Ttashington,D.C., 1919.
e T1 :0

- "

Thomas, Shipleyi

"The History of the A.E.F, George H. Doran

Coapany, Hew York, H.Y.,

9.

The following o f f i c e r s , a t different times, have been interviewed

either by l e t t e r or personal conversation. 9-Cc.pl Solan V-Haj Brott >::^j Bruce 9-Cen turt >Lt Col. Corey V-Lt-j liall 9-Ccrt Hyde ?-!^.j Janda ?-"-.ij Ranson CaptaiXt K.Tf. Bolan, Tank Corps. Kajor Serano B. Brett, Tank Corpe. Uajor A.D. Bruce, Uth Machine Gun Eattallon, 2d Division, * Brigadier General W.P. Burt, GS, Chiof of Staff, V Arny Corps. Limitenont Colonel Uilo C. Corey, 9th Infantry, 2d D i v i s i o n . Uajor C.?. Hall, Brigade Adjutant, Jd Brigade, 2d Divicion. Captain F.)f. Kydo, Headquarters, 2d D i v i s i o n . Major L.T. Jandft, 9th Infaritr^', 2i D i v i s i o n . Uajor Paul L. Hanson, 2d Uachlne Gun Eattalion, 1 s t Division.

- TT.c author, rcftlitin^ that errors w i l ) creep in rfion reviewing past actions of over \h ycarc ago, has carefully oonsulted maps and personal data before usinf hirxolf to verify other sources or be fore raikinr any perttr.al s t a i e a e n t s .

10,

F i e l d S e r r i c o Regulations and t h e Connand and General S t a f f

School t e x t s i 10-FSR F i e l d Service R e g u l a t i o n s , United S t a t e s Arny, 1523. Printing O f f i c e , Washington, D,C, 10-CFSR German F i e l d S e r v i c e Regulations, l>*snand and Conbat of the Combined Army. 1C-TELU The General Service School P r e s s , Ft.Leavenworth, Kansas, 1925* Govornment

Provisional I n s t r u c t i o n s for the T a c t i c a l Bnployment of Large U n i t s , (Translated fron t h e French) The General Service School P r e s s , Ft* Leavenvorth, Kansas, 19^1*.

1C-BFSR

F i e l d Service R e g u l a t i o n s , Volume II ( B r i t i s h ) . O f f i c e , 1929.

Great B r i t a i n War

10-JFSR

Japanese Field S e r v i c e Regulations* (Translation i n 1931)

Japan Ministry of flar

10-TPD

T a c t i c a l P r i n c i p l e s and D e c i s i o n s , The Cosnand and General S t a f f School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas The Connand and General S t a f f Sohool P r e s s , Fort Leavemrorth, Kansau*

1C-TS

T a c t i c a l and S t r a t e g i c a l S t u d i e s , Corps and Army, The Connand and Genoral S t a f f S c h o o l , Fort.Leavemrorth, Kansas The Connand and General S t a f f Sohool P r e s s , Fort Leavenworth, Kansas*

11*

The f o l l o w i n g problems of t h e Connand and General S t a f f School,

Fort Leavontrorth, Kansas were reviewed! l l a , Prob IIP 1 5 - H I , 1919^-1920 ( D i r e c t P r e s s u r e ) ; M 6-IV, 1022-1923 ( D i r e c t P Pressure)1 GTE 18-V, 1922-19231 UP 1 2 - 1 1 , 192l*-1925i MP 7-IV, lofijj 19251 MP 1 7 - n , i925-i$e6> & 9 - n , 1926-19271 UP 1 2 - 1 1 , 1927-19281 HP ji-Y, 1927-1928J OTE li-YI, 1S27-19281 VP 9 - H , 1926-1929; MP 3-V t 19*a-l929i UP 1 2 - 1 1 . 1929-1930! MP 1 3 - 1 1 , 1930-1931 ( I n c l u d e s l i m i t e d night a t t a o k - - f u l l moon)i YP 1 2 - 1 1 , 1931-1932. l i b , Prob IT lJU-II, 1925-l26i UP 12-11, 1926-1927 MP 9-11 # I929-I93O1 MP 7 - H 1930-193I; GTE 15-VI, 1930-1931. U c , Prob GTE 18-VI, I925-I9261 GTE 18-VI, 1^26-19271 UP 2 0 - 1 1 , 1927-1">28| MP

1 9 - n , 1928-19291 GTE le-vi, 1923-1^91 ia> 3 - v i n , 1929-19301 iff 6 - v n i , 1930-1931,

NOTES*

1. All written sources are to be found in th* Conrand

and General Staff Sohool Library*
2, The primary sources used were tho oopies of original

ordors, messages, reports, maps, and tho like of the 2d Division.

V Corps and First Army.
3* Due to site of this bibliography, all documents and

books 'ixanined and discarded are not recorded.

U Sources for Plates are shown on the page opposite
the plate.

P 1 A I K S,

Par convenience to the reader and for the preservation

of old original copies of naps, the plates are bound in
the reverse order* Cor instance, the roader nay unfold
Plate II,spread it out,and refer fcaok to it after Plate
III is unfolded and spread out* with the least inconven ience to the reader and damage to the nape.

PLATE V.
DIAGRAM 0 ?
FORMATION EMPLOYED BY THE ZD DIVISIOK
III HICHT PURSUIT BY DIRECT PRESSURE,

SOUROESi 5-Cp Rpt t 2 Div & 3 Brigj 4*0p Kpt,9 & 23 Infj 9-Lt Ool Corey(See B i b l i ography ) HOTEt Qie diagram aa devolope*'. by the author from a study o f the sources

PLATE V. DIAGRAM OP PORHATIOH EMPLOYED BY THE 2D DIVISION IK NIGHT PURSUIT BY DIRECT PRESSURE.

MACHINE GUN

SELECTED POINT WITH MEN ABLS TO ANSWER ENEMY'S CHALLENGE III ENEMY'S LANGUAGE REDUCED DISTAKOES

PO'INT QUICKLY 'RUSHES

BAYONET

ADVANCE PARTY SO ORGANIZED TO SEED PATROLS OR HOVE PROMPTLY TO JUDU02 ENiXT REiJlSTAKOS

RESISTANCE TOO QREAT K)R POINT * t PLANKINO PATROLS ARE SENT PROU ADVANCE PARTY

REMAINDER OP COMPANY IN COLUMN O TVflS.ONE PILE ON EACH SIDE OP THE * >

W A i ' l JrvXJjwIfJClU i/X t\iir*J\ f " " T * M V4r

BATTALION OR RE5I1IKJIT

NOT DRAWN TO SCALE,

PLATK I . GENERAL SITUATION,AMiSRICAH FIRS? ARMY, 1 N0YilIBER,1918, SOURCES;"General Offensive From September 26 to October 13,1918-Map No140"| "Relation be two on Anarloan Amy and ftrenoh J?burth ArTiy-Map No 138 "j "Gener a l PershingB Plan For November 1st Attaok-llap N 146" from "HILITAItt HISTORY OF THB W)RU> WAB, O 'Plate 4-VAp of Ileuse-Argonne Offonslve-Daily ftront Lines" from "FINAL RRPORT OP (S2I.J0HH J, PKRaiINO,OOM:.'AlIDHR-IK-CHIBF#AiKR10;JI EXPKDITIO NARY FORCE" N0T2t Colors added by "the author*

i .